Thread: @nti-dialectics Made Easy -- Thread Two

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  1. #261
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    In addition to the above references, you can look this up:

    Hegel's Analysis of Colonialism and Its Roots in Scottish Political Economy Gabriel Paquette; CLIO, Vol. 32, 2003

    And here is an abstract of a book on this aspect of Hegel's work:

    Most theorists are unaware that Hegel was an astute student of political economy. Not only did he read Adam Smith and Smith's Scottish Enlightenment contemporaries, he also carefully read the work of James Steuart -- an important figure bridging the French Physiocrats with the Scottish Enlightenment. Indeed, a central concern of Hegel's early work is to sort out the relationship between modern wealth creation and the presence of modern poverty. Hegel postulates that poverty is in fact generated by wealth creation and that the two -- wealth and poverty -- necessarily and systematically go hand in hand. He admits to his own failure in providing a solution to the problem of poverty. As the noted Hegel scholar Shlomo Avineri highlights, it is the only time in the corpus of Hegel's work that he confesses to such a failure. Hegel's confession and his rigorous understanding of the insurmountable problems generated by poverty in market society stand in some tension with his theory of historical progress in which American Indians represent the beginning of history and Europeans the end point. Such a theory of historical progress seems hard to square with Hegel's earlier claim that: (1) poverty is endemic to modern society; and (2) that such systematic poverty was most likely absent among earlier forms of society. Given the pervasiveness of poverty in European market society, how then does Hegel find confidence in a theory of progressive history in which Europeans stand above all other forms of society? The purpose of this paper is to confront this dilemma. We will use Hegel's thought to demonstrate how poverty can be taken with the utmost seriousness while also being utterly disregarded. Hegel's eventual discounting of poverty foreshadows the contemporary stance towards this problem, exemplified by the constant anti-poverty efforts from basic needs to poverty reduction associated with the international apparatuses for promoting development that reinforce the very processes by which poverty is produced.
    Hegel, the Savage, and the Wound of Wealth

    http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_ml...709_index.html

    Where we also read:

    'Shed No Tears: Wealth, Race, and Death in Hegel’s Necro-Philosophy' Naeem Inayatullah Department of Politics Ithaca College, David L. Blaney Department of Political Science Macalester College. Prepared for the panel, “Hegel and International Relations” International Studies Association Chicago, IL February 28-March 3, 2007Though commentators rarely foreground the category of race in Hegel’s philosophy, we will place Hegel’s racializing move at the center of our reading and, by extension, at the center of the modern project of political economy. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1821) is at once a “philosophical reconstruction of modern ethical life” and an historical account, seeking to demonstrate that “modern European culture was a product of a long historical evolution.”2 Hegel’s linkage of modern and European is not incidental. As we shall see, Western Europeans embody modernity’s possibilities, particularly the realization of freedom. As Hegel hints in Philosophy of Right and makes clearer in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1822, 1828, 1830), non-1. This paper is chapter five of Blaney and Inayatullah, Savage Economics. It follows chapters on Adam Smith, John Millar and Adam Ferguson, and James Steuart, and will be followed by a chapter on Karl Marx. Our thanks to Patrick Jackson for his comments on an earlier draft.2Z. A. Pelczynski, “Introduction: The Significance of Hegel’s Separation of the State and Civil Society,” in Z. A. Pelczynski, ed., The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1984), p. 7. 1
    http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_m.../p178709-1.php

    In addition, here are two earlier posts of mine you seem to want to ignore:

    The first was in reply to Bob the Builder, who, just like you, had not done his homework:

    It is not I who called them this (added: i.e., "historical materialists"), but others, mainly Marx and Engels.

    Ronald Meek, "The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology" [1954; collected in his Economics and Ideology and Other Essays, 1967]. Such luminaries as Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith. This influence was actually acknowledged. In The German Ideology, right after announcing their theme that "men be in a position to live in order to be able to `make history'", they say "The French and the English, even if they have conceived the relation of this fact with so-called history only in an extremely one-sided fashion, particularly as long as they remained in the toils of political ideology, have nevertheless made the first attempts to give the writing of history a materialistic basis by being the first to write histories of civil society, of commerce and industry."]
    http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi...terialism.html

    I have to say that the above link is hostile to Marx and Engels, but there is little available on the internet on this.
    Meek actually calls them the "Scottish Historical School" (p.35), but he attributes this to Roy Pascal (Communist Party member, friend of Wittgenstein and translator of the German Ideology), who used it in his article "Property and Society: The Scottish Historical School of the Eighteenth Century" Modern Quarterly March 1938.

    The full passage is:

    Since we are dealing with the Germans, who are devoid of premises, we must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to “make history.” But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. Even when the sensuous world is reduced to a minimum, to a stick as with Saint Bruno [Bauer], it presupposes the action of producing the stick. Therefore in any interpretation of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its implications and to accord it its due importance. It is well known that the Germans have never done this, and they have never, therefore, had an earthly basis for history and consequently never an historian. The French and the English, even if they have conceived the relation of this fact with so-called history only in an extremely one-sided fashion, particularly as long as they remained in the toils of political ideology, have nevertheless made the first attempts to give the writing of history a materialistic basis by being the first to write histories of civil society, of commerce and industry
    http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx...logy/ch01a.htm

    In the Poverty of Philosophy, Marx wrote:

    Let us do him this justice: Lemontey wittily exposed the unpleasant consequences of the division of labor as it is constituted today, and M. Proudhon found nothing to add to it. But now that, through the fault of M. Proudhon, we have been drawn into this question of priority, let us say again, in passing, that long before M. Lemontey, and 17 years before Adam Smith, who was a pupil of A. Ferguson, the last-named gave a clear exposition of the subject in a chapter which deals specifically with the division of labor.
    p.181 of MECW volume 6.

    http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx...ophy/ch02b.htm

    Marx refers to Ferguson repeatedly in his 'Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' (MECW volume 30, pp.264-306), as he does to others of the same 'school' (Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart) throughout this work:

    http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx...nomic/ch32.htm

    He does so too in Volume One of Das Kapital -- MECW volume 35, p.133, 359, 366, 367. [He also refers to others of that 'school', Robertson, p.529, Stewart and Smith (the references to these two are too numerous to list).]

    http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx...me35/index.htm

    Throughout his works, the references to Smith and Stewart are in general too numerous to list.
    And, this was in reply to Leo, who doubted the influence of Aristotle on Marx:

    Leo:

    Which to me shows that Hegel influenced Marx's thinking but that Marx was not a Hegelian in any way.
    Indeed, and Hegel's influence halted at or about the time Marx wrote Das Kapital.

    No, I am saying that once established, he kept using the same methodology.
    But, Marx indicated that he had changed this 'methodology' by the time he wrote Das Kapital.

    I don't think he has to be a Hegelian going on about Hegelian concepts to have traces of Hegel. He has traces of Hegel in his methodology (and not much but nevertheless), doesn't have to repeat them in his terminology though.
    I nowhere said he was a 'Hegelian'; what I said was that we need not speculate since Marx helpfully added a summary of 'his method' from which every trace of Hegel had been removed. So, this new method owes nothing to Hegel.

    Unless you can show otherwise.

    Well yes, but I don't necessarily give the same meaning to this that you do. One could give it a positive meaning as much, even more so than the negative one you are giving it. Again I am not saying Marx was an Hegelian, this term basically proves that while Marx was not a Hegelian, he was paying respects to Hegel for influencing his methodology.
    In that case, your interpretation will have to ignore the summary of 'his method' that he endorsed which contains not one atom of Hegel, or his 'method'.

    Well, he says he reversed the relation Hegel sees in between thought and matter. This is "a trace of Hegel". Had he "dropped" Hegel completely he'd be saying there is no relation between thought and matter. He summarizes his difference quite clearly: To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."
    Not so, this is a return to Aristotle.

    Hegel had mystified Aristotle and Kant, Marx simply indicated that he rejected this. So he is not using Hegel's method, just signalling his return to Aristotle.

    Aristotle did not have a labour theory of value though. The first fella who came up with it is Ibn Haldun.
    Maybe so, but the seeds of the labour theory of value are in Aristotle:

    http://www.economyprofessor.com/econ...y-of-value.php

    That however in the form of commodity values all labours are expressed as equal human labour and therefore as of equal worth could not be read by Aristotle out of the form of value because Greek society was based on slave labour and therefore had as its natural basis the inequality of people and their labour powers. The secret of the expression of value, the equality and equal worth of all labours because and insofar as they are human labour in general, can only be deciphered once the concept of human equality has the firmness of a popular prejudice. This, however, is only possible in a society in which the commodity form is the general form of the product of labour and therefore also the relation of people to each other as commodity owners is the predominant social relation. Aristotle's genius shines precisely in the fact that he discovers in the expression of value of commodities a relationship of equality. Only the historical limit of the society in which he lived prevented him from finding out in what this relation of equality consisted 'in truth'. (Das Kapital Vol. 1 MEW23:74 translation my own ME)
    Bold added.

    Quoted from here:

    http://192.220.96.165/untpltcl/exchvljs.html

    From Rubin's history:

    We consider the following passage in Capital to be crucial for an understanding of the ideas of Marx which have been presented: "There was, however, an important fact which prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute value to commodities, is merely a mode of expressing all labor as equal human labor, and consequently as labor of equal quality. Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality of men and of their labor-powers. The secret of the expression of value, namely, that all kinds of labor are equal and equivalent, because, and so far as they are human labor in general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion of human equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. This, however, is possible only in a society in which the great mass of the produce of labor takes the form of commodities, in which, consequently, the dominant relation between man and man, is that of owners of commodities" (C., I, pp. 59-60). [6] The equality of the autonomous and independent commodity producers is the foundation for the equality of the exchanged goods. This is the basic characteristic of the commodity economy, of its "cell structure," so to speak. The theory of value examines the process of formation of the productive unity called a social economy from separate, one might say independent, cells. It is not without reason that Marx wrote, in the preface to the first edition of the first volume of Capital, that the "commodity form of the product of labor or the form of value of the commodity is the form of the economic cell of bourgeois society." This cell structure of the commodity society represents, in itself, the totality of equal, formally independent, private economic units.

    In the cited passage on Aristotle, Marx emphasizes that in slave society the concept of value could not be deduced from "the form of value itself," i.e., from the material expression of the equality of exchanged commodities. The mystery of value can only be grasped from the characteristics of the commodity economy. One should not be astonished that critics who missed the sociological character of Marx's theory of value should have interpreted the cited passage without discernment. According to Dietzel, Marx "was guided by the ethical axiom of equality." This "ethical foundation is displayed in the passage where Marx explains the shortcomings of Aristotle's theory of value by pointing out that the natural basis of Greek society was the inequality among people and among their labor-powers." [7]Dietzel does not understand that Marx is not dealing with an ethical postulate of equality, but with the equality of commodity producers as a basic social fact of the commodity economy. We repeat, not equality in the sense of equal distribution of material goods, but in the sense of independence and autonomy among economic agents who organize production.

    If Dietzel transforms the society of equal commodity producers from an actual fact into an ethical postulate, Croce sees in the principle of equality a theoretically conceived type of society thought up by Marx on the basis of theoretical considerations and for the purpose of contrast and comparison with the capitalist society, which is based on inequality. The purpose of this comparison is to explain the specific characteristics of the capitalist society. The equality of commodity producers is not an ethical ideal but a theoretically conceived measure, a standard with which we measure capitalist society. Croce recalls the passage where Marx says that the nature of value can only be explained in a society where the belief in the equality of people has acquired the force of a popular prejudice. [8] Croce thinks that Marx, in order to understand value in a capitalist society, took as a type, as a theoretical standard, a different (concrete) value, namely that which would be possessed by goods which can be multiplied by labor in a society without the imperfections of capitalist society, and in which labor power would not be a commodity. From this, Croce derives the following conclusion on the logical properties of Marx's theory of value. "Marx's labor-value is not only a logical generalization, it is also a fact conceived and postulated as typical, i.e., something more than a mere logical concept."
    More here:

    http://www.marxists.org/archive/rubin/value/ch10.htm

    See also:

    http://cas.umkc.edu/ECON/Oeconomicus...0IX/Avsar1.pdf

    Leo:

    While I don't think Marx was too influenced by ancient philosophy to begin with, he certainly paid more attention to Epicurus than Aristotle, writing a major study about him. Of course it is not unnatural for him to be fond of Aristotle too, the guy was rather similar to Marx himself, a freaking writing machine.
    And yet he quotes Aristotle across eight pages in Das Kapital, and Epicurus not once.

    Here are a few of them:

    The two latter peculiarities of the equivalent form will become more intelligible if we go back to the great thinker who was the first to analyse so many forms, whether of thought, society, or Nature, and amongst them also the form of value. I mean Aristotle.

    In the first place, he clearly enunciates that the money form of commodities is only the further development of the simple form of value – i.e., of the expression of the value of one commodity in some other commodity taken at random; for he says:

    5 beds = 1 house – (clinai pente anti oiciaς)

    is not to be distinguished from

    5 beds = so much money. – (clinai pente anti ... oson ai pente clinai)

    He further sees that the value relation which gives rise to this expression makes it necessary that the house should qualitatively be made the equal of the bed, and that, without such an equalisation, these two clearly different things could not be compared with each other as commensurable quantities. “Exchange,” he says, “cannot take place without equality, and equality not without commensurability". (out isothς mh oushς snmmetriaς). Here, however, he comes to a stop, and gives up the further analysis of the form of value. “It is, however, in reality, impossible (th men oun alhqeia adunaton), that such unlike things can be commensurable” – i.e., qualitatively equal. Such an equalisation can only be something foreign to their real nature, consequently only “a makeshift for practical purposes.”

    Aristotle therefore, himself, tells us what barred the way to his further analysis; it was the absence of any concept of value. What is that equal something, that common substance, which admits of the value of the beds being expressed by a house? Such a thing, in truth, cannot exist, says Aristotle. And why not? Compared with the beds, the house does represent something equal to them, in so far as it represents what is really equal, both in the beds and the house. And that is – human labour.

    There was, however, an important fact which prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute value to commodities, is merely a mode of expressing all labour as equal human labour, and consequently as labour of equal quality. Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality of men and of their labour powers. The secret of the expression of value, namely, that all kinds of labour are equal and equivalent, because, and so far as they are human labour in general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion of human equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. This, however, is possible only in a society in which the great mass of the produce of labour takes the form of commodities, in which, consequently, the dominant relation between man and man, is that of owners of commodities. The brilliancy of Aristotle’s genius is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality....
    MECW, Volume 35, Capital Volume One, pp.69-70. Bold added.

    Notice, no past tense when he calls Aristotle a 'great thinker', and that his work is that of 'genius'. I do not think he ever described Hegel that way. Lenin did, but not Marx. 'Mighty thinker' is the best we get.

    And here:

    If a giant thinker like Aristotle erred in his appreciation of slave labour, why should a dwarf economist like Bastiat be right in his appreciation of wage labour?
    Ibid., p.92.

    “For two-fold is the use of every object.... The one is peculiar to the object as such, the other is not, as a sandal which may be worn, and is also exchangeable. Both are uses of the sandal, for even he who exchanges the sandal for the money or food he is in want of, makes use of the sandal as a sandal. But not in its natural way. For it has not been made for the sake of being exchanged.” (Aristoteles, “De Rep.” l. i. c. 9.)
    Ibid., p.96.

    He quotes him again at length on pages 163, 175, 331 (where he notes that Aristotle called 'man' a political animal), and then on page 411 we find this:

    “If,” dreamed Aristotle, the greatest thinker of antiquity, “if every tool, when summoned, or even of its own accord, could do the work that befits it, just as the creations of Daedalus moved of themselves, or the tripods of Hephaestos went of their own accord to their sacred work, if the weavers’ shuttles were to weave of themselves, then there would be no need either of apprentices for the master workers, or of slaves for the lords.”
    Maybe I'll write something on Kant -- when I have time. I am just putting the finishing touches to a 130,000 word essay, which is already ten days overdue.

    But, call them what you like, Marx learnt from them.
    In general, see the following:

    Meek, R. (1967a), 'The Scottish Contribution To Marxist Sociology', in Meek (1967b), pp.34-50.

    --------, (1967b), Economics And Ideology And Other Essays (Chapman & Hall).

    On Aristotle and Marx:

    McCarthy, G. (1992) (ed.), Marx And Aristotle (Rowman & Littlefield).

    Meikle, S. (1985), Essentialism In The Thought of Karl Marx (Open Court).

    --------, (1995), Aristotle's Economic Thought (Oxford University Press).

    On Hegel and Aristotle:

    Ferrarin, A, (2001), Hegel And Aristotle (Cambridge University Press).

    On Kant, see:

    Wood, A. (1998), 'Kant's Historical Materialism' in Kneller and Axinn, Chapter Five.

    --------, (1999), Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press).

    Kneller, J., and Axinn, S, (1998), Autonomy And Community: Readings In Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy (State University of New York Press).

    So, it looks like you haven't done your homework, whereas I have.

    I'll respond to the rest of what you say, in my next post.
    Last edited by Rosa Lichtenstein; 15th March 2010 at 02:24.
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    'Comrade' Artesian, in full sneer mode:

    But wait, there's more... in Rosa's post of March 10, 2009 Rosa claims that historical materialism does not need a theory of agency. Really. OK, before we go any further, what is a theory of agency, Rosa, and if historical materialism is the theory you accept and the name we give the practical analysis we develop from Marx's work, which has to be the analysis of history given Marx's own focus on the actual social organization of labor, how can historical materialism not have a theory of agency, when Marx himself declares that history is the product of class struggle?
    I was of course referring to a philosophical theory of agency, not a scientific or political theory.

    But wait.. there's still more, if you call right now, we'll double your pleasure by producing... by producing a response to BTB who asked for an example, a reference to historical materialism that did not include dialectics. And on March 10 2009, Hyacinth, who is clearly on the Rosa side of the discussion tries to take a crack at it. What does he come up with? He comes up with this from Marx's Contribution to a Critique...
    As wise a Hyacinth is, you need to concentrate on what I have posted, and leave him/her out. After all, do I quote your fellow mystics against you?

    Rosa doesn't dissent from H.'s presentation. She takes not a word of exception to this description of "anti-dialectical" historical materialism. But look what comrade Hyacinth has reproduced-- he has reproduced, in the attempt to remove the dialectic from historical materialism and Marx-- Marx's own reiteration of the "Hegelian" notion of totality, totality being the totality of the relations of property, labor making up the economic relations of the society and the conflict, the contradiction between means and relations of production:
    I certainly won't disagree with Hyacinth in public; what I have or have not said to him/her in private is another thing.

    But, what has any of this got to do with Marx's clear declaration in Das Kapital that he had left all this Hegelian garbage behind? Or with anything I have argued here?

    Answer: nothing at all.

    But, it clearly serves to distract attention from the fact that you can't find a single passage in a published work of Marx's (contemporaneous with Das Kapital or later) that supports the mystical interpretation of HM you are trying to sell us.

    From forms of development of the productive forces, these relations, of property of the organization of labor, of the appropriation of surplus value turn into their fetters. They turn into their opposites-- from incubator to death rattle. There's the dialectic with which Marx never coquettes.
    Alas for you this was before he wrote Das Kapital, where, as we know, he had waved goodbye to this way of explaining HM .

    Class-traitor? You have no knowledge of any action I've ever taken that betrays the working class, least of which is my support of the connection of Marx with Hegel's dialectic, a connection which you yourself have maintained has no practical significance in the practical world of class struggle.
    So you do not like me saying things about you based on very little knowledge, but it's Ok for you to do it...

    Unpleasant? Absolutely. To you. And with pride. Sometimes it's more important to be judged by the people who find you unpleasant. This is one of those times. I intend to be unpleasant to you for just as long as you keep up your sophistry, your distortion of Marx, your posing.
    Just like all the other dialectical mystics I have had the pleasure of wiping the floor with over then last 25 years, you can't hack it, so you become irrational, emotional and abusive.

    After all, I'm attacking your source of quasi-religious consolation, and like the religious, you'll do anything, say anything to hang onto it.

    Unpleasant? Priceless. For everything else there's Mastercard.
    Yes, I suppose a class traitor like you will look to some bank or other to finance your treachery...
    Last edited by Rosa Lichtenstein; 15th March 2010 at 02:52.
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    You may have done your homework, but you have not answered the question which was to provide an example of Hegel's historical materialism. Now I am aware of Marx's study of Ferguson and Smith. And I am also aware of Hegel's interest in "civil society" and the state-- one only has to ready The Philosophy of Right.

    I'm also aware that Hegel was influenced by Toussaint L'Ouverture and the Haitian revolution-- Hegel, Haiti and History anyone?

    Again that wasn't what I was asking-- I was asking about historical materialism, a theory you claim you embrace, support, accept. My definition of historical materialism is that it is an analysis of the actual economic conditions, ike the actual organization of labor, and changes in those material conditions that in turn precipitate historical events.

    I am unaware of Hegel ever conducting such an investigation, as apparently you are also.

    No one here, or in any debate with you has denied that Marx learned from Aristotle, Kant, Smith, Ferguson. Hell, he learned from the physiocrats, the mercantilists, etc. That's not the point. You are the one denying that he learned from Hegel, and that he maintained a connection with what he claims he learned from his study of Hegel-- Hegel's dialectic.

    Why an answer of thousands of words that avoids the simple answer to the question-- can you direct me to a work of historical materialism produced by Hegel? By Kant?

    And you add your long-winded [surprise that] reply to Leo rather than reply to the issues I put to you in the last post-- the issue of transition from the Grundrisse to Capital; the reproduction of Marx's affirmation of the dialectic of contradiction between means and relations of production from "forms of development" to "fetters."

    In this evasion of answers that you post as an answer you draw attention to Marx's characterization of Aristotle as a great thinker and possessing genius, where he doesn't describe Hegel that way, only as a "mighty thinker." So what? Actually WTF? We're not in a beauty pageant here, a popularity contest, a ranking based on adjectives.

    The issue is/was/are/were did Marx extirpate Hegel's dialectic in Capital? Did Marx break with the dialectic as developed by Hegel and adopt or adapt some other dialectic? Can we detect a "transition," evidence, for that break between the Grundrisse and Capital?

    There is no evidence for that extirpation in vol 1 of Capital. You yourself admit that, implicitly Rosa when, in your discussion with DeLeonist, referring to the footnote in vol 1 where Marx, in discussing Mill, again affirms the critical importance of Hegel to the notions of dialectic and contradiction that run through Marx's study of dialective, you describe the footnote [after first incorrectly arguing that Engels had excised that footnote from capital, and then blame your mistake on taking someone else's word and the fact that your 50 volume set of MEGA was in storage], that the footnote was symptomatic, and indication, of the confusion Marx still experience over his relationship to Hegel and Hegel's dialectic.

    I think confusion is the exact word you used. You go on to argue that Marx didn't have the sophisticated vocabulary and logic that we have today to make a complete break with Hegel.

    Oh come on, Marx who could demolish anything and anyone who stood in the way of his investigations into the actual metabolism of capital, who could destroy any argument with language and logic so precise it went in like a scalpel but came out like a hammer? Marx didn't have the sophisticated language and logic to make a complete break with Hegel?

    He could break Adam Smith, Ricardo, every political economist, but he couldn't break with Hegel.

    But in fact you claim Marx did make such a complete break and the complete break is evident in vol 1 where Marx "extirpates" Hegel's dialectic. We are not talking about the preface to the 2nd edition of vol 1, we are talking about the actual vol 1 itself, where he supposedly extirpated something he was confused about and did not have the tools to banish?

    I almost feel sorry for you, Rosa. Almost doesn't count.
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    'Comrade' Artesian:

    You may have done your homework, but you have not answered the question which was to provide an example of Hegel's historical materialism. Now I am aware of Marx's study of Ferguson and Smith. And I am also aware of Hegel's interest in "civil society" and the state-- one only has to ready The Philosophy of Right.
    Well, when you do your homework (if you do), you will have your answer. (**)

    I'm also aware that Hegel was influenced by Toussaint L'Ouverture and the Haitian revolution-- Hegel, Haiti and History anyone?
    Except, this is not relevant to Marx's version of HM; if it were, I'd suggest you wrote an article about it.

    Again that wasn't what I was asking-- I was asking about historical materialism, a theory you claim you embrace, support, accept. My definition of historical materialism is that it is an analysis of the actual economic conditions, like the actual organization of labor, and changes in those material conditions that in turn precipitate historical events.

    I am unaware of Hegel ever conducting such an investigation, as apparently you are also.
    May I refer the honourable class traitor to my answer above? (**)

    No one here, or in any debate with you has denied that Marx learned from Aristotle, Kant, Smith, Ferguson. Hell, he learned from the physiocrats, the mercantilists, etc. That's not the point. You are the one denying that he learned from Hegel, and that he maintained a connection with what he claims he learned from his study of Hegel-- Hegel's dialectic.

    Why an answer of thousands of words that avoids the simple answer to the question-- can you direct me to a work of historical materialism produced by Hegel? By Kant?
    May I once again refer the honourable class traitor to my answer above? (**)

    And you add your long-winded [surprise that] reply to Leo rather than reply to the issues I put to you in the last post-- the issue of transition from the Grundrisse to Capital; the reproduction of Marx's affirmation of the dialectic of contradiction between means and relations of production from "forms of development" to "fetters."
    Eh?

    In this evasion of answers that you post as an answer you draw attention to Marx's characterization of Aristotle as a great thinker and possessing genius, where he doesn't describe Hegel that way, only as a "mighty thinker." So what? Actually WTF? We're not in a beauty pageant here, a popularity contest, a ranking based on adjectives.

    The issue is/was/are/were did Marx extirpate Hegel's dialectic in Capital? Did Marx break with the dialectic as developed by Hegel and adopt or adapt some other dialectic? Can we detect a "transition," evidence, for that break between the Grundrisse and Capital?
    Well we needn't speculate, since Marx save us the trouble by adding summary of 'his method', the 'dialectic method', to the Postface to the second edition to Das Kapital. I suspect you haven't seen it before so here it is:

    "After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

    'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

    "Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]
    So, Marx's method, 'the dialectic method' contains no trace of Hegel -- which means, alas for you, that Marx and I see eye to eye on this.

    Whereas you do not.

    There is no evidence for that extirpation in vol 1 of Capital. You yourself admit that, implicitly Rosa when, in your discussion with DeLeonist, referring to the footnote in vol 1 where Marx, in discussing Mill, again affirms the critical importance of Hegel to the notions of dialectic and contradiction that run through Marx's study of deflective, you describe the footnote [after first incorrectly arguing that Engels had excised that footnote from capital, and then blame your mistake on taking someone else's word and the fact that your 50 volume set of MEGA was in storage], that the footnote was symptomatic, and indication, of the confusion Marx still experience over his relationship to Hegel and Hegel's dialectic.
    Eh?

    I think confusion is the exact word you used. You go on to argue that Marx didn't have the sophisticated vocabulary and logic that we have today to make a complete break with Hegel.
    I'd like to see my exact words on this not your prejudicial précis of them.

    Oh come on, Marx who could demolish anything and anyone who stood in the way of his investigations into the actual metabolism of capital, who could destroy any argument with language and logic so precise it went in like a scalpel but came out like a hammer? Marx didn't have the sophisticated language and logic to make a complete break with Hegel?
    What can I tell you? Humanity has made great strides since the 1870s. We can express thoughts that even the best minds on the planet could not form 130 years ago.

    And by 'we' I leave you out, since you seem to be stuck in an 1840s time warp.

    He could break Adam Smith, Ricardo, every political economist, but he couldn't break with Hegel.
    So you say, but Marx says different (see above).

    But in fact you claim Marx did make such a complete break and the complete break is evident in vol 1 where Marx "extirpates" Hegel's dialectic. We are not talking about the preface to the 2nd edition of vol 1, we are talking about the actual vol 1 itself, where he supposedly extirpated something he was confused about and did not have the tools to banish?
    Eh?

    I almost feel sorry for you, Rosa. Almost doesn't count.
    A class traitor feeling 'sorry' for a genuine materialist?

    I think I'll recover from that serious blow...
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    Once again, here are your own words, which I'm sure will provoke another bit torrent of quotes completely irrelevant to the question at hand:

    "I disagree. Marx is in the process of waving goodbye to the Hegelian way of seeing things, and returning to the scientific method laid down by Aristotle, modernised by the Scottish Historical Materialists. So, these errors are a clear indication of the last remaining areas of confusion in Marx's mind. And that is why the very best he could do was 'coquette' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital. In the 1860s he lacked the much more sophisticate logic and vocabulary we now have in this post-Fregean world. Marx did not have the means therefore to make a total break with Hegel; but we do. The footnote you place so much store by is a clear echo of this. Had Marx lived, he would have edited this out (as Engels did anyway), since it expressed a throwback to his earlier view of things."

    From September 10, 2009 Rosa, in case you forgot-- and it seems your memory has taken on a distinct Watergate-era spottiness.

    So you don't understand historical materialism, no surprise there.

    You think Marx made a transition between Grundrisse and Capital, [this is Rosa's version of Althusser's "rupture" between the young and the mature Marx. Althusser is another person who never read Marx, something he admitted after duping so many for so long-- not us "mystical Hegelians" though, we knew he was an idiot and had never read Marx the first time he published his junk; just as we know Rosa has never read Marx beyond the prefaces to volume 1].

    Yet there is absolutely no evidence of Marx ever explaining such a radical transition in his correspondence, in his notebooks, in any of his works. In fact just the opposite is evident in his correspondence, in his notebooks, and in his further explorations of value.

    There is in volume 1 his words that Hegel is the source of all dialectic. You think that Marx extirpated Hegel in volume 1 but at the same time he was confused, and lacked the tools to completely break with Hegel.

    Seriously, Rosa, you're a mess.
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    'Comrade' Artesian:

    Once again, here are your own words, which I'm sure will provoke another bit torrent of quotes completely irrelevant to the question at hand:

    "I disagree. Marx is in the process of waving goodbye to the Hegelian way of seeing things, and returning to the scientific method laid down by Aristotle, modernised by the Scottish Historical Materialists. So, these errors are a clear indication of the last remaining areas of confusion in Marx's mind. And that is why the very best he could do was 'coquette' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital. In the 1860s he lacked the much more sophisticate logic and vocabulary we now have in this post-Fregean world. Marx did not have the means therefore to make a total break with Hegel; but we do. The footnote you place so much store by is a clear echo of this. Had Marx lived, he would have edited this out (as Engels did anyway), since it expressed a throwback to his earlier view of things."
    From September 10, 2009 Rosa, in case you forgot-- and it seems your memory has taken on a distinct Watergate-era spottiness.
    Where did I deny saying this? I just asked for the exact words.

    Anyway, I'm not sure this helps you rehabilitate that logical incompetent, Hegel.

    So you don't understand historical materialism, no surprise there.
    Maybe so, maybe not, but I do not ignore Marx's published comments and then try to saddle him with mystical ideas he told us he had waved 'goodbye' to.

    You think Marx made a transition between Grundrisse and Capital, [this is Rosa's version of Althusser's "rupture" between the young and the mature Marx. Althusser is another person who never read Marx, something he admitted after duping so many for so long-- not us "mystical Hegelians" though, we knew he was an idiot and had never read Marx the first time he published his junk; just as we know Rosa has never read Marx beyond the prefaces to volume 1].

    Yet there is absolutely no evidence of Marx ever explaining such a radical transition in his correspondence, in his notebooks, in any of his works. In fact just the opposite is evident in his correspondence, in his notebooks, and in his further explorations of value.
    My argument shares nothing in common with Althusser; I'm not making an epistemological point at all.

    However, Marx very helpfully ended all such speculation about his new method when he endorsed a summary of 'the dialectic method', which I think you haven't seen before; here it is:

    "After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

    'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

    "Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]
    Now, I have checked, and several times, but I can't see any mention of these rather obscure 'contradictions' you keep banging on about. Perhaps you can? If so, please highlight them for the rest of us to see.

    Oddly enough, there is no mention either of "quantity passing over into quality", the "negation of the negation", the "unity of opposites", of the "Totality" -- but, perhaps I have missed something here, too.

    Of course, you know what this means? Unless you can find in this summary (or in any other of Marx's published works contemporaneous with, or subsequent to, Das Kapital) some or all of the above, the conclusion is inescapable: 'the dialectic method' that Marx uses has had Hegel completely excised.

    Take your time; no rush. After all, you mystics have only had 140 years to find a least one Hegelian concept in there. I am sure that if you try real hard, you'll find one. I'm certainly rooting for you...

    There is in volume 1 his words that Hegel is the source of all dialectic. You think that Marx extirpated Hegel in volume 1 but at the same time he was confused, and lacked the tools to completely break with Hegel.
    I note you do not actually quote this passage. Wonder why?

    [Answer: I have already covered this in the thread you are progressively mining for 'incriminating' evidence (not finding much, too, are you?), and you already know the deflationary answer I will give, don't you?]

    And now, the obligatory Dialectical Abuse -- you are rapidly running out of nasty things to say about me; your knowledge of abusive words is no more impressive than your facility with logic -- despite being asked many times, we have yet to be told what one of these obscure 'dialectical contradictions' is):

    Seriously, Rosa, you're a mess.
    Only marginally less than you, my class traitorous friend...
    Last edited by Rosa Lichtenstein; 15th March 2010 at 21:07.
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    Rosa, the quotation you keep trotting out, like Bush kept bringing up 9/11, from Marx's preface to Vol 1 aren't Marx's description of his work, but his appreciation of someone else's description of his work. Because that someone else avoided using Hegelian terms in the description, hell, if Marx himself avoided using Hegelian terms, that does not mean Marx extirpated Hegel's dialectic from his analysis,or that Marx "freed himself" of his allegiance to Hegel, unless of course, you think dialectic is and can only be an exercise in vocabulary; unless you think vocabulary is content.... if that's your argument, well then let me point out that you yourself are the living rejection of that argument-- you've got one helluva vocabulary and absolutely no content.

    It's your claim, not mine, that Marx had, in Vol 1 of Capital, extirpated Hegel's dialectic. The footnote, which I didn't quote because anyone can find it at the MIA website or in their volume of Capital is the note discussing Mill and the fact that Mill feels as much at home with absurd contradictions as he is at see in Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic [Chapter 24, Conversion of Surplus Value into Capital, p 654 in the Charles H. Kerr 1906 edition].

    You say Marx made a transition from the Grundrisse [Hegelian] to Capital, vol 1 [Hegel extirpated]. There is no evidence in Marx's studies, notebooks, correspondence indicating he ever made such a transition, ever even contemplated such a transition.

    You might want to believe that it was an unconscious transition, that Marx himself wasn't even aware of it, or that Marx "lacked the tools" to make a complete break with Hegel, in which case, we shall all bid you adieu and leave you to your fantasy world, where Marx is too weak, to unaware to even know why he's doing, or not doing, what Rosa says he must have done.

    Grasping at one more straw in your search for the needle in the proverbial haystack, you actually do claim Marx was still confused in vol 1; that he did lack the tools to make a complete break with Hegel [right, he just didn't have the vocabulary to say that Hegel's dialectic is a complete waste, and worse than a waste, those who think I have anything to do with Hegel's dialectic are enemies of the working class. After all, he wasn't able to bring himself to cast such harsh, definitive judgments on Proudhon or Lasalle, was he?].

    The Hegelian concepts, the Hegelian method are not in the vocabulary Marx uses in volume 1, just as dialectic is not a vocabulary. Marx is quite serious about extracting the rational kernel from Hegel. What is the rational kernel that Hegel presents in an alienated form, albeit in a comprehensive and conscious exposition? It is history, the real content of history.

    Hegel in his Phenomenology, in his movement of consciousness to self-consciousness, of spirit, is presenting in an alienated form, actual development of the human being-- the abstract course of human development. Marx sees in this idealized expression a rational kernel, which is to say, the actual development of the human being is a material development, it is the appropriation of the world not through spirit, but the appropriation of the material world, nature, through labor, and that appropriation is always social. So instead of vocabulary and spirit, Marx sees the rational kernel in the material conditions determining the social organization of labor. And in those material conditions of the social organization of labor, contradiction, antagonism, negation, overthrow exist. In fact it is those qualities of the social organization of labor, which means labor and the forms of property that encapsulate it, that provide the categories which represents as the movement of spirit, as the categories of logic, as the process of becoming.

    That's why Marx in his Contribution to the critique... maintains and reasserts the contradiction between the means and relations of production, not because he is an Hegelian, but because he is NOT, he's a social-ist, and in that contradiction exists the driving force for the development of and limitation to society, labor, the collective, social beings that we are.

    That's why in his notebooks, he is quite content to utilize the actual tensions that are created in language that is not immediately transparent, language that requires the reader to always keep in mind the tension between the individual laborer, the individual capitalist, the individual commodity, and the social collective labor, the class of capitalists, the entire universe of commodities. The tension is there in the Grundrisse, and it's there throughout his economic manuscripts of 1861-1864.

    Capital Vol 1 is an introduction. It is a continuation of the work in the Contribution, but it is an introduction and Marx is clear that he does not want to make it too difficult for the general public. And thank him for that. But the volume is not complete. He says that. We know that. He does not explore expanded reproduction. His choice of vocabulary says nothing, absolutely nothing about his connections, or lack thereof to Hegel. It's the analysis of capital, of its contradictions, of its social relation of production born in contradiction-- the dispossession of the laborer of all means of subsistence and production save his/her own labor which only has use as a means of exchange with those means of subsistence, so that labor and the conditions of labor now exist as opposed to each other, yet recreating each other; the more the laborer produces, the more the conditions of labor accumulate that maintain labors' dispossession. Marx gives us an economics of capitalism all right, and for Marx, and Marxists, economics is nothing but concentrated history, and history is the history of the social organization of labor.

    For Rosa, her Marxism... well, her Marxism isn't, because she quite frankly never grasps, nor can she effect, the transition Marx made in the dialectic from "spirit" to the material conditions of labor.
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    Here's a PS: Shameless self-advertising, if Rosa can do it anybody can do it. She claims she supports historical materialism but won't discuss it. I actually do historical materialism at:

    http://thewolfatthedoor.blogspot.com

    All are welcome to read, enjoy, criticize or ignore as he/she feels fit.
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    'Comrade' Artesian:

    Rosa, the quotation you keep trotting out, like Bush kept bringing up 9/11, from Marx's preface to Vol 1 aren't Marx's description of his work, but his appreciation of someone else's description of his work. Because that someone else avoided using Hegelian terms in the description, hell, if Marx himself avoided using Hegelian terms, that does not mean Marx extirpated Hegel's dialectic from his analysis, or that Marx "freed himself" of his allegiance to Hegel, unless of course, you think dialectic is and can only be an exercise in vocabulary; unless you think vocabulary is content.... if that's your argument, well then let me point out that you yourself are the living rejection of that argument-- you've got one helluva vocabulary and absolutely no content.
    I see you equate Marx's words with the antics of George Dubbya. Which is precisely what I'd expect from a class traitor.

    Rosa, the quotation you keep trotting out, like Bush kept bringing up 9/11, from Marx's preface to Vol 1 aren't Marx's description of his work, but his appreciation of someone else's description of his work.
    Except Marx says of it this:

    "After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method....

    Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?"
    So, Marx, not me, says that what this author takes this to be Marx's method, is in fact the 'dialectic method' -- and, moreover, it contains no Hegel at all (unless you know otherwise...).

    So, Marx, not me, endorses this as the 'dialectic method'. Hence, the 'dialectic method' that Marx accepts contains no Hegel at all.

    Because that someone else avoided using Hegelian terms in the description, hell, if Marx himself avoided using Hegelian terms, that does not mean Marx extirpated Hegel's dialectic from his analysis, or that Marx "freed himself" of his allegiance to Hegel, unless of course, you think dialectic is and can only be an exercise in vocabulary; unless you think vocabulary is content.... if that's your argument, well then let me point out that you yourself are the living rejection of that argument-- you've got one helluva vocabulary and absolutely no content.
    Once more, we needn't surmise, since Marx, not me, put paid to all speculation when he added this to the Postface (oh dear, I feel another non-George Bush move coming upon me):

    "After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

    'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

    "Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]
    Now, if you can see anything Hegelian in there, please share it with us genuine materialists so that we can apologise profusely, and repent at length for maligning the bad name of you mystics.

    And of the alleged 'Hegelian content in Das Kapital, I defy you to find it without also including Hegelian vocabulary (with which we already know Marx merely 'coquetted' anyway...).

    It's your claim, not mine, that Marx had, in Vol 1 of Capital, extirpated Hegel's dialectic. The footnote, which I didn't quote because anyone can find it at the MIA website or in their volume of Capital is the note discussing Mill and the fact that Mill feels as much at home with absurd contradictions as he is at see in Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic [Chapter 24, Conversion of Surplus Value into Capital, p 654 in the Charles H. Kerr 1906 edition].
    In fact, as the above long quotation shows, it is Marx who tells us that Hegel has been extirpated from Das Kapital.

    Now, and once more, if you can find a quotation from any of the volumes of Das Kapital, or any other published source contemporaneous with, or subsequent to, Das Kapital, that tells us that Marx is using Hegel's method, then please share it with us.

    You refer us that controversial passage once more but refuse to quote it (as I asked you to do) -- and we both know why...

    So, either quote it in full, or drop it.

    You say Marx made a transition from the Grundrisse [Hegelian] to Capital, vol 1 [Hegel extirpated]. There is no evidence in Marx's studies, notebooks, correspondence indicating he ever made such a transition, ever even contemplated such a transition.
    Well, and once more, Marx ended all speculation about this transition, since he included in the Postface a passage which he endorses as 'his method' and 'the dialectic method', which, I am sorry to have to tell you, contains no one atom of Hegel (see above).

    Maybe the confusion has arisen since I haven't mentioned this before...

    You might want to believe that it was an unconscious transition, that Marx himself wasn't even aware of it, or that Marx "lacked the tools" to make a complete break with Hegel, in which case, we shall all bid you adieu and leave you to your fantasy world, where Marx is too weak, to unaware to even know why he's doing, or not doing, what Rosa says he must have done.
    Well, I am not going to speculate, since Marx put paid to it all when he added a passage to the Postface which...

    But I suspect you might know the rest by now.

    Grasping at one more straw in your search for the needle in the proverbial haystack, you actually do claim Marx was still confused in vol 1; that he did lack the tools to make a complete break with Hegel [right, he just didn't have the vocabulary to say that Hegel's dialectic is a complete waste, and worse than a waste, those who think I have anything to do with Hegel's dialectic are enemies of the working class. After all, he wasn't able to bring himself to cast such harsh, definitive judgments on Proudhon or Lasalle, was he?].
    In fact, the 'straws' I am 'grasping' are Marx's own words. Now, it's all the same to me if you choose to ignore what he says, but us genuine materialists take what he has to say very seriously.

    And where did I say Marx was 'confused'? He was no more confused than Newton was when he expressed the new Newtonian world-view in rather antiquated language -- and it is no slur on Newton to point this out. Same with Marx.

    right, he just didn't have the vocabulary to say that Hegel's dialectic is a complete waste, and worse than a waste, those who think I have anything to do with Hegel's dialectic are enemies of the working class. After all, he wasn't able to bring himself to cast such harsh, definitive judgments on Proudhon or Lasalle, was he?
    What are you blathering on about?

    The Hegelian concepts, the Hegelian method are not in the vocabulary Marx uses in volume 1, just as dialectic is not a vocabulary. Marx is quite serious about extracting the rational kernel from Hegel. What is the rational kernel that Hegel presents in an alienated form, albeit in a comprehensive and conscious exposition? It is history, the real content of history.
    But there are no Hegelian concepts in Das Kapital.

    How do we know? Well, it may come as a surprise to you, but Marx endorsed as the 'dialectic method' a summary that contained no trace of Hegel at all (see above).

    Or, perhaps you can find a few Hegelian 'concepts' in there -- maybe they are written in invisible ink?

    Hegel in his Phenomenology, in his movement of consciousness to self-consciousness, of spirit, is presenting in an alienated form, actual development of the human being-- the abstract course of human development. Marx sees in this idealized expression a rational kernel, which is to say, the actual development of the human being is a material development, it is the appropriation of the world not through spirit, but the appropriation of the material world, nature, through labor, and that appropriation is always social. So instead of vocabulary and spirit, Marx sees the rational kernel in the material conditions determining the social organization of labor. And in those material conditions of the social organization of labor, contradiction, antagonism, negation, overthrow exist. In fact it is those qualities of the social organization of labor, which means labor and the forms of property that encapsulate it, that provide the categories which represents as the movement of spirit, as the categories of logic, as the process of becoming.

    That's why Marx in his Contribution to the critique... maintains and reasserts the contradiction between the means and relations of production, not because he is an Hegelian, but because he is NOT, he's a social-ist, and in that contradiction exists the driving force for the development of and limitation to society, labor, the collective, social beings that we are.

    That's why in his notebooks, he is quite content to utilize the actual tensions that are created in language that is not immediately transparent, language that requires the reader to always keep in mind the tension between the individual laborer, the individual capitalist, the individual commodity, and the social collective labor, the class of capitalists, the entire universe of commodities. The tension is there in the Grundrisse, and it's there throughout his economic manuscripts of 1861-1864.

    Capital Vol 1 is an introduction. It is a continuation of the work in the Contribution, but it is an introduction and Marx is clear that he does not want to make it too difficult for the general public. And thank him for that. But the volume is not complete. He says that. We know that. He does not explore expanded reproduction. His choice of vocabulary says nothing, absolutely nothing about his connections, or lack thereof to Hegel. It's the analysis of capital, of its contradictions, of its social relation of production born in contradiction-- the dispossession of the laborer of all means of subsistence and production save his/her own labor which only has use as a means of exchange with those means of subsistence, so that labor and the conditions of labor now exist as opposed to each other, yet recreating each other; the more the laborer produces, the more the conditions of labor accumulate that maintain labors' dispossession. Marx gives us an economics of capitalism all right, and for Marx, and Marxists, economics is nothing but concentrated history, and history is the history of the social organization of labor.
    And the relevance of this gobbledygook is what?

    Answer: none at all, since Marx had waved 'goodbye' to all this guff in Das Kapital.

    Unless, of course, you can quote a passage from any of the volumes of the above book, or any other published source contemporaneous with, or subsequent to it that tells us that Marx is using Hegel's method, or still thought the bo**ocks above was relevant to his work.

    If not, why inflict any more of this mystical tripe on humanity?

    Anyway, we already know that this way of seeing the world would make change impossible -- on that see the Mao thread.

    So, no wonder that the very best Marx could do with the jargon of this confused mystic was 'coquette' with it.

    [QUOTE]For Rosa, her Marxism... well, her Marxism isn't, because she quite frankly never grasps, nor can she effect, the transition Marx made in the dialectic from "spirit" to the material conditions of labor.[QUOTE]

    Except, Marx himself, not me, tells us that he had thrown all this mystical rubbish into the trash can when he came to write Das Kapital.

    You keep ignoring this salient fact...
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    'Comrade' Artesian:

    Here's a PS: Shameless self-advertising, if Rosa can do it anybody can do it. She claims she supports historical materialism but won't discuss it. I actually do historical materialism at:

    http://thewolfatthedoor.blogspot.com

    All are welcome to read, enjoy, criticize or ignore as he/she feels fit.
    Except, at your blog you help yourself to the word "contradiction" when you have yet to explain its sense clearly.

    So, you will only be doing genuine Historical Materialism at your blog when, like Marx, you kick this mystical vocabulary out -- or, of cousre, you begin to 'coquette' with it, too...
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    'Comrade' Artesian:
    So, you will only be doing genuine Historical Materialism at your blog when, like Marx, you kick this mystical vocabulary out -- or, of cousre, you begin to 'coquette' with it, too...
    _____________

    One more thing you can't do, make a sensible comment on actual concrete analysis.

    So which is it?

    Did Marx make a "transition" from the Grundrisse to Vol 1 of Capital? Out with Hegel in with the Scots.

    Or was Marx still "confused" in Capital Vol 1 [and 2 and 3, and Theories of Surplus Value]?

    Did he "lack the tools" to make a complete break with Hegel in Vol 1, as you claim? And if he lacked the tools to do so in vol 1, exactly where did Marx make that break, demonstrate that break? Let me quess, in the gracious comment he makes about somebody else describing his method?

    You have taken all 3 positions, which makes you either an incredible contortionist, a student of yoga, or more Hegelian than Hegel.

    Muster all your usual quotes now Rosa, get them all lined up, patch an audio of a drumroll behind them-- tell us, which is it, confused? adamant? lacking in tools or well armed? All? Adamant in confusion, well-armed but lacking in tools.
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    To continue:

    In her wonderful world of distortion Rosa thinks I'm equating Marx's words with George Bush's when to anyone who can read, I am clearly equating her technique in using the passage every time she confronts a criticism with Bush's technique of using 9/11 as a campaign slogan.


    You want me to quote the entire footnote? That's just stupid. Everyone can read the entire footnote for himself or herself.

    You can't provide an ounce of original analysis regarding the valorisation process-- wait you don't have to, right Marx did that for us. But he didn't do it completely. You can't provide an ounce of original analysis regarding the formal vs. the real domination of capital; the conflict between means and relations of production; historical materialism; the labor process.

    You can't provide anything original.

    The floor has been wiped all right, by me, using you as the rag.
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    'Comrade' Artesian:

    One more thing you can't do, make a sensible comment on actual concrete analysis.
    Maybe so, maybe not, but one thing is clear: unlike your posts, mine will not be infected with mystical concepts that you can't explain and which therefore cannot account for capitalism.

    So which is it?

    Did Marx make a "transition" from the Grundrisse to Vol 1 of Capital? Out with Hegel in with the Scots.

    Or was Marx still "confused" in Capital Vol 1 [and 2 and 3, and Theories of Surplus Value]?

    Did he "lack the tools" to make a complete break with Hegel in Vol 1, as you claim? And if he lacked the tools to do so in vol 1, exactly where did Marx make that break, demonstrate that break? Let me guess, in the gracious comment he makes about somebody else describing his method?
    I have in fact already answered this. In your highly emotional state, you obviously missed it.

    You have taken all 3 positions, which makes you either an incredible contortionist, a student of yoga, or more Hegelian than Hegel.
    Since this is your prejudicial attempt to summarise my ideas, I can't help you. I certainly cannot be held to account over ideas which aren't mine.

    Muster all your usual quotes now Rosa, get them all lined up, patch an audio of a drumroll behind them-- tell us, which is it, confused? adamant? lacking in tools or well armed? All? Adamant in confusion, well-armed but lacking in tools.
    No point, you just ignore Marx's own clear words.
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    'Comrade' Artesian:

    In her wonderful world of distortion Rosa thinks I'm equating Marx's words with George Bush's when to anyone who can read, I am clearly equating her technique in using the passage every time she confronts a criticism with Bush's technique of using 9/11 as a campaign slogan.
    So, on this reformulated, but badly mis-firing slur, you are now equating Marx's words with what happened on 9/11.

    So, you are in fact a vacillating class traitor. I'm not sure that's much of an improvement.

    You want me to quote the entire footnote? That's just stupid. Everyone can read the entire footnote for himself or herself.
    Fine, just provide the link, then.

    [And we both know why you are being so evasive on this, don't we?]

    You can't provide an ounce of original analysis regarding the valorisation process-- wait you don't have to, right Marx did that for us. But he didn't do it completely. You can't provide an ounce of original analysis regarding the formal vs. the real domination of capital; the conflict between means and relations of production; historical materialism; the labor process.
    No need to; Marx has already done this for us. Or didn't you know?

    You can't provide anything original.
    You haven't read my essays so you are in no position to judge. Or are you psychic?

    The floor has been wiped all right, by me, using you as the rag.
    You aren't even original in your slurs; you copied this one off me.
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    There is something seriously wrong with Rosa

    She posts this:
    Rosa: Quote:
    In her wonderful world of distortion Rosa thinks I'm equating Marx's words with George Bush's when to anyone who can read, I am clearly equating her technique in using the passage every time she confronts a criticism with Bush's technique of using 9/11 as a campaign slogan.
    So, on this reformulated, but badly mis-firing slur, you are now equating Marx's words with what happened on 9/11
    ____________

    When I have specifically identified her technique of bringing up the same quote over and over regardless of its applicability. It's her technique, not Marx's words, that remind me of the Bush campaign.

    Then she posts this:

    Rosa:
    Quote:
    You want me to quote the entire footnote? That's just stupid. Everyone can read the entire footnote for himself or herself.
    Fine, just provide the link, then.

    [And we both know why you are being so evasive on this, don't we?
    ____________

    After I gave the precise location of the footnote in Capital Volume 1, Kerr addition, and DeLeonist has given a location in the Penguin addition.

    But besides having an organic disorder, what else have we learned about Rosa?

    1. She is a 4D person, relying on distortion, denial, disavowal, and drivel. She claims first that Marx extirpated Hegel, broke completely with Hegel and all that "mystical stuff in vol 1 after undergoing a "transition" between the Grundrisse and Capital when there is no evidence of any transition, and in fact, after the publication of the vol 1 Marx in his correspondence continues to refer to the importance of Hegel's dialectic.

    She also claims that although Marx extirpated Hegel, the footnote in question regarding Mill in Vol 1 is an "echo" of the "confusion" Marx felt when he was making that transition, and that Marx lacked the tools to make a complete break with Hegel. Well, I'm no philosopher, but extirpation means to do away with, to eradicate. So if he lacked the tools to make a complete break, he certainly lacked the tools to eradicate the vestiges of Hegel's dialectic in his own work. So there's a contradiction here between Rosa's self-stated position. And it's not a dialectical contradiction.

    2. She knows nothing about Marx's investigations. She actually thinks that the condition that labor exists in capitalism-- as wage-labor; and the conditions of labor, the means of subsistence and production as private property do not exist in contradiction,in dialectical contradiction, that one must exist for the other to exist, that one can only grow through the expropriation of the other's living contribution which it converts into a means to maintain, advance, expand expropriation. She referred to this condition of exchange, this social relationship that is the focus of all of Marx's explorations-- from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts through the volumes of Capital- as "gobbledygook."

    3. She probably has not read any volume of Capital beyond the prefaces to the first volume. She has no knowledge, no opinion, no information, not a thought about Marx's examination of the valorisation process. She does not understand one iota of Marx's exploration of the labor process.

    4. I doubt that Rosa understands the distinction between simple and expanded reproduction; between the formal and real domination of capital. I know she feels she doesn't have to understand those categories, relations etc. "because Marx already did that for us." No, Marx did not do all of that for us. He developed these critical categories and methodologies for examining capital in the abstract. It is our task, the real "fruit" of Marxism, to do it in the specific, concrete circumstances of history.

    5. She claims she accepts "historical materialism" but has no idea what historical materialism is since historical materialism begins precisely with the examination of the organization of labor, the condition of labor, the exchange between labor and property which she labels, when it comes to capitalism, "gobbledygook."

    6. She likes to throw the term "class-traitor" at those who don't agree with her 4Ds, her pseudo-interpretation of Marx, proving again how much of an idiot she is, how ignorant she is of Marx and Marxism, judging a person's class alliance by their "ideas" rather than their actual work in the class struggle.

    7. IMO, points 1-6 lead me to the inescapable conclusion that Rosa is most probably a cop; a police provocateur designed to engage in these pseudo-debates so that her handlers might gain information about others. The most important thing to do when faced with a police provocateur is to exclude the provocateur from collective discussion and action, to cut off the flow of information. Having exposed Rosa for what she isn't, a Marxist, I have every intention of not exposing myself to what I believe she is-- a cop.
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  23. #276
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    'Comrade' Artesian:

    There is something seriously wrong with Rosa

    She posts this:

    In her wonderful world of distortion Rosa thinks I'm equating Marx's words with George Bush's when to anyone who can read, I am clearly equating her technique in using the passage every time she confronts a criticism with Bush's technique of using 9/11 as a campaign slogan.

    So, on this reformulated, but badly mis-firing slur, you are now equating Marx's words with what happened on 9/11
    ____________

    When I have specifically identified her technique of bringing up the same quote over and over regardless of its applicability. It's her technique, not Marx's words, that remind me of the Bush campaign.

    Then she posts this:

    You want me to quote the entire footnote? That's just stupid. Everyone can read the entire footnote for himself or herself.

    Fine, just provide the link, then.

    [And we both know why you are being so evasive on this, don't we?]
    After I gave the precise location of the footnote in Capital Volume 1, Kerr addition, and DeLeonist has given a location in the Penguin addition.

    But besides having an organic disorder, what else have we learned about Rosa?
    But no link to the online version (or to the discussion with DeLeonist). So, we are still waiting...

    Again, we both know why you are prevaricating.

    Anyway, see below, in my next post.

    1. She is a 4D person, relying on distortion, denial, disavowal, and drivel.
    And, thankfully, you keep supplying more and more of the same.

    She claims first that Marx extirpated Hegel, broke completely with Hegel and all that "mystical stuff in vol 1 after undergoing a "transition" between the Grundrisse and Capital when there is no evidence of any transition, and in fact, after the publication of the vol 1 Marx in his correspondence continues to refer to the importance of Hegel's dialectic.
    Well, and once more, Marx saved us both from indulging in time wasting speculation when he added a summary of 'his method', the 'dialectic method', from which every trace of Hegel had been excised.

    So, pick a fight with Marx, not me.

    She also claims that although Marx extirpated Hegel, the footnote in question regarding Mill in Vol 1 is an "echo" of the "confusion" Marx felt when he was making that transition, and that Marx lacked the tools to make a complete break with Hegel. Well, I'm no philosopher, but extirpation means to do away with, to eradicate. So if he lacked the tools to make a complete break, he certainly lacked the tools to eradicate the vestiges of Hegel's dialectic in his own work. So there's a contradiction here between Rosa's self-stated position. And it's not a dialectical contradiction.
    And, as soon as you supply the entire quotation, or a link to it, I'll comment on your misrepresentation of my ideas. If you refuse to do so, I can't help you any more. [Added on edit: but see below.]

    You have been told this several times, and yet you continue to prevaricate.

    2. She knows nothing about Marx's investigations. She actually thinks that the condition that labor exists in capitalism-- as wage-labor; and the conditions of labor, the means of subsistence and production as private property do not exist in contradiction, in dialectical contradiction, that one must exist for the other to exist, that one can only grow through the expropriation of the other's living contribution which it converts into a means to maintain, advance, expand expropriation. She referred to this condition of exchange, this social relationship that is the focus of all of Marx's explorations-- from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts through the volumes of Capital- as "gobbledygook."
    You continue to pass comment on what I do or do not know, but you keep forgetting to add the proof.

    As we both know, that's because you are desperate to discredit me in any way you can, but since you can't you find you have to lie.

    And, I note for the umpteenth that you once again help yourself to the word "contradiction" when you have signally failed to explain it. Nor has anyone else over the last 200 years.

    And, sure, parts of Marx's early work is gobbledygook, but, fortunately, he waved 'goodbye' to this guff when he wised up in Das Kapital.

    You'd do well to copy him.

    3. She probably has not read any volume of Capital beyond the prefaces to the first volume. She has no knowledge, no opinion, no information, not a thought about Marx's examination of the valorisation process. She does not understand one iota of Marx's exploration of the labor process.

    4. I doubt that Rosa understands the distinction between simple and expanded reproduction; between the formal and real domination of capital. I know she feels she doesn't have to understand those categories, relations etc. "because Marx already did that for us." No, Marx did not do all of that for us. He developed these critical categories and methodologies for examining capital in the abstract. It is our task, the real "fruit" of Marxism, to do it in the specific, concrete circumstances of history.
    Two more baseless allegations.

    Or, have you just found the proof?

    If so, please post it. It's about time someone put me in my place.

    You look up to the job...

    No, Marx did not do all of that for us. He developed these critical categories and methodologies for examining capital in the abstract. It is our task, the real "fruit" of Marxism, to do it in the specific, concrete circumstances of history
    Indeed, but we stand no chance of doing that if we copy you and drown it all in Hegelian gobbledygook.

    5. She claims she accepts "historical materialism" but has no idea what historical materialism is since historical materialism begins precisely with the examination of the organization of labor, the condition of labor, the exchange between labor and property which she labels, when it comes to capitalism, "gobbledygook."
    Where did I label this in that way?

    Yet more abuse:

    6. She likes to throw the term "class-traitor" at those who don't agree with her 4Ds, her pseudo-interpretation of Marx, proving again how much of an idiot she is, how ignorant she is of Marx and Marxism, judging a person's class alliance by their "ideas" rather than their actual work in the class struggle.
    But, we can't trust you to tell the truth, can we? After all, you're a class traitor.

    7. IMO, points 1-6 lead me to the inescapable conclusion that Rosa is most probably a cop; a police provocateur designed to engage in these pseudo-debates so that her handlers might gain information about others. The most important thing to do when faced with a police provocateur is to exclude the provocateur from collective discussion and action, to cut off the flow of information. Having exposed Rosa for what she isn't, a Marxist, I have every intention of not exposing myself to what I believe she is-- a cop.
    Off in fantasy land now, I see. And all because you can't defend this ruling-class theory you mystics have dumped on the workers' movement.
    Last edited by Rosa Lichtenstein; 17th March 2010 at 00:07.
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    Here are my earlier comments on the passage about Mill you refuse to quote (and we will soon see why):

    Ok, I have checked this passage (I can't think why I did not do this before -- something I invariably do), anyway here is it:

    John St. Mill, on the contrary, accepts on the one hand Ricardo’s theory of profit, and annexes on the other hand Senior’s “remuneration of abstinence.” He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic. It has never occurred to the vulgar economist to make the simple reftexion, that every human action may be viewed, as “abstinence” from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a way, over Spinoza’s: “Determinatio est Negatio.”
    http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx...1/ch24.htm#n28

    The first thing to note is that this sentence is ambiguous:

    He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic.
    You seem to think its meaning is obvious, that Marx is claiming that "Hegelian contradiction is the source of all dialectic", but this is not plausible, and for several reasons:

    1) Marx goes on to appeal to Spinoza's principle to illustrate the source of the dialectic:

    It has never occurred to the vulgar economist to make the simple reftexion, that every human action may be viewed, as “abstinence” from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a way, over Spinoza’s: “Determinatio est Negatio.”
    which, of course, predated the invention of Hegel's supposed 'contradictions'. If so, Hegelian 'contradictions' can't be the source of all dialectic (as Marx is clearly indicated by quoting Spinoza). And, indeed, they aren't, for the dialectic originated in ancient Greece.

    2. The sentence itself gives us a clue as to Marx's intentions:

    He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic.
    The final clause could refer back to this:

    as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction,
    or to this:

    He is as much at home in absurd contradictions
    or, what is far more likely, to this:

    He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction,
    in other words Marx is alluding here to the sort of puzzlement that motivated the early Greeks to engage in dialectic (the pursuit of truth through argument and counter-argument), puzzlement that now surfaces in Mill's mind.

    And this interpretation is supported by point 1) above -- Marx appeals to the puzzling features of Spinoza's principle.

    So, far from Marx being guilty of a simple historical error (the claim that Hegel's contradictions are the source of all dialectic, which they plainly aren't), he is pointing out something much less controversial, that puzzlement is the source of the dialectic (in fact, this is a remarkably Wittgensteinian claim to make).

    In that case, I do not have to appeal to the 'coquetting' passage to explain Marx's use of 'contradiction' here, since he is alluding to this puzzling feature of Hegel's work, not endorsing it.

    Anyway, I can only thank you for forcing me to consider this passage again, since it lends support to my view that Marx anticipated Wittgenstein in many ways, this just being the latest example: that philosophy ('all dialectic') is motivated by puzzlement, and that the only legitimate role philosophy can play isn't to try to discover hidden truths that are unavailable to the sciences, but to unravel the puzzles we sometimes find ourselves in.
    http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...&postcount=156

    And, that's why you failed to provide the link since I show here that Hegel's work is not the source of all dialectic, and neither did Marx believe he was, as you claimed.
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    You're a cop, Rosa. I don't waste my time giving information to cops, once they're identified.
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    But just in case anyone else is reading this-- the principle that Marx refers to of Spinoza's “Determinatio est Negatio" is not the principle of puzzlement. The phrase means -- determination is negation-- and is often translated as every determination is a negation, obviously the phrase refers back to Marx's earlier comment in the footnote that every human action may be an abstinence from its opposite, which in turn is Marx's barbed criticism of the incongruity of Mill, who at one and the same time accepts Ricardo's theory of profit and Senior's "abstinence"-- abstinence being a term designed to obscure the expropriation of labor, and the forced abstinence imposed upon labor by the terms of surplus value, by attributing "abstinence," self-discipline, etc. of the capitalist as the source of profit.

    The phrase, as Marx uses it, as Spinoza created it, does not diminish from Marx's assessment of Hegel's contradiction as the source of all dialectic.

    Not just a cop, but a stupid cop, this Rosa.
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    SHIT ITS TEH COPZ! ONOES


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