Victoria Sandinista Para Siempre

[NyChe21]

The names of the seven nations that comprise the region known as Central America are synonymous with the words ‘revolution’ and ‘intervention’. Foreign powers, most notably the United States, have had a significant effect on the politics and society of Central America. The efforts of these nations to assert their independence from foreign influence have included insurrection and rebellion against those who would give in to foreign dominance. About fifty years after Nicaraguan Augusto Sandino started his nation’s fight for hegemony in the 1930’s the movement bearing his name conquered North American imperialism for a short time and whose legacy is still being determined. The Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) defeated Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979, ending almost thirty years of Somocista dominance of Nicaraguan politics. The FSLN continued to conduct both political and social reforms under the prying eyes of the United States. Rather than contending the success or failure of the ‘Revolucion de los Muchachos’ and its 1980’s clash with the United States, this discussion of the revolution covers the possibility of this historical conflict as an opportunity for Nicaragua and all the nations of Central America to express both national and regional sovereignty. Under the intense pressure of a North American trade embargo and a CIA-sponsored counterrevolution force, the Nicaraguan Revolution carried out extensive democratic reform and took part in a historical peace process. Neither of these events took place under the domineering guidance of the United States or the Soviet bloc. The importance of this Central American revolution lies not in its military victories or its economic failures, but in its ability to control much of its own social and political fate while resisting a world power. In no other period of history was a Central American nation able to express self-determination and popular sovereignty.


The Popular Sovereignty and Pluralism of the FSLN
Named after the 1930’s liberal activist, the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional was portrayed as a ‘red and black’ socialist movement manipulated by communist Cuba or Soviet Russia. While American rhetoric may force this view upon some, this judgment of the 1979 revolution is not accurate. The Nicaraguan Revolution was a complete internal social and political movement without foreign mobilization. While the revolution was backed by Cuba’s Fidel Castro and supported by Soviet Russia during the 1980’s, the revolutionary force at the time of victory was pluralistic and pro-democratic. Although named after an agrarian reformer and achieving socialist reforms such as land redistribution and nationalization of export industries, the Sandinistas were not homogeneous; the revolution included all opposition to the Somoza dynasty. Liberal and social democrats, Marxists, compromising elite (such as the victor of the 1990 elections, Violeta Chammoro), and Christian democrats made up a large portion of the FSLN, as did women from all social classes. The domestic diversity of the FSLN made it a nationalistic movement separate from foreign agendas. One must recognize this nationalist movement as an expression of national sovereignty and hegemony.
Ending the forty-three year old authoritarian Somoza dynasty was the prime objective that unified many sectors of Nicaraguan society into the revolutionary force that triumphed over Somoza in 1979. While political leftists fought guerrilla wars in neighboring El Salvador and Andean Peru, the Nicaraguan Revolution represents a widespread sociopolitical movement with national support to provide what can be described as a ‘mandate for revolution’. An announcement by Sandinista leader Tomas Borge reflects the diverse political positions of the revolution:
“there are capitalist sectors who are ready to work with the revolution, and that broad middle strata and the majority of small and medium agricultural producers have incorporated themselves into the revolutionary process” (May Day speech; 1982).
This diversity of support is also suggested in the infamous 1984 elections held by the Sandinistas. Although these elections were discredited by U.S. President Ronald Reagan as undemocratic, Susanne Jonas and Nancy Stein note that the elected 1984 Asamblea Nacional “reflected the great ideological diversity of Nicaraguan political life” (18). As necessary, the FSLN conducted affairs with middle class and bourgeois sectors. The pluralism of the FSLN and the popular domestic recognition of the Nicaraguan Revolution are expressions of national hegemony, an undeniable piece to the notion of sovereignty.

‘Town hall’ Democracy and Community Organization
The recent unilateral establishment of a ‘root of democracy’ in Iraq by the United States provides an example of overseas American nation building. Within the Western hemisphere we have witnessed the molding of nations according to the North American definition of “efficiency and decency in social and political matters” mentioned in the Roosevelt Corollary (T. Roosevelt; 1904). Seemingly, this definition correlated with right wing dictatorships that were supported politically and financially by Washington. The Nicaraguan situation in the 1980’s was an exception. The democratization of the Nicaraguan people occurred internally within the nation-state of around two million people (1985). The Sandinista regime educated a large portion of the population while encouraging democratization of local decision-making and community organization. The Nicaraguan Revolution provided the nation’s people with the opportunity to determine the shape of their new nation. It represented a concrete nation-building activity devoid of international sponsorship.
The revolution provided a solid platform for the growth of grassroots democratic organizations. The Sandinista Front supported this growth alongside cooperative businesses and peasant communities. Provisions made for these associations granted opportunities for women’s associations to develop in conjunction with workers organizations in response to the growth in the number of women employed across the nation. “The Sandinista legacy was strongest in the sphere of practical gender interests” (Luciak; 1995).
Community organizations were a vital resource for the Sandinista government. These ‘consultas populares’ resembled the ‘town hall’ democratic practices of New England communities of the colonial era. The importance of these organizational procedures became prevalent during the campaigns against literacy and poverty. By providing room for community and party organizations to grow, the Sandinista regime reformed not only government structures but the social practices of the nation, making them increasingly democratic and revitalized popular participation in a government that was once routinely feudal in practice. These reforms granted the Nicaraguan people participation in independent government on both local and national levels.
While women’s organizations and democratic decision-making within communities were established under Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista Front, the effectiveness of these groups was blunted during the ensuing military conflict with the U.S. aided Contras. Dwindling economic resources needed to be diverted to the Contra war and caused mass organizations to “subordinate their demands to the government’s defense requirements” (Williams; pg. 175). The process of societal maturation continued to produce a responsible and informed population that was able to successfully remove an ineffective administration in 1990 without significant foreign agitation (such as the propaganda campaign of the Guatemalan counterrevolution). The definite results of the 1990 election and mass participation of both elections (the other occurring in 1984) are indicative of effective internal democratization by the revolution, a revolution sponsored by the Nicaraguan people who provided a stronger mandate than has been received by many modern U.S. presidents.

1984 Election: Popular Sovereignty Discredited
A clear indication of the “internal process of carrying out a social revolution in Nicaragua” was the 1984 election (Jones and Stein). If mass participation and popular approval for the Sandinista Front could be achieved democratically, the North American ‘moral authority’ for intervention would be discredited. Fittingly, the election of 1984 was discredited by the United States government while regional leaders and foreign observers were willing to legitimize the election. Nevertheless, the 1984 Nicaraguan election was reflective of the diverse political views in Nicaragua among the newly politicized society and is a legitimate signal of a sovereignty of politics and social values.
The reason most cited by critics of the 1984 Nicaraguan election was the exclusion of the counterrevolutionary party and its candidates. The Contra’s party, the Coordinadora Democratica Ramiro Sacasa (CD) were invited by the Sandinista administration to participate in the election, the CD and its supporters in the U.S. government saw that a defeat would provide legitimation for a possible social democracy in the Western hemisphere. This was a huge fear of the United States as the Cold War was still a very real conflict that had manifested itself in Guatemala and Cuba. “The decision to withdraw from the election . . . was made by the CD and its U.S. backers” (Jones). Although the CD candidate, Arturo Cruz, used the free press to express Contra views, the decision to withdraw was made and the elections were held without the CD’s participation. Nevertheless, the opposition to the FSLN was still significant and was supported by provisions made by the ruling regime and its challengers as they worked together to establish rules for the election.
In total, there were six parties opposing the Sandinistas during the election; seven in all. According to Jones and Stein:
“All participants were guaranteed equal resources (campaign funding, supplies and the like) and equal access to the main media. A number of emergency restrictions were lifted so that no party was prevented from carrying out an active campaign” (16).
These opposition parties enjoyed freedom of speech and were allowed to confer with one another. These aspects of the election of 1984 were preservations of a liberal democratic model that eluded Central American nations like Guatemala, Honduras and Panama (all protectorates the United States). Most foreign observers in Europe and Latin America recognized the 1984 election as a valid democratic exercise. Civilian experts in the U.S. also noted the openness and pluralism provided by the Sandinistas but these views were dismissed by the Reagan administration as it pushed for financial backing for a Contra war.
The internal reforms of the Sandinista administration resulted in a fair election that was touted by domestic opposition. Nearly a third of governmental seats were won by opposition parties which was a surprise to all who participated as they believed that these parties were weak and divided, with a small electoral base outside the tiny Nicaraguan middle class. Pluralism did thrive regardless of the strength of the party system, which proved to be stronger than previously thought. The Nicaraguan Revolution did successfully socialize and politicized the Nicaraguan pueblo and with these actions and it earned its mandate as a social democracy in the Western hemisphere apart from the guidance of a foreign power like United States.

Regional Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Arias Plan
The greatest triumph of the Sandinista administration was shared with the other nations of Central America in the Esquipulas peace agreement affectionately known as the Arias Plan. This treaty and the regional negotiations preceding it represented a groundbreaking manifestation of regional and personal hegemony for each state in the area. In the face of unrelenting aggression, Nicaragua and Central America conducted dialogue that laid out regional goals for hegemony and democracy without U.S. approval. For some nations, this very act of solidarity was necessary. For others it defied the status quo of political dependence on the United States. In both cases, the Arias Plan and the historic dialogues preceding it became prime examples of Central American sovereignty.
Erupting with the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980, the moral clout of the United States had significantly eroded following human rights violations of U.S. supported regimes in Guatemala and El Salvador. As result of these events, by 1987 the U.S. experience heavy domestic resistance to intervention activity in the region and most importantly had lost support of moderate-right wing leaders in Central America who began a push for regional solidarity (Roberts). In this setting, newly elected Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez began the drafting of an agreement that would bring relative peace to Central America and a Nobel Peace Prize to Arias himself.
The Esquipulas plan, as outlined by the Costa Rican leader would bring a cease-fire to regional conflicts, democratic solutions to those conflicts, and an end of support to insurgent movements. Arias saw CIA measures and terrorist acts such as the mining of the Nicaraguan port of Corinto as resulting in authoritarian measures by the Sandinista government such as the reduced funding of community organizations and the restriction of the press. The violence in Nicaragua and El Salvador was also causing domestic tensions in Costa Rica as tourism profits fell and refugees to pour into the small nation with reluctance to militarize. The armed conflict also appeared to be counterproductive to the peace process and any eventual removal of Sandinista authority. Even Nicaraguan opposition parties called for an end to the military struggle as it continued to threaten internal democratic progress in the country.
As U.S. ideals became more questionable, the desire of control over their respective states led Central American leaders to support the development of the Arias Plan. Due to continued conflict and war with the Sandinista-supported Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), El Salvadoran President Jose Duarte found the terms of the treaty to be necessary in order to bring order to El Salvador. Along with Honduras and Costa Rica, El Salvador was part of the ‘Tegucigalpa Group’, the most stalwart enforcers of American policies in Central America. According to President Arias’ accords, this pro-U.S. alignment would be dissolved and support for the Contras to be prohibited.
As Duarte and Arias found the plan to be positive, the third member of the Tegucigalpa Group, led by President Jose Azcona, became isolated. Honduras was eventually pressured to grant its support to Esquipulas. “Duarte’s acquiescence to the treaty in turn subjected Azcona to intense Latin American pressure to assert Honduran autonomy” states Kenneth Roberts (pg. 23). Azcona had his own reservations about the Contra war as he feared large national opposition to the Contra’s established base in southern Honduras. Thus, the Tegucigalpa group became backers of a landmark peace agreement against the approval of the U.S. government.
The Esquipulas agreement was signed during a regional summit in August of 1987. The leaders of the Tegucigalpa nations along with Daniel Ortega of Sandinista Nicaragua and Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo attended the meeting and signed the accord. Eighteen months later, in February 1989, the Contra forces and the Nicaraguan government agreed to demobilize and conduct an election. This violated the U.S. demand of “democracy before demobilization”. This landmark dialogue promoted hegemony and regional solidarity in resolving conflicts. In the end, the leaders of Central America successfully forwarded the necessary cooperation to bring an end to the violence in Nicaragua. This is something in which the United States was not able to do during the previous ten years.

1990 Election: Democratic Triumph or Sandinista Failure?
As mentioned previously, the democratization process that the Sandinista regime undertook eventually led to a politically diverse nation that expressed its views independent of the Sandinista government. In 1990, the election promised by the Arias Plan occurred with heavy opposition to the Sandinista party and Daniel Ortega. Still, the FSLN was confident in reelection but were surprised along with the United States with the victory of Violeta Chammoro. Although the 1990 election brought the Sandinista era to a close, it is a triumph of both internal reform and regional resolution of a violent conflict.
The responses of the FSLN to ongoing military clashes with the counterrevolutionary force and CIA terror activities were to rollback their own reforms. While the constant strain of confrontation with the U.S. continued, the region provided political support for Nicaragua in form of the Arias Plan which “constrained U.S. policy options and shielded Nicaragua from U.S. coercion” as the FSLN leadership would not converse directly with U.S. authority (Roberts). By 1990, the “prescribed democratization measures” sketched by Arias had taken place and elections occurred in midst of continuing U.S. support for the Contra’s military activities (Jones and Stein).
Although forced into authoritarian practices in the late eighties, the FSLN continued to invigorate mass participation and promote pluralistic democracy in 1990. They insisted that democratic opposition was a “healthy correcting force” (qtd. in Jones and Stein pg. 19). Jones and Stein quote a FSLN member: “The revolutionary process needs a decent opposition – one that is not at the service of foreign interests” (19). Although Chammoro’s UNO alliance was supported by U.S. dollars, she was a former member of the Sandinista Front. Chammoro was not a supporter of the Contra army or a counterrevolutionary. She worked vehemently with Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas in the transition, and obeyed the 1987 constitution. In contrast to other Central American nations, the changeover of power to the right was peaceful and democratic.
Many of the reforms of the Sandinistas remained as Chamorro and the UNO alliance guided the conversion of Nicaragua to a market economy. Many small business cooperatives still exist in Nicaragua, as well as the protection of reproductive rights for women that were granted by the 1987 constitution. The guarantee of twenty-five percent union ownership of industries also remains. The Nicaraguan Revolution was not ‘rolled back’ by a U.S. supported military confrontation (although the Contra war was a factor in the election); the revolution was discontinued due to internal opposition to an administration who failed to provide economic prosperity. The FSLN was not removed by a foreign invading force nor was it victim of an election conducted under the supervision of an international power.
Conclusions
How does the Nicaraguan Revolution compare with the other revolutions in Central America? No other revolutionary regime was as pluralistic and liberal as the FSLN alliance that overthrew the Somoza dynasty in 1979. The motivation for the revolution was a nationalistic movement to establish popular sovereignty. The ‘mandate for revolution’ provided to the Sandinista Front was overwhelming when compared to the rather infamous Cuban Revolution of 1959. Mass participation in the new government was on the level of the overwhelmingly successful Costa Rican democracy. Nationalistic hegemony was furthered by democratic reforms that won the hearts of a large part of the internal and external opposition to the regime and redefined Nicaragua as a Central American democracy.
The most notable revolutions of Central America occurred in the early years of the Cold War. The Guatemalan Revolution of the forties and fifties resulted in a large propaganda campaign and invasion conducted under CIA supervision. The revolutionary regime under the control of Juan Jose Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz could not win the popular support of the Guatemalan military. It soon lost its desire to fight against a possible military confrontation with the United States. The types of reforms conducted by Jose Figeres in Costa Rica did not challenge the hegemony of the United States as did the Sandinista regime. The United States allowed the anti-communist Figeres to conduct reforms freely and helped the conservative Figeres fought off a 1955 uprising. The social democratic revolution of the Sandinistas was a greater achievement in that it redistributed land, gave rights to women, tallied victories against a CIA-sponsored military force, and democratized a nation that had little experience with genuine electoral government. Although considered a failure by some, the Sandinista revolution was a standout in its national and international effects.
In past Central American revolutions and counterrevolutions, the role of the United States as a peacemaker or peace-breaker was a reality that all rebel vanguards had to face. The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua not only represents a national movement against imperialism, but it represents a nation who decided to choose their own future, with or without the Sandinistas. A nation that was politicized and united against imperial rule. The Nicaraguan nation created a sense of Central American sovereignty with its participation in peace accord that defied U.S. policies in the region. Like the namesake of the Frente Sandinista Liberacion Nacional, all Nicaraguans fought against the North American definitions of “efficiency and decency” that manifested themselves in Central America as ‘export dependency and dictatorship’. In some manner, whether one was a right wing conservative or a liberal democrat, all Nicaraguans were Sandinistas.




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