Dialectics

[79dougb]

Am I right in thinking that Dialectics is the concept of a debate between two people?!?

Why are a lot of forum members anti-dialectic?

(Excuse my ignorance!)

[ZeroNowhere]

Dialectics are a method of describing the motions of the universe so that as few people as possible have any idea what the hell you're talking about.
It has nothing to do with 'debate between two people', surely.
Or would debate count as the unity of opposites, thus leading to a contradiction?

Also, any thread about dialectics on Revleft is a ticking bomb.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

This was part of the original meaning, but the German philosopher Hegel transformed it into a cosmic system that ran the entire universe (since he thought that everything was mind, so it made sense to him that the universe sort of argued with itself, so to speak).

Early Marxists took these ideas over, extracted what they called their 'rational core', welded it to materialism, and this became 'Dialectical Materialism'.

It's hard to say what proportion of RevLeft members are anti-dialecticians, but my guess is that practically all of the anarchists are, and some of the Marxists are, including me.

You can find a simple explanation of this theory, along with my refutation of it, here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Anti-D_For_Dummies%2001.htm

[Pogue]

Rosa is it not possible for you to ever condense that down so you can explain it in a short paragraph?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HLVS, that is a tall order! I am not sure that this is possible without serious distortion to dialectics and to my criticism of it.

Here is a 2000 word article I wrote for the Weekly Worker last year (hope this is short enough!):


Has history refuted dialectics?

Rosa Lichtenstein explains why she rejects dialectical materialism - the ‘mystical theory Engels smuggled into Marxism’

In the space available I can only outline a few of my reasons for rejecting dialectical materialism. However, nothing here should be read as an attack on historical materialism, a theory I fully accept.

I will begin by looking at a handful of my criticisms of Engels’s three laws.

Quantity and quality

Engels asserted the following:


“[Q]ualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy) ... Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion: ie, without quantitative alteration of the body concerned.”1

Such changes, according to Plekhanov, are neither smooth nor gradual:


“[Q]uantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness … That is how all nature acts …”2

And yet there are many things in nature that undergo smooth qualitative change - for example, melting metal, glass, plastic, butter, toffee and chocolate. Sure, some things change ‘nodally’, but many do not. So, the ‘nodal’ aspect of this law is defective.

Unfortunately, this implies that it cannot be used to argue that the transformation from capitalism to socialism must be nodal too, for we have no idea whether this transformation is one of these exceptions. Plainly, we could only use this law if it had no exceptions whatsoever. This means that the whole point of adopting this law in the first place has now vanished.

What about ‘quantity into quality’? Undeniably, many material things change qualitatively as a result of the addition or subtraction of matter or energy. But this is not true of all qualitative difference. The order in which events take place can affect quality, too. For example, try crossing a busy main road first and looking second - now, try it the other way round! And anyone who tries pouring half a litre of water slowly into a litre of concentrated sulphuric acid will face a long and painful stay in hospital, whereas the reverse action is perfectly safe.

Moreover, this law is so vaguely worded that dialecticians can use it in whatever way they please. If this is difficult to believe, ask the very next dialectician you meet precisely how long a ‘nodal point’ is supposed to last. As seems clear, if no-one knows, anything from a geological age to an instantaneous quantum leap could be ‘nodal’!

And it really is not good enough for dialectically-inclined readers to dismiss this as mere pedantry. Can you imagine a genuine scientist refusing to say how long a crucially important interval in her theory is supposed to be, and accusing you of ‘pedantry’ for even asking?

Next, enquire what a ‘quality’ is. You might be told it is a property the change of which alters a process/object into something new. Unfortunately, given this explanation of ‘quality’, many of the examples dialecticians themselves employ would cease to work.

For instance, the most hackneyed example they use is that of water turning to ice or steam when cooled or heated. But, given the above, this would not be an example of qualitative change, since water as ice, liquid or steam is still water (ie, H2O). Quantitative addition or subtraction of energy does not result in a qualitative change of the required sort; nothing new emerges. This substance stays H2O throughout.

Faced with that, dialecticians may be tempted to relax the definition of ‘quality’, so that in a solid, liquid or gaseous state, water could be said to exhibit different qualities. Unfortunately, this would rescue the above example but sink the theory. If we allow ‘quality’ to apply to any qualitative difference, then we would have to admit the relational properties of bodies. In that case we could easily witness qualitative change where no extra matter or energy has been added. For instance, consider three animals in a row: a mouse, a pony and an elephant. In relation to the mouse, the pony is big, but in relation to the elephant it is small. Change in quality, with no matter or energy added or subtracted.

Of course, all this is quite apart from the fact that altering the way that ‘quality’ is understood indicates that changes in quality are now relative to an observer’s choice of descriptive framework. Plainly, this introduces a fundamental element of arbitrariness into what dialecticians claim to be a scientific law.

Finally, there are substances called isomers - ie, molecules with exactly the same number of atoms differently arranged - where, if the geometrical orientation of these atoms is altered, the resulting qualities of the compounds involved change. Here, we would have a change in geometry causing a change in quality, with the addition of no new matter or energy, contradicting Engels, who writes: “Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion ...”3 (emphasis added).

So, at the very best, this law is merely a quaint rule of thumb (rather like ‘A stitch in time saves nine’). At worst, it is like a stopped clock: totally useless, even if twice a day it tells the ‘right time’. Hence, Engels’s first law is of no use to revolutionary theory, and so has no role to play in helping to change society.

Unity and interpenetration of opposites

This is perhaps the most important of these laws, for it encapsulates the principle of change, as well as that of temporary stability.

Unfortunately, dialecticians have so far been entirely unclear whether things change because of their internal opposites, whether they change into these opposites (or even into one another) or, indeed, whether they create these opposites as they change:

Here are Lenin, Plekhanov and Mao:

Firstly, Lenin:


“Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things ... as follows: in the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions ....”

Among the elements of dialectics are the following, according to Lenin:


“[I]nternally contradictory tendencies … as the sum and unity of opposites …. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?] ...”.4

Secondly, Plekhanov:


“And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite …”.5

Finally, Mao:


“In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another ....

“[A]ll processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute.”6

But this leaves change a complete mystery. To see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two ‘internal opposites’, O* and O**, and thus changes as a result.

But, O* cannot itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** did not already exist, according to this theory, O* could not change, for there would be no opposite to bring that about.

And it is no good propelling O** into the future so that it now becomes what O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless O** is already there in the present to make that happen!

Hence, if object/process A is already composed of a dialectical union of O* and not-O* (ie, O**) and it ‘changes’ into not-O*, where is the change? All that seems to happen is that O* disappears. Thus, O* does not change into not-O*: it is just replaced by it.

At the very least, this account of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-O* itself came about. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere.

It cannot have come from O*, since O* can only change because of the operation of not-O*, which does not yet exist. And pushing the process into the past (via a ‘reversed’ version of the negation of the negation) will merely reduplicate the above problems.

Of course, this is all quite apart from the fact that many things just do not change into their opposites (or even because of them). When was the last time you saw a male cat turn into a female cat? Your left hand into your right? An electron into a proton? Or even a material object into an immaterial one?

And are we really supposed to believe that every proletarian (as individuals or as a class) will turn into capitalists (and/or vice versa)?

According to the above dialecticians, this must happen.

None of this implies that things cannot change, but it does mean that dialectics cannot explain why they do so.

Negation of the negation

This law is just an extension to the previous law, and so suffers from all the latter’s weaknesses.

Engels retailed a rather unfortunate example, however:


“Butterflies ... spring from the egg by a negation of the egg, pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs.”7

In fact, butterflies and moths go through the following stages:

Adult -> egg -> pupa -> chrysalis -> adult.

Which is the negation of which here? And which is the negation of the negation?

And what about organisms which reproduce by splitting, such as amoebae and bacteria? In any such split, which half is the negation and which the negation of the negation? Indeed, what about vegetative (asexual) reproduction in general, where there are no opposites (no gametes)?

Consider, too, the thoroughly reactionary life-form myxomycota (slime mould), which belongs neither to the plant nor the animal kingdom, but to the protoctista. Its life-cycle involves the following: a giant amoebal stage, followed by a slug-like existence, which morphs into a fungal-like fruiting body, which then releases spores. Again, which is the negation, and which is the negation of the negation?

And with respect to the former USSR (post 1917): if this law is progressive, why did it allow the revolution to decay and go into reverse?

Is modern-day Russia really then the un-negation of the negation of the negation of tsarist Russia?

Practice

Dialecticians tell us that truth is tested in practice. In that case, what does history reveal?

Unfortunately, it shows that dialectical Marxism has not known much in the way of success. The 1917 revolution has been reversed, practically every single socialist state has abandoned Marxism, all four Internationals have gone down the pan and few revolutionary parties these days can boast active membership levels that rise much above the risible. To cap it all, billions of workers worldwide not only ignore dialectics, they have never even heard of it.

And yet most dialecticians claim that dialectics lies at the heart of revolutionary theory and practice. If so, why have none of them drawn the obvious conclusion that history has refuted dialectics?

Nevertheless, it is my contention that this theory is part of the reason why dialectical Marxism is now almost synonymous with failure. This is because such long-term lack of success suggests that dialectical materialism might not be quite as sound as its supporters would have us believe.

No surprise, therefore: that is exactly what we have found

For more details of Rosa Lichtenstein’s views see http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notes

1. F Engels Dialectics of nature Moscow 1954, p63.

2. G Plekhanov The development of the monist view of history Moscow 1956, p163.

3. F Engels Dialectics of nature Moscow 1954, p63.

4. VI Lenin, ‘Philosophical notebooks’ CW Vol 38, Moscow 1961, pp196-97, 221-22.

5. G Plekhanov Moscow 1956, p77.

6. Mao Zedong, ‘On contradiction’ Selected works Vol 1, Peking 1964, pp340-42.

7. F Engels Anti-Dühring Peking 1976, p173.

http://www.cpgb.org.uk/worker/688/dialetics.htm

It was criticised by Jack Conrad, leading CPGB theorist, here:

http://www.cpgb.org.uk/worker/711/marxistthinking.html

To which I replied here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Conrad_Heart_Of_Darkness.htm

[gilhyle]

There are some people who are anti-dialectics on this site. There are a few reasons for this. Many of them are just not Marxists and adhere to more conventional sets of ideas, notably anarchism. Some would claim to be marxists.

The underlying difficult for those people is firstly that dialectics is inherently vague and this makes people ask what use is it and what importance does it have. Secondly dialectics has been used for purposes of intellectual bullying often linked to undesirable political causes - most notably Stalinism but also others such as the Healeyits WRP in the UK in the past, within which reference to dialectics was widely used to suppress debate. Thirdly within the broad tradition loosely called Marxism there have been some significant thinkers, notably Lukacs, Adorno and Sartre who have been influenced to various degrees by Hegel in ways which are different from Hegel's influence on Marx.

So its a complex picture. Rosa's article sets out her position succinctly. That position traces the issue of dialectics back to Engels. Others would say, on the contrary, that Engels did no more than defend a position he shared with Marx - and one Marx had asked him to defend. There is an answer to that argument and an answer in turn to that answer and on it goes.

Underlying this is a question about what Marxism itself is....or rather what it needs to be to play its role as the self-consciousness of a revolutionary movement. For some people, it is possible for us to think clearly. If we put aside ideology and spurious or false bourgeois ideological notions, we can think clearly and such clear thinking can lead us to Marxism - i.e. to a particular understanding of history and the economy.

For an alternative view, Marxism can only exist as a critique of the dominant ideas. For this view, socialists cannot expect to produce independent social or political economic science, but can only expect to pick out the particular flaws in the dominant view which reassure people that capitalism can go on for ever. To do that, so this argumment goes, Marxists need to think in ways that dont fit well into conventional science. They need to make use of provisional, schematic ideas about change.

The nub of the issue is Marx's political economy. There are two alternative views of what Marx's poltical economy involves, one dialectical and the other conventional. But that aspect of the debate has received very limited attention on this site.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


There are a few reasons for this. Many of them are just not Marxists and adhere to more conventional sets of ideas, notably anarchism. Some would claim to be marxists.

Just as there are comrades here and elsewhere who have sold their radical souls for a mess of ruling-class pottage, served up by that bourgeois theorist, Hegel.


Rosa's article sets out her position succinctly. That position traces the issue of dialectics back to Engels. Others would say, on the contrary, that Engels did no more than defend a position he shared with Marx - and one Marx had asked him to defend. There is an answer to that argument and an answer in turn to that answer and on it goes.

The evidence for this is thin at best, and it gets even thinner after the publcation of Das Kapital.

[gilhyle]

You are right in thinking that dialectics was originally a concept relating to debate between two people. It has its origin in a three way distinction between logic, dialectics and rhetoric. The original idea, roughly, was to try to identify what is different between a logical argument on the one hand, a merely persuasive form of speaking at the other extreme and, in between, a form of argument which is persuasive in context.

Medieval theology developed the concept, on the basis of the concept from Greek philosophy. The term was redefined by Kant who saw disputation as a process of seduction by appearances, in no way better than private reflection. For him such semblances involved pretending to apply formal rules of logic to reality. Thus he sought to replace the ars disputatoria with a reconceptualisation of dialectics as critique, in which it had a solely negative role of showing how something does not agree with the formal criteria of truth set out in logic. In his philosophy this creates the space for practical reasoning.

Hegel rejected this dislocation between dialectical critique and practical reasoning. He did not believe the two could be divided up in that way. On the contrary, he believed that the way we come to a certain view of things is bound up unavoidably with the history of how those things have been viewed. In that sense we are always part of an historical discussion on the nature of reality.

But he goes much further by arguing that this process of discovery through history, this debate between the ages, is the dialectic of history.

Feuerbach has usefully suggested that we imagine Hegel as articulating the point of view of a pantheistic God. God is nature and unfolds its/his/her true nature through the historical process....the historical dialectic.

Marx, of course rejected all this idealistic metaphysics and the debate then is around what if anything was left of the Hegelian idea of history as a process. In the course of developing his understanding of the dialectic Hegel had taken the concept far beyond the simple idea of a disputation. He had tried to show how all reality is involved in an unfolding process.

To some it has seemed that once you deny (as Marx certainly does) that the process is one of an unfolding awareness (for Marx it is a process of the development of the forces of production) then the whole dialectical analogy falls flat and must be just abandoned. However, there are statements in Marx (and other Marxists) which suggest differently and which have been persuasive to many - for all that Rosa considers them thin at best and thinner after Capital.

In a way the mystery (if I can call it that without any mystical implications) goes right back to the origins of the concept - in what sense is there anything to a conversation other than logic and rhetoric ? The point arises again in 18th Century philosophy - what is reason, other than logic and rhetoric....and arguably arises again in the 20th century in the discusssion of epistemology.

But it undoubtedly has a very particular character in Marxism where there is much talk of turning Hegel back onto his feet....an analogy which promises much but remains opaque for many.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that summary of certain aspects of ruling-class thought. The question is: what possible interest has any of this for socialists (other than antiquarian)?


However, there are statements in Marx (and other Marxists) which suggest differently and which have been persuasive to many - for all that Rosa considers them thin at best and thinner after Capital.

Well, you have yet to show otherwise.

[piet11111]

i would really like a very easy to understand explanation of dialectics because so far i only got "everything keeps on changing"

so please what is dialectics and how is it useful to me ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

piet, does the article I posted not help in any way?

[piet11111]

piet, does the article I posted not help in any way?

yes but i would like to hear from the dialecticians how its actually supposed to be useful.
giving them a chance to argue their case you know.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ah, I see.

Good luck on that one...

[79dougb]

wikipedia

That is where I got my explannation from?! Hence the confusion about "debate"

[gilhyle]

what is dialectics and how is it useful to me ?

The problem with answering that is that dialectics is of little or no use to you..........unless we know who 'you' are. There is a view (which I would share) that you cant grasp the materialist conception of history, as used by revolutionary socialists, or Marxist political economy without understanding some difficult methodological gymnastics which went into constructing those sets of ideas.

In my opinion, for example, you will not understand why Marx started his analysis in Das Kapital from the analysis of the commodity rather than value or a concept of capital unless you understand the very particular methodology he used. Similarly you will not understand why the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is not and cannot be a statistical phenomenon unless you understand its role within the structure of capital. By the same token, in trying to understand the materialist conception of history you should very soon come across the constant reliance on a concept of the 'level of development of the forces of production' and should quickly realise that this concept is used without supporters of the materialist conception knowing what the level of development of the forces of production is to which it refers. Is this a problem ? For some it is. Within a dialectical methodolgy it is legitimate. Similarly, you wont go far in understanding the materialist conception of history without realising that the conception of class used there is a very unusual one which bears only a limited relationship to the sociological conception of class which we see commonly used around us.

And it goes on. Rosa might (im guessing) want to suggest that all these issues can be resolved by clear thinking. Well, I'll believe that when Rosa actually sets out a clear and consistent communist theory of history and political economy which does not face such issues. She can if she wishes, try to show that it is also Marx's theory and that she is doing nothing more than paraphrasing what he has said, but that would be an add-on; its not required.

As it is, for now, on the face of it there are some very strange methodological approaches taken by Marx which deserve to be wrestled with, instead of pretending there is no difficulty there. As you come to wrestle with those you will come to a conception of what Marx's method was and that is the dialectic.

What is it not (and no classical Marxist has seriously suggested otherwise) is an a priori theory which saves you from engaging with the particular problems of different historical analyses or different political economic issues. As you come to your own view on these issues, you are engaging in an historical dialogue with a writer (Marx) who was deeply embedded in certain intellectual traditions. To engage with him, you must engage with the traditions he came from....critically, as he did. If you try to understand him without referring either to the science of political economy (Smith Ricardo etc) or the philosophy of identity from the critical appreciation of which he developed his views, you will find it difficult to understand his ideas. If you are not involved in that difficult task of engaging with the particular theoretical tradition of Communism then dialectics is of no use to you.


you have yet to show otherwise.

It is important that you are aware that no-one....and I think I am correct in saying 'no-one' who has ever written on this topic or looked carefully at Marx's relationship to Hegel shares Rosa's theory that there was some sort of radical change in Marx's view of Hegel just before the publication of capital. Others - notably Althusser - have argued that Marx's methodology needed little or nothing of a dialectical character. They tend to emphasise what Marxism needs to be while conceeding that Marx thought otherwise. Most people who have looked at the evidence would consider it incontrovertible that Marx had a high regard for Hegel and saw his own methodology as a critical appropriation of Hegel's. They merely say Marx was wrong about that and that his methodology was not, in any distinctive way, an appropriation of that of Hegel. If you accepted those views you could of course be interested in understanding Marx while rejecting dialectics. It is however notable that neither Althusser nor anyone else of this ilk has produced a positive representation of either the materialist conception of history or Marxist political economy which stands up to critical scrutiny.....unlike Marx. Funny that.

[piet11111]

i see a wall of words that are not telling me much of anything at all.

where would i go for an understandable explanation of dialectics gilhyle ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Don't bother asking Gil, piet; I have been doing that for well over two years. You will either get a load of Hegelian gobbledygook, or silence --, the latter, of course, being far more use, and much the clearer of the two.

But, you will notice that using dialectics to help explain Das Kapital ends up doing the exact opposite of what Marx intended (a nice dialectical inversion, if ever there was one); it mystifies it again, and renders it immune from scientitic analysis and confirmation.

Which is, naturally, the whole point...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


It is important that you are aware that no-one....and I think I am correct in saying 'no-one' who has ever written on this topic or looked carefully at Marx's relationship to Hegel shares Rosa's theory that there was some sort of radical change in Marx's view of Hegel just before the publication of capital. Others - notably Althusser - have argued that Marx's methodology needed little or nothing of a dialectical character. They tend to emphasise what Marxism needs to be while conceeding that Marx thought otherwise. Most people who have looked at the evidence would consider it incontrovertible that Marx had a high regard for Hegel and saw his own methodology as a critical appropriation of Hegel's. They merely say Marx was wrong about that and that his methodology was not, in any distinctive way, an appropriation of that of Hegel. If you accepted those views you could of course be interested in understanding Marx while rejecting dialectics. It is however notable that neither Althusser nor anyone else of this ilk has produced a positive representation of either the materialist conception of history or Marxist political economy which stands up to critical scrutiny.....unlike Marx. Funny that.

Indeed, and just like other mystics who look at the world and see 'incontrovertible evidence' for the 'hand of god' in creation.

One small point: not one of you can cope with my objections to your mystical reading of Das Kapital.

But, hey, who am I to come between you and your opiate?

[Radek]

Apologies to jump in here, but hopefully if will be useful to the original poster as well.

If people were to recommend one book on dialectics (and don't give favour to online books, I much prefer paper), from the point of view of a dialectician, what would it be?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

There is in fact a long list here (compiled by yours truly):

http://www.revleft.com/vb/dialectical-materialism-resources-t90813/index.html

The best single book on this 'theory' for a newbie is probably:

Cornforth, M. (1976), Materialism And The Dialectical Method (Lawrence & Wishart, 5th ed.).

More advanced, and easily the best book defending this 'theory' is:

Bukharin, N. (2005), Philosophical Arabesques (Monthly Review Press).

Anti-dialectics books are few and far between (that is why I set my site up!).

The best is by Eric Petersen (an Australian Marxist in the IS tradition), but it is not easy to get hold of:

The Poverty of Dialectical Materialism (Red Door, 1994).

http://www.greenleft.org.au/1996/221/14949

[JimmyJazz]

I recently read this, and it reinforced my initial impression that dialectics are bunk:

http://www.marxist.com/Theory/study_guide1.html

Not only does the guy make absurdly sweeping inferences from one or two examples, and then claim to have replaced formal logic, but he also drops a few stunning examples of his misunderstanding of basic scientific concepts (he gives the impression that he thinks the Big Bang theory is a theory about the creation of the universe when really it is only an explanation for why the universe is expanding; he makes the claim that the entire human body is regenerated by cell death and replacement, apparently thinking that this includes the brain and heart, when really it is only a few body parts like skin, nails and hair that do this).

On the whole just a very silly essay.

Then again, it also brilliantly demonstrates why I am not "anti-dialectics": given the way that the theory's adherents go about "proving" its usefulness, it's basically impossible to disprove it. So I just consider dialectical materialism something to be ignored, hopefully sidelined somewhat, but not endlessly argued against.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JJ: On the contrary, it is quite easy to refute this theory.

[gilhyle]

i see a wall of words that are not telling me much of anything at all.

where would i go for an understandable explanation of dialectics gilhyle ?

You see a 'wall of words' that dont tell you what you expect, in advance to hear. If you are looking for a clear, abstract explanation of dialectics which also shows how it is useful (and that is what you asked for) you wont find it, because that would contradict dialectics itself. You can either find a schematic presentation of dialectics or you can experience its usefulness in practice...what you cannot have is a schematic presentation which shows its usefulness in practice BECAUSE it is a key point about dialectics that it must be redeveloped within each area of study.

Rosa refers to Philosophical Arabesques by Bukharin which I consider a woefully boring, schematic and useless book by someone who (as Lenin pointed out earlier) did not understand dialectics and who in his dottage (in his case in his 50s) just mechaically repeated dialectics as a set of dead ideas that he chose to throw himself into. Conforth is better and you will get realtively clear explanations from him....but you will left feeling that this is useless.

Jimmy Jazz is not far from the correct approach when he writes:


I just consider dialectical materialism something to be ignored, hopefully sidelined somewhat, but not endlessly argued against.

The correct approach is to study Marxism, its political economy and its conception of history and to find there the sense in which dialectics is required in practice. The ONLY reason dialectics needs to be discussed explicitly at all is to respond to those who seek to attack Marxism by attacking dialectics.

The only point worth defending in Sewell's article is the point, which goes back to Kant (not Hegel) that, in practice, human reasoning does not conform to the typologies of formal logical arguments. That uncontroversial observation is not controversial for any logicians who are very familiar with the significant differences between formal logical and practical reasoning. It is a mistake rarely - but occasionally made by advocates of dialectics to suggest that dialectics shows that formal logic is invalid. It doesnt show that and most advocates of dialectics understand that. It merely makes some common sense observations about ways in which practical reasoning doesnt comply with formal logic. Sometimes logicians have tried to refine its formal systems to capture more and more of what practical reasoning involves and this is all very interesting.....but doesnt alter the point that first order logic cant capture many of the ways people actually think - an uncontroversial and not particularly profound observation.
BTW Rosa I dont say you are wrong about Marx changing his view of Hegel just because everyone else disagrees with you. I was responding to your claim that no one has satisfactorily explained why your theory on this is wrong. The point in response is that you have persuaded no one who has looked carefully at the evidence - that doesnt make you wrong but it does counter your point that there is some collective 'we' who are dissatisfied with the counter-arguments to your theory.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Rosa refers to Philosophical Arabesques by Bukharin which I consider a woefully boring, schematic and useless book by someone who (as Lenin pointed out earlier) did not understand dialectics and who in his dottage (in his case in his 50s) just mechaically repeated dialectics as a set of dead ideas that he chose to throw himself into. Conforth is better and you will get realtively clear explanations from him....but you will left feeling that this is useless.

1) Lenin said this fifteen or so years before Bukharin's book was even written, so his comment cannot have applied to this book. And far from it being in written in his 'dotage', he was as old as Marx was when Marx wrote Das Kapital, and as old as Lenin when he wrote all this:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/date/1920.htm

2) Which other book on dialectics is not boring and schematic (but I disagree anyway; this book is among the best written books I have read on this tawdry theory over the last quarter of a century).

As if Hegel was a model of clarity here, anyway!!:lol:

3) When asked to provide an explanation of this 'theory' yourself, you always back down. This is either because you can't explain it, or you too can only do so in a 'boring and schematic' way.


The correct approach is to study Marxism, its political economy and its conception of history and to find there the sense in which dialectics is required in practice. The ONLY reason dialectics needs to be discussed explicitly at all is to respond to those who seek to attack Marxism by attacking dialectics.

But, what practice does this 'theory' inform, anyway?


The only point worth defending in Sewell's article is the point, which goes back to Kant (not Hegel) that, in practice, human reasoning does not conform to the typologies of formal logical arguments. That uncontroversial observation is not controversial for any logicians who are very familiar with the significant differences between formal logical and practical reasoning. It is a mistake rarely - but occasionally made by advocates of dialectics to suggest that dialectics shows that formal logic is invalid. It doesnt show that and most advocates of dialectics understand that. It merely makes some common sense observations about ways in which practical reasoning doesnt comply with formal logic. Sometimes logicians have tried to refine its formal systems to capture more and more of what practical reasoning involves and this is all very interesting.....but doesnt alter the point that first order logic cant capture many of the ways people actually think - an uncontroversial and not particularly profound observation.

Indeed, but Sewell gets Formal Logic all wrong, as do all other dialecticians (excepting, of course, Graham Priest).

One thing is for sure, human reasoning does not conform to the confused canons of dialectical logic (if such excessively generous praise can be heaped upon this form of sub-Aristotelian 'logic'), but more to those of informal logic, which in many ways mirrors formal logic.

Moreover, there are systems of practical reasoning (which are subsystems of formal and informal logic) which address these areas reasonably well.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-informal/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/


BTW Rosa I dont say you are wrong about Marx changing his view of Hegel just because everyone else disagrees with you. I was responding to your claim that no one has satisfactorily explained why your theory on this is wrong. The point in response is that you have persuaded no one who has looked carefully at the evidence - that doesnt make you wrong but it does counter your point that there is some collective 'we' who are dissatisfied with the counter-arguments to your theory.

And I didn't say you did, what I said was this:


Indeed, and just like other mystics who look at the world and see 'incontrovertible evidence' for the 'hand of god' in creation.

One small point: not one of you can cope with my objections to your mystical reading of Das Kapital.

But, hey, who am I to come between you and your opiate?

Which is still true, even if I now have to qualify the 'you' I used to 'you (plural or singular)'.

[benhur]

Am I right in thinking that Dialectics is the concept of a debate between two people?!?

Why are a lot of forum members anti-dialectic?

(Excuse my ignorance!)

Dialectics is about understanding the process of change, in what manner change takes place, what's the object that's undergoing change, for the object to undergo change, must it contain the opposite, and so forth. It's probably the only method by which one can explain what's going on in this world, especially the apparent contradictions. It explains reality as it is.

[piet11111]

Dialectics is about understanding the process of change, in what manner change takes place, what's the object that's undergoing change, for the object to undergo change, must it contain the opposite, and so forth. It's probably the only method by which one can explain what's going on in this world, especially the apparent contradictions. It explains reality as it is.

finally something i can understand.

but this sort of sounds like having to be able to build an entire car from scratch before being able to drive it.

i think i will avoid making a study of dialectics because its likely that at the end of it i will know less about it than i do right now.

[Hit The North]

My recommendation would not be a book on dialectics per se but one which demonstrates the dialectical core in Marx and Engels theory of history and society:

Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism by Franz Jakubowski, a Polish Trotskyist active in the 1930s. Unfortunately it is difficult to obtain and isn't available on the internet.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


Dialectics is about understanding the process of change, in what manner change takes place, what's the object that's undergoing change, for the object to undergo change, must it contain the opposite, and so forth. It's probably the only method by which one can explain what's going on in this world, especially the apparent contradictions. It explains reality as it is.

And yet if dialectics were true, change could not happen -- so how it can help us understand change is something of a mystery.

Proof here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1167412&postcount=250

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1167402&postcount=249

But we have in ordinary langauge (especially when it is augmented by the language of science and mathematics) countless words by means of which we can express and thus understand changes of every conceivable kind, in almost limitless detail.

So, even if dialectics were able to cope with change (which it can't), it would not be needed.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism by Franz Jakubowski, a Polish Trotskyist active in the 1930s. Unfortunately it is difficult to obtain and isn't available on the internet.

Avoid it like the plague -- a book as impenetrable as the Amazonian jungle.

[Hit The North]

To you maybe. To others, it's one of the most lucid accounts of the base/superstructure approach there is.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^Just as the Athanasian Creed is the most lucid explanation of the Holy Trinity, too:

http://www.ccel.org/creeds/athanasian.creed.html

Same source in Neoplatonic mysticism.

[benhur]

BenHur:



And yet if dialectics were true, change could not happen -- so how it can help us understand change is something of a mystery.



Let me ask a simple question. We make table out of wood. Would you say the wood has changed into table? If not, why not?

[Random Precision]

My recommendation would not be a book on dialectics per se but one which demonstrates the dialectical core in Marx and Engels theory of history and society:

Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism by Franz Jakubowski, a Polish Trotskyist active in the 1930s. Unfortunately it is difficult to obtain and isn't available on the internet.

Might this be it? (http://libcom.org/library/ideology-superstructure-historical-materialism-franz-jakubowski-1936)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


Would you say the wood has changed into table?

Well the wood is still wood. You are not suggesting, I hope, that the material this table is made out of is no longer wood?

But, why do you think I am denying change?

What I am saying is that when change takes place, dialectics cannot explain it, and that if dialectics were true, change could not happen.

[Hit The North]

Might this be it? (http://libcom.org/library/ideology-superstructure-historical-materialism-franz-jakubowski-1936)

Yes. How nice to finally find it on the internet.

[gilhyle]

ne was as old as Marx was when Marx wrote Das Kapital

He was, unfortunatley a broken man, mired in sentimentality, and his key vice of hero worship - mechanically reversing the non-marxist sociological views he had previously held. It is telling that you like Bukahrin's drivel and cant understand Jakubowski's erudite (but somewhat Korschian) work.


When asked to provide an explanation of this 'theory' yourself, you always back down

Its not a theory its a method, and it would be inconsistent with the method to set it out as a theory. That it is set out as critique happens only to oppose false ideas put by others. All that happens when presented as a theory is the following :


but this sort of sounds like having to be able to build an entire car from scratch before being able to drive it.


The following, I repeat is a perfectly reasonable response:-


i think i will avoid making a study of dialectics because its likely that at the end of it i will know less about it than i do right now.

Go study Kapital. When you have struggled with that work, reading Hegel's Logic will suddenly prove useful.....it will prove useful without you coming to believe it. Theorising is not just about assent.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


He was, unfortunatley a broken man, mired in sentimentality, and his key vice of hero worship - mechanically reversing the non-marxist sociological views he had previously held. It is telling that you like Bukahrin's drivel and cant understand Jakubowski's erudite (but somewhat Korschian) work.

Who said I couldn't understand that literary waste of space inflicted in humanity by Jakubowski?

And, I agree with you about Bukharin; but his book is still the best of the worst. But, hey -- what can you expect when comrades try to explain to us that philosophical cess pit called Hegel's 'Logic'?


Its not a theory its a method, and it would be inconsistent with the method to set it out as a theory. That it is set out as critique happens only to oppose false ideas put by others. All that happens when presented as a theory is the following :

But, according to you, everything is a philosophical theory.


Go study Kapital. When you have struggled with that work, reading Hegel's Logic will suddenly prove useful.....it will prove useful without you coming to believe it. Theorising is not just about assent.

Indeed, it will for it will put him off Hegel's 'Logic' for life.

------------------------------------

So, 79DougB:

Try this for size (read it and wonder how intelligent comrades can regard this with anything other than utter revulsion and contempt):


From becoming there issues determinate being, which is the simple oneness of being and nothing. Because of this oneness it has the form of immediacy. Its mediation, becoming, lies behind it; it has sublated itself and determinate being appears, therefore, as a first, as a starting-point for the ensuing development. It is first of all in the one-sided determination of being; the other determination, nothing, will likewise display itself and in contrast to it.

§ 192

It is not mere being, but determinate being [Dasein], etymologically taken, being in a certain place; but the idea of space is irrelevant here. Determinate being as the result of its becoming is, in general, being with a non-being such that this non-being is taken up into simple unity with being. Non-being thus taken up into being in such a way that the concrete whole is in the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes determinateness as such.

§ 193

The whole is likewise in the form, that is, in the determinateness of being, for being has likewise shown itself in becoming to be only a moment — a sublated, negatively determined being; but it is such for us in our reflection, it is not yet posited as such in its own self. But the determinateness as such of determinate being is the determinateness which is posited, and this is implied in the expression Dasein [there-being or being which is there]. The two are always to be clearly distinguished from each other; only that which is posited in a Notion belongs in the dialectical development of that Notion to its content; whereas the determinateness that is not yet posited in the Notion itself belongs to our reflection, whether it concerns the nature of the Notion itself or is an external comparison. To draw attention to a determinateness of the latter kind can only serve to elucidate or indicate in advance the course which will be exhibited in the development itself. That the whole, the unity of being and nothing, is in the one-sided determinateness of being is an external reflection; but in the negation, in something and other and so on, it will come to be posited. It was necessary here to draw attention to the distinction referred to; but to take account of all the Remarks which may be prompted by reflection would lead to the prolixity of anticipating what must yield itself in the subject matter. Such reflections may facilitate a general view and thereby an understanding of the development, but they also have the disadvantage of appearing as unjustified assertions, grounds and foundations for what is to follow. They should therefore not be taken for more than they are supposed to be and should be distinguished from what is a moment in the development of the subject matter itself.

§ 194

Determinate being corresponds to being in the previous sphere, but being is indeterminate and therefore no determinations issue from it. Determinate being, however, is concrete; consequently a number of determinations, distinct relations of its moments, make their appearance in it.

(b) Quality
§ 195

Because of the immediacy of the oneness of being and nothing in determinate being, they do not extend beyond each other; so far as determinate being is in the form of being, so far is it non-being, so far is it determinate. Being is not the universal, determinateness not the particular. Determinateness has not yet severed itself from being; and indeed it will no more sever itself from being, for the truth which from now on underlies them as ground is the unity of non-being with being; on this as ground all further determinations are developed. But the relation in which determinateness here stands to being is the immediate unity of both, so that as yet no differentiation of this unity is posited.

§ 196

Determinateness thus isolated by itself in the form of being is quality — which is wholly simple and immediate. Determinateness as such is the more universal term which can equally be further determined as quantity and so on. Because of this simple character of quality as such, there is nothing further to be said about it.

§ 197

Determinate being, however, in which nothing no less than being is contained, is itself the criterion for the one-sidedness of quality as a determinateness which is only immediate or only in the form of being. It is equally to be posited in the determination of nothing, when it will be posited as a differentiated, reflected determinateness, no longer as immediate or in the form of being. Nothing, as thus the determinate element of a determinateness, is equally something reflected, a negation.

Quality, taken in the distinct character of being, is reality; as burdened with a negative it is negation in general, likewise a quality but one which counts as a deficiency, and which further on is determined as limit, limitation.

§ 198

Both are determinate being, but in reality as quality with the accent on being, the fact is concealed that it contains determinateness and therefore also negation. Consequently, reality is given the value only of something positive from which negation, limitation and deficiency are excluded. Negation taken as mere deficiency would be equivalent to nothing; but it is a determinate being, a quality, only determined with a non-being.

Remark: Quality and Negation

§ 199

Reality may seem to be a word of various meanings because it is used of different, indeed of opposed determinations. In philosophy one may perhaps speak of a merely empirical reality as of a worthless existence. But when it is said that thoughts, concepts, theories have no reality, this means that they do not possess actuality; in itself or in its notion, the idea of a Platonic Republic, for example, may well be true. Here the worth of the idea is not denied and it is left its place alongside the reality. But as against mere ideas, mere notions, the real alone counts as true. The sense in which, on the one hand, outer existence is made the criterion of the truth of a content is no less one-sided than when the idea, essential being, or even inner feeling is represented as indifferent to outer existence and is even held to be the more excellent the more remote it is from reality.

§ 200

In connection with the term 'reality', mention must be made of the former metaphysical concept of God which, in particular, formed the basis of the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God. God was defined as the sum-total of all realities, and of this sum-total it was said that no contradiction was contained in it, that none of the realities cancelled any other; for a reality is to be taken only as a perfection, as an affirmative being which contains no negation. Hence the realities are not opposed to one another and do not contradict one another.

§ 201

Reality as thus conceived is assumed to survive when all negation has been thought away; but to do this is to do away with all determinateness. Reality is quality, determinate being; consequently, it contains the moment of the negative and is through this alone the determinate being that it is. Reality, taken as we are supposed to take it, in the so-called eminent sense or as infinite -in the usual meaning of the word-is expanded into indeterminateness and loses its meaning. God's goodness is not to be goodness in the ordinary, but in the eminent sense; not different from justice but tempered by it (a mediatory expression used by Leibniz), just as, conversely, justice is tempered by goodness; and so goodness is no longer goodness, nor justice any more justice. Power is supposed to be tempered by wisdom, but in that case it is not power as such for it would be subject to wisdom; wisdom is supposed to be expanded into power, in which case it vanishes as the wisdom which determines the end and measure of things. The true Notion of the infinite and its absolute unity which will present itself later, is not to be understood as a tempering, a reciprocal restricting or a mixing; such a superficial conception of the relationship leaves it indefinite and nebulous and can satisfy only a Notion-less way of thinking. When reality, taken as a determinate quality as it is in the said definition of God, is extended beyond its determinateness it ceases to be reality and becomes abstract being; God as the pure reality in all realities, or as the sum total of all realities, is just as devoid of determinateness and content as the empty absolute in which all is one.

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl109.htm#HL1_109a

And this is not the worst section!

No wonder Marx totally abandoned this sub-standard bilge.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


How nice to finally find it on the internet.

A bit like a Trojan, then?

[benhur]

What I am saying is that when change takes place, dialectics cannot explain it, and that if dialectics were true, change could not happen.

Can you explain this using the wood-table example (without trying to obfuscate, of course)? Just a paragraph will do.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


Can you explain this using the wood-table example (without trying to obfuscate, of course)? Just a paragraph will do.

Can you ask me without being snide?

[benhur]

BenHur:



Can you ask me without being snide?

I wasn't. However, I believe it's just a problem of semantics, which is why I asked you to explain, so things can become clear. But it's up to you...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

According to the dialectical Holy Books, processes and objects change because of their 'internal contradictions', that is, because of a 'struggle' between dialectically-connected opposites. But, because of this, these objects/processes also inevitably turn into their opposites.

But, this cannot happen with your table example, since a table is not the opposite of wood, nor do they 'struggle' in any obvious way.

And yet, even if they did 'struggle', the table would have to exist alongside the wood for this to happen. In other words, it would have to exist before it existed!

Moreover, tables would make themselves out of wood, by-passing the need for human labour.

So, dialectics cannot explain even the manufacture of tables, let alone anything else.

Alternatively, if dialectics were true, there would be no tables.

Or anything else, for that matter.

So, this is not a problem of 'semantics'. The 'theory' is fundamentally flawed.

[gilhyle]

Rosa you ask


Who said I couldn't understand that literary waste of space inflicted in humanity by Jakubowski?

My explantion is that you wrote:


Avoid it like the plague -- a book as impenetrable as the Amazonian jungle.

I was making the reasonable assumumption that you were using No. 3 definition below in refering to it as impenetrable as in the above quote from you.


   /ɪmˈpɛnhttp://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngɪhttp://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngtrəhttp://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngbəl/ Show Spelled Pronunciation http://cache.lexico.com/g/d/dictionary_questionbutton_default.gif (http://dictionary.reference.com/help/luna/IPA_pron_key.html) [im-pen-i-truh-buhhttp://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngl] Show IPA Pronunciation http://cache.lexico.com/g/d/dictionary_questionbutton_default.gif (http://dictionary.reference.com/help/luna/IPA_pron_key.html)

–adjective 1.not penetrable; that cannot be penetrated, pierced, entered, etc.2.inaccessible to ideas, influences, etc.3.incapable of being understood; inscrutable; unfathomable: an impenetrable mystery.

On that assumption you had described it as being incapable of being understood and therefore, presumamably, did not consider yourself capable of understanding it.


But, according to you, everything is a philosophical theory.


Eh no....but I assume that is a snide reference to my point that your ideas are a philosophical theory, rather than a serious suggestion by you that I actually think 'everything' is a philosophical theory.


The 'theory' is fundamentally flawed. It might be if it was a theory.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil falls into the trap, yet again (what a loser!):


My explantion is that you wrote:


Avoid it like the plague -- a book as impenetrable as the Amazonian jungle.

I was making the reasonable assumumption that you were using No. 3 definition below in refering to it as impenetrable as in the above quote from you.

Impenetrable to the OP, not me, you wally.


On that assumption you had described it as being incapable of being understood and therefore, presumamably, did not consider yourself capable of understanding it.

And you say I am pedantic!

I take my non-dialectical hat off to the expert!


Eh no....but I assume that is a snide reference to my point that your ideas are a philosophical theory, rather than a serious suggestion by you that I actually think 'everything' is a philosophical theory.

And not just mine, anyone I quoted, even before you read what they had to say, was branded as spouting some theory or other -- on the assumption, therefore, that everything is a philosophical theory.


It might be if it was a theory.

Indeed, why do you think I use 'scare quotes' whenever I refer to it?

[benhur]

According to the dialectical Holy Books, processes and objects change because of their 'internal contradictions', that is, because of a 'struggle' between dialectically-connected opposites. But, because of this, these objects/processes also inevitably turn into their opposites.

But, this cannot happen with your table example, since a table is not the opposite of wood, nor do they 'struggle' in any obvious way.



Negation of the negation applies here, doesn't it? Wood becomes table, wood is thus negated. But table is wood, which is the negation of the negation, and yet the wood we have now is not the same we had earlier, it's different in that it has utility etc. So the dialectical process of change is proved.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


Negation of the negation applies here, doesn't it? Wood becomes table, wood is thus negated. But table is wood, which is the negation of the negation, and yet the wood we have now is not the same we had earlier, it's different in that it has utility etc. So the dialectical process of change is proved.

Well, the whole point of being brief is to leave out such complications. So, if you wanted the full answer, why did you ask for a very short reply?

Wood is not 'negated' by being bulit into a table, it is still wood.

In addition, do you really think there is a 'struggle' between the table and this wood?

If not, then you disagree with Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin...

If you do, then tables should be able to manufacture themsleves, and we can save on human labour costs.

In that case, the dialectic, far from being an 'adomination' to the bourgeoisie, is a decided gift; they can sack all their workers, and watch tables 'self-develop'!:lol:


"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.

"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.

"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." [Lenin Philosophical Notebooks (1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphases added.]

Which, perhaps, explains that old anti-dialectical joke:

Q: How many dialecticians does it take to change a lightbulb?

A: None at all; the lightbulb changes itself.

[JimmyJazz]

Gil falls into the trap, yet again (what a loser!):



Impenetrable to the OP, not me, you wally.



And you say I am pedantic!

I take my non-dialectical hat off to the expert!

I don't understand why Rosa doesn't get almost every single one of her posts edited for flaming. By now shouldn't she have been warned, double warned, triple warned and banned, if consistent rules were being applied? It seems like pretty major favoritism.

And she really drags the forum down with her behavior imo.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JJ:


I don't understand why Rosa doesn't get almost every single one of her posts edited for flaming. By now shouldn't she have been warned, double warned, triple warned and banned, if consistent rules were being applied? It seems like pretty major favoritism.

I get 'flamed' all the time. But, no one complains when that happens to me. BTB, for example, has been doing this for well over two years.

I always give as good as I get, often worse.

If that upsets you, too bad...

[JimmyJazz]

It should upset the mods, that's the point of moderation.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JJ:


It should upset the mods, that's the point of moderation.

What? Over calling someone a wally? They are not quite as easily phased as you seem to be.

[benhur]

BenHur:



Well, the whole point of being brief is to leave out such complications. So, if you wanted the full answer, why did you ask for a very short reply?

Wood is not 'negated' by being bulit into a table, it is still wood.

In addition, do you really think there is a 'struggle' between the table and this wood?



This is already explained. Pay attention to this paragraph from August Thalheimer's work:


The first distortion, the Bergsonian, or as one could say, the anarchistic distortion, may be illustrated thus: the law of dialectics demands that I negate the grain of rice. This can be done more thoroughly, it might be said. Instead of planting it in the earth, I can put it into a mortar and break it to pieces. As a consequence its negation will be so thorough that further development becomes impossible. This is the first distortion. It is apparent from this that for each thing there is a particular kind of negation which initiates a developmental process, a negation appropriate to the nature of the thing. The second or opportunistic distortion of dialectics occurs when negation is ignored. The person to whom I give the grain of rice may say that it can develop "of itself." He neither crushes it nor puts it into the around. He will let it lie on the table. And, of course, it will not develop into a plant. It will finally perish as an organism. This illustrates, incidentally, how these two opposed distortions of dialectics have the same result.Source:http://www.marxists.org/archive/thalheimer/works/diamat/11.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


This is already explained. Pay attention to this paragraph from August Thalheimer's work:

I don't think so. [I have read and studied this stuff for longer than most RevLefters have been alive, so this is not new to me!]

First, the germination of grain is a natural process. Wood being made into tables isn't. There is thus no natural way wood can be 'negated' to form a table.

Second, according to the dialectical Gospels, opposites in struggle cause change, but then they also turn into one another.

If that is so, plants must stuggle with seeds, and a seed must turn into the plant it is struggling with, and the plant must change into the seed it is struggling with too.

Have you ever seen plants do this?

Third, it is quite bizarre to speak of seed being 'negated'. Seeds are not items of language. Now, it makes some sort of crazy sense for Hegel to talk this way (since he imagined everything was Mind, or the development of Mind, and hence language was implicated in everything, so to speak), but not for materialists.

Plants may only be negated if they are sentences or clauses.

Unless, of course, you mean by 'negate' something different from the rest of us.

I note you also skipped past all this:


In addition, do you really think there is a 'struggle' between the table and this wood?

If not, then you disagree with Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin...

If you do, then tables should be able to manufacture themsleves, and we can save on human labour costs.

In that case, the dialectic, far from being an 'adomination' to the bourgeoisie, is a decided gift; they can sack all their workers, and watch tables 'self-develop'!

[gilhyle]

And you say I am pedantic!

Only judging you by the standards you apply to others.....interesting if that makes me look like a looser....cos what it makes me look a bit like is you.


do you really think there is a 'struggle' between the table and this wood?


You obviously never tried to make a table


Third, it is quite bizarre to speak of seed being 'negated'. Seeds are not items of language. Now, it makes some sort of crazy sense for Hegel to talk this way (since he imagined everything was Mind, or the development of Mind, and hence language was implicated in everything, so to speak), but not for materialists.


It makes perfect sense if the materialist understands the profound sense in which language is a material reality and not something separated out from material reality as you constantly presume. 'Seeds' are actually items of language ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Only judging you by the standards you apply to others.....interesting if that makes me look like a looser....cos what it makes me look a bit like is you.

In fact, it shows that your criticism of me along these lines was ill-conceived.


You obviously never tried to make a table

You obviously do not know what a table is, or perhaps how they are made.

Given this 'theory', the 'opposite' that the wood becomes (i.e., the finished table) has to 'struggle' with its own 'opposite' (the wood).

In that case, the table has to be finished before it is finished, otherwise it cannot 'struggle' with the wood. If so, why bother making the table in the first place? It is already there ready to 'struggle' with the wood!

Of course, human beings struggle with wood to make tables, but even then the wood does not become the human being who made the table, which it would have to do if we were to believe Lenin and the other dilaectical prophets, who tell us that objects turn into the things with which they 'struggle'.


It makes perfect sense if the materialist understands the profound sense in which language is a material reality and not something separated out from material reality as you constantly presume. 'Seeds' are actually items of language ?

Indeed, language is a material reality, and the reality of language is that it is items of language that can be negated, not objects in the world.

And our use of negation in language has no implication built into it that things have changed, or have partaken in 'non-being' (to use the mystical gobbledygook), otherwise we should have to assume that George W Bush had changed simply because of the following;

G1: George W Bush is not a socialist.

Moreover, your argument suggests that you should also think (if you were consistent -- ha!) that because we have other signs in language that they can be said to apply to things in reality. In that case, we should expect to see imperative objects, since we have the "!" sign. Or, that there are punctuated objects because we have punctuation marks.

Finally, we can see the sort of mess this sloppy logic of yours gets you into: it encourages you mystics to think that tables make themselves, and that they are made before they are made!:lol:

[benhur]

In that case, the table has to be finished before it is finished, otherwise it cannot 'struggle' with the wood. If so, why bother making the table in the first place? It is already there ready to 'struggle' with the wood!



Going by your logic, dictionary=Shakespeare.:rolleyes: Hopefully, you see where that can lead. Raw material and finished goods are the opposites here, and the struggle produces an entity that's different from the original, yet retains its characteristics. This is what change or evolution is all about, and this is more pronounced in sentient beings. An example can only take you so far. Somehow, I get the feeling you're arguing for the sake of arguing, without any seriousness, and trivializing the whole thing.:(

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


Going by your logic, dictionary=Shakespeare.

I am sorry, you lost me here.

Recall, this is not my 'logic'. I am merely working out the consequences of what the Dialectical Gospels tell us.


Hopefully, you see where that can lead. Raw material and finished goods are the opposites here, and the struggle produces an entity that's different from the original, yet retains its characteristics.

I agree, but unfortunately, the Dialectical Prophets tell us the following:

1) Things can only change because of a struggle between 'opposites'.

2) Things change into their opposites.

Thus, if a table is the opposite of a pile of wood (which it must be if the one changes into the other), then there must be a struggle between that table and that pile of wood.

In that case, the table must already exist in order for it to 'struggle' with that pile of wood.

Hence the table must exist before it exists.

Have you ever seen a struggle between the table that results at the end of this process and the pile of wood from which it emerges, both existing at the same time, or they could not change (if the Dialectical Holy Men are to be believed)?

Now, your explanation of change is perfectly OK, but it does not agree with what Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov, and Lenin (among others) tell us. [See below.]

Or, to put it another way, if a human being struggles with a pile of wood in order to make tables then, and if things turn into that with which they struggle (as the Dialectical Magi tell us), then piles of wood should turn into human beings, and vice versa.

Even your mate Thalheimer says so too:


So far we have discussed the most general and most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as in Lao-tse and his disciples - and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus. Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.

This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.

The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.

Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites.


Bold added.

Thalheimer, pp.170-171. Quoted frmm here:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/thalheimer/works/diamat/11.htm

Now, your explanation is based on common sense and ordinary language, that is why it works, and that is why we do not need dialectics at all to explain change.

In fact, if dialectics were true, some pretty odd things would happen, and we'd have to warn carpenters never to try to make a table, on pain of them all turning into a pile of wood!


This is what change or evolution is all about, and this is more pronounced in sentient beings. An example can only take you so far. Somehow, I get the feeling you're arguing for the sake of arguing, without any seriousness, and trivializing the whole thing

Not so; I am merely showing you how ridiculous dialectics is, when you work out its consequences.

Now, where is my reading of the Dialectical Gospels wrong?

Here is what they say, only now more fully (bold added):


"If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues, Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen, by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, naturally veers round to its opposite.

"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975), pp.117-18.]

"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Hegel (1975), p.174.]

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and. their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., p.212-13.]

"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Ibid., p.179.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [i]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285. The translation in the edition I have consulted reads differently from the one Lenin used; Hegel is referring to "tones" here, not "things", as the reference to "harmony" indicates.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical,—under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]

"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature....

"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes." [Stalin (1976b), pp.836, 840.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....

"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....

"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end....[Ibid, pp.311-18.]

"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….

"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite.” [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]

"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]

"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]

"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), 94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.]

"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….

"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]

"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….

"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….

"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….

"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other...'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels.]

"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.

"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, expressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....

"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]

"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'

"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.

"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.

"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)

"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.

"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.' [Rob Sewell.]

References and links can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...Explain-Change

It would not be difficult to double or even treble the length of this list of quotations (as anyone who has access to as many books and articles on dialectics as I have will attest), all saying the same thing.

Ok, if you think I am misinterpreting these characters, where have I gone wrong?

[gilhyle]

the reality of language is that it is items of language that can be negated, not objects in the world.


Well thats your mystical platonic dualism, that this distinction is more important to you than it is in reality. You are confused because you think this sequence of argument is correct:


your argument suggests that you should also think (if you were consistent -- ha!) that because we have other signs in language that they can be said to apply to things in reality.

This would be a picture view of language, which you know is false. But that seduces you into the false view that


our use of negation in language has no implication built into it that things have changed

This is wrong when applied to actual language use in practice, rather than to trivial invented examples.This is your dualism


You obviously do not know what a table is, or perhaps how they are made.


Yea Yea, that must be right, of course I dont know what a table is....of course, great hypothesis !


if you think I am misinterpreting these characters, where have I gone wrong?

You have interpreted key terms the same way I interpreted 'impenetrable'....which is the same way you earlier interpreted 'false' when I spoke of a false argument. Pedantry is the key to your approch.


we'd have to warn carpenters never to try to make a table, on pain of them all turning into a pile of wood!


BTW carpenters do know that tables ultimately do turn into piles of wood...but different wood than it started as....they dont worry cos if they struggle well with the original form of the wood the revised form lasts a long time before turning into the pile of wood. Thats the dialectic of joinery.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Well that's your mystical platonic dualism, that this distinction is more important to you than it is in reality. You are confused because you think this sequence of argument is correct:

A fine taunt coming from a Hermetic mystic.:lol:

But, even you mystics have to use language to describe the world, and hence even you have to use it correctly.


This would be a picture view of language, which you know is false. But that seduces you into the false view that

On the contrary, I do not 'know' the 'picture theory' is false. In fact, if it is a philosophical theory, it is nonsensical.

But you mystics hold to this 'false theory', for you see negation in language picturing certain processes in reality.


This is wrong when applied to actual language use in practice, rather than to trivial invented examples. This is your dualism

Well, much as we would like to accept your word as gospel here, we are going to need to see a few examples of this 'language' you speak of in actual use. Perhaps you can tell us how it might feature on a picket line, or on an anti-Nazi demo?

[But we both know you really mean 'in use in Hegelian philosophy' and/or in the alleged 'materialist' version, which, as you might be able to guess, begs the question.]


that must be right, of course I don't know what a table is....of course, great hypothesis !

Pick a fight with the OP, for it is his example, not mine.


You have interpreted key terms the same way I interpreted 'impenetrable'....which is the same way you earlier interpreted 'false' when I spoke of a false argument. Pedantry is the key to your approach.

And sloppy thought is the bane of yours. :)

Anyway, I don't think so. Lets' walk you through it again (only this time, do try to concentrate):

According to the Dialectical Prophets (quotations above):

1) Things can only change because of a struggle between 'opposites'.

2) Things change into their opposites.

Thus, if a table is the opposite of a pile of wood (which it must be if the one changes into the other), then there must be a struggle between that table and that pile of wood (according to the wise old dialectical sages quoted above).

In that case, the table must already exist in order to 'struggle' with that pile of wood.

Hence the table must exist before it exists.:confused:

Have you ever seen a struggle between the table that results at the end of this process and the pile of wood from which it emerged --, both existing at the same time, or they could not change one another (if the Dialectical Holy Men are to be believed)?

Or, to put it another way, if a human being struggles with a pile of wood in order to make tables then, and if things turn into that with which they struggle (as the Dialectical Magi tell us), then piles of wood should turn into human beings, and vice versa.


BTW carpenters do know that tables ultimately do turn into piles of wood...but different wood than it started as....they don't worry cos if they struggle well with the original form of the wood the revised form lasts a long time before turning into the pile of wood. That's the dialectic of joinery.

Yes, maybe so, but do they also believe that tables do this because of a 'struggle' between that table and its opposite, a pile of dust? They should if they were daft enough to study the Dialectical Gospels, and then believe all they read there.

Indeed, dialectical carpenters might well believe this whacko 'theory' (and perhaps this is also part of the reason for the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism? After all, why should workers trust Marxists who think tables struggle with piles of dust?) -- but those still in possession of their sanity mercifully do not.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

Negation of the negation applies here, doesn't it?

How on Earth is such a convoluted description of how wood becomes a table remotely useful?

It is much simpler and more truthful to state that "tables are often constructed out of wood".


Wood becomes table, wood is thus negated.What do you mean by "negated"? It's still wood, whether it's in the form of a tree or a table.


But table is wood, which is the negation of the negation, and yet the wood we have now is not the same we had earlier, it's different in that it has utility etc. So the dialectical process of change is proved.No, all you've proved so far is that it's possible to slap arbitrary labels on vaguely-defined processes.

[Hit The North]

I actually agree with NoXion here. It doesn't seem useful at all.

By the way, where do the trees come into all this discussion of wood and tables?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


By the way, where do the trees come into all this discussion of wood and tables?

Possibly this: it's what certain dialecticians can't see the wood for.