New documents emerge why Stalin "sided" with Hitler in Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact [Archive]

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chimx

22nd October 2008, 05:41

Fascinating article that confirms what most historians had suspected for quite some time on the thinking of Stalin and other soviet leaders over why they signed the non-aggression pact. What do you think of the USSR's actions at this time?

Newly declassified documents have revealed that Stalin was ready to send over a million Soviet troops to the German border in order to preempt potential Nazi aggression. It’s claimed that if agreement had been reached between the USSR, Britain and France, the strategy could have prevented the outbreak of the Second World War.

The documents - mostly notes of meetings between the three sides and drafts of the agreement - reveal that Stalin was ready to dispatch the troops if Poland would allow them to cross its border.

Up to 120 infantry divisions (each with some 19,000 troops), 16 cavalry divisions, 5,000 heavy artillery pieces, 9,500 tanks and up to 5,500 fighter aircraft and bombers would have been placed on the German border.

Gen Sotskov, an ex-Soviet intelligence serviceman, told the Daily Telegraph: "Had the British, French and their European ally Poland, taken this offer seriously then together we could have put some 300 or more divisions into the field on two fronts against Germany - double the number Hitler had at the time. This was a chance to save the world or at least stop the wolf in its tracks."

The events took place on August 15, 1939. The British and French representatives were set to talk, but not to make any decisions or strike any deals. Their unwillingness to commit made Stalin turn towards Germany and sign the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact barely a week later.

Historian Vladimir Simindey told RT that this shift of sides initiated by the USSR was simple Real Politik. The diplomatic climate in Europe was extremely volatile and, being unprepared for full-scale military action, the USSR had to do everything possible to prevent conflict.

He points out that the new declassified information is just the latest piece of a bigger picture that historians have been observing for many years. The potential for an anti-Nazi alliance between Britain, France and the USSR has long been known, but the newly declassified documents reveal how serious Stalin was about the potential agreement. And, according Simindey, efforts to strike such a deal were made more than once.

"The Soviet Union repeatedly made attempts to create a system of regional and pan-European security from 1934,” he said. “It was then that efforts were made to create a stronger alliance between France and the USSR as well as set up a wider Western Pact which would include other states from Western Europe, not only the USSR, France and Great Britain."

But the attempts were met with cautious rejection. According to the expert, Moscow was ideologically separated from the negotiations because it did not support the policy of appeasement. Nevertheless, it did make efforts to participate in them, by making, among other things, the proposals that are mooted in the newly-declassified documents.

"However, the main problem was within the fact that both Britain and France made huge efforts to create a ‘sanitary corridor’ around the Soviet Union," Simindey added.

He believes that the key issue was that the Western European powers were not interested in cooperating with the USSR. They were, on the other hand, interested in a clash between Stalin and Hitler as, according to their reasoning, this would neutralise the threat arising from both. This was a common theme discussed in political salons in London and Paris alike.

Simindey thinks Russia's swift alliance with Germany was a direct response to the Munich agreement. It was a reaction to the fact they were left with no potential allies and were desperate to preserve the brittle peace in the region. This pact would last for two years, until Hitler's Blitzkrieg attack on Russia in June 1941, by which time most of Europe was already under Nazi occupation.

http://www.russiatoday.com/features/news/32132

Die Neue Zeit

22nd October 2008, 05:47

^^^ Duh. :rolleyes:

[Brief comment not intended at you personally]

The Western powers basically blew it. "What? No chair for me?"

At this time in history anyway, I don't think Stalin was interested in having Soviet puppets as buffer states (obviously because the WWII trauma didn't kick in). Well, maybe JUST Poland (Russian Empire borders and what not)...

chimx

22nd October 2008, 06:16

I prefaced the article with, "confirms what most historians had suspected for quite some time". ;)

Die Neue Zeit

22nd October 2008, 06:26

^^^ Well, I was suspicious of those quoted remarks, given the recent upsurge in the "pre-emptive strike" conspiracy theory generated by Suvorov and the neo-cons. It took quite a while to dismantle this s***.

Il-Peres

22nd October 2008, 06:44

the strategy could have prevented the outbreak of the Second World War. In history we learn not to do assumptions of what could have happened, and even if there were Soviet troops at the German border I doubt how that would have prevented the war. The most important thing is that if such documents really exist and are authentic than as historians we have the task to understand why such an agreement failed. Keep in mind that Blum was all for militarization against Nazi Germany, so I guess the problem is with Britain.

Comrada J

22nd October 2008, 09:13

Here's the youtube for those that like to watch videos:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTuh-hRoCNU

Anyway as we all know WWII happened because the western powers let it happen, the bastards.

ComradeOm

24th October 2008, 19:55

Keep in mind that Blum was all for militarization against Nazi Germany, so I guess the problem is with Britain.Specificially Chamberlain. His anti-communism was never far from the surface and it took considerable persuading from his cabinet to convince him to despatch the military mission in August (!) 1939. Even then it was a feeble gesture and the talks, marked by suspicion on both sides, went nowhere fast. The French had always favoured the collective security arrangements proposed by Litvinov - which were realistically the the only way in which the guarantees given in March could be honoured - and, as in Munich, they were to be badly burned by the more conservative British

Of course the whole discussion was probably a waste of time given that Poland would almost certainly have rejected any proposal that it allow Soviet soldiers on its soil

Edit: I wish I could remember the name of the British officer who led the British military mission to Moscow. IIRC he had some sort of a ridiculous quadruple barrel name

Wanted Man

25th October 2008, 14:57

Very interesting. In a lot of discussions on the M-R Pact, opponents disregard these suspicions (now proven facts, apparently), and instead argue from the premise of a power-mad Stalin who cynically allied with the fascists, with the intent of conquering more land.

I have an interesting book on this subject, which pays some degree of attention to the various rounds of negotiations between the USSR, the western powers and Germany. It may seem like boring details, but in the end, to review the period of 1938 till August 1939 gives a much better perspective of why the M-R Pactwas eventually signed.

Of course the whole discussion was probably a waste of time given that Poland would almost certainly have rejected any proposal that it allow Soviet soldiers on its soil
Unfortunately, this is likely true. Along with Hungary, Poland was one of the 'vultures' who made small territorial gains from the sell-out of Czechoslovakia. After that, they did ally with the west, but did not want Soviet troops in their lands. And the British were certainly not prepared to throw them under the bus for the greater good.

Edit: I wish I could remember the name of the British officer who led the British military mission to Moscow. IIRC he had some sort of a ridiculous quadruple barrel nameMy book mentions a Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax. Is this who you mean? He was an admiral who was given the job for the long term, without much of a serious commitment to reach an agreement.

Sentinel

26th October 2008, 03:41

Il-Peres

26th October 2008, 10:16

It's useless discussing Stalin's 'cynicism' or expansionist intentions. The point is that the British Empire was not ready to cooperate with the USSR unless in last resort in total war. Using these documents to pour marmalade on Stalin's reputation is useless, get a life, who gives a fuck on Stalin's reputation? History is made up of people not of individuals and leaders, unless you are a little girl who likes his mustache.

Edit: :laugh:

ComradeOm

26th October 2008, 12:22

My book mentions a Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax. Is this who you mean? He was an admiral who was given the job for the long term, without much of a serious commitment to reach an agreement.
Ah, that's the name. For some reason I've always found that hilarious

Of course attacking the fascists would also have been the right thing to doQuestion: When do Marxists, of any stripe, 'do the right thing' without regard to reality or material conditions? Answer: When they are ultra-leftists. Now Stalin may have been an opportunistic bastard but this is one ideological failing that you can't fault him for

As it is Stalin's logic seems perfectly sound - first attempt to construct an anti-fascist alliance and then if that fails facilitate an inter-capitalist war that would cripple both Western and Central powers. This would then, as it did in 1917-1923, usher in a period of intense revolutionary activity that would, because Stalin was no internationalist, permanently secure the borders of the USSR

Of course the latter option didn't exactly work out but we tend to forget today that no one in the world, with the exception of A Hitler, expected anything other than a costly war of attrition in northern France

Sentinel

27th October 2008, 10:30

Wanted Man

29th October 2008, 15:41

The material conditions did not justify Stalin's alliance with the Fascists. There are limits for what any internationalist, workerist communist may or may not do, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact -- coldblooded scheming together with the Fascist enemy, against the interests of millions of workers -- was crossing the line as far as I'm concerned.

If that makes me an ultraleftist, I'm proud to be one.
I'm not sure if it's ultraleftist, it's just a very moral judgment. As we've seen in this thread, the Soviets did attempt to form an anti-fascist alliance for years, while the western powers sat at the table with Hitler to allow him to dismantle Czechoslovakia. Of course, even if the British Empire had wanted to fight fascism, there would still be the problem of Polish approval, and would probably require violating their independence (which is what happened, anyway).

Of course, there is not really a possible moral justification for the Pact, and Soviet leaders themselves poorly justified it (Molotov called Poland "an ugly creature of the Versailles Treaty"). But if we're talking about the interests of millions of workers, it would be far worse if they did nothing and let it all go to shit, just because of moral considerations. Then you'd have Germany occupying all of Poland. Considering that even with the buffer zone of the M-R Pact, the Germans still came close to Moscow, the consequences would have been terrible.

Invader Zim

29th October 2008, 17:14

Anyway as we all know WWII happened because the western powers let it happen, the bastards.

A stupid comment with a stupid video. The charge that Britain, and the West, allowed the Second World War to happen, is to ignore pretty much all the historical evidence. Next you will be quoting Correlli Barnett and claiming that the refusal to committ to war was a national 'character flaw'.

The West rejected Stalin's offers because they, and correctly, saw it as being a ploy to facilitate Stalin's imperial ambitions in Poland; something they were not willing to consider while they still believed headway with Germany may have still been possible through discussion at the table. They also were skeptical of the USSR's ability to fight an effective war, especially as Stalin had purged the USSR's armies of its experienced officers; and considering the devistation the Nazi's wraught upon the USSR's armed forces until 1941 (and their successes were as much due to incompetence within German supplies as it was anything else), again their fears were hardly without justification.

British policy was to avoid war, and delay it, until Britain was in a position to actually fight it and win; and British predictions were that Germany would flatten Britain and her allies until re-armament aims were nearing completion in 1940. Again, they would doubtless have been correct, had Hitler not delayed, and actually allowed the British time to continue re-arming (particularly the Air-Service) at an unprecidented rate, well into 1940. And it isn't as if they were naive and were blissfully unaware of what was coming, the Air-Ministry budget in the mid-1930s was around £6m, by the end of the Peace it was £56m. Which pretty much says it all.

Yehuda Stern

29th October 2008, 18:15

Leaving aside the fact that I probably wouldn't consider the USSR to still have been a workers' state at the time, I don't see something inherently wrong about a workers' state making deals with an imperialist power (and in this respect there's absolutely no difference between a fascist or 'democratic' state). What was criminal about the pact was that Stalin started portraying Hitler as a friend of the workers, or at least benign, that he turned in German communists over to the Nazis, and that he used it to conquer and rob Poland.

ComradeOm

31st October 2008, 19:57

Zim, I assume you meant to quote ComradeJ above? Regardless, its an interesting topic so I'll discuss it further

The West rejected Stalin's offers because they, and correctly, saw it as being a ploy to facilitate Stalin's imperial ambitions in Poland; something they were not willing to consider while they still believed headway with Germany may have still been possible through discussion at the tableThere are two major problems with this statement. In the first place you are assuming that London actually gave a damn about the territorial integrity of Poland. The Czechs had been sacrificed in '38 and it was widely assumed by British diplomats in '39 that agreement with Moscow would require the Poles to also make 'border adjustments'. This was not a major sticking point to anyone but the Poles

Secondly of course it was glaringly obvious following the events of '38 that another European war was only a matter of when. This is the significance of the guarantee given to Poland in March '39 (again, worthless in practice without Soviet cooperation) in that it marked the end of Franco-British efforts to negotiate with or appease Berlin. There would be no repeat of Munich. Both the major rearmament efforts and diplomatic flurries of the year preceding war testify to the fact that everyone, save perhaps one or two delusional politicians, was aware of the approaching storm

They also were skeptical of the USSR's ability to fight an effective war, especially as Stalin had purged the USSR's armies of its experienced officers; and considering the devistation the Nazi's wraught upon the USSR's armed forces until 1941 (and their successes were as much due to incompetence within German supplies as it was anything else), again their fears were hardly without justificationTrue, to a degree. There was a general disdain for the Red Army but its reputation didn't nosedive until the humiliation of the Winter War. It was also only in retrospect that people began to factor in the devastating loss of so many experienced officers. But in 1939 the USSR was still a Great Power with millions of men under arms. Its cooperation was the only possible way in which the guarantees given by London in '39 could be honoured or that the advance of Nazi Germany through Eastern Europe could be checked. Remember as well that this is before the stunning success of the Battle of France and the rise of the myth of the German soldier

British policy was to avoid war, and delay it, until Britain was in a position to actually fight it and win; and British predictions were that Germany would flatten Britain and her allies until re-armament aims were nearing completion in 1940Huh? Source for the last sentence? The Allies were fairly confident going into WWII. There was of course huge public fears over the nature and costs of the coming conflict (no one wanted another Great War) but by practically every measure the Franco-British alliance was superior to Germany; and people knew this. Which is one reason why the negotiations with Stalin were not pursued as they should have been. Obviously delaying war would only increase this material advantage (a factor that was more relevant when discussing Hitler's motivations) but the real reason for the Phony War was that the Allied economies were in an incomparably better position to fight a long and protracted war. They were in no rush to force a decisive campaign

Chapaev

3rd November 2008, 20:11

Motivated by feelings of class hatred for the Soviet state, the ruling circles of the West, in the guise of nonintervention and neutrality, had a policy of abetting the fascists. They calculated on diverting the threat of a fascist invasion from their countries, weakening their imperialist rivals through the forces of Russia, and then destroying Russia with the help of these same rivals. They gambled on a mutual exhaustion of Russia and fascist Germany in a protracted war.

The Western powers did not act in good faith in their negotiations with Russia in the summer of 1939. While heading toward a breakdown of the Moscow negotiations, the British government simultaneously secretly contacted the Hitlerites through the German ambassador in London to negotiate an agreement on a repartition of the world at the expense of the USSR. Paris and London were sabotaging constructive Soviet proposals. The Western powers did not want an agreement on a joint struggle against the fascists as proposed by the USSR. In proposing that the Soviet Union assume a unilateral pledge to help any European neighbor in case of an attack, the West wanted to draw the USSR into a single-handed war with Germany. The position of the Western powers foreordained the breakdown of the Moscow negotiations.

Russia was faced with two alternatives: to be isolated in the face of a direct threat of an attack by Germany or, having exhausted all possibilities of forming an alliance with the West, to sign the nonaggression pact proposed by Germany and avoid war. The situation made the second choice inevitiable. As a result of the pact concluded on 23 August 1939, the war began with a conflict within the capitalist world, contrary to the calculations of the Western ruling circles.

Soviet foreign policy in 1939-41 was the policy of a powerful socialist state based on Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence. The Communist Party sought to ease international tension and ensure the triumph of Lenin’s teachings on peaceful coexistence. The efforts of the Communist Party to consolidate Russia’s international position and security were a major factor in achieving the main foreign policy objectives in 1939-1941, chiefly in providing better conditions for repulsing fascist aggression during the Fatherland War.

The principal result of the Communist Party’s work in foreign policy was that Russia’s involvement in the war was postponed and the possibility was given for strengthening its defense, expanding its industrial resources, and reorganizing the work of the military in the face of the imminent war.

Invader Zim

4th November 2008, 17:32

Om, I am currently on a research trip, ironically I'm looking at documents on British re-militarisation in the 1930s and 40s, more specifically on the recruitment of intelligence officials.

I shall get back to you on Monday.

redguard2009

6th November 2008, 07:08

ComradeOm

7th November 2008, 19:57

Fact of the matter is (going back to the erroneous assumption of the viability of a pre-emptive strike), the USSR had the bulk of its armed forces in the sectors which Germany attacked in 1941 and they proved incapable of mounting any sort of defense, let alone offense, against German forces. Soviet forces were completely outclassed (look at the fiasco of the Winter War)Eh... no. The disasters of '41 can be explained by a variety of reasons but the most important are 1) the complete strategic surprise achieved by the Germans (unforgivable), and 2) the fact that the Red Army was in the midst of a major reorganisation programme

The myth of German superiority simply doesn't hold up to history. In terms of weaponry, leadership (after the initial shock anyway), mechanisation, and doctrine, the Red Army was either superior or equal to the Wehrmacht. What differentiated the two in those hectic months of '41 is the immense organisational deficiencies of the former. This was a side effect of the incredible rearmament campaign (in turn a side effect of industrialisation) designed to transform the Red Army into a modern mechanised army. The doctrine (deep operations) had been arrived at in the mid-thirties and the following years saw a variety of experiments designed to provide the best organisational structure for this mobile and aggressive doctrine

The problem was that the USSR was slap bang in the middle of this immense reorganisation when the Germans invaded. Units were either deployed in poor positions or in transit, commanders had little to no experience in their assigned ranks (a result of the purges), equipment had yet to be distributed, and no one had a clue what they were supposed to do. To illustrate, the actual organisational structure of a Soviet division had changed (IIRC) three or four times in as many years! Glantz is perfectly correct when he asserts that Soviet combat effectiveness was at its nadir when the Wehrmacht struck

However all the components were in place for a capable force. The aggressive counter-attacking doctrine magnified losses during '41 but, as its practitioners became more experienced and learned to command large formations, it soon paid dividends. By the end of the war it was the Soviets who were the masters of armoured warfare and they effectively annihilated the Wehrmacht in a series of brilliant mobile manoeuvres

Incidentally Suvorov's 'Icebreaker' thesis - ie, that the USSR was planning a pre-emptive strike that was only thwarted by the German invasion -has been completely demolished by a number of Western historians, most notably Glantz

Invader Zim

7th November 2008, 22:28

As I said, I will respond fully on Monday, but one thing from your latest post: -

The disasters of '41 can be explained by a variety of reasons but the most important are 1) the complete strategic surprise achieved by the Germans (unforgivable)It may have come as a surprise, but it shouldn't have been because Stalin (personally) had early warning. The British had cracked the German Enigma codes, and had become aware of Operation Barbarossa prior to its launch. F. W. Winterbotham, a senior RAF figure in the British intelligence community, revealed the secret that Britain had been breaking German transmissions in his 1974 work The Ultra Secret (Orion Edition 2000), he also revealed that the British knew that a likely invasion of Russia was imminent and that Churchill wrote a letter to Stalin informing him that a big build-up of German forces in Easter Germany (p. 70), Stalin didn't respond, and of course we all know the rest. However it is clear that Stalin was provided sound intelligence prior to Barbarossa, that an invasion was likely to occur.

Furthermore Ronald Lewin, a British historian, noted in his book Ultra Goes To War (1980 Arrow Edition) that the American intelligence services had acquired a copy of the Barbarossa Directive as early as January 1941 from an anti-Nazi official and passed it onto the Kremlin (albeit after considerable delay). p. 104.

So it can't have been a complete shock, and is a prime example why the British were unwilling to put their faith in Stalin, the USSR and the Red Army while they still thought delay, or even peace, might be achieved through talks with Germany.

ComradeOm

7th November 2008, 23:01

It may have come as a surprise, but it shouldn't have been because Stalin (personally) had early warningIndeed, as I noted it was an unforgivable error on Stalin's part. While ignoring the advice of the British was perfectly understandable there was ample warning from Soviet intelligence itself of the impending invasion

Although I fail to see how this excuses the reluctance of the British to do a deal with Stalin. He had after all been far more prescient in predicting a European war than the pre-1938 British establishment...

redguard2009

8th November 2008, 04:50

ComradeOm

8th November 2008, 13:04

I don't see how anything you said differs from my very generalized point, that the Red Army was completely outclassed by the Germans -- this means not just in terms of tactics, strategy, equipment, material, personelle, skill, training or experience, but in all or most of the above aspectsHuh? How about the fact that I explicitly said that Germany did not outclass the Soviets in terms of strategy, equipment, material, or personnel? Training and experience is a very valid point. As I made clear above the German successes were due to the temporary nosedive in Soviet combat effectiveness due to internal reforms, not some inherent superiority of German tactics or fighting spirit

Germany could not have steamrolled through Poland, Denmark, Belgium, France and most of western Russia without some degree of superiority over its foesLets examine these nations in more detail. Poland, Denmark, and Belgium we can essentially ignore seeing as Germany being Germany there was an overwhelming material advantage at play. Minor nations cannot hope to compete with regional superpowers... as Georgia has so recently demonstrated. It is useful to note though that the invasion of Poland, typically held up as the first Blitzkrieg operation, actually utilised relatively conventional tactics driven first and foremost by infantry and artillery

Now France and the Soviet Union are more interesting because these were two scenarios in which Germany was actually at a steep material disadvantage. Explaining these successes is what has given rise to the myth of German superiority - ie, the Wehrmacht was a better army and operating off a completely new strategic platform. I'm afraid that the truth is far more mundane. In terms of training, material, organisation, etc, the Allies were either equal to or superior to the Wehrmacht. For example, its well known that their tanks were considerably superior to German ones but this is typically dismissed by claiming that the French distributed theirs amongst the infantry while the Germans were concentrated into dedicated panzer units. In reality the French did distribute many of their tanks in 'pennypackets' but they also possessed purely armour formations. France, with its impressive numerical superiority in armour, could afford to do both. Its also worth mentioning at this point that the Wehrmacht always remained a 'poor man's army' and in terms of mechanisation always lagged behind the French, British, Soviets, and US even in '39. Until the very end of the war much of the equipment captured in France remained in use with the Wehrmacht

So why did they succeed? The original Halder Plan for the invasion of France called for a limited conventional thrust through Belgium and towards the Channel. This was the plan expected by the Allies and they deployed their forces accordingly to the north. Hitler, driven by economic necessities, decided to change things around and gave approval for a daring armoured thrust through the Ardennes. Crucially the Allied command wrote this sector off as unnavigable by armour and so it was lightly defended by French reservists. More damningly, their strategic reserves were held far to the north and unable to respond to this sudden new threat

Again, this does not indicate that the Wehrmacht was fundamentally superior to that of the French and British armies in any field but leadership. Their success was the result of a brilliant manoeuvre and disastrous incompetence on the part of the Allied command

The Winter War, in which a massive Soviet force equipped with the latest Soviet-made vehicles, tanks and aircraft were almost incapable of dislodging a Finnish force a fraction of the sizeThe Winter War did not exactly cover the Red Army in glory but it was an advance on an extremely narrow front against a well prepared opposition in atrocious conditions. Those in Berlin who took this campaign as a sign that the Red Army was a third-rate force would later deeply regret this underestimation

If you want a more accurate pre-war example of Red Army capabilities then read up on what Zhukov did to the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol

And the Soviet Union did have the bulk of its active formations stationed in the west along the Polish frontiers when the Germans struck and they were annihilatedThat's the point! The Red Army formations were disastrously deployed far too close to the border (amongst other more mundane poor deployments). They were then caught in the massive Wehrmacht pincer movements in the first weeks of the invasion. This probably would have been enough to doom them even without the element of surprise or the chaos in the soviet ranks outlined in my previous post. Ideally they should have been, even by Soviet military doctrine, held a few hundred kilometres back in other to launch their counterattacks

More so than in France it was the element of luck that led Germany to attack when the Red Army was at its nadir. By '41 there was despair in Berlin when it became apparent that the gamble to destroy the Red Army had failed. This lifted somewhat with the fresh successes of the next year but the war was effectively decided at Stalingrad in '42 and early '43. By this point the Red Army leadership was vastly more experienced and capable of putting together impressive operational plans that slowly destroyed the Wehrmacht. The likes of Bagration would not have been possible had the Red Army been as inferior as you claim

But Germany was fighting on three fronts, was being devestated from 1942 onwards by a massive bombing campaign, was syphoning off essential war material for clandestine experimental weapons (I've read that the total resources used to develop the V-1 and V-2, which had negligable impact on the war, could have been used to build over 11,000 bombers), and had no consistent supply of oil (which the US and USSR inparticular had plenty of), and, lastly and perhaps most importantly, was controlled by a complete maniac with little grasp of military theoryPoint by point:

1) The Eastern Front was, in terms of resources consumed, by far and away the most important. That it had been opened at all was largely due to both economic necessity and a concious choice by Hitler and the OKW

2) The Allied bombing campaign did not begin to seriously affect German production until '43 and tended to be both grossly inaccurate and extremely costly until the introduction of the P-51 in late '43 and early '44. At this point the probability of a German victory in the East was nil

3) So you would advise that the strategic missile programme be put into building bombers? Even though Germany had a dire shortage of oil, pilots, and raw materials. German material weakness should not be taken as some excuse for their defeat. Incidentally the costly missile programmes did not enter service until '44

4) It was this "maniac with little grasp of military theory" that was responsible for the victory in France. No one senior staff officer thought Manstein's plan would succeed and it took the support of Hitler, desperate for a rapid victory, to see it implemented. If you are to comment on Hitler's contribution to the German war effort then it is nothing short of intellectually dishonest to ignore the successes and focus on the defeats. Of course that was exactly what the German officers did - their excuses for their own failures were typically along the lines of 'the Fuhrer insisted' or 'the winter arrived' :rolleyes:

Whether or not a pre-emptive strike was in the works, the idea is a proven fact that circled Soviet intelligence and command circlesYes, Zhukov tabled such a suggestion and it was dismissed out of hand by Stalin. There is no more to it than that

I suspect the reason for the complete inaction of the British and French after the invasion of Poland was due to their hope that Germany would continue driving east towards Moscow rather than turn and face themThe reason for their inaction was that they, like everyone else save Hitler, were expecting a lengthy war akin to that of 1914-'18. The weaknesses of the German economy were well known and the Franco-British material advantage, already considerable in '39, would only increase with time. To their eyes there was nothing to lose by waiting for Hitler to strike the first costly blow. Again, had Hitler not intervened this belief would have been vindicated with a costly war in Belgium that would have very much favoured the Allies

redguard2009

8th November 2008, 18:05

The likes of Bagration would not have been possible had the Red Army been as inferior as you claim

By 1943, after Soviet military industry was transported east towards the Urals and Siberia, and after the Red Army had lost its battle virginity, and after considerable material power had been loaned to the Soviet Union via Britain and the US (which was of particular importance for Soviet mobilization efforts as Lend-Lease trucks and halftracks were one of the sole sources of transportation for Soviet artillery and troops), after the Germans had lost 100,000 men captured in North Africa and over half a million more wounded or killed, after Germany had over 120 divisions deployed to the defense of Western Europe, and after the start of the bombing campaign -- which, yes, you are correct, did not hamper production of war material and equipment as much (some of Germany's highest productivity occured in early-mid 1944) it did prove decisive in that it played a large part in crippling Germany's oil and gas production (as epitomized by the Ploesti raids).

By 1943-1944 German development of combat equipment, in terms of quality, matched and even surpassed that of the Soviet Union. Upgraded versions of the Panzer IV were more than a match for the T-34, and developments of the Tiger, Panther, and Tiger II outclassed comparable Soviet designs (such as the T-34-85 and IS-2). The Luftwaffe also enjoyed superiority in the form of the Bf 109 and its wide range of medium/tactical bombers.

3) So you would advise that the strategic missile programme be put into building bombers? Even though Germany had a dire shortage of oil, pilots, and raw materials. German material weakness should not be taken as some excuse for their defeat. Incidentally the costly missile programmes did not enter service until '44

But their development had been in the works for a decade and vast amounts of resources were put into that development and subsequent deployment.

But as regards the actual comparison of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army:

1) The Wehrmacht and its allies actually outnumbered Soviet forces in the theatre of operations;
2) The Red Air Force was at a serious qualitative disadvantage; new Soviet designs, in the form of the Yak-1, LaGG and MiG series were either still under development or just being rolled out of assembly lines. In comparison, the Bf 109 entertained a long history of continual advancements and the Fw 190 afforded even more superiority. Germany also maintained a large fleet of medium and tactical bombers such as Heinkel, Dorner and Messerschmitt designs.
3) It is my opinion that Barbarossa and the subsequent bitter defeats of the Red Army and Air Force led to something of a "Darwinian" effect on the Soviet Union. The defeats of 1941-1942 served to essentially weed out the remaining incompetance in the command heirarchy of the Red Army, while those with the tactical and strategic skill to survive did so -- or else were of the latest generation of up-and-coming generals and army leaders. The destruction and abandonment of Soviet industry in the west, and its rebuilding in the east, was also an important factor; old inefficient industrial practices and designs were replaced with an industrial infastructure specifically built to deal with the high demands of wartime. Production of the T-34, which outclassed all German tanks currently in service, had only begun in mid-1940 -- by the start of Operation Barbarossa less than 1,000 T-34s were in service and many of them were not combat ready; by the end of 1942 and start of 1943, more than 1,000 T-34s were being built per month from the new factories that came online in mid-1942, such as Factory 174, TchKZ and UZTM. In June 1941 the most numerous Soviet tanks were of the BT-7 and T-60 variety which were no match for Germany's Panzer IIIs and IV's.

In short, Operation Barbarossa cut away the deficient aspects of the Red Army and Soviet military industry to allow for far more effective leaders and production to take its place, which, starting in mid-1942 turned the tide of the campaign.

Yes, Zhukov tabled such a suggestion [containment and pre-emptive attack] and it was dismissed out of hand by Stalin. There is no more to it than that

Hardly. The idea of a military alliance between the USSR, Britain and France against Germany reached such a point that a British and French delegation was sent to Moscow during which Kliment Voroshilov proposed the question of how Britain and France would deal with a move by the Red Army to pass through Poland to Germany's frontiers. Simeltaneously, German delegations were also in talks with the Kremlin over what became the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; it was Soviet intentions to pursue both a treaty with the western Allies for deployment into Poland against Germany's eastern frontiers, and pursue a treaty with Germany to occupy eastern Poland to create a buffer zone and afford war. Had the British and French been more hospitable to the idea of an alliance with the USSR, the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty may well have been the one discarded as joint British, French and Soviet armed forces built up along Germany's borders from both the east and the west. As history has shown, however, Chamberlain had no heart for aggressiveness and the Soviets had no choice but to adopt a non-aggression treaty with Germany to avoid a 1-on-1 fight.

It was this "maniac with little grasp of military theory" that was responsible for the victory in France.

Yes, Germany's initial victories can be blamed on Hitler, but by mid-war his initial successes had fostered in his little mind that he was some sort of strategic and tactical military genius and as the war in the East began to falter he was convinced that it was the fault of his Generals and thus assumed more and more direct control over battle operations. It was Hitler's decision to focus efforts in the east towards the southern oil-rich regions rather than the destruction of the Soviet seat of power (Moscow), and his decision to expend so much manpower and resources on the siege of Leningrad. It was his idea to abandon tactical withdrawl and focus instead on stubborn death-to-the-last-man and among his more eccentric tactical escapades was the idea of turning the Jagdtiger into a 70-ton flamethrower tank, replacing the 128mm gun to shoot giant balls of fire.

The reason for their inaction was that they, like everyone else save Hitler, were expecting a lengthy war akin to that of 1914-'18. The weaknesses of the German economy were well known and the Franco-British material advantage, already considerable in '39, would only increase with time. To their eyes there was nothing to lose by waiting for Hitler to strike the first costly blow. Again, had Hitler not intervened this belief would have been vindicated with a costly war in Belgium that would have very much favoured the Allies

By 1940 Germany was itself still mobilizing for war, ramping up production of war material and further re-enforcing its mobilized arms. By the time German forces returned from Poland to form along the frontier with Belgium and France the French had mobilized almost the entirety of their available manpower. The idea of containing Germany and directing its hostility eastwards towards a Soviet-German war had been flying around for years, and considering that both Germany and the Soviets approached the British and French with proposals for an alliance against the other, the British and French had ample knowledge that the two were preparing to go to war with one another. It is perfectly logical that the political factors driving the idea of containment on the west front was to that end.

But anyway, I do not believe that Germany's success in Operation Barbarossa can be so simply tacked onto lowered combat effectiveness of Red Army units due to leadership vacuums and purges. They played a factor, yes, but it doesn't answer for the fact that on a one-to-one basis German military units decisively defeated Soviet formations. The Luftwaffe instrumentally devestated the Red Air Force as it did in Poland and partially in France within the first few days and weeks of the campaign. And it is no coincidence that the war only began turning around as the USSR's military industry began to churn out new material after it was moved eastwards, and after the Wehrmacht was devestaed in North Africa, and when German military might was stretched out across Europe as opposed to being mainly focused in Russia. The turnaround was not solely because of some natural superiority of the Red Army suddenly coming into play. Their eventual defeat was a product of steadily declining German military might and steadily increasing military might of the Soviet Union.

Wanted Man

14th November 2008, 15:22

Of course that was exactly what the German officers did - their excuses for their own failures were typically along the lines of 'the Fuhrer insisted' or 'the winter arrived' :rolleyes:
And that's what kids still learn about WWII in school today: 'superior' panzers, evil leaders and bad weather.:sleep:

Sasha

14th November 2008, 17:05

if this pre-emptive strike story is true its worth to mention that only just a litle bit later the most prominent generals warned stalin that germany would invade and that an pre-emptive strike against the massing german troops at the border was nescecary and that Stalin discarded this as rediculous and that the germans would never invade russia.

there was last week a realy good documentairy about the invasion of poland, the molotov-ribbentrop pact and the situation between stalin and hitler.
i wil try to see if its somewhere online.

Sasha

14th November 2008, 17:15

damn, the video is only availeble for people in britain: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00fkx70

but there is a sumary here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/getting_behind_closed_doors_01.shtml

ComradeOm

15th November 2008, 22:47

By 1943, after Soviet military industry was transported east towards the Urals and Siberia, and after the Red Army had lost its battle virginity, and after considerable material power had been loaned to the Soviet Union via Britain and the US (which was of particular importance for Soviet mobilization efforts as Lend-Lease trucks and halftracks were one of the sole sources of transportation for Soviet artillery and troops), after the Germans had lost 100,000 men captured in North Africa and over half a million more wounded or killed, after Germany had over 120 divisions deployed to the defense of Western Europe, and after the start of the bombing campaignIn other words, everybody but the Red Army contributed to the defeat of Nazi Germany?

I'm sorry but the idea that the the Red Army just stumbled along until the US provided enough aid and enough distractions to weaken the Germans just does not stand up to the facts. It is a deliberate distortion introduced by German generals in the '50s and eagerly supported by Western historians during the Cold War. The reality is that, despite its horrendous initial losses and many subsequent mistakes, the Red Army stopped the Wehrmacht cold in '41 and they did so again at the end of the following year. All this before 1943 when the mass bombing or Lend Lease programmes began to make themselves felt

German casualties and material losses suffered on the Eastern Front were staggering, comprising over 80% of total German losses suffered during the war. In terms of bleeding Germany white, every other front was a sideshow. Including the Western Front - AFAIK no more than fifty odd divisions were stationed in France at the time of Overlord (the vast majority of which were staffed by those unfit for service in the East), not the 120 that you claim

...which, yes, you are correct, did not hamper production of war material and equipment as much (some of Germany's highest productivity occured in early-mid 1944) it did prove decisive in that it played a large part in crippling Germany's oil and gas production (as epitomized by the Ploesti raids)That at least was nothing new, Germany's fuel situation had never been anything but dire. For comparison - British safety stocks of oil were approx 7 million tons whereas Germany (ie, military economy) could barely secure its annual usage of 1.5 million tons

By 1943-1944 German development of combat equipment, in terms of quality, matched and even surpassed that of the Soviet Union. Upgraded versions of the Panzer IV were more than a match for the T-34, and developments of the Tiger, Panther, and Tiger II outclassed comparable Soviet designs (such as the T-34-85 and IS-2)And being forced to upgrade their arsenal, complete with yet another round of over-engineering, caused the Germans no end of trouble. The debut of the Panther, technically the best tank of the war, was a complete fiasco and even after the immediate mechanical issues were resolved it remained a difficult tank to manufacture. In contrast the T-34, which despite the introduction of heavier tanks, remained the mainstay of the Red Army and was continually upgraded to remain competitive against German armour, thus avoiding squandering years of production experience

Of course this is rather irrelevant when considering a comparison of the armies in '41. The Wehrmacht invaded what they assumed to be a decrepit feudal state only to encounter a industrial society armed with an impressive range of robust weaponry and with the ability to produce these in vast quantities. By the time the Panther was fielded this colossal error had already doomed Nazi Germany

But their development had been in the works for a decade and vast amounts of resources were put into that development and subsequent deploymentAnd yet Germany never produced a bomber fleet (I assume that is what you are referring to) that could compare with that of the UK. Or could be even mentioned in the same breath (without sniggering) as the British or US fleets. It wasn't just the numbers, the Ju-88, the bomber that Goering had built the pre-war Luftwaffe around, came nowhere near to fulfilling expectations of it and was dwarfed, both in size and performance, by the likes of the Lancaster or B-17

It is my opinion that Barbarossa and the subsequent bitter defeats of the Red Army and Air Force led to something of a "Darwinian" effect on the Soviet UnionSee below for comments on the evolution of the Soviet officer corp. There is always some basic weeding out during war but it was the purges that cleared out most of the deadwood (plus many exceptional officers) and was responsible for the poor initial performances. That did aid in the rise of the younger generation but then Soviet military circles of the '20s and '30s were very progressive. Up and coming officers would have risen to senior ranks at a time of intense debate and experimentation. They were probably the first generation of generals (before the Germans even) to be thoroughly educated in mobile/armoured doctrine

The destruction and abandonment of Soviet industry in the west, and its rebuilding in the east, was also an important factor; old inefficient industrial practices and designs were replaced with an industrial infastructure specifically built to deal with the high demands of wartimeNo. The Soviet armaments programme had begun in earnest in the mid-'30s and most of the plants devoted to this had only been constructed during the industrialisation programme of that decade. They were modern and any improvement in process layout, or other factors resulting from the move, would have been minor. At the same time the transportation of industry east, while a miraculous feat in its own right, was a huge disruption to the Soviet economy and its transportation network. Not a boon

Production of the T-34, which outclassed all German tanks currently in service, had only begun in mid-1940 -- by the start of Operation Barbarossa less than 1,000 T-34s were in service and many of them were not combat ready; by the end of 1942 and start of 1943, more than 1,000 T-34s were being built per month from the new factories that came online in mid-1942, such as Factory 174, TchKZ and UZTM. In June 1941 the most numerous Soviet tanks were of the BT-7 and T-60 variety which were no match for Germany's Panzer IIIs and IV'sYet the Wehrmacht only invaded with approx 1500 medium Panzers (if you can call the PzKpfw III a medium tank) which was about the same number of T-34 and KV-1s available to the Soviets. The BT-7 and T-26 (note: not T-60) were still the equal of the obsolete Panzer I and II that formed the backbone of the invasion

Hardly. The idea of a military alliance between the USSR, Britain and France against Germany reached such a point that a British and French delegation was sent to Moscow during which Kliment Voroshilov proposed the question of how Britain and France would deal with a move by the Red Army to pass through Poland to Germany's frontiersWell yes, see the first post in this thread. This was however not a pre-emptive strike. The discussed pact was defensive in nature to be activated when a third party (read: Germany) attacked Poland

It was Hitler's decision to focus efforts in the east towards the southern oil-rich regions rather than the destruction of the Soviet seat of power (Moscow), and his decision to expend so much manpower and resources on the siege of LeningradActually it was the OKW that actively pushed for the conquest of the 'prestige cities' of Moscow and Leningrad. Hitler's priority, after the destruction of the Soviet forces of course, was securing the economically vital Ukraine. Had this not been accomplished then the acute grain shortage faced by the Reich in '42 (historically only alleviated by the mass murder and death by starvation of millions of Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians in occupied territories) would have been nothing short of crippling

As for taking Moscow, the importance of this failure has been repeatedly overstated by German generals and later counter-'historians'. Typhoon was launched when the Wehrmacht was at the very end of its logistical tether and against the most impressively fortified city in the world. Plus the weather of course. Even with the incompetence of the Soviet defence (although the German commanders also performed poorly) and the lack of Soviet reserves (deployed south to deal with further expected offensives in the Ukraine) the operation was still a decisive defeat. The Wehrmacht failed to take Leningrad or Stalingrad, it was not going to take Moscow

Once again we have an example of bitter generals deliberately creating the perception of a meddling Hitler losing the war for Germany

The idea of containing Germany and directing its hostility eastwards towards a Soviet-German war had been flying around for years, and considering that both Germany and the Soviets approached the British and French with proposals for an alliance against the other, the British and French had ample knowledge that the two were preparing to go to war with one another. It is perfectly logical that the political factors driving the idea of containment on the west front was to that endIn which case providing a military guarantee to the one nation geographically separating Berlin and Moscow was a real blunder on the part of the British ;)

They played a factor, yes, but it doesn't answer for the fact that on a one-to-one basis German military units decisively defeated Soviet formationsFormations that were poorly deployed, poorly organised, poorly led, and poorly coordinated

The turnaround was not solely because of some natural superiority of the Red Army suddenly coming into play. Their eventual defeat was a product of steadily declining German military might and steadily increasing military might of the Soviet Union.All the elements for Soviet success from '43 onwards were there in '41. In particular the emphasis on armoured warfare and the aggressively mobile operational doctrine. These were the twin bedrocks of Soviet success and they were not suddenly discovered overnight but had in fact been in development for over a decade prior to the war. The difference with the Red Army in '41 (ignoring the particular strategic picture) was that its leaders were simply not experienced enough. They did not have the experience in handling the large unit formations (indeed the reason Soviet divisions were considerably smaller than Western counterparts was this realisation during '41) or coordination necessary to fight a mobile/modern war. This was a direct result of the purges - IIRC Glantz reckons that most Soviet officers in '41 were newly installed in a position at least two ranks above their level of experience/competency. Even studying Typhoon you can see the likes of Rokossovsky struggling to marshal his forces effectively

What happened over the next two years? Events in the West, or even constraints on German production, cannot account for the dramatic upswing in Soviet combat performance. This can however be attributed to the growing competence of the Red Army's generals and commanders as they gained the experience and skills necessary to execute elaborate, and devastating, operations. In a sense they were catching up to the doctrine established by Tukhachevsky almost a decade previously

thinkerOFthoughts

16th November 2008, 04:18

Invader Zim

17th November 2008, 11:56

In the first place you are assuming that London actually gave a damn about the territorial integrity of Poland.

Whether the British politicians cared about Poland's borders is impossible to answer, what they certainly cared about, and continued to care about decades after the Second World War, was Soviet expansion.

Secondly of course it was glaringly obvious following the events of '38 that another European war was only a matter of when. This is the significance of the guarantee given to Poland in March '39 (again, worthless in practice without Soviet cooperation) in that it marked the end of Franco-British efforts to negotiate with or appease Berlin. There would be no repeat of Munich. Both the major rearmament efforts and diplomatic flurries of the year preceding war testify to the fact that everyone, save perhaps one or two delusional politicians, was aware of the approaching storm

I rather think that War was a matter of 'when' as early as 1936, and certainly by 1937. Why do you suppose that Britain began remilitarising, investing in defence technologies, etc? If you read the British News Papers in 1937/38 they paint a picture of war being obvious, providing information in how to construct Air-raid shelters. And that is why the Munich agreement turned Chamberlain, if only briefly, into a national hero; because it provided the hope of peace where war had seemed inevitable. However, despite Churchill and 1950s historians claims to the contrary, Chamberlain was no fool and continued to pump the failing British economy into re-armament, in spite of Munich. Chamberlain knew what he was dealing with, and that is why he hoped for the best but invested Britain into planning for the worst.

It was also only in retrospect that people began to factor in the devastating loss of so many experienced officers.

Not really. The British knew that Stalin had crippled the Red Army, they had been told by émigré's, and they had sparodically listening to Russian radio traffic. But to return to Britain's position, even had they believed Stalin, and that the Red-Army was capable of fighting a war in 1939 (which it manifestly wasn't) they were still tied to France, which was determined to fight a defensive war.

Source for the last sentence?

Which part of it? In terms of British re-armament, as a percent of GDP spent of Re-armament, Britain began later than Germany and was behind Germany until 1940, which is what was predicted by the British. between 1929-35 the percent of Britain's GDP spent on the armed forces was between 2.7 and 2.8%. When germany started re-arming in 1933 it began at 3.2%. By 1934-35, that figure had increased to 3.4%, and in 1935-6 that it was 5.5%. that increased to 7.6% in the following year and 9.6% in 1938. So Britain started rearming later than Germany, and by 1937 re-armament spending had reached only 3.9%, only around half of what Germany had spent on its military. By 1938-39 Britain was spending 8.9% of its GDP on her military, while Germany was spending 18.1%.

J. P. D. Dunbabin, 'British Rearmament in the 1930s: A Chronology and Review', The Historical Journal Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sep., 1975), p. 588.

So no, Britain was not confident going into WW2. They had a far smaller army and Airforce than that of Germany, and the prediction was that 600,000 civillians would be killed in German bombing raids within the first two weeks of the war. This statistic is well known, and can be found in many books and sources. I found it flicking through a copy of A.J.P. Taylor's The Second World War: An Illustrated History, on page 26.

As it turned out they were mistaken, and the British were able to employ the phoney war to great effect in further establishing the radar and costal defences and building up the RAF. Prior to 1939 the Luftwaffe dwarfed spending by the Air Ministry, out producing Britains production of air-craft. Only by 1939 had Britain drawn level, and it was in 1940 that Britain began to build up a sizable increase of production.

David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation (London, 1991), p. 71.

So in short, Britain was unprepared for war prior to 1939, and if we are being honest, more like 1940. Her re-armament campaign was behind that of Germany, her major partner France, refused to fight anything but a defensive war and she predicted her major cities would be devistated by the Luftwaffe within two weeks. As you can see, Britain needed every minute she could get to re-arm.

ComradeOm

22nd November 2008, 17:09

Whether the British politicians cared about Poland's borders is impossible to answer, what they certainly cared about, and continued to care about decades after the Second World War, was Soviet expansionFalse on both counts. Suspicion of the USSR amongst British politicians was largely, despite the occasional flare of Great Game fears, in the vein of the 'red peril' of communism rather than territorial expansion per se. Even if this had not been the case there can be absolutely no question that it was Nazi Germany that fully occupied the attention of British policy makers in the late '30s

As for the territorial integrity of Poland, I direct you to the example of Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, and post-war Poland itself. British politicians repeatedly proved more than happy to adjust the borders of others if it suited their needs. Why expert otherwise from an imperialist power?

I rather think that War was a matter of 'when' as early as 1936, and certainly by 1937We can say now that war was inevitable from Hitler's ascension in '33 but this truth did not fully sink in until '38. Otherwise the concessions at Munich, and indeed the entire programme of appeasement, make no sense. British rearmament before these years was, despite pressure from the likes of Churchill and the Anti-Fascist League, lacklustre at best. It was not until the failure of the Munich Accords that war became accepted by the British government as a near-inevitability and British rearmament accelerated to the required levels

Chamberlain knew what he was dealing with, and that is why he hoped for the best but invested Britain into planning for the worst.If the Munich negotiations proved anything its that Chamberlain did not know what he was dealing with

In terms of British re-armament, as a percent of GDP spent of Re-armament, Britain began later than Germany and was behind Germany until 1940, which is what was predicted by the British. between 1929-35 the percent of Britain's GDP spent on the armed forces was between 2.7 and 2.8%. When germany started re-arming in 1933 it began at 3.2%. By 1934-35, that figure had increased to 3.4%, and in 1935-6 that it was 5.5%. that increased to 7.6% in the following year and 9.6% in 1938. So Britain started rearming later than Germany, and by 1937 re-armament spending had reached only 3.9%, only around half of what Germany had spent on its military. By 1938-39 Britain was spending 8.9% of its GDP on her military, while Germany was spending 18.1%

The question is not one of rearmament but rather of British confidence. The two are not necessarily linked. For example, during the Battle of France the Franco-British alliance commanded a considerable material advantage in every field save aircraft. And this was facing a German economy that had effectively been put on a war footing since '38 at the latest. More importantly, the Allies possessed an overwhelming advantage in industry, only further enhanced by expected US aid, and could comfortably expect to outproduce Germany over a long war

Again it has to be emphasised that a long war was what everybody, barring Hitler, expected. There was no real reason to think that once the fighting had again bogged down in northern France the Royal Navy couldn't slowly throttle Germany with an economic blockade. The latter simply did not have an economy capable of competing with the combined Allied industrial production. From '39 onwards (after German arms production stalled horribly during that year just as Allied programmes accelerated dramatically) every month that passed saw the Allies increase their material superiority. Had the Wehrmacht not pulled off a stunning coup with the invasion of France then its hard to see Nazi Germany lasting more than two years of war without imploding

So, yes Britain was confident. There was widespread fear as to the cost of war (no one wanted another lost generation) but they possessed an extremely favourable advantage in material and could comfirtably be expected to prevail in a war of any length. Had British leaders not been so confident then they would surely have pursued a Soviet alliance with far more need

As you can see, Britain needed every minute she could get to re-arm.An excuse that would be far more convincing had Chamberlain embarked on an impressive rearmament campaign prior to late '38. His disastrous policies effectively handed the initiative to Hitler and forced the Allies to play catch up in an arms race that they should have dominated from the start

Dimentio

22nd November 2008, 17:38

I don't see how this revelation shuts out the possibility of Stalin having intentions of conquering more land, provided one wants to argue along those lines? It would seem he first tried to ally with the western powers against Germany -- which would likely have gotten him much more land than simply dividing eastern Europe with Germany.

And when it failed he went for the 'next best thing'.

Of course attacking the fascists would also have been the right thing to do -- but taking his later actions into account, I somehow doubt Stalin planned that of purely ideological reasons.. Not that you're necessarily saying that either, but yeah.

I think it was rational by the Polish government to refuse Soviet support...

Liberte ou la Mort

22nd November 2008, 18:19

Cumannach

22nd November 2008, 19:21

In short:

The allies really wanted war between Russia and Germany as they were both evenly matched and run by genocidal despots with opposing ideologies.

Stalin never thought Hitler would be so stupid as to invade Russia. Stalin thought wrong.

Stalin never thought Hitler would attack? He had just spent the last ten years preparing for it, against huge opposition from many in the Soviet Union, with a 'forced' (in fact enthusiastically carried on by many of the masses) industrialization of the country and the creation of a modern military machine which would eventually defeat the fascist powers. Have you forgotten that famous quote, about having 10 years to do what England did in 100?

The Western Capitalists goaded Hitler on all the way hoping he would annihilate Communism as he repeatedly stated was his intention, and in the process weaken Germany enough to thwart German imperialist ambitions, which were threatening the empires and markets of the long established powers.

In fact Western Capital would go to any lengths to destroy Socialism. The Soviet Union was leading the way and inspiring communist movements which were growing rapidly in every corner of the world to the horror and consternation of the capitalists. In this fear was the origin of reactionary Fascism in Europe.

Invader Zim

23rd November 2008, 17:18

False on both counts.

On the contrary, it is perfectly accurate. Britain feared Soviet expansion and they largely cold-shouldered Moscow. Detailed studies have been made of British fears of Soviet intentions for expansion, and subsequent view following the purges of 1937, which in the British viewed as having crippled the red-army.

And as for British perceptions of other territory, one can easily pick holes in your position. Firstly one only has to point to the fact that prior to 1939 Britian was incapable of fighting a war. Indeed you yourself said, (and not actually accurately) that British re-armament was lackluster prior to 1938. Of course that isn't true, the British had been re-arming at a very fast rate from 1936/7, massively increasing its total spending each year. But not as fast as Germany. Thus suggesting that yne appeasement policy was one designed to buy time.

Secondly, if you want to claim that Britain didn't care at all about Polish borders, why do you suppose they employed it as an impetous to declare war on Germany, following three years of major re-armament?

but this truth did not fully sink in until '38.Then why do you suppose that local news papers were giving instructions to local people how to construct personal air-raid shelters in 1937, and defence spending increased massively between 1936-1938?

Otherwise the concessions at Munich, and indeed the entire programme of appeasement, make no sense.On the contrary, they make perfect sense, if you look at them in the context of buying time. Which is exactly what historians concluded, as early as the 1960s, once they began to gain access to official documents.

British rearmament before these years was, despite pressure from the likes of Churchill and the Anti-Fascist League, lacklustre at best.Again, this simply isn't true. The figure Britain spent on defence spending in in 1934/5 was £118.9m, but by 1936/7 it was £183 million. So in two years Britains defence spending increased by 64.1m, which is an increase of over 50% in a period when Britain was recovering from a recession. In the same period the British government was also increasing its spending on British industry, particularly the arms and steal industry, and various other schemes in an attempt to speed up economic recovery. So when place in context, British military spending was actually massive even prior to 1938/9. Certainly it was far higher in 1937/8, in terms of a percent of GDP (5.1%) than current American spending, even in the midst of two highly expensive major foreign conflicts. Afetr steady rise sinse 2001, American defence spending is only around 4%. Britain, also involved in these two wars, currently spends less than 3% of its GDP on military spending. So even in a time of war, Britain is currently spending far less on her military than Britain was spending in 1937/8. I have created a graph for you, which I think pretty well proves my point, that British spending after 1935 and before Munich was marked.

http://img152.imageshack.us/img152/2852/defencespendingzo9.jpg

If the Munich negotiations proved anything its that Chamberlain did not know what he was dealing withHaving read Chamberlain's diary, and some of his private letters, I can assure you that was not the case. And anyway, I think the graph above shows precisely the opposite.

The question is not one of rearmament but rather of British confidence.And the two are linked. Britain was not confident entering a war with Germany with only one reliable ally, and an opposition that had been rearming for longer than they had been. It is as simple as that. As I showed in my perious post, British estimates were that the country would be in flames, and over half a million would be dead, within just two weeks. Their only ally was determined to fight a defensive war. You mentioned Russia, but to quote Doerr, "Stalin's purge of the Red Army in June 1937 left many British experts convinced that Soviet offensive military capability had been crippled."

Doerr, ''Frigid but Unprovocative': British Policy towards the USSR from the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the Winter War', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), p. 423.

While Doerr argues that the British were well aware of the need for allies, and the use that the USSR might be in that capacity and as such actually held a position of abivalence towards the USSR; they still feared them, ideologically hated them and thought their military 'crippled' after 1937.

For example, during the Battle of France the Franco-British alliance commanded a considerable material advantage in every field save aircraft.I don't know where you get that idea from. While the allied force had more guns and armour, the German and Italian invasion force outumbered the British and French force by over a million men. Further more the German and Italian military had already gained experience in Spain, and Germany still more in Poland.

And this was facing a German economy that had effectively been put on a war footing since '38 at the latest.That is nonsense, in fact I proved that to be nonsense with the statistics I posted earlier. By 1935/6 Germany was already spending in excess of 5% of its GDP on military spending. Further more Hitler publically announced their would be conscription into the German military in 1935.

More importantly, the Allies possessed an overwhelming advantage in industryAgain, this is nonsense. The German air industry, for example, dwarfed British in terms of spending and man power as late 1939. This is because German re-armament, in particular helped German economic recovery. the same is true of the British and American economies, but their re-armament policies began after Gthe german policies. Read Mark Thomas, 'Rearmament and Economic Recovery in the Late 1930s', The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Nov., 1983), pp. 552-579.

Again it has to be emphasised that a long war was what everybody, barring Hitler, expected.Again, not so. As I stated earlier everyone thought that Britain would be dust within a matter of weaks, because they wildly over-estimated the power of bombing.

There was no real reason to think that once the fighting had again bogged down in northern France the Royal Navy couldn't slowly throttle Germany with an economic blockade.Again this is utter nonsense. Britain, at that time, held a massive empire which it was struggling to cope with. The Navy while still formidable, no longer kept Britain the mistress of the seas as she had once been. This was compounded by the fact that Britain expected to be fighting a naval war in three key zones; Western Europe, South East Asia and the Med. The Navy already was stretched attempting to keep control of a truly global empire which was, at that time beginning to pull towards independence. For the Navy war, in any one of these theatres would be very difficult; in all three it spelled disaster.

The latter simply did not have an economy capable of competing with the combined Allied industrial production.Perhaps when the USSR and the USA were brought into the war. However the combined threat of Germany, Italy and Japan, against just Britain and France both with unweildy imperial committments, is a different matter.

So, yes Britain was confident.Again, I've already proved you wrong on that in the prevous post. British war chiefs were telling Chamberlain that until re-armament Britain was bound to lose to Germany, and that the inevitable air war, without the radar network and a powerful airforce would result in Britain being reduced to rubble. They believed that without delaying war, certainly in 1938, britain was doomed. And that is exactly what they did. No doubt Chamberlain did believe that war could be prevented, but their is a mountain of evidence that even while h held that view he was preparing for the worst.

An excuse that would be far more convincing had Chamberlain embarked on an impressive rearmament campaign prior to late '38.As stated, British re-armament was significant prior to Chamberlain's administration, and it increased while he was Prime Minister from the outset. Furthermore British re-armament was governed by the British economy, which was limited because it was still recovering from the depression.

His disastrous policies effectively handed the initiative to Hitler and forced the Allies to play catch up in an arms race that they should have dominated from the startWhat a ludicrous comment. Chamberlain only actually entered office, as prime Minister, in the last days of May, 1937. As such Britain was already miles behind German in terms of re-armament when Chamberlain took office.

I suggest you start reading some history books published after 1960.

RedStarOverChina

25th November 2008, 16:45

Invader Zim

25th November 2008, 17:09

That's like, literally what my Chinese history textbook says. And they just confirmed it NOW? I think they've been trying to avoid admitting this.

Stalin tried to establish an alliance with Britian and France, but they refused, and instead tried to provoke war between USSR and Nazi Germany so that they themselves could be spared. That's why Stalin HAD to "side" with Hitler.
Well of course not, these revelations are highly specific. Of course historians knew that Stalin attempted to form an alliance with the Western Democracies. And what evidence is there that they attempted to provoke a war between Nazi Germany and the USSR? Please quote your history book and provide a full reference to it.

Louis Pio

25th November 2008, 17:33

While ignoring the advice of the British was perfectly understandable there was ample warning from Soviet intelligence itself of the impending invasion

Indeed, Richard Sorge "the masterspy" comes to mind when dealing with this. He's quite an interesting character who suffered a bad fate as so many other communists at that time. I would recomend anybody with an interest in that part of history to look deeper into his story.
A bit off topic, sorry for that

RedStarOverChina

25th November 2008, 17:55

i probably should have said "provoke". But the situation was this: Germany, Japan an Italy had signed an anti-Bolshevik pact. The Western European Bourgeosie was obviously happy to see that. Waiting for a war to happen between USSR and Germany was almost definitely on Britian and France's mind when they signed the Munich Agreement. . It was an attempt to "lead the troubles eastwards", according to my textbook.

The textbook also argued that after the war was declared, the reason why Britain and France did not attack was because they were still holding on to the hope that war would break out between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th November 2008, 22:11

Wanted Man:

I have an interesting book on this subject,

So, who is it by, and what's its title?

The Author

26th November 2008, 04:30

That's like, literally what my Chinese history textbook says. And they just confirmed it NOW? I think they've been trying to avoid admitting this.

Stalin tried to establish an alliance with Britian and France, but they refused, and instead tried to provoke war between USSR and Nazi Germany so that they themselves could be spared. That's why Stalin HAD to "side" with Hitler.

The Soviet history textbooks said the exact same thing.

See "The Russian version of the Second World War: the history of the war as taught to Soviet schoolchildren" published by Archon Books, 1976, in Hamden Connecticut. It provides an English translation of texts, with the same explanation given by the Chinese in their textbooks. I don't have pages or quotes on me. But if you read it, you'll probably find it. You'll probably even find the same view expressed in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, third edition.

Invader Zim

26th November 2008, 10:08

Waiting for a war to happen between USSR and Germany was almost definitely on Britian and France's mind when they signed the Munich Agreement. . It was an attempt to "lead the troubles eastwards", according to my textbook.

And do you actually believe that? If so have you asked yourself why, around 11 months later Britain and France declared war on Germany, when Germany invaded Poland, if their aim was to lead trouble east? That doesn't make any sense. If Britain and france wanted Germany to move east, then allowing Germany and the USSR to carve up Poland was exactly what they wanted.

Cumannach

27th November 2008, 20:33

If so have you asked yourself why, around 11 months later Britain and France declared war on Germany, when Germany invaded Poland, if their aim was to lead trouble east? That doesn't make any sense. If Britain and france wanted Germany to move east, then allowing Germany and the USSR to carve up Poland was exactly what they wanted.

On the contrary, it made perfect sense; After the declaration of war, bizarrely, the English and French undertook no military action against Germany; not for several weeks; not for several months! They were apparently in a state of war- just a special kind of state of war - a pacific state of war! It was a phoney declaration of war (the Phoney War). Then to their great disapointment, Hitler decided first to turn around to the west and swept up the allies off Western Europe before readying himself for the main event of the war - the destruction of Socialism.

Invader Zim

28th November 2008, 11:28

After the declaration of war, bizarrely, the English and French undertook no military action against Germany; not for several weeks; not for several months!

Kami, you obviouslly need to pay more attention in class. Your view is built upon a fundermental misunderstanding of the state of the British, French and German positions at the opening phase of the Second World War. Int eh terms of the former it was entirely defensive.

The Phony War actually lasted from September 1939 until April 1940 with the Norwegian campaign. But you are entirely wrong to think that in the months of the phoney war nothing happened, on the contrary Britain, in particular, used the period to reinforce the re-armament process begun in the mid-1930s. The French and British also fostered what some historians have called a 'Maginot Mentality'; the idea that war would be conducted in the same manner as the First World War. They believed that they had the opening disadvantage, because Germany had a vast re-arming head start, that would force Britain and France to be on defensive at the beginning of the war. They wanted, and believed that, Germany would attack them and their tactic was to absorb that attack, force Germany into a war of attrition which they believed they would win because their combined economic power could be relied upon out-perform that of the Germans over the long term.

However they knew that they were far weaker than Germany in 1939, and were determined to deminish that opening disadvantage, and that was best achived through un-molested re-armament. They certainly believed that they were in no position to attack Germany until far later. So they were happy to sit by their guns, while building the RAF upto strength, and wait for the Germans to dig their trenches.

From the German perspective, they didn't attack because the re-ordering, after Poland, of the Wehrmacht took far longer than anticipated.

Then to their great disapointment, Hitler decided first to turn around to the west and swept up the allies off Western Europe

An idiotic comment, and you still haven't addressed the issue. If Britain and France wanted Hitler to send his troops East, and attack the Soviet Union, why do you suppose they declared war on Germany when Poland was invaded? Why give Hitler a reason to turn his sights West if their intention was to send him East? Also how do you account for the massive re-armament program undertaken from 1936 onwards?

ComradeOm

7th December 2008, 15:51

Apologies for the delay but this is an interesting discussion and I wanted to marshal my sources

Firstly one only has to point to the fact that prior to 1939 Britian was incapable of fighting a war. Indeed you yourself said, (and not actually accurately) that British re-armament was lackluster prior to 1938. Of course that isn't true, the British had been re-arming at a very fast rate from 1936/7, massively increasing its total spending each year. But not as fast as Germany. Thus suggesting that yne appeasement policy was one designed to buy timeIncapable of fighting a war? Eh… no. The British military position of 1933 cannot possibly be compared to that inherited by Hitler. Now there was a military incapable of fighting a war. It took almost a decade of frantic rearmament for Germany to rebuild its military following the disarmament of Versailles. Obviously Britain and France had to invest significant amounts in order to similarly modernise their forces but for most of the ‘30s they enjoyed a decisive military advantage. You know, what with not having their military apparatus almost entirely dismembered following the Great War. Had French armies marched into Germany following the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, as many advocated at the time, then they would have faced virtually no organised opposition from the Wehrmacht. This is even leaving aside the economic powers possessed by the Allies

The best way to think about the armament of the ‘30s is of a window opening. Starting from a much lower base, Hitler accelerated the German armament campaign to the point where it achieved parity with the Allies sometime in 1938 (German armaments production actually stagnated in ’37 and early ‘39). The problem was of course that this in turn sparked an arms race with the Allies – beginning in 35/36 and accelerating dramatically after Munich clearly failed to secure ‘peace in our time’, as your graph shows – and this was a race that the vastly superior industrial power of the Allies was bound to win*. There was therefore a brief window (no more than a few years) where the Wehrmacht could hope to compete militarily with the combined might of France and Britain. Hitler himself was sharply aware of this reality and this is the reason for the abandonment of the original plans for war in ’43 and the deliberate ratcheting up of tension through manufactured crises during the last years of the 1930

So I criticise the British policy makers on two primary counts – 1) Failing to stop Hitler before his window of opportunity opened and 2) Not mobilising their economic might to narrow/close this window through proper and committed rearmament campaigns that matched that of Germany

*Stephen Van Evera [Causes of War, (1999)] gives a combined Franco-British share of world manufacturing output to be at least 50% greater than that of Germany (11% to 17%) while Mark Harrison’s comparison of GDP [The Economics of World War II, (1998)] gives the Allies an advantage of over 70%. Given Italy’s negligible contribution to the German war effort (pre- or post- Battle of France) I’ve not included it in the totals

Secondly, if you want to claim that Britain didn't care at all about Polish borders, why do you suppose they employed it as an impetous to declare war on Germany, following three years of major re-armament?Isn’t it obvious? The guarantee to Poland, and other Eastern European nations, was not a sudden change of heart amongst the ‘Men of the Empire’ that suddenly saw them respect the borders of small nations. Rather it had nothing to do with Poland and everything to do with Germany. It was a diplomatic marker warning Hitler that here was one line he could not cross and that the expansion of Germany had to end

Had Britain actually cared an iota about Polish sovereignty (and in fairness I’ve no doubt that there were individual politicians or civil servants that did) then it would not have pushed the Polish Government-in Exile to accept the Soviet imposition of the Curzon Line (another example of the British love of cartography). Frankly nor would they have simply signed away a good chunk of Czechoslovakia without even asking Prague

Then why do you suppose that local news papers were giving instructions to local people how to construct personal air-raid shelters in 1937, and defence spending increased massively between 1936-1938?I’ve dealt with the defence spending above, and will do so again below, but I have no ideas as to what motivated who to print what. Newspapers are not a good gauge as to government policy. It is far more pertinent to ask that if the British government was convinced that war was (almost) inevitable from as early as ’37 then why did they not make a concerted effort to match or exceed German spending until over a year later? In short, where was the shift to a war economy that you can see in Germany from ’36 to ’38? I deal with this comparison just below

Certainly [the British defence burden] was far higher in 1937/8, in terms of a percent of GDP (5.1%) than current American spending, even in the midst of two highly expensive major foreign conflictsIncorrect. The current US wars are funded by extra-budgetary supplements and are not included in the military budget. If these, and other ‘extras’ were included the percentage of GDP would rise to roughly 6%

But then the entire premise of the comparison is almost ludicrously flawed. Do you mean to tell me that you are seriously comparing the immense rearmament campaigns and mobilisation of economic assets in preparation for total war to be the equivalent of fighting two minor bush wars that have claimed the lives of less than five thousand US servicemen?

I have created a graph for you, which I think pretty well proves my point, that British spending after 1935 and before Munich was markedIt’s a nice graph but one that largely proves my point. I’m not disputing that there was an increase in the defence burden prior to Munich and, as noted above, it was inevitable that the Wehrmacht’s expansion should kick start an arms race. My criticism is that Britain and France, despite holding all the economic trump cards (see below on Franco-British manufacturing and financial superiority), lost that race. Below is a very quick chart I put together, using your own figures from the above post, illustrating the continued gap between the spending of both powers. Its not nearly as accurate as your own but it does show the basic trend – Britain was continually playing catch up to Germany throughout the decades in question. In every year Germany increased its own military budget to a greater degree than Britain, notice the steepness of the pink line, and this includes the great surge of both armament programmes following Munich. So yes, when compared to Nazi Germany - and there is no other power, past or present, that London’s efforts should be compared to – British rearmament was indeed lacklustre and its shift to a war economy came far, far too late

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v142/GreaterDCU/Misc/NaziDefence.jpg

Indeed by the outbreak of the war, Germany defence outlays were outstripping the combined Allied defence budget by a staggering ratio of 2:1. Drawing from Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (incidentally a great read), and again crudely summarised in chart form below, we can see that in 1930 the Allies were outspending Germany on defence at a rate of 1:6.2. That is an incredible reversal. That these same powers still enjoyed a material superiority (in guns and armour at least) come 1940 reveals the extent of the huge distances that Nazi Germany had to traverse even to reach parity. Had London and Paris maintained this budget ratio at even 1:1 and matched German spending year on year – a task far easier given that the burden was being shared across two nations and that neither had the crippling financial constraints of Berlin – then there would have been no chance of Germany victory. To borrow from my lingo above, Hitler’s window of opportunity would never have opened in the first place

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v142/GreaterDCU/Misc/NaziSpending.jpg

Once again we can only arrive at the conclusion that British and French rearmament efforts were woefully short of what was required to check German expansionism. This was not the result of economic weakness (which I’ve repeatedly dealt with both above and below) but rather a failure of politicians and policy. Certainly such spending patterns preclude the possibility that British ministers were secretly preparing for an inevitable war as early as 1937

I don't know where you get that idea from. While the allied force had more guns and armour, the German and Italian invasion force outumbered the British and French force by over a million menI was indeed talking about guns and armour but I should have noted the (not hugely significant) German numerical advantage. Of course this merely underscores my point in that even with sluggish rearmament the French and British forces commanded a higher ratio of guns to men than their German foes*. And this is after the latter had been gearing up for a war for several years! Yet you claim that the Allies were not in a position to fight a war prior to 1940…

Looking past the myths it is obvious that even the half mobilised economies of France and Britain were able to provide their armies with more guns and tanks, and of better quality, than Germany. Only in the air, where the Luftwaffe had long been the darling of the Nazi rearmament efforts, was this situation reversed. Even this was a not a tenable situation with British aircraft production in 1940 roughly matching that of Germany (although it would take a year or two to replace its obsolete stock) and both London and Paris placing major orders with US manufacturers for thousands of additional modern planes. Indeed by the end of 1940 Britain on her own had already outstripped German aircraft production by almost a third (15,000 to 10,000, Tooze) and this is without counting the US planes. So not only did Germany not have a significant material advantage going into the war their position relative to the Allies was actually weakening considerably. Given another year of war France and Britain would not only have clawed back parity with the Wehrmacht but actually surpassed it, thus restoring, to some degree at least, the pre-1938 balance of power

*Again, I disregard the Italians due to their complete lack of impact during the Battle of France. They only entered the war once German victory to the north had already been secured and even then failed to advance past French defences in the Alps

That is nonsense, in fact I proved that to be nonsense with the statistics I posted earlier. By 1935/6 Germany was already spending in excess of 5% of its GDP on military spending. Further more Hitler publically announced their would be conscription into the German military in 1935Perhaps you missed the "at the latest" in my above post?

Again, this is nonsense. The German air industry, for example, dwarfed British in terms of spending and man power as late 1939. This is because German re-armament, in particular helped German economic recovery. the same is true of the British and American economies, but their re-armament policies began after Gthe german policies. Read Mark Thomas, 'Rearmament and Economic Recovery in the Late 1930s', The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Nov., 1983), pp. 552-579In turn I will direct you to “Tooze, A., (2007), Wages of Destruction”, the latest and most comprehensive study of the Nazi economy as a whole. If the statistics that I have provided above (ie, Evera and Harrison) do not convince you that Britain and France possessed a commanding advantage in industrial power then I’d recommend Tooze’s analysis of the weaknesses inherent in the Nazi economy. In particular he notes that Hitler’s pre-war rearmament effort was continually constrained by the atrocious state of the German trade books. Despite being strong advocates of autarky, the German war economy relied heavily on vital imports – imports that the Nazi state was almost permanently struggling to pay for. These continued payment crises (with the most severe in ’34 but also reoccurring in ’37 and ’39) had an extremely detrimental impact on the rearmament – the volume of arms production stalled in 1937 and actually fell during the first half of 1939. It also forced Nazi planners to continue to allocate substantial resources to commercial exports right up to the end of 1942 (when a renewed steel crisis forced deep cuts in this sector). It was only with the conquest/dominance of most of mainland Europe that this problem eased somewhat and Germany was allowed to run up huge trade deficits against its pliant puppets/allies

So not only did France and Britain possess a larger (joint) industrial base but their financial outlook (ie, actually being able to pay for arms and the war) was immeasurably superior. In 1940 the combined dollar assets of France and Britain were roughly in the region of $7 billion (not surprising after over a century of being the capitals of capital) while Germany had certainly no more than $700 million in foreign currency reserves. So once again the question comes down to political will – Hitler had begun to mobilise the German economy as early as 1934 and it took half a decade for the Allies to wake up. Of course by then it was too late

Again, not so. As I stated earlier everyone thought that Britain would be dust within a matter of weaks, because they wildly over-estimated the power of bombingAnd yet life went on. Plans for defence were made, the BEF was sent across the Channel, the cabinet remained in London, and strategy took shape. Despite the alarmists there was no mass panic or fatalist waiting for the inevitable bombing fleets. In short, and allowing from a small number of those who were both, military theorists had predicted a devastating air war while military professionals set about preparing for a war that they could win

In this the latter naturally looked to the last war, one that had ultimately been won by superior Allied industry. London and Paris were perfectly happy to grind the Wehrmacht down in northern France and Belgium while being confident their economies were far more robust. In this they were undoubtedly correct… until the unexpected happened and France fell. This, coupled with the German seizure of the Ukraine in the next year, threw a lifeline to German industry and secured it the resources required to, just barely, continue the war

Again this is utter nonsense. Britain, at that time, held a massive empire which it was struggling to cope with. The Navy while still formidable, no longer kept Britain the mistress of the seas as she had once been. This was compounded by the fact that Britain expected to be fighting a naval war in three key zones; Western Europe, South East Asia and the Med. The Navy already was stretched attempting to keep control of a truly global empire which was, at that time beginning to pull towards independence. For the Navy war, in any one of these theatres would be very difficult; in all three it spelled disasterWhat? The only Axis power that could even be considered a credible threat to the RN was Imperial Japan. Hence Hitler’s eagerness to bring them into the war, a feat not achieved until 1941. The Kriegsmarine was a shadow of the High Seas Fleet of the previous war and completely incapable of actually challenging the RN for superiority of the seas. Had the pre-war programmes been completed then this balance of power would still not have changed until the late ‘40s or early ‘50s. The Italian fleet was of much more concern but, as with virtually every other aspect of the Italian war effort, ultimately proved to be hopelessly inept – the capabilities of the Regia Marina being severely dented at Taranto (Nov 1940) and Matapan (March 1941); leaving aircraft as the most significant threat to the RN in the Mediterranean. This is the better part of a year before the entry of Japan into the war

To give an illustration as to Allied dominance of the oceans, below are the figures for naval spending in 1939. Bear in mind that, as mentioned above, the vast majority of German spending was earmarked for projects that would take the better part of a decade to complete. Figures are in million reichsmarks and come from 'Duelffer, J., (1973), Weimar, Hitler und die Marine'

Britain: 2,277
France: 724
United States: 2,872
Germany: 2,390
Italy: 424
Japan: 1,256

Now if we were to leave out the USA (while inexplicitly keeping Japan) this looks relatively evenly balanced and would actually give the Axis the advantage. Again leaving aside practical concerns. However the German balance for 1939 is the result of Hitler's Z-Plan of that year which would not bear fruit until at least 1945 and was ultimately abandoned following the outbreak of war. This resulted in a temporary increase of 700 mRM on the 1938 balance. Unlike aircraft or tanks, Germany was never able to surpass or achieve parity with the Western powers in this field. Ships simply took too long to construct. When we accept that the Kriegsmarine was essentially a paper tiger we can see that the Anglo-French alliance was more than a match for Italy and a challenge to even Japan

At the same time there was not a single German planner that would not have given his right arm to be able to draw upon the resources of a quarter of the globe. Far from being a millstone around the neck of London, the Empire, together with US aid, was a vital lifeline that sustained Britain with vast quantities of oil and raw materials. For example, Britain imported 10 million tons of oil during 1942 alone (in comparison Germany received less than 2 million tons from Romania that year, despite the huge demands of the Eastern Front) and maintained reserves of several million tons while Germany’s equivalent reserves were no more than 1.5 million tons and the Wehrmacht was regularly starved of the fuel it so desperately required. As it is Germany was only able to sustain its war effort due to the loot/tribute it accumulated during the war itself – currency and material reserves from captured capitals, oil from Romania, grain from Poland and the Ukraine, and labour from everywhere

Perhaps when the USSR and the USA were brought into the war. However the combined threat of Germany, Italy and Japan, against just Britain and France both with unweildy imperial committments, is a different matterI’ve given plenty of statistics above to prove that this was simply not true. In any case it’s a false comparison. Italian/Japanese industry contributed virtually nothing to the German war effort and Japan did not even enter the war until the end of 1941 – the same time as the US! Similarly Italy did not declare war until France had been effectively knocked out and the ‘long war’ scenario was no longer possible

In short, to summarise several points I've made above, the German economy is often portrayed (not necessarily by yourself) as an industrial superpower but nothing could be further from the truth. It was roughly the same size as Britain's but with several added constraints that continued to dog it throughout the war. Repeated crises with currency, materials, manpower, food, distribution kept the German economy on the very brink of collapse during the war years. These were only alleviated in part through the conquest of foreign land from which resources – coal, oil, wheat, slaves – could be drawn. (Distribution being the exception in that the German rail system almost collapsed, with a major impact on coal/steel production, following a dearth of domestic rolling stock after the invasion of Russia). Germany was not able to compete on an industrial level with Britain/France or Britain/USA

As stated, British re-armament was significant prior to Chamberlain's administration, and it increased while he was Prime Minister from the outset. Furthermore British re-armament was governed by the British economy, which was limited because it was still recovering from the depressionWhereas the German economy was not recovering from a much deeper depression? Come now ;) . The difference between Chamberlain and Hitler is that the latter colluded with domestic capitalists to commit Germany to a war economy through a programme of material rationing, export subsidies, and heavy state control. In contrast Chamberlain did not challenge the hostility of the British bourgeoisie (who were in a very different scenario to their German brothers) to state control/regulation. The constraints on British industry were therefore those of British policy

-----

I'm going to tag this on at the end because its primarily a political rather than economic argument. The idea that appeasement - which, in fairness, was established British policy before Chamberlain's premiership - was somehow 'playing for time' is the most common defence of its apologists. Unfortunately it completely and utterly ignores the realities of the time.

The simple fact is that while Britain and France may not have been fully prepared for war, in 1936 and in the years immediately following, they at least possessed capable militaries and an impressive superiority in material. Hitler's rush towards rearmament was so frantic precisely because Germany was starting from so low a base. It was not until '37 that the Wehrmacht was capable of even staging a limited defensive war and the hugely ambitious programmes of the Luftwaffe were not due for completion until the mid-1940s. Which is not even mentioning the dire state of the Kriegsmarine. The military balance of power lay squarely with France and Britain as late as '38 or even early '39

In the economic sphere Allied influence was even more pronounced with London and Paris possessing the ability to bring the German economy to its knees with a stroke of the pen. Shutting, or even limiting, their markets to German exporters would have dealt a devastating blow to the German balance of trade and forced Hitler to choose between continued rearmament and economic meltdown (historically this was a very delicate balancing act and seriously affected armaments production in both '37 and '39). Had, as many in London advocated, the Anglo-German Standstill Agreement not been renewed in 1936 then its almost impossible to see how Germany could have maintained its balance of payments and thus finance its armament effort

With this in mind even a cursory examination of the major flashpoints prior to the war illustrates just how risky Hitler's strategy was and the degree to which it depended on Allied compliance. Had London taken meaningful action after the remilitarisation of the Rhineland (as early as 1936!), Anschluss, Kristallnacht, or Munich then it would have brought German expansionism to a jarring halt. Indeed so alarmed was the German military by the threat of war with France and Britain in '38 that there was serious talk of deposing Hitler (centred around Beck) but fortunately for the Fuhrer Chamberlain was there to sacrifice the Czechs in the name of peace. The truth is that at every juncture of the march to war France and Britain could have asserted their superiority in arms or industry and forced a retreat from Hitler

In short, the policies of appeasement only delayed a war until Germany was best placed to benefit from one. It was fully within the powers of the Allied governments to force Germany to back down as late as Munich and this would have dealt a devastating blow to Hitler, his policies, and his domestic standing. Instead appeasement, coupled with lacklustre British rearmament, allowed Germany to rearm to the point where it could successfully launch a war of aggression that would engulf the continent. Bravo Chamberlain

Cumannach

7th December 2008, 17:20

Since the British and French several times refused Soviet offers of an anti-Fascist alliance throughout the pre-war period, Collaboration is a more appropriate word than 'appeasement'

Invader Zim

15th December 2008, 16:16

Incapable of fighting a war? Eh… no.Sorry, but yes. Chamberlain thought that Britain and France had narrowly escaped destruction in 1938, and that Germany had lost a major opportunity they wouldn’t receive again, and that is presumably because of the ever growing state of British re-armament. In late December 1939, he wrote to Hilda saying that Hitler had “missed the bus in Sept 1938. He could have dealt France and ourselves a terrible, perhaps a mortal, blow then. The opportunity will not recur.”

Chamberlain, ‘Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 30 Dec 1939’, in Robert Self (ed.), The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters: Volume 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934-1940 (Aldershot, 2005), p. 483.

However, despite having believed that Hitler had lost the chance to destroy the weak Britain of 1938, Chamberlain revealed that Britain was still incapable of bringing the offensive to Germany. Just after the end days of the phoney war Chamberlain wrote a private letter to his sister Hilda, complaining that the British public wanted him to take up the offensive, but that stage it lacked the strength to enact a plan which would take the initiative from Hitler. This was in May 1940, after the years of steady re-armament. So if Chamberlain believed that Britain couldn’t engage in offensive war in 1940, it certainly couldn’t in 1938/9.

“The most common cry […] Why can’t we have some plan which would take him by surprise?
The answer to these questions is simple enough, […] It is Because [sic] we are not yet strong enough. […] We have plenty of manpower but it is neither trained nor equipped. We are short of many weapons of offence and defence. Above all we are short of airpower.”

Chamberlain, ‘Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 4 May 1940’ in Self, p. 526.

Quite clearly the British position was, at the highest levels, was that in 1938 the belief was that Britain would lose any war in 1938, and that even by May 1940 inferior military strength limited British ability to engage in an offensive war with Germany. We could debate, with the benefit of hindsight and the contents of the German archives, whether than was true or not (and I would argue that it was true); but that is largely irrelevant and academic. What is important is British assessment of her strength vs that of Nazi Germany, and clearly Britain found her armed forces wanting on many levels.

Furthermore, as I already stated in my previous posts on the matter, Chamberlain was following the advice of the British military. Paul Kennedy, whom I note you bring up in your post, published another work which you maybe aware of called the Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976), and it is one I will return to repeatedly in this post, beginning now. Kennedy noted that the Chiefs of Staff, were among the most vocal of appeasers. He quotes their 1937 statement: -

“ we cannot foresee the time when our defence forces will be strong enough to safeguard our trade, territory and vital interests against Germany, Italy and Japan at the same time … We cannot exaggerate the importance from the point of view of Imperial Defence of any political or international action which could be taken to reduce the number of our potential enemies and to gain the support of potential allies.” p. 290.

And that is a key reason why London was pro-appeasement, because the military informed them that they must reduce potential enemies and gain friends because, as it stood in 1937, they thought themselves, at that time, incapable of fighting a war on the scale they predicted.

Obviously Britain and France had to invest significant amounts in order to similarly modernise their forces but for most of the ‘30s they enjoyed a decisive military advantage.

You over-estimate Britain’s military strength. From 1919 to 1932 Britain adopted the 10 year plan (which was made a rolling plan in 1928), which saw a fall in military budget from well in-excess of 700 million in 1919 to around 100 million by 1932. When the plan was finally dropped in 1932 Britain was in the midst’s of economic depression. And until the mid to late-1930s there was little reason for Britain to begin re-arming. Other than the open, as opposed to clandestine, re-armament operated by the Nazi state, the first aggressive move by Nazi Germany was to re-militarise the Rhineland which began in the March of 1936. Note that it was in 1936 that British re-Armament begins in earnest. German Re-armament long predated 1936, and as I pointed out earlier, the Nazis had actually introduced conscription in 1935.

As a result Britain’s military advantage was gone almost as soon as Germany began to make concerted efforts at re-armament, and to quote Fuchser, describing Chamberlain’s position arguing against issuing of a second warning to Germany (regarding Czechoslovakia) in late August 1938, “First among them was Britain’s military weakness.” Fuscher then adds, “British military weakness was indeed an indisputable fact,”

Fuchser, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: A Study in the Politics of History (London, 1982), p. 137.

And even if it were not an inescapable fact, even if they wildly underestimated Britain’s of strength and Germany’s ability to wage a war, it doesn’t really matter. No right-minded politician would ignore the advice of his or her military officials and throw their country into a conflict they were being told they it wasn’t ready for. And that is the position Chamberlain faced when he entered power in 1937, in the middle of your ‘window of opportunity’; an aggressive group of potential enemies, and a military informing him that Britain was incapable of fighting them.

Had French armies marched into Germany following the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, as many advocated at the time, then they would have faced virtually no organised opposition from the Wehrmacht.

But you ignore two major points, firstly French policy which was by this stage defensive. Secondly I would like to know who these ‘many’ are. British public opinion was firmly against a war with Germany until very late in the day. And the re-militarization of the Rhineland wasn’t generally attacked because the general feeling was that Germany should have the right to do what it liked in its own lands. The spectre of the previous war haunted Britain, and the prospect of Britain supporting a French invasion of Germany for placing troops within its own lands was absolutely untenable. And there is no way British politicians would have been able to persuade, and that falsely assumes that they even wanted to, the British public that attacking Germany would have been a good idea. Even Churchill, who virulently opposed appeasement, really only began to take that position in 1937 onwards (and at least partly, I suspects, because he had been denied a place in Chamberlain’s cabinet).

Starting from a much lower base, Hitler accelerated the German armament campaign to the point where it achieved parity with the Allies sometime in 1938 (German armaments production actually stagnated in ’37 and early ‘39).

Well, lets explore this claim shall we. When Hitler announced to the world that he had been rebuilding the military capacity of Germany, he noted that the German military had 2,500 aircraft and 300,000 men in the Wehrmacht. In 1936, a year after this announcement was made, the RAF home force numbered around 1,500 aircraft, and by 1920 the British Army was down to around 370,000. To say a little more on British Aircraft production, that dropped behind Germany as early as 1934. German Aircraft production in 1933 numbered 386, by 1934 it had increased to 1,968. In 1933 British aircraft production was 633 and by 1934 increased to 740; well behind that of Germany. (in Kennedy, p. 419) Indeed the state of the British armed forces was of serious worry in London during the height of the depression. Funding had become so low, and the ability of British forces to maintain empire so tenuous, that in 1932 the 10 year rolling plan was abolished, a defence requirements sub-committee was formed to examine just how bad things had become and to offer suggestions to repair the damage.

Indeed the only area where Britain had a clear, large advantage over Germany was in Naval Strength, which was of course largely committed to maintaining control of the Empire. And this, of course, is the position Britain was in when it began re-arming in 1936. Germany had already had over a year to build upon its 1935 position, had already geared its economy towards military growth, and was already spending more of its GDP on the military than Britain. In other words, Britain, individually, held little if any advantage over Germany, and that was certainly long gone by the time Chamberlain gained the keys to Number 10 in 1937. If you include France, then maybe you have a point. However, including France was not something policy makers were willing to do, for several reasons. Firstly France was, at that time, on the verge of political crisis with a restless fascist political element. They feared civil war could break out should they make poor foreign policy decisions.

Furthermore, if we take Kennedy’s spending stats, which are significantly different to that of the figures I employed before, then we see even further that Britain was well behind Germany when Chamberlain entered office. Kennedy’s figures state that the British Empire (note that is the Empire, which had its own defence commitments) had a National Income of 22 billion dollars in 1937, and it spent some 5.7% of that on defence. That is near enough 1.25 billion dollars on defence. Germany on the other hand was spending 23.5% of its 17 billion dollar income on defence. That comes to just under 4 billion. France was spending 9.1% of its 10 billion income in defence, that is of course 0.91 billion. So, Britain and France by 1937 were already well behind Germany in terms of military spending and strength. Incidentally these figures on page 429 of Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.

The problem was of course that this in turn sparked an arms race with the Allies – beginning in 35/36 and accelerating dramatically after Munich clearly failed to secure ‘peace in our time’, as your graph shows – and this was a race that the vastly superior industrial power of the Allies was bound to win*.

Well, certainly the British thought that while Germany had a massive starting advantage, that if they entered a prolonged war, they would inevitably catch up. But this was in 1939, when rearmament of the previous years, and strengthening of the economy was starting to pay dividends. As Chamberlain said, Germany had missed the boat. Appeasement had, in Chamberlains own words, bought Britain time diminish the massive advantage Germany had build from having up to two years head start in rearmament. As Chamberlain confessed in his letter, had Hitler called Britain’s bluff and drawn Britain into a war in the Sep. of 1938, he believed Britain and France would have been dealt a serious, if not mortal, blow. In other words, he doubted Britain and France, who had begun seriously rearming in 1936, while Germany had been rearming since 1934 (and introduced conscription in 1935), was capable of winning a war at that stage.

So I criticise the British policy makers on two primary counts – 1) Failing to stop Hitler before his window of opportunity opened

But this assumes that such a window of opportunity actually existed, and certainly by 1937 it didn’t. Secondly, it also assumes that British policy makers were capable of taking Britain to war even if the military was capable (which I contend it wasn’t). Manifestly, they couldn’t have persuaded the highly pacifist British public of the period to go to war. That change in British public opinion occurred as German foreign policy grew more ambitious and their internal policies (such as the ‘38 pogrom) became increasingly barbaric. Thirdly, it assumes that the British policy makers actually saw justification for such a policy. Certainly they did not find such justification in the remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Claiming that Britain and France could have destroyed Germany in 1936 is all very well, but in 1936 they had no justification for doing so.

2) Not mobilising their economic might to narrow/close this window through proper and committed rearmament campaigns that matched that of GermanyAs pointed out, British re-armament did begin earlier, and in earnest, before you give it credit. Secondly, also as noted, the state of the British economy was a highly limiting factor ion British re-armament, especially after the economic slump in British and American economies in 1937.

*Stephen Van Evera [Causes of War, (1999)] gives a combined Franco-British share of world manufacturing output to be at least 50% greater than that of Germany (11% to 17%) while Mark Harrison’s comparison of GDP [The Economics of World War II, (1998)] gives the Allies an advantage of over 70%. Given Italy’s negligible contribution to the German war effort (pre- or post- Battle of France)

However, if you read ‘declinist’ historiography (Perry Anderson, et al.), I can promise you will find a very different set of statistics. Furthermore, if you read Paul Kennedy’s work, which you actually brought into this thread, you will also see very different stats. Britain (9.4%) and France (4.5%) are accorded 13.9% of World manufacturing output in 1937, Germany (11.4%) and Italy (2.7%) are accorded 14.1%. p. 426.

To quote Kennedy, on the impact of the economy on British naval power: -

“A third fact in restricting the navy’s expansion was more alarming still: when the Royal Navy began its plans for new ships which the war clouds looming on the horizon dictated and which even the Treasury found it impossible to resist fully, it was discovered that Britain no longer possessed the productive strength to satisfy these urgent orders. The long lean years of virtually no construction, the lack of incentive for technological innovation, the unwillingness to invest capital in what had been regarded as unprofitable fields and, above all, that steady cancerous decay of the country’s sinews, were now showing their fruit.”

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976), pp. 286-287.

Isn’t it obvious? The guarantee to Poland, and other Eastern European nations, was not a sudden change of heart amongst the ‘Men of the Empire’ that suddenly saw them respect the borders of small nations. Rather it had nothing to do with Poland and everything to do with Germany. It was a diplomatic marker warning Hitler that here was one line he could not cross and that the expansion of Germany had to end

There is an inherent contradiction within this statement of yours. On the one hand you argue that Britain, at this point, does not care about the sovereignty of small Eastern-European nation states, yet at the same time note that they desired to place “a diplomatic marker warning Hitler that here was one line he could not cross and that the expansion of Germany had to end”? Why, if they don’t care about German expansion East, do you suppose that they wished to even create such a marker… to prevent German expansion East?

Had Britain actually cared an iota about Polish sovereignty (and in fairness I’ve no doubt that there were individual politicians or civil servants that did) then it would not have pushed the Polish Government-in Exile to accept the Soviet imposition of the Curzon Line (another example of the British love of cartography). Frankly nor would they have simply signed away a good chunk of Czechoslovakia without even asking Prague

Of course they would. British policy was to stop German expansion through a mixture of the carrot and the stick. By granting concessions to Germany, while laying down threats they hoped to limit further German expansion. However, when it came to Czechoslovakia, those threats were bluffs, and Hitler called that bluff. To quote Chamberlain in a cabinet meeting, “No state … ought to make a threat of war unless it was both ready to carry it out and prepared to do so.” (Cited in Fuchser, p.136.) Evidently Britain was neither perceiving itself to be both lacking the military strength and public opinion to go to war against a major European power.

but I have no ideas as to what motivated who to print what. Newspapers are not a good gauge as to government policy.

They are, however, a good gauge of public perception, and in this case on a local level, show us what the public knew at the time. They knew a war may be coming, and they were preparing for that eventuality; just as the government was endeavouring to do by investing millions in the military.

It is far more pertinent to ask that if the British government was convinced that war was (almost) inevitable from as early as ’37 then why did they not make a concerted effort to match or exceed German spending until over a year later?

Put simply, they lacked the money and the run-up that Germany had. They certainly increased military spending dramatically prior to 1938, and because of the impact of that, causing a change in the footing of the economy, that allowed them to spend even more in subsequent years because investing in public schemes (in this case rearmament) stimulated the economy. However they were unable to go overboard and spend more than they had. In Germany on the other hand, the Nazis largely didn’t care about overspending and when they did, began nationalising the lucrative businesses’ of their political opponents and ‘impure’ members of the population, and, of course, began employing slave labour. They also took away workers rights, banning both trade unions and outlawing strikes, effectively allowing employers increase productivity at the expense of workers health, pay and time.

Incorrect. The current US wars are funded by extra-budgetary supplements and are not included in the military budget. If these, and other ‘extras’ were included the percentage of GDP would rise to roughly 6%

Source?

But then the entire premise of the comparison is almost ludicrously flawed. Do you mean to tell me that you are seriously comparing the immense rearmament campaigns and mobilisation of economic assets in preparation for total war to be the equivalent of fighting two minor bush wars that have claimed the lives of less than five thousand US servicemen?

Firstly, at that time, they weren’t at total war. Total war is the point when the war reaches the point that a nation employs all of its assets in its war effort. That didn’t come until far later in the day. Secondly, modern warfare is the most expensive it has ever been, and these two minor wars actually have cost the US more than WW1 (inflation adjusted), which was the first example of total war on a global scale. The cost of a single Spitfire was around £12,500. Which, in modern money is something in the region of half a million pounds. A fair bit of money. However, all modern military combat aircraft employed by western powers cost millions, usually an eight figure number. The F-15 Eagle, for example, costs around 30 million dollars. That is why the two minor Bush wars make the WoT the second most expensive US history.

My criticism is that Britain and France, despite holding all the economic trump cards (see below on Franco-British manufacturing and financial superiority), lost that race.So you seem to believe, however you are ignoring the fact that Britain and France started later than Germany by at least two years. And when you consider that we are discussing the period of 1934-1939, those two years are very substantial. And you don’t take that into account in the graph. You don’t start the graph in 1933/4, instead you started it in 1935/6 (two years after Germany begins rearming, and, incidentally was already spending more (in percentage terms) than Britain). I have re-drawn the graph from the point both Britain and Germany began rearming. And that shows the considerable head start Germany had by 1936.

http://img218.imageshack.us/img218/5258/graphzq9.jpg

I was indeed talking about guns and armour but I should have noted the (not hugely significant) German numerical advantage.

Sorry, but the German and Italian numerical advantage was huge. It is actually, from the point of view of the allies 2,850,000 troops something in the region of 40% numerical advantage. Also, the Axis disadvantage in term of armour and artillery was offset by a large advantage in the air superiority.

Of course this merely underscores my point in that even with sluggish rearmament the French and British forces commanded a higher ratio of guns to men than their German foes*.

But far fewer aircraft, and over 20 months after Munich, which rather annihilates your point; and underscores the wisdom of postponing major military conflict until the latest moment possible, allowing Britain (in particular) time to prepare herself.

Looking past the myths it is obvious that even the half mobilised economies of France and Britain were able to provide their armies with more guns and tanks, and of better quality, than Germany.

Sure the German’s were still using the Panzer 1 in the Battle of France, but I think you overestimate the quality of the allied tanks. British tank design stalled during the interwar period and Britain began producing a lot of crap, under-armed, tanks which broke down regularly and that didn’t really change until after the Battle of France and the British Army realised that it was in deep trouble and required a rethink of both its equipment and tactics.

The French, ironically the second largest tank producer in Europe at this time (after the USSR), were still actually fielding some WW1 tanks in the Battle of France. While they wielded likes of the Somua S-35, one of the most advanced tanks available at the time, they also fielded 500 Ft-17s which were from WW1 and utterly obsolete. Furthermore, just like the British, French tank tactics were far behind that of the Germans who had fielded their new designs and tested tactics in Spain.

Even this was a not a tenable situation with British aircraft production in 1940 roughly matching that of Germany

Actually, by 1940 British production far out stripped German production (by 50%). Which I think further proves my point, that waiting until re-armament had neutralised the German advantages, was the smart move on the part of the British.

So not only did Germany not have a significant material advantage going into the war their position relative to the Allies was actually weakening considerably. Given another year of war France and Britain would not only have clawed back parity with the Wehrmacht but actually surpassed it, thus restoring, to some degree at least, the pre-1938 balance of power

This doesn’t make any sense. I’ll grant you that by the Battle of France that British and French power was growing closer to the point of parity with that of Germany, but it certainly wasn’t in 1938. Far from it. Indeed, if anything you have just justified the British and French decision to wait, because the British and French position, relative to that of Germany, was far stronger in 1940 than it had been in 1938. At least as far as the British were aware.

then I’d recommend Tooze’s analysis of the weaknesses inherent in the Nazi economy.

I haven’t read Tooze’s book, my research area is in Britain before and during WW2, not the Nazi regime.

Hitler had begun to mobilise the German economy as early as 1934 and it took half a decade for the Allies to wake up.But you confuse just how Hitler was able to mobilise the German economy; and that was through rearmament; which brought Germany from the depression in 1934; British rearmament largely begins in 1936. Unlike Hitler, Britain did not have an agenda which forced them to begin rearming in 1933/4. Nor were they willing to begin supporting that program of rearmament through slavery to do so. Furthermore, as I have already noted above, the Nazis were able to ignore the impact (which was a reduction in workers wages of around 25% in real terms) of their policies upon workers because they denied workers a voice.

And yet life went on. Plans for defence were made, the BEF was sent across the Channel, the cabinet remained in London, and strategy took shape. Despite the alarmists there was no mass panic or fatalist waiting for the inevitable bombing fleets.

On the contrary the majority of the population began digging trenches in their gardens, equipped the country with gas masks, made it illegal to show a single spot of light from houses, and sent their children into exodus from the cities. As for the cabinet remaining in London, in 1938 they constructed a massive 12km2 bunker with a thick steal roof to house them, and it was widely employed by Churchill and the cabinet during the war. And the view was hardly unique to alarmists, and a few strategists and military officials, it was the view of pretty much everybody. Hence the reason why the RAF’s budget increased from £27.4m in 1935 to £82.2 by 1937 and became the most heavily funded of the services by the following year.

The only Axis power that could even be considered a credible threat to the RN was Imperial Japan.

True, however that was not the worry. The problem was, that in order to face a power such as Japan, the Navy would leave other key waters vulnerable. So, for example, if the navy were to send sufficient forces east, to offset the threat Japan posed, it would leave other vital waters insufficiently defended. Paul Kennedy spelled out the problems Britain faced in his chapter ‘The Years of Decay (1919-1939)’ in his work, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.

I will continue replying later, when I have more time.

Invader Zim

19th December 2008, 12:46

Comrade Om. I will finish my previous post later, but that will be my last post in this thread to you. Not because of the standard of your posts, which have been excellent and stimulating, but because I have realised that I have written well over 4,000 words in my previous post, and I don't think I can really justify the kind of time I spend writing such responces when i should be getting on with my actual work. Though I do look forward to reading your rebuttle, accept my apologies for not responding in advance.

Cheers,

IZ.