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It's not about whether Portugal, Ireland or Greece leaving the Euro would look 'impressive' (I ssume you mean making an apocalyptically negative impression) - no matter how small they are, the inability of the Eurozone to keep them on board would be evident. It would look 'very bad'. Spain or Italy leaving would be I'd say definitely 'apocalyptic' (ie, worse than 'very bad') for the Euro. But the relative size of these economies isn't the point. The point I was making was that these five economies are those that appear at most risk of an exit. What I don't understand is why you think the Netherlands is in any such danger; or, convversely, what the relevance of the potential for Eurozone failure has to do with the situation in the Netherlands in particular that isn't also applicable to France, Italy, Germany, Belgium (a country that is still functioning even though it was without a government for 14 months), etc.
Well, my point is that the Eurozone is indeed disintegrating. The probability of a general crisis in the Netherlands seems to me related to the rhythm of such disintegration. For what I have read, the Dutch economy is probably the weakest of those that aren't usually mentioned as focal points of crisis (all of them, naturally, clearly situated in the periphery).
Luís Henrique
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It will depend on the rhythm of the disintegration of the Eurozone, I think.
Luís Henrique
I can agree with that but of all countries within the core the Netherlands is one of the least likely to erupt into open social war, it has a relatively small surplus proletariat (as opposed to, say, France or the UK), it has a very large managerial stratum and petit-bourgeoisie together with mostly white collar workers employed in the FIRE sector (Finance, Insurance, Real-estate) or technical research. The Dutch economy would suffer severe blows upon the disintegration of the Eurozone and social unrest would be (and I think will be) inevitable, but the forms in which this will manifest will be far from revolutionary, especially at first. It will most likely initially take the form of voter discontent and a rampant rise of both left-wing and right-wing national-populism (currently represented by the PVV and SP) which will soon prove themselves (something the PVV has already burned its hands at) equally inept at managing capital's crisis, which would likely lead to a proliferation of various 'indiganados'-like "burgerinitiatieven" (civil initiatives) of a very petit-bourgeois signature (ie. against financial capital, for the REAL economy; tax the bankers, save THE PEOPLE; calls for dissolving the eurozone in favor of an economic union of 'healthy northern countries') together with an increasingly loud conservative "law & order sentiment".
Ofcourse revolutionary tasseography hasn't gotten us anywhere ever but the situation here will completely depend on the emergence and proliferation of revolutionary currents elsewhere in the Eurozone. That is not to say there will not be moments and situations where the historical communist tendency will not rear its head, as in proletarians looting stores, occupying buildings, etc.