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synthesis
14th December 2008, 07:08
Bullshit, Biology & Balzac:



A Brief Glimpse into the Post-Modern Belief System





“The world is opaque, and appearances fool us.”



– Nassim Taleb





“We are in quite another latitude, in fact; we have left the North for the East, but the darkness is just as thick as before.”



– Lost Illusions by Honoré de Balzac



Post-modernism is not a particularly easy phenomenon to explain.

The term has been used in so many different ways that any reasonably adequate explanation of the post-modernist movement requires sufficient information about the movements which preceded it.

In Antiquity and the Renaissance, many philosophers made the basic assumption that reality was primarily governed by logic and rationality, and could be wholly deciphered by objective scientific reasoning, as a rejection of the absolute supremacy of Church dogma.

Centuries later, the combination of the Industrial Revolution and the horrible suffering of the two World Wars annihilated the sense of harmony and logic with which Renaissance-era philosophers perceived the world around them; additionally, Einstein’s Theory of Relativity cast doubts upon the ossified notion of total scientific objectivity. Consequently, the modernist movement had a tendency to respond to these uncomfortable truths by focusing on absurdity and the surreal.

Post-modernism can thus be perceived as an attempt to recreate some sense of order out of the random fragments of the rational, rigidly logical Renaissance worldview, shattered by modernity over the course of the 20th century.

Post-modernist thinkers reject the idea that reality can be explained entirely through objective, predictable rationality, yet they also tend to reject the abstraction and absurdity of modernism as infertile soil for a useful understanding of human nature.

Essentially, the dialectic of post-modernism attempts to achieve a satisfactory synthesis of absolutism and relativism, morality and skepticism – fundamental for an era of bullshit, trapped between the disproved ideology of total scientific objectivity and the inevitable solipsism engendered by an entirely subjective worldview.

Post-modernism asks for reconciliation of the deification of objectivity in the Renaissance and the Modernist movement’s cynicism towards objectivity through the construction of the narrative theory, arguing that as social creatures, humans perceive the world through overly cohesive narratives.

In Richard Dawkins’ book The Selfish Gene, the author argues that the basis of these narratives lies in “memetics,” asserting that the genesis and survival mechanisms of narratives – composed of “memes” – are analogous to genetic replication in that the individual units of transmission are intrinsically inclined to self-replicate.

“When you plant a fertile meme in my brain,” says Dawkins, “you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host cell.”[1] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn1) Dawkins provides the example of the “God meme”: its enormous capacity for survival and self-replication lies in its psychological appeal, as a source of immutable justice, existential security, and divine authority.[2] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn2)

The God of the New Testament replicated, mutated, and displaced the God of the Old Testament because the “all-loving, all-forgiving” New Testament narrative was a more potent vehicle for self-replication than the jealous Old Testament God; in memetics theory, this evolution paved the way for Christianity to become the dominant world religion of today.

In attempting to deconstruct the concept of a narrative into its basic units, Dawkins constructs a narrative wherein the proliferation of a meme (or gene) is chiefly predicated upon its ability to self-replicate.

In reality, narratives have a penchant for painting a false picture of actuality, termed the “narrative fallacy” by the theorist Nassim Nicholas Taleb.

Using the field of history as an example in his book The Black Swan, Taleb argues that “the more we try to turn history into anything other than an enumeration of accounts to be enjoyed with minimal theorizing, the more we get into trouble”[3] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn3) in terms of accurately depicting reality. “History,” says Taleb, “is certainly not a place to theorize or derive general knowledge.”[4] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn4)

As evidence, he cites Herodotus, one of the first historians, who said that his purpose was to chronicle the wars between Ancient Greece and “barbarian” nations, “and, in particular, beyond everything else, to give a cause to their fighting one another”[5] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn5) when, in fact, the cause of any one particular skirmish may not comply with his neatly constructed narrative.

According to Taleb, the potency of the narrative fallacy is predicated upon the existence of “silent evidence.” Taleb describes silent evidence as an optical illusion; when learning “history”, for example, the historian cannot reference the vast majority of occurrences which no one thought notable to record for future reference, as “history… is any succession of events seen with the effect of posterity”[6] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn6) and therefore the collections of subjectively notable occurrences which academics call “history” can excessively skew our perception of any given time and place in the past.

Shifting between academic fields, Taleb examines the life and literature of the French novelist Honoré de Balzac, who has remained prominent in literary circles since his death in 1850. Taleb notes that many critics ascribe the success and longevity of de Balzac’s works to characteristics such as realism, character development, and insightfulness.

However, Taleb points to the silent evidence of contemporary authors whose works possessed the same characteristics, yet ultimately failed to achieve the prominence of de Balzac; therefore, “if there are indeed many perished manuscripts with similar attributes, then, I regret to say, your idol Balzac was just the beneficiary of disproportionate luck compared to his peers.”[7] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn7)

Taleb never argues that characteristics such as realism and sensitivity are absent in Balzac’s works; instead, he denies that these characteristics are the sole source of Balzac’s longevity, raising questions about the influence of external circumstances on Balzac’s legacy.

In fact, the question of the role of circumstances is a prevalent theme in Balzac’s literature. Taleb refers to de Balzac’s novel Lost Illusions, where “success is presented cynically, as the product of wile and promotion or the lucky surge of interest for reasons completely external to the works themselves.”

Taleb presses his point by remarking that nostalgia consumes the characters of the book, “bemoaning that things are no longer as they were before,”[8] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn8)as when Etienne de Lousteau laments “the bourgeois taste for literature without ideas.”[9] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn9) The characters engage in the fallacy of silent evidence by presuming that the successes and failures of ancient literary figures were any less subject to external circumstances than those of contemporary writers.

However, Taleb does not dismiss the utility of narratives entirely. Returning to the field of history, Taleb asserts that despite the vast quantity of silent evidence which inevitably skews any conclusions that historians might attempt to infer from their studies, “history is useful for the thrill of knowing the past, and for the narrative… provided it remains a harmless narrative… We can get negative confirmation from history, which is invaluable, but we get plenty of illusions of knowledge along with it.”[10] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn10) Ultimately, these “illusions of knowledge” represent the dark side of the narrative fallacy, when it ceases to be harmless.

Narrative fallacies are not bad because they are “wrong” or “lies”, but because they are “bullshit.” The narrative fallacy does not involve acceptance or rejection of “the truth,” but rather “bullshit” or a lack of regard for truth; bullshit utilizes truth when suitable and discards truth when it forms a hindrance to the construction and maintenance of appearances.

Thus, when Herodotus discusses an event that complies with his narrative of historical processes, he need not lie about the cause; when he encounters an event that does not comply with his narrative, he might manipulate the evidence to fit his theory of causation. “By virtue of this,” argues Harry Frankfurt, “bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.”[11] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn11)

As a further example, Sigmund Freud once theorized that all dreams are a form of wish-fulfillment. In many cases, Freud would not have to “lie” to reconcile a dream with his narrative, as some dreams do fit into his schema.

However, when faced with a patient’s dream which clearly did not represent an unfulfilled wish, Freud argued that the wish of the dream was solely to prove his theory wrong.

Again, the issue is not whether the claim is right or wrong, but that it is bullshit – ostentation emerging victorious over truth.

In On Bullshit, Harry Frankfurt posits that one source of bullshit in modern times might, in fact, be Modernism. He asserts that “various forms of skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality… undermine confidence in the value of disinterested efforts to determine what is true and what is false.”[12] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn12)

Frankfurt speculates that modernist solipsism has replaced the ideal of objective “correctness” with the ideal of subjective “sincerity.” Therefore, in Modernism, being “true to oneself” is superior to being “true to the facts,” which are inherently unknowable.

However, Frankfurt argues that the truth about oneself is no more “solid and resistant to skeptical dissolution” than the truths of other things, and subsequently, “sincerity itself is bullshit.”[13] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn13) The implicit argument – that being true to the facts is as valuable as being true to oneself – evinces how post-modernists labor at the task of building new structures on top of the rubble of traditional philosophy, demolished by modernity.

With the theories of Taleb and Frankfurt in mind, the narrative fallacies of The Selfish Gene in general – and Dawkins’ theories of memetics in particular – become readily apparent. Dawkins describes a meme as a unit of cultural transmission, yet fails to adequately define what he means by “culture”; a meme is more aptly explained as a unit of semiotic replication.

As Dawkins’ critics have noted, a meme cannot be a sign in and of itself, as all signs require an interpretant in order to acquire meaning. However, even the second definition is somewhat lacking, or at the very least creates a false impression of “a kind of misplaced agency, that both genes and memes - replicators - can be understood without considering their embeddedness in a dynamic system which imbues them with their function and informational content.”[14] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn14) Dawkins commits the fallacy of silent evidence when he depicts replicators as dominant over the “dynamic system” in which they exist.

Dawkins’ particular brand of bullshit is not predicated upon lies but rather a desire to force the dynamics and unpredictability of reality into his particular narrative concerning the omnipotent replicator. “However studiously and conscientiously the bullshitter proceeds,” says Frankfurt, “it remains true that he is also trying to get away with something.”[15] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn15)

Accordingly, Terrence Deacon argues that Dawkins’ theory of memetics “is not wrong, it just cuts corners that suggest that certain essential aspects of information processing in biological systems can be treated as merely derivative from the replicator concept. In fact, this inverts the reality.”[16] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn16) Just as our genes are only patterns of DNA until they become information - on a context-dependent basis - memes are just “sign vehicles” until encountered by an interpretant.

Dawkins seems to acknowledge external factors influencing the fate of a replicator only when the factors are other replicators, thus distracting his audience from the context in which these replicators exist.

Therefore, the idea that Christianity survived and thrived because the New Testament God was a more potent meme does not necessarily have to be wrong, but it does “cut corners” in that it ignores the context in which these memes existed, such as the shifting dynamics of the Roman Empire, the Crusades, and European colonialism.

In short, a critical analysis of The Selfish Gene, On Bullshit, and The Black Swan is essential to any thorough understanding of the post-modern system of belief.

Through the examination of memetics, bullshit, and the fallacy of silent evidence, all three authors outline the potency of narratives and the methods by which narratives influence practically every aspect of human society.

At the same time, the tendency to view all of society as a product of narratives or memes has become a narrative in and of itself, as evinced by Dawkins’ all-encompassing replicator.

Therefore, any post-modern thinker has to be conscious of the broader context in which narratives exist; otherwise, one would risk remaining in the shackles of the “illusion of knowledge,” knee-deep in bullshit.

[1] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref1) Dawkins, 192

[2] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref2) Dawkins, 193

[3] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref3) Taleb, 199

[4] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref4) Ibid.

[5] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref5) Ibid.

[6] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref6) Taleb, 101

[7] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref7) Taleb, 103

[8] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref8) Taleb, 105

[9] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref9) http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13159/13159.txt

[10] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref10) Taleb, 199

[11] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref11) Frankfurt, 61

[12] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref12) Frankfurt, 64-5

[13] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref13) Frankfurt, 66-7

[14] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref14) http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/srb/10-3edit.html

[15] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref15) Frankfurt, 23

[16] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref16) http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/srb/10-3edit.html

synthesis
14th December 2008, 07:16
Side note: When I say "bullshit," I mean the philosophical usage as defined by Frankfurt.

http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7929.html

S. Zetor
14th December 2008, 11:47
Re Dawkins' meme concept, I found it dubious for the same reasons.. it doesn't really explain anything.

Re postmodernism in general, David Harvey has made several good points in his book 'The Condition of Postmodernity'. His argument in the book, as summarised on the very first page, is:

"While simultaneity in the shifting dimensions of time and space is no proof of necessary or causal connection, strong a priori grounds can be adduced for the proposition that there is some kind of necessary relation between the rise of postmodernist cultural forms, the emergence of more flexible modes of capital accumulation, and a new round of 'time-space compression' in the organisation of capitalism."

"Time-space compression", which Harvey uses excessively (and not necessarily so usefully, IMO) refers simply to what is usually called the world getting smaller, and information flows becoming more and more "immediate". N.B. also just-in-time capitalism, shortening of turnover time of capital etc.

"The Enlightenment project [..] took it as axiomatic that there was only one possible answer to any question. From this it followed that the world could be controlled and rationally ordered if we could only picture and represent it rightly. [..] But after 1848 the idea [..] began to break down. [..] Most commentators argue that this furore of experimentation [with different representational models] resulted in a qualitative transformation in what modernism was about somewhere between 1910 and 1915." (p. 27-28)

As the socialist movement increasingly challenged the unity of Enlightenment, modernism "had to recognise the impossibility of representing the world in a single language. Understanding had to be constructed through the exploration of multiple perspectives. Modernism, in short, took on multiple perspectivism and relativism as its epistemology for revealing what it still took to be the true nature of a unified, though complex, underlying reality." (p. 30)

In Harvey's opinion, the most startling fact about postmodernism is "its total acceptance if the ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic that formed the one half of Baudelaire's conception of modernity. But postmodernism responds to the fact of that in a very particular way. It does not try to trancend it." (p. 44)

Harvey's assessment of postmodernism, with which I agree, is that "in its concern for difference, for the difficulties of communication, for the complexity and nuances of interest, cultures, places, and the like, it excercises a positive influence. [..] Postmodernism has been paricularly important in acknowledging 'the multiple forms of otherness as they emerge from differences in subjectivity, gender and sexuality, race and class [..]". But he points out, that as critics of modernism, the po-mo's neglect that there was plenty of variety within modernism itself. Marx and the Marxists, for example, had a lot more "eye for detail, fragmentation, and disjunction that is often caricatured out of existence in postmodern polemics." (p. 115)

Harvey also puts well what I consider to be the biggest shortcoming of postmodernism as a guide to political action:

"Obsessed with deconstructing and delegitimising every form of argument they encounter, they can end only in condemning their own validity claim to the points where nothing remains of any basis for reasoned action. Postmodernism has us accepting the reifications and partitionings, actually celebrating the activity of masking and cover-up, all the fetishisms of locality, place or social grouping, while denying that kind of meta-theory which can grasp the political-economic processes (money flows, international divisions of labour, financial markets, and the like) that are becoming ever more universalizing in their depth, intensity, reach and power over daily life." (p. 116-117.)

The best part of the book is certainly chapter 7, where Harvey deals with the economic transformations from the Fordist mode of accumulation of more flexible, post-Fordist mode of accumulation.

"Flexible accumulation [..] is characterised by the emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and organizational innovation." (p. 147.)

One of the best observations Harvey makes is in my opinion this one:

"The half-life of a typical Fordist product was, for example, from five to seven years, but flexible accumulation has more than cut that in half in certain sectors (such as textile and clothing industries) while in others - such as the so-called 'thought-ware' industries (e.g. video games and computer software programmes) - the half-life is down to less that eighteen months. Flexible accumulation has been accompanied on the consumption side, therefore, by a much greater attention to quick-changing fashions and the mobilization of all the artifices of need inducement and cultural transformation that this implies. the relatively stable easthetic of Fordist modernism has given way to all the ferment, instability, and fleeting qualities of a postmodernist aesthetic that celebrates difference, ephemerality, spectacle, fashion, and the commodification of cultural forms." (p. 156.)

All this goes neatly together with the growth of the service sector in imperialist countries, as the product is consumed at the same time it is produced..