Thread: Anti-Duhring

Results 121 to 140 of 475

  1. #121
    Join Date Nov 2005
    Location UK
    Posts 16,778
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    Trivas:

    I see that you don't know what your talking re. This is an evasion, not even a stupid response.
    Ask a stupid question, you get a stupid answer.

    And you are a fine one to talk; you have been evading at least three challenges of mine for days. Here is an earleir comment of mine:

    You demand answers of me, but you refuse to respond to any of mine -- for example, we still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.
    http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...5&postcount=67

    It explains it to my satisfaction, too bad you just don't like the explanation.
    This reminds me of the Scopes trial in 1925 when William Jennings Bryan was put on the stand by Clarence Darrow, and was masked a series of unanswerable questions about the Bible.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scopes_Trial

    Bryan simply refused to reply, and told Darrow that the Bible was good enough for him, and he was quite happy with its explanation of creation.

    But there is also an embarrassing side to Bryan: the ‘great commoner’ was a Bible-banging fundamentalist. When officials in Dayton, Tennessee decided to roast John Scopes for teaching evolution in 1925, they called in the ageing Bryan to prosecute. The week-long trial became a national sensation and reached its climax when the defence attorney, Clarence Darrow, called Bryan to the stand and eviscerated his Biblical verities. ‘Do you believe Joshua made the sun stand still?’ Darrow asked sarcastically. ‘Do you believe a whale swallowed Jonah? Will you tell us the exact date of the great flood?’ Bryan tried to swat away the swarm of contradictions. ‘I do not think about things I don’t think about,’ he said. The New York Times called it an ‘absurdly pathetic performance’, reducing a famous American to the ‘butt of a crowd’s rude laughter’. This paunchy, sweaty figure went down as an icon of the cranky right. Today, most Americans encounter the Scopes trial and Bryan himself in a play called Inherit the Wind. I once played the role of Bryan and the director kept saying: ‘More pompous, Morone. Make him more pompous.’
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n04/moro01_.html

    You are just as dogmatic and closed-minded. A simple faith is OK for you, even though I have ripped your core theory to shreads.

    You are indeed the William Jennings Bryan of RevLeft.
  2. #122
    Join Date May 2008
    Location Regno de Granda Fenviko
    Posts 2,336
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    You are just as dogmatic and closed-minded. A simple faith is OK for you, even though I have ripped your core theory to shreads.
    It takes a philosophy to make a philosophical argument, R. Too bad ad hominems don't cut it.
    Eppur si muove -- Galileo Galilei


    [FONT=Tahoma]
    [/FONT]
  3. #123
    Join Date May 2008
    Location Regno de Granda Fenviko
    Posts 2,336
    Rep Power 0

    Default The role of Marx's Political Economy vis-a-vis Hegel:

    Originally Posted by F. Engels

    Since Hegel's death hardly any attempt has been made to develop science in is own inner inter-connection. The official Hegelian school had appropriated from the dialectics of the master only manipulation of the simplest tricks, which it applied to anything and everything often with ludicrous clumsiness. For it, the whole inheritance of Hegel was limited to a mere pattern by the help of which every theme could be correctly devised, and to compilation of words and turns of speech which had no other purpose than to turn up at the right time when thought and positive knowledge failed. This it came about that, as a Bonn professor said, these Hegelian understood nothing about anything, but could write about everything. its worth was in accordance. Meanwhile, these gentlemen were, in spite of their self-complacency, so conscious of their weakness that they avoided big problems as much as possible.The old pedantic science held the field by its superiority in positive knowledge. And when Feuerbach also gave notice that he was quitting the field of speculative conceptions, Hegelianism quietly fell asleep; and it seemed as if the old metaphysics, with its fixed categories, had begun to reign anew in science...

    Here, therefore, was another problem to be solved, one which had nothing to do with political economy as such. How was science to be treated? One the one hand there was the Hegelian dialectics in the wholly abstract, "speculative" form in which Hegel had bequeathed it; on the other hand there was the ordinary, essentially metaphysical Wolffian method which had again become fashionable and in which the bourgeois economists had written their fat, disjointed tomes. This latter method had been so annihilated theoretically by Kant and particularly by Hegel that only laziness and the lack of any simple alternative method could make possible its continued existence in practice. On the other hand the Hegelian method was absolutely unusable in its available form. It was essentially idealistic, and the problem here was that of developing a world outlook more materialistic than any previously advanced. The Hegelian method started out from pure thinking and here one had to start from stubborn facts. A method which, according to its own admission, "came from nothing, through nothing, to nothing," was in this form completely our of place here.

    Nevertheless, of all the available logical material, it was the only thing which could be used at least as a starting point. It had never been criticized, never overcome. Not one of the opponents of the great dialectician had been able to make a breach in its proud structure; it fell into oblivion, because the Hegelian school had not the slightest notion what to do with it. It was, therefore, above all necessary to subject the Hegelian method to thoroughgoing criticism.

    What distinguishes Hegel's mode of thought from that of all other philosophers was the enormous historical sense upon which it was based. Abstract and idealist though it was in form, yet the development of his thoughts always proceeded in line with the development of world history and the latter was really meant to be only the test of the former. If, thereby, the real relation was inverted and put on its head, nevertheless its real content entered everywhere into the philosophy, all the more so since Hegel -- in contrast to his disciples -- did not parade ignorance, but was one of the best intellects of all time. He was the first who attempted to show an evolution and inner coherence, in history and while today much in his Philosophy of History may seem peculiar to us, yet the grandeur of the basis of his fundamental outlook is admirable even today, whether one makes comparison with his predecessors, or with anyone since his time who has taken the liberty of reflecting in general about history. Everywhere, in his Phenomenology, Aesthetics, History of Philosophy, this magnificent conception of history, penetrates, and everywhere this material is treated historically, in a definite even if abstractly distorted inter-connection with history.

    This epoch-making conception of history was the direct theoretical prerequisite for the new materialist outlook, and thereby provided a connecting point for the logical method. Since this forgotten dialectics had led to such results even from the stand point of"pure thinking,", and had, in addition, so easily settled accounts with all preceding logic and metaphysics, in any case there must have been something more to it than sophistry and hair-splitting. But the criticism of this method, which all officially recognized philosophy had fought shy of and still does , was no trifle.

    Marx was, and is, the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the Hegelian logic the kernel which comprised Hegel's real discoveries in this sphere, and to construct the dialectical method divested of its idealist trappings, in the simple shape in which it becomes the only true form of development of thought.

    The working out of the method which forms the foundation of Marx's Critique of Political Economy we consider a result of hardly less importance than the basic materialistic outlook itself.

    The criticism of economics, even according to the method employed, could still be exercised in two ways -- historically or logically. Since in history, as in its literary reflection, development as a whole proceeds from the most simple to the most complex relations, the historical development of the literature of political economy provided a natural guiding thread with which criticism could link up and the economic categories as a whole would thereby appear in the same sequence as in the logical development. This form apparently has the advantage of greater clearness, since indeed it is the actual development that is followed, but as a matter of fact it would thereby at most become more popular. History often proceeds by jumps and zigzags and it would in this way have to be followed everywhere, whereby not only would much material of minor importance have to be incorporated but there would be many interruptions of the chain of thought. Furthermore, the history of economics could not be written without that of bourgeois society and this would make the task endless, since all preliminary work is lacking. The logical method of treatment was, therefore, the only appropriate one. But this, as a matter of fact, is nothing else than the historical method, only divested of its historical form and disturbing fortuities. The chain of thought must begin with the same thing that this history begins with and its further course will be nothing but the mirror-image of the historical course in abstract and theoretically consistent form, a corrected mirror-image but corrected according to laws furnished by the real course of history itself, in that each factor can be considered at its ripest point of development, it its classic form.

    In this method we proceed from the first and simples relation that historically, and in fact, confront us; therefore from the first economic relation to be found. We analyze this relation. Being a relation already implies that it has two sides related to each other. Each of these sides is considered by itself, which brings us to the way they behave to each other, their reciprocal interaction. Contradictions will result which demand a solution. But as we are not considering an abstract process of thought taking place solely in our heads, but a real happening which has actually taken place at some particular time, or is still taking place, these contradictions, too, will have developed in practice and will probably have found their solution. We shall trace the nature of this solution, and shall discover that it has been brought about by the establishment of a new relation whose two opposite sides we now have to develop, and so on.

    Political economy begins with commodities, begins with the moment when products are exchanged for one another -- whether by individual or by primitive communities. The product that appears in exchange is a commodity. It is, however, a commodity solely because a relation between two persons or communities attaches to the thing, the product, the relation between producer and consumer who are here no longer united in the same person. Here we have an example of a peculiar fact, which runs through the whole of economics and which as caused utter confusion in the minds of the bourgeois economists: Economics deals not with things but with relations between persons and in the last resort between classes; these relations are, however, always attached to things and appear as things. This inter-connection, which in isolated cases, it is true, has dawned upon particular economists, was first discovered by Marx as obtaining for all political economy, whereby he made the most difficult questions so simple an clear that now even the bourgeois economists will be able to grasp them.

    If now we consider commodities from their various aspects, commodities in their complete development, and not as the first laboriously develop in the primitive barter between two primitive communities, they present themselves to us from the two points of view of use value and exchange value, and here we at once enter the sphere of economic dispute. Anyone who would like to have a striking illustration of the fact that the German dialectical method in its present state of elaboration is at least as superior to the old, shallow, garrulous metaphysical method as the raiiway is to the means of transport of the Middle Ages, should read in Adam Smith or any other reputable official economist what a torment exchange value and use value were to these gentlemen, how difficult it was for them to keep them properly apart and to comprehend each in its peculiar distinctness, and should then compare the simple, clear treatment by Marx...

    It is seen that with this method the logical development is by no means compelled to keep to the purely abstract sphere. One the contrary, this method required historical illustrations, continual contact with reality. Such proofs are accordingly introduced in great variety, with references to the actual course of history at different stages of social development as well as to the economic literature in which the clear working out of the determinations of economic relations is pursued from the beginning. The criticism of individual, more or less one-sided or confused modes of conception is then in essence already given in the logical development itself and can be briefly formulated.
    -- Engels, "Review of Marx's Critique of Political Economy"(1859), in Ludwig Feuerbach, Appendix. 75-81.
    Eppur si muove -- Galileo Galilei


    [FONT=Tahoma]
    [/FONT]
  4. #124
    Join Date Nov 2005
    Location UK
    Posts 16,778
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    Ah, the revenge of our very own William Jennings Bryan, I see.

    And, what possible relevance has this piece of hokum (of Engels's) you quoted got?

    As I wrote in Essay Nine, Part Two:

    There are in fact two main types of dialectician (which groups can, of course, over lap at the edges):

    (1) Low Church Dialecticians [LCDs]: Comrades in this category cleave to the original, unvarnished truth laid down in the sacred DM-texts (written by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, or Mao). These simple souls are highly proficient at quoting endless passages from the holy books as an answer to everything and anything, just like the faithful who bow to the East or who fill the gospel halls around the world. Their unquestioning faith is as impressive as it is un-Marxist.

    They may be naive, but they are at least consistently so.

    [FL = Formal Logic.]

    In general, LCDs are blithely ignorant of FL. Now, on its own this is no hanging matter. However, such self-inflicted and woeful ignorance does not stop them from pontificating about FL, or from regaling us with it alleged limitations -- charges based on ideas they unwisely copied from Hegel, surely the George W Bush of Logic.
    http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm
    Last edited by Rosa Lichtenstein; 18th June 2008 at 08:49.
  5. #125
    Join Date Nov 2005
    Location UK
    Posts 16,778
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    Trivas:

    Too bad ad hominems don't cut it.
    There's nothing intrinsically wrong with 'ad hominems', either:

    One of the most widely misused terms on the Net is "ad hominem". It is most often introduced into a discussion by certain delicate types, delicate of personality and mind, whenever their opponents resort to a bit of sarcasm. As soon as the suspicion of an insult appears, they summon the angels of ad hominem to smite down their foes, before ascending to argument heaven in a blaze of sanctimonious glory. They may not have much up top, but by God, they don't need it when they've got ad hominem on their side. It's the secret weapon that delivers them from any argument unscathed.

    In reality, ad hominem is unrelated to sarcasm or personal abuse. Argumentum ad hominem is the logical fallacy of attempting to undermine a speaker's argument by attacking the speaker instead of addressing the argument. The mere presence of a personal attack does not indicate ad hominem: the attack must be used for the purpose of undermining the argument, or otherwise the logical fallacy isn't there. It is not a logical fallacy to attack someone; the fallacy comes from assuming that a personal attack is also necessarily an attack on that person's arguments.

    Therefore, if you can't demonstrate that your opponent is trying to counter your argument by attacking you, you can't demonstrate that he is resorting to ad hominem. If your opponent's sarcasm is not an attempt to counter your argument, but merely an attempt to insult you (or amuse the bystanders), then it is not part of an ad hominem argument.

    Actual instances of argumentum ad hominem are relatively rare. Ironically, the fallacy is most often committed by those who accuse their opponents of ad hominem, since they try to dismiss the opposition not by engaging with their arguments, but by claiming that they resort to personal attacks. Those who are quick to squeal "ad hominem" are often guilty of several other logical fallacies, including one of the worst of all: the fallacious belief that introducing an impressive-sounding Latin term somehow gives one the decisive edge in an argument.

    But enough vagueness. The point of this article is to bury the reader under an avalanche of examples of correct and incorrect usage of ad hominem, in the hope that once the avalanche has passed, the term will never be used incorrectly again. I will begin with some invented examples, before dealing with some real-life misuses of the term at the end.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "This does not logically follow. By your own argument, the set of rodents is a subset of the set of mammals; and therefore, a weasel can be outside the set of rodents and still be in the set of mammals."

    Hopefully it should be clear that neither A's argument nor B's argument is ad hominem. Perhaps there are some people who think that any disagreement is an ad hominem argument, but these people shouldn't be allowed out of fairyland.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "This does not logically follow."
    B's argument is less comprehensive, but still not ad hominem.
    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "This does not logically follow. You evidently know nothing about logic."

    B's argument is still not ad hominem. Note that B directly engages A's argument: he is not attacking the person A instead of his argument. here is no indication that B thinks his subsequent attack on A strengthens his argument, or is a substitute for engaging with A's argument. Unless we have a good reason for thinking otherwise, we should assume it is just a sarcastic flourish.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "You evidently know nothing about logic. This does not logically follow."

    B's argument is still not ad hominem. B does not imply that A's sentence does not logically follow because A knows nothing about logic. B is still addressing the substance of A's argument.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "You evidently know nothing about logic."

    B's argument is, most probably, still not ad hominem. The word "evidently" indicates that B is basing his opinion of A's logical skills on the evidence of A's statement. Therefore, B's sentence is a sarcastic way of saying that A's argument is logically unsound: B is attacking A's argument. He is not attacking the person instead of the argument.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "You know nothing about logic."

    Even now, we can't conclude that B's reply is ad hominem. It could well be, and probably is, the case that B is basing his reply on A's argument. He is not saying that A's argument is flawed because A knows nothing about logic; instead, he is using A's fallacious argument as evidence to present a new argument: that A knows nothing about logic.

    Put briefly, ad hominem is "You are an ignorant person, therefore your arguments are wrong", and not "Your arguments are wrong, therefore you are an ignorant person." The latter statement may be fallacious, but it's not an ad hominem fallacy.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "This does not logically follow. And you're an asshole."

    B is abusive, but his argument is still not ad hominem. He engages with A's argument. There is no reason to conclude that the personal abuse of A is part of B's argument, or that B thinks it undermines A's argument.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "You're an asshole."

    B's reply is not necessarily ad hominem. There is no evidence that's his abusive statement is intended as a counter-argument. If it's not an argument, it's not an ad hominem argument.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "You evidently know nothing about logic. And you're an asshole."

    Again, B's reply is not necessarily ad hominem.
    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "Fuck you."

    Not ad hominem. B's abuse is not a counter-argument, but a request for A to cease the discussion.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "Well, you've never had a good grasp of logic, so this can't be true."

    B's argument here is ad hominem. He concludes that A is wrong not by addressing A's argument, but by appealing to the negative image of A the person.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "Well, you're a moron and an asshole, so there goes your argument.
    "
    B's reply here is ad hominem and abusive.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "Well, you're a rodent and a weasel, so there goes your argument."

    B's argument here might appear on superficial inspection to be sound, but it is in fact ad hominem. He is using the terms "rodent" and "weasel" in different senses to those used by A. Although he tries to make it appear that he is countering A's argument by invalidating one of the premises, he is in fact trying to counter A's argument by heaping abuse on A. (This might also be an example of an ad homonym argument.)

    A: "All murderers are criminals, but a thief isn't a murderer, and so can't be a criminal."
    B: "Well, you're a thief and a criminal, so there goes your argument."

    Harder to call this one. B is addressing A's argument, but perhaps unwittingly.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "Wrong! If a weasel isn't a rodent, then it must be an insectivore! What an asshole!"

    B's argument is logically fallacious, and he concludes with some gratuitous abuse, but nothing here is ad hominem.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "I'm sorry, but I'd prefer to trust the opinion of a trained zoologist on this one."

    B's argument is ad hominem: he is attempting to counter A not by addressing his argument, but by casting doubt on A's credentials. Note that B is polite and not at all insulting.

    A: "Listen up, asshole. All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "Yet another ad hominem argument. Ignore this one, folks."

    A is abusive, and his argument is fallacious, but it's not ad hominem. B's reply, ironically, is ad hominem; while he pretends to deal with A's argument, in using the term "ad hominem" incorrectly, B is in fact trying to dismiss the argument by imputing that A is resorting to personal attacks.

    A: "Listen up, asshole. All rodents are mammals, and a lizard isn't a mammal, so it can't be a rodent."
    B: "Yet another ad hominem argument. Ignore this one, folks."

    A's argument is sound, and not ad hominem. B's reply is again ad hominem.

    A: "B is a convicted criminal and his arguments are not to be trusted."
    B: "Yet another ad hominem argument. Ignore this one, folks."

    A's argument is ad hominem, since it attempts to undermine all of B's (hypothetical) arguments by a personal attack. B's reply is not ad hominem, since it directly addresses A's argument (correctly characterising it as ad hominem).

    A: "All politicians are assholes, and you're just another politician. Therefore, you're an asshole."
    B: "Yet another ad hominem argument."

    If you accept the premises, A's argument is sound. Either way, from the given context, we cannot conclude that it is ad hominem: it's not an attempt to undermine B's (hypothetical) arguments by abusing him, but instead an attempt to establish that B is an asshole. B's reply is ad hominem, since by incorrectly using the term "ad hominem", he is trying to undermine A's argument by claiming that A is resorting to personal attacks.

    A: "All politicians are liars, and you're just another politician. Therefore, you're a liar and your arguments are not to be trusted."
    B: "Yet another ad hominem argument."

    If you accept the premises, A's argument is sound; but I think most of us would sympathise with B and class it as fallacious, and ad hominem.

    This is because we do not accept the premise that all politicians are liars. There is a false premise that lies behind all ad hominem arguments: the notion that all people of type X make bad arguments. A has just made this premise explicit.

    A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
    B: "That does not logically follow."
    A: "*Sigh* Do I have to spell it out for you? All rodents are mammals, right, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal! What's so hard to understand???!?"
    B: "I'm afraid you're mistaken. Look at it logically. If p implies q, then it does not follow that not-p implies not-q."
    A: "I don't care about so-called logic and Ps and Qs and that stuff, I'm talking COMMON SENSE. A weasel ISN'T a mammal."
    B: "Okay, this guy's an idiot. Ignore this one, folks."
    A: "AD HOMINEM!!!! I WIN!!!!!"

    Although the last line of B, taken out of context, might look ad hominem (and was seized upon as such by A), it should be clear that taken as a whole, B's argument is not ad hominem. B engaged thoroughly with A's argument. He is not countering A's argument by saying A is an idiot; on the contrary, having logically countered A's argument, and having seen A's reaction, he is arguing that A is an idiot.

    Some real-life examples:

    A: "I agree that the writing is first class, but I am left with the distinct impression that the author is using the game as a vehicle for self-aggrandizement rather than to entertain the player. "
    B: "... let's refrain from ad hominem arguments, and accept that we have different tastes, shall we?"

    A's argument was not ad hominem. "The author is using the game as a vehicle for self-aggrandizement" is the conclusion of his argument, not an attempt to undermine the said author's (unseen) arguments by casting aspersions on him.

    A: "I can even handle misplaced apostrophes every now and then. Not excessive amounts of them, [...]"
    B: "Perhaps double-check your grammar before you write a grammar rant that refers to 'amounts of apostrophes'."
    C: " ...the ad hominem nature of [B's reply] takes the sanctimonious angle that any who criticize must be without stain."

    B's reply was not ad hominem. It was not a counter-argument to A, but an attempt to point out what B saw as A's hypocrisy. C's use of language, by the way, demonstrates that he is clearly out of his depth.

    A: "Can someone please direct me to the ad hominem attacks in the TADS competition game "Futz Mutz"?"

    There are no ad hominem attacks in Futz Mutz. Just a lot of stupid abuse.

    A: "OK, I've been following this thread for a while, and I hate to say it, but you're being an asshole. You're really taking this whole thing too personally, and seriously misconstruing everyone else's arguments. Nobody here is arguing that copyright infringement is ethically, morally, legally, or otherwise justifiable. They're simply arguing that equating it with theft is simplistic and inaccurate."
    B: "...calling me an asshole is called an ad hominem attack, which does not show me wrong."

    No, calling you an asshole is just abuse. A's argument is not ad hominem. A has carefully pointed out what he sees as the flaws in B's argument, and based on B's failure to acknowledge them and general behaviour, has concluded that B is an asshole. This conclusion is quite independent of A's treatment of B's arguments.

    A: "But the capability is, of course, there, and if you 'fail to see' how any of the standard systems can handle realtime then you clearly have zero understanding of virtual machines."
    B: "...your over-reaching ad hominim[sic] judgements about what people do and do not know..."

    A's argument is not ad hominem: he is not attempting to undermine B's arguments by claiming that B knows nothing about VMs. Instead, based on B's arguments about VMs, he has reached the conclusion that B has no understanding of them, and presented this as a new argument. (B later even had the nerve to direct A to the Wikipedia page on ad hominem, which he clearly didn't understand.)
    Bold added.

    http://plover.net/~bonds/adhominem.html

    Now, even though I have quoted the above, I do not endorse all it says, for ad hominem is only an informal fallacy, and it is not always even that. For example, if arguing 'to the man' shows that he/she is being inconsistent in some way, then it is a valid method of criticism.

    And a personal attack can also work; both are illustrated here:

    A: B says that all fools should be ignored. But B is a fool; therefore he should be ignored.

    C: D says she believes p and q. But D also believes r, which implies not-p. Therefore D should abandon either p or r (or rational debate).

    So, if it is indeed the case that you, like William Jenninings Bryan, are content with your simple faith, and cannot defend it, it is relevant to point this out -- especially when you make the same claim of my good self (when I do little other than defend my ideas).

    It takes a philosophy to make a philosophical argument, R.
    That is about as stupid as saying a doctor has to catch a disease to eradicate that disease.

    It is possible to show that a philosophical theory, such as the 'theory' of change in dialectics is fallacious by showing that whatever is done with it, it cannot work -- as indeed I have done -- without doing any philosophy, just as a doctor can eradicate a disease without actaully having to catch it first.

    So, once more:

    And you are a fine one to talk; you have been evading at least three challenges of mine for days. Here is an earleir comment of mine:

    You demand answers of me, but you refuse to respond to any of mine -- for example, we still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.
    http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...5&postcount=67
    Or, like William Jennings Bryan, are you merely content to say:

    'I do not think about things I don’t think about'
    Last edited by Rosa Lichtenstein; 18th June 2008 at 08:49.
  6. #126
    Join Date Sep 2005
    Posts 1,688
    Rep Power 14

    Default

    My words say it better than your misleading precis, so quote those in future, please.
    I know that is your approach, but I fundamentally disagree with it. Paraphrase is essential to effective argument. In the matter you disputed above, for example, I presented a paraphrase and I still cant see the difference between the paraphrase and the original, which I subsequently quoted. Secondly, I would be quite skeptical of the role of quotation in your own essays. They present an appearance of attention to the original, but much more effective would be a rounded paraphrased presentation of what Engels argued for, which you dont do.

    If I paraphrase what you say, and you do not object to the paraphrase, then we have evidence of a shared understanding of a point (which one or other may not agree with). If I quote you, I might well misunderstand what I am quoting. Paraphrase is therefore a constructive methodology if debate is intended to make progress.

    Well, your selective blindness is now almost legendary.
    This is interestingly depressing. It is as plain to me as day that I set out a reading of the sections on the Law of Q/Q and N/N and you didnt disagree with any of that. You now smell blood and want to move on to the area of Maths. I prefer to leave it out because any point that would need to be conceded in that regard, I already concede in relation to the Law of N/N while getting into the whole Maths things gets us into the Philosophy of Mathematics and that just diverts us from the central focus. However if there is any point relevant to the overall reading of the relevant sections that are contained only in the parts on Maths, feel free to draw them out.

    I suspect you wont, because your methodology involves, instead of presenting Engels views, the discounting of that. Your argument is focused on finding a way to conclude that it does not matter what Engels argued for (i.e. anti-dogmatism) or what he thought he was doing, but that the truth of his position is supposedly hidden in the logical structure of his sentences and the origins of his views, irrespective of what his views were. (and , of course you approach Marx with the same methodology only drawing different conclusions.)

    In a way, this difference is the fundamental point. For you [I paraphrase ] what I am sayng is evasive, unacceptably vague and pointless. For me your argument is esoteric, characterised by chop logic and fantastically improbable speculations about what Marx's and Engel's 'real' methodologies supposedly was. And we both consider the other's argument as representing a ruling class ideological position and as involving the practice of philosophy [which we each for different reasons consider objectionable] !

    I have no doubt that these views of each others argument reflect different philosophical assumptions. Any discussion over dialectics as presented in the classical tradition is merely a reflection of that difference. Because it is a reflection, it is necessarily inconclusive and rambling. What would be so much better would be to present your own views systematically and let them be tested.

    I know the answer to that...but there is a difference between you and me. In my view, it politically pointless to present systematic views on philosophical issues. YOur long years of effort in the criticism of dialectics must reflect a view on your part that something positive can be achieved by presentation of views on these issues. My perspective leads to the conclusion that only the criticism of views presented by others is a legitimate activity and even that is hardly important enough to be worth the effort. You dont believe this kind of work is a waste, so you should set out your views rather than setting out the reflection of your views.

    On laws, I note the following comment that the inherent laws of capitalism "impose themselves only as the mean of apparently lawless irregularities that compensate one another" [MECW 35 P.112]

    By the way Trivas7, thanks for the link to the paper on law !
    Last edited by gilhyle; 19th June 2008 at 07:09.
    "Dixi et salvavi animam meam" - quoted by Marx
    "Things rarely work out well if one aims at 'moderation'..." - Engels
    "By and by we heare newes of shipwrack in the same place, then we are too blame if we accept it not for a Rock." Sir Philip Sydney
    "The most to be hoped for by groups who claim to belong to the Marxist succession (...) is for them to serve as a hyphen between past and future....nothing can be held sacred – everything is called into question. Only after having been put through such a crucible could socialism conceivably re-emerge as a viable doctrine and plan of action." - Van Heijenoort
  7. #127
    Join Date May 2008
    Location Regno de Granda Fenviko
    Posts 2,336
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    It is possible to show that a philosophical theory, such as the 'theory' of change in dialectics is fallacious by showing that whatever is done with it, it cannot work -- as indeed I have done -- without doing any philosophy, just as a doctor can eradicate a disease without actaully having to catch it first.
    It works for me fine. You don't eradicate a disease by pretending you can't catch it. Marxism isn't a boil and you have no philosophical scalpel with which to lance it.

    Perhaps I should learn not to feed the trolls.

    From Chris Matthew Sciabarra -- a libertarian(!) -- another definition of dialectics:
    Originally Posted by Chris Sciabarra
    What is dialectics? Dialectics is the art of context-keeping. It counsels us to study the object of our inquiry from a variety of perspectives and levels of generality, so as to gain a more comprehensive picture of it. That study often requires that we grasp the object in terms of the larger system within which it is situated, as well as its development across time. Because human beings are not omniscient, because none of us can see the “whole” as if from a “synoptic” godlike perspective, it is only through selective abstraction that we are able to piece together a more integrated understanding of the phenomenon before us—an understanding of its antecedent conditions, interrelationships, and tendencies.

    In social theory, the object of our inquiry is society social relations, institutions, and processes. Society is not some ineffable organism; it is a complex nexus of interrelated institutions and processes, of volitionally conscious, purposeful, interacting individuals—and the unintended consequences they generate. A dialectical approach to social theory is one that recognizes that a given social problem will often entail an investigation of related social problems. What makes a dialectical approach into a radical approach is that the task of going to the root of a social problem, seeking to understand it and resolve it, often requires that we make transparent the relationships among social problems. Understanding the complexities at work within any given society is prerequisite for changing it.
    -- Chris Matthew Sciabarra, "Dialectics and Liberty"
    Last edited by trivas7; 19th June 2008 at 05:09.
    Eppur si muove -- Galileo Galilei


    [FONT=Tahoma]
    [/FONT]
  8. #128
    Join Date Sep 2005
    Posts 1,688
    Rep Power 14

    Default

    Dunno what is going on here !! I posted a long post which I now repost in quotes below....Rosa posted a response saying she was cooking and would respond later and on my computer I now see neither post ! Both seem to have been deleted.

    I got diverted from my intention to continue to read Anti Duhring. Having read the sections that are actually about dialectics [MECW 25 P. 110-134] and the earlier introductory remarks which introduce that MECW 25 P. 33 - 44), it is essential to go back then and look at the prefatory material and the introductory general remarks to see if those answer any of the questions raised.

    And those questions are:

    1. what is the purpose of dialectics (i.e. what are its laws meant to be used for)
    2. If dialectical contradiction is not capable of formal definition, what general elaboration can we give of the concept ?
    3. Similarly, can we pin down what negation of the negation means, given that 'negation' is used in a strange way.

    And I dont rule out that we cannot.....that would say much about the Anti Duhring.

    Its important to acknowledge that at the very beginning of his general remarks, Engels draws a contrast between his own perspective and that of those who believe in eternal values oreason and justice, which Engels characterises as ruling class ideologies. Engels contrasts his view with those who believe that socialism is the "expression of absolute truth" [MECW 25 P.20] This is by the way of reminding us, once again, how strange an idea it is that Engels could - even inadvertently - fall into a priori dogmatics.

    What Engels goes on then to do is to try to give a summary idea of what dialectics is for ....and this is relevant to the first question above, which is in turn relevant to the question of what kind of law a materialist dialectical law might be and what the point might be of citing the law, as we have seen Marx do in Capital and seen Engels defend.

    What Engels argues is that empiricism tends to see entities as rigidly fixed and to build their understandings on that. By contrast he argues that there is a tradition which sees things as constantly in flux "But this conception correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details" [Ibid P.21] without which and this is an important statement "we have not a clear idea of the whole picture" [P.21-22] Note carefully this idea that one can have a less clear and a more clear picture of the overall situation, that each can be valid, that the second can be better than the first and to become better it requires detail. He writes "In order to understand these details we must detach the from their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately" (P. 22) Thus he recognises the legitimacy of the methodological move undertaken by empiricist-influenced scientists who set out to identify and categorise distinct things and their regularities. But then he adds "...sooner or later (it) reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract,, lost in insoluble contradictions" [P.23] Notice, btw, that the reference is not to dialectical contradictions !

    Interestingly, he uses the example of the foetus that has been at the heart of so many modern debates on abortion as his example of how origins, destinations, "motion" is lost sight of. His point being that it is "impossible" to determine "absolutely" moments of change. (Ibid)

    We then get a repetition of the central idea later in the book used in the elaboration of the concept of dialectical contradiction (and which we need to come back to ) that "every organic being is every moment the same and not the same". One of the most puzling ideas then follows, that of interpenetration of opposites, but as no reliance is later placed on this we can leave it aside for now.

    Dialectics we are then told thinks all these complexities and is proven by Nature. What is difficult with this is that the discussion was introduced by saying science has a problem at a certain point in its development. Is dialectics being introduced now as the way science will find its way out of that problem ? No ! For he immediately goes on to say that science itself discerns the same relationships However (P.24) he then says that the situation is confused, with some scientists moving beyond static ways of thinking and others not doing so. It is this very problem within science which, he explains, justifies turning to dialectics for "an exact representation of the universe" (P.24)

    We could we understand this argument as follows but for one phrase (the word "exact) The argument would be that science is having trouble making a key transition from the static methodology to a more dynamic one. meanwhile, the argument would go, if we need a more adequate picture of the physical universe as a whole, we can appropriate some ideas from Philosophy. That philosophy itself is a dead dog, but it has left us an inheritance of some ideas which fill out the idea of the universe as a location where there is constant change. Since it is the grasping of change which is the problem of the moment (in the 1870s), dialectics proves very useful to allow us to anticipate the general picture of the universe which in due course science will develop in more detail. This philosphical inheritance has allowed a new materialism - anticipating those outcomes - to emerge.

    But why would one want to anticipate those outcomes ? Why would one want a picture of the universe ? Why not just wait for science to do its job ? It is certainly not because the new dialectical materialism wishes to be a philosophy. No. "modern materialism....no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences" (P.26) Perhaps there is a play on words here - maybe the so-called modern materialism does not believe in a philosophy of the totality of reality, but in a science of that totality, generalising from the examples of the other sciences......No ! His answer to that is also in the negative: "As soon as each special science is bound to make clear its position in the great totality of things and of our knowledge of things, a special science dealing with this totality is superfluous." So WHY is there a need at all at this point in time for a general conception of the universe ?

    His answer is that the development of class struggle has made conceptions of human history an ideological battleground between the contending classes. With the development of scientific socialism, a materialist conception of history has emerged. This involved situating capitalism in history as something that emerged and will, because of what it is, in due course disappear. To argue that convincingly it was also necessary to explain what capitalism is - to identify its ESSENCE.

    Without going further, it is clear that Engels believes that it is in the context of developing and polemicising in support of those ideas against contrary ideas that it becomes useful to have a general conception of the universe which anticipates scientific discoveries and which highlights the importance of identifying inter-connections and analysing essences.

    If we simply observe this perspective, plain on the face of the Anti Duhring (but so often ignored), we see that hidden right in front of us is the answer to the question what is dialectics for ? We see that the purpose of dialectics is polemical - its purpose is to anticipate the development of science in order to assist in socialists in situating the matierialist conception of history and Marxist political economy, in polemic against the opponents of those key ideas, as being consistent with the methodologies of the best natural science and as destined to fit into the best available views on the natural and social sciences.

    That dialectics is polemical rather than systematic in character in its materialist form, that its formulation is justified by the a priori philosophies thrown at socialism by its ideological opponents and that its formulations are anticipations of scientific developments which will only make sense in so far as they are made redundant....all that is generally ignored both by the supporters of dialectics as well as its opponents.
    Anyway, Im away until Sunday.
    "Dixi et salvavi animam meam" - quoted by Marx
    "Things rarely work out well if one aims at 'moderation'..." - Engels
    "By and by we heare newes of shipwrack in the same place, then we are too blame if we accept it not for a Rock." Sir Philip Sydney
    "The most to be hoped for by groups who claim to belong to the Marxist succession (...) is for them to serve as a hyphen between past and future....nothing can be held sacred – everything is called into question. Only after having been put through such a crucible could socialism conceivably re-emerge as a viable doctrine and plan of action." - Van Heijenoort
  9. #129
    Join Date Nov 2005
    Location UK
    Posts 16,778
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    Yes, my response to an earlier post of yours seems to have disappeared!

    I will summarise what I had to say.

    I prefer to leave it out because any point that would need to be conceded in that regard, I already concede in relation to the Law of N/N while getting into the whole Maths things gets us into the Philosophy of Mathematics and that just diverts us from the central focus. However if there is any point relevant to the overall reading of the relevant sections that are contained only in the parts on Maths, feel free to draw them out.
    I can understand you wanting to keep away from Engels's comments on mathematics, since it is quite clear here that he is intent on imposing a certain view on the subject matter, just as it is also clear that this confirms my view that Engels is dogmatist.

    In a way, this difference is the fundamental point. For you [I paraphrase ] what I am sayng is evasive, unacceptably vague and pointless. For me your argument is esoteric, characterised by chop logic and fantastically improbable speculations about what Marx's and Engel's 'real' methodologies supposedly was. And we both consider the other's argument as representing a ruling class ideological position and as involving the practice of philosophy [which we each for different reasons consider objectionable] !
    What is 'chop logic'? [I could respond that your argument is 'chop illogic', but what would that achieve?]

    And far from my intepretation of Engels being 'esoteric' it is in fact consistent with the interpretation put on his ideas by later dialecticians (that he hold these laws to be universal, and necessary, and that he thinks Q/Q is nodal, etc.), even if they failed to note his dogmatism.

    You are the one who excuses this dogmatism, explains away his lack of clarity and failure to be self-critical, etc.

    I have no doubt that these views of each others argument reflect different philosophical assumptions. Any discussion over dialectics as presented in the classical tradition is merely a reflection of that difference. Because it is a reflection, it is necessarily inconclusive and rambling. What would be so much better would be to present your own views systematically and let them be tested.

    I know the answer to that...but there is a difference between you and me. In my view, it politically pointless to present systematic views on philosophical issues. YOur long years of effort in the criticism of dialectics must reflect a view on your part that something positive can be achieved by presentation of views on these issues. My perspective leads to the conclusion that only the criticism of views presented by others is a legitimate activity and even that is hardly important enough to be worth the effort. You dont believe this kind of work is a waste, so you should set out your views rather than setting out the reflection of your views.
    I have no philosophical assumptions, and the last sentence in the first paragraph is unclear.

    [I did make one or two other points, but they simply repeated things I had said earlier which you merely hand-waved away.]
  10. #130
    Join Date Nov 2005
    Location UK
    Posts 16,778
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    Trivas, still doing his William Jennings Bryan impression:

    It works for me fine. You don't eradicate a disease by pretending you can't catch it. Marxism isn't a boil and you have no philosophical scalpel with which to lance it.
    Ah, an attempt at an argument; well done!

    But, who has pretended I can't catch it? The point is that you don't have to catch a disease in order to eradicate it.

    Now, do try to concentrate!

    And Marxism isn't a boil, I agree (and I never said it was, nor implied it); it is just covered with them, and, like Marx's carbuncles, they need lancing.

    And I have indeed got the scalpel to do this -- you just ignore the results, since you want to keep the carbuncles.

    Perhaps I should learn not to feed the trolls.
    You are the one who came here with a dogmatic view, which you refuse to defend (mostly because you can't), and who posts one-liners and won't engage in debate.

    So far from not feeding the trolls, you have done little else here but impersonate one.

    And thanks for the Sciabarra quote, but I have read this sort of stuff so many tiems, I have lost count. And I do not buy it for the reasons I have set out here over the last two and a half years.

    But, this does at least confirm that you can't think for yourself, and like to quote others, Low Church Dialectician that you are...

    Now, WJB, let's see if you can think about things that you do not think about:

    We still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.
    Last edited by Rosa Lichtenstein; 19th June 2008 at 09:30.
  11. #131
    Join Date Nov 2005
    Location UK
    Posts 16,778
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    Gil:

    1. what is the purpose of dialectics (i.e. what are its laws meant to be used for)
    2. If dialectical contradiction is not capable of formal definition, what general elaboration can we give of the concept ?
    3. Similarly, can we pin down what negation of the negation means, given that 'negation' is used in a strange way.

    And I dont rule out that we cannot.....that would say much about the Anti Duhring.
    But, you are approaching this from an uncritical angle, as is apparent from the weak case for the defence you have pieced together so far. So, the last sentence is disingenuous to say the least.

    This is by the way of reminding us, once again, how strange an idea it is that Engels could - even inadvertently - fall into a priori dogmatics.
    But, Engels never leaves this perspective behind -- he is writing in a tradition that has been doing this for 2400 years. His many ''inadvertent' slips give this away. So much so, that they are not slips at all.

    Here is a fine example (and one you seem to have uncritically swallowed yourself):

    What Engels argues is that empiricism tends to see entities as rigidly fixed and to build their understandings on that. By contrast he argues that there is a tradition which sees things as constantly in flux "But this conception correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details" [Ibid P.21] without which and this is an important statement "we have not a clear idea of the whole picture" [P.21-22] Note carefully this idea that one can have a less clear and a more clear picture of the overall situation, that each can be valid, that the second can be better than the first and to become better it requires detail. He writes "In order to understand these details we must detach the from their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately" (P. 22) Thus he recognises the legitimacy of the methodological move undertaken by empiricist-influenced scientists who set out to identify and categorise distinct things and their regularities. But then he adds "...sooner or later (it) reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract,, lost in insoluble contradictions" [P.23] Notice, btw, that the reference is not to dialectical contradictions !
    Bold added.

    The Heraclitean tradition is no less dogmatic -- Heraclitus dreamt up this idea based on an invalid argument about stepping into a river. On the basis of that he pontificated about all of reality for all of time. Engels just swallowed this a priori conclusion. He does not question it, as any non-dogmatist would.

    So, his view is no less 'one-sided'.

    Interestingly, he uses the example of the foetus that has been at the heart of so many modern debates on abortion as his example of how origins, destinations, "motion" is lost sight of. His point being that it is "impossible" to determine "absolutely" moments of change. (Ibid)
    But he fails to tell us what determing the absolute 'moment' of anything is, let alone of change, so we are unclear what he is ruling out.

    And we may well wonder if Engels confused 'logic' would help in any way at all here; in fact, as I have shown, his view means that change cannot happen.

    This again shows that you are not interested in a critical encounter with Engels, just concerned to re-package a tradition.

    And here is another piece of a priori dogmatism:

    We then get a repetition of the central idea later in the book used in the elaboration of the concept of dialectical contradiction (and which we need to come back to ) that "every organic being is every moment the same and not the same". One of the most puzling ideas then follows, that of interpenetration of opposites, but as no reliance is later placed on this we can leave it aside for now.
    But, how does Engels know this?

    He can't possibly know it. Hence, he is merely content to impose this view of nature.

    Without going further, it is clear that Engels believes that it is in the context of developing and polemicising in support of those ideas against contrary ideas that it becomes useful to have a general conception of the universe which anticipates scientific discoveries and which highlights the importance of identifying inter-connections and analysing essences.
    Engels does not question whether there are any 'essences', which is yet another example of his dogmatism.

    We see that the purpose of dialectics is polemical - its purpose is to anticipate the development of science in order to assist in socialists in situating the matierialist conception of history and Marxist political economy, in polemic against the opponents of those key ideas, as being consistent with the methodologies of the best natural science and as destined to fit into the best available views on the natural and social sciences.
    You forgot to add that dialectics anticipates dogmatically, for Engels is not prepared to allow even the science of his day to contradict as single thesis he lifted from Hegel. We can see this from his language, and from the fact that he is highly selective in the examples he chooses --, and even there, he has to force the phenomena into an a priori 'dialectical' mould.

    That dialectics is polemical rather than systematic in character in its materialist form, that its formulation is justified by the a priori philosophies thrown at socialism by its ideological opponents and that its formulations are anticipations of scientific developments which will only make sense in so far as they are made redundant....all that is generally ignored both by the supporters of dialectics as well as its opponents.
    And, it is not even good polemics. Not only is it hopelessly vague, it is not the least bit self-critical.

    And that dogmatic fault seems to have rubbed off on you.
  12. #132
    Join Date May 2008
    Location Regno de Granda Fenviko
    Posts 2,336
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    The Heraclitean tradition is no less dogmatic

    And here is another piece of a priori dogmatism:

    Engels does not question whether there are any 'essences', which is yet another example of his dogmatism.

    You forgot to add that dialectics anticipates dogmatically

    And that dogmatic fault seems to have rubbed off on you.
    You keep using this term. Do you mean anything by it other than as an expression of your personal opprobrium?
    Eppur si muove -- Galileo Galilei


    [FONT=Tahoma]
    [/FONT]
  13. #133
    Join Date Nov 2005
    Location UK
    Posts 16,778
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    Trivas:

    You keep using this term. Do you mean anything by it other than as an expression of your personal opprobrium?
    Look the term up if you are having difficulties with it.

    Here, let me help you out:

    http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dogmatism

    But, what about this:

    We still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.
  14. #134
    Join Date May 2008
    Location Regno de Granda Fenviko
    Posts 2,336
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    Look the term up if you are having difficulties with it.
    I see. Is it the unwarrantedness or the arrogance of said dialectics that you object to? Or is it OTOH the unexamined premises of dialects you think have not been accounted for?
    Last edited by trivas7; 19th June 2008 at 20:31.
    Eppur si muove -- Galileo Galilei


    [FONT=Tahoma]
    [/FONT]
  15. #135
    Join Date Nov 2005
    Location UK
    Posts 16,778
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    Trivas:

    Is it the unwarrantedness or the arrogance of said dialectics that you object to? Or is it OTOH the unexamined premises of dialects you think have not been accounted for?
    Well, let me answer your questions when you deal with these:

    We still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.
  16. #136
    Join Date Jul 2006
    Location Somewhere in hell
    Posts 622
    Organisation
    Unorganized Proletarian
    Rep Power 14

    Default

    Radioactive decay is the process in which an unstable atomic nucleus loses energy by emitting radiation in the form of particles or electromagnetic waves. This decay, or loss of energy, results in an atom of one type, called the parent nuclide transforming to an atom of a different type, called the daughter nuclide.
    Quantitative Change: an unstable atomic nucleus loses energy by emitting radiation in the form of particles or electromagnetic waves.

    Qualitative Change:
    an atom of one type, called the parent nuclide transforming to an atom of a different type, called the daughter nuclide.

    Negation of the atom of previous being into an atom of different being, an opposite being. Such movement and change explains the dialectic here in this concrete example of natural science.

    In regards to social science, the dialectic is used to understand the nature of the contradictions between the opposing classes, the mode of production, the status of economic and political crises. Once the material conditions are understood, we use these conditions to change the world to our advantage. "The philosophers have only interpreted the world...the point is to change it."
  17. #137
    Join Date Nov 2005
    Location UK
    Posts 16,778
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    Criticise-somethings-sometimes:

    We have already established here and in other threads that this 'law' only appears to work because key terms have been left vague (such as 'quality', 'the addition of matter and/or energy', 'node'/'leap'), and the thermodynamic boundaries of the systems involved are undefined.

    http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...5&postcount=90

    http://www.revleft.com/vb/quantity-q...709/index.html

    http://www.revleft.com/vb/stalin-mat...588/index.html

    So, there's little use having more examples thrown at us until this branch of Mystical Mickey Mouse Science you lot have swallowed is made properly scientific.

    The other stuff you added is just a rehearsal of the same tired old dogmas that have been demolished in these threads many times.
    Last edited by Rosa Lichtenstein; 20th June 2008 at 15:37.
  18. #138
    Join Date Apr 2007
    Location Eisenach, Gotha, & Erfurt
    Posts 14,047
    Organisation
    Sympathizer re.: Communistisch Platform, WPA, and CPGB (PCC)
    Rep Power 80

    Default

    ^^^ Rosa, you said the word "thermodynamic." Why not replace HM, which can't explain this, with dyna-mat?
    "A new centrist project does not have to repeat these mistakes. Nobody in this topic is advocating a carbon copy of the Second International (which again was only partly centrist)." (Tjis, class-struggle anarchist)

    "A centrist strategy is based on patience, and building a movement or party or party-movement through deploying various instruments, which I think should include: workplace organising, housing struggles [...] and social services [...] and a range of other activities such as sports and culture. These are recruitment and retention tools that allow for a platform for political education." (Tim Cornelis, left-communist)
  19. #139
    Join Date Nov 2005
    Location UK
    Posts 16,778
    Rep Power 0

    Default

    JR, I am surprised you think HM should be able to explain anything from physics, let alone thermodynamics -- or, even that you think that I should think this.
  20. #140
    Join Date Jul 2006
    Location Somewhere in hell
    Posts 622
    Organisation
    Unorganized Proletarian
    Rep Power 14

    Default

    Originally Posted by RosaAntiquatedStein
    Criticise-somethings-sometimes:

    We have already established here and in other threads that this 'law' only appears to work because key terms have been left vague (such as 'quality', 'the addition of matter and/or energy', 'node'/'leap'), and the thermodynamic boundaries of the systems involved are undefined.

    http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...5&postcount=90

    http://www.revleft.com/vb/quantity-q...709/index.html

    http://www.revleft.com/vb/stalin-mat...588/index.html

    So, there's little use having more examples thrown at us until this branch of Mystical Mickey Mouse Science you lot have swallowed is made properly scientific.

    The other stuff you added is just a rehearsal of the same tired old dogmas that have been demolished in these threads many times.
    You've established nothing. Try as hard as you may, you still haven't demonstrated how dialectical materialism cannot be applied to the natural and social sciences. And you never will. Your entire effort is an exercise in futility.

Similar Threads

  1. Replies: 5
    Last Post: 2nd April 2008, 06:10
  2. 'Anti-teen' device - Anti-youth prejudice
    By BobKKKindle$ in forum News & Ongoing Struggles
    Replies: 9
    Last Post: 13th February 2008, 19:47
  3. Anti-racist, Anti-homophobia, Anti-sexist
    By Red Menace in forum Learning
    Replies: 6
    Last Post: 25th February 2007, 14:24
  4. Replies: 8
    Last Post: 3rd June 2003, 22:26
  5. Replies: 0
    Last Post: 24th September 2001, 21:35

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts

Tags for this Thread