Log in

View Full Version : Philosophical and Moral Assessment Pt.1 - Humanism



Dean
29th September 2008, 06:18
Right, so I've been working on this a bit, and I wanted to get some ideas. The point is to define concisely my own moral and philsophical stances and the logic of how I got there. I figure I don't have any single compelling theories or whatever, so my best bet for personal posterity is to write it out in this sense. I mostly just want a reference point for my own ideas and ideology so when I become elderly and insane I can go back and get some footing again.

I welcome any criticism, but I would like the whole metaphysical point set aside. I'm much more interested in why my statements might not be cohesive or coherent; I don't want to argue about the basic premises of morality and the mind, sentience and mysticism, though they are brought up.

This is the first portion, which will describe humanism as a fundamental moral value. Later, I explain why / how psychology, liberation and communism all grow out of this premise.


Humanism - Fundamental values for assessing moral relevancy and standards

In this section I will attempt to explain some basic viewpoints on ethics as they are interested in and applied to the human condition. It should be said firstly that I am basically pro-human. That is, what is good for humans is ultimately the standard for which other value judgments should be made. This sets humanism up as the primary foundation for my belief structure.

If humanism is understood to be “what is good for humans,” then we must also explain what that means. It is my understanding that what is good is ultimately productive. This is by no means setting up efficiency, commodity production or other economic functions as ends in themselves. This means, rather, that productiveness is a standard by which human activity and goals can be judged, and can be seen as the root and goal of labor. Productiveness, put simply, is specifically interested in whatever nurtures, enhances, uplifts and empowers the human being.

It is important to understand this on clear terms. Labor is the subject of productiveness, and productiveness is the subject of humans. Therefore, all activities, labors, orientations and goals should be judged for their productive content, which itself is only important as it benefits mankind. This benefit can be seen as a free actuation of the human being which in turn frees, informs and empowers us as actors in society and in nature.

Why is human profit or efficiency not listed? These values do not directly benefit the human being. Profit may be beneficial, if someone has debts or needs which can only be met by trade. But capital is not in itself useful or desired by humans. The same is true for efficiency. It may be quite valuable for a human being to be efficient in cooking, for instance. But when that efficiency reaches a point, it becomes no longer useful for human society, and can in fact be destructive – a person extremely efficient in one kind of production may make others feel less valuable in the same industry, or they may render the labor of others obsolete, thus narrowing the workforce and creating an unfair burden on the worker.

In fact, both profit and efficiency can be destructive in the same way. They both turn labor into a force interested in bulkier or expedited commodity production, which recreates labor into a self-destructive impulse. The final goal of labor, the benefit of mankind, fails when labor becomes a selfish or over-consuming goal, and the labor therefore fails.

Every thought put forth so far assumes that human beings have some value simply for being human. That lends itself to the question, ‘what makes humanness valuable?’ I think the answer is simple. The humanist perspective is specifically interested in the sentient existence of the human being. The individual conditions, biologically and environmentally, have no power in regards to the moral worth of the human being. Because humanism is a productive orientation towards the human being, it must look inward to understand how the human being works. What is good or desired for a human being is, as a standard, what humanism is interested in. Subsequently, the organ and entity for whose benefit the human being primarily works holds the key to understanding what conditions and values are most fundamentally important to the human being. The brain, as the housing for the mind, is the most valuable and important organ, and just as we talk of each individual as the central subjects of society, we also understand the brain as the central organ of the human, for which all others work. It is only because a heart creates a life-sustaining blood flow to the brain that the heart has any worth.

Decolonize The Left
29th September 2008, 06:42
Interesting.


It should be said firstly that I am basically pro-human. That is, what is good for humans is ultimately the standard for which other value judgments should be made. This sets humanism up as the primary foundation for my belief structure.

"What is good for humans" is already a value judgment/statement. So it appears as though you are positing this as the 'ultimate' value of sorts.


If humanism is understood to be “what is good for humans,” then we must also explain what that means. It is my understanding that what is good is ultimately productive. This is by no means setting up efficiency, commodity production or other economic functions as ends in themselves. This means, rather, that productiveness is a standard by which human activity and goals can be judged, and can be seen as the root and goal of labor. Productiveness, put simply, is specifically interested in whatever nurtures, enhances, uplifts and empowers the human being.

If I may paraphrase you here, what I gather you are saying is:
Humanism centers around what is good for humans. What is good for humans is productivity. Productivity is "whatever nurtures, enhances, uplifts and empowers the human being."

Is this correct?


It is important to understand this on clear terms. Labor is the subject of productiveness, and productiveness is the subject of humans. Therefore, all activities, labors, orientations and goals should be judged for their productive content, which itself is only important as it benefits mankind.

It would be wise to drop the sexist word "mankind" in favor of "humankind."

Furthermore, your movement of abstraction here is dangerous. For example, in a small community, the productivity of any given action ought not be measured by the benefit towards "humankind," as such a benefit cannot be known. Rather, and far more simply, it ought to be measured by the benefit towards the individual and community.

If you wish to extrapolate this individual/communal benefit out towards a species-benefit then do so, but such a large generalization and abstraction will quickly loose a reader and fall into the dangers of idealism.



Why is human profit or efficiency not listed? These values do not directly benefit the human being. Profit may be beneficial, if someone has debts or needs which can only be met by trade.

Seem contradictory to you? You will need to reword these statements. Perhaps you wish to differentiate between the values of profit and efficiency and the realities?


But capital is not in itself useful or desired by humans. The same is true for efficiency. It may be quite valuable for a human being to be efficient in cooking, for instance. But when that efficiency reaches a point, it becomes no longer useful for human society, and can in fact be destructive – a person extremely efficient in one kind of production may make others feel less valuable in the same industry, or they may render the labor of others obsolete, thus narrowing the workforce and creating an unfair burden on the worker.

Again, you are claiming that these things are not valuable, and then explaining how they might be valuable in a given situation. You are arguing against yourself to your own detriment...


Every thought put forth so far assumes that human beings have some value simply for being human. That lends itself to the question, ‘what makes humanness valuable?’

I understand that you are assuming this, and I await your answer. Which I will not get in the following paragraph:


I think the answer is simple. The humanist perspective is specifically interested in the sentient existence of the human being. The individual conditions, biologically and environmentally, have no power in regards to the moral worth of the human being. Because humanism is a productive orientation towards the human being, it must look inward to understand how the human being works. What is good or desired for a human being is, as a standard, what humanism is interested in. Subsequently, the organ and entity for whose benefit the human being primarily works holds the key to understanding what conditions and values are most fundamentally important to the human being. The brain, as the housing for the mind, is the most valuable and important organ, and just as we talk of each individual as the central subjects of society, we also understand the brain as the central organ of the human, for which all others work. It is only because a heart creates a life-sustaining blood flow to the brain that the heart has any worth.

You have said little of consequence here. This needs serious revision.

- August

Ratatosk
29th September 2008, 11:43
It is important to understand this on clear terms. Labor is the subject of productiveness, and productiveness is the subject of humans.What does that mean, other than the obvious assertion that "humans can work and work can be productive"?

But when that efficiency reaches a point, it becomes no longer useful for human society, and can in fact be destructive – a person extremely efficient in one kind of production may make others feel less valuable in the same industry, or they may render the labor of others obsolete, thus narrowing the workforce and creating an unfair burden on the worker.I dunno, that seems like a very silly argument for the "destructiveness" of efficiency. I mean, intelligence can intimidate some people and make their work obsolete, too, therefore, intelligence is destructive?

It seems trivial to me that being efficient at a desirable goal is pretty good and being efficient at an undesirable goal is not very useful and can be harmful. That's no great philosophy.

In fact, both profit and efficiency can be destructive in the same way. They both turn labor into a force interested in bulkier or expedited commodity production, which recreates labor into a self-destructive impulse.I literally can make no sense of that last clause.

Dean
29th September 2008, 23:52
I am still digesting the responses. You both bring up good points about coherence and unclear logic. Of course, this is a first draft of a proposed first section of the work, so it is very weak.

Decolonize The Left
30th September 2008, 00:54
I am still digesting the responses. You both bring up good points about coherence and unclear logic. Of course, this is a first draft of a proposed first section of the work, so it is very weak.

Naturally, but that's why you posted it here and we were so helpful with our constructive criticism.

Take your time and toss out a second draft when you're ready.

- August

Apeiron
30th September 2008, 04:39
Hi. This will be my first post here.

I like much of what has been said already, but there are a few things I'd like to add regarding your statement...

For clarity's sake you may want to identify precisely what you mean by terms such as 'humanism' and 'production.' Humanism in particular is quite a loaded term; there are various types of humanism, and as an ethical doctrine it has quite a long history. Your understanding of humanism seems to be heavily influenced by Marx's early manuscripts, but there are various accounts of humanism that vary in quite significant ways from this one, so just be aware of that.
It seems as though (and I may be far off here), following Marx, you're arguing that productivity is the essential characteristic of human life; it is what defines humanity - the human is the animal that produces the conditions of its own existence. You may want to be more explicit about this, thus clarifying what you mean by 'humanity' (perhaps as opposed to humanity as the 'rational animal,' etc.). Writing about 'humanity' as a singularity in the 21st century is quite a contentious move to make, so be clear about what you mean by the term and anticipate criticism on this point; defend your claim. Make it clear that productivity is not only a transhistorical and translocal feature of human life, but is its definitive feature. That is, if this is your intention. If not, definitive humanity according to whatever you do feel is its definitive characteristic.

The 'value'-laden aspects of your argument are very unclear to me. When you say productivity I assume that you're a good student of Marx and are referring to material production via labor; however, this is quite unclear. This may not be the case. I think your use of 'production' here warrants a definition. Also, you seem to be holding 'productivity' as the highest measure of value for human beings, but then you go on to define it according to other value-laden concepts:
"Productiveness, put simply, is specifically interested in whatever nurtures, enhances, uplifts and empowers the human being."
If you're trying to define what is 'good for humans,' using vague positively-connoted terms such as 'nurtures, enhances, uplifts, and empowers' doesn't quite help explain precisely what is good for humans. Further, if production is merely good because it generates various goods, it is not the highest good. You're more or less saying: what is good for humans is productivity, and productivity is all these other things that are good for humans (or at least sound as though they are) and not making a precise appeal to humanity as you conceive of it. What is it precisely about the relationship between the activity of production and the concept of humanity you're putting forward that is good (the highest good)? This is easily solvable if you're definition of 'humanity' is as I've identified above (though I may be misinterpreting, assuming you're borrowing more from Marx than you actually are).

I'm failing to understand much of what you're getting at in the rest of your statement.. in particular, the last paragraph is very unclear to me (what is the role of sentience here?). One comment is - you seem to posit transhistorical human desires (ie: 'But capital is not in itself useful or desired by humans' - where do human desires come from and why is capital necessarily undesirable? this is something has not been addressed yet), though I think this is highly contestable (particularly within a Marxist framework). Desire is another loaded term in philosophy (and of course in psychoanalysis!), so be precise. Are certain desires natural/universal? Can desire be produced by the material conditions of one's existence? Is ideology productive of desire? Once again this would benefit from a bit more clarity and defense. As noted above, I do not find the argument against efficiency to be convincing either. Also, why is the final goal of labor 'the benefit of mankind' rather than the reproduction of (individual or collective) biological (and/or perhaps social) existence? Speaking of the aims of labor in universal terms is highly contentious as well - is labor under capitalist modes of production aiming towards the same end as labor in a collective agrarian society? Perhaps you can argue that it is, but it's not immediately evident here.

Just some (hopefully helpful) thoughts.