Is 'all truth concrete'?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

In reply to a post here (that truth is always 'concrete'), I made this point:

But the claim that all truth is concrete is itself abstract, so if:

T1: All truth is concrete

is true, then it's false!

But, the comrade whose blog this was (whose name will be withheld to protect the innocent, but for the sake of argument we'll call "BS") deleted this reply, and will no longer let me post at his/her blog.

It seems this comrade can't defend his/her ideas against me.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/blog.php?bt=3636

Well, this comrade has now posted this 'reply' to someone else who claimed I was right the make the above point (or it seems he/she thought this, but I'm not so sure, check it for yourself):

Rosa's comment that "all truth is concrete" is itself an abstraction therefore self--contradictory happens to be correct.

Anyway, here is the 'answer' BS posted:

I am making this a separate post because it is less important than my post above.

I did not reply to Rosa on this because, in my experience, discussion of any kind with Rosa turns out to be non-productive. (See the graphic above about someone being wrong on the internet.) I am happy, however, to reply to you on this as long as we are agreed that our 100 words/week quota will be applied to more important topics and that this topic does not count toward our 100 words/week quota.

Truth is always concrete. It is true. You can bet your life on it.

It is a practical matter. As revolutionary thinkers--we must deal (all the time) with concrete truth and abstract generalizations. We must understand the distinction between them.

The apparent contradiction stems from the simple fact that language is often imprecise. All words (being themselves generalizations) are in some sense clumsy instruments.

The statement that "truth is always concrete" is not a "truth" because it is not, itself, concrete. It is a generalization. It is also a generalization that happens to always be true. The "proof" that it is true--is that there is no counter-example.

Rosa's "cleverness" consists of not understanding that a concrete truth is not the same as a generalization that happens to always be true.

In a practical sense, the statement that "truth is always concrete" comes up anytime we talk about anything important. For example: if we talk about the working class. The term "working class" is itself a generalization in the sense that not all working classes are identical. The Russian working class in 1905 was not the same as the Russian working class in 1913, nor in 1921. Nor is it the same as the working class in the U.S. in 2011 or in 2040.

Activists often do not understand simple things like this and often think only in abstractions: they often treat different abstractions as being identical because they share the same name. One result of this kind of corrupt thinking is cargo-cult Leninism.

We need to learn to think and understand things concretely. All situations are different from one another. Two different working classes are not the same just as two different people are not the same. A working class at one point in time is not the same as the same working class at another point in time--just as you (today) are not the same as you were when you were 20 years old. This is the origin of the phrase: "you cannot step in the same river twice" (ie: the river will be different).

In a more practical sense, how we build a revolutionary mass organization in the U.S. today will not be identical to what took place in Russia in 1921. I have come to the conclusion that such an organization will emerge from a relatively loose network that makes good use of the emerging revolution in communications. I came to that conclusion by investigating the concrete conditions of the time and place in which I live.

The statement that "practice is the criterion of truth" is often understood in a shallow way. For example, Frank uses this statement to deny the importance of political transparency. Frank argues that I have been practicing this for some time and little has come of it--so therefore (according to Frank) this principle cannot be very important. But this is a vulgar kind of logic. This is the kind of logic that idiots used to predict that human beings would never be able to fly aircraft. By this kind of vulgar logic, nothing that is new would be possible.

About Rosa--please understand that I want nothing to do with any of her posts. If you want to ask me about something she says (because you consider the point she may raise as important) -- then go ahead. But if it is not important--I do not want to become involved with her kind of toxic energy. It leads nowhere.

Ok, taking each point separately:

I am making this a separate post because it is less important than my post above.

I did not reply to Rosa on this because, in my experience, discussion of any kind with Rosa turns out to be non-productive. (See the graphic above about someone being wrong on the internet.) I am happy, however, to reply to you on this as long as we are agreed that our 100 words/week quota will be applied to more important topics and that this topic does not count toward our 100 words/week quota.

Truth is always concrete. It is true. You can bet your life on it.

It is a practical matter. As revolutionary thinkers--we must deal (all the time) with concrete truth and abstract generalizations. We must understand the distinction between them.

The apparent contradiction stems from the simple fact that language is often imprecise. All words (being themselves generalizations) are in some sense clumsy instruments.

The statement that "truth is always concrete" is not a "truth" because it is not, itself, concrete. It is a generalization. It is also a generalization that happens to always be true. The "proof" that it is true--is that there is no counter-example.

Rosa's "cleverness" consists of not understanding that a concrete truth is not the same as a generalization that happens to always be true.

But, BS says the following:

Truth is always concrete. It is true.

Then he tells us:

The statement that "truth is always concrete" is not a "truth" because it is not, itself, concrete. It is also a generalization that happens to always be true.

Well, is it true of not?

Careful readers will note that the above inference -- "The statement that 'truth is always concrete' is not a "truth" because it is not, itself, concrete" -- is based on the truth of the claim that all truth is concrete. The inference would not work unless it were true.

How is this contradiction to be explained? Well, BS is happy to help us out here:

The apparent contradiction stems from the simple fact that language is often imprecise. All words (being themselves generalizations) are in some sense clumsy instruments.

If so, how can BS possibly know what legitimately follows from the words he uses? If language is so imprecise, how can we be sure we understand "all" "concrete", and "truth" -- not to mention "always" and "contradiction" -- to be able to derive anything from them?

Well, we can see for ourselves that BS does not actually believe what he says about language being "imprecise", since he is quite happy to draw clear conclusions from a sentence containing the word "generalisation"

It is also a generalization that happens to always be true.

So, BS picks and chooses which words he accepts as precise and which he condemns as "imprecise".

And yet, how does he know that all words are "imprecise"? Has he gained independent access to the precise nature of the things all words are supposed to be about so that he can then deliver the glad tidings to the rest of us that our words never quite match up to their supposed targets? If not, how can he tell us words are 'imprecise'?

What about the following, though?

All words (being themselves generalizations) are in some sense clumsy instruments.

All words? Really? What about Proper Names like "Lenin", "Marx" and "Hegel"? What are they generalisations of? And what about words like "in", "under" and "one"? What are they generalisations of?

Moreover, what are key words like "truth" and "generalisation" a generalisation of? BS is silent on this as he is generally when it comes to difficult ideas in the philosophy of language and logic.

But, even if all words were generalisations, how does that show they are "imprecise"?

Indeed, in view of the fact that "all words are generalisations" is not itself concrete, it can't be true.

On the other hand, if it is true, and it's not concrete, then it constitutes a clear counterexample to this bold claim:

It is a generalization. It is also a generalization that happens to always be true. The "proof" that it is true -- is that there is no counter-example.

Finally, isn't the claim that there are no counter-examples itself a generalisation and thus not itself concrete? If so, it can't be true.

In a practical sense, the statement that "truth is always concrete" comes up anytime we talk about anything important. For example: if we talk about the working class. The term "working class" is itself a generalization in the sense that not all working classes are identical. The Russian working class in 1905 was not the same as the Russian working class in 1913, nor in 1921. Nor is it the same as the working class in the U.S. in 2011 or in 2040.

But is this true? If so, is it concrete? Well, it doesn't look like it is. In which case, and once again, it can't be true.

On the other hand, might it be a generalisation that 'always happens to be true'? How can we be sure? Alas, BS is silent on this, too.

Despite this, comments about "the Russian working class in 1905" are still general, and this aren't concrete, either.

In fact, BS has yet to give us an example of a 'concrete' truth that does not involve abstract/general terms -- and I'll go so far as to say there are and can be no 'concrete' truths that do not involve the use of general terms (quantifiers, predicables, relational expressions, etc.) -- in which case there are no 'concrete' truths.

And, that generalisation does not just happen to be true, either.

Activists often do not understand simple things like this and often think only in abstractions: they often treat different abstractions as being identical because they share the same name. One result of this kind of corrupt thinking is cargo-cult Leninism.

As we can now see, BS also belongs to the sad group of individuals who do not "understand simple things like this", since he, too, had to use abstract/general terms to deliver this timely lecture to the rest of us.

We need to learn to think and understand things concretely.

But, we have yet to be given a single example of one of these rare beasts -- 'concrete truths'. Nor have we been shown (by BS, Lenin, or anyone) how to 'think concretely' -- especially by those who argue abstractly in support of these odd ideas, as we can see from this sentence:

All situations are different from one another.

Is this, abstract, concrete, general, specific, imprecise...?

BS:

Two different working classes are not the same just as two different people are not the same. A working class at one point in time is not the same as the same working class at another point in time--just as you (today) are not the same as you were when you were 20 years old. This is the origin of the phrase: "you cannot step in the same river twice" (ie: the river will be different).

But, it is very easy to step into the same river. Or does BS think that if he steps into the Rappahannock it changes into the Potomac?

On a side issue, it's not a good idea to defend the useless ideas Hegel inflicted on humanity by quoting the even more confused ideas of that ancient mystic Heraclitus.

This mystical bumbler thought he could decide what was true for all of reality for all of time by observing what happens if you step into a river!

And he got those details wrong too! It is surely possible to step into the same river (as I have shown above) and many times, too. What Heraclitus probably meant was that it is not possible to step into the same water twice.

But even that is easy to do. Water is always H2O, and stays H2O no matter how many times you step into it.

Maybe he meant "Step into the same body of water", but that too is easy. If that body of water is Lake Superior, it does not change into Lake Ontario if you step into it.

Perhaps he meant that the atoms concerned were different? But he knew nothing of atoms.

Maybe then we can refer to different atoms? But every water atom is identical to every other water atom.

So, it's not possible to make sense of this obscure remark (just like it's not possible to make sense of any metaphysical remark) that all too many comrades regard as gospel truth.

Of course, if anyone thinks they can make sense of Heraclitus's confused thought, they are welcome to try.

Anyway, isn't the claim "you cannot step in the same river twice" not less abstract, and thus not true?

The statement that "practice is the criterion of truth" is often understood in a shallow way. For example, Frank uses this statement to deny the importance of political transparency. Frank argues that I have been practicing this for some time and little has come of it--so therefore (according to Frank) this principle cannot be very important. But this is a vulgar kind of logic. This is the kind of logic that idiots used to predict that human beings would never be able to fly aircraft. By this kind of vulgar logic, nothing that is new would be possible.

But we have already seen that the idea that "practice is the criterion of truth" is itself false.

Which it should be anyway, since it is yet another abstraction!

But, even if this nostrum were true, what has it got to do with the following:

This is the kind of logic that idiots used to predict that human beings would never be able to fly aircraft. By this kind of vulgar logic, nothing that is new would be possible.

Well, perhaps this: practice has shown that human beings can fly aircraft -- in other words, practice has once again shown that a generalisation is true! But which 'concrete truth' has been demonstrated here? BS forget to tell us.

About Rosa--please understand that I want nothing to do with any of her posts. If you want to ask me about something she says (because you consider the point she may raise as important) -- then go ahead. But if it is not important--I do not want to become involved with her kind of toxic energy. It leads nowhere.

A bit like the fact that Dialectical Marxism has led us 'nowhere' in 150 years?

[JazzRemington]

Aren't generalizations abstractions anyway?

[Lord Hargreaves]

Something is made "concrete" when it combines the abstract and the real - ergo: something that is just real, just pure experience or just practical know-how, is not concrete.

In Marxism, this Hegelian language is reworked into the combination of theory and practice: just as theory is made "concrete" by application in practice, so equally is practice without being made "concrete", without a broader theoretical understanding of what is taking place, doomed to failure.

Thus "all truth is concrete" is only half the story, at best

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Jaz:

Aren't generalizations abstractions anyway?

So we are told, but I have yet to be told what they are abstractions of.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:

Something is made "concrete" when it combines the abstract and the real - ergo: something that is just real, just pure experience or just practical know-how, is not concrete.

Except, when these 'abstractions' are give the Hegel-treatment, they are turned into the names of abstract particulars, destroying generality (and thus theory). As I have argued here before:

Dialectical 'Logic' derives from Hegel's (deliberate) misunderstanding of Aristotle, and from a linguistic dodge invented in the Middle Ages.

First of all, Hegel thought that certain sentences contained an in-built contradiction.

If we use Lenin's example:

J1: John is a man.

we can see where this idea came from, and thus where it goes astray. [Hegel in fact used the sentence, "The rose is red".]

First of all, Hegel accepted a theory invented by Medieval Roman Catholic theologians (now called the Identity Theory of Predication), which re-interprets propositions like J1 in the following way:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

The former "is" of predication was replaced by an "is" of identity.

[Predication involves saying something about someone or some thing. So, in J1, Lenin was saying something about John. "John" is the subject, and "is a man" is the predicate. When this "is" is turned into one of identity, J1 is turned into the monstrosity, "John is identical with a man." This why J2 is often used, even though it, too, is no less of a monstrosity.]

The argument then went as follows: since John cannot be identical with a general term (or, rather, with what it represents, a universal), we must conclude the following:

J3: John is not identical with Manhood.

But then again, if John is a man, he must be identical with (or at least he must share in) what other men are, so we must now conclude:

J4: John is not not identical with Manhood.

Or, more simply:

J5: John is not a non-man.

It's hard to believe, but out of this was born the Negation of the Negation.

Hegel thought this showed that motion was implicit in our concepts, as thought passed from one pole to another (positive to negative, and then to a (higher) positive again), and that this indicated that it had dialectics built into it.

It also allowed him to cast doubt upon the validity of the 'Law of Identity' [LOI] -- a 'Law', incidentally, that cannot be found in Aristotle's work, but which was invented by Medieval Roman Catholic theologians, once more.

Hegel thought this showed that it was now possible to state this 'Law' negatively.

However, in order to proceed, Hegel not only employed a barrage of impenetrably obscure jargon, he relied on some hopelessly sloppy syntax. He plainly thought he could ignore the logical/grammatical distinctions that exist between the various terms he used, or, at least, between the roles they occupy in language -- i.e., between naming, saying, describing and predicating. This 'enabled' him to pull-off several neat verbal tricks --, and from the ensuing confusion, 'the dialectic' emerged.

For instance, Hegel thought that the LOI could be stated negatively, and that this implied the so-called Law of Non-contradiction [LOC].

When the principles of Essence are taken as essential principles of thought they become predicates of a presupposed subject, which, because they are essential, is "everything". The propositions thus arising have been stated as universal Laws of Thought. Thus the first of them, the maxim of Identity, reads: Everything is identical with itself, A = A: and negatively, A cannot at the same time be A and Not-A. This maxim, instead of being a true law of thought, is nothing but the law of abstract understanding. The propositional form itself contradicts it: for a proposition always promises a distinction between subject and predicate; while the present one does not fulfil what its form requires. But the Law is particularly set aside by the following so-called Laws of Thought, which make laws out of its opposite. It is asserted that the maxim of Identity, though it cannot be proved, regulates the procedure of every consciousness, and that experience shows it to be accepted as soon as its terms are apprehended. To this alleged experience of the logic books may be opposed the universal experience that no mind thinks or forms conceptions or speaks in accordance with this law, and that no existence of any kind whatever conforms to it. [Hegel, Shorter Logic, quoted from here.]

So, from A =A he thought he could obtain "A cannot at the same time be A and not-A", which is supposed to be the LOC. But, the LOI concerns the conditions under which an object is identical with itself, or with something else; it's not about the alleged identity of propositions.

[Indeed, if a proposition had no identity, it wouldn't be a proposition to begin with. That is, if it were unclear what was being proposed, then plainly nothing can have been proposed, and so nothing could follow from it.]

In that case, the alleged negative version of the LOI cannot have anything to do with the connection between a proposition and its contradictory. The LOC, on the other hand, is about propositions (or clauses), not objects. Only by confusing objects (or the names of objects) with propositions (and clauses) -- that is, by confusing objects and their names with what we say about them, truly or falsely -- was Hegel able to concoct the 'dialectic'.

[The full details here are rather complex, so I have omitted them. However, readers can find out what these are here and here.]

Furthermore, propositions are not objects; if they were they could not be used to say anything. Sure, we use signs to express propositions, but these signs become symbols (i.e., they signify things for us, and convey meaning). We achieve this by the way we employ such signs according to the grammatical complexity our ancestors built into language.

To see this, just look at any object or collection of objects and ask yourself what it/they say to you. You might be tempted to reply that it/they say this or that, but in order to report what it/they allegedly say, you will be forced to articulate whatever that is in a proposition. You could not do this by merely reproducing the original objects, or just by naming them. This is not surprising, since objects have no intellect, social history, or language, whereas we do.

Unfortunately, Engels and Lenin swallowed this spurious Hegelian line of reasoning hook, line and sinker; and that is because they both knew no logic, but had a wildly inflated view of Hegel and his expertise in this area. [This is not to demean these two great revolutionaries; many others, who should know better, have similarly been duped.]

However, because of this misplaced respect for Hegel, Marxists have been saddled with his loopy logic ever since (upside down, or 'the right way up').

Here is Lenin, for example:

To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….

Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a "nucleus" ("cell") the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general. [Lenin (1961), i.e., Philosophical Notebooks, pp.359-60.]

In this passage, Lenin felt he could 'derive' fundamental truths about reality, not from a scientific investigation of the world, but from examining a few words seen through Hegel's distorting lens!

[And yet, dialecticians still tell us with a straight face that their theory has not been imposed on nature!]

However, J1 is a descriptive sentence, so it cannot be treated in the way Hegel imagined. In fact, Aristotle would have approached it differently. In order to explain its structure, he would have said:

A1: Manhood applies to John.

[J1: John is a man.]

In other words, in J1 the predicate is used to describe John; it is not expressing an identity.

Indeed, it makes no sense to suppose with Hegel that John (or his name) could be identical with a general term -- any more than it would make sense to suppose that you, for example, are identical with a conjunction, a preposition, an adverb, or even with what any of these allegedly 'represent'.

In which case, this perverse example of Medieval, Roman Catholic 'logic' is not simply misguided, it's bizarre!

It surely takes a special sort of 'genius' (which we are assured by Lenin that Hegel possessed) to suppose that an object like John could be identical with a predicate, or with the abstraction which it supposedly designated!

Now, if we return to the original sentence, translated this time into Hegel-speak, we can see more closely where the argument goes astray:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

It is now impossible to explain what the extra "is" here means (highlighted), which has to be used to make the alleged identity between John and Manhood (or whatever) plain.

In fact, if all such uses of "is" expressed disguised identities (as we are assured they must), J2 would now have to become:

J2a: John is identical with identical with Manhood

as "is identical with" replaces the bold "is" from J2.

If now the green "is" in J2a is replaced with what it is supposed to mean -- i.e., "is identical with" in blue --, it becomes:

J2b: John is identical with identical with identical with Manhood.

If now this new (underlined) "is" we had to use in J2b is given a similar dialectical make-over, it yields:

J2c: John is identical with identical with identical with identical with Manhood.

And so on...

[These untoward moves can only be halted by those who do not think "is" always expresses an identity; but dialecticians gave up the right to lodge that particular appeal the moment they accepted the Identity Theory of Predication.]

Fortunately, Aristotle's approach short-circuits all this; there is no "is" at all in A1:

A1: Manhood applies to John.

In contrast to this, Hegel's 'analysis' cannot avoid this verbal explosion; indeed, it invites it.

Anyone who thinks this is nit-picking need only reflect on the fact that Hegel -- and anyone who agrees with him -- cannot explain his theory without using J2:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

But, Hegel's theory stalls at this point, for this extra "is" cannot be one of identity (for the above reasons), and if it isn't, then the theory that tells us that "is" is always one of identity (in such contexts) must be false.

In fact, this Hegelian trick can only be carried out in Indo-European languages. By-and-large, other language groups do not possess this particular grammatical feature. The above moves depend solely on the subject-predicate form taking the copula "is" (and its cognates), which is found almost exclusively in the aforementioned language group.

This shows that Hegel's logic is not just bizarre, it's highly parochial. Hence, no general conclusions (or any at all) can follow from it.

To illustrate these bogus moves in more detail, consider J1 again:

J1: John is a man.

Given traditional grammar, this is in effect:

G1: S is P.

[Where, "S" = "Subject", "P" = "Predicate".]

Now, we already have the facility in language to express identity (and genuinely so). For example, here is an uncontroversial identity statement:

G2: Cicero is Tully.

["Tully" was Cicero's other name. Cicero was a right-wing politician who lived in Ancient Rome, about the same time as Julius Caesar.]

So, G2 quite legitimately means:

G2a: Cicero is identical with Tully.

Or:

G3: A = B.

[Where "A" is "Cicero and "B" is "Tully"; using "=" as the identity sign, here.]

G3 expresses an unambiguous "is" of identity. No problem with that. But, it is important to note that the identity expressed here is between two names, or between two named individuals (depending on how it is read). This is typical of the use of the "is" of identity.

Now, just look at the superficial similarity that exists between the following two linguistic forms -- that is, between G1 (a predication) and G2 (an identity):

J1: John is a man.

G1: S is P.

G2: Cicero is Tully.

G3: A = B.

Highly influential ancient and medieval logicians noticed this, too, and proceeded to combine the two distinct forms into one, reading the "is" of predication as an "is" of identity.

But this now turns the predicate "P" into a name, for identities are expressed between names (or between other singular terms).

Unfortunately, if "P" is a name, it cannot now be a predicate.

As noted above, Hegel also adopted this approach to such propositions, confusing the "is" of identity with the "is" of predication. This then 'allowed' him to claim that propositions like J1 were in fact identity statements. Of course, that means this part of Hegel's 'logic' was based solely on what is in effect a grammatical stipulation -- i.e., a dogmatic assertion that these two forms are one and the same, which then creates the sorts of problems we have seen above.

Even worse, this is a stipulation that destroys the capacity language has for expressing generality, for that is what predicates do -- they allow us to say general things about named individuals, etc. Turning predicates into names undermines this completely.

So, given the 'Hegel treatment', J1 thus becomes J1a and/or J1b:

J1: John is a man.

J1a: John = man/Manhood.

J1b: John is identical with man/Manhood.

[Unfortunately, however, in his old age Aristotle was already moving in this direction -- i.e., he too was beginning to confuse predication with identity, or, rather, he was beginning to confuse predicates with names, and thus describing with naming.]

Hence, on this view, just as "Tully" names Cicero, "man" 'names' Manhood --, or perhaps, the class/set of all men.

The 'rationale' underlying these moves had already been established by earlier mystics and theorists, who were, among other things, concerned about the union or identity between the human soul and 'God'/'Being'. Hence, they played around with the Greek verb "to be" (and thus the "is" of predication) until it was made to say what they wanted it to say.

Of course, this grammatical sleight-of-hand helps account for the emphasis placed by subsequent Idealists on the 'identity' of 'Thought' and 'Being', which later became the main problematic of German Idealism --, a problematic Engels also accepted.

[On that, see his Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy.]

There is in fact no other reason for adopting the Identity Theory of Predication, which also helps explain why it was theologians and mystics who invented it. Of course, none of this occurred in an ideological vacuum; a brief outline of the relevant details can be found here.

Anyway, logicians after Aristotle, and especially those working in the Middle Ages, began to conflate these two distinct forms as a matter of course. This fed into, and was fed in return by, an increasingly elaborate and complex metaphysic supposedly about the ultimate structure of reality and the relation of 'Thought' to 'Being' --, all based solely on this ancient linguistic sleight-of-hand!

[Similar moves underpinned Anselm's infamous Ontological Argument for the existence of 'God'. In this case, too, Anselm thought he could 'derive' profound 'truths' about 'divine reality', valid for all of space and time -- and beyond -- solely from language/thought.]

So, in the end, J1/G1 and G2-type sentences were both modelled along the lines expressed in G4 and G5 -- i.e., as identity statements.

J1: John is a man.

G1: S is P.

G2: Cicero is Tully.

G4: A = B.

G5: John = Manhood.

But, once more, this turns predicates into Proper Names -- i.e., "...is a man" becomes the proper name of Manhood, which it plainly is not. Naming is not the same as describing. We name our children when they are born, we do not describe them. We do not call children "is a man", or "is tall". Not even pop stars do that to their off-spring! We describe the world around us, we do not name it.

The untoward result of this process is explained clearly by Professor E J Lowe:

What is the problem of predication? In a nutshell, it is this. Consider any simple subject-predicate sentence, such as..., "Theaetetus sits". How are we to understand the different roles of the subject and the predicate in this sentence, "Theaetetus" and "sits" respectively? The role of "Theaetetus" seems straightforward enough: it serves to name, and thereby to refer to or stand for, a certain particular human being. But what about "sits"? Many philosophers have been tempted to say that this also refers to or stands for something, namely, a property or universal that Theaetetus possesses or exemplifies: the property of sitting. This is said to be a universal, rather than a particular, because it can be possessed by many different individuals.

But now we have a problem, for this view of the matter seems to turn the sentence "Theaetetus sits" into a mere list of (two) names, each naming something different, one a particular and one a universal: "Theaetetus, sits." But a list of names is not a sentence because it is not the sort of thing that can be said to be true or false, in the way that "Theaetetus sits" clearly can. The temptation now is to say that reference to something else must be involved in addition to Theaetetus and the property of sitting, namely, the relation of possessing that Theaetetus has to that property. But it should be evident that this way of proceeding will simply generate the same problem, for now we have just turned the original sentence into a list of three names, "Theaetetus, possessing, sits."

Indeed, we are now setting out on a vicious infinite regress, which is commonly known as "Bradley's regress", in recognition of its modern discoverer, the British idealist philosopher F. H. Bradley. Bradley used the regress to argue in favour of absolute idealism.... [Lowe (2006). Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at my site.]

Lowe, E. (2006), 'Take A Seat, Then Consider This Simple Sentence', Times Higher Education Supplement, 07/04/06.

So, a collection of names is a list, and lists say nothing --, just as objects say nothing.

Of course, it could be objected that there are languages in which names do in fact describe. For example, Native Americans use names such as "Sitting Bull", "Crazy Horse", or "Rain In The Face", which describe what the individual concerned either did or was reminiscent of.

Even so, no Native American would argue as follows:

N1: Sitting Bull has just stood up.

N2; Therefore Sitting Bull is no longer Sitting Bull, he is Standing Bull.

But they would argue as follows:

N3: That animal over there is a sitting bull.

N4: It has just stood up, so it is now a standing bull.

These show that the logical use of names is distinct from that of descriptions. Any contingent psychological or idiosyncratic associations a name has are logically irrelevant, no matter how important they are to a given culture.

Hence the name "Sitting Bull" here is a logical unit, and cannot be split up like a description can. This is because, as Aristotle noted (De Interpretatione, Section 3), names are tenseless, but predicates are not. The above examples bring this out, since change (expressed by the use of a tensed verbs) applies to predicates, not to names.

[These and other complications are discussed at length in Geach (1968), pp.22-80. See also here.]

Geach, P. (1968), Reference And Generality (Cornell University Press, 2nd ed.).

So, for Hegel, "...is a man" became the Proper Name of Manhood, which was then 'dignified' by being called an "abstraction", or even worse, an "essence" -- both of which entities were conjured into existence by this linguistic dodge, and nothing more.

In this way then, dialectics has arisen solely from ancient, defective logic like this --, compounded by a crass misconstrual of a sub-branch of Indo-European grammar!

Hard to believe? Well, Marx himself indicated that this was so:

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels: The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

Now, even if the above analysis of mine were incorrect in some way, neither Aristotle nor Hegel (nor anyone else for that matter since) has been able to explain how or why contingent features of Indo-European grammar could possibly have such profound implications built into them --, or how they could reveal to us such fundamental truths about the deep structure of reality, valid for all of space and time.

In fact, I call this approach to knowledge Linguistic Idealism.

More on that here.

LH:

In Marxism, this Hegelian language is reworked into the combination of theory and practice: just as theory is made "concrete" by application in practice, so equally is practice without being made "concrete", without a broader theoretical understanding of what is taking place, doomed to failure.

But we have yet to be given a single example of a 'concrete' truth.

That's not to deny the need for theory, but we get that from Historical Materialism not dialectics.

[Apoi_Viitor]

Is all truth concrete?



Yes.

[Lord Hargreaves]

But we have yet to be given a single example of a 'concrete' truth.

That's not to deny the need for theory, but we get that from Historical Materialism not dialectics.

But I'm just pointing out that it is Hegelian, and that even a very basic understanding of "concrete" would show that the equation of "concrete" and "practical" apparently being made here (by the poster you are addressing) is simply erroneous. I was backing you up in that sense Rosa.

[ExUnoDisceOmnes]

Rosa: It seems that you manipulate language in order to confuse people and wrap them up in their own words. I wanted to interject:

It doesn't matter what the words are, what matters is the intention behind the words. We all know what he meant to say. That's all that matters. No need to draw him into a debate about whether or not his sentence was self-contradictory.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:

But I'm just pointing out that it is Hegelian, and that even a very basic understanding of "concrete" would show that the equation of "concrete" and "practical" apparently being made here (by the poster you are addressing) is simply erroneous. I was backing you up in that sense Rosa.

In that case, I should read what you post more carefully.

-----------------------------

Ok, I have read what you said again, and more carefully, and I can't for the life of me see how you are backing me up.

Not only is it not 'half the truth' that 'all truth is concrete', it's not even remotely true -- indeed, it's non-sensical, just like all such philosophical theses, as I have shown here.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ExUno:

Rosa: It seems that you manipulate language in order to confuse people and wrap them up in their own words. I wanted to interject:

It doesn't matter what the words are, what matters is the intention behind the words. We all know what he meant to say. That's all that matters. No need to draw him into a debate about whether or not his sentence was self-contradictory.

And how is it possible to discern intentions without those being expressed in language?

Even worse, how do you decide if you have determined those intentions correctly? After all, you can't ask Hegel or Lenin, can you? And BS is far to uptight to tell us, and even then, he'll have to use those annoying words again.

Even worse still, what precisely is the intention here? As soon as you tell us, all the problems I have outlined above simply come into play again.

[ExUnoDisceOmnes]

ExUno:



And how is it possible to discern intentions without those being expressed in language?

Even worse, how do you decide if you have determined those intentions correctly? After all, you can't ask Hegel or Lenin, can you? And BS is far to uptight to tell us, and even then, he'll have to use those annoying words again.

Even worse still, what precisely is the intention here? As soon as you tell us, all the problems I have outlined above simply come into play again.

Even with proper application of language, it's impossible to absolutely discern their intention. Are you proposing a whole new method of communicating information that doesn't have that flaw? If you find one let me know.

You can boil down any sentence to meaninglessness. However, what's the point in doing that? It seems as if this grammatical sort of argument is useless in that it doesn't achieve anything.

[JazzRemington]

Even with proper application of language, it's impossible to absolutely discern their intention. Are you proposing a whole new method of communicating information that doesn't have that flaw? If you find one let me know.

You seem to be conflating people's use of language with language itself.

You can boil down any sentence to meaninglessness. However, what's the point in doing that? It seems as if this grammatical sort of argument is useless in that it doesn't achieve anything.

Depends on what you mean by "meaninglessness" and the context in which the sentence is used.

[Meridian]

Even with proper application of language, it's impossible to absolutely discern their intention. Are you proposing a whole new method of communicating information that doesn't have that flaw? If you find one let me know.

That is no 'flaw' of language. That has nothing to do with language or communication itself.

If I have an intention behind saying something, for example, if I say "I want ice cream" and I actually just want to distract the listeners or something, then that still has no bearing on the meaning of the sentence itself. The listeners have, presuming they know English and heard it properly, still understood all there is to understand about the sentence.

You can boil down any sentence to meaninglessness. However, what's the point in doing that? It seems as if this grammatical sort of argument is useless in that it doesn't achieve anything.

Again, the meaning of a sentence has nothing to do with whatever intentions someone has by uttering it. You can't 'boil' normal sentences down to meaninglessness, I don't understand where you got that idea from. Anyways, if that were the case, you wouldn't be able to communicate that point, as all your sentences would essentially be meaningless.

[Ben Seattle]

Hi folks,

Since my activity appears to have played a role in the origin of this thread I believe I should explain that I am the "BS" to whom Rosa refers above.

Rosa, of course, is not a bad person. But I kicked her off my blog when it became clear that productive and respectful discussion with her was not possible. Maybe this will change in the future, but, of course, this is a matter over which I have no control.

Anyone interested can read all about it here:

Why it is not a good idea to waste time arguing with idiots
http://www.revleft.com/vb/blog.php?b=751

[Apoi_Viitor]

If I have an intention behind saying something, for example, if I say "I want ice cream" and I actually just want to distract the listeners or something, then that still has no bearing on the meaning of the sentence itself. The listeners have, presuming they know English and heard it properly, still understood all there is to understand about the sentence.

What about the sentence: I support socialism.

Surely a European and American speaker would have completely different understandings of that sentence...

[Meridian]

What about the sentence: I support socialism.

Surely a European and American speaker would have completely different understandings of that sentence...

Well, that has nothing to do with the point I was making (about intentions behind utterances), however...

They could likely have different reactions and connotations to it, but insofar as they are capable of understanding English and know what socialism is, the meaning of the sentence remains the same for both.

Even though many US citizens have a bad idea, or very negative idea, of what socialism is, I don't think the word's meaning is changed quite yet, even in the US. Or else I would find it hard to believe that the users here from the United States would admit to calling themselves socialists.

[ar734]

No, all truth is not concrete. Truth is always in the process of becoming concrete; then, the truth begins to decay, fracture, disintegrate, become false. The false begins to organize, integrate, and become true.

Truth is an evolutionary, sometimes revolutionary, process.

The mistake Hegel made, as originally noted by Marx, is his conclusion that this process of integration and disintegration was directed to a certain end, the absolute ideal.

[PhoenixAsh]

Isn't truth always a perception and interpretation of reality (or a representation of reality) and therefore subjective or at least never concrete?

[JazzRemington]

Isn't truth always a perception and interpretation of reality (or a representation of reality) and therefore subjective or at least never concrete?

The statement "truth is subjective" is in the indicative mood, which means it's supposed to be a fact and thus cannot be subjective. But yet, it's claimed otherwise...

[PhoenixAsh]

The statement "truth is subjective" is in the indicative mood, which means it's supposed to be a fact and thus cannot be subjective. But yet, it's claimed otherwise...

ok...well my English language skills are not at an advanced enough level and I can not fully comprehend the OPs post because of this.

But wasn't the indicative mode a factual statement?

If truth equals subjective than the statement could be reformulated as subjective is subjective. Making the statement factual.