[STUDY GROUP] A total halt to the productive forces?

[Bilan]

A total halt to the productive forces?

Key points I got from here were that it was elaborated by Marx that the decadence of a mode of production to not necessitate an end to any productive movement, but that it means that things which helped the development of the mode of production in its period of ascent then become fetters on its development.
"it happens that the characteristic movement of the different periods of decadence in history (including the capitalist system) tends rather in the direction of expanding these frontiers up to their final limits than towards their restriction.Under the aegis of the state and under the pressure of economic and social necessities, the system's carcass swells while casting off everything that proves superfluous to the relations of production, everything not strictly necessary to the system's survival."

I don't have much to add.

[Marion]

Not much for me to add either. I guess, to cut a long story short, I'd be interested in how other groups (whether believing in decadence or not) have interpreted Marx's reference to "fetters"? While the interpretation given in the pamphlet is plausible I'm not convinced it is the only one that could be made.

Anyway, perhaps we need to move on to the next chapter???

[Bilan]

Perhaps, but it seems people have lost interest in it.

[Samyasa]

Perhaps Marion could give us his interpretation of what he says the pamphlet is saying about "fetters" and what an alternative might look like?

Also bear in mind that the deeper we get into the pamphlet, the more we're coming up against the core of the current debate in the ICC about the nature of the post-war boom and some tricky economic questions.

Comrades, both in and outside the ICC, may be a bit more hesitant to try and put forward a view if they don't feel entirely clear about the questions themselves.

[Marion]

Well, I'm certainly interested in continuing discussions (although I've been a bit slow recently). I guess as long as myself, you and Nicolo are happy putting forward questions and interpretations and the likes of Samyasa and others are happy putting forward possible solutions there isn't really a problem...

[Niccolò Rossi]

I'd be interested in how other groups (whether believing in decadence or not) have interpreted Marx's reference to "fetters"? While the interpretation given in the pamphlet is plausible I'm not convinced it is the only one that could be made.

This is a good question. To give one recent example of this on the board I will quote the user "robbo203" from the thread "The theory of capitalist collapse":

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or - this merely expresses the same thing in legal term - with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. (Marx, Preface of a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy)

If all crises of capitalism are not only periodic but also provide the impetus for future growth and development within the framework of capitalism itself how can we talk of capitalist social relations as being fetters on the development of the means of production? What factor, what force is constricting and restraining their full development?

But read the quote again! Note what it says. It says the relations of production "fetter" the development of the productive forces. In other words they hold back or restrain them...

So I read Marx's statement quite differently to you. What he is talking about is the potential of the material forces if organised on a communist basis. This potential is prevented from being materialised by capitalism itself most self evidently in the form of an economic crisis when you have the contradiction of "overproduction" alongside obvious human want

This leads us to the most nonsensical conclusions. For the former half of the quote: If capitalist relations of production act as a fetter on the development of the productive forces since the day it is born, can we then conclude that the epoch of social revolution has been open since the 17th century? ...

I dont see it this way. Capitalism becomes decadent or reactionary once the productive forces have developed to the point at which communism becomes feasible. This is I think what lies behind the quote from the Critique of Political Economy when it says . From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. Saying the productive forces are fettered means they are held back. Capitalists dont invest in more productive forces becuase the market does not permit this even if the need for expanded production is there. That is the only sensible way in which you could interpet the above passage. It doesnt mean that the epoch of social revolution was open since the 17th century. Although the first commecial crisis was reputedly in the early 19th century according to Engels, this does not mean the capitalist relations did not act to restrain the productive forces even then but these relations at that stage had still on balance a progressive role to play in developing the forces of production. Today they no longer have a progressive role to play since the productive forces are more than adequate to sustain communism

I think the interpretation Robbo was putting forward here is identical to that of Mandel which is commented upon in Part 5 of "Understanding the Decadence of Capitalism":

"For Mandel, “...it is not therefore the decline of the productive forces, but an exacerbated parasitism and increased waste accompanying growth, and taking control of it (...). The most damaging form of waste inherent in capitalism’s senility is henceforth the misuse of the productive forces;” the system’s rottenness is demonstrated by “...the pitiful results compared with the possibilities of the third technological revolution and automation (...). Measured in relation to these possibilities, the waste of potential and real productive forces has grown immeasurably. In this sense, - but only on the basis of this kind of definition – Lenin’s description of imperialism as ‘the capitalist mode of production’s phase of generalised decay’ remains justified”. For Mandel, capitalism has three phases: “...the capitalism of free competition from Waterloo to Sedan, the epoch of classical capitalism up to the inter-war period, and the senility of capitalism today”, and, so he tells us, “in absolute value, the productive forces have grown more rapidly during the epoch of capitalism’s senility than previously”. This is fine company that the GCI and CoC are keeping. Further on, Mandel explicitly reinterprets Marx’s definition of the decadence of a mode of production in the Preface: “It is all the more obvious that Marx is not referring here to the fall of capitalism, but to the fall of all class society. He would certainly not have had the idea of characterising the period preceding the victory of modern history’s bourgeois revolutions (the Netherlands in the 16th, the English in the 17th, and the American and the great French revolutions in the 18th centuries) as a phase of stagnation or even diminution of the productive forces” (Le troisieme age du capitalism).

"What are we get out of this inextricable mess? A pure and simple negation of the marxist conception of historical evolution. The decline of a mode of production is no longer the result of a blockage of the productive forces by the relations of production, i.e. of the gap between potential and real growth, but, says Mandel, is defined as the difference between what is technically possible under a socialist mode of production and actual growth, between an economy of automation and abundance and today’s growth, which is “infinitely faster than before”, but oh!, so “wasteful” and “misused”. Defining capitalism’s rottenness by demonstrating the superiority of socialism demonstrates nothing at all, and certainly does not answer the question of why, when and how, a society enters into decline. But Mandel gets around this question, by denying decadence, like our critics. Thus he claims that the period from the 16th to the 18th century is not one of decadence of the feudal mode of production and of transition to capitalism, but of full-blown growth, which allows him to attribute to Marx a conception that is the contrary to everything he ever wrote on the subject. Mandel adds together two opposite dynamics, in a period where two different modes of production are intertwined: the decline of feudalism from the 14th to the 18th centuries, bringing in its wake famines, epidemics, wars and agricultural crisis, and the transition to capitalism which is bringing a new dynamic to production (the merchant and artisan classes...)."

Anyway, perhaps we need to move on to the next chapter???

If we do, we aught to create the thread this weekend or for sometime at the end of the week for next weekend. It seems that in the past they have lyed dormant until the weekend when people get a little more free time.

Also bear in mind that the deeper we get into the pamphlet, the more we're coming up against the core of the current debate in the ICC about the nature of the post-war boom and some tricky economic questions.

All the more reason to press on in my opinion, especially given I don't think I really got much out the later chapters when I read through the pamphlet for the first time.

On the actual chapter itself, I will try to make some notes and post any questions or comments this afternoon, though I agree with what has been said about not having much to add.

[Niccolò Rossi]

Whilst I think the first half of the chapter is very good and really provides a good and well thought out explanation of the real economic implications and meaning of the decadence of modes of production (capitalism in particular), it falls short in it's second half.

Here there has not been a thorough and rigorous demonstration of the 'Slow-down in growth of the productive forces since 1914'. Instead what we get is a series of graphs, tables and statistics, all gathered (it appears) from a single source and put together hodgepodge in less than 700 words. Now personally, despite finding economic statistics and the like unpleasant to pour through, I think this tendency is an essential one and one that needs to be dealt with more thoroughly. When I say this however, not only do I mean the subject has to be dealt with greater length, I think it also has to be structured more logically and methodically. For example, it seems strange that only the Industrial Production for Germany and the US for the period 1913-1929 and 1929-1938 respectively are quotes, or that of all countries, Argentina is chosen to demonstrate the rise of the US as a new major economic power. Similarly, I am confused why statistics such as the number of workers or the area of cultivated land in the US or even statistics showing the rise of the US and Japan are even quoted at all and what, if any, is there relevance to demonstrating the slow-down in the growth of the productive forces.

P.S. Sorry if my comments on the latter section of the chapter came off as a big abrasive. I trust however the general thrust of my criticism is understood.

P.P.S. Maybe paragraphs could be added to the online version, make it a little more readable.

[Marion]

Perhaps Marion could give us his interpretation of what he says the pamphlet is saying about "fetters" and what an alternative might look like?

At the time of writing I was thinking that theoretically it might be difficult to say that being fettered necessarily means a slowing down in comparison to previous performance. For example, if someone put heavy weights in my pockets my speed at running would be fettered, but I'd still probably be able to run quicker than I was able to 20 years ago (although not obviously as quickly as a year ago). I wasn't necessarily focussing on particularly economic arguments as an interpretation of "fetters" - but I know that this word tends to be given quite a bit of weight in discussions relating to decadence.

Anyway, I think the example Niccolo gave is a useful one in terms of moving the argument forward.

[Samyasa]

For example, it seems strange that only the Industrial Production for Germany and the US for the period 1913-1929 and 1929-1938 respectively are quotes

This is most likely because these two countries were the main industrial powers in that period. This is part of the reason why they suffered most in the Great Depression, a situation paralleled by the situation of the industrial powers today.

Similarly, I am confused why statistics such as the number of workers or the area of cultivated land in the US or even statistics showing the rise of the US and Japan are even quoted at all and what, if any, is there relevance to demonstrating the slow-down in the growth of the productive forces.

I agree that this is not made clear. With regard to the number of workers, it is important to remember that it is living labour that is the source of all profit. A situation where "From 1919 to 1929, although the index of industrial production rose by almost 60 per cent, the number of workers decreased from 8.4 million to 8.3 million" indicates that although production has increased, the actual exploitation of labour has remained stagnant. This inevitably indicates a decline in surplus value and thus a slow-down in accumulation.

The situation of agriculture which the pamphlet describes: "from 1910 to 1924, 13 million acres of cultivated land reverted to prairieland, grassland or grazing land"; indicates the crisis of overproduction in agriculture. This in the context of a population that rose from over 92 million in 1910 to 123 million in 1930.

I think the point about the rise of the peripheral powers is to show that this rise took place by displacing the former industrial powers, whose growth (where it occured) significantly slowed. In other words, the growth of the new powers took place to some extent to the detriment of the old rather than the two continuing in parallel. It can be argued that a similar situation is occuring with China vis a vis the Wester powers today.

I do agree that more care does need to be taken with these matters though, both in collating these statistics and also explaining their significance. And, yes, the layout of the online article doesn't help - it's awful!

[Marion]

With regard to the number of workers, it is important to remember that it is living labour that is the source of all profit. A situation where "From 1919 to 1929, although the index of industrial production rose by almost 60 per cent, the number of workers decreased from 8.4 million to 8.3 million" indicates that although production has increased, the actual exploitation of labour has remained stagnant. This inevitably indicates a decline in surplus value and thus a slow-down in accumulation.

I don't know what's happening to my head today (possibly the consequences of last night), but for some reason I can't follow this at the moment. Someone talk me through it!

[Niccolò Rossi]

This is most likely because these two countries were the main industrial powers in that period. This is part of the reason why they suffered most in the Great Depression, a situation paralleled by the situation of the industrial powers today.

This is perfectly understandable, even more so when we take into account the room dedicated to this thesis. However, reading it one still feels this is a matter of picking and choosing the statistics which correspond with and support this position. Again, I think this is something which can and should be dealt with in more detail and at greater length to confirm it's validity.

With regard to the number of workers, it is important to remember that it is living labour that is the source of all profit. A situation where "From 1919 to 1929, although the index of industrial production rose by almost 60 per cent, the number of workers decreased from 8.4 million to 8.3 million" indicates that although production has increased, the actual exploitation of labour has remained stagnant. This inevitably indicates a decline in surplus value and thus a slow-down in accumulation.

Like Marion, I'm not quite sure what you are saying here. Doesn't an increase in industrial production, corresponding with a fall in the absolute number of workers point towards an increase in exploitation? Even here though this is not a straightforward matter given that it is the number of wage labourers which is considered here and not the volume of socially necessary labour-time which the statistics guage.

The situation of agriculture which the pamphlet describes: "from 1910 to 1924, 13 million acres of cultivated land reverted to prairieland, grassland or grazing land"; indicates the crisis of overproduction in agriculture. This in the context of a population that rose from over 92 million in 1910 to 123 million in 1930.

A legitimate point certainly, but not one which supports the thesis of a 'slow-down in growth of the productive forces since 1914'.

[Samyasa]

This is perfectly understandable, even more so when we take into account the room dedicated to this thesis. However, reading it one still feels this is a matter of picking and choosing the statistics which correspond with and support this position. Again, I think this is something which can and should be dealt with in more detail and at greater length to confirm it's validity.

Fair enough.

Like Marion, I'm not quite sure what you are saying here. Doesn't an increase in industrial production, corresponding with a fall in the absolute number of workers point towards an increase in exploitation? Even here though this is not a straightforward matter given that it is the number of wage labourers which is considered here and not the volume of socially necessary labour-time which the statistics guage.

I'm having a think about this in response to Marion's post, so I'll get back to you on this. But see also below.

A legitimate point certainly, but not one which supports the thesis of a 'slow-down in growth of the productive forces since 1914'

It depends what you mean the productive forces. If you simply mean technology you'd be right, but the term "productive forces" is actually quite broad. The productive forces include labour, the instruments of production (machines, etc.), and the subjects of production (raw materials, etc.). (The last two are also known collectively as the means of production).

In the case of agriculture, a reduction in the use of land for production represents a contraction in the productive forces employed in that the means of production (the land) is being utilised less and less. Note also that this can also apply to the contraction in the labour force indicated by the labour statistic, despite the increase in productivity.

I'm hoping to expand on this in another post but I need to read up on a couple of things first and call on people far more knowledgeable than me to see if I've got it right!

[Alf]

[FONT=Verdana]I'm not sure if I am getting the main point of Niccolo's question, but perhaps I can approach the problem from a different angle. [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana]In a letter to Engels in October 1858, Marx wrote: "[FONT=Verdana]The proper task of bourgeois society is the creation of the world market, at least in outline, and of the production based on that market".[/FONT][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana]In other words, capitalism's 'task' was to spread wage labour across the globe. Marx thought in that same letter that the opening up of [/FONT][FONT=Verdana]China[/FONT][FONT=Verdana], [/FONT][FONT=Verdana]Australia[/FONT][FONT=Verdana] and [/FONT][FONT=Verdana]California[/FONT][FONT=Verdana] was the beginning of the end of that process. But there is a world of difference between forcing [/FONT][FONT=Verdana]China[/FONT][FONT=Verdana] to buy opium and building a few ports on its coastline and imposing wage labour as the main social relation within the whole vast territory. In fact, capitalism's division of the globe, which was complete by the beginning of the 20th century and which pushed the imperialist powers into a direct conflict to redivide the world market, long preceded the establishment of wage labour as the main social relation - it has been estimated (by Fritz Sternberg I think) that by 1914 the wage relation only accounted for about one third of global production. [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana]What the pamphlet is getting at here I think is the fact that for most of the decadent period there has not been a tendeny for the wage relation to become the main one but rather has seen it stagnate. At the beginning of the 20th century, the majority of the world were still probably peasants. Throughout the 20th century the peasantry has declined but rather than being increasingly integrated into collective labour, which was the most significant trend in the 19th century, the peasant in flight from the disintegration of pre-capitalist relations in the countryside has been pushed into the most precarious existence in the massive slums that ring the cities of the 'third world'. This is certainly an expression of the decadence of the system which can no longer generalise its relations across the globe but tends towards the decomposition of social life. [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana]It's true that in the past decade or two there has been a considerable growth in the proletariat in countries like China, but this doesn't amount to a new 'ascent' for capitalism, since it is predicated to a large extent on the deindustrialisation of large parts of the central capitalist countries. [/FONT]

[ern]

To add to Alf's point concerning the importance of the expansion of the world market and to develop the relationship to the question of increase in production at same time a as a fall in the number of productive workers. Samyasa rightly points out that the proletariat is the source of surplus value and thus a reduction in the number of workers actively production SV represents a reduction in the production or potential production of SV. To take this a bit further. In the US in the 1920s there were massive increases in labour productivity. Between 1919-27 produciton of automobiles increased by 98%, for rubber tires it increased by 198% (source Lewis Corey's The Decline of American Capitlaism, COVICI FRIEDE Publisher, 1934). At the same time there was an absolute displacement of workers. Corey makes the following important point for our understanding of what we mean by the fetters on capitalism:
"The absolute displacment of directly productive workers is of extraordinary significance. It was the result of the development of the forces underlying the decline of capitalism. Teh direct significance appears clearly in a comparison of the aborption and displacement of workers in the thirty years 1899-1929. In 1899-1919, 7,010.00 workers were absorbed by employment in manufactures, mining. agriculture and railroads. In 1919-29, on the contrary, the sme industries displaced 1,155,00 workers (including clerical workers, whose labour was increasingly mechanized). And this diplacement was accompanied by greater output, except for a small decrease on raildroads" (page 228). The reason for this according to Corey was the ending of the period of the expantion of the world market. The period of the historic expansion of captialist relations In the ascendent period the expansion of capitalism, particularly the production of capital goods had been able to absorb those made unemployed by increasing productive, or who joined the labour force.
Thus the increase in output in the context of the increasingly restricted relations of the world market, simply poured more commodities onto the market than could be absorbed.
This analysis of the conflict between increased production and decrease in the number of productive workers is not only to do with the 1920's and 30's but also the 1950's. And also needs to take into consideration the increasing weight of the war economy in the world economy, as we underline in the pamphlet.
From reading the discussion so far I think that there is general agreement that when we talk about fetters we are not talking about an absolute stopping of the development of the means of production, rather the taking of the contradiciton between the permanent pressure to develop the means of production in relation to the historical restrictions of the world market.
In brief reply to Niccolo Rossi, the increase in production and the fall in the number of productive workers does mean a greatly increased level of exploitation. For example in the 1950's there was a systematic application of 3 shift working in factories through out the western bloc, which imposed night work onto millions of workers (something that the workers' struggles in the 19th century had successed in getting banned for most trades). This not only increased the level of exploitation but had a very serious impact upon their help. Research has shown that 3 shift working is one of the most injurious system of work to workers health.
Corey is the name of Louis Friana one of the founders of the CP in the US: he was driven out of the party by a false allegation of being a police spy. He does not base his analysis of Luxemburg's analysis - or at least explicitly- but does make an interesting analysis which seeks to integrate the falling rate of profit and the expansion of the market.
I hope this post has helped to clarify this discussion? It is rather late at night and I am tired.

[Niccolò Rossi]

[FONT=Verdana]

It depends what you mean the productive forces. If you simply mean technology you'd be right, but the term "productive forces" is actually quite broad. The productive forces include labour, the instruments of production (machines, etc.), and the subjects of production (raw materials, etc.). (The last two are also known collectively as the means of production).

This is a very good point and one I think I have forgotten, equating the means of production with the forces of production.

In the case of agriculture, a reduction in the use of land for production represents a contraction in the productive forces employed in that the means of production (the land) is being utilised less and less. Note also that this can also apply to the contraction in the labour force indicated by the labour statistic, despite the increase in productivity.

It would be interesting to know whether this tendency is supported by the statistics up till the present day and on a global scale. I mean this question rhetorically, though I think that such statistics would be necessary to really use this in a more thorough proof of the thesis (the slow-down in the development of the productive forces).

I also think there may be more complexities here other than merely the absolute area of land under cultivation, including its fertility and productivity in terms of agricultural yield (or whether this contributes at all to its value as a productive force and how this can be gauged quantitatively, compared with other sets of unlike numerical data etc.) Unfortunately I don’t think any of us here are agricultural specialists

I agree with Alf’s comments which I think are very useful, one unrelated question I would ask is:
[/FONT] [FONT=Verdana]

It's true that in the past decade or two there has been a considerable growth in the proletariat in countries like China, but this doesn't amount to a new 'ascent' for capitalism, since it is predicated to a large extent on the deindustrialisation of large parts of the central capitalist countries.

[/FONT] [FONT=Verdana]I’ve seen comments made by left communists similar to these regarding deindustrialisation. Maybe to clarify, are you suggesting that deindustrialisation represents a disappearance of the proletariat in the ‘first world’ (as has been suggested by some leftist academics)? Whilst deindustrialisation does account, I agree, for the industrialisation of parts of the ‘third world’ certainly it also however represents an absolute growth in the proletariat worldwide (assuming workers in the reindustrialised nations have not been bourgeois-fied), albeit maybe not a growth at hitherto experienced levels (this is of course not the same as a new ‘ascent’ for capitalism as you note).[/FONT][FONT=Verdana]
[/FONT]

[FONT=Verdana]In brief reply to Niccolo Rossi, the increase in production and the fall in the number of productive workers does mean a greatly increased level of exploitation. For example in the 1950's there was a systematic application of 3 shift working in factories through out the western bloc, which imposed night work onto millions of workers (something that the workers' struggles in the 19th century had successed in getting banned for most trades). This not only increased the level of exploitation but had a very serious impact upon their help. Research has shown that 3 shift working is one of the most injurious system of work to workers health.[/FONT]

[FONT=Verdana]
[/FONT] [FONT=Verdana]This is what I thought. I think Samyasa is correct regarding the decline in labour-power as a productive force and not in his explanation that a decrease in the volume of surplus value means a slow down in accumulation and in turn the development of the means of production (whilst this in itself is correct), where instead the slow down in accumulation is a result of the saturation of extra-capitalist makets and not in a decrease in exploitation.

Also, don’t worry Ern, your post is indeed of great value, even if containing spelling mistakes and other confusing titbits [/FONT]

[Alf]

generally deindustrialisation involves a change in the make up of the proletariat rather than a disappearance - a shift to more service sector, precarious and often unproductive jobs, but still based on wage labour. The problems faced by the proletariat in this process involve a loss of identity, of self-awareness due to the dispersal of previously militant sectors with a strong tradition of struggle (eg, in the UK, steel, car, dock and mine workers). But a new class identity is being forged by a new generation - eg the struggles in France 2006 or Greece 2008.

[beltov]

Hi. Is it time to move on to the next chapter? Some ICCers are going to be away at a meeting over the next week or so, so I've stepped in to take their place. I hope the rest of you haven't lost interest...

I've read all of the threads on chapters 1 to 4 and have been very impressed with the discussions -- it's been good to see people asking some excellent questions. There are one or two things I'd like to add myself but these will probably come up in the following discussions...



Beltov.

[Niccolò Rossi]

Hi. Is it time to move on to the next chapter?

Unless there are any other questions or comments I definitely think so (I just realised thsi thread has been open now for over 2 weeks!)

Given how short the next section is I think it would be good if we could get it started ASAP and mabye have it finished and ready to move on for next weekend.

I hope the rest of you haven't lost interest.

Of course not, that is, if there are enough of us to be called a 'rest'

There are one or two things I'd like to add myself but these will probably come up in the following discussions.

I for one look forward to it.