concerns about transhumanism

You aren't getting the point, I think. All of this you say is from an outsiders perspective. If you kill yourself, you will kill yourself. You will not live on even if there's another perfect copy of yourself that will.

Functionally, there's no difference between going to sleep and waking up the next morning than having one's mind copied and the original destroyed at the same time. The copy will have all the memories, experiences and personality of the original, and to all intents and purposes will be the same person.

Unless of course, you don't destroy the original. Then you will end up with two very similar people, getting more and more different all the time as they have differing experiences.

Scenario 3:
We destroyed my original mind/body. We have created a mind that is completely alike. But, just like how I would not of been in control of both minds in scenario 2, I would not be in control of this copy either. Of course, the rest of the world would have no way of knowing.

And neither would "you" as all "you" would remember is being copied. There is a continuity of consciousness. There is no special "you" that is somehow mysteriously attatched to your previous biological body, so therefore the copy is "you" as it is a continuation of the original consciousness.

And neither would "you" as all "you" would remember is being copied. There is a continuity of consciousness. There is no special "you" that is somehow mysteriously attatched to your previous biological body, so therefore the copy is "you" as it is a continuation of the original consciousness.

i disagree if i am to be copied and i would wake up after that is done then i would still find myself in my current body and not in the new body.
i dont want a copy i want to be the one in that new body !

i disagree if i am to be copied and i would wake up after that is done then i would still find myself in my current body and not in the new body.
i dont want a copy i want to be the one in that new body !

Then destroy the original at the same time you copy it. That's simply a faster version of what happens naturally - very few of the cells in your body are the same cell you had when you were say, 10 or 20 years younger. Allow me to illustrate it in simple terms:

:

Version 1 (destructive copy):

Original you -> Destructive copying of your consciousness -> New you.

The above is a "continual consciousness" in that at no point do the things that make you "you" (memories, personality etc) exist more than once at the same time. Slowly replacing braincells with cybernetic components is simply a slower version of the above.

:

Version 2 (non-destructive copy)

Original you -> Non-destructive copying of your consciousness -> You Mk2
                                                   |
                                                   |---> Original You

In the above, there is still the original "you", but there is now a copy of you that will start being more and more different from you the longer the copy exists, as it will be having different experiences from you. Both are seperate but very similar (at least at the start) individuals.

Then destroy the original at the same time you copy it. That's simply a faster version of what happens naturally - very few of the cells in your body are the same cell you had when you were say, 10 or 20 years younger. Allow me to illustrate it in simple terms:

No, you will always be the "original person" and people actually have the same neurons in their brain as when they were 20 years younger.

What you call "destructive copying of the consciousness" would kill you. The method would not transfer your consciousness. It would merely create a copy and the copy is another person who cannot be controlled by you. The copy would simply be an excellent impostor and in the perception of other people indistinguishable from the original person.

No, you will always be the "original person" and people actually have the same neurons in their brain as when they were 20 years younger.

What you call "destructive copying of the consciousness" would kill you. The method would not transfer your consciousness. It would merely create a copy and the copy is another person who cannot be controlled by you. The copy would simply be an excellent impostor and in the perception of other people indistinguishable from the original person.

So if the copy has your exact same memories, experiences, and personality, everything that makes you "you", how is the copy not you if there is a continuous line between the copy and you?

You may have the same neurons, but you aren't the same person you were twenty years ago - the two different versions of "you" seperated by two decades have different experiences and most likely different personalities.

So if the copy has your exact same memories, experiences, and personality, everything that makes you "you", how is the copy not you if there is a continuous line between the copy and you?

Because from my perspective I simply go to the copying machine and die there. How would it benefit me that the copy continues to live?

If the original person is copied and then killed less than one millisecond later he is totally dead. From the point of view of other people only there would be a "continuous line". However, the mind of the clone would always be distinct from my mind.

You may have the same neurons, but you aren't the same person you were twenty years ago - the two different versions of "you" seperated by two decades have different experiences and most likely different personalities.

I am the same person. I have aged and acquired new memories but I am certainly the same individual.

Because from my perspective I simply go to the copying machine and die there. How would it benefit me that the copy continues to live?

What experiences "your" perspective? "You" do, that's who. Everything that makes you "you" will be transferred onto the copy. Your copy is "you" in the exact same way the "you" five minutes ago is the same "you" now.

If the original person is copied and then killed less than one millisecond later he is totally dead. From the point of view of other people only there would be a "continuous line". However, the mind of the clone would always be distinct from my mind.

Why? the copy has the exact same experiences, personality, everything that makes you "you". There isn't something unique or special about your body or the patterns in your brain that form your mind that cannot be reproduced down to the atomic level.

I am the same person. I have aged and acquired new memories but I am certainly the same individual.

The only reason you're considered by yourself and others to be the same person is because of mental and bodily continuity, which is a social construct - if you had an accident, lost a limb or two and went into a coma and emerged from it with total amnesia and a different personality, would you be the same individual?

Others might consider you as an individual completely unique to the one before the coma, whereas others might also consider you the same individual but "changed" because this new personality is inhabiting the same body.

I think it might help if we establish just what constitutes a single individual. Is it mental continuity? Bodily continuity? Both? Neither?

Quote:
If the original person is copied and then killed less than one millisecond later he is totally dead. From the point of view of other people only there would be a "continuous line". However, the mind of the clone would always be distinct from my mind.
Why? the copy has the exact same experiences, personality, everything that makes you "you". There isn't something unique or special about your body or the patterns in your brain that form your mind that cannot be reproduced down to the atomic level.

Noxion if you still dont understand what unicorn and me are trying to say i dont think you will ever get it.

we believe that even if we have a perfect copy we would remain the same person we are today and the copy would just live a life that we do not control.
we do not want a copy we want to be the transhuman and if we would do one of those destructive copying we would actually commit suicide instead of becoming the new guy.

we believe that even if we have a perfect copy we would remain the same person we are today and the copy would just live a life that we do not control.

Why do you believe that? Is there some kind of pattern unique to "you" that cannot be replicated in any fashion? If so, why not?

we do not want a copy we want to be the transhuman and if we would do one of those destructive copying we would actually commit suicide instead of becoming the new guy.

The copy would be you. It will have your memories, your experiences, your personality, everything that makes you what you are.

Unless of course, you can prove the existance of a non-material "soul" that cannot be copied by any physical process.

yes i believe that part of my being that is considering what to type right now can not possibly control 2 body's.

and if i had a perfect copy i would look at that handsome guy and know that what i am thinking is not the same what he is thinking and i definitely am not in control of him.
because of that he is not me but someone else.
it has nothing to do with the mythical soul or whatever you are trying to get unicorn and me to say as the reason we have a problem with your xerox aproach.

yes i believe that part of my being that is considering what to type right now can not possibly control 2 body's.

There is only ever one body in existance at any one time.

and if i had a perfect copy i would look at that handsome guy and know that what i am thinking is not the same what he is thinking and i definitely am not in control of him.
because of that he is not me but someone else.
it has nothing to do with the mythical soul or whatever you are trying to get unicorn and me to say as the reason we have a problem with your xerox aproach.

I believe I have pinned down the essential problem. You think I am proposing a situation whereby you are copied without the original being destroyed. In that case, yes, the copy would be another individual as from the moment it starts experiencing things it becomes a different person by virtue of having differing experiences from yours.

But if the original was not extant at the time when the copy was made, then the copy would still be you, as there is only ever one "you" in existance, and that single copy has everything that the original has.

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Let's have a little thought experiment. Suppose there was a service available that offered to store your mind-state and genetic code so that in the case of an accidental death, your mind-state could be downloaded into a freshly made blank clone of your body. Every month or so, you would go to an upload centre to "update" your saved mind-state with your new memories and experiences.

Would you go for this service, assuming it was easily affordable? (perhaps it's offered as part of a national health service...) If not, why not?

I believe I have pinned down the essential problem. You think I am proposing a situation whereby you are copied without the original being destroyed. In that case, yes, the copy would be another individual as from the moment it starts experiencing things it becomes a different person by virtue of having differing experiences from yours.

But if the original was not extant at the time when the copy was made, then the copy would still be you, as there is only ever one "you" in existance, and that single copy has everything that the original has.

No, the essence of my personhood is the continuity of my thinking and mind. If I go to the copying machine and my mind is destroyed there I am dead. I would die going through the normal stages of clinical death.

It's irrelevant to me that the copy continues to live. To other people the copy is as good as the original but that does not help the dead guy. You are confusing other people's perspective with my subjective perspective.

No, the essence of my personhood is the continuity of my thinking and mind.

So if I were to knock you out, you wouldn't be the same person when you came round? If you were to go into a coma, would you be a different person if you came round, even if you retained your memories and personality? How is going into a coma different from being copied in such a fashion?

If I go to the copying machine and my mind is destroyed there I am dead. I would die going through the normal stages of clinical death.

And the copying machine would bring you back to life by producing an exact copy of you before you died.

Tell me, do you worry that the software you bought wasn't "real" simply because it has been pressed onto CDs millions of times? When you load a saved game, is it not the exact same game you played earlier?

It's irrelevant to me that the copy continues to live. To other people the copy is as good as the original but that does not help the dead guy. You are confusing other people's perspective with my subjective perspective.

And your "subjective perpective" is produced by a particular arrangement of matter and energy, both of which can be duplicated, thus duplicating your perspective. This is basic materialism! There is no special, unique "you" floating ethereally around, mysteriously attached to one particular organic body.

So if I were to knock you out, you wouldn't be the same person when you came round? If you were to go into a coma, would you be a different person if you came round, even if you retained your memories and personality? How is going into a coma different from being copied in such a fashion?

In coma the functions of brain are suspended but the brain itself is not destroyed and the person can be revived. In your copying scenario my brain would be destroyed.

And the copying machine would bring you back to life by producing an exact copy of you before you died.

Tell me, do you worry that the software you bought wasn't "real" simply because it has been pressed onto CDs millions of times? When you load a saved game, is it not the exact same game you played earlier?

Software is immaterial, humans are material beings.

I have a Che Guevara poster which is a material object. Imagine that I copied it 100% accurately and destroyed the original. The copy would be a different object from the original. In the case of humans copying and destroying the original would mean the death of the original guy.

The logical conclusion of your views is that as the functions of the human brain can be theoretically perfectly replicated digitally human minds could be copied to hard disks and people could continue to "live" eternally in a virtual reality created by a supercomputer. It is irrelevant whether the copied mind would be planted to a computer or any biological platform, for example a human body. For me it would be absurd to think that the copy continues to live my life.

In coma the functions of brain are suspended but the brain itself is not destroyed and the person can be revived. In your copying scenario my brain would be destroyed.

And in the case of copying, the functioning would be continued in a different brain or in a digital environment. Function is what is important, not substrate. The "function" of your mind is not unique to your brain - your mind is merely an electrochemical process in your brain, the function of which can be duplicated in a suitably analogous process.

Software is immaterial, humans are material beings.

Software is material - it is a series of on/off binary switches on a hard disk or CD, expressed and translated by the rest of the computer and the monitor.

Now consider, software = mind, Compact Disk = traditional organic brain, hard disk = cybernetic brain. You can transfer the software (brain) from it's original substrate, the CD/organic brain, to the hard disk/cybernetic brain.

I have a Che Guevara poster which is a material object. Imagine that I copied it 100% accurately and destroyed the original. The copy would be a different object from the original.

In what way?

In the case of humans copying and destroying the original would mean the death of the original guy.

No, it would mean destruction of the original body. The mind-state of the person at the time of death would be preserved in order to place it inside a biological or cybernetic substrate. Mind is a process, and it is irrelevant whether that process occurs in an organic brain or or a cybernetic one.

OK, so what if instead of doing it all at once, the cells in your brain were slowly replaced one at a time by a cybernetic counterpart with all the functions of the original? At what point does is the divide between the completely organic being at the start of the process and the completely cybernetic one at the end of it?

The logical conclusion of your views is that as the functions of the human brain can be theoretically perfectly replicated digitally human minds could be copied to hard disks and people could continue to "live" eternally in a virtual reality created by a supercomputer. It is irrelevant whether the copied mind would be planted to a computer or any biological platform, for example a human body. For me it would be absurd to think that the copy continues to live my life.

Why? the copy has everything that makes you what you are, and most likely won't exist at the same time as you, therefore not constituting two entities but one entity that goes through a series of rapid changes.