Trotsky and the minimum programme

  1. Tower of Bebel
    Tower of Bebel
    It would be very happy if I could get some decent information about the relationship between Trotsky and the programme of social democracy. I get the feeling that got under the radar of both Marxists and "bourgeois intellectuals" (historians, etc.).

    I remember Jacob Richter writing that Trotsky didn't really get "Erfurtianism" (the programmatic and organizational principles derived from the Erfurt Programme which was a classic Marxist minimum-maximum programme). But I never saw any proof except for the underestimations (f.e. pary-building) made by Trotsky in his Transitional Programme when he wrote about "bridges".

    I have the minutes of the 1903 congres where both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks discussed the programme. But apparantly Trotsky didn't say much, so that's a dead end. I've read an important passage in "Results and Prospects" (1905) where Trotsky basically agrees with Kautsky's statement from 1902 that the minimum programme is the programme of bourgeois democracy. That was a big help to get to understand Trotsky.

    Are there any other passages, books, etc. I could read to make sure I get the full picture?
  2. Proletarian Ultra
    Proletarian Ultra
    a classic Marxist minimum-maximum programme).
    Hey, where/when did the model of the classic Marxist minimum-maximum programme come about?

    Also, Jacob: you said somewheres that Trot programs are too economist for your tastes. Would you mind expanding on that?
  3. Tower of Bebel
    Tower of Bebel
    Marx collaborated with Engels, Guesde and Lafargue in order to create the 'programme du Parti Ouvrier Français', which was what Marx called a min-max programme. Engels adviced the Germans to adopt the economic section of that programme when they wrote their 'erfurterprogramm'.

    When the Erfurt Programme was written Kautsky wrote a book that would explain its basic principles. The whole (programme + booklett) became the starting point for many social democratic programmes in Europe (the programme of the Russian SDLP, the Dutch SDP or the belgian WP).

    Trotsky claims that the programme of "classical social democracy" (whatever classical might mean) contained no "bridge" between actual struggles (for the minimum programme?) and our goal (socialism). That's why he formulated a programme that contained a series of transitional demands that would act as a bridge between present consciousness and socialism.

    However, the old min-max programme did contain a bridge, because in essence the minimum programme was designed to arms the working class with the means to fight for socialism (trade unions, political workers' parties, democracy, freedom of movement, etc). Trotsky ignored this in his Transitional Programme.
  4. Tower of Bebel
    Tower of Bebel
    This is an interesting passage in "The proletarian regime" from "Results and Prospects". It gives us some information about Trotsky's vision of a minimum programme.
    To imagine that it is the business of Social Democrats to enter a provisional government and lead it during the period of revolutionary-democratic reforms, fighting for them to have a most radical character, and relying for this purpose upon the organized proletariat – and then, after the democratic programme has been carried out, to leave the edifice they have constructed so as to make way for the bourgeois parties and themselves go into opposition, thus opening up a period of parliamentary politics, is to imagine the thing in a way that would compromise the very idea of a workers’ government. This is not because it is inadmissible ‘in principle’ – putting the question in this abstract form is devoid of meaning – but because it is absolutely unreal, it is utopianism of the worst sort – a sort of revolutionary-philistine utopianism.

    For this reason:

    The division of our programme into maximum and minimum programmes has a profound and tremendous principled significance during the period when power lies in the hands of the bourgeoisie. The very fact of the bourgeoisie being in power drives out of our minimum programme all demands which are incompatible with private property in the means of production. Such demands form the content of a socialist revolution and presuppose a proletarian dictatorship.

    Immediately, however, that power is transferred into the hands of a revolutionary government with a socialist majority, the division of our programme into maximum and minimum loses all significance, both in principle and in immediate practice. A proletarian government under no circumstances can confine itself within such limits. Take the question of the eight-hour day. As is known, this by no means contradicts capitalist relations, and therefore it forms an item in the minimum programme of Social Democracy. But let us imagine the actual introduction of this measure during a period of revolution, in a period of intensified class passions; there is no question but that this measure would then meet the organized and determined resistance of the capitalists in the form, let us say, of lockouts and the closing down of factories.

    Hundreds of thousands of workers would find themselves thrown on the streets. What should the government do? A bourgeois government, however radical it might be, would never allow affairs to reach this stage because, confronted with the closing-down of factories, it would be left powerless. It would be compelled to retreat, the eight-hour day would not be introduced and the indignant workers would be suppressed.

    Under the political domination of the proletariat, the introduction of an eight-hour day should lead to altogether different consequences. For a government that desires to rely upon the proletariat, and not on capital, as liberalism does, and which does not desire to play the role of an ‘impartial’ intermediary of bourgeois democracy, the closing down of factories would not of course be an excuse for increasing the working day. For a workers’ government there would be only one way out: expropriation of the closed factories and the organization of production in them on a socialized basis.

    Of course, one can argue in this way: we will suppose that the workers’ government, true to its programme, issues a decree for an eight-hour day; if capital puts up a resistance which cannot be overcome by the resources of a democratic programme based on the preservation of private property, the Social Democrats will resign and appeal to the proletariat. Such a solution would be a solution only from the standpoint of the group constituting the membership of the government, but it would be no solution for the proletariat or for the development of the revolution. After the resignation of the Social Democrats, the situation would be exactly as it was at the time when they were compelled to take power. To flee before the organized opposition of capital would be a greater betrayal of the revolution than a refusal to take power in the first instance. It would really be far better for the working-class party not to enter the government than to go in so as to expose its own weakness and then to quit.

    Let us take another example. The proletariat in power cannot but adopt the most energetic measures to solve the question of unemployment, because it is quite obvious that the representatives of the workers in the government cannot reply to the demands of unemployed workers with arguments about the bourgeois character of the revolution.

    But if the government undertakes to maintain the unemployed – it is not important for us at the moment in what form – this would mean an immediate and quite substantial shift of economic power to the side of the proletariat. The capitalists, who in their oppression of the workers always relied upon the existence of a reserve army of labour, would feel themselves economically powerless while the revolutionary government, at the same time, doomed them to political impotence.

    In undertaking the maintenance of the unemployed, the government thereby undertakes the maintenance of strikers. If it does not do that, it immediately and irrevocably undermines the basis of its own existence.
    There is nothing left for the capitalists to do then but to resort to the lockout, that is, to close the factories. It is quite clear that the employers can stand the closing down of production much longer than the workers, and therefore there is only one reply that a workers’ government can give to a general lockout: the expropriation of the factories and the introduction in at least the largest of them of State or communal production.

    Similar problems arise in agriculture by the mere fact of the expropriation of the land. In no way must it be supposed that a proletarian government, on expropriating the privately-owned estates carrying on production on a large scale, would break these up and sell them for exploitation to small producers. The only path open to it in this sphere is the organization of co-operative production under communal control or organized directly by the State. But this is the path to Socialism.

    All this quite clearly shows that Social Democrats cannot enter a revolutionary government, giving the workers in advance an undertaking not to give way on the minimum programme, and at the same time promising the bourgeoisie not to go beyond it. Such a bilateral undertaking is absolutely impossible to realize. The very fact of the proletariat’s representatives entering the government, not as powerless hostages, but as the leading force, destroys the border-line between maximum and minimum programme; that is to say, it places collectivism on the order of the day. The point at which the proletariat will be held up in its advance in this direction depends upon the relation of forces, but in no way upon the original intentions of the proletarian party.

    For this reason there can be no talk of any sort of special form of proletarian dictatorship in the bourgeois revolution, of democratic proletarian dictatorship (or dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry). The working class cannot preserve the democratic character of its dictatorship without refraining from overstepping the limits of its democratic programme. Any illusions on this point would be fatal. They would compromise Social Democracy from the very start.

    The proletariat, once having taken power, will fight for it to the very end. While one of the weapons in this struggle for the maintenance and the consolidation of power will be agitation and organization, especially in the countryside, another will be a policy of collectivism. Collectivism will become not only the inevitable way forward from the position in which the party in power will find itself, but will also be a means of preserving this position with the support of the proletariat.
  5. Die Neue Zeit
    Die Neue Zeit
    I suppose you're trying to tie your quotation of Trotsky with what Prachanda did.

    The problem here, as noted by everyone who opposed Trotsky, is that the Russian working class was a minority within the Russian population at large.

    Let's say that the czar was overthrown in 1905, and that Lenin would realize his dream of the SPD model in Russia.

    The scenario of the RSDLP being the senior partner was reliant upon a peasantry that was either passive (illiteracy concerns notwithstanding) or politically divided. In either case, the scenario was reliant upon the SRs initially not doing their job.

    At some point, though, the class balance would have been altered. The ranks of the working class would grow through capitalistic development, while the ranks of the peasantry would shrink. The RSDLP could implement an "alternative culture" for the growing working class, but a more active peasantry would force the party to go into opposition simply by sheer numbers.