[T]his [...] cannot be taken to sensibly entail that a young horse is also a horse carcass at the same time (or in any interval of time when the damn horse still lives).
Even so, your argument neglects that the principle I speak of is that at the same time - A is and is not A. This is the foundation of that nonsensical view of motion as "self-contradictory". You're basically proposing temporizing the principle - but then there is no such principle left standing.
You're misinterpreting the dialectic by attempting to *remove* it from the reality of time and motion -- see (1)(b):
Marx develops a comprehensive, theoretical understanding of political reality early in his intellectual and activist career by means of a critical adoption and radicalization of the categories of 18th and 19th century German Idealist thought. Of particular importance is Hegel's appropriation of Aristotle's organicist and essentialist categories in the light of Kant's transcendental turn.[2]
Marx builds on four contributions Hegel makes to our philosophical understanding. They are: (1) the replacement of mechanism and atomism with Aristotelean categories of organicism and essentialism, (2) the idea that world history progresses through stages, (3) the difference between natural and historical (dialectical) change, and (4) the idea that dialectical change proceeds through contradictions in the thing itself.
(1) Aristotelian Organicism and Essentialism
(a) Hegel adopts the position that chance is not the basis of phenomena and that events are governed by laws.[3] Some have falsely attributed to Hegel the position that phenomena are governed by transcendent, supersensible ideas that ground them. On the contrary, Hegel argues for the organic unity between universal and particular.[4] Particulars are not mere token types of universals; rather, they relate to each other as a part relates to a whole. This latter has import for Marx's own conception of law and necessity.
(b) In rejecting the idea that laws merely describe or independently ground phenomena, Hegel revives the Aristotlean position that law or principle is something implicit in a thing, a potentiality which is not actual but which is in the process of becoming actual.[4] This means that if we want to know the principle governing something, we have to observe its typical life-process and figure out its characteristic behavior. Observing an acorn on its own, we can never deduce that it is an oak tree. To figure out what the acorn is - and also what the oak tree is - we have to observe the line of development from one to the other.
