Chapter 3: The revolutionary strategy of the centre

  1. Q
    Q
    Chapter 3
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]3 [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The revolutionary strategy of the centre[/FONT]




    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The centre tendency in the German Social Democratic Party and Second International was also its ideological leadership. In spite of eventually disastrous errors and betrayals, this tendency has a major historical achievement to its credit. It led the building of the mass workers’ socialist parties of late 19th and early 20th century Europe and the creation of the Second International. The leftist advocates of the mass strike strategy, in contrast, built either groupuscules like the modern far left (such as the De Leonists) or militant but ephemeral movements (like the Industrial Workers of the World).[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Down to 1914, Russian Bolshevism was a tendency within the centre, not a tendency opposed to it - even if Kautsky preferred the Mensheviks. Without the centre tendency’s international unity policy there would have been no RSDLP; without the lessons the Bolsheviks learned from the international centre tendency, there could have been no mass opening of the Bolshevik membership in 1905, no recovery of the party’s strength through trade union, electoral and other forms of low-level mass work in 1912-14, and no Bolshevik political struggle to win a majority between April and October 1917. [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The centre tendency did not, of course, identify itself as such. It self-identified as the continuators and defenders of ‘orthodox Marxism’ against ‘anarchists’ (to its left, but not in the centre’s view) and ‘revisionists’ to its right. In this sense it was primarily defined by negative judgments on the coalition strategy of the right and the mass strike strategy of the left. Both Kautsky’s The social revolution (1902) and his The road to power (1909) are extremely cautious in making positive categorical predictive claims about strategy. There are nonetheless some core principled understandings about strategy which emerge from the arguments.[/FONT]


    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Organisation[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]For the centre tendency, the strength of the proletariat and its revolutionary capacity flows, not from the employed workers’ power to withdraw their labour, but from the power of the proletariat as a class to organise. It is organisation that makes the difference between a spontaneous expression of rage and rebellion, like a riot, and a strike as a definite action for definite and potentially winnable goals.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Moreover, as soon as we move beyond craft unionism, which relies on skills monopolies to coerce the employer, the difference between victory and defeat in a strike is the ability of the solidarity of the class as a whole to sustain the strikers in the face of the economic and political pressure the employers can exert. Finally, it is the need and (potential) ability of the proletariat as a class to organise democratically when we enter into a mass strike wave or revolutionary crisis that represents the potential alternative authority to the authority of the capitalist class.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Proletarian organisation need not only be deployed in the form of strike action. Solidarity and the power to organise can also create cooperatives of various sorts, workers’ educational institutions, workers’ papers, and workers’ political parties: and it can turn out the vote for workers’ candidates in public elections. Strong votes for a workers’ party will increase the self-confidence and sense of solidarity of the working class as a class and its ability to organise and act, not just electorally but in other arenas of struggle, such as strikes, for example. [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The core of the political strategy of the centre tendency was to build up the workers’ organised movement, and especially the workers’ political party as its central institution. In their view, as the organised movement of the working class grew stronger, so would the self-confidence of the class and its ability to take political decisions and impose them on the bourgeoisie and the state. Both in the struggle for reforms and in mass strike waves or revolutionary crises, a powerful mass party of the working class which had at the core of its aims the perspective of the working class taking power and overcoming the regime of private property would be the essential instrument of the working class asserting an alternative form of authority.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]It is important to be clear that the movement that the centre tendency sought to build was not the gutted form of the modern social-democracy/Labourism, which is dependent on the support of the state and the capitalist media for its mass character. The idea was of a party which stood explicitly for the power of the working class and socialism. It was one which was built up on the basis of its own resources, its own organisation with local and national press, as well as its own welfare and educational institutions, etc.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]This view was a direct inheritance from Marx and Engels’ arguments from the time of the First International onwards. The Hegelian-Marxists, who claimed that it was an undialectical vulgarisation of Marx and Engels, faced with the historical evidence, logically had to conclude that Engels had vulgarised Marx. But this has been shown by Draper and others to be false.38 [/FONT]


    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The self-emancipation of the majority[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The second central feature of the strategic understandings of the centre tendency was that the socialist revolution is necessarily the act of the majority. This is fairly elementary and fundamental Marxism: it formed the basis of Marx and Engels’ opposition to various forms of socialist putschism and support for enlightened despots.39 The object of the socialist revolution is precisely the self-emancipation of the working class majority and through this the emancipation “of all human beings without distinction of sex or race”.40 The idea that this can be accomplished through the action of an enlightened minority is a self-contradiction.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The centre tendency drew two conclusions from this understanding - against the left, and against the right. The first was rejection of the mass strike strategy. On this issue, the centre presented the anarcho-syndicalists and the left with a version of Morton’s Fork. The first limb of the fork was that a true general strike would depend on the workers’ party having majority support if it was to win. But if the workers’ party already had majority support, where was the need for the general strike? The workers’ party would start with its electoral majority as a mandate for socialism, rather than with the strike. It was for this reason that the centre, in Bebel’s resolution at the 1905 Jena Congress of the SPD, was willing to demand the use of the mass strike weapon in defence of, or in the struggle for, universal suffrage. [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The second limb of the fork was that the strategy of the working class coming to power through a strike wave presupposed that the workers’ party had not won a majority. In these circumstances, for the workers’ party to reach for power would be a matter of ‘conning the working class into taking power’. However formally majoritarian the party might be, the act of turning a strike wave into a struggle for power would inevitably be the act of an enlightened minority steering the benighted masses. [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The argument against the right was also an argument against minority action - but minority action of a different kind. The right argued that the workers’ party, while still a minority, should be willing to enter coalition governments with middle class parties in order to win reforms. The centre argued that this policy was illusory, primarily because the interests of the middle classes and those of the proletariat were opposed. Behind this argument was one made by Marx in 1850, that it would be a disaster for the workers’ party to come to power on the back of the support of the petty proprietors, since the workers’ party would then be forced to represent the interests of this alien class.[/FONT]
    “[FONT=Times New Roman, serif]We are devoted to a party which, most [/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif]fortunately [/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif]for it, cannot yet come to power. If the proletariat were to come to power the measures it would introduce would be petty-bourgeois and not directly proletarian. Our party can come to [/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif]power [/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif]only when the conditions allow it to put [/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif]its own[/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif] view into practice. Louis Blanc [French socialist who participated in a republican coalition government in 1848] is the best instance of what happens when you come to power prematurely.”[/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif] 41[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]This logic applied all the more to the creation of a coalition government with the political representatives of the petty proprietors. By becoming part of such a coalition, the workers’ party would in practice accept responsibility for the petty-proprietor government. Again, the opposition to participating in coalitions as a minority was no novelty, but followed arguments already made by Marx and Engels. Thus, for example, Engels wrote to Turati in 1894, anticipating a possible Italian (democratic) revolution:[/FONT]
    “[FONT=Times New Roman, serif]After the common victory we might perhaps be offered some [/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif]seats in the new government[/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif] - but always in a [/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif]minority.[/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif] [/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Here lies the greatest danger.[/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif] After the February Revolution in 1848 the French socialistic democrats ... were incautious enough to accept such positions. As a minority in the government they involuntarily bore the responsibility for all the infamy and treachery which the majority, composed of pure republicans, committed against the working class, while at the same time their participation in the government completely paralysed the revolutionary action of the working class they were supposed to represent.”[/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, serif]42 [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] This is a hard judgment, but it is one which has been repeatedly confirmed by history. Participation by communists in nationalist and ‘democratic’ governments, and ‘critical support’ policies, animated by the desire to ‘do something for the workers’, has in the course of the 20th century brought on the workers’ movement in several countries disasters far worse than those of 1848: the fates of the mass Indonesian, Iraqi and Iranian communist parties spring to mind. The effect of the coalition policy can be not merely defeat, but the destruction of the very idea of socialism and working class politics as an alternative to the capitalist order.[/FONT]


    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Patience[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The centre’s strategic line was, then, a strategy of patience as opposed to the two forms of impatience; those of the right’s coalition policy and the left’s mass strike strategy. This strategy of patience had its grounds in the belief that the inner-logic of capital would inevitably tend, in the first place, to increase the relative numbers and hence strength of the proletariat as a class, and, in the second, to increase social inequality and class antagonism. Kautsky makes the argument most clearly in The social revolution. In this situation the workers’ party/movement could expect to build up its forces over the long term to a point at which it would eventually be able to take power with majority support.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]This strategic line can be summed up as follows. Until we have won a majority (identifiable by our votes in election results) the workers’ party will remain in opposition and not in government. While in opposition we will, of course, make every effort to win partial gains through strikes, single issue campaigns, etc, including partial agreements with other parties not amounting to government coalitions, and not involving the workers’ party expressing confidence in these parties.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]When we have a majority, we will form a government and implement the whole minimum programme; if necessary, the possession of a majority will give us legitimacy to coerce the capitalist/pro-capitalist and petty bourgeois minority. Implementing the whole minimum programme will prevent the state in the future serving as an instrument of the capitalist class and allow the class struggle to progress on terrain more favourable to the working class.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]I have left on one side the question of imperialism, which I discussed at considerable length in a series in the Weekly Worker in July-August 2004. As I indicated there and in chapter two, it has significant implications for the centre tendency’s strategy of patience. The inherent tendency in capitalism towards social polarisation is partially displaced from the imperialist countries onto the colonial countries.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]In particular, the material division of labour on a world scale results in a proportional increase in the professional, managerial and state official middle classes in the imperialist countries - a phenomenon observed by Hobson of south eastern England and then in Lenin’s Imperialism, and one which has been considerably more marked in the period since 1945. An increasing proportion of the total population of the imperialist countries becomes wholly or partly dependent on the spoils of empire. The version of the strategy of patience adopted by the SPD/Second International leadership depends on the workers’ party actually achieving an electoral majority. But the economic and social effects of imperialism in the imperialist countries mean that this is unlikely in any single imperialist country and outside of conditions of acute political crisis.[/FONT]


    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The state[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]What distinguished the centre tendency from post-1917 communists most fundamentally was the belief that the working class could take over and use the existing capitalist state bureaucratic apparatus, a view developed most clearly in Kautsky’s The road to power. This, too, had its roots in claims made by Marx and - particularly - Engels. [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]In The civil war in France Marx had asserted precisely that the working class “cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes,” and had proposed the Commune as a model of the future workers’ regime.43[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]In the first draft of The civil war in France, indeed, Marx had characterised the Commune by saying that “This was, therefore, a revolution not against this or that, legitimate, constitutional, republican or imperialist form of state power. It was a revolution against the state itself, of this supernaturalist abortion of society, a resumption by the people for the people of its own social life.”44 [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]In an April 1871 letter to Kugelmann, Marx wrote: “If you look at the last chapter of my Eighteenth Brumaire you will find that I say that the next attempt of the French revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to smash it, and this is essential for every real people’s revolution on the continent”.45[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] But that was in the first flush of the revolutionary movement. Later, in the aftermath of the Commune, the Bakuninists argued that the mass strike revolution was to abolish the state. In response to the uselessness of the Bakuninists’ line, Marx and - in particular - Engels ‘bent the stick’ against it in a number of texts. [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]In On authority (1872), Engels uses a series of arguments for the need for authority (ie, collective decision-making mechanisms) in modern cooperative production.46 But he explains them in a very unqualified way, which makes no distinction between the temporary subordination of one individual to another which is unavoidable in collective decision-making, and the permanent division of labour between managers and grunts which characterises both capitalist (and other class), and bureaucratic, regimes. Engels’ arguments in this respect were to be used both by Kautsky against the left, and by Lenin in the 1918-21 process of construction of the bureaucratic regime in Russia.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Engels’ 1891 afterword to The civil war in France is a little more ambiguous on ‘smashing up’ the state than Marx’s letter to Kugelmann: “In reality, however, the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy; and at best an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot avoid having to lop off at the earliest possible moment, until such time as a new generation, reared in new and free social conditions, will be able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap-heap” (emphasis added).47 [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] In Engels’ 1895 Introduction to Marx’s Class struggles in France, 1848-1850 we find Engels asserting that: “With [the SPD’s] successful utilisation of universal suffrage, however, an entirely new method of proletarian struggle came into operation, and this method quickly took on a more tangible form. It was found that the state institutions, in which the rule of the bourgeoisie is organised, offer the working class still further levers to fight these very state institutions. The workers took part in elections to particular diets, to municipal councils and to trades courts; they contested with the bourgeoisie every post in the occupation of which a sufficient part of the proletariat had a say. And so it happened that the bourgeoisie and the government came to be much more afraid of the legal than of the illegal action of the workers’ party, of the results of elections than of those of rebellion” (emphasis added).48[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] It is clear from Engels’ correspondence in 1895 that he did not by any means intend to rule out illegal or forcible action, and was exasperated at the SPD leadership’s use of the Introduction to suggest that he did.49 But this does not alter the significance of the positive arguments, only part of which have been quoted here.[/FONT]


    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Theory[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Behind these ambiguities is a problem of theory.50 Marx and Engels had started out with an appropriation and ‘inversion’ of Hegel’s theory of the state: Hegel saw the state as growing out of the internal contradictions of ‘civil society’ (bürgerliche Gesellschaft); Marx and Engels identified bürgerliche Gesellschaft with capitalism. But they became conscious that the state as a social form in general is historically prior to the emergence of capitalism. In The civil war in France, Marx projects the rise of capitalism back onto the emergence of the absolutist state in the phase of the decline of feudalism. [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Behind the argument of The civil war in France is, in fact, an earlier understanding that absolute monarchy must be broken by revolution. In England’s 17th century revolution (1850) Marx and Engels wrote that “Although M Guizot never loses sight of the French Revolution, he does not even reach the simple conclusion that the transition from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy can take place only after violent struggles and passing through a republican stage, and that even then the old dynasty, having become useless, must make way for a usurpatory side line.”51 [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] Marx’s 1871 letter to Kugelmann similarly refers to the need to smash the state “on the continent” (ie, as opposed to Britain and the US). Engels’ 1891 critique of the Erfurt programme makes a similar distinction: “One can conceive that the old society may develop peacefully into the new one in countries where the representatives of the people concentrate all power in their hands, where, if one has the support of the majority of the people, one can do as one sees fit in a constitutional way: in democratic republics such as France and the USA, in monarchies such as Britain, where the imminent abdication of the dynasty in return for financial compensation is discussed in the press daily and where this dynasty is powerless against the people. But in Germany where the government is almost omnipotent and the Reichstag and all other representative bodies have no real power, to advocate such a thing in Germany, when, moreover, there is no need to do so, means removing the fig-leaf from absolutism and becoming oneself a screen for its nakedness.”52 [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] Marx’s late work found in the Ethnological notebooks indicates that he recognised the insufficiency of this account, which ties the state to early modern absolutism. In The origins of the family, private property and the state, Engels’ “execution of a bequest” of Marx’s anthropological work, Engels identifies the origins of the state with the break-up of clan society in antiquity: the social contradictions which produce the state are then given by the emergence of full alienable private property and classes.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] The result, both in Marx’s Civil war in France version and in Engels’ Origins version, is that capitalism inherits “the state” from the prior social orders. It is then rational to suppose that socialism (either as the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, or as the ‘first phase of communism’), will inherit “the state” from capitalism. [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] What is missing is a general theory which will explain why the absolute monarchies had to be ‘smashed’ in order for fully capitalist states to emerge, in a process which was completed in the Netherlands in 1609 and England in 1688, but was not completed until 1871 in France and 1918 (and perhaps even 1945) in Germany. [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] But such a theory should also explain why the late antique state had to be ‘smashed’ in order for feudal state regimes to emerge, in a process completed in the former western Roman empire over the 7th-11th centuries, but which in Byzantium failed, ending in the conquest of the still stubbornly late antique state by the Ottoman regime in 1453. Similarly, in China a regime very similar to the late antique state recapitulated itself on changes of dynasty until it finally fell in the 1911-12 revolution, but in Japan such a state was ‘smashed’ in the 12th century, opening the way to a feudal development.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] Such a theory could not properly stop at the immediate outcome, the particularity of the late feudal bureaucratic-coercive state and its relationship to capitalism. Nor could it stop at the beginning, at the absolute generality of the emergence of the state in connection with the transition to class society (which was probably in Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt, China, India and Mesoamerica rather than, as Engels placed it in Origins, in Greek and Roman classical antiquity). It would have to grasp the relation of concrete state forms (city-state and god-empire, national kingdom as part of a larger religious unity, rule-of-law constitutional state as part of a system of states) to their class bases (slavery, feudalism, capitalism). [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] In approaching the matter in this way, it would become visible that Engels’ 1891 judgment that in France, the USA and England “the representatives of the people concentrate all power in their hands, [and], if one has the support of the majority of the people, one can do as one sees fit in a constitutional way” was false. The inner secret of the capitalist state form is not ‘bourgeois democracy’. Rather, it has three elements: 1. the ‘rule of law’ - ie, the judicial power; 2. the deficit financing of the state through organised financial markets; and 3. the fact that capital rules, not through a single state, but through an international state system, of which each national state is merely a part.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] This, in turn, carries the implication that Engels’ 1891 critique of the SPD’s failure in the Erfurt Programme to call for the democratic republic was true but insufficient, and that his 1895 claim that “It was found that the state institutions, in which the rule of the bourgeoisie is organised, offer the working class still further levers to fight these very state institutions” was misconceived.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] In the absence of an explicit democratic-republican critique of the state hierarchy forming part of the SPD’s agitation, the party’s participation in the local and sectoral governmental organs of the German Second Empire served, not to undermine the imperial state, but to integrate the workers’ movement behind that state and to support the development of bureaucratic hierarchies within the workers’ movement.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] The problem of failure to grasp the character of the nation-state system as part of an international state system and subject to the world market was one the centre shared with the right wing, and was more profoundly disastrous than the failure to grasp the problem of the class character of state forms. It, too, has its origins in Marx and Engels.[/FONT]


    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The nation-state[/FONT]
    “[FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie” (Communist manifesto).[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]There is a peculiarity about this statement. Early in the Manifesto, we are told: “To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London and sketched the following manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.” The ideas of Marx and Engels reflected in the Manifesto, moreover, could be said to be drawn from the appropriation and critique of German philosophy, English political economy (and Chartism, though Lenin left this source out), and French utopian socialism.53 Moreover, what immediately followed (not, of course, as a result of the Manifesto) was the outbreak of an international revolutionary wave affecting France, Germany, Austria, Hungary.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Indeed, previous (bourgeois) revolutionary movements had also been international: the Europe-wide commune movement of the 12th and 13th centuries, 16th-17th century protestantism (in particular Calvinism) and Enlightenment republicanism of the 18th and early 19th centuries. Future, more proletarian, revolutionary waves were also to be international in character, as in the rise of class struggles which led up to the 1914-18 war, those of the end and immediate aftermath of that war, the aftermath of 1945, and the late 1960s-early 1970s.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]True, in the Critique of the Gotha programme Marx wrote: “It is altogether self-evident that, to be able to fight at all, the working class must organise itself at home as a class and that its own country is the immediate arena of its struggle - insofar as its class struggle is national, not in substance, but, as the Communist manifesto says, ‘in form’.” But he went on, however, to criticise the programme for saying “Not a word, therefore, about the international functions of the German working class! And it is thus that it is to challenge its own bourgeoisie - which is already linked up in brotherhood against it with the bourgeois of all other countries - and Herr Bismarck’s international policy of conspiracy.”54[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Engels’ contemporaneous critique in a letter to Bebel has a similar insistence both on the workers’ party initially organising nationally, and on its underlying international content: “There was, of course, no need whatever to mention the International as such. But at the very least there should have been no going back on the programme of 1869, and some sort of statement to the effect that, though first of all the German workers’ party is acting within the limits set by its political frontiers (it has no right to speak in the name of the European proletariat, especially when what it says is wrong), it is nevertheless conscious of its solidarity with the workers of all other countries and will, as before, always be ready to meet the obligations that solidarity entails. [/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Such obligations, even if one does not definitely proclaim or regard oneself as part of the ‘International’, consist for example in aid, abstention from blacklegging during strikes, making sure that the party organs keep German workers informed of the movement abroad, agitation against impending or incipient dynastic wars and, during such wars, an attitude such as was exemplarily maintained in 1870 and 1871, etc.”55[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The growth of the SPD, however, gave rise to a shift in Engels’ attitude. An increased emphasis was placed on the defence of Germany as the country in which the workers’ movement was strongest. In 1891 the initial emergence of an alliance of France with Russia threatened a war in which Germany might be attacked on two fronts (as, in the event, happened in 1914).[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Engels wrote to Bebel that “we must declare that since 1871 we have always been ready for a peaceful understanding with France, that as soon as our Party comes to power it will be unable to exercise that power unless Alsace-Lorraine freely determines its own future, but that if war is forced upon us, and moreover a war in alliance with Russia, we must regard this as an attack on our existence and defend ourselves by every method ...”[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]And “if we [Germany] are beaten, every barrier to chauvinism and a war of revenge in Europe will be thrown down for years hence. If we are victorious our party will come into power. The victory of Germany is therefore the victory of the revolution, and if it comes to war we must not only desire victory but further it by every means.”56[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] The same position was publicly adopted by Bebel on behalf of the SPD, and Engels published it (as his own opinion) in France.57[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif] With this we have arrived at the position which the SPD took up in August 1914. It is, in fact, dictated by the inner logic of the combination of the claims that “the proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie” and that the (nation-) state is “an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy”. In August 1914 these commitments left the centre as badly enmeshed in the defence of ‘national interests’ as the right, and led them to support feeding the European working class into the mincing machine of the war.[/FONT]


    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]Dialectic[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]It is a commonplace of the far left, following hints from Lenin elaborated by Lukacs and others, to accuse Kautsky in particular and the centre in general of an insufficient grasp of dialectic. I have argued against this approach before.58 In particular, it is clear that Kautsky and his immediate co-thinkers did not imagine an uninterrupted social peace which would allow the SPD to progress without crises and setbacks, and that they did grasp that history moves both in a slow molecular fashion and in an accelerated and chaotic fashion in periods of crisis.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The trouble was that their errors on the state and the nation-state rendered this understanding useless when it came to the test of war. They were to have the same result in the revolution of 1918-19 and when, in 1931-33, the SPD was confronted with the rise of Nazism.[/FONT]
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The centre’s strategy of patience was more successful than the other strategies in actually building a mass party. Its insistence on the revolution as the act of the majority, and refusal of coalitionism, was equally relevant to conditions of revolutionary crisis: the Bolsheviks proved this positively in April-October 1917, and it has been proved negatively over and over again between the 1890s and the 2000s. However, because it addressed neither the state form, nor the international character of the capitalist state system and the tasks of the workers’ movement, the centre’s strategy collapsed into the policy of the right when matters came to the crunch.[/FONT]
  2. Tower of Bebel
    Tower of Bebel
    [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]The growth of the SPD, however, gave rise to a shift in Engels’ attitude. An increased emphasis was placed on the defence of Germany as the country in which the workers’ movement was strongest. In 1891 the initial emergence of an alliance of France with Russia threatened a war in which Germany might be attacked on two fronts (as, in the event, happened in 1914).[/FONT]
    Some historians have questioned who influenced who. Not every dubious letter written by Engels is the result the important role the SPD was to play in the near future. There was also disinformation for example. Was it Engels who influenced Bebel's ("left nationalist") actions or was it Bebel who influenced Engels?

    Kautsky did not really believe in the ulitmate crisis of capitalism and he did not write much on party-building either. So I ignore Kautsky and only mention Bebel here.

    I think it was Bebel who influenced Engels. Bebel's insistance on the fact that the masses were more to the left than the party partially deceived him. His aproach towards the right, the opportunist trends and the whole question of German social democracy eventually influenced the attitude of Engels.
  3. Die Neue Zeit
    Die Neue Zeit
    Even above the last chapter of the book, this chapter is my favourite (mainly because I can afford to be as "magisterial" in my approach to this chapter as Kautsky - as opposed to "polemical" like Guesde).

    1) First off, why in blazes did he change the title of this? "The centre" as opposed to "the centrists" (thus rubbing it for those stuck in "action" dogma)?

    2) "Even if Kautsky preferred the Mensheviks" - Macnair never bothered to change this, even after Lih's mention of Driving Forces.

    3) Regarding Morton's Fork: more discussion is needed on the "50%+1" scenario. It is a majority, but nevertheless still gives impetus to the "For Mass Strike Waves and All Power to the Soviets" strategy, especially if that majority isn't strong enough against the state opposition.

    4) I criticized Macnair's non-mention of organized spoilage campaigns in the Chapter 2 thread. This chapter (and the rest of the book) doesn't consider this or other forms of non-electoral yet equally political support.



    5) I e-mailed both of you about lower levels of government. Which strategy is most appropriate?
  4. Tower of Bebel
    Tower of Bebel
    How about the question of organization? What should the center have done to guard the revolutionary party from the liquidators?
  5. Die Neue Zeit
    Die Neue Zeit
    Before I answer your question, here's a related rant:

    I am of the opinion that Marxists should reject democratic centralism as they have social democracy.

    There's a wiki edit on democratic centralism's Lassallean origins, referring to the "strict organization" of some German social-democrat. The term was appropriated by the 19th-century Marxists just as social democracy was.

    Like social democracy's "re-appropriation" (the third post-modernist demand in Hardt and Negri's Empire) by reactionaries, democratic centralism reverted to "strict organization" in the 1920s.

    Bordiga had a point about the 19th-century Marxists (but he used the wrong term): they should have explicitly emphasized programmatic centralism. This could have been the basis for expelling the liquidators.
  6. Tower of Bebel
    Tower of Bebel
    What's programmatic centralism? How does it incorporate the freedom of discussion and the right to oppose the programme?
  7. Die Neue Zeit
    Die Neue Zeit
    Damn it! That's why two words aren't good enough! Forgive my rambling, since I was detracting even from my suggested neologisms "circumstantial discussive unity" (the broader concept) and "publicized discussive unity" (the form necessary for modern organization).

    Even then, whatever the term used, it should take into account the difference between Basic Principles and program. The liquidators were opposed to both (class strugglism and partiinost being the principles opposed).

    "A Party member is one who: fully and informedly agrees with the Basic Principles (class strugglism, social labour, transnational emancipation, partiinost), reasonably accepts the Program, provides regular financial support, and participates in the party's organizations for programmatic development and other activities."

    [The "programmatic development" takes into account workers who don't have much time on their hands to be praktiki. Of course, there should be debate beforehand on inter-nationalism vs. trans-nationalism.]
  8. Tower of Bebel
    Tower of Bebel
    I'm posting this because it's so true:
    As against the coalesced bourgeoisie, a coalition between petty bourgeois and workers had been formed, the so-called Social-Democratic party. The petty bourgeois saw that they were badly rewarded after the June days of 1848, that their material interests were imperiled, and that the democratic guarantees which were to insure the effectuation of these interests were called in question by the counterrevolution. Accordingly they came closer to the workers. On the other hand, their parliamentary representation, the Montagne, thrust aside during the dictatorship of the bourgeois republicans, had in the last half of the life of the Constituent Assembly reconquered its lost popularity through the struggle with Bonaparte and the royalist ministers. It had concluded an alliance with the socialist leaders. In February, 1849, banquets celebrated the reconciliation. A joint program was drafted, joint election committees were set up and joint candidates put forward. The revolutionary point was broken off and a democratic turn given to the social demands of the proletariat; the purely political form was stripped off the democratic claims of the petty bourgeoisie and their socialist point thrust forward. Thus arose social-democracy. The new Montagne, the result of this combination, contained, apart from some supernumeraries from the working class and some socialist sectarians, the same elements as the old Montagne, but numerically stronger. However, in the course of development it had changed with the class that it represented. The peculiar character of social-democracy is epitomized in the fact that democratic-republican institutions are demanded as a means, not of doing away with two extremes, capital and wage labor, but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into harmony. However different the means proposed for the attainment of this end may be, however much it may be trimmed with more or less revolutionary notions, the content remains the same. This content is the transformation of society in a democratic way, but a transformation within the bounds of the petty bourgeoisie. Only one must not get the narrow-minded notion that the petty bourgeoisie, on principle, wishes to enforce an egoistic class interest. Rather, it believes that the special conditions of its emancipation are the general conditions within whose frame alone modern society can be saved and the class struggle avoided. Just as little must one imagine that the democratic representatives are indeed all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of shopkeepers. According to their education and their individual position they may be as far apart as heaven and earth. What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is, in general, the relationship between the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they represent. After this analysis it is obvious that if the Montagne continually contends with the party of Order for the republic and the so-called rights of man, neither the republic nor the rights of man are its final end, any more than an army which one wants to deprive of its weapons and which resists has taken the field in order to remain in possession of its own weapons.
    The Eightteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon


    You could argue that the first part in bold discribes the Erfurt programme.
    Replying to a rejoinder, Crispien said: “Dictatorship is nothing new, it was already mentioned in the Erfurt Programme.” The Erfurt Programme says nothing about the dictatorship of the proletariat, and history has proved that this was not due to chance. When in 1902-03, we were drawing up our Party’s first programme, we always had before us the example of the Erfurt Programme; Plekhanov, that very Plekhanov who rightly said at the time, “Either Bernstein will bury Social-Democracy, or Social-Democracy will bury Bernstein”, laid special emphasis on the fact that the Erfurt Programme’s failure to mention the dictatorship of the proletariat was erroneous from the standpoint of theory and, in practice was a cowardly concession to the opportunists. The dictatorship of the proletariat has been in our programme since 1903.
    The second congress of the Communist International
  9. Die Neue Zeit
    Die Neue Zeit
    On the other hand, the phrases "democratic republic" and "dictatorship of the proletariat" didn't appear in the Program of the French Workers Party, either.

    The "first part in bold" describes perfectly the program of the USPD. While the text was identical to the Erfurt Program, more than enough time had passed for programmatic caution to be cast aside, since the USPD's anti-war stance was more than enough for the Kaiser to drive it underground. Remember, the SPD had just come from underground (the RSDLP, meanwhile, had the underground luxury of stating its intentions from the get-go).

    When Comrade Crispien now says that the dictatorship of the proletariat is nothing new, and goes on to say: “We have always stood for the conquest of political power”, he is evading the gist of the matter. Conquest of political power is recognised, but not dictatorship. All the socialist literature—not only German, but French and British as well—shows that the leaders of the opportunist parties, for instance, MacDonald in Britain, stand for the conquest of political power. They are, in all conscience, sincere socialists, but they are against the dictatorship of the proletariat! Since we have a good revolutionary party worthy of the name of Communist, it should conduct propaganda for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as distinct from the old conception of the Second International. This has been glossed over and obscured by Comrade Crispien, which is the fundamental error common to all of Kautsky’s adherents.
    May I ask, then, how you would evaluate the relevant part of the Basic Principles I have outlined ("of a ruling class")?

    The equally transnational emancipation of labour, which has nothing to lose but its chains, can only be brought about by a highly class-conscious and organized working class independently, capturing the full political power of a ruling class for itself in accordance with the slogan “WORKERS OF THE WORLD, UNITE!”
  10. Tower of Bebel
    Tower of Bebel
    Yes, I think that just typical of Marx to make a piece of text as concise as possible.
    The French socialist workers, in adopting as the aim of their efforts the political and economic expropriation of the capitalist class and the return to community of all the means of production [...].
    That was enough.

    Wouldn't it be better if you wrote "as a ruling class"?
  11. Die Neue Zeit
    Die Neue Zeit
    My apologies re. the PO program.

    "The full political power as a ruling class for itself" seems grammatically weird. A shortened form could be "capturing full political power as a ruling class," but that would lose out Lukacs' phraseology (despite his anti-Kautsky crap).

    BTW, you didn't respond to my post above on "membership" or on the five points (Driving Forces, 50%+1, levels of government, etc.).
  12. Tower of Bebel
    Tower of Bebel
    Regarding the Mass strike, I'll put up part two "The Political Mass Strike in Imperial Germany". Many including Hilferding supported the notion of a combined strategy: the mass strike and the majority.

    About remark n° 3: it probably doesn't need mentioning at all. It's important to keep things (as) concise if/as possible.

    I don't think I have anything to say about remark n° 2. Remark n° 1 is a bit weird because "centrism" is different from "those who belong to, or support, the center tendency". "Revolutionary centrism" is terribly contradictory for most people.

    And forth, I don't get n° 5 at all.

    And last, what does it mean to accept something "reasonably"?
  13. Die Neue Zeit
    Die Neue Zeit
    For some reason I'm too lazy to add the "eagle" Hilferding to my avatar, in spite of plans made long ago to do so.

    BTW, I'm sure even many class-conscious workers haven't heard the word "centrism" used in a Marxist manner, hence my highly personal crusade around that word.

    And last, what does it mean to accept something "reasonably"?
    Two things (or more): 1) At a basic level, you need to understand what the not-so-verbose program says in the first place. 2) A certain level of agreement with the substance of the program outside of the Basic Principles is needed, unless one happens to be a programmatic maximalist (DeLeonists, Bordigists, etc., who should nevertheless be in the organization to combat reformist sentiments). One may not agree with how a certain demand is worded (my proposed solution for mass media, or using the statistical median and not the statistical mean in determining "average workers' wages"), but the substance is worth more (the need to deal with the mass media politically, "average workers' wages").

    #5 reposted (from the e-mail I sent you, please ask for clarifications if you're confused on something):

    I'm also about to ask Mike a question regarding the SPD's coalitionism at lower levels...

    [...]

    Given Die Linke's electoral success in Saarland and Thuringia today, and given that I have yet to comment on an appropriate strategy for lower-level governments, I should ask: What strategy is appropriate (right, left, or center)? Can the party combine electoral efforts with organized ballot spoilages and grassroots constitutional amendment campaigns?

    [I'm advocating this for higher-level governments to end Ch. 5 of PCSSR.]

    I see two factors with regards to lower-level governments: 1) ability to change the constitution (DOTP measures), and 2) ability to enact radical measures that don't necessitate constitutional change (living wages, for example).

    While obviously I have accepted and advocated the Kautskyist strategy for national politics and above (EU, perhaps UN later on), I'm still leaning towards the "mass strike strategy" at the lower levels. If the center strategy is applied, then when the party comes to power at lower levels, it may not be able to implement #1 above (definitely the case at the municipal level). At best, #2 can be implemented without coalitionist interference.
    Basically, if Die Linke shouldn't be in regional coalitions with the SPD (in spite of the political differences being definitely smaller at this level), what should its strategy be, then?
  14. Die Neue Zeit
    Die Neue Zeit
    Although nobody has yet answered my questions above ( ), I'd like to bump this up by pointing to a Learning thread where various posters express minoritarian tendencies:

    http://www.revleft.com/vb/overthrow-...852/index.html
  15. Tower of Bebel
    Tower of Bebel
    The party of extreme opposition? Ring a bell? The only option left for Die linke is a united front (which also means: a socialist programme).
  16. Q
    Q
    The party of extreme opposition? Ring a bell? The only option left for Die linke is a united front (which also means: a socialist programme).
    How do you think that will happen? Die Linke's leadership isn't exactly waiting for a socialist programme, despite the rhetorics.
  17. Die Neue Zeit
    Die Neue Zeit
    So more or less #2, then (program for radical measures that don't necessitate constitutional change, without any coalitionist interference)?

    It's just that the socialist program is "irrelevant" at lower levels due to the dastardly federal structure.

    Does the "mass strike" tactic at the lower levels also constitute a "party of extreme opposition" - i.e., have a provincial program that in the long-term facilitates mass strikes during the revolutionary period and in the here and now facilitates civil disobedience?



    [Maybe my post above was confusing, but what I meant to say was that you guys didn't answer my question "Does the Kautskyist strategy break down at lower levels?"]
  18. Die Neue Zeit
    Die Neue Zeit
    Sorry for bumping this up, but while I was surfing for stuff on the Chavez's international project, I came across this Mike Macnair remark:

    http://www.socialistunity.com/?p=4773#comment-161074

    Two distinctions:

    (1) As several commentators have pointed out, there is a difference between coalition government agreements in local government and in national government. The reason is that coalition in national government involves taking responsibility for (a) the existing state of the laws and (b) foreign and ‘defence’/ war policy. In local government no-one expects an administration to act beyond the limits of the existing laws; in national government matters are different.

    (2) There is also a difference at both levels between ad hoc coalition agreements for particular purposes (possibly quite extensive) and *government* agreements, which involve ministerial solidarity and voting for the budget.

    It is perfectly clear that the consequence of entering into national, government agreements with the social-liberals or the openly pro-capitalist parties is to discredit the claim of the left to offer a political alternative to the right. Witness the recent failure of Rifondazione in Italy, which other commenters have brought up but Andy has so far studiously avoided; witness also France in the Gauche Plurielle period, which Andrew also studiously avoids; but there are also many, many other examples going back to the early 20th century.

    This is not in itself a “reform or revolution” issue. The French problem is simply that the PCF is committed to electoral agreements with the PS which subordinate any ‘leftism’ from PCF elected representatives, and the PS is controlled by the right. The suggestion that the LCR’s / NPA’s refusal to join this system is ’sectarian’ or an ‘excuse’ is therefore BS.
  19. Paul Cockshott
    Paul Cockshott
    I'm posting this because it's so true:

    The Eightteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon


    You could argue that the first part in bold discribes the Erfurt programme.

    The second congress of the Communist International
    The particular passage " The peculiar character of social-democracy is epitomized in the fact that democratic-republican institutions are demanded as a means, not of doing away with two extremes, capital and wage labor, but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into harmony. However different the means proposed for the attainment of this end may be, however much it may be trimmed with more or less revolutionary notions, the content remains the same. "
    Is very similar to the criticisms I put in of the CPGB draft
  20. Paul Cockshott
    Paul Cockshott
    How do you think that will happen? Die Linke's leadership isn't exactly waiting for a socialist programme, despite the rhetorics.
    Well, we are making a bit of headway here, I addressed many of their leading intellectuals on it last month in Berlin and at least got a sympathetic hearing, Modrow seemed reasonably convinced. A number of their parliamentarians are at least reading and discussing the programme we presented
    see http://www.socialismoxxi.org/Transit...%20english.pdf or
    http://reality.gn.apc.org/