Descartes

[Post-Something]

Ok, I need major fucking help. I have an essay to hand in, and I hate Descartes. Here's the question:


DESCARTES AND OTHER-MINDS SCEPTICISM

Here is a form of scepticism given little attention by Descartes:

I'm not justified in being certain that other people have thoughts and feelings. I can see their bodies, but for all I know those bodies are just fleshy robots, programmed to act and speak as they do without any thoughts or experiences going on. For instance, I can see someone catch their finger in the door and hear them cry out and watch them writhe as they clutch the finger - but at the end of the day I have no good ground for being sure that behind these bodily movements and noises there exists a mind that actually feels pain as I would do if I caught my finger in the door. For all I know, the fact that when I cry “ouch” and clutch my squashed finger I have a feeling of pain is unique to me: it could be that in experiencing feelings I am a freak of nature and no-one else has them.

How do you think Descartes would respond to this form of scepticism? What do you think of the response you think he would make?


How do I tackle this exactly? I have two extremes, either I say Descartes is afraid to answer the question because he can't be sure it's there, or I say he is absolutely certain that other people exist because God would never do such a horrible thing. What should I do?

I have notes to help answer the question actually, I'll post them up after this...

[Post-Something]

Notes on how to tackle this question



(1) Think about the general grounds of Cartesian scepticism and the general pattern of Descartes' response to scepticism. This response is developed throughout the Meditations, particularly in his responses to the dreaming problem and the demon hypothesis. The threads are drawn together in the sixth Meditation.

[BtW, people who claim to have 'done' Descartes at school often have no idea that he actually offered an answer to the problems of dreams and demons and so forth.]

(2) Although Descartes does not offer a full-dress discussion of other-minds scepticism, consider aspects of his thought where, on some interpretations at least, other-minds scepticism may seem to be alluded to or at least to be implicit. These include:



The run-up to the cogito, early in Meditation II, where Descartes “has the persuasion…that there was…neither minds nor bodies”. (Everyman p. 79/Penguin p. 103)




The ‘hats and cloaks’ passage introduced in connection with the wax example towards the end of Meditation II. (Everyman, p. 85/Penguin p. 110)




His doctrine of the real existence of body and mind: for the more he goes down the road of maintaining that body and mind are entirely distinct substances, the more pressingly do questions arise about why we might think any particular body somehow has a mind conjoined to it.




Descartes' view of (non-human) animals, which is often said to be this, that they are merely fleshy machines, with no feelings at all; that if the dog howls when you kick her, this is not because she feels any pain but only because a mechanical process has been set in motion which leads to the emission of a howling noise just like a high-pitched ‘cuckoo’ sound comes from the wooden bird in the cuckoo clock. Part 5 of the Discourse on Method may well seem to advance this view: see especially the penultimate paragraph, where he seems to liken animal behaviour to that of a clock. And note that in Part 5 of the Discourse he seems to think he has good reason to attribute mental events to other people but not to animals. Whether Descartes really held this view of animals is controversial: see, for instance, J. Cottingham, “Descartes’ Treatment of Animals”, in J. Cottingham, ed., Descartes, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, OUP Oxford, 1998. But if Descartes’ really did hold that the dog’s howling is not backed by any feeling of pain, the question arises whether there is any more reason to suppose that your sister Mary’s “Ouch” when she catches her finger in the door is really backed by any feeling of pain.


(3) On the basis of (1) and (2), work out how you think Descartes would respond to other-minds scepticism.

(4) Consider whether the response you think he would make to scepticism about other minds is a good one, i.e. whether he offers good reason to reject scepticism about other minds and to think, as we usually think, that other people really do have thoughts and feelings.

(5) There is no single approach that everyone has to take. An essay that started from the animal angle mentioned above could get a good mark; an essay that almost or entirely ignored the animal angle could also get a good mark.

(6) Markers will not operate with an official view of how Descartes would respond to other-minds scepticism, such that essays will be marked right or wrong according as they do or don't match up to it. We are looking for an interpretation and discussion that is carefully defended by reference to the Meditations and associated texts, and it is perfectly possible for a marker to give a high mark to an essay s/he does not agree with.

(7) Likewise, when it comes to the question, “What do you think of the response you think he would make?”, there is no particular angle you have to take and no particular verdict that you have to reach, in order to get a good mark.


You might focus on one or more general problems of the Cartesian response to scepticism such as the circularity problem or the nature and role of clear and distinct perceptions.
Again, you could compare Descartes’ likely response to other-minds scepticism with the claim, sometimes made, that though positions like the demon hypothesis and the dream doubt and other-minds scepticism may at first sight seem plausible, there is some deep incoherence or inconsistency involved in stating them, so that instead of trying to answer such arguments we should dismiss them as somehow self-defeating or self-undermining. This latter sort of position is simplistically sloganized in the lectures as: “Scepticism is meaningless”. O.K. Bouwsma’s article, “Descartes’ Evil Genius” (Philosophical Review, 1949; reprinted in Sesonske & Fleming, Meta-Meditations, Belmont, California, 1965) is an entertaining non-technical example of this sort of response as applied to the demon hypothesis, and you might like to consider whether and how it could be adapted to other-minds scepticism.
If you think Descartes' response to other-minds scepticism is untenable, you may, but do not have to, say how you think other-minds scepticism can be answered. Or you are at liberty to argue (but "argue" is a key word: simply giving your opinion is not the same as putting forward an argument) that there is no good argument for rejecting other-minds scepticism.

[nuisance]

I'm actually studying Descartes now at university and in fact he does both of your origional points, from my knowledge. He believes God to be kind, and not decietful, the contrast to his evil genius hypothesis- God could never decieve him. Descartes also never actually says what he generally thinks, however this could be due to fear of persuction due to the period he lived in, or because he can't actually decide.

P.S. I'm drunk, so if this makes no sense, this is why.

[Post-Something]

I'm actually studying Descartes now at university and in fact he does both of your origional points, from my knowledge. He believes God to be kind, and not decietful, the contrast to his evil genius hypothesis- God could never decieve him. Descartes also never actually says what he generally thinks, however this could be due to fear of persuction due to the period he lived in, or because he can't actually decide.

P.S. I'm drunk, so if this makes no sense, this is why.

Exactly, so that's why I have a dilema! I'm caught between those two extremes.

[nuisance]

Exactly, so that's why I have a dilema! I'm caught between those two extremes.
You could explain each? Or whatever you could give a more indepth explanation of, while also referencing to the other conclusion you could have came to.

[Decolonize The Left]

It appears as though Cartesian skepticism undermines this 'other-minds skepticism.' For if I cannot be certain about anything other than "I am," then how can I be certain that these sensory experiences I am having actually represent human beings - let alone human beings with feelings?

Aside from this, I would argue both of the 'extremes' and claim that Descartes could occupy either position. It appears as though you're capable of doing this, and it would be a coherent approach to this essay.

But, me personally, I would settle in on this:
"If you think Descartes' response to other-minds scepticism is untenable, you may, but do not have to, say how you think other-minds scepticism can be answered. Or you are at liberty to argue (but "argue" is a key word: simply giving your opinion is not the same as putting forward an argument) that there is no good argument for rejecting other-minds scepticism."

I would certainly argue that any form of skepticism this extreme is impractical, absurd, unrelated to material existence, and totally worthless as a relationship to existence. But that's me...

- August

[shorelinetrance]

so descrates walks into a bar, and the barkeep says "would you like another drink?", descrates replies "i think not!" and the drink disappears.

that's all i have to add. :laugh:

[Apeiron]

Descartes' view of (non-human) animals, which is often said to be this, that they are merely fleshy machines, with no feelings at all; that if the dog howls when you kick her, this is not because she feels any pain but only because a mechanical process has been set in motion which leads to the emission of a howling noise just like a high-pitched ‘cuckoo’ sound comes from the wooden bird in the cuckoo clock. Part 5 of the Discourse on Method may well seem to advance this view: see especially the penultimate paragraph, where he seems to liken animal behaviour to that of a clock. And note that in Part 5 of the Discourse he seems to think he has good reason to attribute mental events to other people but not to animals. Whether Descartes really held this view of animals is controversial: see, for instance, J. Cottingham, “Descartes’ Treatment of Animals”, in J. Cottingham, ed., Descartes, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, OUP Oxford, 1998. But if Descartes’ really did hold that the dog’s howling is not backed by any feeling of pain, the question arises whether there is any more reason to suppose that your sister Mary’s “Ouch” when she catches her finger in the door is really backed by any feeling of pain. This point is probably your best bet for developing an answer closest to what Descartes himself thought about the question (if it at all occurred to him). I haven't read it in a while, but I believe in the above mentioned discussion of animals in the Discourse on Method he more or less argues that humans can be differentiated from animals due to consciousness (duh), which is made manifest via human spontaneity; whereas animals, as mindless machines, act predictably, humans are, as conscious subjects ('thinking things'), unpredictable in their actions... spontaneity indicates that other humans are 'thinking things,' just as I am.

[apathy maybe]

so descrates walks into a bar, and the barkeep says "would you like another drink?", descrates replies "i think not!" and the drink disappears.

that's all i have to add. :laugh:

Actually, it is Descartes that disappears... (And, if you work it out using formal logic, the disappearance of Descartes when he states "I don't think", doesn't follow from his existence due to "I think", if that makes sense.)


As to the OP, God! is always the answer.

I think, personally, that Descartes scepticism and "I think therefore I am" are the only meaningful things that he brought to philosophy. His arguments for god don't work, and weren't even original. In summary then, Descartes provides only one "unique" gem to philosophy, "I think, therefore I am" (scepticism wasn't new).

The only thing that Descartes philosophy is good for, is to teach as an example of bad logic, and flawed philosophy. (I would be interested if philosophy teachers even used it for anything else.)

[Apeiron]

Actually, it is Descartes that disappears... (And, if you work it out using formal logic, the disappearance of Descartes when he states "I don't think", doesn't follow from his existence due to "I think", if that makes sense.)


As to the OP, God! is always the answer.

I think, personally, that Descartes scepticism and "I think therefore I am" are the only meaningful things that he brought to philosophy. His arguments for god don't work, and weren't even original. In summary then, Descartes provides only one "unique" gem to philosophy, "I think, therefore I am" (scepticism wasn't new).

The only thing that Descartes philosophy is good for, is to teach as an example of bad logic, and flawed philosophy. (I would be interested if philosophy teachers even used it for anything else.) Descartes is (and should be) taught/read as the founder of modern philosophy. His skepticism was radical to a degree not found among philosophy prior, and most importantly his formulation of the subject is at base in all Western thought since. This last point cannot be understated; we still haven't properly moved away from Cartesian subjectivity; without understanding Descartes, there's little hope in grasping any modern or contemporary (dare I say 'post-modern'?) thought.

Also, I think one of his arguments for god was new at the time (the other was inherited from Anselm)... not that it necessarily holds up (after Kant this type of 'proof' becomes officially antiquated), but they're interesting to examine as significant pieces in the history of thought and for understanding Descarte's system, if for nothing else.

[BurnTheOliveTree]

Descartes doesn't properly doubt everything; He takes for granted that his logic can lead him to a correct conclusion. No philosopher ever does this, no philosopher ever directly questions whether or not we can even arrive at a sensible conclusion.

For this reason the cogito cannot really get off the ground, unless you're willing to just let him off on not being totally sceptical in the first place.

-Alex

[Post-Something]

Thank you all for your responses. I think I'm just going to outline exactly how he came to the conclusion God exists, and then say that God wouldn't decieve him etc. I'll probably do what Apathy Maybe and August said.

[jake williams]

Descartes doesn't properly doubt everything; He takes for granted that his logic can lead him to a correct conclusion.
It's a superficially valid question and it's worth asking at least to consider it, but the fact is that there's no coherent way to formulate a real opposition to the validity of cogito. If you're willing to not question but deny the potential logicity of all statements inherently then you're dismissing the whole process of inquiry you're engaging in.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Post Something: I think that is the right approach.

[Anna]

also in dire need of help with the descartes essay. to the guy with the fugazi picture.. do you have any helping hints? deadline is on tuesday and i'm barely past an introduction. crisis!

[Dystisis]

It's a superficially valid question and it's worth asking at least to consider it, but the fact is that there's no coherent way to formulate a real opposition to the validity of cogito. If you're willing to not question but deny the potential logicity of all statements inherently then you're dismissing the whole process of inquiry you're engaging in.
Exactly.

By questioning your ability to question you are... questioning... In other words, you bite yourself in the arse. Therefore perhaps we can say that our language is limited.