The Stalin Thread 2: all discussion about Stalin (as a person) in this thread please

[Ismail]

"Provocations" such as a stream of scouting incursions (both aerial and on the ground) into Soviet territory and the movement of German formations into attack positions. Even as late as the opening hours of the invasion Moscow was still telling commanders not to open fire on 'German provocations'... such as air raids and artillery barrages.

"Documents published since the end of the USSR have shown... that the warnings from intelligence and other sources were contradictory and uncertain. V.V. Kozhinov points out the problems of distinguishing deliberate disinformation and just plain error from accurate information in the evaluation of intelligence, and how contradictory the intelligence available to Soviet leaders was.

The German Army had a disinformation plan to spread false rumors to the Soviet leadership, A detailed order to this effect by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, dated February 15, 1941, has been published.

As Kozhinov points out, Khrushchev's accusations here can be turned around on his own thesis. Historians do not blame President Roosevelt for failing to foresee the attack on Pearl Harbor. Therefore to blame Stalin for not foreseeing the precise time and place of the Nazi attack is to fall prey to the 'cult of personality', to believe Stalin was supposed to have superhuman abilities and inexplicably failed to use them." (Furr, Khrushchev Lied, pp. 84-85.)

A military conspiracy involving the entire top brass and some 30,000 officers

"In 1937 the Soviet armed forces readmitted 4,661 ousted men... 6,333 officers regained their old status in the services in 1938, and 184 in 1939, totalling 11,178 in three years. In addition, 2,416 won changes in the terms of their dismissals, presumably from political to less serious grounds. By 1939, more air force officers were reinstated (867) than arrested (344) ....

In the other, detailed accounts of what happened, the fate of 24,624 army and air force officers who left the service in the Terror is unknown. Not all of them were killed or imprisoned. More than two-thirds of the 9,600 officers arrested were acquitted, and many were reinstated. This pattern indicates that the regime believed it was investigating a real plot. If the goal had been to terrorize the military, far fewer would have been exonerated." (Thurston, Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, p. 123.)

[ComradeOm]

"Documents published since the end of the USSR have shown... that the warnings from intelligence and other sources were contradictory and uncertain. V.V. Kozhinov points out the problems of distinguishing deliberate disinformation and just plain error from accurate information in the evaluation of intelligence, and how contradictory the intelligence available to Soviet leaders was

Of course. I forgot that the massed German armies on the border, along with regular scouting incursions across it, could only be a feint for an invasion of England. And that the only appropriate response to such a feint was to cripple the Red Army through flawed deployments and an enforced lack of preparation. Oh, that wily Stalin

The German Army had a disinformation plan to spread false rumors to the Soviet leadership, A detailed order to this effect by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, dated February 15, 1941, has been published.

Well I never. An army tried to deceive its enemies. Those rotten, cheating Germans. I bet the Soviets never stooped so low to attempt employ such maskirovka!

As Kozhinov points out, Khrushchev's accusations here can be turned around on his own thesis. Historians do not blame President Roosevelt for failing to foresee the attack on Pearl Harbor. Therefore to blame Stalin for not foreseeing the precise time and place of the Nazi attack is to fall prey to the 'cult of personality', to believe Stalin was supposed to have superhuman abilities and inexplicably failed to use them." (Furr, Khrushchev Lied, pp. 84-85.)

No. Classic whataboutism. Had Roosevelt had access to a fraction of the warnings and intelligence that Stalin did, and had he ignored this information in favour of putting the entire US navy at the mercy of the Japanese, then he too should/would have been admonished.

Stalin, personally, had sight of detailed warnings (down to dates and times) as to the coming invasion. There were reports from ports, interviews with multiple German communist defectors, alerts from the German embassy (where the staff had started burning documents and their families had let the country), warnings from diplomats and intelligence agents in Berlin, hundreds of recorded aerial incursions (as the Luftwaffe systematically mapped out Red Army positions and planned their future raids), etc.

Being sceptical about such information, or struggling to decipher it, is natural. What is unforgivable stupidity is point blank ignoring all of it, and issuing directives to this effect, in favour of a delusional belief that the Nazis simply would not invade. Even when Timoshenko and Zhukov personally pleaded with Stalin on 21 June 1941 he refused to release the shackles and allow the Read Army to prepare itself for the coming assault (now hours away).

None of this supposes "superhuman abilities" on the part of Stalin but rather the ability to accept an overwhelming wall of evidence and act appropriately. Or at the very least not gamble by deliberately hindering the Red Army's preparations.

"In 1937 the Soviet armed forces readmitted 4,661 ousted men... 6,333 officers regained their old status in the services in 1938, and 184 in 1939, totalling 11,178 in three years. In addition, 2,416 won changes in the terms of their dismissals, presumably from political to less serious grounds. By 1939, more air force officers were reinstated (867) than arrested (344) ....

The purges killed three (of five) Marshals, 20 army commanders and 64 corps commanders (of 15 and 64 respectively, in 1936) and 131 divisional commanders (of 201). It was a near complete sweep of the upper echelons of the Red Army.

Throw in the disruptions caused by the mass arrests and the results were catastrophic. Officers barely over 35 led divisions and corps; men barely past 40 led entire armies. Officers could not be replaced and the authorities resorted to throwing cadets into roles for which they were in no way ready - as late as 1940 not one of the Red Army's 225 regimental commanders had passed through the Frunze academy (Mercatante). According to Glantz, most Red Army commanders were serving at least two ranks above their training/competency.

All in the name of a witch-hunt fuelled by Stalin's paranoia. If Hitler himself had whispered that Stalin's own mother was a fascist then half of Russia's womanhood would have started receiving visits from the NKVD

[Ismail]

Stalin, personally, had sight of detailed warnings (down to dates and times) as to the coming invasion. There were reports from ports, interviews with multiple German communist defectors, alerts from the German embassy (where the staff had started burning documents and their families had let the country), warnings from diplomats and intelligence agents in Berlin, hundreds of recorded aerial incursions (as the Luftwaffe systematically mapped out Red Army positions and planned their future raids), etc.

And yet few of these reports concurred completely with the other. Furr quotes Kozhinov, "Lack of trust of the intelligence information about a German invasion was also caused by the disagreements they contained about the dating of the beginning of the war. 'They specified May 14 and 15, May 20 and 21, June 15, and, at last, June 22... Once the first May periods had passed, Stalin... finally came to believe that Germany would not invade the USSR in 1941...'" And on the intelligence provided by Sorge, Kozhinov notes that "it was impossible to simply believe it after a series of inaccurate dates that had been communicated through sources considered 'reliable.' (by the way, Sorge himself at first reported that the invasion would take place in May). And contemporary 'analysts', knowing - as does the whole world - that the war began precisely on June 22, and therefore waxing indignant at Stalin because he had neglected Sorge's precise information sent out on June 15, seem naïve at the very least..." (quoted in Furr, Khrushchev Lied, p. 336.)

Geoffrey Roberts also notes that Stalin had reason to distrust reports. For instance, speaking of the visit of Rudolf Hess to Britain in May 1941, "Hess's defection coloured Stalin's view of the many intelligence reports on the coming German attack that were now crossing his desk. Were the reports accurate or were they rumours circulated by those who wanted to precipitate a Soviet-German war? Stalin's suspicions in this regard were not far wrong. The British did use the Hess affair to sow discord in Soviet-German relations by circulating rumours that he was on an official mission to form an Anglo-German alliance against Russia. The dreadful irony was that when the British became convinced that the Germans were indeed about to invade Russia and attempted to warn Stalin of the danger, they were not believed...

In this uncertain situation Stalin relied on his own reasoning to assess Hitler's likely intentions: it did not make sense for Germany to turn against Russia before Britain was finished off. Why fight a two-front war when the Soviet Union self-evidently posed no immediate danger to Germany? In May 1941 Stalin told the graduating cadets of the Red Army academies that Germany defeated France in 1870 because it fought on only one front but had lost the First World War because it had to fight on two fronts. This rationalisation was reinforced by the assessment in some of the intelligence reports presented to him. For example, on 20 March 1941 General Filip Golikov, the chief of Soviet military intelligence, presented a summary of reports on the timing of German military action against the USSR. Golikov concluded, however, that 'the most likely date for the beginning of military action against the USSR is after victory over England or after the conclusion of an honourable peace with Germany. Rumours and documentation that war against the USSR is inevitable in the spring of this year must be considered as disinformation emanating from English or, even, perhaps, German intelligence.'" (Stalin's Wars, pp. 66-67.)

If Hitler himself had whispered that Stalin's own mother was a fascist then half of Russia's womanhood would have started receiving visits from the NKVD

As an amusing aside, "On a report based on information from [two Soviet spies in Germany] dated 17 June 1941 Stalin wrote to his intelligence chief, V.N. Merkulov, 'perhaps you can send your 'source' from the staff of the German air force to go fuck his mother. This is not a 'source' but a disinformer.'" (Ibid. p. 67.)

[ComradeOm]

And yet few of these reports concurred completely with the other. Furr quotes Kozhinov, "Lack of trust of the intelligence information about a German invasion was also caused by the disagreements they contained about the dating of the beginning of the war. 'They specified May 14 and 15, May 20 and 21, June 15, and, at last, June 22... Once the first May periods had passed, Stalin... finally came to believe that Germany would not invade the USSR in 1941...'" And on the intelligence provided by Sorge, Kozhinov notes that "it was impossible to simply believe it after a series of inaccurate dates that had been communicated through sources considered 'reliable.' (by the way, Sorge himself at first reported that the invasion would take place in May). And contemporary 'analysts', knowing - as does the whole world - that the war began precisely on June 22, and therefore waxing indignant at Stalin because he had neglected Sorge's precise information sent out on June 15, seem naïve at the very least..." (quoted in Furr, Khrushchev Lied, p. 336.)

Which is an example of staggering stupidity, on the part of both. Only Furr could hold up an increasing mountain of evidence and claim that it's sheer abundance pointed to the opposite conclusion.

Everyone knew that the German invasion was coming. Everyone. Soviet intelligence had known of possible preparations for this since 1940; the Red Army knew; the British and Americans knew; the diplomats knew; the commanders on the ground knew. The specifics (eg the start date) were of course variable but the overall picture was unmistakable: Nazi Germany was preparing for an imminent war against the USSR. That Sorge got his date wrong by two days in no way undermines the overall validity of this intelligence.

(The alternative, ie to dismiss a report and a source because the specific date was wrong, is obviously and undeniably stupid. 1941 proved that if nothing else. It's also worth noting that those earlier dates were correct at the time - Barbarossa was scheduled to begin in May 1940, only to be continually postponed as preparations were finalised. The intelligence was often correct at the time but, being as it was a snapshot, was outpaced by subsequent changes to the invasion date.)

The information was there and the story that it was telling was clear. It was Stalin's decision to draw the wrong conclusions from it. I mean, really, the Wehrmacht is massed in eastern Poland, the Luftwaffe is running hourly sorties over western Russia, a constant stream of intelligence reports scream invasion... and the conclusion is that Hitler is about to invade Britain? Almost a year after the Battle of Britain ended? A conclusion unsupported by anything other than a deeply flawed political calculation? Seriously, were those million German soldiers on the Soviet border (by March 1941) there on holiday?

Stalin was badly, badly at fault here and his assumptions were squarely contradicted by both reality and the warnings from, well, everyone else.

And to reiterate: none of this would have been of real consequence if Stalin's wilful blindness hadn't led him to limit the ability of the Red Army to come to combat readiness. The issue is not that Stalin didn't know the exact date for the invasion but that his disbelief that it was coming in the summer of 1941 stretched to the point of shackling Soviet attempts to counter the coming invasion.

As an amusing aside, "On a report based on information from [two Soviet spies in Germany] dated 17 June 1941 Stalin wrote to his intelligence chief, V.N. Merkulov, 'perhaps you can send your 'source' from the staff of the German air force to go fuck his mother. This is not a 'source' but a disinformer.'" (Ibid. p. 67.)

Disinformers, provocateurs... for Stalin everyone was an enemy agent of some sort conspiring against the USSR. Except Hitler. It's an irony that a regime that spent years persecuting millions of its citizens in the pursuit of imaginary conspiracies ended up trusting the intentions of its single most dangerous foe.

[Invader Zim]

Let us suggest, for the moment, that the regime was justifiable in ignoring its foreign intelligence sources as well as the information provided from external sources. Surely the Soviets were conducting direction finding techniques on Axis military radio traffic and performing traffic analysis?

To explain: Necessarily military units during the Second World War were assigned radio sets. Every time you transmit a message the same signal used to receive the message by your intended recipient can be picked up by anybody else listening. Moreover, in addition to a radio each unit is assigned a call sign. Even if they transmit an enciphered message, they began their communication by noting their call sign. This means that the enemy listening in also knows which unit is sending a message even if they do not know what the message says. Furthermore, if you can send and receive a message you can work out where the message his been sent from, provided that you have more than one station listening in (triangulation - this is also how mobile phone tracking works). Typically this was done by dedicated stations called direction finding stations, while other stations would do the actual listening and transcription of messages.

So what does all this mean? Basically, it means that these powers (certainly Britain, Germany and the United States did it extensively) created radio listening stations across their borders. This created a stream of data recording which units were using their radios, what frequency they were using, which callsign they were using and importantly where they were transmitting from. It is interesting to note that the German railway system also used radios. So the idea that in an age of warfare in which radio was necessary and ubiquitous that the Soviet Union would not have been able to tell that there was a massive military buildup in Poland strikes me as nonsense. Certainly, we know that the Soviets were gathering serious signals intelligence (SigInt) from Japanese traffic, so they would undoubtedly have tried the same thing against Germany. And that includes Traffic Analysis. While the regime may not have trusted its human intelligence and refused to gather image intelligence, a radio signal respects no national borders and traffic analysis and signals intelligence should have made them pretty suspicious.

[G4b3n]

He loved American Cow boy movies.
He also liked to put cigarettes out on his wife.
Stalinist policy probably killed anywhere between 20-40 million people not including WWII idiocy such as the purging of competent leaders who could have saved Russian lives.

Thank you Stalin, for making it so easy for the future bourgeois to denounce communism as an ideology of genocide. Your legacy lives on champ.

[a_wild_MAGIKARP]

Thank you Stalin, for making it so easy for the future bourgeois to denounce communism as an ideology of genocide. Your legacy lives on champ.

I think even if he had not killed so many people, capitalists would have just claimed he did anyway. I mean, since when do they care about the truth?
Perhaps they wouldn't be able to get away with saying he killed 60 million or whatever bullshit number they came up with, but surely they would still demonize him even if he was a saint, as they do with pretty much every communist leader.

[Fourth Internationalist]

I think even if he had not killed so many people, capitalists would have just claimed he did anyway. I mean, since when do they care about the truth?
Perhaps they wouldn't be able to get away with saying he killed 60 million or whatever bullshit number they came up with, but surely they would still demonize him even if he was a saint, as they do with pretty much every communist leader.

But certainly the attacks on Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, etc are very weak and unknown to most people. All people I know who hate communism point out how Stalin killed millions (or whatever other state capitalist leader) but not that Marx was incorrect in whatever philosophical or economic idea etc (that is just by far less common and weak).

The attacks on Lenin that he killed millions (which he didn't) are not accepted by historians, so the ruling class doesn't just claim stuff like that. They can't be too dishonest.

[Geiseric]

I think even if he had not killed so many people, capitalists would have just claimed he did anyway. I mean, since when do they care about the truth?
Perhaps they wouldn't be able to get away with saying he killed 60 million or whatever bullshit number they came up with, but surely they would still demonize him even if he was a saint, as they do with pretty much every communist leader.

He wasn't a communist leader, he may of been in the Bolsheviks (he robbed banks for party funds which Lenin wasn't fond of), but he wasn't very important until people like sverdlov died and had to be replaced. He grew in power as soon as there was desperation, which benefits him since he appointed many bureaucrats who were in charge of distributing scarce goods.

[a_wild_MAGIKARP]

But certainly the attacks on Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, etc are very weak and unknown to most people. All people I know who hate communism point out how Stalin killed millions (or whatever other state capitalist leader) but not that Marx was incorrect in whatever philosophical or economic idea etc (that is just by far less common and weak).

The attacks on Lenin that he killed millions (which he didn't) are not accepted by historians, so the ruling class doesn't just claim stuff like that. They can't be too dishonest.

That's true, and I'm sure Stalin did make it easier for them, but without him, then they probably would have focused on one of those people you mentioned. Like Trotsky, if he had replaced Lenin. Surely they still could have figured out some way to have a "big bad communist" everyone is afraid of, just not as easily.

And I don't know how much they really care about what historians think... Capitalists are the ones who get to decide what history books are printed or what documentaries are shown on TV, aren't they?

[Fourth Internationalist]

That's true, and I'm sure Stalin did make it easier for them, but without him, then they probably would have focused on one of those people you mentioned. Like Trotsky, if he had replaced Lenin. Surely they still could have figured out some way to have a "big bad communist" everyone is afraid of, just not as easily.

And I don't know how much they really care about what historians think... Capitalists are the ones who get to decide what history books are printed or what documentaries are shown on TV, aren't they?

Exactly, it would be much harder. While the ruling class does have an influence of what is considered history, it isn't just completely made up (at least in academic institutions). Exaggerations, yeah. But even we learn from these ruling class history and we are able to get tons of good information enough to get past the lies about what communism is and what communists want.

[G4b3n]

I think even if he had not killed so many people, capitalists would have just claimed he did anyway. I mean, since when do they care about the truth?
Perhaps they wouldn't be able to get away with saying he killed 60 million or whatever bullshit number they came up with, but surely they would still demonize him even if he was a saint, as they do with pretty much every communist leader.

No, I think there would be bias of course, but he would not be demonized.
Lenin murdered his far share of real and imagined counter-revolutionaries and he no where near as demonized as Stalin. As you can see, people still take Leninists seriously. The same can not be said for Stalinists.

[Ismail]

Lenin murdered his far share of real and imagined counter-revolutionaries and he no where near as demonized as Stalin. As you can see, people still take Leninists seriously. The same can not be said for Stalinists.

What are "Leninists"? Trots? Of course plenty admire Maoism and Castroism too, both petty-bourgeois ideologies which have as their foundation attacks on Stalin (and, through him, Lenin), and which appeal to student radicals.

And of course the bourgeoisie regarded Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Co. as more "reasonable," "sensible" than Stalin.

[Geiseric]

What are "Leninists"? Trots? Of course plenty admire Maoism and Castroism too, both petty-bourgeois ideologies which have as their foundation attacks on Stalin (and, through him, Lenin), and which appeal to student radicals.

And of course the bourgeoisie regarded Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Co. as more "reasonable," "sensible" than Stalin.

Ambassador davies was mighty fond of Stalin over trotsky and Lenin.

[Nevsky]

No, I think there would be bias of course, but he would not be demonized.
Lenin murdered his far share of real and imagined counter-revolutionaries and he no where near as demonized as Stalin. As you can see, people still take Leninists seriously. The same can not be said for Stalinists.

From today's perspective it seems more unlikely to demonize Trotsky but at the time he was like an absolute incarnation of international ("jewish"-)bolshevist evil in the eyes of many reactionaries. If I remember correctly, Churchill himself even congratulated Stalin on the murder of Trotsky. Trotsky was an ideal hate target for conservatives while Stalin is a perfect hate target for liberals. That's why "totalitarian" Stalin gets most negative attention from today's western historians.

[Ismail]

Ambassador davies was mighty fond of Stalin over trotsky and Lenin.

And the rest of the diplomatic corps claimed he was "duped" by the Soviets. And Cold War historiography attacked him utterly for having the gall to defend the authenticity of the Moscow Trials, which he attended as an observer. He was not "fond of Stalin over Lenin," he was an anti-communist who praised the Soviet stand against Hitler and called for cooperation with the USSR for this purpose.

A number of businessmen met with and praised Lenin as well. I don't see the significance.

This is qualitatively different from the praise international capitalism lavished on Khrushchev, his "Secret Speech," his bastardization of peaceful coexistence, and so on.

[Invader Zim]

And Cold War historiography attacked him utterly for having the gall to defend the authenticity of the Moscow Trials, which he attended as an observer.

We are talking about something ephemeral here, an individual's emotional reaction to an experience. However, in the final analysis either Davies' observations were accurate, and that the trials were 'legitimate' or they were not. And it is difficult to find an historian today who, having examined the available evidence, who finds Davies observations to be an accurate reflection of the facts. Observation, as a form of source requires external verification to be deployed as repository of fact.

[Ismail]

We are talking about something ephemeral here, an individual's emotional reaction to an experience. However, in the final analysis either Davies' observations were accurate, and that the trials were 'legitimate' or they were not. And it is difficult to find an historian today who, having examined the available evidence, who finds Davies observations to be an accurate reflection of the facts. Observation, as a form of source requires external verification to be deployed as repository of fact.

Of course when Davies published Mission to Moscow there was no archival materials in the hands of researchers, or much else of anything. All that existed was the testimony of the Trials, the impressions of those who observed them, attempts by Trotsky and Co. to disprove them, and a few miscellaneous "sounds legitimate" opinions (e.g. American engineer John D. Littlepage claiming that Pyatakov's claims at the Trials in-re sabotage sounded credible from what he observed working in the USSR.)

When J. Arch Getty searched Trotsky's archive at Harvard he discovered that Trotsky did send letters to Karl Radek and also that he did work to set up an organized opposition in the early 30's, including a "left"-right bloc, inside the USSR. During the Dewey Commission Trotsky, for logical reasons, lied about the latter, whereas the former had only Radek's own claims at the Trials up until Getty's research. This alone demonstrates that the Trials had some material basis in reality.

It's also worth noting that Davies' impressions of the Trials aren't important simply because he observed them, but also because he was a lawyer. Such added more authority than usual to his observations, as opposed to the likes of Anna Louise Strong or Lion Feuchtwanger.

As Davies wrote: "I talked to many, if not all, of the members of the Diplomatic Corps here and, with possibly one exception, they are all of the opinion that the proceedings established clearly the existence of a political plot and conspiracy to overthrow the government." Also, as one author notes, "When two former U. S. Assistant Attorneys-General, Charles Warren and Seth W. Richardson, studied the Moscow trial transcripts, each agreed that most defendants were unquestionably guilty." (Jules Archer, Man of Steel: Joseph Stalin, 1974, p. 106.)

[Geiseric]

A bloc with the right opposition was always an impossibility. Trotsky denounced p.o.u.m. for it. I think it's funny that you put so much faith in bourgeois statesman though, whom would of had an interest in the death of the communist movement.

[Brutus]

He wasn't a communist leader, he may of been in the Bolsheviks (he robbed banks for party funds which Lenin wasn't fond of), but he wasn't very important until people like sverdlov died and had to be replaced. He grew in power as soon as there was desperation, which benefits him since he appointed many bureaucrats who were in charge of distributing scarce goods.

Hardly! He was voted into the central committee in 1912 and was in charge of Pravda throughout 1917. Sure, he didn't have as bigger role as Trotski in the revolution, but whilst Trotski was sipping coffee in Vienna, Stalin was organising workers and agitating.