abbielives!
10th November 2008, 20:01
Got the Hallow Points for the Snitches
confronting
snitch culture:
historical examples and current proposals
“Homeboy was talking to the po-po, we had to let everybody that was
a no-no, he thought he was on the low low, and was surprised when I
hit him with the fou(4)-fou(4)”
-Uncle Murda, “Bullet, Bullet”
With the growing wave of repression
by the state towards direct action oriented
struggles, radicals have been bombarded
with the shameful concern of snitches and
informants. In a struggle which is purely
of choice and individual realization, as opposed
to a rich cultural or family heritage, a
valor dedication to one’s community has been
shamefully neglected by some. The following
article provides a brief look into how radical
communities of the past have approached
traitors to the community, while at the same
time proposing how more unique struggles
can learn from it. It is an excerpt from the
zine; “Got the Hallow Points for the Snitches”.
To order a copy of this pamphlet, you
can contact the email below:
[email protected]
As Anarchists, we fight in the face
of what appears to be insurmountable odds;
our project of liberation is the natural enemy
of the culture of authority and capitalism we
now live under. Considering that our revolt
against the institutions of domination are not
isolated pockets of resistance, and that we do
not live separately from the rest of society,
our communities are inevitably affected --and
perhaps infected-- by the culture we are aiming
to destroy.
Snitch Culture is not exclusive to Communities
in Resistance, but is one thread of
control in the larger social fabric of America.
Those in power want people to snitch on each
other-- especially those from communities
that are targeted in particular by the government
and are therefore more vulnerable to
Snitch Culture-- because snitching works to
create a climate of fear and mistrust that can
fragment the populations that threaten the
structures of power.
For example, in the war against the poor and people of
color --those that fill the prisons of America-- the State promotes
snitching as a means to perpetuate crime by creating a ‘revolving
door’ in which low-level drug dealers, addicts, and other petty
offenders are arrested and released with orders to provide more
information in order to create more arrests in order to fill more
prisons. The effects of this cycle of snitch-and-prison are that
entire communities are torn apart, families broken up, and the
United States has the largest prison population in the world.
In Anarchist circles everyone knows that Snitch Culture
breaks solidarity among activists and paralyzes our ability to wage
effective resistance. Though there is much complaining and handwringing
about the divisive role snitches play in our communities,
we have engaged in very little constructive action about this
serious and persistent problem. This zine is an attempt to educate
and foster dialogue in our communities in order to develop effective
strategies for dealing with snitches and to forge a resistance
that can withstand the attacks of power.
To start, we must realize that Snitch Culture is not a new
phenomena or only particular to Anarchists, and that many Communities
of Resistance in North America and Europe have come
up with a number of different ways –some more effective than
others-- to deal with Snitch Culture while maintaining their core
values.
There are three components --perhaps of unequal importance--
that resistance groups and others have traditionally used
to determine their response to snitches: practicality, the agreeability
to the core values of the group, and tactical benefit.
The ultra-militant Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany
tried to use something called “Revolutionary Discipline” to respond
to a growing number of snitches. This discipline drew heavily on
the promise of immediate personal reprisals for snitching. Snitches
both in jail and out were subject to vicious beatings and in one
case, a snitch was blinded. This type of response was practical for
the RAF because they had a number of supporters both inside and
outside of jail. Most snitches could be easily located and jumped
by supporters or actual RAF members. It was agreeable to the
RAF because it fit in with their concepts of both Revolutionary Discipline
and a glorification of violence. However, it did not prove to
be an effective tactic for reducing the impact of snitches. By the
end of the RAF’s existence, snitches were an important part of the
State’s efforts to not only disrupt, but to arrest numerous members
of the RAF-- including its leadership.
The tactics they employed did not seem to reduce
Snitch Culture within their own ranks or of other contemporary
militant radical organizations in West Germany.
The Weather Underground (WU) also had an
extreme but somewhat different strategy when confronting
the problem of snitches. The WU used terror as a
way to stop the effectiveness of snitches. They required
all members to give the names and addresses of close
friends and family and were explicitly warned --sometimes
while on psychedelic drugs-- that if they snitched,
they and their family would be subject to violent reprisals.
In one rambling message from the WU --written
after an AIM snitch took the stand against former
comrades-- published in radical periodicals at the time
and believed to have been written by Bernadine Dorn,
stated that the WU was not afraid to support the “[Charlie]
Manson approach” when it came to “bringing hell on
Earth for pig-snitches.” It went into detail about how violently
the WU would deal with snitches and their friends
and family. This approach ended up being completely
impractical for the WU because they had neither
the members nor the support to pull off such grandiose
plans. By the nature of being underground, they
were marginalized and had little ability to strike out at
snitches in any way. In fact, there is no evidence that
any snitch on the WU was ever even bothered by the
group. Whether this approach of terror was agreeable to
the core values of the WU is hard to say since the WU
position on violence and acceptable violence seemed to
change constantly. It was however, consistent with the
ultra-violent streak in the core leadership of the group.
As a tactic is was counter-productive-- it caused considerable
debate in radical circles and most of it was negative.
The cops also had little trouble turning folks associated
with the WU, and a number of the most rhetorically
violent members of the leadership either turned themselves
in, or cut deals.
No resistance group in recent times can compare
to the Black Panther Party (BPP) --and its factions-- in
terms of being completely infiltrated by snitches as well
as law enforcement! The BPP, in the popular mind, is
associated with violence and ultra-militancy. The image
of a tough leather-clad Black Panther carrying a shotgun
is an ever present part of the iconography of the radical
left. One would think that the BPP’s approach to snitches
would be similar to the RAF and the WU; however, they
took a completely different approach and relied on community
shame as a mechanism for dealing with snitches.
This was a somewhat practical approach because they
had a number of widely circulating publications and
outlets to get information about snitches out. They also
were followed closely by the radical left and had access
to a staggering number of mediums to report to the
broader cultures of resistance. It was certainly agreeable
to the ideals of the BPP, which claimed to be the voice of
specific communities and saw itself as a communitybased
organization. Tactically, the record speaks for
itself. There were a large number of snitches, many
who were not named until well after the fall of the BPP,
and the government --which was particularly brutal and
repressive in dealing with the BPP-- never had trouble
turning members affiliated with the BPP against the organization.
In Chicago, for example, the number of snitches was nearly epidemic.
While the above examples are not particularly
positive, they illustrate some of the difficulties we face
in dealing with snitches today in our own communities
--and thus the need for dialogue. However, groups like
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque Separatists
(ETA), and namely the WWII French Resistance
Fighters (The Maquis), are positive examples of Communities
in Resistance that dealt successfully with
Snitch Culture. The Maquis, according to Gestapo/Vichy
records, show that less than 5% of all detainees
were “cooperative”. William Volman, in his book, Rising
Up and Rising Down, says that the Spanish --and
French-- governments have “never been successful
in creating a culture of informants”. The key is to
learn from the mistakes of the past and forge our own
response to snitches that is practical, agreeable to our
core values, and tactically beneficial.
To understand why these groups --IRA, ETA
and the Maquis-- were successful, we have to look
not only at their formal and informal policies regarding
snitches, but at the movements as a whole. There
is precious little written in English about ETA, but from
the few sources available, Clean Hands, Dirty Wars,
it seems that ETA has been able to avoid widespread
Snitch Culture by the very nature of its resistance. It is
heavily family- and community-based; nearly everyone
knows everyone else and every Basque community has
been affected by the draconian repression of the Madrid-
State. Since most Basque are deeply attached to
their homeland, even the non-nationalists, the idea of
snitching on neighbors and comrades is wrought with
practical difficulties. Raising the stakes for squealing,
neighbors, co-workers and friends would react negatively
to the appearance of a snitch, and so anyone
caught snitching would not only have to create a new
social circle, but relocate.
The IRA put a tremendous amount of energy
into prisoner support. In fact it was estimated by Gerald
O’Mann that nearly a 1/3 of all money raised by the IRA
was spent directly on prisoner support. The Irish nationalist
concept of prison support is more extensive than ours
and includes family support, the glorification of prisoners,
treating ex-prisoners like returning veterans, as well as
in-jail support. An IRA prisoner was even elected to parliament
while still in jail! This support seriously diluted the
benefits of snitching and the consequences (often violent
reprisals) greatly outweighed the benefits. The IRA, more
than any other group, was successful in reducing the punitive
nature of incarceration.
The Maquis used a combination of violent attacks
on snitches as well as “reframing” propaganda. There is
much written about the beatings and shootings carried out
by Maquis, but the historic record actually shows that the
Maquis ability to carry out such attacks was extremely limited.
They made use of very public reprisals, in no doubt
due to the monopoly on news by the occupiers, which,
in turn, increased their effectiveness. However, the use
of violence can only be seen as a partial explanation for
the success of the Maquis in resisting Snitch Culture. The
Maquis used an effective propaganda that was based on
the idea that they soon would be victorious, which made
less attractive the cooperation with illegitimate authorities
that would soon be removed. What is surprising when one
reads the memoirs of resistance fighters and the historical
accounts of everyday French living under occupation is
their firm and unshakeable belief that they would be liberated.
In fact, most French not only believed they would be
liberated, but liberated by the combined French Resistance
forces. This belief gave legitimacy to the Maquis and made
crossing them a more consequential prospect, since they
believed they would come to power-- which in fact many
did.
In our own present Communities of Resistance
there seems to be no clear theory or discipline regarding
the issue of snitches, however, as Anarchists, our inherent
critique of authority and power, knowledge of security
culture, and decentralized style of organizing are certainly
beneficial in fighting Snitch Culture. That said, the few
approaches we have used in dealing directly with snitches
have not been very successful. We seem to mainly operate
under some loose code somewhat akin to the “Revolutionary
Discipline” of the RAF. The idea that ‘Snitches get
Stitches’ is prevalent and agreeable to our politics, however
it is impractical in that we lack the sheer numbers --
both inside and outside of the jails-- to make this a reality.
‘Snitches get Stitches’ functions more like the WU idea of
terror and with the exact same results in preventing Snitch
Culture: absolutely none. Knowing this, communities have
also tried the BPP model of shame, but with the recent
evidence of government infiltration of radical groups and
organizations, former comrades turning into collaborators
with wiretaps, and friends arrested or under Grand Jury
subpoenas naming names and cooperating with authorities,
there is ample evidence that this too is ineffective and
unlikely to stem the continuing tide of snitches.
It is easy to look at all of this and grow desperate.
Snitch Culture is not a problem that can be easily solved
and the very issues at the core of it run right through the
heart of everything we are attempting. And perhaps that is
the question and answer to this issue: what are we attempting? Why are some groups, like ETA, the IRA,
or The Maquis able to successfully deny attempts by
those in power to fracture and break their cultures
of resistance? Why do Anarchists, with the goals of
destroying power and creating a new world of freedom
and mutual aid, turn into ‘cooperating witnesses’ and
sacrifice not just their own dreams but those of the
communities they belong to?
These are the questions we must ask ourselves
if we want to build Communities of Resistance that
will hopefully, one day, win. We must think of ways to
strengthen our communities of autonomous individuals
and build a resistance that is effective and sustainable
in the long-term, instead of the current haphazard and
reactive scrambling to each and every blow of government
repression.
What we can learn from the Communities of
Resistance that were successful in defeating Snitch
Culture is that they believed wholeheartedly in their
struggle. Those that were actively fighting, as well as
those who supported them, did not see any choice
but to liberate themselves from illegitimate authority
and therefore saw themselves individually as part
of something larger. This should not be read as a call
for individuals to sacrifice themselves on the altar of
the collective, but to illustrate that people who believe
in what they are fighting for, and identify themselves
personally with the success or failure of that fight, are
less likely to betray that struggle because that struggle
IS them.
However, it must be said that it is probably
easier for people to identify intimately with national
liberation struggles that have --in a sense-- simpler
goals, than with something as complex and far-reaching
as Anarchy. The Maquis wanted to overthrow the
Nazi-collaborator Vichy government and to oust the
German occupiers from France. The IRA wants to kick
the English out of Ulster. ETA wants autonomy from
Spain and France and to preserve the Basque language
and culture. These groups are fighting against one particular
source of power, whereas Anarchists are struggling
to destroy all power.
Considering the fact that Anarchy is more than
just the liberation from one particular illegitimate
authority and there are as many battlefields as there
are stars in the sky, it can become easy to feel disillusioned
or ineffective. After all, authority and capitalism
still exist and we are drowned in the propaganda
that we have reached the End of History; that the Way
Things Are will continue unabated, forever. Snitches
in Communities of Resistance are often people whose
identity with the struggle for total liberation has become
fractured, or those who, in the face of the repressive
power of the state, betray their communities
because they feel there is little chance those communities
can win.
If we are to defeat Snitch Culture in our Communities
of Resistance, we must refute the propaganda
of those in power. It means tearing up the history
books because the end is not predetermined by anyone
but us. The ways and means of building a resistance that can refute their history and can engage in a
sustainable and long-term struggle for freedom, are
the same ones needed to give Snitch Culture the final
blow. Clearly, the solution is not as simple as the suggestion
‘Snitches get Stitches,’ but is complex and
takes us in many directions.
As detailed earlier, there have been plenty of
failed experiments in dealing with the issue of snitches
and the current epidemic of snitching cannot be
stopped through random beatings or through empty
threats. While violence against snitches or collaborators
may be necessary (for example, the very public
targeting of snitches utilized by the Maquis could
prove useful) it is often harmful or useless in ending
Snitch Culture. Not only can the State outmatch us in
terms of the violence it can expend, rendering moot
a wholesale campaign of violent reprisals --as in the
case of the RAF-- it also seems counter to our politics
of freedom to use the idea of terror to coerce people
into line and could put off sympathetic or interested
individuals --much like the WU did. This should not be
read as a dismissal of the tactic of violence in our resistance,
but as strong critique of violence as a useful
tool in combating Snitch Culture.
What has the greatest possibility of working
--although it is currently not practiced to the extent
that it needs to be-- is community shame coupled with
prisoner support. Community shame has the benefit
of not being irrevocable --how can you make amends
for shooting or beating someone terribly if it turns out
they were wrongly accused?-- as well as providing a
powerful disincentive for snitches by denying them
friendship and support. Prisoner support is obviously
positive in that it helps remove the power of violence
that the State holds over people. Prisoners who feel
supported and know they will be cared for have less
reason to abandon their principles and betray their
friends. Coupled together, a strategy of strong communities
of autonomous individuals that will not allow
collaborators back in, along with a prisoner support in
which the benefits of not snitching far outweigh any
measure put forth by the State, seems to be the best
course of action. Presently, however, these tactics
have proved ineffective in the prevention of Snitch
Culture. Snitches know that they will be reviled by
some, but they can remain in our communities by
moving to where they may be anonymous or because
there are people who will not ostracize them and allow
them to return. And even though our prisoner support
is one of our strongest attributes, it fails to be the
linchpin that prevents Snitch Culture, mainly because
it is limited in scope.
What this leads us back to is the idea of building
stronger communities capable of long-term resistance
to the powers of the State. Community shame
and prisoner support lack their necessary bite precisely
because our Communities of Resistance are fractured,
with no real communication or trust amongst
groups. In tightly-knit societies like the Basque,
snitches have nowhere to go because word will travel
and they would face social isolation wherever they go.
Shame only works when communities can communicate in
a way that is informative and trustworthy. Without information
about snitches, communities cannot take steps to
isolate or shame that person; and without trust, communities
have no idea if the information is reliable or that others
will also take steps to ostracize a snitch.
In terms of prisoner support, our current Communities
of Resistance offer a heartfelt support; however,
due to our lack of infrastructure and support outside of
traditional Anarchist circles, we cannot provide the all
encompassing prisoner support of the IRA. For instance,
in most cases, we cannot offer jobs, money to families, or
pay for legal representation. Most prisoners are shunted
from public view and only a few are known on a national
or international basis. On the contrary, IRA prisoners were
glorified and at the height of the Troubles, the majority of
the murals in IRA neighborhoods were dedicated to celebrating
prisoners and their deeds. The culture of prisoner
support in the IRA fostered an environment that made it
desirable to not snitch, a desire based on a total community
support for the prisoner and family. With some exceptions,
this is something that we cannot currently provide.
Where this leaves us is on the brink of a solution.
While we do seem to utilize the effective tactics in combating
Snitch Culture --prisoner support and community
shame-- they are not actually effective in stopping it.
Snitch Culture is not an isolated problem, as mentioned
earlier, but an interrelated issue with other problems facing
our Communities of Resistance. It comes as no shock
to hear that our communities are fragmented and that
there is little communication or mutual aid between them.
The same also goes for the lack of infrastructure or support
of people not traditionally identified with Anarchists
or other radical groups. We must seriously and critically
examine our communities and search for ways that we
can do things better, not just to defeat Snitch Culture, but
to win!
The way to strengthen our communities and increase
our resistance to Snitch Culture would begin by practicing
real mutual aid. Very few groups actually work together in a
way that is interrelated and that would actually help build our
counter-infrastructure. For instance, people in cities who want
to grow their own food and those who already live on farms
could participate in projects like the Victory Gardens in Athens,
Maine, which helps disenfranchised people in both urban and
rural communities develop their own sources of organic food;
groups in different cities could pool money and have benefits to
pay for the legal costs of prisoners in other places; and those
choosing not to work could help provide daycare for working
people who have to. The ways in which we can work together
and support each other are limitless, and working together
on projects and actions is a simple but unrivaled way to build
trustworthy lines of communication based on experience-- as
well as creating networks of autonomous communities that
support each other and would not tolerate a snitch among
them.
Infrastructure is important if we are to provide support
for people in prison that would actually function as a deterrent
to snitching. For instance, we cannot always give people jobs
--if they want them-- when they are out, or provide for people’s
families if they are put away. The counter-infrastructure we do
have is largely based on entertainment, and while this is a positive
thing in our communities, we must move beyond this into
other territory. For many obvious reasons, creating an infrastructure
that does not rely on capitalism, but is our very own,
is absolutely vital to our ability to wage effective resistance.
We must also address the lack of support for our resistance
in communities outside of Anarchist circles. One way
other Communities of Resistance have been effective is that
they had a large network of support in larger society. Besides
the obvious, this larger support functioned as a way to propel
resistance and created a climate of hope --a climate that Snitch
Culture does not function very well in. This lack of support
may be due to the fact that our definition of Anarchist culture
is rather narrow. Although not true in the least, the image of
Anarchists as young black-clad punks certainly does persist and
is to an extent perpetuated by Anarchist culture. Anarchists
should proudly proclaim themselves, but should also move beyond
the stereotype and show our many faces: young and old,
queer and straight, crusty and freshly-showered.
And obviously, our current prisoner support
must continue --and increase-- while working on
the long-term projects of building infrastructure and
widening our circles of support. Prisoner support
needs to become something that everyone in our
community is working on. Comrades must have the
full support of their communities when facing down
the courts, the jails, and the prison terms of the
State. We need to make prisoner support public and
visible, and we need to show comrades on the other
side of the wall that they are not forgotten. Murals,
benefits, sending letters and birthday cards, attending
court dates, and solidarity events are all easy
ways to show that we celebrate and stand behind
those from our communities who are behind bars.
We need to make good on the saying: they are in
there for us, so we are out here for them!
It should be clear that there is no simple
solution to the persistence of Snitch Culture in our
Communities of Resistance. This zine set out to
begin a dialog on how we can destroy Snitch Culture
once and for all. As we have seen, we may currently
be unable to prevent snitches in our fight for liberation
because we lack the community support and
infrastructure we need. This does not mean that
we should ever, ever condone snitching. Snitching
represents the most vile betrayal of one’s self and
one’s community and although we may not be able
to prevent Snitch Culture now, this does not mean
that we should not continue in the active removal of
snitches from our communities at present and withdraw
support from all collaborators immediately. But
now we know that this is not enough. To eradicate
Snitch Culture we must set ourselves upon the task
of building a long-term resistance that can withstand
the attacks of power, and that will take time and
a lot of hard work. We must create strategies that
look beyond today and will allow us to proactively
deal with State repression, not only to defeat Snitch
Culture, but to create a world made of our desires.
Excerpted from: Fire to the Prisons #4
confronting
snitch culture:
historical examples and current proposals
“Homeboy was talking to the po-po, we had to let everybody that was
a no-no, he thought he was on the low low, and was surprised when I
hit him with the fou(4)-fou(4)”
-Uncle Murda, “Bullet, Bullet”
With the growing wave of repression
by the state towards direct action oriented
struggles, radicals have been bombarded
with the shameful concern of snitches and
informants. In a struggle which is purely
of choice and individual realization, as opposed
to a rich cultural or family heritage, a
valor dedication to one’s community has been
shamefully neglected by some. The following
article provides a brief look into how radical
communities of the past have approached
traitors to the community, while at the same
time proposing how more unique struggles
can learn from it. It is an excerpt from the
zine; “Got the Hallow Points for the Snitches”.
To order a copy of this pamphlet, you
can contact the email below:
[email protected]
As Anarchists, we fight in the face
of what appears to be insurmountable odds;
our project of liberation is the natural enemy
of the culture of authority and capitalism we
now live under. Considering that our revolt
against the institutions of domination are not
isolated pockets of resistance, and that we do
not live separately from the rest of society,
our communities are inevitably affected --and
perhaps infected-- by the culture we are aiming
to destroy.
Snitch Culture is not exclusive to Communities
in Resistance, but is one thread of
control in the larger social fabric of America.
Those in power want people to snitch on each
other-- especially those from communities
that are targeted in particular by the government
and are therefore more vulnerable to
Snitch Culture-- because snitching works to
create a climate of fear and mistrust that can
fragment the populations that threaten the
structures of power.
For example, in the war against the poor and people of
color --those that fill the prisons of America-- the State promotes
snitching as a means to perpetuate crime by creating a ‘revolving
door’ in which low-level drug dealers, addicts, and other petty
offenders are arrested and released with orders to provide more
information in order to create more arrests in order to fill more
prisons. The effects of this cycle of snitch-and-prison are that
entire communities are torn apart, families broken up, and the
United States has the largest prison population in the world.
In Anarchist circles everyone knows that Snitch Culture
breaks solidarity among activists and paralyzes our ability to wage
effective resistance. Though there is much complaining and handwringing
about the divisive role snitches play in our communities,
we have engaged in very little constructive action about this
serious and persistent problem. This zine is an attempt to educate
and foster dialogue in our communities in order to develop effective
strategies for dealing with snitches and to forge a resistance
that can withstand the attacks of power.
To start, we must realize that Snitch Culture is not a new
phenomena or only particular to Anarchists, and that many Communities
of Resistance in North America and Europe have come
up with a number of different ways –some more effective than
others-- to deal with Snitch Culture while maintaining their core
values.
There are three components --perhaps of unequal importance--
that resistance groups and others have traditionally used
to determine their response to snitches: practicality, the agreeability
to the core values of the group, and tactical benefit.
The ultra-militant Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany
tried to use something called “Revolutionary Discipline” to respond
to a growing number of snitches. This discipline drew heavily on
the promise of immediate personal reprisals for snitching. Snitches
both in jail and out were subject to vicious beatings and in one
case, a snitch was blinded. This type of response was practical for
the RAF because they had a number of supporters both inside and
outside of jail. Most snitches could be easily located and jumped
by supporters or actual RAF members. It was agreeable to the
RAF because it fit in with their concepts of both Revolutionary Discipline
and a glorification of violence. However, it did not prove to
be an effective tactic for reducing the impact of snitches. By the
end of the RAF’s existence, snitches were an important part of the
State’s efforts to not only disrupt, but to arrest numerous members
of the RAF-- including its leadership.
The tactics they employed did not seem to reduce
Snitch Culture within their own ranks or of other contemporary
militant radical organizations in West Germany.
The Weather Underground (WU) also had an
extreme but somewhat different strategy when confronting
the problem of snitches. The WU used terror as a
way to stop the effectiveness of snitches. They required
all members to give the names and addresses of close
friends and family and were explicitly warned --sometimes
while on psychedelic drugs-- that if they snitched,
they and their family would be subject to violent reprisals.
In one rambling message from the WU --written
after an AIM snitch took the stand against former
comrades-- published in radical periodicals at the time
and believed to have been written by Bernadine Dorn,
stated that the WU was not afraid to support the “[Charlie]
Manson approach” when it came to “bringing hell on
Earth for pig-snitches.” It went into detail about how violently
the WU would deal with snitches and their friends
and family. This approach ended up being completely
impractical for the WU because they had neither
the members nor the support to pull off such grandiose
plans. By the nature of being underground, they
were marginalized and had little ability to strike out at
snitches in any way. In fact, there is no evidence that
any snitch on the WU was ever even bothered by the
group. Whether this approach of terror was agreeable to
the core values of the WU is hard to say since the WU
position on violence and acceptable violence seemed to
change constantly. It was however, consistent with the
ultra-violent streak in the core leadership of the group.
As a tactic is was counter-productive-- it caused considerable
debate in radical circles and most of it was negative.
The cops also had little trouble turning folks associated
with the WU, and a number of the most rhetorically
violent members of the leadership either turned themselves
in, or cut deals.
No resistance group in recent times can compare
to the Black Panther Party (BPP) --and its factions-- in
terms of being completely infiltrated by snitches as well
as law enforcement! The BPP, in the popular mind, is
associated with violence and ultra-militancy. The image
of a tough leather-clad Black Panther carrying a shotgun
is an ever present part of the iconography of the radical
left. One would think that the BPP’s approach to snitches
would be similar to the RAF and the WU; however, they
took a completely different approach and relied on community
shame as a mechanism for dealing with snitches.
This was a somewhat practical approach because they
had a number of widely circulating publications and
outlets to get information about snitches out. They also
were followed closely by the radical left and had access
to a staggering number of mediums to report to the
broader cultures of resistance. It was certainly agreeable
to the ideals of the BPP, which claimed to be the voice of
specific communities and saw itself as a communitybased
organization. Tactically, the record speaks for
itself. There were a large number of snitches, many
who were not named until well after the fall of the BPP,
and the government --which was particularly brutal and
repressive in dealing with the BPP-- never had trouble
turning members affiliated with the BPP against the organization.
In Chicago, for example, the number of snitches was nearly epidemic.
While the above examples are not particularly
positive, they illustrate some of the difficulties we face
in dealing with snitches today in our own communities
--and thus the need for dialogue. However, groups like
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque Separatists
(ETA), and namely the WWII French Resistance
Fighters (The Maquis), are positive examples of Communities
in Resistance that dealt successfully with
Snitch Culture. The Maquis, according to Gestapo/Vichy
records, show that less than 5% of all detainees
were “cooperative”. William Volman, in his book, Rising
Up and Rising Down, says that the Spanish --and
French-- governments have “never been successful
in creating a culture of informants”. The key is to
learn from the mistakes of the past and forge our own
response to snitches that is practical, agreeable to our
core values, and tactically beneficial.
To understand why these groups --IRA, ETA
and the Maquis-- were successful, we have to look
not only at their formal and informal policies regarding
snitches, but at the movements as a whole. There
is precious little written in English about ETA, but from
the few sources available, Clean Hands, Dirty Wars,
it seems that ETA has been able to avoid widespread
Snitch Culture by the very nature of its resistance. It is
heavily family- and community-based; nearly everyone
knows everyone else and every Basque community has
been affected by the draconian repression of the Madrid-
State. Since most Basque are deeply attached to
their homeland, even the non-nationalists, the idea of
snitching on neighbors and comrades is wrought with
practical difficulties. Raising the stakes for squealing,
neighbors, co-workers and friends would react negatively
to the appearance of a snitch, and so anyone
caught snitching would not only have to create a new
social circle, but relocate.
The IRA put a tremendous amount of energy
into prisoner support. In fact it was estimated by Gerald
O’Mann that nearly a 1/3 of all money raised by the IRA
was spent directly on prisoner support. The Irish nationalist
concept of prison support is more extensive than ours
and includes family support, the glorification of prisoners,
treating ex-prisoners like returning veterans, as well as
in-jail support. An IRA prisoner was even elected to parliament
while still in jail! This support seriously diluted the
benefits of snitching and the consequences (often violent
reprisals) greatly outweighed the benefits. The IRA, more
than any other group, was successful in reducing the punitive
nature of incarceration.
The Maquis used a combination of violent attacks
on snitches as well as “reframing” propaganda. There is
much written about the beatings and shootings carried out
by Maquis, but the historic record actually shows that the
Maquis ability to carry out such attacks was extremely limited.
They made use of very public reprisals, in no doubt
due to the monopoly on news by the occupiers, which,
in turn, increased their effectiveness. However, the use
of violence can only be seen as a partial explanation for
the success of the Maquis in resisting Snitch Culture. The
Maquis used an effective propaganda that was based on
the idea that they soon would be victorious, which made
less attractive the cooperation with illegitimate authorities
that would soon be removed. What is surprising when one
reads the memoirs of resistance fighters and the historical
accounts of everyday French living under occupation is
their firm and unshakeable belief that they would be liberated.
In fact, most French not only believed they would be
liberated, but liberated by the combined French Resistance
forces. This belief gave legitimacy to the Maquis and made
crossing them a more consequential prospect, since they
believed they would come to power-- which in fact many
did.
In our own present Communities of Resistance
there seems to be no clear theory or discipline regarding
the issue of snitches, however, as Anarchists, our inherent
critique of authority and power, knowledge of security
culture, and decentralized style of organizing are certainly
beneficial in fighting Snitch Culture. That said, the few
approaches we have used in dealing directly with snitches
have not been very successful. We seem to mainly operate
under some loose code somewhat akin to the “Revolutionary
Discipline” of the RAF. The idea that ‘Snitches get
Stitches’ is prevalent and agreeable to our politics, however
it is impractical in that we lack the sheer numbers --
both inside and outside of the jails-- to make this a reality.
‘Snitches get Stitches’ functions more like the WU idea of
terror and with the exact same results in preventing Snitch
Culture: absolutely none. Knowing this, communities have
also tried the BPP model of shame, but with the recent
evidence of government infiltration of radical groups and
organizations, former comrades turning into collaborators
with wiretaps, and friends arrested or under Grand Jury
subpoenas naming names and cooperating with authorities,
there is ample evidence that this too is ineffective and
unlikely to stem the continuing tide of snitches.
It is easy to look at all of this and grow desperate.
Snitch Culture is not a problem that can be easily solved
and the very issues at the core of it run right through the
heart of everything we are attempting. And perhaps that is
the question and answer to this issue: what are we attempting? Why are some groups, like ETA, the IRA,
or The Maquis able to successfully deny attempts by
those in power to fracture and break their cultures
of resistance? Why do Anarchists, with the goals of
destroying power and creating a new world of freedom
and mutual aid, turn into ‘cooperating witnesses’ and
sacrifice not just their own dreams but those of the
communities they belong to?
These are the questions we must ask ourselves
if we want to build Communities of Resistance that
will hopefully, one day, win. We must think of ways to
strengthen our communities of autonomous individuals
and build a resistance that is effective and sustainable
in the long-term, instead of the current haphazard and
reactive scrambling to each and every blow of government
repression.
What we can learn from the Communities of
Resistance that were successful in defeating Snitch
Culture is that they believed wholeheartedly in their
struggle. Those that were actively fighting, as well as
those who supported them, did not see any choice
but to liberate themselves from illegitimate authority
and therefore saw themselves individually as part
of something larger. This should not be read as a call
for individuals to sacrifice themselves on the altar of
the collective, but to illustrate that people who believe
in what they are fighting for, and identify themselves
personally with the success or failure of that fight, are
less likely to betray that struggle because that struggle
IS them.
However, it must be said that it is probably
easier for people to identify intimately with national
liberation struggles that have --in a sense-- simpler
goals, than with something as complex and far-reaching
as Anarchy. The Maquis wanted to overthrow the
Nazi-collaborator Vichy government and to oust the
German occupiers from France. The IRA wants to kick
the English out of Ulster. ETA wants autonomy from
Spain and France and to preserve the Basque language
and culture. These groups are fighting against one particular
source of power, whereas Anarchists are struggling
to destroy all power.
Considering the fact that Anarchy is more than
just the liberation from one particular illegitimate
authority and there are as many battlefields as there
are stars in the sky, it can become easy to feel disillusioned
or ineffective. After all, authority and capitalism
still exist and we are drowned in the propaganda
that we have reached the End of History; that the Way
Things Are will continue unabated, forever. Snitches
in Communities of Resistance are often people whose
identity with the struggle for total liberation has become
fractured, or those who, in the face of the repressive
power of the state, betray their communities
because they feel there is little chance those communities
can win.
If we are to defeat Snitch Culture in our Communities
of Resistance, we must refute the propaganda
of those in power. It means tearing up the history
books because the end is not predetermined by anyone
but us. The ways and means of building a resistance that can refute their history and can engage in a
sustainable and long-term struggle for freedom, are
the same ones needed to give Snitch Culture the final
blow. Clearly, the solution is not as simple as the suggestion
‘Snitches get Stitches,’ but is complex and
takes us in many directions.
As detailed earlier, there have been plenty of
failed experiments in dealing with the issue of snitches
and the current epidemic of snitching cannot be
stopped through random beatings or through empty
threats. While violence against snitches or collaborators
may be necessary (for example, the very public
targeting of snitches utilized by the Maquis could
prove useful) it is often harmful or useless in ending
Snitch Culture. Not only can the State outmatch us in
terms of the violence it can expend, rendering moot
a wholesale campaign of violent reprisals --as in the
case of the RAF-- it also seems counter to our politics
of freedom to use the idea of terror to coerce people
into line and could put off sympathetic or interested
individuals --much like the WU did. This should not be
read as a dismissal of the tactic of violence in our resistance,
but as strong critique of violence as a useful
tool in combating Snitch Culture.
What has the greatest possibility of working
--although it is currently not practiced to the extent
that it needs to be-- is community shame coupled with
prisoner support. Community shame has the benefit
of not being irrevocable --how can you make amends
for shooting or beating someone terribly if it turns out
they were wrongly accused?-- as well as providing a
powerful disincentive for snitches by denying them
friendship and support. Prisoner support is obviously
positive in that it helps remove the power of violence
that the State holds over people. Prisoners who feel
supported and know they will be cared for have less
reason to abandon their principles and betray their
friends. Coupled together, a strategy of strong communities
of autonomous individuals that will not allow
collaborators back in, along with a prisoner support in
which the benefits of not snitching far outweigh any
measure put forth by the State, seems to be the best
course of action. Presently, however, these tactics
have proved ineffective in the prevention of Snitch
Culture. Snitches know that they will be reviled by
some, but they can remain in our communities by
moving to where they may be anonymous or because
there are people who will not ostracize them and allow
them to return. And even though our prisoner support
is one of our strongest attributes, it fails to be the
linchpin that prevents Snitch Culture, mainly because
it is limited in scope.
What this leads us back to is the idea of building
stronger communities capable of long-term resistance
to the powers of the State. Community shame
and prisoner support lack their necessary bite precisely
because our Communities of Resistance are fractured,
with no real communication or trust amongst
groups. In tightly-knit societies like the Basque,
snitches have nowhere to go because word will travel
and they would face social isolation wherever they go.
Shame only works when communities can communicate in
a way that is informative and trustworthy. Without information
about snitches, communities cannot take steps to
isolate or shame that person; and without trust, communities
have no idea if the information is reliable or that others
will also take steps to ostracize a snitch.
In terms of prisoner support, our current Communities
of Resistance offer a heartfelt support; however,
due to our lack of infrastructure and support outside of
traditional Anarchist circles, we cannot provide the all
encompassing prisoner support of the IRA. For instance,
in most cases, we cannot offer jobs, money to families, or
pay for legal representation. Most prisoners are shunted
from public view and only a few are known on a national
or international basis. On the contrary, IRA prisoners were
glorified and at the height of the Troubles, the majority of
the murals in IRA neighborhoods were dedicated to celebrating
prisoners and their deeds. The culture of prisoner
support in the IRA fostered an environment that made it
desirable to not snitch, a desire based on a total community
support for the prisoner and family. With some exceptions,
this is something that we cannot currently provide.
Where this leaves us is on the brink of a solution.
While we do seem to utilize the effective tactics in combating
Snitch Culture --prisoner support and community
shame-- they are not actually effective in stopping it.
Snitch Culture is not an isolated problem, as mentioned
earlier, but an interrelated issue with other problems facing
our Communities of Resistance. It comes as no shock
to hear that our communities are fragmented and that
there is little communication or mutual aid between them.
The same also goes for the lack of infrastructure or support
of people not traditionally identified with Anarchists
or other radical groups. We must seriously and critically
examine our communities and search for ways that we
can do things better, not just to defeat Snitch Culture, but
to win!
The way to strengthen our communities and increase
our resistance to Snitch Culture would begin by practicing
real mutual aid. Very few groups actually work together in a
way that is interrelated and that would actually help build our
counter-infrastructure. For instance, people in cities who want
to grow their own food and those who already live on farms
could participate in projects like the Victory Gardens in Athens,
Maine, which helps disenfranchised people in both urban and
rural communities develop their own sources of organic food;
groups in different cities could pool money and have benefits to
pay for the legal costs of prisoners in other places; and those
choosing not to work could help provide daycare for working
people who have to. The ways in which we can work together
and support each other are limitless, and working together
on projects and actions is a simple but unrivaled way to build
trustworthy lines of communication based on experience-- as
well as creating networks of autonomous communities that
support each other and would not tolerate a snitch among
them.
Infrastructure is important if we are to provide support
for people in prison that would actually function as a deterrent
to snitching. For instance, we cannot always give people jobs
--if they want them-- when they are out, or provide for people’s
families if they are put away. The counter-infrastructure we do
have is largely based on entertainment, and while this is a positive
thing in our communities, we must move beyond this into
other territory. For many obvious reasons, creating an infrastructure
that does not rely on capitalism, but is our very own,
is absolutely vital to our ability to wage effective resistance.
We must also address the lack of support for our resistance
in communities outside of Anarchist circles. One way
other Communities of Resistance have been effective is that
they had a large network of support in larger society. Besides
the obvious, this larger support functioned as a way to propel
resistance and created a climate of hope --a climate that Snitch
Culture does not function very well in. This lack of support
may be due to the fact that our definition of Anarchist culture
is rather narrow. Although not true in the least, the image of
Anarchists as young black-clad punks certainly does persist and
is to an extent perpetuated by Anarchist culture. Anarchists
should proudly proclaim themselves, but should also move beyond
the stereotype and show our many faces: young and old,
queer and straight, crusty and freshly-showered.
And obviously, our current prisoner support
must continue --and increase-- while working on
the long-term projects of building infrastructure and
widening our circles of support. Prisoner support
needs to become something that everyone in our
community is working on. Comrades must have the
full support of their communities when facing down
the courts, the jails, and the prison terms of the
State. We need to make prisoner support public and
visible, and we need to show comrades on the other
side of the wall that they are not forgotten. Murals,
benefits, sending letters and birthday cards, attending
court dates, and solidarity events are all easy
ways to show that we celebrate and stand behind
those from our communities who are behind bars.
We need to make good on the saying: they are in
there for us, so we are out here for them!
It should be clear that there is no simple
solution to the persistence of Snitch Culture in our
Communities of Resistance. This zine set out to
begin a dialog on how we can destroy Snitch Culture
once and for all. As we have seen, we may currently
be unable to prevent snitches in our fight for liberation
because we lack the community support and
infrastructure we need. This does not mean that
we should ever, ever condone snitching. Snitching
represents the most vile betrayal of one’s self and
one’s community and although we may not be able
to prevent Snitch Culture now, this does not mean
that we should not continue in the active removal of
snitches from our communities at present and withdraw
support from all collaborators immediately. But
now we know that this is not enough. To eradicate
Snitch Culture we must set ourselves upon the task
of building a long-term resistance that can withstand
the attacks of power, and that will take time and
a lot of hard work. We must create strategies that
look beyond today and will allow us to proactively
deal with State repression, not only to defeat Snitch
Culture, but to create a world made of our desires.
Excerpted from: Fire to the Prisons #4