I figured I'd give my take on the first chapter, The Body of the Condemned. To begin, I'd like to outline the basis of Foucault's analysis, or what he considers the rules guiding his work on the history of bodies and judicial systems: 1) Regard punishment as a complex social function. 2) Regard punishment as a political tactic (a technique for exercising power). 3) Make the technology of power the very principle both of the humanization of the penal system and the knowledge of man (observe an 'epistemologico-juridicial' formation). 4) See whether the entry of the soul onto the scene of penal justice (explained below) is not the effect of a transformation of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations. Foucault also urges us to recognize that power doesn't simply repress knowledge; it creates knowledge. Foucault starts with an analysis of the use of punishment in monarchist systems. He describes how the public torture and execution was focused on reaching the body of the criminal, and how it was always related to the crime committed (he later on expands on this). He then contrasts this with modern judicial systems, which he says differ significantly. The most important difference is that punishment is no longer aimed at specific crimes but rather at the "souls" of individuals. Or as he puts it: "not only on what they do, but also on what they are, will be, may be." Futher on: "judges have gradually... taken to judging something other than crimes, namely, the 'soul' of the criminal." No longer is the judicial system concerned with simply punishing crimes, but something called “rehabilitation” – with diagnosing the problem in the criminal which caused the crime, and treating it in the hopes that the criminal can be transformed into a productive member of society. The treatment was directed not at the body (or at any corporeal entity) but rather at something inside the criminal which guided his actions and behavior - something called the soul. Foucault argues that this shift in power relations led to the production of what we consider the human soul – both as a juridical subject for punishment and as a subject of psychological assessment. Although there several things to comment on here, what I find most interesting is the link between this argument and the one put forth in The History of Sexuality. In the latter he argues that the our modern discourse on sexuality has produced the homosexual – in previous ages there were just people who committed homosexual acts, it was never thought to be something innate or inherent in an individual. Nowadays of course we consider homosexuality to be an inescapable part of someone’s identity, a part of their soul so to speak (it additionally carries certain assumptions like an inversion of masculine and feminine etc), and as such treatment or medical assessment is aimed at that soul. It’s also interesting the implicit link this shows between the modern discourse on crime and the modern discourse on homosexuality. They’re both viewed in the same light (deviant behaviors which are detrimental to society as a whole), both subject to the same power relations (medical and psychiatric assessment aimed at a person’s inner essence) and they have both produced similar results (the exclusion of certain individuals from society at large and the production of something called “the soul”). There’s loads more I’d like to comment on (there’s a section where he goes really Marxist and applies historical materialism to shifts in the penal system, and another part where he critiques the conventional Marxist understanding of power) but this is just supposed to be a starting point. Btw the more I think about it the more it seems there’s a pretty damning critique of humanism developing here. What are your thoughts?
