[STUDY GROUP] Deng Xiaoping Study Group

[jacobin1949]

Since anti-Deng sentiment has grown heated on Revleft, I've created this study group so both sympathizers and die-hard opponents of Deng Xiaoping Theory can learn more about the theoretical background, and economic success of Deng Theory.

For my early lessons I will be posting mostly from CPUSA publications like the PA and PWW. In the future I may aid articles from Communist PArties in Latin America, africa and Asia. Perhaps some of Deng's more important speeches works and documents can be added.

[jacobin1949]

China 2002: Building socialism with Chinese characteristics


Search WWW Search pww.org Archive Modern archive back to Oct. 2001 2002 Editions Mar 30, 2002
Earlier this month, a Communist Party USA delegation – National Chairman Sam Webb, Vice Chairman Scott Marshall, African American Equality Commission Chairwoman Debbie Bell and International Secretary Marilyn Bechtel – visited China for a week on invitation of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The group was the first official party delegation since long-time National Chairman Gus Hall visited China with a delegation in 1988.

In studying China today, it is important to recall where the great-great grandparents of today’s Chinese people were a century and a half ago. Together with many Chinese visitors, we viewed that story in well-designed museums in each city we visited – Beijing and the southeastern cities of Shanghai, Suzhou and Jiaxing.

The story begins with the starved, miserable, disease-ridden existence of most Chinese in the mid-19th century, as a corrupt and crumbling empire gave way before European colonial powers who would “oversee” China’s economy, steal its riches and distort its social development. The saga continues through the many sharp struggles that led to the 1949 revolution and the enormous effort that continues today, to bring a vast, impoverished developing country into the modern world and to begin the building of socialism.

In even an exceptionally well-planned whirlwind tour, following an itinerary we requested because it let us glimpse the fast-developing southeastern area that is open to foreign investment – we could only scratch the surface. We came away realizing that before any firm conclusions can be drawn, much further study is needed of the way in which the Communist Party of China is leading the building of the New China in the world’s largest socialist country; Of how party, government and people are working to solve the very difficult, long-term problems of rural-urban and regional economic disparities, massive reorganization of major industries and participation in a capitalist-dominated global economy. Many questions remain, and time and further experiences will tell if the policies now being pursued in a very thoughtful manner will succeed.

The CPC believes that China is in the primary stages of building socialism. When the Communist Party won state power in 1949, China had been ravaged by civil war and invasion. The early years after 1949 were marked both by periods of substantial economic and social progress, and by costly mistakes. During the “cultural revolution,” from 1966-1976, continuous political upheavals dealt a grievous setback to economic and social development.

The policies of reform and opening to the outside world that underlie China’s development today began in 1978, with the renewed leadership role of Deng Xiaoping. In practice, this means a thorough restructuring of the state owned sector aimed at bringing these industries up to world standards, and a planned opening of the economy to domestic and foreign private investment.

The CPC maintains that public ownership must remain primary. In 1997, for example, over 75 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) came from the state-owned sector. Here, the future trend will be important.

In the cities we visited, construction, both commercial and residential, is booming. Architecture is attractive – often elegant – and strikingly varied. This construction boom could serve as a metaphor for the energy and enthusiasm that is apparent among people on the street as well as among the Communist Party, academic, enterprise and government leaders with whom we met.

Among the issues on our minds was the effect of opening China’s economy to transnational capital, and in particular China’s newly acquired membership in the World Trade Organization. In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping asserted that opening up to private domestic and foreign capital was necessary to jump-start a developing economy. He emphasized that communism does not mean shared poverty, and stated that developing certain areas and industries was necessary to speed the development of the socialist economy as a whole.

We explored the issue at the Development Research Center of the State Council – the government’s top policy think tank. Director Wang Menkui emphasized the necessity for China to enter the global market in depth by trying to increase the power of developing countries and to influence policy in the World Trade Organization.

China faces major challenges because the WTO is controlled by the United States and other developed countries, but Wang and others we talked with believe that China will gain vital economic experience and information from WTO participation.

China is now much more directly affected by the global economy, Wang said. The world economic slowdown has negatively affected China’s exports, though last year China’s growth rate remained above 7 percent while worldwide economic growth stagnated at around 1.6 percent. Chinese agriculture, improvement of which is high on the priority list, will be sharply challenged, especially by U.S. agribusiness.

The impact of foreign investment was most visible in Shanghai, which was opened to international capital in the 1980s. A stroll through a brightly – even gaudily – neon pedestrian mall revealed a profusion of storefronts beckoning the strolling throngs with foreign as well as Chinese goods – electronics, clothing, furniture, appliances, consumer goods of all sorts. Had we wished a change from the Chinese haute cuisine we were served at every meal, we could have found McDonald’s, KFC, Starbucks, Burger King and more.

Another facet of foreign invest-

ment is exemplified by the Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) – the newest and most competitive of China’s more than 40 such parks. The city of Suzhou used to be a tourist magnet. Now, industrialized, its GDP is seventh in the country.

The park itself is the only joint venture project between the Chinese government and a foreign government – Singapore. The object is to gain the up-to-date technology, commercial and management experience of Singapore with its booming economic development, while giving the foreign investors an avenue to the vast Chinese market.

We inquired about the level of unionization at SIP – the All China Trade Union Federation had said its goal is to organize all the workers in the private sector as well as the state-owned enterprises. We were informed that over 20 unions function at the industrial park, and more than 75 percent of workers are organized. Under government agreements, joint venture companies must not place any obstacles in the way of workers who want to unionize.

Our hosts seemed sure that developing a mixed economy and encouraging foreign investment is not only necessary for the economy of a vast developing country in the early stages of building socialism, but offers benefits that far outweigh the risks. Naive? Perhaps – but having state power gives them added confidence in their ability to keep the public sector dominant.

The other prong of the economic development approach is the rigorous reorganization of the state-owned enterprises, or SOEs. Though there are many small- and medium-sized SOEs, the industrial heavyweights tend to be in this sector. The one we visited, the giant Bao Steel, appears to be doing a booming business in structural and other forms of steel.

Over the country as a whole, restructuring the SOEs is in full swing, and is resulting in significant unemployment. The official figure is given as 3.6 percent, and it is stated that 90 percent of these receive some level of subsistence allowance.

But the size of the migrant population there – 3 million temporary residents beyond the city’s 13 million population, bespeaks a larger problem. Our hosts asserted – we felt accurately – that these serious problems will take considerable time to surmount, but that the restructuring of inefficient SOEs is urgent for China’s future economic progress.

Related long-term problems are the differences in economic development between rural and urban areas, and between western and eastern China. Though agriculture accounts for only 20 percent of today’s GDP, 60 percent of the population lives in rural areas. With little arable land and low productivity, it is necessary to encourage people to move to the city, at the same time agricultural productivity is improved and small and medium industries are encouraged in rural areas. The population movement puts further pressure on the cities.

At the same time, the Chinese take great pride in the reduction of the number of people living below the poverty line by about 10 percent per year. They say the number of rural poor has decreased from 250 million in 1978 to about 30 million today. However, they express great concern that urban per capita incomes rose by 8.5 percent last year, but rural incomes only by 4.2 percent.

Our visit took place at the same time the National People’s Congress – the national legislature – was meeting in Beijing. We noted that a wide range of issues received media coverage. Discussion there was for the most part very open about problems as well as successes. One such issue is corruption, which the Chinese are dealing with as a major issue for immediate correction.

Another is the need for greater environmental protection – brought home to us by the constant pall of smog in the cities. China is waking up – a little late – to the fact that environmental prevention is vastly better than cure.

A third is housing, a national priority in the current five-year plan. In addition to the new high rise housing springing up everywhere, our hosts showed us tightly packed, shabby older housing still often found even in Beijing and Shanghai.

Our hosts were eager for our views on many questions including our estimates of the future direction of U.S. society. This provided an opportunity to convey our sense of urgency about the Bush administration’s adventurous ambitions at home and abroad.

Our Chinese hosts emphasized that they seek normal, stable state-to-state relations with the United States. At the time of our visit – just before the revelation that China is a Pentagon nuclear target – the biggest problem they cited was Taiwan. They insist the island must be recognized as part of China, albeit under a “one state, two systems” policy of accepting Taiwan’s capitalist economy, as has been done in the case of Hong Kong, and they are very concerned about U.S. intervention that could necessitate a sharp Chinese response. Particular ire was aroused by Washington’s invitation to Taiwan’s head of state to participate in a U.S. arms seminar earlier this month.

Our Chinese hosts welcomed us with great warmth and prepared the itinerary with much care, scheduling meetings with a member of the CPC’s Political Bureau, the Minister of the CPC International Department and the head of the government’s principal policy think tank, as well as visits to a variety of enterprises, the trade union federation, and historical/cultural sites. We found our hosts willing to discuss both successes and potholes in China’s developmental path.

Many questions and concerns about China’s future development remain open, needing both much further study, and further time to ascertain. A short visit did not allow assessment of the level of popular participation in the grassroots organizations of the party and government.

But we came away with a new respect for the thoughtfulness, thoroughness, energy and optimism with which the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people are going about the complex, long-term process of building socialism in a vast developing country, which is of necessity part of an increasingly globalized economy.


Marilyn Bechtel can be reached at [email protected];

Debbie Bell can be reached at [email protected]
http://www.pww.org/article/articleview/899/1/68/

[jacobin1949]

Deng on Mao

ANSWERS TO THE ITALIAN JOURNALIST ORIANA FALLACI
August 21 and 23, 1980


Oriana Fallaci: Will Chairman Mao's portrait above Tiananmen Gate be kept there?

Deng Xiaoping: It will, forever. In the past there were too many portraits of Chairman Mao. They were hung everywhere. That was not proper and it didn't really show respect for Chairman Mao. It's true that he made mistakes in a certain period, but he was after all a principal founder of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China. In evaluating his merits and mistakes, we hold that his mistakes were only secondary. What he did for the Chinese people can never be erased. In our hearts we Chinese will always cherish him as a founder of our Party and our state.

Question: We Westerners find a lot of things hard to understand. The Gang of Four are blamed for all the faults. I'm told that when the Chinese talk about the Gang of Four, many of them hold up five fingers.

Answer: We must make a clear distinction between the nature of Chairman Mao's mistakes and the crimes of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. For most of his life, Chairman Mao did very good things. Many times he saved the Party and the state from crises. Without him the Chinese people would, at the very least, have spent much more time groping in the dark. Chairman Mao's greatest contribution was that he applied the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, pointing the way to victory. It should be said that before the sixties or the late fifties many of his ideas brought us victories, and the fundamental principles he advanced were quite correct. He creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to every aspect of the Chinese revolution, and he had creative views on philosophy, political science, military science, literature and art, and so on. Unfortunately, in the evening of his life, particularly during the ``Cultural Revolution'', he made mistakes -- and they were not minor ones -- which brought many misfortunes upon our Party, our state and our people. As you know, during the Yan'an days our Party summed up Chairman Mao's thinking in various fields as Mao Zedong Thought, and we made it our guiding ideology. We won great victories for the revolution precisely because we adhered to Mao Zedong Thought. Of course, Mao Zedong Thought was not created by Comrade Mao alone -- other revolutionaries of the older generation played a part in forming and developing it -- but primarily it embodies Comrade Mao's thinking. Nevertheless, victory made him less prudent, so that in his later years some unsound features and unsound ideas, chiefly ``Left'' ones, began to emerge. In quite a number of instances he went counter to his own ideas, counter to the fine and correct propositions he had previously put forward, and counter to the style of work he himself had advocated. At this time he increasingly lost touch with reality. He didn't maintain a good style of work. He did not consistently practise democratic centralism and the mass line, for instance, and he failed to institutionalize them during his lifetime. This was not the fault of Comrade Mao Zedong alone. Other revolutionaries of the older generation, including me, should also be held responsible. Some abnormalities appeared in the political life of our Party and state -- patriarchal ways or styles of work developed, and glorification of the individual was rife; political life in general wasn't too healthy. Eventually these things led to the ``Cultural Revolution'', which was a mistake.

Question: You mentioned that in his last years, Chairman Mao was in poor health. But at the time of Liu Shaoqi's arrest and his subsequent death in prison Mao's health wasn't so bad. And there are other mistakes to be accounted for. Wasn't the Great Leap Forward a mistake? Wasn't copying the Soviet model a mistake? And what did Chairman Mao really want with the ``Cultural Revolution''?

Answer: Mistakes began to occur in the late fifties -- the Great Leap Forward, for instance. But that wasn't solely Chairman Mao's fault either. The people around him got carried away too. We acted in direct contravention of objective laws, attempting to boost the economy all at once. As our subjective wishes went against objective laws, losses were inevitable. Still, it is Chairman Mao who should be held primarily responsible for the Great Leap Forward. But it didn't take him long -- just a few months -- to recognize his mistake, and he did so before the rest of us and proposed corrections. And in 962, when because of some other factors those corrections had not been fully carried out, he made a self-criticism. But the lessons were not fully drawn, and as a result the ``Cultural Revolution'' erupted. So far as Chairman Mao's own hopes were concerned, he initiated the ``Cultural Revolution'' in order to avert the restoration of capitalism, but he had made an erroneous assessment of China's actual situation. In the first place, the targets of the revolution were wrongly defined, which led to the effort to ferret out ``capitalist roaders in power in the Party''. Blows were dealt at leading cadres at all levels who had made contributions to the revolution and had practical experience, including Comrade Liu Shaoqi. In the last couple of years before Chairman Mao's death he said that the ``Cultural Revolution'' had been wrong on two counts: one was ``overthrowing all'', and the other was waging a ``full-scale civil war''. These two counts alone show that the ``Cultural Revolution'' cannot be called correct. Chairman Mao's mistake was a political mistake, and not a small one. On the other hand, it was taken advantage of by the two counter-revolutionary cliques headed by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, who schemed to usurp power. Therefore, we should draw a line between Chairman Mao's mistakes and the crimes of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four.

Question: But we all know that it was Chairman Mao himself who chose Lin Biao1 as his successor, much in the same way as an emperor chooses his heir.

Answer: This is what I've just referred to as an incorrect way of doing things. For a leader to pick his own successor is a feudal practice. It is an illustration of the imperfections in our institutions which I referred to a moment ago.

Question: To what extent will Chairman Mao be involved when you hold your next Party congress?

Answer: We will make an objective assessment of Chairman Mao's contributions and his mistakes. We will reaffirm that his contributions are primary and his mistakes secondary. We will adopt a realistic approach towards the mistakes he made late in life. We will continue to adhere to Mao Zedong Thought, which represents the correct part of Chairman Mao's life. Not only did Mao Zedong Thought lead us to victory in the revolution in the past; it is -- and will continue to be -- a treasured possession of the Chinese Communist Party and of our country. That is why we will forever keep Chairman Mao's portrait on Tiananmen Gate as a symbol of our country, and we will always remember him as a founder of our Party and state. Moreover, we will adhere to Mao Zedong Thought. We will not do to Chairman Mao what Khrushchov did to Stalin.

Question: Do you mean to say that the name of Chairman Mao will inevitably come up when the Gang of Four is brought to trial as well as when you have your next Party congress?

Answer: His name will be mentioned. Not only at the next Party congress but also on other occasions. But the trial of the Gang of Four will not detract from Chairman Mao's prestige. Of course, he was responsible for putting them in their positions. Nevertheless, the crimes the Gang of Four themselves committed are more than sufficient to justify whatever sentences may be passed on them.

Question: I have heard that Chairman Mao frequently complained that you didn't listen to him enough, and that he didn't like you. Is it true?

Answer: Yes, Chairman Mao did say I didn't listen to him. But this wasn't directed only at me. It happened to other leaders as well. It reflects some unhealthy ideas in his twilight years, that is, patriarchal ways which are feudal in nature. He did not readily listen to differing opinions. We can't say that all his criticisms were wrong. But neither was he ready to listen to many correct opinions put forward not only by me but by other comrades. Democratic centralism was impaired, and so was collective leadership. Otherwise, it would be hard to explain how the ``Cultural Revolution'' broke out.

Question: There was one personage in China who always went unscathed, and that was Premier Zhou Enlai. How do you explain this fact?

Answer: Premier Zhou was a man who worked hard and uncomplainingly all his life. He worked 12 hours a day, and sometimes 16 hours or more, throughout his life. We got to know each other quite early, that is, when we were in France on a work-study programme during the 1920s. I have always looked upon him as my elder brother. We took the revolutionary road at about the same time. He was much respected by his comrades and all the people. Fortunately he survived during the ``Cultural Revolution'' when we were knocked down. He was in an extremely difficult position then, and he said and did many things that he would have wished not to. But the people forgave him because, had he not done and said those things, he himself would not have been able to survive and play the neutralizing role he did, which reduced losses. He succeeded in protecting quite a number of people.

Question: I don't see how terrible things like the ``Cultural Revolution'' can be avoided or prevented from recurring.

Answer: This issue has to be addressed by tackling the problems in our institutions. Some of those we established in the past were, in fact, tainted by feudalism, as manifested in such things as the personality cult, the patriarchal ways or styles of work, and the life tenure of cadres in leading posts. We are now looking into ways to prevent such things from recurring and are preparing to start with the restructuring of our institutions. Our country has a history of thousands of years of feudalism and is still lacking in socialist democracy and socialist legality. We are now working earnestly to cultivate socialist democracy and socialist legality. Only in this way can we solve the problem.

Question: Are you sure that things will proceed more smoothly from now on? Can you attain the goal you have set yourselves? I hear that the so-called Maoists are still around. By ``Maoists'' I mean those who backed the ``Cultural Revolution''.

Answer: The influence of the Gang of Four should not be underrated, but it should be noted that 97 or 98 per cent of the population hate them intensely for their crimes. This was shown by the mass movement against the Gang of Four which erupted at Tiananmen Square on April 5, 1976, when the Gang were still riding high, Chairman Mao was critically ill and Premier Zhou had passed away. Since the Gang's overthrow [in 1976], and particularly in the past two years, the will and demands of the people have been given expression in the Third, Fourth and Fifth Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. We are considering ways of resolving our problems by improving our institutions. Many issues have already been raised now. Particular emphasis is being laid on working single-mindedly for the four modernizations, and this is winning the hearts of the people. They want political stability and unity. They are fed up with large-scale movements. Such movements invariably ended up hurting a number -- and not a small number -- of people. Incessant movements make it practically impossible to concentrate on national construction. Therefore, we can say for sure that given the correctness of our present course, the people will support us and such phenomena as the ``Cultural Revolution'' will not happen again.

Question: The Gang of Four could only have been arrested after the death of Chairman Mao. Who engineered their arrest? Who initiated the idea?

Answer: It was collective effort. First of all, I think, it had a mass base laid by the April 5th Movement [of 1976]. The term ``Gang of Four'' was coined by Chairman Mao a couple of years before his death. We waged struggles against the Gang for two years, in 1974 and 1975. By then people clearly saw them for what they were. Although Chairman Mao had designated his successor, the Gang of Four refused to accept this. After Chairman Mao's death, the Gang took the opportunity to try and get all power into their own hands, and the situation demanded action from us. They were rampant at that time, trying to overthrow the new leadership. Under these circumstances, the great majority of the comrades of the Political Bureau were agreed that measures had to be taken to deal with the Gang. The efforts of one of two individuals would not have sufficed for this purpose.

It should be pointed out that some of the things done after the arrest of the Gang of Four were inconsistent with Chairman Mao's wishes, for instance, the construction of the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall. He had proposed in the fifties that we should all be cremated when we died and that only our ashes be kept, that no remains should be preserved and no tombs built. Chairman Mao was the first to sign his name, and we all followed suit. Nearly all senior cadres at the central level and across the country signed. We still have that book of signatures. What was done in the matter after the smashing of the Gang of Four was prompted by the desire to achieve a relative stability.

Question: Does this mean that the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall will soon be demolished?

Answer: I am not in favour of changing it. Now that it is there, it would not be appropriate to remove it. It wasn't appropriate to build it in the first place, but to change it would give rise to all kinds of talk. Many people are now speculating whether we will demolish the Memorial Hall. We have no such idea.

Question: It is said that you are giving up the post of Vice-Premier.

Answer: I will not be the only one to resign. All other comrades of the older generation are giving up their concurrent posts. Chairman Hua Guofeng will no longer serve concurrently as Premier of the State Council. The Central Committee of the Party has recommended Comrade Zhao Ziyang as candidate for that post. If we old comrades remain at our posts, newcomers will be inhibited in their work. We face the problem of gradually reducing the average age of leaders at all levels. We have to take the lead.

There were previously no relevant rules. In fact, however, there was life tenure in leading posts. This does not facilitate the renewal of leadership or the promotion of younger people. It is an institutional defect which was not evident in the sixties because we were then in the prime of life. This issue involves not just individuals but all the relevant institutions. It has an even greater bearing on our general policy and on whether our four modernizations can be achieved. Therefore, we say it would be better for us old comrades to take an enlightened attitude and set an example in this respect.

Question: I have seen other portraits in China. At Tiananmen I've seen portraits of Marx, Engels and Lenin and particularly of Stalin. Do you intend to keep them there?

Answer: Before the ``Cultural Revolution'' they were put up only on important holidays. The practice was changed during the ``Cultural Revolution'', when they were displayed permanently. Now we are going back to the former way.

Question: The four modernizations will bring foreign capital into China, and this will inevitably give rise to private investment. Won't this lead to a miniaturized capitalism?

Answer: In the final analysis, the general principle for our economic development is still that formulated by Chairman Mao, that is, to rely mainly on our own efforts with external assistance subsidiary. No matter to what degree we open up to the outside world and admit foreign capital, its relative magnitude will be small and it can't affect our system of socialist public ownership of the means of production. Absorbing foreign capital and technology and even allowing foreigners to construct plants in China can only play a complementary role to our effort to develop the productive forces in a socialist society. Of course, this will bring some decadent capitalist influences into China. We are aware of this possibility; it's nothing to be afraid of.

Question: Does it mean that not all in capitalism is so bad?

Answer: It depends on how you define capitalism. Any capitalism is superior to feudalism. And we cannot say that everything developed in capitalist countries is of a capitalist nature. For instance, technology, science -- even advanced production management is also a sort of science -- will be useful in any society or country. We intend to acquire advanced technology, science and management skills to serve our socialist production. And these things as such have no class character.

Question: I remember that several years ago, when talking about private plots in rural areas, you acknowledged that man needs some personal interest to produce. Doesn't this mean to put in discussion communism itself?

Answer: According to Marx, socialism is the first stage of communism and it covers a very long historical period in which we must practise the principle ``to each according to his work'' and combine the interests of the state, the collective and the individual, for only thus can we arouse people's enthusiasm for labour and develop socialist production. At the higher stage of communism, when the productive forces will be greatly developed and the principle ``from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'' will be practised, personal interests will be acknowledged still more and more personal needs will be satisfied.

Question: You mentioned that there are others who made contributions to Mao Zedong Thought. Who were they?

Answer: Other revolutionaries of the older generation, for example Premier Zhou Enlai, Comrades Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De -- and many others. Many senior cadres are creative and original in their thinking.

Question: Why did you leave your own name out?

Answer: I am quite insignificant. Of course, I too have done some work. Otherwise, I wouldn't be counted as a revolutionary.

Question: What we did not understand was: If the Gang of Four was, as you said, a minority with all the country against them, how could it happen that they were holding the whole country, including the veteran leaders? Was it because one of the four was the wife of Mao Zedong and the ties between Mao Zedong and her were so profound that no one dared to touch her?

Answer: This was one of the factors. As I've said, Chairman Mao made mistakes, one of which was using the Gang, letting them come to power. Also, the Gang had their own factional set-up and they built a clique of some size -- particularly they made use of ignorant young people as a front, so they had a fair-sized base.

Question: Was Mao Zedong blinded by her so that he wouldn't see what she was doing? And was she an adventuress like the Empress Dowager Yehonala?

Answer: Jiang Qing did evil things by flaunting the banner of Chairman Mao. But Chairman Mao and Jiang Qing lived separately for years.

Question: We didn't know that.

Answer: Jiang Qing did what she did by flaunting the banner of Chairman Mao, but he failed to intervene effectively. For this he should be held responsible. Jiang Qing is rotten through and through. Whatever sentence is passed on the Gang of Four won't be excessive. They brought harm to millions upon millions of people.

Question: How would you assess Jiang Qing? What score would you give her?

Answer: Below zero. A thousand points below zero.

Question: How would you assess yourself?

Answer: I would be quite content if I myself could be rated fifty-fifty in merits and demerits. But one thing I can say for myself: I have had a clear conscience all my life. Please mark my words: I have made quite a few mistakes, and I have my own share of responsibility for some of the mistakes made by Comrade Mao Zedong. But it can be said that I made my mistake with good intentions. There is nobody who doesn't make mistakes. We should not lay all past mistakes on Chairman Mao. So we must be very objective in assessing him. His contributions were primary, his mistakes secondary. We will inherit the many good things in Chairman Mao's thinking while at the same time explaining clearly the mistakes he made.

(Excerpts concerning domestic issues taken from the Chinese transcript of a two-part interview.)

[jacobin1949]

REMARKS ON SUCCESSIVE DRAFTS OF THE
``RESOLUTION ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS IN THE
HISTORY OF OUR PARTY SINCE THE FOUNDING
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA''
March 1980-June 1981


(The ``Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China'' was drafted under the guidance of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and of its Secretariat, with Comrades Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang presiding over the work. A drafting group was set up, with Comrade Hu Qiaomu as its principal leader. On a number of occasions between March 1980 and the Sixth Plenary Session of the Party's Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981, Comrade Deng Xiaoping gave his opinions on the drafting and revision of the resolution. Here are excerpts from nine of his talks.)

I

I have gone over the outline of the resolution prepared by the drafting group, and my impression is that it is over-extended. We should avoid the narrative method and make the writing more succinct. There should be expositions of important questions, and a bit more expository language generally. And of course we have to be accurate.

The document should cover three main points:

First, affirmation of the historical role of Comrade Mao Zedong and explanation of the necessity to uphold and develop Mao Zedong Thought. This is the most essential point. We must hold high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought not only today but in the future. There has been considerable ideological confusion among a number of people ever since the decision of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Party's Eleventh Central Committee on the rehabilitation of Comrade Liu Shaoqi was transmitted to the lower levels. Some people disagree with the decision, believing that it contravenes Mao Zedong Thought. Others think that the rehabilitation of Comrade Liu Shaoqi shows that Mao Zedong Thought is wrong. Both views are incorrect, and all such confused thinking must be clarified. The appraisal of Comrade Mao and of Mao Zedong Thought is a matter of great concern both inside and outside the Party, both at home and abroad. Not only all our Party comrades but also our friends in various quarters are concerned about what we have to say on this question.

The history of Mao Zedong Thought -- its origins and development -- should be written into the document. It can be said that Mao Zedong Thought assumed relatively complete form during the Yan'an period. The theories on the new-democratic revolution, including those on Party building and the principles on the handling of inner-Party relations, all essentially took shape around the time of the rectification movement [of the early forties] in Yan'an. The resolution on certain questions in the history of our Party adopted [in April 1945] by the [enlarged] Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in the main criticized the three ``Left'' lines in contrast to the correct line represented by Comrade Mao Zedong. But it did not systematically expound the entire content of Mao Zedong Thought. This time, as we intend to give a correct evaluation of Mao Zedong Thought and scientifically establish its guiding role, we have to expound its main contents in general terms, especially those elements which we shall continue to implement in the future. Comrade Mao Zedong made mistakes during the decade of the ``cultural revolution'' [1966-76]. In our appraisal of him and of Mao Zedong Thought, we must analyse those mistakes in the spirit of seeking truth from facts.

The second main point should be an analysis, in the same spirit, of the rights and wrongs in the major events of the 30 years since the founding of New China, including a fair evaluation of the merits and demerits of some leading comrades.

Third, there should be a basic summary of our past work. As I said before, it is better to write it in broad outline and not go into too much detail. The purpose of summing up the past is to encourage people to close ranks and look to the future. We should try to ensure that when this resolution is adopted, the thinking of Party members and non-Party people alike will be clarified, common views will be reached and, by and large, debate on the major historical questions will come to an end. Of course, it will be difficult to avoid debates over the past completely. However, such discussions may be conducted in connection with the ongoing work in each period in the future. For the present, we should work with one heart and one mind for China's four modernizations, and all of us should unite as one and look forward. But that's not so easy to achieve. We must do our best to work out a good resolution so that we can reach a consensus and not let major differences arise again. Then, even if the past is brought up, people won't differ significantly in their views. They will stick to talking over the content of the resolution and the lessons to be learned from past experience.

These three points constitute the general requirements or principles or guidelines for this resolution. The first is the most important, the most fundamental, the most crucial.

In the past, we often talked about 10 struggles between two opposing lines. How should we regard them now?

The struggle against Comrade Peng Dehuai cannot be viewed as a struggle between two lines. Nor can the struggle against Comrade Liu Shaoqi. That makes two such struggles less. Lin Biao and Jiang Qing formed counter-revolutionary cliques. Chen Duxiu and Comrades Qu Qiubai and Li Lisan did not engage in conspiracies. Luo Zhanglong tried to split the Party by setting up another central committee. Zhang Guotao engaged in conspiracy, and so did Gao Gang. And, of course, so did Lin Biao and Jiang Qing.

It was correct to expose Gao Gang and Rao Shushi. Whether this struggle can be regarded as one between two lines is something that can be looked into further. I am quite clear on the whole story. After Comrade Mao Zedong proposed at the end of 1953 that the work of the Central Committee be divided into a ``front line'' and a ``second line'', Gao Gang became very active. He first gained the support of Lin Biao, which was what emboldened him to go ahead full steam. At the time, he was in charge in northeast China, while Lin Biao was in charge in central-south China and Rao Shushi in east China. So far as southwest China was concerned, he tried to win me over and had serious talks with me in which he said that Comrade Liu Shaoqi was immature. He was trying to persuade me to join in his effort to topple Comrade Liu Shaoqi. I made my attitude clear, saying that Comrade Liu's position in the Party was the outcome of historical development, that he was a good comrade on the whole, and that it was inappropriate to try to oust him from such a position. Gao Gang also approached Comrade Chen Yun and told him that a few more vice-chairmanships should be instituted, with himself and Chen each holding one of them. At this point, Comrade Chen Yun and I realized the gravity of the matter and immediately brought it to Comrade Mao Zedong's attention. It was highly irregular for Gao Gang to engage in behind-the-scene deals and conspiracies in his attempt to bring Comrade Liu Shaoqi down. Therefore, we should reaffirm that it was correct to struggle against Gao Gang. The Gao-Rao case was handled rather leniently. Hardly anyone was hurt. In fact, care was taken to protect a number of cadres. All in all, we had no choice but to expose Gao Gang and Rao Shushi and deal with their case as we did. Our handling of it was correct from the present perspective as well. But so far as Gao Gang's real line is concerned, actually, I can't see that he had one, so it's hard to say whether we should call it a struggle between two lines. Please discuss this further.

The necessity for the anti-Rightist struggle of 1957 should be reaffirmed. After the completion of the socialist transformation, there was indeed a force -- a trend of thought -- in the country that was bourgeois in nature and opposed to socialism. It was imperative to counter this trend. I've said on many occasions that some people really were making vicious attacks at the time, trying to negate the leadership of the Communist Party and change the socialist orientation of our country. If we hadn't thwarted their attempt, we would not have been able to advance. Our mistake lay in broadening the scope of the struggle. The United Front Work Department wrote a report to the Central Committee suggesting that in all cases of persons wrongly labelled as Rightists, the judgements should be corrected, but that where the labels had been correct, the judgements should be allowed to stand. However, in the case of figures formerly prominent in the democratic parties who were correctly labelled Rightists, it should be written into the judgements on their cases that they had performed good deeds before the anti-Rightist struggle, and especially during the period of the democratic revolution. Their family members should not be discriminated against but should be properly looked after politically and in terms of their daily life and work.

The several points about our experience mentioned towards the end of your outline are well written, but I suggest you consider adding one or two more.

To sum up, historical questions should be expounded only in broad or general outline, and not in too much detail. As for the erroneous opinions of some of our comrades on a number of questions, you should brace yourselves and resist them. On the major issues, further exposition is needed. I suggest that you work out the draft as soon as possible.

(Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, March 19, 1980)

II

Generally speaking, Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership was correct before 1957, but he made more and more mistakes after the anti-Rightist struggle of that year. ``On the Ten Major Relationships'' is a fine speech. So is ``On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People''. In his article ``The Situation in the Summer of 1957'', Comrade Mao said that we must build a modern industrial and agricultural base in China and that only with its achievement could our socialist economic and political system be said to have obtained a fairly adequate material base. He said that to build socialism the working class must have its own army of technical cadres and of professors, teachers, scientists, journalists, writers, artists and Marxist theorists, and it must be a vast army, as a few would not suffice. He said that we should create a political situation in which we had both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness. The two Zhengzhou Meetings were most timely. In the first half of 1959 we were correcting ``Left'' mistakes. And the early stage of the Lushan Meeting was devoted to economic work. With the issuing of Comrade Peng Dehuai's letter, however, there was a change of direction. Comrade Peng's views were correct, and it was normal for him as a member of the Political Bureau to write to the Chairman. Although he had his shortcomings, the way his case was handled was totally wrong. After that came the period of economic difficulties. In 1961, the Secretariat of the Central Committee presided over the drafting of the ``Seventy Articles on Industrial Work'' and of a resolution on industrial questions. At the time Comrade Mao Zedong was quite satisfied with these articles and spoke highly of them. He said that we had finally managed to work out some guiding rules for industrial work. Earlier, we had drawn up the ``Twelve Articles on Agricultural Work'' and the ``Sixty Articles on the Work of the People's Communes''. It seemed that Comrade Mao Zedong was then earnestly correcting the ``Left'' mistakes. His address at the conference attended by 7,000 comrades in early 1962 was also fine. At the Beidaihe Meeting of July-August that year, however, he reversed direction again, laying renewed and even greater stress on class struggle. Of course, Comrade Mao Zedong did say in his speech at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee that the renewed emphasis on class struggle should not interfere with the economic readjustment then in progress. That speech had a positive effect. But after that session, he personally focused on class struggle by initiating the movement of the ``four clean-ups''. Later he wrote the two instructions on literary and art work, and Jiang Qing's stuff began to surface. Towards the end of 1964 and the beginning of 1965, in the discussions on the ``four clean-ups'' movement, Chairman Mao held not only that there were capitalist roaders in power but that there were two ``independent kingdoms'' in Beijing. Judging from the developments between 1961 and 1966, we can see that the economic readjustment had obtained good results, that the economic and political situation was favourable, and that public order was good. In a word, in the 17 years following the founding of the People's Republic, our work was basically correct, although there were setbacks and mistakes. We carried out the socialist revolution well, and Comrade Mao Zedong wrote good articles and put forth good ideas after we shifted our attention to socialist construction. When we talk about mistakes, we should not speak only of Comrade Mao, for many other leading comrades in the Central Committee made mistakes too. Comrade Mao got carried away when we launched the Great Leap Forward,76 but didn't the rest of us go along with him? Neither Comrade Liu Shaoqi nor Comrade Zhou Enlai nor I for that matter objected to it, and Comrade Chen Yun didn't say anything either. We must be fair on these questions and not give the impression that only one individual made mistakes while everybody else was correct, because it doesn't tally with the facts. When the Central Committee makes a mistake, it is the collective rather than a particular individual that bears the responsibility. We should analyse these matters by combining Marxism-Leninism with our practice so that we can make new contributions and push things forward.

The several points in the outline concerning our experience are good. The question is where to place them.

As far as the general organization is concerned, we should consider whether there should be a foreword containing a brief history of the new-democratic revolution prior to the founding of the People's Republic, followed by a section covering the first 17 years of New China, a section about the ``Cultural Revolution'', a section about Mao Zedong Thought and, finally, the concluding remarks. These concluding remarks should make it clear that, when all is said and done, our Party is a great party with the courage to face up to, and correct, its own mistakes. The most essential, the most fundamental, point in the resolution is that we must adhere to and develop Mao Zedong Thought. People inside and outside the Party and at home and abroad all expect us to expound and elucidate this issue and make some relevant generalizations.

(Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, April 1, 1980)

III

I have gone over the draft of the resolution. It is no good and needs rewriting. We stressed at the very beginning that the historical role of Comrade Mao Zedong must be affirmed and that Mao Zedong Thought must be adhered to and developed. The draft doesn't reflect this intention adequately. The passages dealing with the events before 1957 are all right as to the facts, but the way they are presented -- the sequence and especially the tone of presentation -- should be reconsidered and altered. We have to give a clear account of Comrade Mao Zedong's contributions to China's socialist revolution and construction. Mao Zedong Thought is still in the process of development. We should restore and adhere to Mao Zedong Thought and go on developing it further. Comrade Mao laid a foundation for us in all these respects, and the resolution should fully reflect his ideas. It should cite some of his important articles and speeches in the period of socialist revolution and construction, such as ``On the Ten Major Relationships'', ``On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People'' and ``The Situation in the Summer of 1957''. They contain the ideas which we must continue to adhere to and develop today. We must give people a clear understanding of what specific ideas we have in mind when we say we will hold high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought and adhere to Mao Zedong Thought.

The tone of the draft as a whole is too depressing -- it doesn't read like a resolution. It seems it will have to be revised, which will take a lot of work. The emphasis should be on what Mao Zedong Thought actually is and what Comrade Mao Zedong's correct ideas were. Criticism of mistakes is necessary but it must be appropriate. Criticizing Comrade Mao's personal mistakes alone will not solve problems. What is most important is the question of systems and institutions. Comrade Mao made many correct statements, but the faulty systems and institutions of the past pushed him in the opposite direction. The mistakes Comrade Mao made in both theory and practice in his later years should be mentioned, but they should be dealt with properly and only in general outline. The main thing is to concentrate on the aspects in which he was correct, because that conforms to historical reality. Shouldn't the concluding section include a passage about our determination to go on developing Mao Zedong Thought? We should also criticize the ``two whatevers''. Comrade Mao Zedong's mistakes consisted in violations of his own correct ideas. According to the ``two-whatevers'' viewpoint, we should adhere, without the slightest change, to Comrade Mao's erroneous views in his later years. The slogan ``Act according to the principles laid down'' meant to act in accordance with the erroneous principles Comrade Mao laid down in the evening of his life. The resolution should also discuss the influence of the vestiges of feudalism, but again in a proper way. Comrade Mao said on numerous occasions that he was against adulation of anyone, and he proposed that no places or enterprises should be named after leaders and that there should be no celebration of their birthdays and no presentation of gifts. It is precisely Mao Zedong Thought that the present Central Committee upholds, only we have given it concrete content.

(Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, June 27, 1980)

IV

The inner-Party discussions, in which 4,000 comrades are participating, are still going on. I have read some summaries. The comrades have been airing their ideas freely and putting forward different views, some of which are very good. I think the draft of the resolution being discussed is still too long and needs to be condensed. Delete what is dispensable and give more prominence to the essentials. Many discussion groups want a section in the draft to be devoted to the period following the smashing of the Gang of Four. It seems we shall have to write one.

One most important question is whether the resolution should include an appraisal of the merits and demerits of Comrade Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought. If so, how should they be appraised? I talked to some comrades from the Guards Bureau under the General Office of the Central Committee; they told me they had read to their soldiers the transcript of my recent interview with the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci and had organized some discussions on it. All the officers and men felt that what I had said was appropriate and acceptable. If we don't mention Mao Zedong Thought and don't make an appropriate evaluation of Comrade Mao's merits and demerits, the old workers will not feel satisfied, nor will the poor and lower-middle peasants of the period of land reform, nor the many cadres who have close ties with them. On no account can we discard the banner of Mao Zedong Thought. To do so would, in fact, be to negate the glorious history of our Party. On the whole, the Party's history is glorious. Our Party has also made big mistakes in the course of its history, including some in the three decades since the founding of New China, not least, so gross a mistake as the ``Cultural Revolution''. But after all, we did triumph in the revolution. It is since the birth of the People's Republic that China's status in the world has been so greatly enhanced. It is since the founding of the People's Republic that our great country, with nearly a quarter of the world's population, has stood up -- and stood firm -- in the community of nations. That's how Comrade Mao Zedong put it: The Chinese people have now stood up. Our people at home and Chinese nationals abroad all felt this change deeply and strongly. It is also since the founding of thePeople's Republic that the country (excepting Taiwan) has been truly reunified. In old China, there was no national reunification in the true sense under the rule of the Kuomintang, much less in the previous years of constant fighting among warlords. Provinces like Shanxi, Guangdong, Guangxi and Sichuan could not be considered as being really united with the rest of China. Our country would still be in its old plight were it not for our Communist Party, our new-democratic revolution, our socialist revolution and the establishment of our socialist system. What we have achieved cannot be separated from the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Zedong. It is precisely this point that many of our young people don't sufficiently appreciate.

The appraisal of Comrade Mao Zedong and the exposition of Mao Zedong Thought relate not only to Comrade Mao personally but also to the entire history of our Party and our country. We must keep this overall judgement in mind. We have emphasized it repeatedly ever since we started drafting this resolution. It must contain a section expounding Mao Zedong Thought. It's not merely a theoretical question that is involved but also and especially a political question of great domestic and international significance. If we don't have this section, or if it is badly written, it would be better to have no resolution at all. As to how to write it, we should of course give serious consideration to the suggestions made by the comrades.

It is right not to say that Mao Zedong Thought is a development of Marxism-Leninism in all its aspects or that it represents a new stage of Marxism. But we ought to recognize that Mao Zedong Thought is the application and development of Marxism-Leninism in China. In the course of applying it to the solution of China's practical problems, our Party has indeed developed Marxism-Leninism in many respects. This is an objective reality and a historical fact. The draft resolution, however it is written, should also contain a clear exposition of the merits and demerits of Comrade Mao, the content of Mao Zedong Thought and its guiding role in our work both at present and for the future. Since the Third Plenary Session, we have been restoring the correct things advocated by Comrade Mao Zedong; we have been studying and applying Mao Zedong Thought correctly and as an integral whole. The basic points of Mao Zedong Thought are still those we have enumerated. In many respects, we are doing things Comrade Mao suggested but failed to do himself, setting right his erroneous opposition to certain things and accomplishing some things that he did not. All this we shall continue to do for a fairly long time. Of course, we have developed Mao Zedong Thought and will go on developing it.

Mao Zedong Thought was set as the guiding thought for our whole Party at its Seventh National Congress. The Party educated an entire generation in Mao Zedong Thought, and that is what enabled us to win the revolutionary war and found the People's Republic of China. The ``Cultural Revolution'' was really a gross error. However, our Party was able to smash the counter-revolutionary cliques of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four and put an end to the ``Cultural Revolution'' and it has continued to advance ever since. Who achieved all this? Is it not the generation educated in Mao Zedong Thought? Now, when we speak of setting things right, we mean that we should undo the damage done by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, criticize the mistakes Comrade Mao Zedong made in his later years, and put things back on the right track of Mao Zedong Thought. In short, if we fail to include in the resolution a section concerning Mao Zedong Thought, which, since it has been proved correct in practice, ought to serve as the guideline for our future work, we will diminish the practical and historical significance of the revolution and construction we have engaged in and will continue to engage in. It would be a grave historical mistake not to expound Mao Zedong Thought in the resolution or to cease to adhere to it.

Today, some comrades attribute many problems to the personal qualities of Comrade Mao Zedong. As a matter of fact, there are quite a few problems that cannot be explained in that way. Mistakes are unavoidable under some circumstances even for people of fine quality. During the period of the Red Army, a campaign was mounted against the A-B [``Anti-Bolshevik''] Group in the Central Revolutionary Base Area. Can it be said that all the participants in the campaign were bad people? At first, Comrade Mao Zedong also took part in this struggle, but he came to see what was wrong with it earlier than others and drew the necessary lessons. Later, in Yan'an, he put forward the principle of ``killing none and arresting few''. In the exceptionally tense wartime conditions that then prevailed, when bad elements were discovered within our ranks, it was necessary to heighten our vigilance. However, when we failed to act soberly and make clear analyses but simply believed in confessions by the accused, it was hard to avoid mistakes. Objectively, the situation then was really tense but subjectively, of course, there was also the problem of our lack of experience.

And, in the ``Cultural Revolution'', Comrade Mao Zedong did not intend to overthrow all the veteran cadres. For instance, from the very beginning Lin Biao was bent on persecuting Comrade He Long, but Comrade Mao Zedong wanted to protect him. Despite the fact that Comrade Mao wanted to ``rectify'' anyone who disobeyed him, he still gave some consideration to how far he should go. We cannot say that he bore no responsibility for the intensified persecution of veteran cadres that occurred later, but he was not the only one to blame. In some instances, persecutions had already been carried out by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, while in others they took place behind Comrade Mao's back. This notwithstanding, it must be said that the overthrow of a large number of cadres was one of the biggest tragedies of Comrade Mao Zedong's later years.

In those years, Comrade Mao Zedong was in fact not so consistent in his thinking as he previously had been, and some of his statements were mutually contradictory. For instance, in appraising the ``Cultural Revolution'', he said that its mistakes amounted to only 30 per cent and its achievements to 70 per cent. And when he referred to the 30 per cent of mistakes, he meant ``overthrowing all'' and waging a ``full-scale civil war''. How can anyone reconcile this with the idea of 70 per cent achievements?

We should unequivocally criticize mistakes, including those by Comrade Mao Zedong. But we must seek truth from facts and analyse the different situations -- and not attribute everything to the personal qualities of particular individuals. Comrade Mao Zedong was not an isolated individual, he was the leader of our Party until the moment of his death. When we write about his mistakes, we should not exaggerate, for otherwise we shall be discrediting Comrade Mao Zedong, and this would mean discrediting our Party and state. Any exaggeration of his mistakes would be at variance with the historical facts.

(Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, October 25, 1980)

V

I think we can settle for this outline of the draft resolution.

We all agree that much was achieved during the first seven years of the People's Republic. China's socialist transformation was a success -- a truly remarkable success -- and it represented a major contribution by Comrade Mao Zedong to Marxism-Leninism. Even today, we need to elaborate upon it in terms of theory. Of course there were shortcomings. Sometimes, in certain spheres, we were a bit too impetuous in our work.

Our work in the 10 years before the ``Cultural Revolution'' should be assessed as generally good; in the main, it proceeded along the right road. We suffered setbacks and made mistakes during that period, but the achievements were the main thing. The Party was then close in feeling to the masses and its prestige among them was high. The general atmosphere in society was fine, and the cadres and the people in general were in high spirits. Therefore, when we met with difficulties, we were able to get through them quite smoothly. There were some problems in the economy, but on the whole it made progress. While fully affirming our achievements, the resolution must also discuss the mistakes we made in the anti-Rightist struggle, in the Great Leap Forward and at the Lushan Meeting. In general, these mistakes were due to our inexperience and, of course, to the fact that success went to our heads. Naturally, Comrade Mao Zedong bore the chief responsibility for them, for which he criticized himself and assumed the blame. When all these matters are clearly set forth, we can move on to discuss how the ``Left'' ideology developed and how it eventually led to the outbreak of the ``Cultural Revolution''.

The section dealing with the ``Cultural Revolution'' should be written in broad outline. I agree with Comrade Hu Qiaomu's views. Compared with the mistakes made in the preceding 17 years, the ``Cultural Revolution'' was an error of particular gravity, one affecting the overall situation. Its consequences were so serious that they are still being felt today. We say that the ``Cultural Revolution'' wasted the talents of a whole generation of our people. In fact, it didn't stop with just one generation. It opened the floodgates to anarchism and ultra-individualism, and seriously debased standards of social conduct. However, there were also some healthy phenomena even in that decade. The so-called February adverse current was not adverse at all; rather, it was a good current of repeated struggles against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four.

Comrade Hu Yaobang has suggested that after the draft is completed we take it to some veteran cadres and statesmen, including Comrades Huang Kecheng and Li Weihan, and hear what they have to say. This is a good suggestion and I am in favour of it.

(Talk with leading comrades of the drafting group for the ``Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party'', March 18, 1981)

VI

I went to see Comrade Chen Yun the day before yesterday. He made two more suggestions for the revision of the draft resolution. One is that we should add a section reviewing the entire history of the Party in the 60 years since its founding, including the years before Liberation. With this 60-year review, he said, it will be possible to make a more comprehensive summary of Comrade Mao Zedong's merits and contributions, and we will have an adequate basis for affirming Comrade Mao Zedong's historical role and the necessity of adhering to and developing Mao Zedong Thought. This is a fine suggestion. Please convey it to the other members of the drafting group. The other suggestion by Comrade Chen Yun is that the Central Committee should encourage people to study, principally to study Marxist philosophy, with the emphasis on Comrade Mao Zedong's philosophical works. Comrade Chen Yun says that he has benefited a lot from studying them. Comrade Mao told him on three occasions that he must study philosophy. While in Yan'an, he read Comrade Mao's writings attentively, and that had a great influence on his own later work. Many of our cadres still don't understand philosophy and very much need to improve their way of thinking and work. We should select and publish in one book such articles as ``On Practice'', ``On Contradiction'', ``On Protracted War'', ``Problems of War and Strategy'' and ``On Coalition Government''. We should also select some works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin for study. In a word, it is essential to study Marxist philosophy and a little history as well. Young people don't know Chinese history, especially the history of the Chinese revolution and of the Chinese Communist Party. Please report these suggestions to Comrade Hu Yaobang. The resolution should contain a richer and more substantial exposition of Comrade Mao Zedong's contribution to Marxist philosophy. The conclusion should include some remarks encouraging people to study.

(Talk with a leading comrade of the drafting group for the ``Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party'', March 26, 1981)

VII

There have been several rounds of discussion of the draft resolution. Many good suggestions have been made that should be accepted. However, there have also been some suggestions that are unacceptable. For instance, some people have suggested we declare that the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee and the Ninth Party Congress were not legitimate. But to deny their legitimacy would pull the rug out from under us when we say that during the ``Cultural Revolution'' the Party was still functioning and the State Council and the People's Liberation Army were still able to do much of their essential work. Comrade Zhou Enlai gave an explanation at the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, saying that 10 members of the Central Committee had died by then and that the vacancies had all been filled by alternate members. Thus 50 members of the Central Committee, or more than half the total, were present at the session. That means the session was legitimate. So it's not right to say that neither the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee nor the Ninth Party Congress was legitimate. This is clear if we take into consideration Comrade Mao Zedong's policy decision (a wise one) in Yan'an concerning the legitimacy of the provisional central leadership set up in Shanghai in 1931 and of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee that it later convened. Some comrades have argued that the Party ceased to exist during the ``Cultural Revolution''. We can't say that. Though the Party's regular activities stopped for a period, it did in fact exist. If it didn't, how could we have smashed the Gang of Four without firing a single shot or shedding a single drop of blood? The Party did exist during the ``Cultural Revolution''. To deny the legitimacy of the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee or of the Ninth Party Congress would be tantamount to saying that the Party ceased to exist for a period of time. This is not in accord with the facts.

During the ``Cultural Revolution'' great successes were achieved in our work in foreign affairs. Despite the domestic turmoil, internationally China's status as a great nation was recognized and its stature rose. Kissinger visited China in July 1971, and in October of that year more than two-thirds of the member states of the United Nations voted to restore the lawful seat of the People's Republic of China in that organization, an event that greatly discomfited the United States. In February 1972, Nixon visited China, and the ``Shanghai Joint Communique'' was signed. In September of that year, China and Japan restored diplomatic relations. In April 1974, I attended the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, where I spoke on behalf of the Chinese Government and was accorded a warm welcome. After my speech, delegates from many countries came up to shake hands with me. All these are facts.

(Talk with leading comrades of the drafting group for the ``Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party'', April 7, 1981)

VIII

We have spent more than a year writing this document, and it has gone through I don't know how many drafts. In October 1980, it was discussed by 4,000 comrades, who made many good and important suggestions. On the basis of their discussion and the more recent one by more than 40 comrades, it was again revised several times. More than 20 comrades, who worked really hard on it, have now produced the present draft.

Some comrades have said that perhaps we shouldn't be in such a rush to write this resolution. But that's wrong because people are waiting for it. In China, people both inside and outside the Party are waiting. If we don't come out with something, there can be no unity of views on major issues. The world is waiting, too. People are watching events in China with some doubts about its stability and unity. And one of their doubts is about whether we can produce this document, and if so, when. So we can't take any longer because further delay will be unfavourable. Of course, we want the draft to be good. In my estimation, the present draft can at least serve as a good basis. It has been prepared in conformity with the three basic requirements set down at the beginning, and it has fulfilled them.

If we are to get this document out soon, we cannot -- and need not -- hold another round of discussion by the 4,000 comrades. They have already aired their opinions, which have been fully incorporated in the revised draft. Our present method is to hold this enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau attended by more than 70 comrades, who will spend some time and energy scrutinizing the draft so as to further improve and finalize it. Once it is finalized it will be submitted to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee. We plan to publish it on the 60th anniversary [July 1, 1981] of the founding of our Party. There's no need to write much else to mark the anniversary. We should, of course, do something to commemorate it, and publishing this document will be the main thing.

In my opinion, a defect of this draft is that it is a bit too long. We tried to condense it to no more than 20,000 characters but finally set the limit at 25,000. Now it runs to 28,000. My view now is that an excess of three to five thousand characters doesn't matter and that it needn't be cut further if that proves difficult. Of course, it would be better if, through discussion, you could condense it in some places.

This draft was revised on the basis of the discussion by 4,000 comrades and the recent discussion by more than 40 comrades. Many good suggestions have been incorporated. For instance, Comrade Chen Yun suggested that the resolution begin with a review of the Party's history in the 28 years before the founding of the People's Republic. That was a very valuable suggestion, and we now have this review at the beginning of the draft. There were many other valuable suggestions, and a reading of the draft will reveal the corresponding changes. Of course, some suggestions were rejected.

In short, there are two key questions. First, with regard to Comrade Mao Zedong: Which were primary, his achievements or his mistakes? Second, in the last 32 years, and especially the 10 years before the ``Cultural Revolution'', were our achievements or our mistakes primary? Was the situation in those years all dark, or was its bright side dominant? There is also a third question: Should we blame Comrade Mao Zedong alone for all the mistakes of the past, or should others also take some responsibility? This draft says in more than one place that the Central Committee of the Party should be held responsible for those mistakes and that other comrades should share the blame. I think that, relatively speaking, this conforms to reality. The fourth point is that although Comrade Mao Zedong made mistakes, after all they are the mistakes of a great revolutionary, a great Marxist.

(Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, May 19, 1981)

IX

On the whole, this is a good resolution and a good draft. From the beginning we have intended that this resolution should hold high the great banner of Mao Zedong Thought and make a balanced appraisal of the ``Cultural Revolution'' and of Comrade Mao Zedong's merits and demerits, his achievements and mistakes, an appraisal based on facts. In this way the document can perform the same function as the 1945 resolution on the history of our Party, that is, to sum up experience, unify thinking and unite all our comrades as one in looking to the future. I think this draft meets these requirements.

Drafting this resolution has taken more than a year, during which time it was discussed by 4,000 comrades and then by several dozen more and by an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau. Our discussion at this preparatory meeting for the Sixth Plenary Session, then, is the fourth round. I think we have been rather careful and conscientious in this matter.

The central issue remains how to assess Comrade Mao Zedong, and the draft deals with it in a well-measured way. For instance, whether or not to categorize his errors as errors of line is a question that has to be handled judiciously. We have decided not to refer to them by that term because in the past the formulations ``struggle between two lines'' and ``error of Party line'' were used inaccurately, indiscriminately and too often. Formerly we used to talk about several two-line struggles in the Party's history, but from our present point of view it seems clear that at least two such designations cannot stand and ought to be reversed once for all. I am referring to the case of Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi and Yang Shangkun and the case of Peng Dehuai, Huang Kecheng, Zhang Wentian and Zhou Xiaozhou. The basic verdict

[jacobin1949]

Sam Webb on Chinese Socialism

PA: Many countries that have a socialist orientation are in the developing world: China, Vietnam, Cuba. Several have adopted a concept of socialism called market socialism. I know we have said there are no models, but is the socialist market economy the new model?
Socialism is not just a project of the left; it has to be a mass project of millions and of diverse social forces.

Webb: These countries are in the early stages of socialism – they are developing countries and the productive forces are at a low level – so they are employing market mechanisms to assist in their economic development. This doesn’t contradict the thinking of Marx, Engels or Lenin. Even if we were dealing with more advanced countries – take our country for example - if this were the day after, the week after, the year after, the decade after the socialist revolution, we would employ market mechanisms in the construction of the socialist economy. There was a tendency in the communist movement to expect that market relations would disappear almost overnight, in the early stages of socialism. I’m not convinced that was an accurate reading of the classical literature or a lesson that we should draw from the experience of socialist construction in the 20th century. Some socialist countries tried to make too quick a leap from one stage of socialist development, in which market relations were employed, to a more advanced stage, in which commodity-money relations were marginal, and, as a result, experienced very negative consequences.

The example that comes most readily to mind is China. At the core of Mao’s economic policies was not simply the acceleration of the pace of development, but rather leaping over whole stages. Unfortunately, China pursued that policy at a very dear price. There’s a lot of controversy now about the current economic policies of the Communist Party of China. Many people are critical, but in my short stay there (I visited about a year and a half ago), it was apparent that the opening up of the country and the employment of market mechanisms has led to the acceleration of growth. Some say there is greater inequality, and that’s true, but at the same time they are lifting tens of millions out of poverty. Simply because the Chinese are utilizing market mechanisms and inserting themselves into the global economy is not reason enough to conclude that China is moving away from socialism.

Why do I say this? First of all, no country can develop apart from the global economy? While it is no simple task for the socialist and developing countries to insert themselves into a world economy that is dominated by and structured in the interests of the most powerful capitalist countries, do these countries have any other feasible option? Secondly, market mechanisms are not by definition at war with socialist construction. Whether they are utilized and how they contribute to socialist construction of one or another country can’t be solved abstractly in the realm of high theory. It has to be answered by examining the concrete political and economic circumstances in any given country.

Finally, we should study the experience of socialism in the 20th century as well as revisit both the early literature and more recent discussions on the socialist economy before we draw hard and fast conclusions with respect to the use of market criteria and tools in a socialist society. Lenin once said (and I’m paraphrasing him here) that the economic policies of the post-civil war Soviet state had to be adjusted to the mentality of the peasants, which led to the adoption of the New Economic Policy in the early 1920s. Not only was this necessary to revive an economy that was in shambles after the civil war, but it was the glue that maintained the strategic alliance between a tiny working class and huge peasantry. This alliance, Lenin argued time and again, was the essential political requirement for the forward movement of socialism in a very backward country.

http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/24/1/1

[jacobin1949]

The Leninist Heritage of the Socialist Market Economy

By C.J. Atkins


9-05-07, 9:13 am

Just as China's socialist market economy is today dismissed by many in academia and the bourgeois press as a return to capitalism, it is important to recall that Lenin too faced similar criticism during the early years of Soviet power. His New Economic Policy (NEP) was often characterized by critics, both outside and inside the Communist movement, as an abandonment of socialism and Marxist ideology. While the conditions which necessitated the NEP in 1920's Soviet Russia and those which brought about the need for economic reform in China following the chaos of the Cultural Revolution were quite different, the ideological challenges the Russian Communist Party faced in the aftermath of the civil war and those that Chinese Communists were forced to address in the late 1970s do share some similarities.

Lenin understood there could be no successful advance to socialist relations of production without a highly-developed set of productive forces to sustain socialist methods of distribution. Addressing the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in March of 1921, referring to the necessity of cooperation with foreign and domestic capitalist elements, Lenin stated:

We are now in a transitional stage, and our revolution is surrounded by capitalist countries. As long as we are in this phase, we are forced to seek highly complex forms of relationships. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 189)




A component of these "highly complex forms of relationships," of course, was the institution of the market mechanism in first the agricultural and later other sectors of the economy. In further remarks to the Congress, Lenin assured delegates that the gravest problem in the immediate period was not the policy of concessions to capitalism as some, particularly those on the left, warned. Rather, it was the very low level of the productive forces that threatened the survival of the October Revolution.

We must not be afraid of the growth of the petty bourgeoisie and small capital. What we must fear is protracted starvation, want and food shortage, which create the danger that the proletariat will give way to petty-bourgeois vacillation and despair. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 237-8)



Many of Lenin's writings from the early 1920s demonstrate the conclusion that in a predominantly peasant country with low levels of productive forces and education there could be no leap to socialist or communist lines of production and distribution. Instead, the transition would have to take place in stages. These kinds of measures were intended to build up the material-technical foundations for socialism that Marx and Engels had envisioned being already developed by capitalism in advanced industrial societies, where they had predicted the first socialist revolutions would take place. The proletarian revolution was expected to occur in the most technologically and economically advanced capitalist countries because of the development of a large industrial working class and the acute contradictions of advanced capitalist development which would serve as a catalyst for rising class consciousness.

The socialist revolutions of poor, underdeveloped, and usually overwhelmingly agrarian countries created a new challenge; once the working class and its Marxist parties succeeded in capturing state power, they were confronted with the task of trying to develop socialism in economies that were in no way prepared to support socialist relations of distribution. Lenin himself was the first to face the real-life situation of creating a socialist system on an underdeveloped base. He proposed what has recently been described as a "socialist market economy in embryonic form." (Sargis, PA Jan. 2004, p. 33) Shortly after the victory of the October Revolution, Soviet Russia became embroiled in a civil war and came under attack by interventionist armies from fourteen nations, among them the United States, Britain, and Japan. Under these conditions, with food and industrial shortages plaguing the country, a harsh system of surplus extraction from the peasants was introduced and wages were leveled, the policy of "war communism." After the civil war was won by the Red Army and the foreign interventionists were pushed out of the country, the Soviet economy was in ruins. The productive capacity of the nation had dwindled; agriculture was below even pre-WWI levels. There was an urgent need to raise capital and jumpstart the development of the productive forces.

In 1921, Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy to replace the extreme measures of war communism, "with which," in Lenin's words, the country "was saddled by the imperative conditions of wartime." (LCW, vol. 32, p. 187) The NEP allowed limited denationalization, foreign-domestic joint ventures, some foreign-owned enterprises, cooperatives running on market principles, and the use of economic administrators who had been trained in capitalist management methods. State-owned enterprises, which for the most part only constituted the commanding heights, had to be self-reliant and operated on profit/loss principles. The commanding heights referred to the lifeline sectors of the economy, such as energy, transport, finance/banking, and steel--those sectors that effectively control or support most other areas of the economy. Under the NEP, the state still formulated an overall plan for the economy, but it was achieved primarily through market, not administrative, means. Production of individual goods and services would be based on supply and demand, not on the decree of a central planning authority. Economic competition defined relations between public and private sectors. Of primary importance in this competition was which sector would win out. Addressing the Second Congress of Political Education Departments in the fall of 1921, Lenin stated the matter bluntly.

We must face this issue squarely—who will come out on top? Either the capitalists will succeed… Or the proletarian state power, with the support of the peasantry, will prove capable of keeping a proper reign on these gentlemen, the capitalists… The question must be put soberly. (LCW, vol. 33, p. 66)



Lenin admitted that such an arrangement was not fully socialist. "Retreat is a difficult matter, especially for revolutionaries who are accustomed to advance." (LCW, vol. 33, p. 280) He realized, however, that market relations were necessary until the capacity and infrastructure of a fully socialized economy could be constructed and secured. This was a task which he foresaw as encompassing years, even decades of transition. Lenin spent much time trying to explain what the New Economic Policy was and why it was an absolute necessity.


What is free exchange? It is unrestricted trade, and that means turning back towards capitalism… How then can the Communist Party recognize freedom to trade and accept it? Does not the proposition contain irreconcilable contradictions? The answer is that the practical solution of the problem naturally presents exceedingly great difficulties… How this is to be done, practice will show. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 218)

Since the state cannot provide the peasant with goods from socialist factories in exchange for all his surplus, freedom to trade with this surplus necessarily means freedom for the development of capitalism. Within the limits indicated, however, this is not at all dangerous for socialism as long as transport and large-scale industry remain in the hands of the proletariat. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 457)



The development of such a form of capitalism controlled and regulated by the state, which Lenin time and again referred to as state capitalism, if directed carefully by a socialist state, would be not only advantageous, but even necessary, in an underdeveloped country.

Like Soviet Russia in the years following the October Revolution, China today also finds itself facing a world economy dominated by and structured in the interests of the most powerful capitalist economies. Just as Lenin did in the 1920s, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has, since 1978, reached the conclusion that the liberation and development of the productive forces is the key to building the foundations for a transition to socialism. This idea was stressed throughout the first years of the reform period. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that,


"The fundamental task for the socialist stage is to develop the productive forces. The superiority of the socialist system is demonstrated, in the final analysis, by faster and greater development of those forces than under the capitalist system." (Selected Works, vol. 3, p. 73)



The rapid development of China over the past three decades has demonstrated the correctness of the CPC's overall approach, though of course there are contradictions which remain to be overcome. Like Lenin, the CPC estimates that the socialist market economy is a formation which will cover decades of development. The CPC Constitution states that China is in the "primary stage of socialism" and will remain so for a long period of time as it modernizes, even over "a hundred years." (2002, 78-9)

For the socialist market economy to truly be a means of navigating the transition to socialism (whether in China, Vietnam, or anywhere else), there must be a workers' state led by a proletarian party to promote a trajectory toward socialism. This has been recognized as a necessity since the days of Lenin's NEP. In his pamphlet, The Tax in Kind, Lenin stated without reservation that "…socialism is inconceivable unless the proletariat is the ruler of the state." (LCW, vol. 32, p. 334) There is always the danger in a socialist economy which contains elements of both the plan and the market that capitalist thinking could threaten socialist development and ideology. As referenced above, Lenin warned his fellow Bolsheviks of such a possibility. The main function of the state in a socialist market economy is to maintain a path directed toward socialism and uphold the dominance of the working class.


The socialist market economy, however, should not be viewed as the end result of socialist development; as Lenin said, mixed economic forms are transitional. Though the economic model of socialism based on the centralized plan and total public ownership of all sectors may have been instituted prematurely in the past, advances in technology and computer accounting makes an efficient central plan a greater possibility for the future (assuming the productive forces are in place to support it). It is difficult to predict what the exact characteristics and details of socialist economies may be in the future, though public ownership, working class power, and planned development figure highly in any projection. However, under current conditions, there is no reason to conclude that the socialist market economy is necessarily a departure from the socialist path. Changing conditions necessitate new strategies for development.

REFERENCE LIST

Communist Party of China. 2002. Constitution of the Communist Party of China. In Documents of the 16th National Congress of the CPC, 76-114. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
Deng Xiaoping. 1994. Building a Socialism with a Specifically Chinese Character. In vol. 3 of Selected Works, 72-5. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
Lenin, Vladimir I. 1977a. Report on the Political Work of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.). In vol. 32 of Collected Works, 170-91. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
------. 1977b. Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Appropriation System. In vol. 32 of Collected Works, 214-38. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
------. 1977c. The Tax in Kind. In vol. 32 of Collected Works. 329-65.
------. 1977d. Theses for a Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P. In vol. 32 of Collected Works, 453-61.
------. 1980a. The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments. In vol. 33 of Collected Works, 60-79. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
------. 1980b. Political Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.) In vol 33 of Collected Works, 263-309. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Sargis, Al L. 2004. Unfinished Business: Socialist Market Economy. Political Affairs, January, 32-34.