Nepal: strategies and alternatives

Like every other movement in history, the movement in Nepal has its own peculiarities. Like no other movement in history the movement in Nepal will have to take special cognizance of the external factors. Internally off course, the goal is the take over of power but at the most crucial juncture this internal process will be affected by external powers and factors. This revolution will be determined by the strategies that are designed to cope with the external factors. The internal strategies will have to be derived from the strategies applied to deal with the external factors. In the last analysis, the internal strategies will have a dual role. The dual role will consist primarily of the power take over from the internal forces in Nepal countersigned by the most important external strategies that will prevent foreign intervention at and after the internal take over of power. That an external power may intervene is always a possibility. We may however make that threat harder for the external power to deliver and in the best of cases just that, a threat and nothing more. The revolution will fail to achieve its immediate end if the external powers interfere at the precise moment in which the party is poised to take over power and in the immediate period after it. The approach in this article is to first state the external threats and then derive the movement strategy that will permit the seizure of power while at the same time deal with the external threats effectively.

At present, the following external factors are dealing with arms, logistical, monetary and most importantly the psychological support to the royal Nepalese army against the party.
India, china and surely the powers of western imperialism that covertly support such activities no doubt support with the latest technology, the royal Nepalese army.

There is no doubt that these powers would like to interfere directly in the case of a possible situation that may enable the party to take over power. What then are the situations under which these powers will be able to justify direct intervention to the people back home? Obviously only when the normal life, the life of prosperity of the bourgeoisie in these regions is considered under threat. The manner and the situation, which will compel a direct intervention, will differ from region to region with one similarity, the threat of disturbance to the class domination of the bourgeoisie in these states.

Western and US imperialism will intervene to prevent an outright communist victory which may inspire some centre left movement if not an outright communist movement in the parts of the world that really fuel the riches of the US, particularly Latin America. Can it be imagined what a shot in the arm it will be to the left, centre-left movements in regions like Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina where the US has huge business interests? Let there be no doubt that this materialistic threat will make the US want to interfere directly in the case of power take over in Nepal by the communist party. Western intervention will most certainly be under the garb of United Nations pace keeping troops.

India desperately wants to crush the naxalite movement. It will interfere with the sole aim of crushing the naxalite movement by presenting to the broader sections of the society the acceptable bogey threat of danger to internal security. Once intervention starts, the Indian army will stop not just by crushing the Nepalese revolution but also by fulfilling its real aim, the crushing of the naxalites. India’s broad political aim in direct intervention will be the liquidation of the naxalites. Power take over by the communists will only provide the Indian army with the acceptable ruse of national security by which to do so. India will also enthusiastically support United Nations intervention to keep peace in Nepal, at the same time it is the nation that is most likely to intervene directly, citing continued help to the naxalites by the communists in Nepal. In this venture, it will most certainly be supported by western imperialism and the United Nations.
What about china? It has long ago given up Marxist policies. The regime there now is a dominating bourgeoisie class that shudders more than the western capitalists at the mention of Marxist policies. Under such conditions, there exists the distinct possibility of the ruling party having degenerated into factions by now. The ruling faction will never ever want the Nepal revolution to be successful. Given its materialistic interests, it has abandoned Marxist policies as a consequence of which it will not be able to support the Marxist insurrection in Nepal. The opposing faction will use the failure of Chinese aid to the Nepal revolution as the ammunition to challenge the ruling faction. The ruling faction stability in the Chinese communist party is most likely to be affected by a successful Nepal coup. How valid is the assumption of the existence of factions in the Chinese communist party? This is a very likely assumption and most likely to happen in a party that rules by rhetoric, not action.

Even if there is no factional fight over a successful Nepalese revolution, the Chinese leadership will be caught in a catch 22 situation in the event of a successful Nepalese revolution. If the United Nations or India does intervene, it will be exposed of its hollowness if it does not intervene to stop the same. Chinese communist solidarity will become the laughing stock of the world and the current Chinese leadership will have to be made the scapegoat and may even loose power. However the trade interests of the ruling class of which the Chinese leadership is an expression, will not allow china to antagonize its trade partners. The Chinese communist party has the greatest interest in covert arms supply to the royal Nepalese army. It is the leadership that can least afford to deal with a Nepalese revolution, for the truth is, if a Nepalese revolutionary situation were to develop and foreign intervention does take place under whatever garb, either the current Chinese leadership or its ideological superiority or both will be finished.

There are thus three major regions interested in the revolutionary defeat of Nepal. The western (mainly US) countries, India and china.

Does it then mean that the very act that may create a successful revolution in Nepal will also be the cause of its destruction? The answer to this question can be realized by analyzing the extent after which and by what strategy the three regions will intervene.

The western powers will want internal crushing of the revolution. To this end, it will provide monetary and all possible support to the army. It will intervene in the event of the likelihood take over of power by the communist party in Nepal. Most likely, it will want to intervene in the situation of continued military impasse in Nepal. It will then be able to justify to its populace the intervention as one in support of human rights, democracy and the restoration of peace. The United Nations peacekeeping force will be the garb of its intervention.

India will try its level best to internally crush the revolution by the same methods. In the case of United Nations intervention, it will join the UN forces. The argument to its populace will be the same. Remember, it is a nation that is craving to be designated as a responsible and big player in the subcontinent. In the event of a successful revolution, it is most likely to intervene directly citing the naxalite link as a grave security threat. It will be heightened by some staged terrorist activities that will be blamed on the naxalites. From where did the naxalites acquire such daring? Off course from their ruling counterparts in Nepal. So who to deal with to preserve the security of the nation? Off course Nepal. That will be the crux of argument for direct intervention in the case of a successful revolution in Nepal. India will also desperately try for a change in the leadership in the CPN (Maoist). It will want the communist party to become parliamentarian democracist.

Remember, the parliamentary communists are one of the major blocks of the ruling coalition in India at present. To a lesser extent, they face the same catch 22 situation as that of the Chinese communists, though their leadership (assuming off course that their current leaders can be said to constitute a leadership) is less likely to be affected by a successful revolution in Nepal because nobody attaches with them much importance in world affairs. Still, a covert operation that can destroy the communist struggle in Nepal and make them parliamentary parties, much more bourgeoisie than all the bourgeoisie parties themselves, will save the parliamentary communists in India major embarrassment at home. The operation will be used to the enhance the status of these worshippers of parliamentary democracy. It will be covert but subtle hints and reports will be dropped to the media that will leave no doubt as to the originator of the changed strategy of the Nepalese communists. To this end, they will use devisionists and capitulators from the CPN (Maoist). Leadership change with an aim to dissipate revolutionary energy and transform the CPN (Maoist) to a parliamentary socialist party, that great betrayer of world revolution will be a lucrative option before India. Comrade Prachanda should always fear assassination. No extent is impossible for the bourgeoisie of India who go under the name of communism.

The present Chinese leadership can least afford a Nepalese revolution without damage to their personal positions. They will contribute most highly with arms and all other supplies to the army. It too will be interested in a leadership change along the same line as the communists in India. In the case of an United Nations intervention, it will either have to remain neutral or join the forces under the disguise of securing the best possible deal for the communist of Nepal. Under the circumstance of an Indian intervention, it will remain neutral. However, the Chinese party will be most at ease with the internal crushing of the revolution, to this end it will be the most gracious contributor to the army.

What then and of what magnitude will be the implications of a Nepalese revolution on the three respective regions?

For western powers it will be the prognosis of future such revolutions especially in Latin America and more importantly it will be an ideological class clash.

For India, it will be enhanced economic loss and the danger of a class conflict if the cooperation of the CPN (Maoist) with the naxalites remains intact.

For china, it will represent the exposure of ideological hypocrisy and under the existence of factions, the loss of personal power of the current Chinese leadership.

How will the intervention strategies look like? What will be their strategies? An attempt is made below to answer the above questions.

United Nations intervention is the biggest military threat and it can be implemented in the case of a military stalemate. If the forces of the party lay seize to Katmandu over a period of days the UN forces will intervene. If after the seizure of power, clashes continue to errupt the UN forces will intervene. In the same manner as the supply to the white army in the Bolshevik revolution, the foreign players will provide assistance and prop up renegade generals. That must be stopped.
There is a quantity and quality before which UN intervention will not be possible because the intervention will then be seen as an assertion of dominance by the populace of the respective nations themselves. This quantity will be the number of days the military stalemate continues and the statistics of casualties in the case of a direct military confrontation. If the city of Katmandu is under seize for more than a certain number of days UN intervention will be justified, on the other hand if the city is seized in a couple of days UN intervention will always be seen as barbaric and as an act of undue interference. How many days can the people’s army lay seize before an UN intervention? That will depend on the quality of reports, true or false , but reports which the foreign powers can paint as true to the domestic audience about law and order and the condition in general of the civil war zones. It may be just a couple of days, under a reasonable stalemate with no great loss or more importantly under a failure of the foreign government to portray an alarming loss of lives and in general conditions, it may stretch to say two weeks. UN intervention will however not be overnight following an armed attempt at power wrestling by the CPN (Maoist) nor will it stretch to months. No, the propaganda machine of the bourgeoisie government will try as soon as possible and with as many lies as possible to justify an intervention. The quality of actual or conjured up evidence of the general conditions of civil war zones will play a very crucial role here. It is not to be neglected. An effective management of this quality can well give the people’s army the couple of extra days needed to give it victory.

In the final analysis it must be said that to minimize (one can never use the word prevent, with the bourgeoisie anything is possible) as much as possible the chances of an UN intervention, the victory over Katmandu and other important cities must be swift. Quality control of evidence and rumors over civil war zones will be extremely crucial in determining the outcome. If the party cannot conceivably think of a swift victory, this idea of power seizure through a direct confrontation with the army must be given up.

Equally crucial will be the quick restoration of law and order, at least the presentation of an image of the same following actual seizure of power.

It is my contention that if the party is able to achieve victory over Katmandu and other important cities under the time justified by the general qualitative and quantitative conditions of the conflict zones, maintain a reasonable semblance of control over law and order following the seizure of power and also equally importantly, project so to the world media, UN intervention is highly improbable.

As far as India is concerned, the suggested strategy involves some very hard measures. The sole political aim of India’s involvement in the crushing of the Nepal revolution will be the crushing of the naxalite movement. The moment the party comes into power the Indian army and the Indian political machinery will create through terrorist acts and blatant lies directed at their own people, the projection of the naxalites as massive security threats. Once the military intervention in Nepal begins, the Indian army will stop at nothing short of complete elimination of the last naxalite deep in the villages of southern India. Will the ruling class in India prefer an independent intervention to an UN one? The answer is no, because of two factors. One off course is the cost of operations involved. The other is the genuine realization of the mass support of the naxalites. However, post a successful take over of power by the CPN (Maoist), the fear of the same mass support to the naxalites will provoke the ruling class to crush the movement. Can the effect of a successful revolution just across home be imagined on the morale of the cadres in India? Will not the lies of the media stating communist movements to be eternally dammed to failure in the twenty first century be exposed for what they are, lies? This qualitative change in cadre morale can cause gigantic and feared quantitative changes. The ruling class in India cannot risk the people, especially in rural and semi rural areas see the true socialistic nature of the communists in Nepal. As the government in Nepal will get stronger, as their programs on land reforms and industrial equity will get underway, the people here will understand and support the naxalite cause more and more. Ultimately, the situation will come to such an extent that the ruling coterie of parties in New Delhi will be facing a political as well as a military revolution in all major village districts in India. The economy will be crippled. The ruling class will be doomed. This, the bourgeoisie in India will never allow. This change will be sudden and quantitative as in the number of cadres, sympathizers and intellectuals joining the communist cause in India. This quantitative change will be sparked by the qualitative changes in Nepal, stemming from the broad pro people, pro society, and pro equality policies of the CPN (Maoist). Remember, post a successful power take over, the CPN (Maoist) will have legitimacy and control over the state media as well. Once sparked, this change will not be stopped by any force upon earth. This will make a military crushing of the Nepalese revolutionary movement and the naxalites in India imperative. What then shall the strategy towards India be?

The answer is a difficult one, but necessary. Post successful take over in Nepal the CPN (Maoist) must severe logistical and military supply to their comrades in India. Yes, this is harsh but it is essential not only for the successful survival of the revolution in Nepal but also more importantly for the survival of the genuine communist movement, the naxalite movement, in India. Post power capture, active collaboration with the naxalites will seal the fate of the naxalites in India. They will be annihilated on the pretext of false and cooked up charges. The CPN (Maoist) must however maintain ideological and passive support to the naxalites. In their propaganda they must glorify each and every achievement of the naxalites, show the world their true nature. This will be most essential for a successful movement in India. This is not the proper space of analyzing the tactics of the Indian communist movement but one point is visible. If active collaboration with the Indian communists continue both the Nepalese communist movement as well as the Indian communist movement will be finished, is that clear now? The western powers will support India’s war on Nepal as a war on terrorism. For the very survival of the Indian comrades after a successful coup in Nepal the way of active collaboration must stop. Hard as it is, it must be this way. The attitude here must be one of the Bolsheviks towards the German communist party.

What of current arms supplies to the army? The people’s army is already dealing with this. This will be the most preferred route to crush the movement in Nepal. The army must be annihilated and victory must be quick in the case of a direct confrontation. The objective and subjective factors for an attempt at this off course can only be decided by the party men at the scene of action.

What if a direct military action is not possible? There still exists another more protracted route. Here I am advocating a second completely different strategy. The CPN (Maoist) must take part in the parliament elections. Going by reports in the Indian media, the CPN (Maoist) is most likely to emerge as the largest block in the case of elections. The strategy is this: the CPN (Maoist) must use the forum of parliamentary elections to destroy the same system. The campaign slogans must be simple and reflect the basic, most fundamental demands of the masses, the ones most feared by the king and the bourgeoisie. They must include land reforms, minimum worker wages, ending of royal privileges. What will be the post election strategy and slogans? This off course depends on the strength of the CPN (Maoist). I envisage a situation where government formation is not possible without the support of the CPN (Maoist) or at the very least, the CPN (Maoist) is the main opposition with a significant number of seats mainly in the rural agricultural regions. The CPN (Maoist) must join the government if in a position to do so or in the very least take active part in the election process and then destroy the same from within.

Post elections immediate demands for implementation of the above slogans should be made. Daily confrontations should be entered into with the bourgeoisie constituents regarding the passing of bills making land reforms legal, minimum worker wages and ending royal privileges. Each and every party member should talk of nothing but these demands. Under no situations will the bourgeoisie concede to all demands. Their rejection of the same will make the party stronger and stronger. The only party which might accept all these demands and clamor for the same are the parliamentary Marxists. They will however fail to implement it. Under their labor reforms, land will be made available to the bourgeoisie elements in their party. The CPN (Maoist) must expose such activities. If on the other hand the CPN (Maoist) gets the responsibility of land reforms as a constituent part of the government, it must be carried out fully stretching to the last village in Nepal. On the issue of worker wages, the party must be equally vocal. Here I classify under workers not only industrial proletarians but also and more so, the service sector workers, the sherpas and other workers of the tourism industry. The broad strategy of the CPN (Maoist) must be this: an all out attempt at the implementation of Marxist party policies. At each step, they will face hindrance and obstacles from the bourgeoisie parties. This must be highlighted as well as dealt with as effectively as possible. Special attention should be paid to those parties who agree to the principal demand of land reforms and other related proletarian demands but direct their action only towards the reverse, towards the consolidation of lands in hands of the bourgeoisies party members under the garb of land reforms. The above policies must be pursued from being a mere slogan to a living dynamic reality. Particular attention must be paid to the tendency of the bourgeoisie parties to start the process, hijack and unsettle the strength of the agitation for the same by their initial adoption of such policies. Slack in revolutionary zeal upon witnessing the initial compliance of the bourgeoisie parties to our basic demands will only pave the way for a bitter repression and reversal of all Marxist demands by the bourgeoisie. Initial compliance of the bourgeoisie parties with the Marxist demands will only be the weapon with which to lessen the revolutionary zeal of the cadres, lull the party into a false sense of security, with the ultimate aim of crushing the aims of the revolution. Under whatever circumstances, the government will be transitory. The reason for the collapse of the government will be the unbending, unyielding pursuance of the people’s demands by the CPN (Maoist) and the lack of the same by the bourgeoisie. From this transition, the party will emerge as the legitimate representative of the people. The change will be enormous both qualitatively as well as quantitatively. This acquired strength will put the party in the position to challenge for power unequivocally.

Two things stand out in this context. The party must demand immediate implementation of the fundamental goals, and must be ready to fight the counterrevolutionary tendency of the bourgeoisie parties to the genuine people’s demands. The party must believe solely in action and not adoption of statues or policies and action that is not ceased or slacked but carried out till its logical end. There is no doubt that the bourgeoisie parties will not be able to carry out full implementation of the people’s demands. In fact, the sole chance of bourgeoisie survival depends on the crushing of the Marxist demands. That will make the party unique, the legitimate representative of the people. Non-participation in the political process will be portrayed as unwillingness of the party to legally and peacefully start the process of implementation of the people’s demands. Only by joining the political process and if possible, the government will the hollowness of the bourgeoisie propaganda be truly revealed.

Political participation in the parliamentary form of government will be temporary and the most vital weapon with which to take power, non-participation will be held as a symbol of unwillingness to coexist. Only by parliamentary participation will the truth be demonstrated to the masses, that the bourgeoisie from of government will never yield to their genuine demands. We will destroy the myth of this form of government by participating in the same and exposing its hollowness. The government will be one, which is torn apart by contradiction, a contradiction that will make the party stronger at each instant and push down the transitory government towards doom. No process on earth can prevent that.

The great danger that arises from participation in the parliamentary process is the tendency of some party members to become enamored by the power and privileges of official posts and positions. Look no beyond than the CPI (M), in India as an example of this, guard against the danger of bourgeoisie to unleash counterrevolution and become degraded and devoid of all morals upon tasting the salt of official power and comfort. The danger will arise from bourgeoisie members of the party, particularly the unconscious bourgeoisie members. In as much as they are bourgeoisie, they are opposed to the aristocracy domination but are much more afraid of the actual revolution without they themselves realizing it. The party must guard vigilantly against such elements in the transitory government period. How long will this period be? No definite answer can be given at this point, however what can be said is that it will definitely not stretch beyond a year at most. The soviet transitory government did not last beyond a few months.
What will be the nature of confrontation after the collapse of the provisional government?
If the power comes in hands by complete switch over of the army of the government in favor of the party, it will no doubt be most welcome, such as one that happened in the Russian revolution. That however seems most unlikely. It is quite possible that the party will have to fight with certain sections of the royal Nepalese army. One of the chief aims of joining the parliamentary process is to make the soldiers of the army aware of the party policies. Counterpoised to the slogans of the people’s demands the period of transitory process must witness by the party slogans targeting the soldiers of the army. They must be made to realize that the aim of the struggle is simple: a better life for the downtrodden who are very often the kin and friends of the soldiers, from the same social class and villages that the soldiers themselves come from. The propaganda for this must be unrelenting. Slogans highlighting the difference in pay and privileges of the ordinary soldier from the officers must be raised. Demands must be made for better pay and privileges for the ordinary soldiers. At each point, the contrast between the lifestyle of the officers, generals and the soldiers must be highlighted. While this may not result in total turnaround of the army towards the party, it will sow doubts into the minds of the soldiers in the army. Certain sections may switch allegiance to the people’s army. This is most vital. The soldiers must be made to realize the aims of the party.

There is however, a very high probability of conflict between crack army regiments and the people’s army. The people’s army must build up strength and capability during the transition period. It is to be kept in mind that the collapse of the transitory government will almost certainly result in armed conflict. The party must never surrender arms as a condition of participation in the political process. That will kill the revolution. The transitory period must be a period of consolidation and build up of the people’s army.

What about the role of external powers in this case? Their strategy will be same. Intervention will be justified in the case of a military impasse following the collapse of the transitory government and non-severance of material relations with the naxalites will invite a direct military intervention from India. The broad aim of the long route of power seizure through participation in the political process is the build up of suitable internal conditions for quick takeover of power by the people’s army. Once the transitory government falls under the weight of its own contradiction and the broad section of the military does not switch over to the party prompting an almost bloodless power seizure like that in Russia, civil war conditions will prevail. Under this condition the same analysis is applicable as the one on direct or quick military seizure of power presented earlier in the article. The only aim of this strategy is to take the military and political strength of the people’s army to the point where it can achieve a decisive and quick military victory and thus minimize the chances of foreign intervention. Even after the fall of the transitory government, if the party is not in a situation to do so, it must avoid immediate confrontation with the royal Nepalese army and continue with the present strategy, build up forces and wait for the opportune moment.

What are the worst fallouts of these strategies?

One, the party decides that it is in a position to achieve a swift military victory over the royal Nepalese army. The people’s army however, is defeated by either the army or foreign intervention. This is a possibility. Revolution is not a game, specially armed insurrection. Once started, we either win or we die. Under such circumstances, the party must once again revert back to the guerilla life in remote villages and build up from scratch there.

Two, the party decides to participate in the parliamentary process with the sole aim of exposing the incompatibility and hollowness of this system of governance and decides to challenge militarily for power post the transition government collapse. Once this is achieved however, the party is still annihilated after the fall of the transitory government. The party will once again have to revert back to the guerilla life of the build up years. The very least aim of the party in participation in the political process should be the availability of a platform from where to convince the soldiers of the army, the industrial proletariat, some intelligentsia of the aims and conviction of the party program. This qualitative gain must be the least temptation for the party to participate in the parliamentary process. If the party can sway opinion in its favor and is still defeated post the transitory government collapse, the defeat will be temporary. In that defeat will lie the seeds of future victory.

It is thus most important for propaganda, slogans and clear-cut positioning of party aims to be successful in the transitory period. The party must publish its own newspaper and delegate the best orators to explain the party aims and win over sympathizers and cadres in this period. The war will be as much determined by propaganda as by actual military conflict in this situation. Propaganda is a must in the transitory period. Daily, hourly propaganda and articulation of the party aims is mandatory.

If the party feels that the above two strategies are both not realizable it must continue with the present strategy.

Ultimately, off course the decision will have to be taken by the ground leaders who are aware of the objective and subjective conditions in Nepal. However, I feel that going for the strategy of power seizure through temporary parliamentary participation is the route to be followed. Off course, it depends on my understanding of the ground conditions in Nepal at this juncture, which may be totally wrong.

The movement in Nepal is the great hope for the movement not only in Asia but also in the entire world. We hope much from it. The paper was aimed to present some strategical alternatives available to the party in Nepal.

Under whatever circumstances, the belief in the revolution will never cease.

Until always.