Materialist Dialectics

Trivas:

I am far from sure you know the difference between these.

Anyway, as George Novack said:

"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), The Origins Of Materialism, p.17. Bold emphasis added.]

Which makes your 'axiom' eminently idealist.

Mike:

1) Who is 'they' here?

2) And this cannot work:

This is far too vague. "Anything observed that depends on something else observed"? What items of observation does that rule out? If an astronomer looks through her telescope, and judges the distance between two distant (observed) stars as 10 light years, is this one of these 'qualities'?

If so, the relational properties of bodies (such as size, distance, hardness, velocity, etc.) must be included as 'qualities' too. And if that is so, countless things can change 'qualitatively' with no addition of matter or energy.

For example, take three animals in a row: a mouse, a cat and a horse. In relation to the mouse the cat is large, but in relation to the horse it is small. Change in 'quality' with no change in quantity.

And your characterisation (you can't call it a definition since it picks out far too many things you will want to exclude) of 'quality' will adversely affect the examples you gave earlier.

For instance, warm water can often become hot water slowly (and we can count the two states as part of the "anything observed that depends on something else observed"), when heat is added. No sudden change of 'quality' here. There are countless other examples:

These include the following: melting or solidifying plastic, metal, rock, sulphur, tar, toffee, sugar, chocolate, wax, butter, cheese, and glass. As these are heated or cooled, they gradually change (from liquid to solid, or vice versa). There isn't even a "nodal point" with respect to balding heads! In fact, it is difficult to think of many state of matter transformations (from solid to liquid (or vice versa)) that exhibit just such "nodal points" -- and these include the transition from ice to water (and arguably also the condensation of steam). Even the albumen of fried or boiled eggs changes slowly (but non-"nodally") from clear to opaque white while they are being cooked.

Moreover, a slow vehicle can speed up gradually until it is travelling quickly; light can change form bright to dull slowly; sound can change from loud to quiet slowly, and so on.

That is why Hegel opted for Aristotle's understanding of 'quality' (quoted earlier); it gave him what he thought was a water-tight definition -- which he then proceeded to forget, since it does not apply to his example of boiling or freezing water.

Hence, there is no definition' of 'quality' that will work in all cases. So, this can't be a 'law'.

But, if there are many things in nature an society that do not change suddenly, then Engels's 'law' cannot safely be applied to social revolution, since, for all we know, some of these could be examples of gradual change.

Yes, we know that, but Engels got it all wrong (or, rather, his 'law' was so vaguely worded, it is impossible to determine what he in fact meant), as I have shown.

But, the second 'law' (the interpenetration of opposites), if true, would make all change impossible:

Quotes:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...0&postcount=76

Argument:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...1&postcount=77

And we are still waiting for a clear defintion of a 'dialectical node'...

As predicted, deafening silence...

People such as Engels or his present-day followers who speak of a "transformation of quantity into quality."

What are you asking me for? I never wrote about the size of a mouse and horse. You have to wait until someone says they have noticed a qualitative change taking place in something, and then challenge them to elaborate about why they consider it a qualitative change. You can't ask me in advance, in the case of a certain object, what its quality is. It could be anything that a writer is thinking about. Each writer gets to decide what to call the quality in their own paragraph where they report that they have noticed a qualitative change.

Whoever said that a statement about something has to to be true for other things? A person can't make a statement about how water behaves because you will object that plastic doesn't behave the same way? Since when can't a person can't make a point about one particular thing?

I suggest you go to whomever used that term and ask them. No one here used it.

Mike:

The point is that your 'definition' of 'quality' allows the mouse-cat-horse example to count as a change in 'quality' where there is no change in quantity.

And, your claim that anyone can make their own mind up what 'quality' means makes my point for me, since this 'theory' is so vague, anyone can proceed as they see fit, turning an allegedly 'objective law' into a subjective word game.

In genuine science this would not be tolerated for one second. Can you imagine what would happen if, say, an undergraduate interpreted rest mass to be the same as inertial mass, and then tried to justify it along the lines you tried? He/she would fail their first year exams, even if they got that far.

But, in the Mickey Mouse 'science' of dialectics, this is all OK.

Once more, you miss the point. If this 'law' fails to apply to a whole range of objects and processes, then it can't be a law to begin with.

Once more, if we found that for most objects, the rate of change of momentum was not proportional to the impressed force, we'd stop calling Newton's Second Law a law. And then, we certainly could not use it to make inferences.

In that case, you can't use it (as you try to) to infer that social revolutions must all be sudden, since some of them might be exceptions to this 'law' too. So, for all we know, social change like this might be like melting metal not boiling water.

But, as I also noted above, the normal canons of scientific inquiry do not apply to this mystical theory, do they?

Hegel, Engels, Lenin and a host of other dialecticians used it (and the word 'leap') regularly.

But, if you do not like 'node', then what is your definition of 'sudden'? How long is one of these 'suddens'?

Deafening silence...

What axiom is that?

You are still confused. Materialist philosophy doesn't proceed from dialectics, if that's what you mean to say.

Trivas:

This one:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...22&postcount=9

I can take advanced lessons in confusion from you, since these weren't my words, but George Novack's (a leading US dialectician), as should be clear from the reference I gave.

And you missed his point, too.

Offhand I would say that the quantitative difference that makes one living species different from another is the way that a pattern of A,T,G and C bases gives arrangement to merely twenty amino acids into a huge number of possible combinations, which some people like to compare to the way that a small alphabet can be combined to form a complex language. But it doesn't have to be that. It could be anything that a person has in mind when they say something like, "Here we see an aspect that is merely a matter of number, but over there we see things that are fundamentally different."

Mike:

Well, I think you miss the point, so to illustrate the problems your 'definition' presents you with, let's change the example slightly: consider three cubes of iron in a row (all cast from the same batch). Cube A is one unit cubed (cm or inch -- take your pick); cube B is 125 units cubed, and cube C is 729 units cubed.

In relation to A, B is large, but at the same time in relation to C, B is small. Here we have a change in 'quality' with no change in quantity.

No base units here to muddy the waters...

[However, just like Christians and their Book of Genesis, it always amazes me the contortions dialecticians will put themselves through to save their theory -- and one that has not served them at all well for 150 years.]

But, to take your example: consider amino acid combination B (in the cat): the body in which amino combination B is situated is large compared to the body in which amino acid combination A is situated (in the mouse) but small in comparison with the body in which amino acid combination C is situated (in the horse).

So, the same amino acid combination B produces a body that is big in comparison with that produced by A, and small in comparison with that produced by C. Hence, here we have a change in 'quality' to the same amino acid combination B with no change in quantity to the same amino acid combination B.

QED.

[And this change in 'quality' is not the least bit 'sudden', either.]

And that is why you need Aristotle's definition of 'quality' (seriously defective though it is).

To say something is "qualitatively different" has to do with speaking about categories when communicating. The idea of using categories has to be vague until someone makes a choice. Is this flowering tree in the same category as that coniferous tree? You may reply, "What, do you mean regarding the type of seeds? No, they're if different categories." Then I may say, "no, I mean animal versus plant." Then you may say, "Oh, yes, they're in the same category." Can we teach people about nature without ever lumping things into categories? We couldn't do it. When I say the phrase "the practice of classifying things", is the rule about of where to draw the line left vague? Yes, extremely vague. Could we do without it? Not for a minute.

Who said 'objective law'? Are you answering me, or are you answering some book you once read?

It's what people in science talk about all the time, but with the specific example deleted, and only the pattern remaining, so that the pattern applies to many examples. Say the example is: a little change in a diode voltage will suddenly produce the effect called breakdown. Or, just a little bit more gas and this red giant star would have become a supernova. Or your water phase example: A little change in the temperature of the water will produce a sudden phase change. Now delete the example itself, and say what the general pattern of the sentence was: Sometimes the change in a variable may be merely a matter of degree (quantitative), but then some result that depends on it may become categorically (qualitatively) different. When I put it that way you think the statement is unscientific. Maybe you're just not accustomed to recognizing the general form of a problem when the problem itself has been deleted.

In that example, I don't see where someone says that one thing changes quantitatively which causes another thing to change qualitatively.

Besides, there's a difference between performing science and discussing the philosophy of science. In an essay about the philosophy of science, which is what Engels tried to write with 'The Dialectics of Nature', that's not where we expect to find rigorous derivations. We expect generalizations like "it's interesting that nature often does this."

"Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny."

"Nature abhors a vacuum."

"Entities should not be multiplied needlessly."

See how vague?

Mike:

Well, I note that you have now changed your 'definition' from earlier, which was:

This latest version of your is a little closer to Aristotle's definition, so you are on slightly firmer ground.

But, even your own examples violate Engels's embattled 'law', for you admit that the same objects can change in 'quality' when there is no change in quantity -- just by categorising them differently.

In addition, your new 'definition' is eminently subjective.

Here is Engels:

Presumably these 'laws' are not subjective; if so, they must be objective.

Now, you may or may not believe these 'laws' are objective; but if the aren't, then how can they be 'laws' to begin with?

Anyway, we already know they can't be 'laws' since they are abrogated more times than they are obeyed.

Ah, but things like 'volt' and 'diode' have clear meanings in science; none of the terms used in dialectics is at all clear, and that is the point.

If a first year undergraduate (let alone a research scientist) were to turn in an essay with such sloppy reasoning, ill-defined terms and dearth of supporting evidence, he/she'd be failed.

In the philosophy of science, things are even stricter. Check out the papers published here, and try to find as many key terms that are as vague, imprecise and ill-defined as they are in dialectics:

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/view/subjects/

But, when we examine his examples, it turns out that nature does not do 'this'.

Water, for example, does not change in 'quality' when boiled, since it remains H20.

And not all things change in 'quality' suddenly -- I gave many examples earlier.

So, whichever way we look, this 'law' is about as defective as it can be.

The first two can and have been given precise formulations; this is not so with dialectics. Whatever is done to it, it remains either too vague to do anything with, or just plain wrong.

And the third example here is not from science, but from medieval philosophy.

The difference between large and small is quantitative. Your examples you didn't mention any qualitative diifferences.

You seem to be finding fault with a point that Engels tried to make, where he refered to the "quality" of something, by trying to insert Aristotle's use of the word "quality." You can't do that. When Engels makes a point, the words means only by what he means by those words.

Mike:

But that is why you need Aristotle and Hegel's definition of 'quality', since, as I pointed out to you earlier, without it the relational properties of bodies will count as 'qualities'.

Now, 'bigger' and 'smaller' can certainly be quantitative, but not necessarily. They are also qualitative. The problem is, that your use of 'quality' is so vague, there is no definitive answer to this quandary -- in that case, you need Aristotle's definition. It's not a good definition, but it is at least (slightly) defensible.

Anyway, the point is that the qualitative relation between these lumps of metal varies as we concentrate on any given two of them, but with no change in quantity, since all three stay the same all the way through.

But, if you do not like 'bigger', consider tall. That is just as 'qualitative' as 'bald' or 'liquid'.

So, a tall (three year old) child is not a tall human being (in fact, a tall three year old is invariably a small human being). Here we have qualitative change with no addition or subtraction of matter or energy.

1) Engels in fact used Hegel's theory here, and Hegel explicitly borrowed from Aristotle (there is no wiggle room on that one).

2) It's not my say-so, the Marxist Internet archive (an several dialectical materialist textbooks -- I can give you the list if you want) uses it -- reference in an earlier post.

3) Without this definition, your 'theory' is even more hopelessly vague, as we have seen. You have even had to alter your off-the-cuff 'definition' of 'quality' at least twice since this thread began!

I note also the fact that you have ignored the countless processes in nature and society where 'qualitative' change is not 'sudden', but smooth and gradual.

No worries, Engels and every other DM-fan ignore them too, just like those Christians who ignore pain and suffering, but still tell us that 'god' is good, or those who ignore evidence of dysteleology (lack of design) in nature, but still tell us it is designed.

Heads back in the sand, eh, comrades...

For the benefit of new readers, a comment on what this thread is about.

There are some people who think that something never changes in a basic way when magnitudes have changed. Those who believe in laissez faire capitalism believe that the right to private property is absolute, all magnitudes of private property are in one category, all types of using private property are identical actions, all types of taking away someone's property are identical acts.

They often tell the socialist something like, "Your have freedom and you may wear pants. Would you want someone to steal your pants? Of course not. Likewise, it would be morally wrong for society to take possession of the factories, mines and railroads away from the capitalists. To steal their their personal belongings would be to abolish freedom."

Another thing they often say to a poverty-stricken person is, "You have ten dollars in a bank account. Therefore you are a capitalist."

They say that, if a corporation owns a thousand newspapers, that's identical to your freedom of expression when you write a letter.

They deny that wage slavery is a possibility. They say that, as long as no one is holding a gun to your head, and it's legal for you to quit your job, the worker has complete freedom.

When they say these things, they are denying the fact the magnitudes of things can make all the difference when determining what things are.

Realizing that some people are unable to realize (or to admit) that magnitudes can change what things are, and desiring to expose their fallacy, Engels decided in the 1880s to do some writing that listed examples in many fields of knowledge where the magnitudes of things put them into different categories, and examples where the magnitudes of causes of things put their effects into different categories. Engels listed examples from astronomy, geology, and various other fields. He called this concept "transformation of quantity into quality."

Perhaps if the reader can just be persuaded that it's possible in some cases for a quantitative differences to bring about a qualitative difference, the reader may then go on to admit that this could also be the case when talking about private property, freedom, and other social issues.

What I'm saying in this thread is that Engels had a point. His point isn't sufficiently developed to call it a scientific law. It's just an anecdotal observation. It's not expressed in a form that would be directly applicable to the task of distinguishing unambiguously between any true proposition and a false proposition. It's just a kind of analogous point based on a collection of anecdotes. Still, I think Engels had a point.

What Rosa is doing is focusing on here is the fact that it's vague and not given in a scientific form. In chapter 2 of his book 'The Dialectics of Nature', Engels said "THE LAW OF the tranformation of qualtity into quality" [my emphasis]. That promise -- to express his thesis in the directly applicable form that scientists call a "law" -- Engels failed to fulfill.

So in my conversation with Rosa we have a "glass half-empty or half-full" situation. I give Engel credit for making a useful observation, although his way of expressing it is garbled, his unfinished manuscripts is not much more than his notebook of anecdotes, and he exaggerates the "scientific" character of his project. I think he has a good point somewhere in there. Rosa doesn't give him that much credit.

IMO Engels wants to flesh out the implications of the dialectical method; w/ Marx's approval I may add, as he edited Dialectics of Nature. It is simply testament to the dialectical method that is vague, suggestive, and often juxtaposes different levels of abstraction. It is mental temperment, as much as anything.

Mike, I'll respond later -- I have to go out!

Mike:

You put this in a misleading way, since you omit those among us who accept that significant changes takes place when more matter/energy is added to or subtracted from a system -- we just refuse to say that all such changes occur this way (for example, some are the result of ordering changes, or typological changes, etc. to a system, and where no new matter or energy is added).

And he was premature in this since we now know that many things do not change in the way he said. This is not to give ground to idealism, for the sort of changes I list are no less material.

Now, only a dogmatist will cling on to a defective theory after it has been shown to be such -- but dialecticians are dogmatists, so this is no surprise.

1) Engels certainly thought it was a 'law', and applied to everything in the universe. But the 'evidence' he offered in support of it was laughably thin. Even a rather poor first year undergraduate would be ashamed of it.

2) This 'law' is not even remotely true, so it is not even 'anecdotally' true. There are more processes in reality that break this 'law' than 'obey' it (even if we could figure out what Engels was trying to say -- his formulation of it is hopelessly vague).

In that case, you can't extrapolate this non-'law' into new areas (such as using it to try to analyse future social change, as you have done), any more than you can use, say, Phlogiston theory to predict the behaviour of certain chemicals.

But, it is not possible to say what this 'good point' actually is. Certainly you haven't been able to.

After 130 years of dialecticians trying to find this 'good point', and failing miserably, I think we can safely say that there are about as many 'good points' here as there are teeth in a duck's mouth.