Quote:
Most historians agree that the Red Army had little to do with the liberation of Yugoslavia, and that it was mostly Communist Partisans who liberated Yugoslavia, just like in your beloved Albania.
The Communist partisans in Yugoslavia were founded by a party affiliated with the Comintern, led by a longtime member of the Comintern, were in regular contact with the Soviets, and had the benefit of the Red Army assisting in the liberation of Belgrade and other areas.
Obviously the Yugoslavs would have taken power on their own, but the same could be said for Mao's men as well. It was Soviet assistance that allowed them to take power when they did in both cases.
Quote:
How is Tito a bourgeois nationalist when he reaffirmed his desire for a Federal Yugoslavia where all ethnicities would be treated equally and effectively brought them together.
All Slavs, perhaps, but certainly not Albanians who were treated as an enemy nation and denied their own republic. Furthermore the Yugoslavs held that Muslims constituted a nation among other anti-Marxist views on nationality. See:
http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.or...e/titoites.htm
Furthermore you have a narrow understanding of bourgeois nationalism as basically just opposition to chauvinism within one's own country (in which case Tito still fails to qualify, as noted), when in fact bourgeois nationalism goes further than this.
Quote:
How is Stalin not a bourgeois nationalist when his prime foreign policy interests consisted at first to hijack revolutionary movements to bring them under his control.
You already think that the "Bolshevists" placed revolutionary movements under their control. Again, your issue is with Lenin, not with Stalin.
Quote:
Then he engaged in typical Russian irredentism with the invasions of Finalnd, the Baltic states, and Eastern Poland (collaborating with Hitler to ensure that last one).
First off, the Baltic states had been severed from close collaboration with Soviet Russia through the intervention of White Guardists of Finland, the British, and the Germans, which overthrew the soviet republics established in those three states.
On the Baltics I bring you a book except:
Quote:
"The three [Baltic] States had all gained their independence as a result of the disintegration of the Russian Empire. It was widely held in the Soviet Union that they had been 'snatched' (to use Zinoviev's word) from Russia with German aid, and maintained by the forces of the Entente, which had been active in suppressing the Communist regimes established in the winter of 1918-19 in the wake of German withdrawal. Relations between the Soviet Union and the three republics during the 1920s were cool, but on the whole, correct. There were some attempts at subversion, culminating in the abortive Communist coup in Estonia in 1924, but with the demise of the Comintern as a leading agent of Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet Union posed no immediate or evident threat to the integrity of the Baltic States. The resurgence of Germany in the 1930s altered the political scene in the Baltic area. In the event of conflict with Germany, the Soviet Union could not afford to have its front door opened by the defection of pro-German States on its very doorstep. This was clearly spelled out by Andrei Zhdanov to the VIIIth Congress of Soviets in November 1936. According to the Latvian chargé d'affaires, Zhdanov warned the governments of neighbouring States that if they drifted too far in the direction of Fascism 'they might feel the strength of the Soviet Union, and the window of the Soviet Union might well be widened'."
(Martin McCauley (Ed.).
Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 1977. p. 22.)
"As Stalin told the Latvian Foreign Minister, who was summoned in turn on 2 October [1939], the demands of the U.S.S.R. arose purely out of the wartime situation: the Soviet government had no desire to encroach upon the internal affairs of Latvia. He informed Munters with brutal frankness that a division of spheres of interest between the U.S.S.R. and Germany had already taken place, and that 'as far as Germany is concerned we could occupy you'."
(Ibid. p. 25.)
"During the period of the Winter War, the Soviet Union scrupulously observed the terms of the treaties with the Baltic States. Red Army troops were strictly disciplined and behaved with absolute correctness. Attempts by pro-Communist elements to establish contacts with Russian troops were discouraged, and access to Soviet embassies was officially denied. The Soviet government made no representations when large numbers of Latvian Communists were arrested in January 1940, and in no way interfered in the running of the affairs of the three countries. At the end of October [1939], Molotov denounced as malevolent talk the rumours of the imminent sovietisation of the Baltic States: in December, Stalin spoke with satisfaction of the smooth running of the treaty with Estonia and assured the visiting Estonian military delegation of the continued independence of their country."
(Ibid. p. 26.)
"There is evidence of Stalin's mistrust of native Communists. In October 1939, he told the Lithuanian Foreign Minister that it was no concern of the Soviet Union how the Lithuanian government dealt with its Communists; and, even more bluntly, he informed the Latvian Foreign Minister: 'There are no Communists outside Russia. What you have in Latvia are Trotsk[y]ists: if they cause you trouble, shoot them.' In the deportations of June 1941, not a few Party members found themselves in trains bound for the interior of the Socialist fatherland.
Lacking instructions from Moscow, the local Communist Parties seemed to have played safe and followed the prevalent popular front line. The Lithuanian Communist Party programme of 1939 urged the mobilisation of all democratic forces to overthrow the Černius government, and the Party sought alliance with the Social Democrats. In common with the Parties of Latvia and Estonia, its programme issued in 1940 was democratic in tone rather than Communist. The governments which were established in June 1940 seemed to offer a genuine opportunity for a reintroduction of democratic liberties, and as such they gained the passive and even active support of many democrats and Socialists who had suffered under the old regimes. The authoritarian regimes which had been set up in the early 1930s in Latvia and Estonia and in 1926 in Lithuania had all shown signs of collapse before the outbreak of war in 1939. They had suppressed political liberties and had failed to replace them with anything other than poor imitations of Austrian Fascism. The percipient comment of the British Minister to Riga on the state of affairs in Latvia is equally applicable to Estonia and Lithuania. The Collapse of the Ulmanis regime, 'literally overnight':
'left a political vacuum which, as the result of M. Ulmanis' totalitarianism, could be filled by no alternative middle-class organisation, and the swing to the left was therefore unduly abrupt, partly no doubt owing to the influence exercised by the USSR but also owing to the absence of any mobilisable political forces to challenge or correct those of the town workers.'
The evidence available would suggest that considerable sections of the urban proletariat, including the Jewish and Russian minorities, supported the new order, whilst many democratic and left-wing intellectuals were prepared to give the new regimes a chance to fulfil their promises. The new governments, composed of left-wing democrats rather than Communists, did indeed appear to represent a fresh wind of change in an atmosphere which had become stagnant during the last years of the dictatorships. All-round wage increases were decreed in June, laws against hoarding and speculation were passed, whilst assurances were given to peasant landholders that their land would not be touched. The bastions of the old order were speedily demolished and replaced by new organisations. In Latvia, for example, the law of 26 June provided for the creation of workers' committees in factories employing more than twenty persons, whilst on 8 July a law establishing the
politruk system in the army was passed. The Estonian trade unions, which had managed to preserve much of their independence during the Päts' regime, were taken over by the Communists on 20 June. The
Kaitseliit guards were dissolved on 27 June, and replaced by a workers' militia under the direct control of the Communist-dominated Ministry of the Interior. Widespread purges of local government and the bureaucracy occurred in the last days of June and early July, with Communists installed in vital positions. Nevertheless, the lack of Party members in all three countries—and, quite possibly, Soviet mistrust of local Communists—meant that 'progressive elements' willing to serve the regime were used. In rural areas, there appears to have been less change, and appointees of the old regimes remained in office... The left-wing intellectuals who formed the governments of Latvia and Estonia remained in favour and high office until the purges of 1950, when they were accused of bourgeois nationalism and replaced by more reliable Soviet-trained Communists."
(Ibid. pp. 29-31.)
Furthermore the release of Soviet archives after 1991 confirmed that Stalin was not interested in "sovietizing" the Baltics until internal reports reached him that such policies would actually be popular in those countries. Before that he just wanted military assurances that these states would not assist the Nazis in the event of any conflict between the USSR and Nazi Germany.
Eastern Poland was not Polish. It had been taken by the Polish bourgeois state in 1921.
"The population of the area did not oppose the Russian troops but welcomed them with joy. Most were not Poles but Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians. U.S. Ambassador Biddle reported that the people accepted the Russians 'as doing a policing job.' Despatches told of Russian troops marching side by side with retiring Polish troops, of Ukrainian girls hanging garlands over Russian tanks."
(Anna Louise Strong.
The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream Publishers. 1957. p. 80.)
As for Finland, its government refused to conclude a treaty allowing the Soviet Union to defend Leningrad from a future Nazi invasion, even though the Finnish negotiators (which included a future Prime Minister) had asserted repeatedly that Stalin's proposals were acceptable. Stalin had no aim of territorial conquest, but the securation of Leningrad.
Quote:
Most unbiased historians both left and right almost unanimously agree that although the PCE was the strongest faction (due to Russian armament as it is after all a Bolshevist Communist Party), its ultimate quest for supremacy was what led the Trots and Anarchists to disassociate themselves from the Popular Front.
The POUM and various anarchists were denouncing the "Stalinists" and calling for a proletarian revolution during the civil war, opposed the formation of a regular army to fight the reactionaries, carried out forced collectivization in the countryside (whatever you think of Stalin's campaign, it wasn't conducted during a civil war), and so on.
Quote:
They are not responsible for the loss to Franco though. Foreign intervention was what tipped the balance. The USSR halted its foreign intervention after the Germano-Soviet pact. Hmmm...I wonder why?
The Spanish Republic fell in April 1939. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in August that year. I didn't reply to you the first time because what you said made no sense.
Every single historian of the left and right notes that the Soviet Union's assistance to the Spanish allowed for Madrid to be defended in the first year of the war. It was the British and French who proposed "non-intervention," treating the elected Spanish Republic with the same legitimacy as a fascist uprising in its armed forces. It is true that by April Soviet assistance had declined, but that's hardly surprising when the Republicans were clearly losing. The issue was whether they could hold out for a few more months, but that was answered in the negative when a right-wing coup ousted Negrín and immediately began negotiations with Franco.
Quote:
Again making excuses for Stalin when you know that part of the post-War agreement with Churchill and Truman was to leave Greece to be put under Western influence.
Hungary was supposed to be 50/50%, that obviously didn't work out now did it?
Quote:
It was Stalin who had the elections rigged and his own stooges put into power in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania etc
No he didn't. In fact even bourgeois sources acknowledge that in Czechoslovakia the Communists enjoyed genuine popularity. It was because of this that the events of February 1948 occurred, wherein the bourgeois parties tried to expel the KSČ from the government and the KSČ replied by arming workers and rebuffing such an attempt.
Quote:
But again, its the revisionist fault. Always the revisionists fault without realising they are a product of the Stalinist regime.
It was the revisionists who attacked Stalin in literally every field, who declared that Yugoslavia was a socialist country, who restored capitalism and who transformed the USSR into a social-imperialist state.