redguard2009
7th November 2008, 18:17
I'm reading this book called On A Field Of Red; it is outwardly anti-communist and particularly anti-Comintern/USSR but I've found it somewhat interesting -- it mainly talks about the global political scene before, during and after the second world war (it could almost be a political intrigue piece of fiction).
One small section is devoted to the Spanish Civil War, and the way in which that conflict was viewed by various governments at the time. Of particular interest is the discussion on the Comintern's behaviour towards the conflict.
In short, support for both sides of the Civil War were apparent in most governments. In Britain, a section of the Tory party were feverishly pro-Franco (and sympathetic with Germany and Italy), while upstarts from the Labour party pledged support for the left-wing forces. The British, infact, or more accurately British sympathizers of fascism even helped launch the conflict by providing Franco with logistical support.
France was mainly anti-Franco; It saw fascist regimes on three frontiers (Germany, Italy and possibly Spain) as unacceptable.
The Soviet Union and the Comintern were, obviously, anti-Franco, though some reluctance to draw lines and take sides is evident (according to the book). Stalin at first tried to "ignore" the conflict, but when it became apparent with the launch of Franco's coup that whether he liked it or not the Spanish Civil War would be drawn on the lines of the left versus the right, he grudgingly agreed to support it.
Material support was limited. From Stalin's mindset, the Spanish Civil War was essentially turning into a proxy war between Germany and fascism and the USSR and communism; and given a global arena in which almost all of the major powers in the world were decidedly anti-communist (Britain, Germany, Italy, the US, et al) Stalin was reluctant to force the issue of conflict and engage in a fight which may have led to the front steps of the Soviet Union itself. In the Spanish Civil War, Stalin saw the possibility that Germany would take the USSR's involvement as a prelude for a war between the two countries itself, which the USSR was ill prepared for.
While the book is, as I said, anti-communist and anti-USSR, it does bring up interesting topics outside of the usual "Stalin betrayed the Civil War". It explores potential reasons behind it; in one example, it describes how the International Brigades, made up of volunteers from around the world, had no or very few Russians in its ranks, after a decree by the USSR that barred Russians from joining again on the pretext of wanting to avoid Soviet citizens being captured by the fascists, which would lead to immediate accusations of "social imperialism" against the USSR. The USSR did authorize material support for the left-wing factions in the war -- but through the Comintern, and not officially the Soviet Union itself. Workers were urged to donate funds to an "officially" Comintern-led support effort, and material was donated to the Comintern to then be turned over to leftist forces in Spain.
So in the opinions of the very bright, open minds of this forum, is this answer reasonable? Did Stalin and the USSR have a legitimate fear of provoking an open confrontation between Germany and itself? Was it legitimately reluctant to engage in a proxy war which may have led to an actual war? Although the point became moot in 1941, it was not for lack of the Soviets trying to prevent it; along with the reluctance to force a confrontation between fascism and communism in Spain, the Soviet Union would later go on to sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact which (they hoped) would stall the inevitable German attack on Russia long enough for the USSR to prepare.
In the grand scheme of things, the USSR's strategy during the 30s and early 40s was one of temporary appeasement as a lead-up to an eventual and unavoidable conflict; Soviet policy for most of the 30s was to avoid confrontation and "prod" Europe for signs of social weakness which could be capitalized upon to promote a large-scale conflict which would usher in revolutionary movements. The USSR even attempted to form ad-hoc coalitions between itself and Britain, France and Poland to form an Anti-Fascist union (while at the same time Germany was attempting to do the same, to form an Anti-Comintern alliance). Evidence seems to show that the USSR had hoped to create an alliance and then invade Germany from both Poland and France. Germany's quick dispatch of Poland in 1939 and then France and the Low Countries in 1940 obviously dispelled this idea.
It's a far cry from some of the accusations against Stalin that he was a veritable partner of Hitler's, that his aspirations included nothing more than his goal of cementing his power on the Soviet Union, that he betrayed global revolutionary movements and helped Germany take over Europe. It is interesting that the take on Stalin's motives during the 1930s promoted in this book comes from the pen of an anti-communist; we leftists are rarely as cordial towards Stalin and his ambitions.
I, for one, find myself entertaining more cordial views towards Stalin and his conduct of the Spanish Civil War. I was initially quite critical of him for his handling of that conflict, but after reading up on the European political situation of the times I find myself more understanding of what he had to contend with. His decisions, in the end, may have been proven wrong, but I believe his intentions were far less aggressive than is commonly held.
So I propose the questions:
Could more firm and widespread material and financial support for the leftists during the Spanish Civil War by the USSR led to a leftist victory over Franco?
Could this incease in support have led to the "proxy war" between Germany and the USSR to become a direct military confrontation?
If a confrontation in the mid to late 30s between Germany and the USSR materialized, did Stalin have ample reason to fear global segregation, and would the western world stood idly by and even subtly supported Germany?
Could the Soviet Union have won if direct confrontation between Germany and the USSR erupted?
One small section is devoted to the Spanish Civil War, and the way in which that conflict was viewed by various governments at the time. Of particular interest is the discussion on the Comintern's behaviour towards the conflict.
In short, support for both sides of the Civil War were apparent in most governments. In Britain, a section of the Tory party were feverishly pro-Franco (and sympathetic with Germany and Italy), while upstarts from the Labour party pledged support for the left-wing forces. The British, infact, or more accurately British sympathizers of fascism even helped launch the conflict by providing Franco with logistical support.
France was mainly anti-Franco; It saw fascist regimes on three frontiers (Germany, Italy and possibly Spain) as unacceptable.
The Soviet Union and the Comintern were, obviously, anti-Franco, though some reluctance to draw lines and take sides is evident (according to the book). Stalin at first tried to "ignore" the conflict, but when it became apparent with the launch of Franco's coup that whether he liked it or not the Spanish Civil War would be drawn on the lines of the left versus the right, he grudgingly agreed to support it.
Material support was limited. From Stalin's mindset, the Spanish Civil War was essentially turning into a proxy war between Germany and fascism and the USSR and communism; and given a global arena in which almost all of the major powers in the world were decidedly anti-communist (Britain, Germany, Italy, the US, et al) Stalin was reluctant to force the issue of conflict and engage in a fight which may have led to the front steps of the Soviet Union itself. In the Spanish Civil War, Stalin saw the possibility that Germany would take the USSR's involvement as a prelude for a war between the two countries itself, which the USSR was ill prepared for.
While the book is, as I said, anti-communist and anti-USSR, it does bring up interesting topics outside of the usual "Stalin betrayed the Civil War". It explores potential reasons behind it; in one example, it describes how the International Brigades, made up of volunteers from around the world, had no or very few Russians in its ranks, after a decree by the USSR that barred Russians from joining again on the pretext of wanting to avoid Soviet citizens being captured by the fascists, which would lead to immediate accusations of "social imperialism" against the USSR. The USSR did authorize material support for the left-wing factions in the war -- but through the Comintern, and not officially the Soviet Union itself. Workers were urged to donate funds to an "officially" Comintern-led support effort, and material was donated to the Comintern to then be turned over to leftist forces in Spain.
So in the opinions of the very bright, open minds of this forum, is this answer reasonable? Did Stalin and the USSR have a legitimate fear of provoking an open confrontation between Germany and itself? Was it legitimately reluctant to engage in a proxy war which may have led to an actual war? Although the point became moot in 1941, it was not for lack of the Soviets trying to prevent it; along with the reluctance to force a confrontation between fascism and communism in Spain, the Soviet Union would later go on to sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact which (they hoped) would stall the inevitable German attack on Russia long enough for the USSR to prepare.
In the grand scheme of things, the USSR's strategy during the 30s and early 40s was one of temporary appeasement as a lead-up to an eventual and unavoidable conflict; Soviet policy for most of the 30s was to avoid confrontation and "prod" Europe for signs of social weakness which could be capitalized upon to promote a large-scale conflict which would usher in revolutionary movements. The USSR even attempted to form ad-hoc coalitions between itself and Britain, France and Poland to form an Anti-Fascist union (while at the same time Germany was attempting to do the same, to form an Anti-Comintern alliance). Evidence seems to show that the USSR had hoped to create an alliance and then invade Germany from both Poland and France. Germany's quick dispatch of Poland in 1939 and then France and the Low Countries in 1940 obviously dispelled this idea.
It's a far cry from some of the accusations against Stalin that he was a veritable partner of Hitler's, that his aspirations included nothing more than his goal of cementing his power on the Soviet Union, that he betrayed global revolutionary movements and helped Germany take over Europe. It is interesting that the take on Stalin's motives during the 1930s promoted in this book comes from the pen of an anti-communist; we leftists are rarely as cordial towards Stalin and his ambitions.
I, for one, find myself entertaining more cordial views towards Stalin and his conduct of the Spanish Civil War. I was initially quite critical of him for his handling of that conflict, but after reading up on the European political situation of the times I find myself more understanding of what he had to contend with. His decisions, in the end, may have been proven wrong, but I believe his intentions were far less aggressive than is commonly held.
So I propose the questions:
Could more firm and widespread material and financial support for the leftists during the Spanish Civil War by the USSR led to a leftist victory over Franco?
Could this incease in support have led to the "proxy war" between Germany and the USSR to become a direct military confrontation?
If a confrontation in the mid to late 30s between Germany and the USSR materialized, did Stalin have ample reason to fear global segregation, and would the western world stood idly by and even subtly supported Germany?
Could the Soviet Union have won if direct confrontation between Germany and the USSR erupted?