The most qualified to take over after Stalin

Since we all oppose Nikita the revisionist:

Who in your opinion,was the man who could take up the leading position in the USSR after the death of Stalin?

At a first look,a simple question,you just choose the "best" of the many people arround Stalin.


However,if we take a closer look,we can see that it was a complicated story for itself.

Many key Soviet politicians had their enemies,and many of them had a great influence,they were all in various positions and certianly held a lot of power,however,the question remains: who would have been a good leader?

{note:i would like to see opinions on Beria,Zhdanov,Molotov,Kaganovich)

Hard choice, but I'd say Georgij Malenkov (even if many might disagree; he did have his faults). I thought he was decent as Premier of the Soviet Union, and Stalin seemed to trust him before his death. I think if he had a longer and more successful run, things would have turned out better for the Soviet Union. Unlike Khrushchev, he was not a moronic brinkman (infact, Malenkov believed in international nuclear disarmament).

Molotov would have run the Soviet Union well after Stalin's death too. He was a good premier in the 30s and a good first deputy. Though, maybe I am biased because he was a vegetarian (like me) and didn't drink to excess (like me); though Milovan Djilas believed he drank more than Stalin (it is more likely that Molotov was not a teetotaler, but one who avoided getting drunk) Stalin himself was not a great drinker anyway.

Molotov would have run the Soviet Union well after Stalin's death too. He was a good premier in the 30s and a good first deputy. Though, maybe I am biased because he was a vegetarian (like me) and didn't drink to excess (like me); though Milovan Djilas believed he drank more than Stalin (it is more likely that Molotov was not a teetotaler, but one who avoided getting drunk) Stalin himself was not a great drinker anyway.

One of the most important points for measuring the ability of a party leader is their ability to keep their alcohol down and still be able to make compelling arguments about Marxism.

Molotov and Kaganovich were both "Stalinists," although their views weren't the same as those of Hoxha or Mao. Hoxha clearly thought that Molotov was the best man out of the whole Soviet leadership, though.

Mikoyan, because if we are going downhill, let's really go downhill.

Honestly, I really don't know, by that time, the CPSU was considerably bureaucratised, the commitment of it's high ranks to class-struggle was questionable, political apathy striked most of it's membership and many other economic factors that contributed to a bureacratic opportunist line such as Kruschev's to triumph, for example the new dependency to Soviet aid by the people's democracies, during and after their economic reconstruction. For me the growing competition between the Central Committee members that Omsk pointed out is a sympton of all that, of a political competition between cliques (such as Kruschev/Mikoyan vs Molotov/Kaganovich) rather than a real debate of differing political lines, perhaps we could blame Molotov and Kaganonovich for not being able to form a real political opposition.

But if I were a CPSU member at the time, I would have prefered Beria first, then Khaganovich or Molotov. Though there is a lot of hindsight in this.

One of the most important points for measuring the ability of a party leader is their ability to keep their alcohol down and still be able to make compelling arguments about Marxism.

Palingenism at it's best.

Well,Molotov didnt have a positive opinion on Beria,which is noted;


He (Beria) was unprincipled. He was not even a communist. I consider him a parasite on the party.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 339

I regard Beria as an agent of imperialism. Agent does not mean spy. He had to have some support--either in the working class or in imperialism. He had no support among the people, and he enjoyed no prestige. Even had he succeeded in seizing power, he would not have lasted long.
...a big scum.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 340

In "Molotov Remembers".

Molotov in fact,criticized all other "Stalinists".

Did the Mensheviks have more theoreticians?
The Mensheviks were nothing but theoreticians....
Voroshilov was weak as a theoretician. Like Kalinin, he leaned a little to the right.... Twenty years have gone by since Stalin died. And who has remained loyal to Stalin throughout? Kaganovich and myself. I know of no one else.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 228

He criticized all of the major Soviet figures:

Khrushchev was absolutely a reactionary sort of person. He merely hitched himself to the Communist party. He certainly didn't believe in any kind of communism.
Bulganin didn't really represent anything. He never took a firm stand either for or against anything. He drifted along with the wind, wherever it blew.
Beria, to my mind, was not one of us. He crept into the party with ulterior motives. Malenkov was a capable functionary. ...I don't think Malenkov was very interested in issues of theory and problems of communism.
Khrushchev was somewhat interested in these questions, though in a retrograde sense, in order to find out when and how things could be reversed.
...Khrushchev wasn't interested in ideas. He couldn't tell one from the other.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 232-234

Beria was especially criticized by almost all of the other major figures,so i doubt he could have actually made it as the leader of the USSR. [He was not too popular]


What do you comrades think of Zhdanov?I think nobody mentioned him.

Molotov and Kaganovich were both "Stalinists," although their views weren't the same as those of Hoxha or Mao. Hoxha clearly thought that Molotov was the best man out of the whole Soviet leadership, though.

Hoxha was right, indeed.

I do not think Zhdanov would have been a good choice of leader for the SU, he seemed more interested in internal cultural matters rather than the SU's external political matters too.

Zhdanov would be a terrible choice because he was dead in 1953. I think he was a fine Marxist-Leninist, but other than that discussing if he would be a good general-secretary by the time Stalin died is a little too far from reality for me. I mean how would have he acted during the that period is more of speculation than anything else.

When i mentioned Andrei Zhdanov,i thought of the possibility of him taking the position of second in command,(of course,presuming he lived up to 1953) and after Stalins death,his role as the Gen.Sec.

I know its speculation,but i just wanted to know the general opinion on Zhdanov.{As a possible party leading figure}

And,comrade Roach,i know you are pro-Beria,so how do you respond to the big amount of criticism coming from the anti-party members and other "Stalinists"?

When i mentioned Andrei Zhdanov,i thought of the possibility of him taking the position of second in command,(of course,presuming he lived up to 1953) and after Stalins death,his role as the Gen.Sec.

I know its speculation,but i just wanted to know the general opinion on Zhdanov.{As a possible party leading figure}

Actually Zhdanov is the figure whom I view with the most positive light of all in this thread, I like his works on philosophy and I honestly think they were written by a principled Marxist-Leninist, the problem is that they were written on the 30's and it was not much of a matter of individual principles but more of the CPSU a as wholle, the party had serious problems that could have been only resolved with an understanding of the phenomenom of revisionism that they didn't have at the time. Sorry if my first aswer seemed a little un-polite and incomplete.

And,comrade Roach,i know you are pro-Beria,so how do you respond to the big amount of criticism coming from the anti-party members and other "Stalinists"?

I have no idea, I like Alliance ML work on Beria, but to be honest Bill Bland did have some strange opinions on things (like what he wrote about Dimitrov). Enver Hoxha wasn't that sypathetic to Beria too. Also I think Molotov was rather vacillating.

http://ml-review.ca/aml/PAPER/AUGUST...Beria1953.html

http://ml-review.ca/aml/BLAND/DOCTORS_CASE_FINAL.htm

Vyacheslav Molotov was Stalin's closest comrade-in-arms, and held for many years very important positions in the Soviet Union. One might have hoped, therefore, that his memoirs would have contained valuable information on the way in which revisionists managed to wreck socialism in the USSR and clear the way for the restoration of capitalism.

The Assassination of Kirov

The book does, indeed, contain one or two interesting snippets of information hitherto unknown, or little known, outside the highest circles in the former Soviet Union. For example, he tells us:

"Krushchev hinted that Stalin had Kirov killed. A commission was set up in 1956. Tile commission concluded that Stalin was not implicated in Kirov's assassination. Khrushchev refused to have the findings published since they didn't serve his purpose".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): 'Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics'; Chicago; 1993; p. 353).

Revelations -- About the Memoirist
Sadly, however, for the roost part Molotov's memoirs -- like most memoirs -- tell us more about Molotov's own deficiencies than about the events he recalls.

No one could question Molotov's dedication to socialism and the working class. He followed Stalin loyally during the latter's lifetime, but it is clear that once Stalin's guiding hand had been removed, his political acumen was not sufficiently acute to prevent the revisionists who surrounded him from using him as their tool in the critical years from Stalin's death in 1953 to his own expulsion from the CPSU by the revisionists in 1957.

Molotov's Tacit Endorsement of the Attack upon Stalin

Although he defends Stalin in many respects, Molotov admits that he kept silent during Khrushchev's savant attack on Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956:

"Some people holding pretty much the same view blame me. 'Why did you keep silent at the 20th Congress? To keep silent, they say, is tantamount to consent. That's how it turned out. I kept silent and thus consented".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 351).

He gives as his reason for remaining silent that the Party was 'not ready' for a Marxist-Leninist analysis of events and that if he and other Marxist-Leninists had spoken out against Khrushchev's slanders at the congress, they would have been 'expelled from the Party':

"The Party was not ready for such an analysis. We would simply have been kicked out. No one would have supported us. No one". (Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 350).

He tells us that:

“I still hoped that if we remained in the Party we would be able to correct the situation gradually".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 350).

But in fact Molotov was not completely silent during the attacks on Stalin at the 20th Congress. On the contrary, at one of the open sessions of the congress he had no hesitation in

‘condemning 'the cult of the individual"'
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 10; p. 14,748).

which was a clear prelude to the named attack on Stalin which followed at the secret session.

However, long after it had become patently obvious to anyone with even a smattering of Marxist-Leninist understanding that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was dominated by open revisionists who were restoring an essentially capitalist social order in the country, Molotov tells us his main preoccupation in the years following his expulsion was not so much with fighting revisionism as with trying to persuade the revisionist leaders to reinstate him in the Party:

"I send letters to the Central Committee after each congress asking them to consider my application for reinstatement in the Party.
Four times I applied to be reinstated in the Party. I wrote to Brezhnev. I am going to send another application to the 24th Congress".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 284, 356).

Indeed, he goes so far as to agree that he deserved punishment for opposing the revisionists, and merely maintains that expulsion was excessively severe:

"I ought to have been punished, true, but expulsion from the Party . .?"
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 356).

The Case of Israel

The general picture of the development of revisionism in the former Soviet Union is now known, but it would have been useful if Molotov had filled in, from his personal knowledge, details of some of the more controversial episodes in Soviet history -- such as the support given by the Soviet regime to the partition of Palestine and the coup against Lavrenti Beria.

Unfortunately, he largely fails to do perform this task.

A paper read to the Stalin Society earlier this year presented the evidence for the view that it was revisionists in the leadership of the CPSU who, under the leadership of Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Deputy foreign Minister, succeeded in distorting Soviet foreign policy in favour of the partition of Palestine.

Molotov, who held the post of Soviet Foreign Minister at the time, gives a very garbled version of events. He appears to say that the American imperialists were 'opposed' to the formation of the state of Israel, while he and Stalin 'supported' it:

"Q: In the formation of the state of Israel, the Americans were opposed?
A: Everyone objected but us -- me and Stalin".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 65).

But it is clearly nonsense to say that the US imperialists were opposed to the formation of the state of Israel:

"US support of the partition was critical in bringing about passage of the resolution (for the partition of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel -- Ed.) by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly". ('Encyclopedia Americana', Volume 15; Danbury (USA); 1992; p. 533).

However, Molotov goes on to explain that what he and Stalin supported was not, in fact, the formation of a racist Israeli state, but a state of Palestine in which Arabs and Jews shared power:

"We proposed, however, an Arab-Israeli (clearly he means 'Arab-Jewish' ` -- Ed.) union, for both nations (clearly he means 'nationalities' -- Ed.) to live together".
(Albert Resis (}d.): cit.; p. 65).

In other words, Molotov appears to support the view expressed in the Stalin Society paper -- that Stalin supported the formation of a Palestinian state in which Jews and Arabs shared power.

The Case of Beria

In a paper read to the Stalin Society entitled "The 'Doctors' Case' and the Death of Stalin", the evidence was presented for the view that, following the death of Stalin, leading revisionists, headed by Khrushchev, deceived honest members of the leadership into believing that Lavrenti Beria was an agent of imperialism and into participating in a military-style coup against him. The sole reason which Molotov gives for agreeing to participate in the coup was that Khrushchev told him that 'apparently' Beria was 'up to something'!

Molotov's story of these events is almost identical with that of Krushchev

"If you are interested in. . . . the final. Politburo session on Beria, you must bear in mind that some preliminary work had been done before that. In this Khrushchev showed he was an exceptionally energetic and efficient organiser. The initiative was in his hands as he was the Party secretary. He was definitely a good organiser.

He summoned me to the Central Committee building, and l came over.
'I'd like to talk to you about Beria., He can't be trusted".
I said: 'I fully support this idea. He must be removed and expelled from the ‘Politburo'.

Immediately before the session we agreed that expelling Beria from the Politburo would not be enough. He had to be placed under arrest. Two days later we all gathered in session.
Khruschev was the organiser of the entire affair. Why? . Apparently he had been informed that Beria was up to something. And Beria had troops under his command.
He was arrested at the Politburo session. We were all friends. . . .

I was one of the first to speak. I said that Beria was a degenerate, . . . and that he was no communist.

Then Beria took the floor to defend himself.
Beria had arrived at the session totally unaware of what lay in store for him. .

The room was securely guarded, but sitting in Poskrebyshev's room, which adjoined the meeting room, was a group of military officers, headed by Zhukov. The group was waiting to be called in to arrest Beria.
Malenkov pressed the button. That was the signal. The group of officers led by Zhukov entered the room.
Malenkov says: 'Arrest Beria'.

Q: Was that a complete surprise for Beria?
A: Exactly . . .

'I fell into a trap", he cried. He didn't expect that from Khrushchev.
Moskalenko was also involved. Khrushchev had him promoted to marshal.
Moskalenko was put in charge of the jail where Beria was kept".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 343, 344, 345, 346).

While the official indictment against Beria was that he was a

". . . hireling of foreign imperialist forces",
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 9; p.13,029).

Molotov insists that Beria was not an agent of imperialism in this sense:

"Q: To this day, people still argue whether Beria had been an agent of some foreign intelligence service.
A: I don't think he was". .
(Albert Resis (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 339).

He charges Beria only with being 'an agent of imperialism' in that in 1953 he supported within the leadership a policy which objectively assisted imperialism:

"He played the role of an agent of imperialism, that's the point.
I regard Beria as an agent of imperialism. Agent does not mean spy". (Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 340).

Many years later Molotov still declares that he has 'no regrets' about participating in the coup and praises Khrushchev for organising it!:

"I consented' (to take part in the coup against Beria -- Ed.). I have no regrets about it now. On the contrary, I believed, and I continue to believe, that this was to Khrushchev's great credit. That's my opinion".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid,l; p. 345).

Molotov reveals that the charge of 'serving imperialism' levelled against Beria was concerned with the policy which the Soviet government should adopt towards the building of socialism in occupied East Germany. The Marxist -Leninist position on 'the export of socialism' was put by Stalin in his interview with American newspaper magnate Roy Howard in March 1936:

"Howard: May there not be an element of danger in the genuine fear existent in what you term capitalist countries of an intent on the part of the Soviet Union to force its political theories on other countries?
Stalin: There is no justification whatever for such fears. If you think that Soviet people want to change the face of surrounding states, and by forcible means at that, you are entirely mistaken. Of course, Soviet people would like to see the face of surrounding states changed, but that is the business of the surrounding states".
(Josef V. Stalin: Interview between Josef Stalin and Roy Howard (March 1936), in: ''Works' Volume 14; London; 1978; p.136-37).

Stalin therefore maintained that the Soviet government's concern with post-war Germany was limited to the question of preventing future German aggression. In a speech in November 1943 he defined Soviet war aims in this connection as to

" establish such an order in Europe as will completely exclude the possibility of fresh aggression on the part of Germany".
(Josef V. Stalin: Speech at Celebration fleeting of Moscow Soviet (6 November 1943), in: 'War Speeches, Orders of the Day and Answers to Foreign Press Correspondents during the Great Patriotic War: July 3rd 1941 - June 22nd 1945'; London; 1945; p. 82).

As far as can be gathered from Molotov's somewhat garbled account, Beria maintained the position that the Soviet government's only concern with defeated Germany should be to ensure that it was anti-fascist and peaceful, and that the question of the building of socialism in any part of Germany was a matter for the German working people:

"After Stalin's death,. . .. Beria took an active stand on the German question. . . . Beria, who was then becoming particularly active, advanced the following argument: let it (the GDR --Ed.) just be a peaceful country. That is sufficient for our purposes'. . . . . .
Beria kept insisting that . . . . . the most important concern was that Germany must be peaceful"
(Albert Resis (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 333, 334).

However, Molotov relates, other members of the Politburo -- including Khrushchev and Molotov himself, demanded that the Soviet government should move to establish a socialist society in East Germany:

"The Politburo was nearly split on the issue. Khrushchev supported my position. . . Malenkov remained silent, and I knew he would follow Beria, I objected that there could not be a peaceful Germany unless it took the road to socialism". (Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 335, 336)

This was then, according to Molotov, the main issue which provided the pretext for accusing Beria of being an "imperialist agent". If so, it was an issue in which Beria was following Marxist-Leninist principles, while Molotov and Khrushchev were in breach of them!

Molotov's Failure Correctly to Assess Revisionism

Even many years after international revisionism had thrown off its mask, Molotov signally failed to recognise its counter-revolutionary character.

Indeed, despite his general admiration for Stalin, we find him repeating some of the revisionist slanders about him:

"He (Stalin -- Ed.) succumbed to sickly suspiciousness.. . . . In his last years he suffered from impaired judgment.
In his last years Stalin suffered from a persecution mania".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 317, 324).

We find him praising the revisionist Yuri Andropov as a 'godsend':

"Andropov. . . . has introduced a fresh stream of thought and a good direction. . . .
Andropov is a godsend. .
Andropov . . . is firm in politics, a man of broad horizons, a reliable person. . . . He has proved to be quite trustworthy".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 395, 407).

We find him describing the French revisionist Maurice Thorez as

“. . . a very good man -- a Stalinist",
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 82).

and the German revisionist Walter Ulbricht as

“. a dedicated communist, a politically conscious comrade".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 334).

He depicts even Khrushchev as no worse than 'a not especially dedicated communist'

"I don't consider Khrushchev an especially dedicated communist".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 356).

IN 1984, AT THE AGE OF NINETY-FOUR, MOLOTOV ACHIEVED A LONG-HELD AMBITION. HAVING SATISFIED THE REVISIONIST LEADERS OF HIS HARMLESSNESS TO THEIR AIMS, HE WAS READMITTED TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

HE DIED TWO YEARS LATER -- STILL CLINGING TO THE ILLUSION THAT SOCIALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION WAS BASICALLY INTACT AND SECURE, THAT A COMMONWEALTH OF SOCIALIST STATES EXISTED, AND THAT, DESPITE SOME MINOR RIGHTIST DEVIATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION WAS ADVANCING TOWARDS A COMMUNIST SOCIETY:

"Now we have a powerful country and a commonwealth of socialist states.
I think the dreams of counter-revolution will not come true. Our state, like the entire socialist camp, is still the strongest in the world. .
We are undeviatingly moving forward, but more slowly than is desirable.
The line we are pursuing is Leninist, it is socialist, but not enough. .
We are building socialism and moving towards communism because state power and the vanguard of the people rest solidly on the policy pursued by the Party, That's the main thing.
In our country the vanguard is preserved, it is growing it is socialist, communist -- this is the main thing". (Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 381, 409, 413).

http://ml-review.ca/aml/BLAND/Molotov.html

Thank you for providing links.

Another note (some more from Molotov on Beria)

During his [Stalin] last days I had in some sense fallen out of favor.... I had seen Stalin for five weeks before he died. He was absolutely healthy. They called for me when he was taken ill. When I arrived at the dacha some Politburo members were there. Of non-Politburo members, only Mikoyan and myself, as I recall, had been called. Beria was clearly in command.
Stalin was lying on the sofa. His eyes were closed. Now and then he would make an effort to open them and say something, but he couldn't fully regain consciousness. Whenever Stalin tried to say something, Beria ran up to him and kissed his hand.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 236

CHUEV: Was Stalin poisoned?
MOLOTOV: Possibly. But who is there to prove it now?... But all hell broke out the moment he died.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 237

CHUEV: Beria himself was said to have killed him.
MOLOTOV: Why Beria? It could have been done by a security officer or a doctor. As he was dying, there were moments when he regained consciousness. At other times he was writhing in pain. There were various episodes. Sometimes he seemed about to come to. At those moments Beria would stay close to Stalin. Oh! He was always ready...
One cannot exclude the possibility that he had a hand in Stalin's death. Judging by what he said to me and I sensed.... While on the rostrum of the Mausoleum with him on May 1st, 1953, he did drop hints.... Apparently he wanted to evoke my sympathy. He said, "I did him in!"--as if this had benefited me. Of course he wanted to ingratiate himself with me: "I saved all of you!" Khrushchev would scarcely have had a hand in it. He might have been suspicious of what had gone on. Or possibly... All of them had been close by. Malenkov knows more, much more, much more.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 237

There is also something from Alliluyeva, Svetlana {I am just listing this as reading material,nothing else}

Instead of the customary deep silence, everyone was bustling and running around. When someone finally told me that my father had had a stroke in the night and was unconscious, I even felt a little relieved. I had thought he was already dead. They'd found him at three in the morning, in the room I was standing in, right there, lying on a rug by the sofa. They decided to carry him to the next room, to the sofa he usually slept on. That's where he was now. The doctors were in there, too.
...Doctors I didn't know, who were seeing him for the first time--Academician Vinogradov, who'd looked after my father for many years, was now in jail--were making a tremendous fuss, applying leeches to his neck and the back of his head, making cardiograms and taking X-rays of his lungs. A nurse kept giving him injections and a doctor jotted it all down into notebook.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 6

They all felt that something portentous, something almost of majesty, was going on in this room and they conducted themselves accordingly.
There was only one person who was behaving in a way that was very nearly obscene. That was Beria. He was extremely agitated. His face, repulsive enough at the best of times, now was twisted by his passions--by ambition, cruelty, cunning, and a lust for power and more power still. He was trying so hard at this moment of crisis to strike exactly the right balance, to be cunning, yet not too cunning. It was written all over him. He went up to the bed and spent a long time gazing into the dying man's face. From time to time my father opened his eyes but was apparently unconscious or in a state of semiconsciousness. Beria stared fixedly at those clouded eyes, anxious even now to convince my father that he was the most loyal and devoted of them all, as he had always tried with every ounce of his strength to appear to be. Unfortunately, he had succeeded for too long.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 7

During the final minutes, as the end was approaching, Beria suddenly caught sight of me and ordered: "Take Svetlana away!" Those who were standing nearby stared, but no one moved. Afterward he darted into the hallway ahead of anybody else. The silence of the room where everyone was gathered around the deathbed was shattered by the sound of his loud voice, the ring of triumph unconcealed, as he shouted, "Khrustalyov! My car!"
He was a magnificent modern specimen of the artful courtier, the embodiment of Oriental perfidy, flattering, and hypocrisy who had succeeded in confounding even my father, a man whom it was ordinarily difficult to deceive.... But I haven't the slightest doubt that Beria used his cunning to trick my father into many other things and laughed up his sleeve about it afterwards. All the other leaders knew it.
Now all the ugliness inside him came into the open--he couldn't hold back. I was by no means the only one to see it. But they were all terrified of him. They knew that the moment my father died no one in all of Russia would have greater power in his grasp.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 8

...I loved my father more tenderly than I ever had before.... Yet even the grandchildren who never saw him loved him--and love him still.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 9


For the last 12 hours the lack of oxygen was acute. His face altered and became dark. His lips turned black and the features grew unrecognizable. The last hours were nothing but a slow strangulation. The death agony was horrible. He literally choked to death as we watched. At what seemed like the very last moment he suddenly opened his eyes and cast a glance over everyone in the room. It was a terrible glance, insane, or perhaps angry and full of the fear of death and the unfamiliar faces of the doctors bent over him. The glance swept over everyone in a second. Then something incomprehensible and awesome happened that to this day I can't forget and don't understand. He suddenly lifted his left hand as though he were pointing to something above and bringing down a curse on us all.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 10


...The members of the government then rushed for the door.
All of them except the utterly degenerate Beria spent those days in great agitation, trying to help yet at the same time fearful of what the future might bring. Many of them shed genuine tears. I saw Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Bulganin, and Khrushchev in tears.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 11


My father's servants and bodyguards came to say goodbye. They felt genuine grief and emotion. Cooks, chauffeurs, watchmen, gardeners, and the women who had waited on the table, all came quietly in. They went up to the bed silently and wept. They wiped their tears away as children do, with their hands and sleeves and kerchiefs. Many were sobbing. The nurse, who was also in tears, gave them drops of valerian....
Valechka, as she was called, who had been my father's housekeeper for 18 years, came in to say goodbye. She dropped heavily to her knees, put her head on my father's chest and wailed at the top of her voice as the women in villages do. She went on for a long time and nobody tried to stop her.
All these men and women who were servants of my father loved him. In little things he wasn't hard to please. On the contrary, he was courteous, unassuming, and direct with those who waited on him.... Men, women, everyone, started crying all over again. . No one was making a show of loyalty or grief.... He never scolded anyone except the top men, the generals and commandants of his bodyguard. The servants had neither bullying nor harshness to complain of. They often asked him for help, in fact, and no one was ever refused.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 12


...Like everyone who worked for my father she'll [Valechka] be convinced to her dying day that no better man ever walked the earth.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 13


No one in this room looked on him as a God or a Superman, a genius or a demon. They loved and respected him for the most ordinary human qualities, those qualities of which servants are the best judges of all.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 14

Molotov did criticize Nikita,but he also attacked Beria a lot.

MOLOTOV: There was only a thin layer of party leadership in the 1920s, and there were always fissures in this thin layer--now right-wingers, then nationalists, then workers’ opposition.... How Lenin managed to bear this is amazing. Lenin died, but they all lived on, and Stalin had to pass through very tough times. Khrushchev is proof of that. He turned out to be a right-winger, though he was pretending to be for Stalin, for Lenin.... Only when Stalin's power weakened did the conspirator in him surface....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 27

No, Khrushchev wasn't such a dullard. He was culturally deprived.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 187

Khrushchov reminded me of a livestock dealer. A small-time livestock dealer. A man of little culture, certainly. A regular livestock trader, a man who deals in cattle.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 347

Khrushchev? A person like him could have switched sides in a flash.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 272

CHUEV: Then Khrushchev distorted your words?
MOLOTOV: Definitely. He was never dependable. He was a man without scruples. Slapdash. Very primitive.
CHUEV: Kaganovich told me nearly the same story.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 287

...Khrushchev, Mikoyan, rightists, they sat on the Politburo where they pretended to be Stalin's greatest champions.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 317

...But as a matter of fact, Mikoyan is a Rykovist, a rightist, and a Khrushchevite. I see no great difference between Khrushchev and Rykov. And I have never supported Khrushchev.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 319

What Beria proposed would never have come up for discussion in Stalin's time. Stalin made a public statement when the GDR was created, that this was a new stage in the development of Germany, and that there could be no doubts about this. Stalin was the sort of man to sacrifice everything for the sake of socialism. He would never have abandoned the conquest of socialism.
I objected that there could not be a peaceful Germany unless it took the road to socialism. Therefore all talk about a "peaceful Germany" implied a bourgeois Germany, period.
I consider Khrushchev a rightist, and Beria was even further right. We had the evidence. Both of them were rightists. Mikoyan too.
...Being a rightist, Khrushchev was rotten through and through. Beria was even more of a rightist and even more rotten.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 336-337

He (Beria) was unprincipled. He was not even a communist. I consider him a parasite on the party.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 339

I regard Beria as an agent of imperialism. Agent does not mean spy. He had to have some support--either in the working class or in imperialism. He had no support among the people, and he enjoyed no prestige. Even had he succeeded in seizing power, he would not have lasted long.
...a big scum.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 340

He was a good organizer, a good administrator--and a born security operative, of course. But quite without principles.
I had a sharp clash with Beria the first week after Stalin's death. It is quite possible that I was not the one to meet either his or Khrushchev's requirements. Their policies would not have differed greatly.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 341

...he (Beria) was, in any event, a dangerous character.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 343

CHUEV: Beria is called a diehard enemy of Soviet power.
MOLOTOV: I don't know whether he was a diehard or some other kind of enemy, but I do know he was an enemy.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 343

CHUEV: Was Khrushchev adept in matters of theory?
MOLOTOV: No. He was extremely weak in that regard. We were all "practicals," all practitioners. Before the Revolution we read all the books and newspapers, now we read nothing.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 348

The trouble, I say, is that in the present situation it is impossible to offer a definition of socialism. There is no complete clarity on this question. One can only depict distinct stages, fundamental phases.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 349

CHUEV: Why did Khrushchev come out against Stalin so drastically?
MOLOTOV: Because he pursued a different policy. He is a rightist.... The rightist and the Trotskyist extremes come together. The main threat in the 1930s came from the rightists rather than from the Trotskyists. They had close ties with the village. Their social base was the kulak class. That's where Khrushchev had his roots....
Deep down Khrushchev was an enemy of Stalin. On the surface Stalin was the be-all and end-all, but deep down it was another matter.... His bitterness toward Stalin stemmed from the fact that Khrushchev's eldest son got himself shot. Driven by such bitterness, Khrushchev would balk at nothing to besmirch the name Stalin.
CHUEV: Nikita disowned his son, didn’t he?
MOLOTOV: Yes. His son was something of a traitor, which also reflects on Khrushchev. A good political leader with a son like that?...
Stalin didn't want to pardon Khrushchev's son. And Khrushchev personally hated Stalin. Of course, that added to his animosity, but that was not the main thing about him. He was not a revolutionary. He didn't join the party until 1918--some militant! Ordinary workers had joined the party earlier. Some leader of our party he turned out to be! It was absurd, absurd.
Khrushchev opposed Stalin and Leninist policy.... The rightists wanted to block us from pressing for the liquidation of the kulaks; they were champions of a pro-kulak policy.... We saw this in Khrushchev and spoke about it,...
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 351-352

...Initially the three of us were labeled "the antiparty group"--Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov--then they also added Shepilov who had joined us. And after a while they included Bulganin and Voroshilov.
...The "antiparty" group had to be removed, and four of us were expelled.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 355

He [Khrushchev] had no serious interest in ideology.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 356

...Stalin's supporters would hew to the party line, but Khrushchev was always clever enough to adapt to that line. He was quite a capable man. You can't say he had been merely a lucky fellow. He could very well have become a Bukharinite, but he moved in the opposite direction. He sensed it would be more secure that way. Khrushchev in essence was a Bukharinite, but under Stalin he was not a Bukharinite.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 360

Khrushchev was for Soviet power but against the Revolution. This is his distinguishing feature: he was against everything revolutionary.... to him, of course, collectivization--which in our country was carried out by Stalinist methods--was impermissible. Yes, impermissible. But no alternative was proposed.
He is against collectivization. He is without a doubt a Bukharinite.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 362

...He was never seriously interested in or thought about the meaning of Leninism or of Marxism.... Khrushchev wanted to rehabilitate everyone, but everyone.
Khrushchev and Mikoyan posed as arch-Stalinists, but deep down they were not.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 363

He [Khrushchev] was a half-educated man, alien to the party. Alien, absolutely alien. He couldn't stay at the top for long. You see, his former supporters finally got rid of him and had him quietly buried at Novodevichy cemetery. Now they all behave as if they had had nothing to do with him.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 364

You can't say he [Khrushchev] was unintelligent; he was very shrewd.... Since Khrushchev himself was not a communist, how could he judge whether Stalin was a communist?
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 365

Khrushchev knew as much about matters of theory as a shoemaker. He was a real foe of Marxism-Leninism, a real enemy of communist revolution, a covert, cunning, skillfully camouflaged enemy.... The thing is that he reflected the spirit of the overwhelming majority.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 366

...But Khrushchevism is the bourgeois spirit.
I told Khrushchev this straight to his face,... We have very many "Khrushchevs" in our country; indeed, they are the overwhelming majority.... It would have been so easy to kick him out. But we are surrounded by little "Khrushchev's," and they keep mum....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 391


Molotov presented himself as the "most loyal to Stalin"

The Jews did not like Kaganovich. They would rather have had a more intellectual Jew in the Politburo. Even today Kaganovich is such an ardent supporter of Stalin that no one would dare to say anything derogatory about Stalin in his presence. Among all of us he was a 200 percent Stalinist.
He felt I didn't praise Stalin well enough....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 229

As we review these events, it becomes clear that Khrushchev was not, as he represented himself in his 1956 denunciation of Stalin, a moralist horrified by transgressions against a socialist ideal but the leader in a political struggle for power within the Party between the Khrushchev & Molotov groupings, and this conflict had been going at least since Stalin's death. In 1956, therefore, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin, he did so as the leader of an anti--Stalin faction in the Party. The policies of this faction soon appeared. They were those of liberal, anti-socialist "reforms." Molotov, an old Bolshevik who had worked under tsarist terror, had a long record of devotion to the working class and to socialism. He had supported Stalin's plans for socialist industrialization, and had for many years at Party Congresses, along with Kaganovich, made the main reports on this subject. The "everything new" that Molotov opposed were Khrushchev's "reforms."
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 123

"I [Kaganovich] loved Stalin, and he was something worth loving--he was a great Marxist.... We should be proud of him, every Communist should be proud of him.... We have uncrowned Stalin and without realizing it we have uncrowned 30 years of our own work."
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography. New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 317

Any thoughts on all this?

And yes,Molotov was indecisive,and if i remember,he admited that he and Kaganovich didnt do enough to oppose the Anti-Stalin revisionist wing.

Some of those criticisms are highly subjective, mostly dealing with Beria's personality traits rather than his politics, in this list I would include Hoxha's own comments about Beria on The Kruschevites, in which he recalled Beria's ''snake eyes'' through his glasses and described the usual weird traits that said that Beria supposedly had.

About Germany well I have already posted this link: http://ml-review.ca/aml/PAPER/AUGUST...Beria1953.html. I am of opinion that the East Germans pursued an ultra-leftist course of action during those years, that ultimately ended in the 1953 uprising, from which the western imperialist gazed opportunistically, of course this can be debated.

Felix Chuev's interviewed Molotov during the 80s, by that time Molotov had already enough time to reflect about what happened, despite that he still kept making theoretical mistakes, like in the text that I qouted, but back in the days when a swift and quick response was needed, he vacilated. Finnally it all comes down to the fact that the true critique of Soviet revisionism is not written neither by Molotov nor Beria, but by Enver Hoxha.

What are your thoughts on Beria and Zhdanov comrade?

In short=

Zhdanov - A good Marxist-Leninist,its a shame he died because of heart problems.

Beria - I am not too sure about Beria,lets just say i am not too positive about him. (He is still a too controversial figure,even among ML's)

One of the most important points for measuring the ability of a party leader is their ability to keep their alcohol down and still be able to make compelling arguments about Marxism.

Holy shit, crown me the new Glorious Leader.

Zhdanov was indeed a good communist and it is indeed a shame that he died, but I couldn't see him as the leader of the SU if he had lived. He seems more philosophical and concerned with the culture of his country, whereas a good leader should be more international minded.

Molotov would have been the better choice between Beria, Molotov and Kaganovich - discounting Zhdanov for the reason Roach mentioned - and had proven his capability before.

Beria is not the demon people have made him to be. He was imperfect but most of the criticisms about him are, indeed, personal opinions that do not really deal with his abilities.

My favorite is Zhdanov.

Of those alive in 1953, hmm maybe Kaganovich or Molotov. Or Beria, although I am not sure, which "side" he was on.

I would say KIROV. Though I think many have given useful ideas on the subject. Zhdanov did indeed work himself to death/. In a fast changing world, with many fatigued or just plain dead after the war, time for a younger man or indeed woman to move up the ladder. Take stock, take a serious look at parties around the world. Plainly many did not have revolution on the agenda. What of the people? Were they asleep? After the fall of the Reich did they think that 'it had all been done'? What is clear is that fool K was a disaster. His handling of Chinese relations was a low point. Fostered suspicion and doubt. The Chinese were in no mood to be pushed about by any on the planet. They had just stood up. What an 'own goal'. Whoever took over, needed the 'common touch' Stalin had that in spades, he could talk to all in a language that was readily accessible. Albeit an intellect of a high order, there was no hint of aloofness in his demeanour or writings. Nothing about the 'drawing room' or salon. It was said Stalin filled meetings with hand picked delegates, no doubt that happened, more importantly he spoke the language of workers from all corners. He listened. Had the common touch. What is the old phrase? Oh yes, "a hard act to follow", indeed.

Zhdanov was seriously ill but his death might have something to do with the "killer doctors".

Yes,most of the people consider that the doctors only made his ill health worse.

He might have survived.

I do not think Zhdanov would have been a good choice of leader for the SU, he seemed more interested in internal cultural matters rather than the SU's external political matters too.

Necromancy time.

Initially I had a slight disagreement with you on this issue, but after some reading I did last week (namely Ramiz Alia's writings), now I agree with you, I had forgoten that the obsession with super-estrutural issues (the outgrowth of the economic base) is a trait of revisionism. Taking for example Ramiz Alia himself, or some examples of easier access such as the fact that a common way of praising Mao Tse-tung thought as a new, more developed phase of Marxism, was the fact that it gave a new approach on super-estrutural issues (i.e. cultural revolution), or an even more comprehensible example-Slavoj Zizek. In conclusion the class-analisys of cultural aspects doesn't mean necessarily a good comprehension of class politics or marxism in general, said cultural analisys being a good ground for careerists and opportunists to operate.