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Emancipatory Knowledge
CRITICAL ANALYSIS: Facts, Values; Objectivity, Subjectivity, through the Lens of Eagleton’s “Ideology”
On page 99 in Terry Eagleton’s Ideology, one comes upon the following quote:
To seize history as totality is to grasp it in its dynamic, contradictory development, of which the potential realization of human powers is a vital part. To this extent, a particular kind of cognition - knowing the whole - is for both Hegel and Lukacs a certain kind of moral and political norm. The dialectical method thus reunites not only subject and object, but also ‘fact’ and ‘value’, which bourgeois thought has ripped asunder. To understand the world in a particular way becomes inseparable from acting to promote the free, full unfolding of human creative powers.
We are not left high and dry, as we are in positivist or empiricist thought, with a dispassionate, value-free knowledge on the one hand, and an arbitrary set of subjective values on the other. On the contrary, the act of knowledge is itself both ‘fact’ and ‘value’. an accurate cognition indispensable for political emancipation. As Leszek Kolakowski puts the point: ‘In this particular case [i.e. that of emancipatory knowledge} the understanding and transformation of reality are not two separate processes, but one and the same phenomenon.
The part in bold makes one question: how has bourgeois thought “ripped asunder” ‘fact’ and ‘value’?
Upon embarking on this line of thought, I immediately realized that a number of preliminary questions were important to ask before a meaningful answer could be achieved. And not just ‘a’ meaningful one, but a fully true one.
My inquiry began with the following questions:
· Precisely what do we mean when we distinguish objectivity from subjectivity?
· What is the nature of one’s access to objective reality?
· Are objectivity and subjectivity attributable to reality, or only knowledge? (i.e., are we properly dealing with metaphysics or epistemology or both)
· In what sense is Eagleton using the terms ‘fact’ and ‘value’, to begin with?
And, as that last question was the most fundamental, I consulted the text, and found the following quote on page 17:
“A moral realist, by contrast, refuses this binary opposition of ‘fact’ and ‘value’ (which has in fact deep roots in bourgeois philosophical history), . and ‘denies that we can draw any intelligible distinction between those parts of assertoric discourse which do, and those which do not, genuinely describe reality’. On this theory, it is mistaken to think that our language separates out into steel-hard objectivism and soggy subjectivism, into a realm of indubitable physical facts and a sphere of precariously floating values.”
So now we have a bit more information. Facts are statements that “genuinely describe reality”, while values are, as Eagleton suggests, at least on a macro level, a matter of class interest.
Ideology, thus, would be any form of factual givenness that serves to conceal the contradiction between the bourgeoisies’ (or any class’s) own interests and the interest of society as a whole.
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Having sufficiently answered that question for the time being, let us move on to the first question we asked: What is the nature of one’s access to objective reality?
Obviously sensory perception is a key aspect of this. Yet without interpretation, sensations are utterly meaningless. Time and time again, for example, I’m struck by the physiologically identical nature of pain and pleasure. It’s on a purely symbolic level; in the realm of fantasy; the realm of the ego/society-at-large, that a symptom becomes distinguished as either pain or pleasure – or, even more: distinguished at all. Perception is a matter of relativity.
In the same way, objectivity and subjectivity are not merely interrelated, but are not separate aspects of ‘the Absolute’ whatsoever. (I hedge in this concept of ‘the Absolute’ later through the Hindu concept of Advita, aka, sanscrit for “non-dual”. But if you know of a superior discourse for discussing this, I’m all ears).
In this way, as our resident Lacanians have so often suggested, the symbolic order of being does in fact supersede the physiological one. Or perhaps, it’s not even a matter of levels, but a spectrum of experience, from differentiated/sophisticated, to undifferentiated/unsophisticated. One thinks of the spectrum of sensation itself, with touch being highly undifferentiated in comparison to sight. Our touch dwells largely in reflexive action, while our sight has a more direct relation to symbolic understanding, etc.
So to answer our question of one’s access to objective reality, or of possessing objective knowledge -- we sublate it through a dialectical understanding of objectivity/subjectivity itself -- that is, physical reality is the antagonism of cogito and materiality.
This answer is infinitely more useful than that which is typically posited in the bog of purely positivist discourse, where the answer is either that there is “dispassionate, value-free knowledge on the one hand, and an arbitrary set of subjective values on the other.”
From the bottom of page 107:
"The modern bourgeoisie is accordingly caught in something of a cleft stick. Unable to retreat to old-style metaphysical certainties, it is equally loath to embrace a full-blooded scepticism which would simply subvert the legitimacy of its power."
The bourgeois subject is stuck in a tension where they can no longer go back to pure metaphysics, as immanent to capitalism is a dynamism and mutability that constantly threatens to cut the authoritative ground from under its own feet. One can’t help but feel that many of our contemporary philosophical controversies would be resolved if more people were aware of the historical class basis of the controversies being engaged in.
To approach the issue of subjectivity/objectivity from a slightly different direction, let us ask this: to what degree are they separate? Here again the typical language of objectivity/subjectivity is by and large useless.
Discourse on IDEOLOGY leads us down a somewhat fruitful path. However, it can be quite challenging to posit a scientific genealogy of the discourse of ideology -- let alone coming to a working definition of it (which is useful for those interested in consistent action, which unfortunately the Left currently fails to maintain). I laud Eagleton’s book as the closest the left has come to succeeding in this that I am aware of.
On Ideology:
Ideology is the inversion; the condensed, nodal point of this dualism. Ideology is a synecdoche of the ideal of objectivity -- perception from a god’s eye view.
Which brings us to Lacan, who gives us the hint in identifying the “Big Other” as potentially synonymous with this god’s eye view.
Yet this god’s eye view is unassailable. At least ‘some’ big other is necessary for social order, for the two appear to be essentially synonymous. For, in Hiedegerrian language, the big other is nothing more than the space; the clearing -- where beings ‘are’. We could say “they go there to communicate”, but that is insufficient. They are there, `as` being. Without identifying an 'other', individuality evaporates.
But, to backtrack, we now reach a tentative, partial definition of subjectivity: subjectivity is localized, incomplete awareness/self-reflexivity of non-dual being, or materiality.
And here we come to a major problem. How are we to posit this totality of which a subject is to be distinguished cataphatically? The best way of approaching it that I know is through the Hindu concept “advita”, which means "non-dual" in Sanskrit, and is used to undermine both a pluralistic worldview as well as a monadic one.
However, to even most of the Zen Buddhists I’ve met, who tend to be the most progressive among Eastern religious thinkers, alongside some Taoists, there is always this smell of a monadic God regardless. Or at the very least an implicit anti-intellectualism.
Another reason I’m posting this here, besides being in search of assistance in understanding the problem of the Absolute/complete subjectivity and/or objective reality, as well as to stimulate discussion, is to ask another question:
Are all values ideological?
And if they are, is action best justified through statistical cost/benefit analysis then? Is morality to be so cheap?
Last edited by Riot; 22nd July 2016 at 22:28. Reason: spelling
I think the first way to understand "value" in Eagleton's discourse is to view it as context. It is not only if one has a a position on the topic of interest, but that one is even approaching a topic from some one or angles that seems to constitute value for Eagleton. Further I think this is the way that the subjective should first be understood in both Eagleton's and Kant's dichotomy between the subjective and the objective.
The fact/value distinction is a problem in ethics with modern Western Philosophy. You would do very well to NOT conflate that with Advaita, which is an idealist trend in medieval Indian philosophy.
Also, minor point, but if you ask a dozen Japanese/Japanese-American leftists about the most "progressive" religious sect in Japan, I'll wager that few-to-none will say Zen. It was basically an elite pastime for the samurai class, at least before it was discovered by the west. There are progressive trends in Buddhism though.
xxsadf< mispost>
Yes, advita can be connoted to idealism, just as pretty much all pre-modern philosophy can be. A better reason for me not making that speculative leap would be that I'm not clarifying the value to be taken from the concept of advita. Best to stay tighter to one tradition, unless I'm willing to justify the usage adequately.
Thanks for the feedback.
Zen is conceptually quite radical, but you are right that it has not historically been politically or socially radical. You don't even need to go as far back as the Samurai era when feudal warriors were debating the meaning of their existence - during WWII many of Zen's highest figures were willing mouthpieces of Japanese Imperialism. Of course, an apologist might argue that they did not really have a choice considering the militaristic authoritarianism of Japan at the time, but that argument seems fairly unconvincing.
As for the fact/value distinction, one might argue that this is a case of the most historically significant Advaita Vedanta philosopher confronting a similar problem. That said, I am not aware of Advaita philosophers ever articulating the problem explicitly
Aristotelianism, Stoicism and Epicureanism, as well as ancient Greek Atomism in general, leaned towards materialism. There were also materialist strains in Hindu and Buddhist philosophy which disagreed with Advaita philosophy and Idealist interpretations of Buddhism.
Last edited by Sinister Cultural Marxist; 31st July 2016 at 01:48.
Socialist Party of Outer Space
To be perfectly transparent, my primary access to *advaita* is through Ramana Maharshi, whose philosophy seems to be loosely categorized under what Wikipedia calls "Neo-Advaita".
This is largely beside the point though -- I'm still hoping someone is willing to attempt to elaborate on how bourgeois thought has "ripped asunder" 'fact' and 'value'.
If what characterizes bourgeois society as those who, to put it simplistically for the sake of discussion, own the means of production, then the distinction between facts and values, one must presume, emerges from that social relationship. However, this begs another question: were facts and values unified before bourgeois society? If no, what does it mean when Eagleton says that they were" ripped asunder"? If yes, through what aspects of the rise of the bourgeoisie are we to understand this shift in consciousness, and, besides alienation, what consequences has this split had?
