synthesis
14th December 2008, 07:08
Bullshit, Biology & Balzac:
A Brief Glimpse into the Post-Modern Belief System
“The world is opaque, and appearances fool us.”
– Nassim Taleb
“We are in quite another latitude, in fact; we have left the North for the East, but the darkness is just as thick as before.”
– Lost Illusions by Honoré de Balzac
Post-modernism is not a particularly easy phenomenon to explain.
The term has been used in so many different ways that any reasonably adequate explanation of the post-modernist movement requires sufficient information about the movements which preceded it.
In Antiquity and the Renaissance, many philosophers made the basic assumption that reality was primarily governed by logic and rationality, and could be wholly deciphered by objective scientific reasoning, as a rejection of the absolute supremacy of Church dogma.
Centuries later, the combination of the Industrial Revolution and the horrible suffering of the two World Wars annihilated the sense of harmony and logic with which Renaissance-era philosophers perceived the world around them; additionally, Einstein’s Theory of Relativity cast doubts upon the ossified notion of total scientific objectivity. Consequently, the modernist movement had a tendency to respond to these uncomfortable truths by focusing on absurdity and the surreal.
Post-modernism can thus be perceived as an attempt to recreate some sense of order out of the random fragments of the rational, rigidly logical Renaissance worldview, shattered by modernity over the course of the 20th century.
Post-modernist thinkers reject the idea that reality can be explained entirely through objective, predictable rationality, yet they also tend to reject the abstraction and absurdity of modernism as infertile soil for a useful understanding of human nature.
Essentially, the dialectic of post-modernism attempts to achieve a satisfactory synthesis of absolutism and relativism, morality and skepticism – fundamental for an era of bullshit, trapped between the disproved ideology of total scientific objectivity and the inevitable solipsism engendered by an entirely subjective worldview.
Post-modernism asks for reconciliation of the deification of objectivity in the Renaissance and the Modernist movement’s cynicism towards objectivity through the construction of the narrative theory, arguing that as social creatures, humans perceive the world through overly cohesive narratives.
In Richard Dawkins’ book The Selfish Gene, the author argues that the basis of these narratives lies in “memetics,” asserting that the genesis and survival mechanisms of narratives – composed of “memes” – are analogous to genetic replication in that the individual units of transmission are intrinsically inclined to self-replicate.
“When you plant a fertile meme in my brain,” says Dawkins, “you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host cell.”[1] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn1) Dawkins provides the example of the “God meme”: its enormous capacity for survival and self-replication lies in its psychological appeal, as a source of immutable justice, existential security, and divine authority.[2] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn2)
The God of the New Testament replicated, mutated, and displaced the God of the Old Testament because the “all-loving, all-forgiving” New Testament narrative was a more potent vehicle for self-replication than the jealous Old Testament God; in memetics theory, this evolution paved the way for Christianity to become the dominant world religion of today.
In attempting to deconstruct the concept of a narrative into its basic units, Dawkins constructs a narrative wherein the proliferation of a meme (or gene) is chiefly predicated upon its ability to self-replicate.
In reality, narratives have a penchant for painting a false picture of actuality, termed the “narrative fallacy” by the theorist Nassim Nicholas Taleb.
Using the field of history as an example in his book The Black Swan, Taleb argues that “the more we try to turn history into anything other than an enumeration of accounts to be enjoyed with minimal theorizing, the more we get into trouble”[3] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn3) in terms of accurately depicting reality. “History,” says Taleb, “is certainly not a place to theorize or derive general knowledge.”[4] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn4)
As evidence, he cites Herodotus, one of the first historians, who said that his purpose was to chronicle the wars between Ancient Greece and “barbarian” nations, “and, in particular, beyond everything else, to give a cause to their fighting one another”[5] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn5) when, in fact, the cause of any one particular skirmish may not comply with his neatly constructed narrative.
According to Taleb, the potency of the narrative fallacy is predicated upon the existence of “silent evidence.” Taleb describes silent evidence as an optical illusion; when learning “history”, for example, the historian cannot reference the vast majority of occurrences which no one thought notable to record for future reference, as “history… is any succession of events seen with the effect of posterity”[6] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn6) and therefore the collections of subjectively notable occurrences which academics call “history” can excessively skew our perception of any given time and place in the past.
Shifting between academic fields, Taleb examines the life and literature of the French novelist Honoré de Balzac, who has remained prominent in literary circles since his death in 1850. Taleb notes that many critics ascribe the success and longevity of de Balzac’s works to characteristics such as realism, character development, and insightfulness.
However, Taleb points to the silent evidence of contemporary authors whose works possessed the same characteristics, yet ultimately failed to achieve the prominence of de Balzac; therefore, “if there are indeed many perished manuscripts with similar attributes, then, I regret to say, your idol Balzac was just the beneficiary of disproportionate luck compared to his peers.”[7] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn7)
Taleb never argues that characteristics such as realism and sensitivity are absent in Balzac’s works; instead, he denies that these characteristics are the sole source of Balzac’s longevity, raising questions about the influence of external circumstances on Balzac’s legacy.
In fact, the question of the role of circumstances is a prevalent theme in Balzac’s literature. Taleb refers to de Balzac’s novel Lost Illusions, where “success is presented cynically, as the product of wile and promotion or the lucky surge of interest for reasons completely external to the works themselves.”
Taleb presses his point by remarking that nostalgia consumes the characters of the book, “bemoaning that things are no longer as they were before,”[8] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn8)as when Etienne de Lousteau laments “the bourgeois taste for literature without ideas.”[9] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn9) The characters engage in the fallacy of silent evidence by presuming that the successes and failures of ancient literary figures were any less subject to external circumstances than those of contemporary writers.
However, Taleb does not dismiss the utility of narratives entirely. Returning to the field of history, Taleb asserts that despite the vast quantity of silent evidence which inevitably skews any conclusions that historians might attempt to infer from their studies, “history is useful for the thrill of knowing the past, and for the narrative… provided it remains a harmless narrative… We can get negative confirmation from history, which is invaluable, but we get plenty of illusions of knowledge along with it.”[10] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn10) Ultimately, these “illusions of knowledge” represent the dark side of the narrative fallacy, when it ceases to be harmless.
Narrative fallacies are not bad because they are “wrong” or “lies”, but because they are “bullshit.” The narrative fallacy does not involve acceptance or rejection of “the truth,” but rather “bullshit” or a lack of regard for truth; bullshit utilizes truth when suitable and discards truth when it forms a hindrance to the construction and maintenance of appearances.
Thus, when Herodotus discusses an event that complies with his narrative of historical processes, he need not lie about the cause; when he encounters an event that does not comply with his narrative, he might manipulate the evidence to fit his theory of causation. “By virtue of this,” argues Harry Frankfurt, “bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.”[11] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn11)
As a further example, Sigmund Freud once theorized that all dreams are a form of wish-fulfillment. In many cases, Freud would not have to “lie” to reconcile a dream with his narrative, as some dreams do fit into his schema.
However, when faced with a patient’s dream which clearly did not represent an unfulfilled wish, Freud argued that the wish of the dream was solely to prove his theory wrong.
Again, the issue is not whether the claim is right or wrong, but that it is bullshit – ostentation emerging victorious over truth.
In On Bullshit, Harry Frankfurt posits that one source of bullshit in modern times might, in fact, be Modernism. He asserts that “various forms of skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality… undermine confidence in the value of disinterested efforts to determine what is true and what is false.”[12] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn12)
Frankfurt speculates that modernist solipsism has replaced the ideal of objective “correctness” with the ideal of subjective “sincerity.” Therefore, in Modernism, being “true to oneself” is superior to being “true to the facts,” which are inherently unknowable.
However, Frankfurt argues that the truth about oneself is no more “solid and resistant to skeptical dissolution” than the truths of other things, and subsequently, “sincerity itself is bullshit.”[13] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn13) The implicit argument – that being true to the facts is as valuable as being true to oneself – evinces how post-modernists labor at the task of building new structures on top of the rubble of traditional philosophy, demolished by modernity.
With the theories of Taleb and Frankfurt in mind, the narrative fallacies of The Selfish Gene in general – and Dawkins’ theories of memetics in particular – become readily apparent. Dawkins describes a meme as a unit of cultural transmission, yet fails to adequately define what he means by “culture”; a meme is more aptly explained as a unit of semiotic replication.
As Dawkins’ critics have noted, a meme cannot be a sign in and of itself, as all signs require an interpretant in order to acquire meaning. However, even the second definition is somewhat lacking, or at the very least creates a false impression of “a kind of misplaced agency, that both genes and memes - replicators - can be understood without considering their embeddedness in a dynamic system which imbues them with their function and informational content.”[14] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn14) Dawkins commits the fallacy of silent evidence when he depicts replicators as dominant over the “dynamic system” in which they exist.
Dawkins’ particular brand of bullshit is not predicated upon lies but rather a desire to force the dynamics and unpredictability of reality into his particular narrative concerning the omnipotent replicator. “However studiously and conscientiously the bullshitter proceeds,” says Frankfurt, “it remains true that he is also trying to get away with something.”[15] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn15)
Accordingly, Terrence Deacon argues that Dawkins’ theory of memetics “is not wrong, it just cuts corners that suggest that certain essential aspects of information processing in biological systems can be treated as merely derivative from the replicator concept. In fact, this inverts the reality.”[16] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn16) Just as our genes are only patterns of DNA until they become information - on a context-dependent basis - memes are just “sign vehicles” until encountered by an interpretant.
Dawkins seems to acknowledge external factors influencing the fate of a replicator only when the factors are other replicators, thus distracting his audience from the context in which these replicators exist.
Therefore, the idea that Christianity survived and thrived because the New Testament God was a more potent meme does not necessarily have to be wrong, but it does “cut corners” in that it ignores the context in which these memes existed, such as the shifting dynamics of the Roman Empire, the Crusades, and European colonialism.
In short, a critical analysis of The Selfish Gene, On Bullshit, and The Black Swan is essential to any thorough understanding of the post-modern system of belief.
Through the examination of memetics, bullshit, and the fallacy of silent evidence, all three authors outline the potency of narratives and the methods by which narratives influence practically every aspect of human society.
At the same time, the tendency to view all of society as a product of narratives or memes has become a narrative in and of itself, as evinced by Dawkins’ all-encompassing replicator.
Therefore, any post-modern thinker has to be conscious of the broader context in which narratives exist; otherwise, one would risk remaining in the shackles of the “illusion of knowledge,” knee-deep in bullshit.
[1] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref1) Dawkins, 192
[2] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref2) Dawkins, 193
[3] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref3) Taleb, 199
[4] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref4) Ibid.
[5] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref5) Ibid.
[6] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref6) Taleb, 101
[7] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref7) Taleb, 103
[8] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref8) Taleb, 105
[9] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref9) http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13159/13159.txt
[10] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref10) Taleb, 199
[11] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref11) Frankfurt, 61
[12] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref12) Frankfurt, 64-5
[13] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref13) Frankfurt, 66-7
[14] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref14) http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/srb/10-3edit.html
[15] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref15) Frankfurt, 23
[16] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref16) http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/srb/10-3edit.html
A Brief Glimpse into the Post-Modern Belief System
“The world is opaque, and appearances fool us.”
– Nassim Taleb
“We are in quite another latitude, in fact; we have left the North for the East, but the darkness is just as thick as before.”
– Lost Illusions by Honoré de Balzac
Post-modernism is not a particularly easy phenomenon to explain.
The term has been used in so many different ways that any reasonably adequate explanation of the post-modernist movement requires sufficient information about the movements which preceded it.
In Antiquity and the Renaissance, many philosophers made the basic assumption that reality was primarily governed by logic and rationality, and could be wholly deciphered by objective scientific reasoning, as a rejection of the absolute supremacy of Church dogma.
Centuries later, the combination of the Industrial Revolution and the horrible suffering of the two World Wars annihilated the sense of harmony and logic with which Renaissance-era philosophers perceived the world around them; additionally, Einstein’s Theory of Relativity cast doubts upon the ossified notion of total scientific objectivity. Consequently, the modernist movement had a tendency to respond to these uncomfortable truths by focusing on absurdity and the surreal.
Post-modernism can thus be perceived as an attempt to recreate some sense of order out of the random fragments of the rational, rigidly logical Renaissance worldview, shattered by modernity over the course of the 20th century.
Post-modernist thinkers reject the idea that reality can be explained entirely through objective, predictable rationality, yet they also tend to reject the abstraction and absurdity of modernism as infertile soil for a useful understanding of human nature.
Essentially, the dialectic of post-modernism attempts to achieve a satisfactory synthesis of absolutism and relativism, morality and skepticism – fundamental for an era of bullshit, trapped between the disproved ideology of total scientific objectivity and the inevitable solipsism engendered by an entirely subjective worldview.
Post-modernism asks for reconciliation of the deification of objectivity in the Renaissance and the Modernist movement’s cynicism towards objectivity through the construction of the narrative theory, arguing that as social creatures, humans perceive the world through overly cohesive narratives.
In Richard Dawkins’ book The Selfish Gene, the author argues that the basis of these narratives lies in “memetics,” asserting that the genesis and survival mechanisms of narratives – composed of “memes” – are analogous to genetic replication in that the individual units of transmission are intrinsically inclined to self-replicate.
“When you plant a fertile meme in my brain,” says Dawkins, “you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host cell.”[1] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn1) Dawkins provides the example of the “God meme”: its enormous capacity for survival and self-replication lies in its psychological appeal, as a source of immutable justice, existential security, and divine authority.[2] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn2)
The God of the New Testament replicated, mutated, and displaced the God of the Old Testament because the “all-loving, all-forgiving” New Testament narrative was a more potent vehicle for self-replication than the jealous Old Testament God; in memetics theory, this evolution paved the way for Christianity to become the dominant world religion of today.
In attempting to deconstruct the concept of a narrative into its basic units, Dawkins constructs a narrative wherein the proliferation of a meme (or gene) is chiefly predicated upon its ability to self-replicate.
In reality, narratives have a penchant for painting a false picture of actuality, termed the “narrative fallacy” by the theorist Nassim Nicholas Taleb.
Using the field of history as an example in his book The Black Swan, Taleb argues that “the more we try to turn history into anything other than an enumeration of accounts to be enjoyed with minimal theorizing, the more we get into trouble”[3] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn3) in terms of accurately depicting reality. “History,” says Taleb, “is certainly not a place to theorize or derive general knowledge.”[4] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn4)
As evidence, he cites Herodotus, one of the first historians, who said that his purpose was to chronicle the wars between Ancient Greece and “barbarian” nations, “and, in particular, beyond everything else, to give a cause to their fighting one another”[5] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn5) when, in fact, the cause of any one particular skirmish may not comply with his neatly constructed narrative.
According to Taleb, the potency of the narrative fallacy is predicated upon the existence of “silent evidence.” Taleb describes silent evidence as an optical illusion; when learning “history”, for example, the historian cannot reference the vast majority of occurrences which no one thought notable to record for future reference, as “history… is any succession of events seen with the effect of posterity”[6] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn6) and therefore the collections of subjectively notable occurrences which academics call “history” can excessively skew our perception of any given time and place in the past.
Shifting between academic fields, Taleb examines the life and literature of the French novelist Honoré de Balzac, who has remained prominent in literary circles since his death in 1850. Taleb notes that many critics ascribe the success and longevity of de Balzac’s works to characteristics such as realism, character development, and insightfulness.
However, Taleb points to the silent evidence of contemporary authors whose works possessed the same characteristics, yet ultimately failed to achieve the prominence of de Balzac; therefore, “if there are indeed many perished manuscripts with similar attributes, then, I regret to say, your idol Balzac was just the beneficiary of disproportionate luck compared to his peers.”[7] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn7)
Taleb never argues that characteristics such as realism and sensitivity are absent in Balzac’s works; instead, he denies that these characteristics are the sole source of Balzac’s longevity, raising questions about the influence of external circumstances on Balzac’s legacy.
In fact, the question of the role of circumstances is a prevalent theme in Balzac’s literature. Taleb refers to de Balzac’s novel Lost Illusions, where “success is presented cynically, as the product of wile and promotion or the lucky surge of interest for reasons completely external to the works themselves.”
Taleb presses his point by remarking that nostalgia consumes the characters of the book, “bemoaning that things are no longer as they were before,”[8] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn8)as when Etienne de Lousteau laments “the bourgeois taste for literature without ideas.”[9] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn9) The characters engage in the fallacy of silent evidence by presuming that the successes and failures of ancient literary figures were any less subject to external circumstances than those of contemporary writers.
However, Taleb does not dismiss the utility of narratives entirely. Returning to the field of history, Taleb asserts that despite the vast quantity of silent evidence which inevitably skews any conclusions that historians might attempt to infer from their studies, “history is useful for the thrill of knowing the past, and for the narrative… provided it remains a harmless narrative… We can get negative confirmation from history, which is invaluable, but we get plenty of illusions of knowledge along with it.”[10] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn10) Ultimately, these “illusions of knowledge” represent the dark side of the narrative fallacy, when it ceases to be harmless.
Narrative fallacies are not bad because they are “wrong” or “lies”, but because they are “bullshit.” The narrative fallacy does not involve acceptance or rejection of “the truth,” but rather “bullshit” or a lack of regard for truth; bullshit utilizes truth when suitable and discards truth when it forms a hindrance to the construction and maintenance of appearances.
Thus, when Herodotus discusses an event that complies with his narrative of historical processes, he need not lie about the cause; when he encounters an event that does not comply with his narrative, he might manipulate the evidence to fit his theory of causation. “By virtue of this,” argues Harry Frankfurt, “bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.”[11] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn11)
As a further example, Sigmund Freud once theorized that all dreams are a form of wish-fulfillment. In many cases, Freud would not have to “lie” to reconcile a dream with his narrative, as some dreams do fit into his schema.
However, when faced with a patient’s dream which clearly did not represent an unfulfilled wish, Freud argued that the wish of the dream was solely to prove his theory wrong.
Again, the issue is not whether the claim is right or wrong, but that it is bullshit – ostentation emerging victorious over truth.
In On Bullshit, Harry Frankfurt posits that one source of bullshit in modern times might, in fact, be Modernism. He asserts that “various forms of skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality… undermine confidence in the value of disinterested efforts to determine what is true and what is false.”[12] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn12)
Frankfurt speculates that modernist solipsism has replaced the ideal of objective “correctness” with the ideal of subjective “sincerity.” Therefore, in Modernism, being “true to oneself” is superior to being “true to the facts,” which are inherently unknowable.
However, Frankfurt argues that the truth about oneself is no more “solid and resistant to skeptical dissolution” than the truths of other things, and subsequently, “sincerity itself is bullshit.”[13] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn13) The implicit argument – that being true to the facts is as valuable as being true to oneself – evinces how post-modernists labor at the task of building new structures on top of the rubble of traditional philosophy, demolished by modernity.
With the theories of Taleb and Frankfurt in mind, the narrative fallacies of The Selfish Gene in general – and Dawkins’ theories of memetics in particular – become readily apparent. Dawkins describes a meme as a unit of cultural transmission, yet fails to adequately define what he means by “culture”; a meme is more aptly explained as a unit of semiotic replication.
As Dawkins’ critics have noted, a meme cannot be a sign in and of itself, as all signs require an interpretant in order to acquire meaning. However, even the second definition is somewhat lacking, or at the very least creates a false impression of “a kind of misplaced agency, that both genes and memes - replicators - can be understood without considering their embeddedness in a dynamic system which imbues them with their function and informational content.”[14] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn14) Dawkins commits the fallacy of silent evidence when he depicts replicators as dominant over the “dynamic system” in which they exist.
Dawkins’ particular brand of bullshit is not predicated upon lies but rather a desire to force the dynamics and unpredictability of reality into his particular narrative concerning the omnipotent replicator. “However studiously and conscientiously the bullshitter proceeds,” says Frankfurt, “it remains true that he is also trying to get away with something.”[15] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn15)
Accordingly, Terrence Deacon argues that Dawkins’ theory of memetics “is not wrong, it just cuts corners that suggest that certain essential aspects of information processing in biological systems can be treated as merely derivative from the replicator concept. In fact, this inverts the reality.”[16] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn16) Just as our genes are only patterns of DNA until they become information - on a context-dependent basis - memes are just “sign vehicles” until encountered by an interpretant.
Dawkins seems to acknowledge external factors influencing the fate of a replicator only when the factors are other replicators, thus distracting his audience from the context in which these replicators exist.
Therefore, the idea that Christianity survived and thrived because the New Testament God was a more potent meme does not necessarily have to be wrong, but it does “cut corners” in that it ignores the context in which these memes existed, such as the shifting dynamics of the Roman Empire, the Crusades, and European colonialism.
In short, a critical analysis of The Selfish Gene, On Bullshit, and The Black Swan is essential to any thorough understanding of the post-modern system of belief.
Through the examination of memetics, bullshit, and the fallacy of silent evidence, all three authors outline the potency of narratives and the methods by which narratives influence practically every aspect of human society.
At the same time, the tendency to view all of society as a product of narratives or memes has become a narrative in and of itself, as evinced by Dawkins’ all-encompassing replicator.
Therefore, any post-modern thinker has to be conscious of the broader context in which narratives exist; otherwise, one would risk remaining in the shackles of the “illusion of knowledge,” knee-deep in bullshit.
[1] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref1) Dawkins, 192
[2] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref2) Dawkins, 193
[3] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref3) Taleb, 199
[4] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref4) Ibid.
[5] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref5) Ibid.
[6] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref6) Taleb, 101
[7] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref7) Taleb, 103
[8] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref8) Taleb, 105
[9] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref9) http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13159/13159.txt
[10] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref10) Taleb, 199
[11] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref11) Frankfurt, 61
[12] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref12) Frankfurt, 64-5
[13] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref13) Frankfurt, 66-7
[14] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref14) http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/srb/10-3edit.html
[15] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref15) Frankfurt, 23
[16] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftnref16) http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/srb/10-3edit.html