Marx the philosopher

[Die Neue Zeit]

I was taken by surprise by Rosa's comments a couple of days ago that Marx never was a philosopher. I have to contest those comments, merely because of my peculiar stay-away attitude towards the Manifesto (the words describing my attitude being found only today here) and increased receptiveness towards structuralist works like Brumaire, Zasulich, and so on.

While he may have steered away from dialectics later on to focus on historical development, in his early life he definitely employed a lot of philosophy (which would explain the more flowery language of his earlier works, language which evokes reticence on my part). Take, for example, this (obviously the part about monopoly interests me, but not in terms of reading Poverty instead of asking about Luxemburg's or Kalecki's accumulation stuff, begging for the link that Lenin never provided between accumulation and monopoly):

Thesis: Feudal monopoly, before competition.

Antithesis: Competition.

Synthesis: Modern monopoly, which is the negation of feudal monopoly, in so far as it implies the system of competition, and the negation of competition in so far as it is monopoly.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

It really depends on what you mean by 'philosopher'.

In his day, even scientists were called 'natural philosophers'.

So we could call Marx a 'social philosopher' in that sense.

But what I meant was that he rejected traditional philosophy, as practiced by Hegel etc.

Here are some of his words to that effect:

"One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life.

"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118.]

"Is it surprising that everything, in the final abstraction…presents itself as a logical category? Is it surprising that, if you let drop little by little all that constitutes the individuality of a house, leaving out first of all the materials of which it is composed, then the form that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a body; that if you leave out of account the limits of this body, you soon have nothing but a space -– that if, finally, you leave out of account the dimensions of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity, the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in the final abstraction the only substance left is the logical categories. Thus the metaphysicians, who in making these abstractions, think they are making analyses, and who, the more they detach themselves from things, imagine themselves to be getting all the nearer to the point of penetrating to their core…." [Marx (1978), p.99.]

"The mystery of critical presentation…is the mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction….

"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'…. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -– 'Fruit'….

"Having reduced the different real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….

"The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind…. When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of 'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute Fruit'.

"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….

"It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'

"In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975), pp.72-75.]

And we all know this famous quote:

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the
point is to change it.

And then there is this one:

"Philosophy is to the real world as masturbation is to sex."

A load of wankers then...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Finally:

Thesis: Feudal monopoly, before competition.

Antithesis: Competition.

Synthesis: Modern monopoly, which is the negation of feudal monopoly, in so far as it implies the system of competition, and the negation of competition in so far as it is monopoly.

This schema was adopted by Marx early on (he seems to have abandoned it later, though); he was taught it by one of his university professors who got Hegel wrong.

You can find the details here:

http://www.revleft.com/index.php?showtopic...st&p=1292097892

And he used a few philosophical terms in Capital (derived from Hegel), but as he said, he merely 'coquetted' with them.

They played no genuine role in his work.

[Herman]

Young Marx might have been interested in philosophy, but Adult Marx understood that philosophy had to be practical.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red, you are right, but that meant he abandoned philosophy in favour of social, economic and historical science (understood in the German sense).

[Die Neue Zeit]

^^^ You quoted a lot of Marx there, but care to elucidate upon the time frame (ie, when did he actually say those, before the 1860s or after)?

[Hehe, Holy Family, Poverty, and the Manifesto itself would be a really good study in a "philosophy" class, while most others suited to "heterodox" economics and historical development.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Most were from the German Ideology and The Holy Family. Mid-1840's.

So, he was still very young.

[Demogorgon]

No offence, but isn't this a bit of a pointless discussion given that the word philosophy can be understood in a nimber of ways? Under some definitions anyone working in the realm of political theory could be called a philosopher after all.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Demogorgon, you are right, but this is a philosphical point in itself: exactly what Philosophy is.

I tend to agree with Marx and Wittgenstein, here; it is a critical activity, one that does not reveal truths to us, but helps us make sense of what we already think we know -- among other things.

Amd it does this, as Marx says, by looking at things from the perspective of ordinary material language.

[McCaine]

It's really pointless to use citations like "(Marx 1970)" if you're not going to provide a bibliography, btw.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Apologies McCaine, but I have posted these before with the exact references, I just forgot this time.

Marx and Engels (1970) is the German Ideology, and Marx and Engels (1975) is the Holy Family.

If you want to know the editions I have used, let me know.

[gilhyle]

So, what is Marx 1978 ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

A rare brand of Cuban cigars.



[Marx, K. (1978), 'The Poverty Of Philosophy' (Foreign Languages Press).]

[gilhyle]

I wanted to write few words about the nature of dialectics. I do this,despite the fact that – as I have said before – there is a connundrum facing any discussion of the topic, which is that Marxist dialectics has never been expounded with any great effect. The closest to it is the work of Engels and Adorno (and Benjamin’s related remarks). On philosophical questions Lukacs was no Marxist at all, nor were Althusser and Gramsci and Bukharin. Remarks by Lenin and Trotsky are journalistic in nature, or mere research notes. A writer like Cauldwell is ultimately glib. Epigones like Rees and Smith are simply irrelevant.

This fact is frustrating both for Marxists, who see that a dialectical method is at work in Marx’s Capital and for opponents of dialectics, who have no good target to aim at and end up constructing paper tigers to hit out at. On this board there is a militant critique of dialectics which suffers significantly from the impracticality of getting any definitive statement of the object of its criticism.

I have no intention of solving that. But there is one thought I can add that might be helpful. It is this : contrast Kant’s critique of Metaphysics with that of Wittgenstein and you get some idea of what dialectics is about. Wittgenstein came from a tradition which believed that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use. Wittgenstein emphasised the option of dissolving those problems rather than solving them. Thus for Wittgenstein the practice of philosophy is the practice of discerning logical form, i.e. what really follows from a proposition. In his later work this amounts to studying language games. In this later work he draws distinctions between what makes sense not by applying a général theory of what is an appropriate use of language, but pragmatically by seeing on the basis of the special features of each case whether there is a rule based language game. Notwithstanding that this is an unusual method, it remains the case that he believed that there are things which appear to follow from propositions which do not and that is the basis of his critique of metaphysics. It is also the basis of hiis belief that while there are no legitimate philosophical propositions, there is a legitimate activity of philosophising.

This belief that there is a significant social phenomenon of linguistic confusion has always appeared decidedly naive, a-political and simplistic to Marxists. It has seemed to Marxists that it ignores the social character of thinking….and the concept of language games does not rescue it in that regard. Consequently, notwithstanding the fact that Marxists sympathise with Wittgenstein’s rejection of metaphysics they are unable to go along with his belief that there can be an effective social practice of discerning linguistic confusion. Marxists go further and reject the legitimacy of philosophical practise also.

Kant, by contrast is not interested so much in what can be expressed as in how judgements are made. So, like Wittgenstein, he does not claim that there must be a first cause (to take an example) of everything that exists, but unlike Wittgenstein, he beleives he can make the philosophical claim that causality is a necessary general and common ingredient in our minds.

But he also argues that there are errors that we necessarily enter into because reason cannot be extended to ever more general premises. These errors are the errors of metaphysics. Thus Kant differentiates between the general ideas that we must have to be able to think as we do and the general ideas we do not have to have tin order to think that way, but which we have to have because we think that way.

He is also very different from Wittgenstein in that he does not explain the existence of metaphysiscs as being a result of linguistic confusion, but rather as the result of the necessarily erroneous application of reason.

Reasoning for Kant is synthetic knowledge derived from the nature of concepts. Kant believes that concepts are « entirely our own work » (CPR A301 B358) and, consequently it should be contrary to common sense to think that we can derive knowledge of objects in themselves from our examination of our concepts – since sense data is not involved in their creation. Reasoning, for Kant, is legitimately about the coherence of our thinking with itself – it « secures the unity of rules of understanding under principles (CPR A302 B359) Kant sets out to explain false reasoning which we all necessarily enter into : « Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error but he will never be able to free himself from the illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. » (CPR A339 B397) Believing this, Kant sets out to analyse the methods by which the very nature of reason itself creates illusions in our minds. These illusions, which are not errors of reason fall into three kinds : paralogisms, antinomies and ideals of reason.

Hegel disagrees with Kant that the examination of concepts can reveal nothing about external reality. He disagrees not because he reaffirms a traditional metaphysical way of thinking. He disagrees because, as part of his critique of scepticism, he has redefined what we must mean in philosophy by external reality. For him, external reality must be the total picture implied within each partial understanding and not some independent external reality. In other words, Hegel associates reality with coherent thinking and rejects the possibility of what might today be called, a bit loosely, ‘objective knowledge’. But Hegel also rejects the possibility of conducting a critque of knowledge which labels it as subjective. We never escape the criteria of coherence, even to the extent necessary to contrast coherence with correspondence. This is the foundation of Hegel’s (then) distinctive idealism, which has been replicated in many post-modern radical constructivist theories since the 1980s..

This view leads Hegel to the observations about dialectics that are relevant here. He looks at Kants analysis of paralogisms, antinomies and so-called ideals of reason (which are all different ways Kant identified in which reason necessarily leads to erroneous metaphysical conclusions) and Hegel asks what are we to make of these ways of thinking once we recognise that we do not have the priviledged independent access to reality to judge them true or false or meaningless. Hegel’s answer is that no simplistic concept of ‘error’ (whether error in reasoning or language) gives us a sufficient explanation of the complex pattern of thinking involved in such metaphysics.

Rather, to understand this practice of metaphysics we must recognise that it is always attempting to create a totalising picture, to make a transition from the well perceived to the less perceived, from the well understood to the less well understood – it is always speculative.

In other words metaphysisc has always been the refusal of agnosticism in all its forms. Unlike Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein, many thinkers have refused to be satisfied to just remain silent about that of which we cannot speak with scientific authority. Such thinkers are more like the rest of us who, in our everyday lives all speculate on the nature of broader realities than are evident to us.

I cant go into how Hegel went on to analyse such speculaltive thinking, for reasons of length. The key point is Hegel’s observation that such totalising thinking suffuses all our thinking. We cannot separate out a legitimate, grounded type of thinking which does not involve metaphysical presuppositions. Thus he denies the legitimacy of Wittgenstien’s project - which for him would be like trying to purge humans of their hungers. He illustrated this point at great length and this is where ‘dialectics’ comes in. There are a series of patterns which can be discerned in the changes in the way we think which show that we are constantly engaged in the speculative completion and disruption of pour own ways of viewing the world in order to progress our thinking.

Then he observes, ia addition, that the way we think about the fact that we think this way can also be understood this way. We can, he argues, see our thinking about the nature of metaphysics itself evolving. When we recognise that, he argues, we can see the historical unity of all thinking as itself a totality moving towards a conclusion.

Marx rejects this last step. For him Hegel has mistaken the totality. The totality of thinking is not a significant one, since all thinking derives from the material circumstances in which it comes into existence. It is the unfolding of those material circumstances which needs to be grasped as the most significant totality. Consequently, the conclusion is that the proper critique of metaphysics is neither that it is an error of linguistic confusion, nor that it is an error of reasoning or that it is an erroneous attempt to grasp the totality of thought statically, when it is actually something that unfolds historically. All these are the erroneous critques of metaphysics by, respectively Wittgenstein, Kant and Hegel.

Rather the totalising activity that we see in metaphysics (and the patterns of change in human thinking that we see around us) are reflections of the constantly changing relationship of ideas to their constantly changing material circumstances. We can identify formal patterns in thinking which show that the changes in human thinking and the speculative use of reason are not random (they dont, by the way, ‘prove’ this point since it itself is a speculative completion of reality)

Marx’s equivalent of Hegel’s doctrine of the Concept is then to go on to accept that revolutionaries themselves are part of this. They must engage in totalising conceptualisations. They cannot confine themselves to what can be said within the dominant forms of science. It is a Comtean-style delusion to think that revolutionary socialism can be grounded merely in science as if it were an accessible‘truth’ available if we can only exclude error. This is a delusion that harks back to the Enlightenment and the false belief of the representatives of the bourgeoisie that there is a truth available to people by the mere exercise of their reason which indicates how society should be organised.

By contrast, Marxism necessarily involves speculative thinking, but not with an Enlightenment purpose. It should be disciplined and careful speculative thinking which proceeds not to paint pictures of how we would like things to be but which is built up carefully making transitions from concrete observation and scientific knowledge to abstract hypotheses about reality (which necessarily go further than the available evidence strictly ‘proves’) and then which are applied back again to concrete reality to inform action.

WHat the character of that set of thoughts is might seem at first sight very like what Wittgenstein does - both are critical processes of reflection on the ideas people have or the language people use. But Wittgenstein is validating logical relations, Marx is not. In that sense Marx is not a philosopher in a way that Wittgenstein is. Because Marx believes there is an unfolding dynamic in thinking that is derived from material relations and dialectical in form, the validity or otherwise of the logical relations postulated in a body of thinking critiqued by Marx is of minor importance. (It is not of no importance since Marx continued to use internal critique as a rhetorical device to call opposing views into question) but it is subordinate to the situating of ideas within their material relations.

This practice of critique by Marxists has always puzzled philosophers BECAUSE it does not prioritise the testing of logical relations. THey accuse Marxists of falling into the genetic fallacy, i.e. of thinking that they have disproved a proposition by showing that it was uttered with a malign purpose. In this, however, it is they who misunderstand Marxism which is not trying to test the truth of a proposition when situating it. Rather. Marxists are measuring the distance between the proposition and the interests of the working class. This kind of practice is best understood as being entirely outside the continuity of philosophy in a way neither Wittgenstein, Kant or Hegel were.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil, thank you for putting all this time into explaining a few things, but it was all wasted effort, for you have merely repeated the same old canards.

Wittgenstein came from a tradition which believed that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use.

Where in Wittgenstein's writings (or unpublished notes) does he say language needs reforming?

In fact he says "ordinary language is alright as it is".

You have confused him with Russell.

Sure you say he came from that tradition, but he actually invented that tradition, and it was Russell who went down the route you mention. The tradition Wittgenstein established never wanted to reform anything (linguistically).

This belief that there is a significant social phenomenon of linguistic confusion has always appeared decidedly naive, a-political and simplistic to Marxists. It has seemed to Marxists that it ignores the social character of thinking….and the concept of language games does not rescue it in that regard. Consequently, notwithstanding the fact that Marxists sympathise with Wittgenstein’s rejection of metaphysics they are unable to go along with his belief that there can be an effective social practice of discerning linguistic confusion. Marxists go further and reject the legitimacy of philosophical practise also.

Not so; Wittgenstein's turn to the social (under the influence of Gramsci), is precisely this. I, for instance, have endeavoured to add the necessary detail.

Kant, by contrast is not interested so much in what can be expressed as in how judgements are made. So, like Wittgenstein, he does not claim that there must be a first cause (to take an example) of everything that exists, but unlike Wittgenstein, he beleives he can make the philosophical claim that causality is a necessary general and common ingredient in our minds.

Kant's a priori and dogmatic psychology is a classic example of such linguistic confusion.

He is also very different from Wittgenstein in that he does not explain the existence of metaphysiscs as being a result of linguistic confusion, but rather as the result of the necessarily erroneous application of reason.

But even one so great (and as confused) as Kant had to use language to do this -- and that is where his own garbled thought intervened.

Hegel disagrees with Kant that the examination of concepts can reveal nothing about external reality. He disagrees not because he reaffirms a traditional metaphysical way of thinking. He disagrees because, as part of his critique of scepticism, he has redefined what we must mean in philosophy by external reality. For him, external reality must be the total picture implied within each partial understanding and not some independent external reality. In other words, Hegel associates reality with coherent thinking and rejects the possibility of what might today be called, a bit loosely, ‘objective knowledge’. But Hegel also rejects the possibility of conducting a critque of knowledge which labels it as subjective. We never escape the criteria of coherence, even to the extent necessary to contrast coherence with correspondence. This is the foundation of Hegel’s (then) distinctive idealism, which has been replicated in many post-modern radical constructivist theories since the 1980s..

But Hegel is even worse; he committed more than his fair share of basic logical errors, and on that rotten edifice this 'theory' you are trying to defend was erected.

Rather, to understand this practice of metaphysics we must recognise that it is always attempting to create a totalising picture, to make a transition from the well perceived to the less perceived, from the well understood to the less well understood – it is always speculative.

In other words metaphysics has always been the refusal of agnosticism in all its forms. Unlike Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein, many thinkers have refused to be satisfied to just remain silent about that of which we cannot speak with scientific authority. Such thinkers are more like the rest of us who, in our everyday lives all speculate on the nature of broader realities than are evident to us.

Not so, metaphyiscs is just bogus a priori super-science, and involves its practiotioners dressing up mystical ideas in obscure jargon to fool comrades like you.

I cant go into how Hegel went on to analyse such speculaltive thinking, for reasons of length. The key point is Hegel’s observation that such totalising thinking suffuses all our thinking. We cannot separate out a legitimate, grounded type of thinking which does not involve metaphysical presuppositions. Thus he denies the legitimacy of Wittgenstien’s project - which for him would be like trying to purge humans of their hungers. He illustrated this point at great length and this is where ‘dialectics’ comes in. There are a series of patterns which can be discerned in the changes in the way we think which show that we are constantly engaged in the speculative completion and disruption of pour own ways of viewing the world in order to progress our thinking.

Even if you were right, Hegel would be the last person we should look to for help here in view of the spurious nature of the 'logic' he used, and the incomprehensible jargon he layered ontop of it.

Marx rejects this last step. For him Hegel has mistaken the totality. The totality of thinking is not a significant one, since all thinking derives from the material circumstances in which it comes into existence. It is the unfolding of those material circumstances which needs to be grasped as the most significant totality. Consequently, the conclusion is that the proper critique of metaphysics is neither that it is an error of linguistic confusion, nor that it is an error of reasoning or that it is an erroneous attempt to grasp the totality of thought statically, when it is actually something that unfolds historically. All these are the erroneous critques of metaphysics by, respectively Wittgenstein, Kant and Hegel.

Marx went even further, and rejected Hegel in his entirety -- by the time he wrote Capital.

And as far as linguistic confusion is concerend, this is what Marx said:

"One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life.

"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels The German Ideology (1970), p.118. Bold added.]

Apart from a few idiomatic differences, that could almost have been written by Wittgenstein himself.

But, we are still no clearer what exactly this super-duper theory of yours actually means.

Linguistic confusion, it seems, has cast its long shadow over you too!

[Die Neue Zeit]

Originally posted by gilhyle@September 29, 2007 09:12 am
I wanted to write few words about the nature of dialectics. I do this,despite the fact that – as I have said before – there is a connundrum facing any discussion of the topic, which is that Marxist dialectics has never been expounded with any great effect. The closest to it is the work of Engels and Adorno (and Benjamin’s related remarks). On philosophical questions Lukacs was no Marxist at all, nor were Althusser and Gramsci and Bukharin. Remarks by Lenin and Trotsky are journalistic in nature, or mere research notes. A writer like Cauldwell is ultimately glib. Epigones like Rees and Smith are simply irrelevant.

So what's with all the talk about Lenin being the "founder" of diamat?

This fact is frustrating both for Marxists, who see that a dialectical method is at work in Marx’s Capital and for opponents of dialectics, who have no good target to aim at and end up constructing paper tigers to hit out at. On this board there is a militant critique of dialectics which suffers significantly from the impracticality of getting any definitive statement of the object of its criticism.

*snip*

This practice of critique by Marxists has always puzzled philosophers BECAUSE it does not prioritise the testing of logical relations. THey accuse Marxists of falling into the genetic fallacy, i.e. of thinking that they have disproved a proposition by showing that it was uttered with a malign purpose. In this, however, it is they who misunderstand Marxism which is not trying to test the truth of a proposition when situating it. Rather. Marxists are measuring the distance between the proposition and the interests of the working class. This kind of practice is best understood as being entirely outside the continuity of philosophy in a way neither Wittgenstein, Kant or Hegel were.

That's something big to think about - that "logic" has nothing to do with Marx's dialectics (or lack thereof, depending on one's opinion) whatsoever.



[Personally, I'm on the neither side of the dialectics/anti-dialectics debate, since I've found dialectics to be of secondary nature to the more important stuff: emphasizing the "history" in "historical materialism."]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hammer, the 'logic' Hegel used was already a garbled and bowdlerised version of Aristotle's highly limited system (which no scientist has ever used, nor has any human ever used to reason with -- except as an exercise) before he got his hands on it.

Hegel just screwed it up even more.

So, there is no logic even in Hegel!

[gilhyle]

Originally posted by Rosa Lichtenstein@September 29, 2007 05:24 pm
But, we are still no clearer what exactly this super-duper theory of yours actually means.

Rosa, you are more or less correct that you are no clearer on what dialectics means (i.e. what its content is), but then, I made it clear that I would not seek to answer that question.

My concern in observing threads on the topic on this board is that its historical place goes unremarked and even obfuscated in the somewhat arrogant idea that Hegel was befuddled.

Your approach - which is based on the philosophical practice of identifying supposed linguistic confusion and seeking to destroy or at least contain that confusion by clarification of logical relations - feeds off two phenomena. Firstly, it feeds off the fact (undoubted) that dialectics is difficult to engage with, given the inadequate forms in which it is formulated. Secondly your approach feeds off the inherent tendency in capitalist society for reflective thinking to be confined to the practice of science and logical analysis, where science is dominated by the social relations within which it operates and logical analysis is such an inadequate tool for understanding the complexities of reality that it becomes an area for undisciplined speculation.

Your point about Wittgenstein not supporting the reform of language is quite right. But I never said otherwise. My point was that Wittgenstein came from a tradition in which these alternative ways of examining language were articulated - he was part of that tradition, at one end of it. Of course I dont confuse Russell and Wittgenstein. My point is the tradition should be seen as one unit, by contrast with Kant.

From within this tradition for both you and a follower of Russell, Kant appears mired in linguistic confusion. But, then, from within Kant's tradition Wittgenstein appears to overestimate what ontological conclusions can be drawn from the examination of logical relations. In other words, for a Kantian - amusingly - Wittgenstein engages in metaphysics !

My point is to draw a contrast between different ways, as Broudeny calls it, of attempting to leave philosophy. What Kant did was to abandon Metaphysics as a positive doctrine, while accepting that it survives as a) a NECESSARY error and b) a presupposition of practical reasoning. Wittgenstein denies that it survives as a necessary error, thinking that metaphysical expressions are, at least in principle, capable of being dispelled by clear thinking. Thus both Kant and Wittgenstein retain conceptions of philosophical practice - practices which generate structures for the analysis of the practice of thinking/speaking.

You correctly quote from Marx, but the question left outstanding by your quote is how the postulation of consciousness as an independent realm is to be overcome. If one believes in the legitimacy of a philosophical practice of dispelling linguistic confusion, the answer is by tracing the correct logical relations to reveal the confusion. If, as Marx believes, one believes that men alter their thinking in the course of altering what he calls in the GI their material intercourse then the attempt to dispel linguistic confusion comes to be seen as itself treating consciousness as an independent realm. It is this which the GI surpasses. Marx situates the process of critique as subordinate to the project of revolution. The old formula of the working class serving as the tool of the 'theoretical communists' who also serve as the agents of the working class is surpassed. It is understood in the GI that the working class do not serve the intellectuals at all. Critique is now seen not to be a philosophical exercise, but part and parcel of the practical reasoning of the revolutionary, serving not to dispel linguistic confusion but to empower the revolutionary. This is the distinctive character of Marx's way of leaving philosophy, radicaly more complete than Wittgensteins and philosophically much more problematic.

(The marginal influence of Gramsci on Wittgenstein does not concern me, since neither man was Marxist in method. )

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:

Rosa, you are more or less correct that you are no clearer on what dialectics means (i.e. what its content is), but then, I made it clear that I would not seek to answer that question.

Indeed, it has yet to be answered by anyone.

My concern in observing threads on the topic on this board is that its historical place goes unremarked and even obfuscated in the somewhat arrogant idea that Hegel was befuddled.

Not so much 'arrogant' as accurate.

The man was a complete charlatan, who barely understood even the garbled Aristotelian logic he was 'taught'.

Your approach - which is based on the philosophical practice of identifying supposed linguistic confusion and seeking to destroy or at least contain that confusion by clarification of logical relations - feeds off two phenomena. Firstly, it feeds off the fact (undoubted) that dialectics is difficult to engage with, given the inadequate forms in which it is formulated. Secondly your approach feeds off the inherent tendency in capitalist society for reflective thinking to be confined to the practice of science and logical analysis, where science is dominated by the social relations within which it operates and logical analysis is such an inadequate tool for understanding the complexities of reality that it becomes an area for undisciplined speculation.

And I could say the same of you, except in my case I can substantiate what I say -- you merely assert.

Your point about Wittgenstein not supporting the reform of language is quite right. But I never said otherwise. My point was that Wittgenstein came from a tradition in which these alternative ways of examining language were articulated - he was part of that tradition, at one end of it. Of course I dont confuse Russell and Wittgenstein. My point is the tradition should be seen as one unit, by contrast with Kant.

Not so. As I pointed out, Wittgenstgein began this tradition, and it was not as you alleged. His approach was totally new, and cannot be seen as part of one 'unit' without serious distortion

You implied that he was a Russellian by your incautious description.

From within this tradition for both you and a follower of Russell, Kant appears mired in linguistic confusion. But, then, from within Kant's tradition Wittgenstein appears to overestimate what ontological conclusions can be drawn from the examination of logical relations. In other words, for a Kantian - amusingly - Wittgenstein engages in metaphysics !

Well, as with Marx, I take a stance in ordinary language -- the language of the working class, and from that stance Kant is a confused mystic.

You may prefer to adopt a view borrowed from ruling-class tradition, but then that is your problem.

And there are no ontological implications that can or have been drawn (by me) from this approach, and none that Wittgenstein depended on or derived -- not even in the Tractactus.

You correctly quote from Marx, but the question left outstanding by your quote is how the postulation of consciousness as an independent realm is to be overcome. If one believes in the legitimacy of a philosophical practice of dispelling linguistic confusion, the answer is by tracing the correct logical relations to reveal the confusion. If, as Marx believes, one believes that men alter their thinking in the course of altering what he calls in the GI their material intercourse then the attempt to dispel linguistic confusion comes to be seen as itself treating consciousness as an independent realm. It is this which the GI surpasses. Marx situates the process of critique as subordinate to the project of revolution. The old formula of the working class serving as the tool of the 'theoretical communists' who also serve as the agents of the working class is surpassed. It is understood in the GI that the working class do not serve the intellectuals at all. Critique is now seen not to be a philosophical exercise, but part and parcel of the practical reasoning of the revolutionary, serving not to dispel linguistic confusion but to empower the revolutionary. This is the distinctive character of Marx's way of leaving philosophy, radicaly more complete than Wittgensteins and philosophically much more problematic.

Well, none of that made the slightest bit of sense, and seems to contradict (if I grasped even 1% of it) the passage I quoted.

Is it any wonder academic Marxism is a dead end if you academics spout such meaningless stuff?

[gilhyle]

I take a stance in ordinary language -- the language of the working class

this is an interesting comment. Marx certainly had a view in 1845, which I dont find in later works and which he got from Feuerbach that there was a plain and simple, self-evident access to truth. It is a common theme in the GI which never appears again, although it vitiates Feuerbach's philosophy for the rest of his life and reduces it to a shadow of its original potential. This is the puzzle of Feuerbach for many writers that, despite his detailed knowledge of the history of philosophy acceptance of rationalist criteria of self-evidence led him to an uncritical philosophy in his later works.

I would generally think that I agree with everything Marx wrote from 1845 onwards; these sentiments - unargued and unexplained in the GI, although much relied on in the criticism of Stirner - are the only exception.

they run counter to his other expressed view that it is not the mental riches of the working class that make them the agent of revolution but the poverty of their culture, their enslavement to their material conditions....

If we try to reconcile the two we can only do so by treating the idea of self-evidence (an idea present in the American declaration of independence...or is it the constitution ?) as a theoretical point.

In other words, Marx can only be consistent if he is saying that there is a self evidence but that it is not accesible to the working class