Spain, the Unfinished Revolution [Paperback] Arthur H. Landis (Author) Surely by now a classic.........fought alone by the Spanish people against the invading forces of Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. The farce of 'Non-Intervention', whereby other countries were prevented from aiding Spain, but Germany and Italy's interventions were permitted. The Soviet Union and Mexico broke with Non-Intervention, and gave more aid to Spain than any other countries
That's a great book,I read it a couple of years ago and I can highly recommend it. For anyone who hasn't read it you can download it as a PDF: http://espressostalinist.files.wordp.../12/espana.pdf.
I have not read the book, but here's a good video on the subject: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZSRmCMg6BZw
Useful links Durdles and Khalid, thanks. By William Podmore This review is from: Spain in International Context, 1936-59 (Hardcover) This is a splendid collection of fifteen essays, by scholars from eight countries, on Spain's relations with Germany, Italy, France, Britain, the Soviet Union and the USA. Geoffrey Roberts' essay on Soviet foreign policy and the Spanish civil war is particularly fascinating. He shows that in 1938 the British government successfully pressed the French government to close its Spanish border, ending supplies from the Republic's only supporter, the Soviet Union. He concludes that Soviet participation in the Non-Intervention Committee prevented the British and French governments from reaching an agreement with Hitler and Mussolini over Spain. Roberts writes of "the Soviet belief that the way to deal with the fascist powers was to stand up to them." He sums up: "Soviet policy towards Spain followed a relatively simple and straightforward course. Given the constraints of real-world diplomacy and politics and perceptions of its own and republican interests, Moscow did what it could to aid the anti-fascist cause in Spain." Enrique Moradiellos' brilliant essay on the British government's non-intervention policy during the civil war shows how its aim was Franco's victory. As Lord Hailsham said, "Cabinet would love to see the earliest possible victory for General Franco." The policy also rehearsed a non-intervention policy encouraging Hitler to attack the Soviet Union. Paul Preston's fine essay on Franco's overall foreign policy notes that in June 1940, Franco "changed Spain's official neutrality to the much more pro-Axis position of non-belligerency." Churchill described what this meant: "Throughout the war German influence in Spain has been consistently allowed to hinder the war effort of Great Britain and her allies and it is a fact that a Spanish division was sent to fight our Russian allies." Churchill also dismissed as worthless Franco's neutral posture during the Allied North African campaign. Throughout the war, Franco aided Hitler, providing him with bases to refuel the U-boats attacking British Atlantic shipping, selling him raw materials, giving him intelligence information, and constantly threatening France. Qasim Ahmad shows how, after the war, Franco switched protectors, relying first on the British government, then on the USA, to defend his rule against the people.
This review is from: The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War (Canto) (Paperback) Paul Preston was fundamentally wrong when he wrote that Gerald Brenan provided the 'foundations of all modern scholarship on the Spanish Republic and Civil War': "While most contemporary writers were still playing with the simplistic notion that the Spanish war was a battle between fascism and communism, Brenan perceived that it was a fundamentally Spanish affair." It was neither a battle between fascism and communism, nor a fundamentally Spanish affair. The German and Italian intervention in Spain in July 1936 changed the nature, and the prospects, of the war. The government's, and people's, defence of the legitimately elected government against an attempted fascist coup became a war of national defence, waged by a sovereign nation against international fascist aggression. A matter internal to Spain became a matter of international concern. The British government worked against further intervention, not against the growing German and Italian intervention, but against any French intervention in support of the Republic. When socialist Premier Leon Blum came to London on 22 July, Baldwin warned him that Britain would refuse to aid France if Germany or Italy attacked her because she was aiding Spain, and told him to ban at once the supply of arms to the Republic. Blum did so. Later, too late, he admitted that prompt arms shipments could have saved the Republic and that non intervention had been idiotic. The British Government wanted Hitler and Mussolini to win. Eden said that his Government "preferred a Rebel victory to a Republican victory." It aimed to deny the Republic the right to buy arms. From the start, it secretly embargoed arms exports to the Republic. The British government tried to justify its policy by defining the war as a civil war between 'rival factions.' This analysis deliberately left out of account Hitler's and Mussolini's interventions. If the British government had instead correctly defined the war as one of national defence against foreign aggression, then the Republican government alone could legitimately have been awarded belligerent rights. Non Intervention could be enforced against the Republic, which would be denied its legal right to buy arms abroad. But Germany and Italy would ignore the ban and would carry on both their direct aggression and their aid to the rebels. In effect they were being awarded belligerent rights in the country they were illegally invading, while that country's legitimate government was denied its right to defend itself. Japan, when attacking China, was allowed to buy arms. Spain, defending itself from Axis aggression, was forbidden to buy arms. The British government set up the Non Intervention Committee (NIC). As the British Charge d'Affaires assured the German government, the proposed NIC "was not to have the task either of exerting control powers or of making majority decisions or the like." A Foreign Office official called it 'an extremely useful piece of humbug.' The NIC, chaired by Lord Plymouth, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, first met on 9 September in the Foreign Office. It found `no evidence of foreign intervention in Spain'. The British government now asked fascist Portugal to join the NIC, promising Prime Minister Salazar that this would not stop him sending troops to fight the Republic. So Britain's 'oldest ally' joined the NIC, and promptly sent 20,000 troops to Spain. Salazar said his policy was one of "complete support for the rebels as far as it was possible to do so and maintain the semblance of complete neutrality" - just like Baldwin's. The policy of Non Intervention effectively blockaded the Spanish Republic. "It isolates only the Spanish Government", as The Spectator admitted at the time. It tipped the balance decisively against Republican Spain. Baldwin and Chamberlain had rigged the fight while claiming to hold the ring. They had blockaded the victim and backed the aggressors. The Spanish people fought "the overwhelming superiority of their enemy not only in personnel, but in the all-important weapons of modern war, trucks, tanks, artillery, and aircraft." "Success was impossible for the Republic without sufficient men, arms, basic equipment or transport." The British, French and US policy of non-intervention sanctioned the German and Italian intervention, which was the main cause of the Republic's defeat. The Daily Telegraph's obituary of Eden in 1977 said, "The Non Intervention Committee failed to prevent intervention. It merely localised the conflict, and in effect, it helped to ensure the victory of Franco and his unofficial allies, the Nazi and Fascist dictators. Eden loyally carried out the British Government's policy." The British Government had ensured the fascist victory in effect, and in intention. It had not designed the Non Intervention Committee to prevent the decisive German and Italian intervention. It had always intended to leave the Spanish Republic alone and at the mercy of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and their agents the rebels. The British Government was determined that the Republic should be defeated. REVIEW BY WILLIAM PODMORE
This review is from: Britain, Italy, Germany and the Spanish Civil War (Hardcover) There are many factors that led to the second world war and many people have different ideas and theories through hindsight that try to answer the question(s) of how Mussolini and Hitler managed to gain the power that led to WWII. Among these theories rests the ideas of the U.S. Great Depression, revenge of the Treaty of Versailles or Economic problems in Italy and Germany. Another theory by hindsight is the policies of appeasement that Great Britain and Chamberlain held that led Mussolini and Hitler to the great powers the led to WWII. Will Podmore's book Britain, Italy, Germany and The Spanish Civil War, is about the appeasement polices that Chamberlain had that let Mussolini take advantage of Britain. The text briefly referred to how the appeasement polices influenced Hitler and his acts of aggression but the book primly focuses on Britain and Italy and why Chamberlain excused Italy's acts of aggression in Spain and other countries. I liked the book, it gave me an unequaled presentation of the appeasement of the British government during the 1930's. I felt the audience of the book was intended to be scholarly because of the format Podmore used white writing the text. I felt the dating method he used to date events was confusing, most of the time he does not specify the year. This made it hard to follow certain events and put everything in a time line with other events of history from the same time period. One advantage of the text is that it is well documented with a large works cited list after the end of each chapter. I felt the text was very reliable because of the many different sources the author used. The large list of sources used convinced me that this was a purely academic work to be used by scholars in a research intuition. I had no trouble accepting Podmore's point of view simply because he had many outside sources to back up his opinion. Every chapter had over 50 different sources that led me to believe that his text was extremely creditable. I would consider this book a historiography because of its presentation of the progression and interaction between the different governments during the 1930's. The reader of the text will discover that it covers the main tenants of appeasement and treaties between Italy and Britain and the social polices in Britain that kept the public unaware of the bad decisions Chamberlain was making to keep peace with the aggressive nations of Italy and Germany. My only real complaint in consideration of this book as a historiography is that I was clueless to some to some of the events that led up to the rise of Franco and how Italy got involved. If Podmore mentioned this it was very brief, and must have been very dry because I do not remember, I could of fallen asleep (sorry). If he could have detailed the events surrounding the Franco Civil war I would have had a better understanding of the entire situation and understood the book more thoroughly. My biggest praise of the book is the use of the sources he combined to create the text. He went back to original sources from England directly quoted people like Chamberlain. The quotes he used made me want to yell at people: like Chamberlain for his stupid appeasement policies. It was fun reading the text because of the hindsight I have of WWII and how it started. When Chamberlain did something to promote appeasement of Mussolini or Hitler I gasped with frustration because WWII could have been avoided if Britain would of worked with France and bullied up on the Axis powers. For the most part, excluding the rise of Franco, Podmore was effective in creating a story that kept me involved by sharing events that led to the great powers of Italy and Germany. This book gave me first hand information because Podmore drew from hundreds of sources. The author got the point across about Britain's policy and how it led to the dangerous power that Italy and Germany after the Spanish Civil War. This is a good book for research and I would recommend it to anyone who wanted more information on how Britain reacted to Mussolini and Hitler's acts of aggression. Podmore gave a good presentation of the facts and created a nice book to read for fun or research.
: Britain, Italy, Germany and the Spanish Civil War (Hardcover) Here William Podmore is adding info about his book. Among studies of the 1930s there are many books on British policy towards Germany, a few on policy towards Japan, but none on policy towards Italy. There are also many books on the Spanish Civil War, but none that look at it in the context of Anglo-Italian relations. This book is based on the primary sources at the Public Record Office and elsewhere, particularly the Cabinet and Foreign Office Papers, but also on the secondary sources. The book shows the pattern of British government policy towards Mussolini. This tacitly encouraged his aggressive wars against Libya (1922-31), Ethiopia (1935-42) and Spain (1936-39). It treated Mussolini as an ally in the struggle against Bolshevism, and as an instrument of collaboration with Hitler. The book details the making of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 1938, which ratified Italy's wars against Ethiopia and Spain, and left Austria under Nazi control. This Agreement led directly to the Munich Agreement, by which Chamberlain, Mussolini, Daladier and Hitler arranged Czechoslovakia's sacrifice to Hitler. The Munich Agreement also helped Mussolini to step up his aggression in Spain and to unleash his invasion of Albania in April 1939. Chamberlain visited Mussolini in Rome in January 1939, to reach agreements on the war in Spain and on the war to come in Eastern Europe. Through 1939, moves were made to strengthen the Four-Power Pact, and Chamberlain sought to arrange a second Munich over Danzig, to sacrifice Poland also to Hitler. These agreements all strengthened the forces preparing the Second World War, assisting the aggressor powers at the expense of their victims. The British governments' actions consistently prevented collective security through the League of Nations. Their policy towards Italy sabotaged the Grand Alliance against fascism which alone could have prevented the Second World War
You can download it via PDF because I was the one who manually transcribed every single page of it back when I: A. Had more time than I do now; B. Undervalued my ability to scan the book.
