Can someone explain some of this to me please?

[MaverickChaos]

1.) The meaning of dialectical and historical materialism. I've looked this up on wikipedia and tried to make sense of it but you guys and girls always seem to explain things better to me.

2.) The meaning of division of labour - haven't really read into this but I see it mentioned a lot.

3.) I want to hear your arguments against Private Property - simply to strengthen my position on the subject.

You don't have to try and answer all three, but any contributions will be much appreciated :)

Thanks.

[RadicalRadical]

3.) I want to hear your arguments against Private Property - simply to strengthen my position on the subject.

I will answer number three, because it is the one I can answer best. When Marx said private property, he meant property like farmland, not property like your computer or your book collection. In our society almost all land is owned by the rich and powerful, and because the rich control this land, which includes everything from farms to factories, the proletariat has to put up with wage slavery and poverty. If private property were abolished and farms and factories were collectivized by the workers for the workers there would be an equal divide on what is equally everybody's, because the earth should not have a pricetag on it. In a world where 90% of the wealth is owned by 10% of the world's population this makes a lot of sense. That's my argument anyway.

[#FF0000]

2.) The meaning of division of labour - haven't really read into this but I see it mentioned a lot.

Division of labor is basically the specialization of labor. Maybe an example will make it clearer.

Before the Industrial Revolution, if someone wanted to make a nail, the blacksmith was pretty much involved in every part of the process. The blacksmith took the metal, heated it, and hammered out the point, the head, the body of the nail, and everything, and then packages the nails himself.

With the Division of Labor, the nailmaking process is broken down, and different individuals take part in a different aspect of production. That is, one worker's job is to shape the head of the nail, one's job is to shape the point, another's job is to shape the body of the nail, and one must package the nails.

Basically think of an assembly line, where one person puts one piece of a car in place, then the piece is moved to another person who puts another piece on that, and so on and so forth until you have a car.

It's a strategy meant to increase productivity. It made Henry Ford rich by allowing him to produce many cars very cheaply. Meanwhile, the workers on the assembly lines are intensely unfulfilled and alienated from being treated like tools.


I want to hear your arguments against Private Property - simply to strengthen my position on the subject.

The default argument I use is the Labor Theory of Value:

A boss has hired a worker and pays him $10 a day to make widgets.
The worker takes the job and produces the widgets.
The boss takes the widgets the worker made and sells them for $50, and gives the worker $10 for his wage.
The boss made $40 off the widgets. The worker made $10, even though he created the $50 through his labor.

Basically, the worker payed his boss $40 for the privilege of using the tools his boss claims ownership of, even though those tools were the product of another worker's labor!.

There's nothing free or fair in this exchange. The worker MUST surrender that $40 of the $50 he created in widgets. If not, he has no means to produce himself, and will starve.

[Module]

I guess I'll be doing 1 then!

1.) The meaning of dialectical and historical materialism. I've looked this up on wikipedia and tried to make sense of it but you guys and girls always seem to explain things better to me.
First off, materialism is about recognising that the only thing that really exists is matter. All change, all conditions, as a result of interactions between this matter. Historical materialism is a way of looking at historical change as a product of the material interactions of human society, and at it's core, the economic system. Material conditions are what define human existence. The economy is the basis of social structure.
Dialectical materialism is something I'm going to have to leave to another poster, because it honestly isn't something I have a firm enough grasp on to attempt to educate you on it!

[spice756]

because the rich control this land, which includes everything from farms to factories, the proletariat has to put up with wage slavery and poverty


It is the capitalists who own the means of production not the worker .They exploit the worker with low pay and long work hours .Well the capitalists has a big bank account million or billions of money in the big bank account .Well the worker is paying rent. and does not know if there is enough money for food

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Forget dialectical materialism.

I have outlined it briefly here (and demolished at the same time):

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Anti-D_For_Dummies%2001.htm

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/disclaimer.htm

[MaverickChaos]

Thanks everyone :)

[trivas7]

Go here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yo8X7lAQyUY) for an explanation of dialectical materialism. Simply put, it is the theory that the world is both dialectica (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dialectical)l and materia (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/material)l.

[mikelepore]

I made a list of the statements written by Marx and Engels that seem to me to be their definitions of the "materialist conception of history."

http://www.deleonism.org/materialist-conception-of-history.htm

[Yehuda Stern]

1.) The meaning of dialectical and historical materialism. I've looked this up on wikipedia and tried to make sense of it but you guys and girls always seem to explain things better to me.Rosa's indignation notwithstanding, I'll try to explain shortly what dialectical and historical materialism means.

Philosophy, from ancient times, could be divided into two major trends: the idealist trend and the materialist trend. Idealists believe that human consciousness determines the conditions in which men live, while materialists believe that the conditions in which we live determine our consciousness. Naturally, Marxists are materialists, as we believe that the class reality in which a person lives shapes his consciousness, including his political outlook.

Dialectics, as opposed to formal logic, are in the end a mode of logic. The premise for dialectics is that processes that we see happening in nature do not allow us to conclude that different forms of matter are really separate from each other as formal logic dictates. Our formal logic says that water is water and steam is steam, and we know that water in any temperature remains water until it reaches 100 degrees - and then becomes steam. This steam leads to the creation of clouds, which leads to rain, which is used by plants, animals and humans to survive and procreate.

However, dialectics have come a long way from that. Hegel, who lived in the time of the French revolution, was probably the first modern philosopher to finalize the dialectic as a method of analysis.

Marx and Engels were at first Hegelians. They then broke with Hegel and became supporters of Feuerbach. Feuerbach broke with Hegel over his disagreements with him on his idealist philosophy, and in the process also broke with dialectics. Marx and Engels later broke with Feuerbach, understanding that he was right to disagree with Hegel's philosophy, which was religious and worshipped the state, he was wrong to adopt formal logic.

This synthesis between dialectics and materialism is called dialectical materialism. It can be summed up by saying that all that exists is matter, that matter changes constantly from one thing to another, and that the small qunatitative changes that are invisible to us cause contradictions under the surface which at some point explode and lead to qualitative changes.

Historical materialism is the way in which Marx and Engels analyzed history to reach most of their political conclusions, featured prominently in the Communist Manifesto. Since this post came out much longer than I intended already, I will just say that it is dialectical materialism applied to the analysis of historical-political events.

The water example from above is a pretty basic one, which is given quite often (although philosophy enthusiasts will argue that the change of matter from one phase to another is a qualitative change in form, but only a quantitative change in essence, which is correct). Two more examples that Marxists often use bring us more to concrete matters.

One of the concepts of Marxism that many people often find difficult to understand is that every state is both a dictatorship and a democracy. Since from a bourgeois point of view, classes are legalistic beings (not social forces built into the mode of production), we learn that in states in which the law proclaims all people to be equal, there is no ruling class - there may be inequality, but that is something that needs to be reformed democratically, without a revolution. This is the theoretical basis of reformism.

Marxists say, no, classes are very real even when they are not written into the rule book of the state, and the ruling class of every state always excercises its will through the state - through either a parliamentary democracy or a dictatorship. In the end, the capitalist state is built in a way as which to give the capitalists a way to settle their differences without stirring up too many conflicts, while making sure the other classes do not get a say in the policies of the state. In this is contained the dialectical understanding that every state is both a dictatorship of the ruling class (against other classes) and a democracy of the ruling class (for itself). In this sense, a workers' state would be both a dictatorship against the old ruling class as well as a democracy in which workers can finally take control of their own lives.

Another example is reformist workers parties. Lenin used to refer to these parties as "bourgeois workers parties," a concept which would at first seem strange to people who know a little about Marxism to know that for Marxists a party represents the class interests of a given class. However, Lenin observed that these parties contain a contradiction: their leadership comes from the privileged parts of the working class (AKA the "labor aristocracy") and the middle class, while its membership comes (or used to come) from among the ranks of common workers. This means that while the leadership is bourgeois in every sense of the word, the rank and file of the party can be won over to the socialist revolution if it is proven to them that their leadership cannot serve their interests. How exactly to do this - why, that is a question for a different thread...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

YS:


Dialectics, as opposed to formal logic, are in the end a mode of logic. The premise for dialectics is that processes that we see happening in nature do not allow us to conclude that different forms of matter are really separate from each other as formal logic dictates. Our formal logic says that water is water and steam is steam, and we know that water in any temperature remains water until it reaches 100 degrees - and then becomes steam. This steam leads to the creation of clouds, which leads to rain, which is used by plants, animals and humans to survive and procreate.

Bold added.

Where does Formal Logic 'say' this?

And, as I have shown (in other threads here, and at my site), dialectical logic cannot cope with, let alone explain, change, whereas formal logic (Aristotelian, and even more so, modern temporal, modal and mathematical logic) can cope with, and thus help explain change, as can ordinary language.


This synthesis between dialectics and materialism is called dialectical materialism. It can be summed up by saying that all that exists is matter, that matter changes constantly from one thing to another, and that the small qunatitative changes that are invisible to us cause contradictions under the surface which at some point explode and lead to qualitative changes.

But, as I have also shown, this 'law' of Engels's does not work in general, for not only do many things not change suddenly (for example, all metals change from solid to liquid slowly when heated, as do all plastics and glass), water as a liquid and as steam is still H20, so no new quality has emerged.


However, Lenin observed that these parties contain a contradiction: their leadership comes from the privileged parts of the working class (AKA the "labor aristocracy") and the middle class, while its membership comes (or used to come) from among the ranks of common workers. This means that while the leadership is bourgeois in every sense of the word, the rank and file of the party can be won over to the socialist revolution if it is proven to them that their leadership cannot serve their interests. How exactly to do this - why, that is a question for a different thread...

Bold added.

But, why is this a 'contradiction'?

Dialectical materialism, as I have shown, makes not one ounce of sense; no wonder then that it has presided over almost 150 years of almost total failure.

History has already refuted it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Go here for an explanation of dialectical materialism. Simply put, it is the theory that the world is both dialectical and material.

The OP needs to be warned that this link takes the unwary to YouTube, where the unsuspecting viewer will have inflicted on him/her the same old nostrums that have been shown not to work many times over, and not just at RevLeft.

[Yehuda Stern]

Rosa, if you want to debate whether or not dialectical materialism is correct or not, we can do that in another thread. Open one up and I'll gladly join. For now, a person has asked to understand the concept, so you might want to shelf your rampant anti-dialecticalism this time around.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I could also complain about your rampant pro-dialecticism, and the fact that you are telling fibs about logic, among other things.

And there are plenty of threads already open in Philosophy were you can join in; here are a few:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/dialectics-nature-does-t87066/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/rosa-lichtensteins-letter-t89012/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/contradictions-society-t87742/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/anti-duhring-t80412/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/nti-dialectics-made-t67725/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/scrapping-dialectics-would-t79634/index.html

[Yehuda Stern]

Rampant pro-dialectism? The man asked about the subject, I give him my definition of it. Get over yourself.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

YS:


Rampant pro-dialectism? The man asked about the subject, I give him my definition of it. Get over yourself

Ah, but he did not asked to be misled about logic, did he?

Nor did he ask to be fed tired old dogmas that have been refuted more times than the Fourth International has split.

[MaverickChaos]

Haha, there's a lot of conflict on this forum isn't there? Thanks a lot for the explanations guys and girls.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

There is indeed, but you will no doubt also note that the dialectical mystics here cannot respond to my attacks on their 'theory'.

[shorelinetrance]

I suggest you look into what rosa has wrote about dialectical materialism. Dialectical materialism is pretty ridiculous, and as rosa said there are better ways of explaining changes in society without relying on useless metaphysical mysticism.

[Reclaimed Dasein]

3.) I want to hear your arguments against Private Property - simply to strengthen my position on the subject.

The best argument against private property is as follows. A notion of property either depends on some social convention (social agreement) or ontological being (nature of things in themselves). If the basis of private property is social convention then its a simple manner to say productive property (factories, farms, etc) should be owned by the state/workers/democratic polis. Among the host of reasons, because most accept that it is moral to feed the hungry and this sort of ownership facilitates this.

However, if the basis of private property is ontological (out of being in itself) some metaphysic of private property must be shown. The usual argument is that anything I mix my labor with (work on) should be mine unless I enter into some contract (exchange). This notion of libertarian capitalism holds that it is immoral for anyone to take what is mine without my permission in the form of the state, taxes, theft, etc. All of our goods must come either through our own labor, exchange, or voluntary gift. These good are justly acquired. All other goods are not.

However, we may not justly use unjustly acquired goods. A stolen brick of gold is not justly acquired. Someone giving me a stolen brick of gold is not justly acquired. Using a stolen shovel to dig for bricks of gold does not make the bricks justly acquired. What is the upshot of this?

The history of the world is a history of theft (see Marx's primitive accumulation). Therefore, no goods are justly acquired and so no one has any ontological right to anything. Thusly, all property rights must be social rights subject to social command. This makes the capitalists (libertarians) just fucked up selfish socialists until they can give a coherent theory of property.

[Yehuda Stern]

There is indeed, but you will no doubt also note that the dialectical mystics here cannot respond to my attacks on their 'theory'.

It's not that I can't - it's that I have little patience for pompous, hysterical anti-dialecticians who think they're saying something new, and moreover, this is not the subject of the thread. I have given a definition of dialectical materialism from a Marxist point of view, as asked. If you want a debate on dialectics, you're more than welcome to start one somewhere else.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

YS:


It's not that I can't - it's that I have little patience for pompous, hysterical anti-dialecticians who think they're saying something new, and moreover, this is not the subject of the thread. I have given a definition of dialectical materialism from a Marxist point of view, as asked. If you want a debate on dialectics, you're more than welcome to start one somewhere else.

1) I note your use of the sexist term 'hysterical' when dealing with a female comrade. Unfortunately for you, I am not as easily intimidated as your mother.

2) Just as I note that your incapacity to answer my criticisms is matched by your irrational and emotive response.

3) I have already given you more than enough links to the Philosophy section where you are welcome to add your thoughts, if you have any.

The fact that you haven't done so since you joined in June confirms my suspicion that, just like the other mystics here, you are all talk.

4) We are still waiting for you to tell us where 'Formal Logic' says the things you alleged of it. You do not need a new thread to do that.

Feel free to throw another tantrum, though...:rolleyes:

[black magick hustla]

1) I note your use of the sexist term 'hysterical' when dealing with a female comrade. Unfortunately for you, I am not as easily intimidated as your mother.

How is that sexist?

I think he has a point. I think maoism is anti-working class but I dont go on every thread about maoism to derail it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

M:


How is that sexist?

If you were female, you'd know.


I think he has a point. I think maoism is anti-working class but I dont go on every thread about maoism to derail it.

I might have left him alone had he not posted this:


Rosa's indignation notwithstanding, I'll try to explain shortly what dialectical and historical materialism means.

That suggests my objections are either irrational or emotional, which slur deserves a slap-down.

Moroever, just like every other dialectician who posts here, and who writes on the subject, he tells lies about logic, but when asked to substantiate what they say, they attack the one asking for such proof, but neglect to post the proof.

Finally, it does not amount to 'de-railing' a thread to challenge what someone else has said.

Comrades do this all the time -- they just get picky when I do it.

[Yehuda Stern]

Oh very good! I apparently underestimated your intellectual bankruptcy. You were actually able to take my dismissal of your pompous rant and make it into a sexist issue! Well well, you are indeed well educated in the SWP debate style.

Oh and by the way, my mother is not easily intimated by anyone, much less by me. She is a strong woman, who doesn't go to every place trying to shove her hysterical criticisms at everyone, and doesn't use her gender as a way of avoiding criticism directed at her.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

YS:


Oh very good! I apparently underestimated your intellectual bankruptcy.

Even so, you can't deal with my arguments, but must resort only to personal attacks. This, I think, reveals more about the bankruptcy of your ideas than it says anything about me.


You were actually able to take my dismissal of your pompous rant and make it into a sexist issue! Well well, you are indeed well educated in the SWP debate style.

Once more, you were the one who used a term of sexist abuse, and suddenly, I am the one who is in the wrong for pointing this out!

And, this has nothing to do with the SWP. I can't think why you would now launch a sectarian attack ontop of your sexist slur -- except that this is the only thing us Trots are good at, as the sectarian thread showed.


Oh and by the way, my mother is not easily intimated by anyone, much less by me. She is a strong woman, who doesn't go to every place trying to shove her hysterical criticisms at everyone, and doesn't use her gender as a way of avoiding criticism directed at her.

Yes, I thought you had mother 'issues'.

This confirms it.:rolleyes:

I bet you never call her 'hysterical'...

[Yehuda Stern]

Uh, I haven't made any sexist slur, Rosa - I called you hysterical. Which is what you are.

And with the mother issues - man, you are truly sick in the head. You've got some nerve, having a quote about other people having mental diseases in your signature.

We are done here.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

YS:


Uh, I haven't made any sexist slur, Rosa - I called you hysterical. Which is what you are.

This is in fact a sexist slur, whether you know it or not.

And, in what way am I 'hysterical'? All I have done is question the dogma you have swallowed, and asked you to provide evidence that Formal Logic is as you say it is. Or, do you think that anyone who questions received opinion is 'hysterical'?


And with the mother issues - man, you are truly sick in the head. You've got some nerve, having a quote about other people having mental diseases in your signature.

As sick in the head as I am, or am not, you definitely protest the mother 'issues' issue to much, methinks.


We are done here.

Not until you provide evidence that Formal Logic does what you allege of it.

You have been given the opportunity to do that here, or in the other threads I linked to above.

Otherwise, we are beginning to suspect you either made this up, or uncritically swallowed it from Trotsky (among others -- like Woods and Grant).

Or, you can always do the honourable thing, and withdraw it.

[Lord Hargreaves]

1.) The meaning of dialectical and historical materialism. I've looked this up on wikipedia and tried to make sense of it but you guys and girls always seem to explain things better to me.

As far as I am aware, the term dialectical materialism was invented by Engels. It was originally supposed to describe the belief that the whole world is ultimately matter, and that this matter moves dialectically, i.e. that it is constantly in motion (motion is ontologically primary), that it moves by a "synthesis" of "opposites" - the matter in itself being "contradictory" - and that it changes by radical quantitative to qualitative shifts.

As far as many Marxists are now concerned, dialectical materialism - as described here - is a dead philosophy. As soon as the Western Marxists and Critical Theorists (those trained in or familiar with philosophy, specifically that philosophy in the German Idealist tradition) got hold of it from the Orthodox Marxists, it was essentially dropped as something rather absurd and quite embarrassing. Engel's dialectical materialism, insofar as it involves metaphysical speculation about nature as it is "in-itself", goes well beyond the limits of metaphysics and human knowledge of nature that Immanuel Kant so impressively demonstrated in his Critique of Pure Reason . No one who had really read Kant and understood the implications of his work would have said the kinds of things Engels - and, it has to be said, Lenin, Trotsky and Mao too - were saying. On top of this, Sartre's objections in his Critique of Dialectical Reason, are seen as pretty much authoritative on the issue

As for dialectics itself, as a particular way of thinking or method of presentation, it continues to play an important part in Marxism. The most important terms are, I would say, "totality" and probably "contradiction"

Totality - In analytic philosophy, the tendency is to try and break down complex phenomenon into separate consituent parts in order to understand it (as you would take apart a machine to see how the wheels and cogs inside fit together). In contrast, dialectical Marxists try and see every human society as a totality, in which a full understanding of the particular cannot be achieved without seeing it in its inter-relation with everything else. In an analysis this involves moving back and forth from the particular to the universal, the abstract to the concrete, and from the historical to possibilties in the future

Contradiction - Again, in analytic philosophy, a contradiction is a logical mistake which reduces the proposition that contains it into meaninglessness. In dialectics, following Hegel, a "contradiction" expresses two opposing sides of human existence which exist alongside each other, where both cancel each other out when brought to a logical conclusion, but where both cannot but exist within the system in which they arise. The most common example is the "contradiction" between public labour and private appropriation in the capitalist economy.

Finally, I would stress that dialectics is supposed to be a new way of thinking about cause, and also about time. Dialectical causation usually means structural cause, where the cause is internal, as opposed to mechanical causation - "this causes that" - which is external (notice how Marx, in his 'Preface to Critique of Political Economy' uses words like "conditions", "corresponds" or "determines" and never "cause").

Structural causation is how Marxists usually see capitalism working, as it advances with, in spite of, and by its limitations - it cannot work effectively without reproducing the conditions for its failure, and those conditions that make it most vulnerable are those by which it finds strength. In contrast to this, many bourgeois economists (especially libertarians) think along the lines "capitalism works great in its pure form, its just the government/the socialists/the welfare recipients/the environmentalists/ the statists who keep getting in its way that are the problem" - a typically non-dialectical way to see things

Historical materialism is simply the idea that people's material lives and material existence are what it is most important to study if we want to understand the movement of history. The most important material factors don't always have to be economic factors, though the economic always plays - in Althusser's language - the "overdetermining" role. It is in capitalism, with the radical separation of the economic and the political (and other social elements), that getting to grips with how the economy works becomes crucial.

It is very important that you notice that here the word "material", in historical materialism, is being used in a different way than the word "material" is being used in dialectical materialism. We can say it is vital for social theorists to understand the material necessities of human life - say food, shelter, property etc. - as being primary in the development of history, without going to a scientist and making any metaphysical statements about the way the "matter" in the chemicals he holds in his test tube is changing "dialectically" when it reacts, or whatever


2.) The meaning of division of labour - haven't really read into this but I see it mentioned a lot.

In the way I understand it, division of labour is usually the result of technological change in the capitalist economy. So, for instance, you might get from a single worker making a single coat, to a single worker "specializing" in a certain area of coat production - say, making buttons.

This specialization is also, conversely (dialectically), a reduction in the overall knowledge workers have. This can mean a break in the solidarity of workers, as it becomes harder to realise that all their interests are really the same. It also makes it harder for everyone to understand what is really going on in the world as a complete system. Thus, for those interested in class struggle, the most important division of labour to be overcome is that between "intellectual" and "manual" labour - educate the workers, and create the all-rounded individual


3.) I want to hear your arguments against Private Property - simply to strengthen my position on the subject.

Arguments for private property, when they are not simply utilitarian ("private property works!"), are usually based on some kind of labour theory of appropriation - the "I own this house because I made it" argument. This appeals to commonly held principles of just desert, and is fairly unobjectionable as long as it goes - the problem, however, is that this kind of argument rests on the assumption that the earth, prior to human interaction with it, was unowned. When this is taken to its logical conclusion, it provides scope for great inequality and oppression, as - in theory, and, as we see historically, in practice too - it seems to allow a select few to take over the earth for themselves, forcing everyone else to work for them

The way to argue against private property, then - as you may now be able to see, given the objections to the originally unowned earth theory - is to start by not arguing about property at all, but about the essential values of justice we feel human beings should live by. If we don't, then the objection that private property leads to deep inequality etc. is meaningless - the defenders of private property will just give you a "why should I even care?" type of response.

Failing to turn the argument back on its feet can lead to absurdity. By analogy:

We might say, for instance, that the air around us is unowned. This seems fair enough at the outset. But, of course, this would seem to entail the possibility of some talented philosopher coming up with an air-appropriation theory, by which people try to justify sucking oxygen from the air into tanks for their own exclusive use. Thus, many people across the planet who cannot avoid to buy oxygen end up suffocating. So, where did we go wrong? We have to say that the air around is jointly owned, and not unowned, because the utterly essential point we left out is that we all need oxygen to survive.

And so, as we might assert that air is jointly owned by arguing that all humans have a right to life, we should assert that the earth is jointly owned by arguing that humans have a right to life, a right to equality, a right to autonomy, a right to "pursue happiness", a right to be free, etc.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Again, in analytic philosophy, a contradiction is a logical mistake which reduces the proposition that contains it into meaninglessness. In dialectics, following Hegel, a "contradiction" expresses two opposing sides of human existence which exist alongside each other, where both cancel each other out when brought to a logical conclusion, but where both cannot but exist within the system in which they arise. The most common example is the "contradiction" between public labour and private appropriation in the capitalist economy.

I'd like to see you find an analytic philosopher who says that a contradiction is a 'logical mistake'. In fact, in indirect proof in logic and mathematics, contradiction plays a vitally important role.

Moreover, contradictions are not 'meaningless', either. If they had no meaning, we would not be able to tell they were contradictions.

And, Hegel's understanding of the term was based on a series of crass logical errors he made when he tried to derive a contradiction from the alleged negation of the 'law of identity', as I tried to show you over at Political Crossfire Forums a month or so ago.

Hence, the entire rationale for this is based on a series or errors:


In dialectics, following Hegel, a "contradiction" expresses two opposing sides of human existence which exist alongside each other, where both cancel each other out when brought to a logical conclusion, but where both cannot but exist within the system in which they arise.

Why call these 'contradictions' then? We have far better words for this in ordinary language.


The most common example is the "contradiction" between public labour and private appropriation in the capitalist economy

We can see you do not really mean this since it is not a contradiction in any sense of that word; hence the quotation marks.

And structural causation is a viable notion, but not if you introduce the useless term 'dialectical contradiction' into the mix.

And the notion that change is caused by internal factors cannot work either.

1) It is impossible to say what constitutes an 'internal' factor without this theory descending into atomism. [This is demonstrated at my site, in Essay Eight Part One.]

2) Even if this were not so, if everything is interconnected, then change cannot be the result of internal factors. On the other hand, if change were the result of internal factors, then everything cannot be interconnected. [This is in fact a corollary of the previous point.] So, you have a choice: abandon the interconnected 'Totality', or ditch the doctrine that the cause of change is these obscure 'internal contradictions'.


In analytic philosophy, the tendency is to try and break down complex phenomenon into separate constituent parts in order to understand it (as you would take apart a machine to see how the wheels and cogs inside fit together). In contrast, dialectical Marxists try and see every human society as a totality, in which a full understanding of the particular cannot be achieved without seeing it in its inter-relation with everything else. In an analysis this involves moving back and forth from the particular to the universal, the abstract to the concrete, and from the historical to possibilities in the future

This is not so. Wittgenstein's Tractatus, for example, is based on the idea that the totality of facts constitutes the world, and that the sense of any proposition depends on the general form of a proposition, which form encompasses every conceivable proposition, whether this be an infinite number, or a large finite one.

Other analytic philosophers are Wholists, too. Quine for example.

And, of course this does not work, hence Wittgenstein's' switch away from such Wholism (or Hegelian Expansionism, as I have called it -- HEX for short).

The situation with HEX is far worse; while it is not possible for HEX also to reach a conclusion, it cannot even begin. The reason for saying this is bound up with that fact that instead of seeking increasingly fundamental units, HEX-theorists aim to find ever wider, more involved and inclusive connections, which must be explored before any attempt to depict the "specific characteristics" of anything in particular can even begin.

This, of course, immediately stops the dialectical roller-coaster in its tracks because no element in this metaphysical wild goose chase is ascertainable before all the rest have been -– meaning, of course, that none ever will be. Since one half of this open-ended meander through endless epistemological space involves the completion of an infinite task, neither option is viable. Therefore, the entire process cannot end, and so it cannot begin.

Even HEX-lovers admit that their approach delivers only "partial" truths (at best). To be sure, these are supposed to edge humanity ever-closer to "absolute truth" (if tested in practice); nevertheless, the infinitary nature of the task ahead completely undermines the whole endeavour. Each element in the Totality in effect lies at the centre of a set of 'concentric circles' (or 'spheres', if we move into a metaphorical 'third dimension') with infinitely expanding regions of ever-broader 'interconnections' emanating outward from that centre.

Unfortunately, the indefinite expansion of the radii of each of these circles of "partial knowledge" would have no discernible effect on the remaining level of ignorance. This is because the difference between a large finite number of facts (representing the current status of "partial knowledge") and the infinite number of facts constituting "Absolute" knowledge, is itself infinite.

If a finite cardinal of arbitrary size is subtracted from the smallest transfinite cardinal, the latter remains the same size (always assuming, of course, that post-Cantorian cardinal number theory is itself correct -- I will pass no comment on that here).

Hence, the following would be true (for arbitrarily large n):

Ào - 10^n = Ào

[Ào -- this is the best that the formatting here will allow; this symbol stands for 'Aleph zero', the smallest transfinite cardinal (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transfinite_number).]

So, even if humanity accumulated knowledge (in terms of facts and/or theories) comparable to that depicted by the real number above (i.e., the power of ten), the difference between that number and the smallest 'infinite' cardinal would itself still be infinite.

This means that no matter how far science advances, humanity would still be no nearer "absolute" knowledge than it is at present, or than it was 20,000 years ago. In that case, clearly, the "asymptotic progress" metaphor is a highly (i.e., infinitely) misleading picture of the progress of scientific knowledge.

In the final analysis, therefore, dialectics possesses its own version of Kant's unknowable Noumenon -– but one that has been given a temporal twist and projected into the 'infinite' future.

According to dialecticians, since the entire nature of the part is determined by its relation to the whole -- and vice versa --, and since we do not, and never will know the whole, we cannot, and will not ever know the part. In which case, dialecticians should say (rather like the character Manuel from Fawlty Towers): "Fundamentally, we know nothing" -- i.e., "Fundamentally, we are infinitely ignorant of everything".

Hence, there seems to be little point in bragging about dialectic's ability to penetrate to the heart of reality -- or to grasp the "thing-in-itself" -- if it now turns out that the results of this particular example of dialectical-bravado have to be postponed forever.

In that case, if the road to epistemological Nirvana is paved with such god-like intentions, human ignorance must always remain infinite.

So, the dialectical 'Totality' (even if we knew what it was, which we do not) would condemn humanity to infinite ignorance.

Of course, if we try to limit the 'Totality' to human history, that won't work either, for human history is connected with much that has happened in the solar system, and thus with countless processes beyond.

[Lord Hargreaves]

LH:



I'd like to see you find an analytic philosopher who says that a contradiction is a 'logical mistake'. In fact, in indirect proof in logic and mathematics, contradiction plays a vitally important role.

Moreover, contradictions are not 'meaningless', either. If they had no meaning, we would not be able to tell they were contradictions.

Obviously


And, Hegel's understanding of the term was based on a series of crass logical errors he made when he tried to derive a contradiction from the alleged negation of the 'law of identity', as I tried to show you over at Political Crossfire Forums a month or so ago.

Hegel doesn't "negate" the law of identity, as far as I am aware



Why call these 'contradictions' then? We have far better words for this in ordinary language.

Partly because of tradition, and partly because the idea of a contradiction does best express what is meant - something which is lost in words like "anatagonism" or "struggle" etc




We can see you do not really mean this since it is not a contradiction in any sense of that word; hence the quotation marks.

I am only trying to give a definition


And structural causation is a viable notion, but not if you introduce the useless term 'dialectical contradiction' into the mix.

You will have to explain this


And the notion that change is caused by internal factors cannot work either.

1) It is impossible to say what constitutes an 'internal' factor without this theory descending into atomism. [This is demonstrated at my site, in Essay Eight Part One.]

2) Even if this were not so, if everything is interconnected, then change cannot be the result of internal factors. On the other hand, if change were the result of internal factors, then everything cannot be interconnected. [This is in fact a corollary of the previous point.] So, you have a choice: abandon the interconnected 'Totality', or ditch the doctrine that the cause of change is these obscure 'internal contradictions'.

I haven't read what you have written in your essays (why would I want to?) so I won't pass judgement on any of this




This is not so. Wittgenstein's Tractatus, for example, is based on the idea that the totality of facts constitutes the world, and that the sense of any proposition depends on the general form of a proposition, which form encompasses every conceivable proposition, whether this be an infinite number, or a large finite one.

Other analytic philosophers are Wholists, too. Quine for example.

And, of course this does not work, hence Wittgenstein's' switch away from such Wholism (or Hegelian Expansionism, as I have called it -- HEX for short).

This is the first time I have heard the Tractatus called "Wholist" (where has the 'W' come from?) As far as I am aware, this "wholism" is not what I mean by "totality". Reducing the world to a collection of facts (is this not what he means?) and reducing the meaning of every proposition to a central propositional structure is not what Hegel had in mind


The situation with HEX is far worse; while it is not possible for HEX also to reach a conclusion, it cannot even begin. The reason for saying this is bound up with that fact that instead of seeking increasingly fundamental units, HEX-theorists aim to find ever wider, more involved and inclusive connections, which must be explored before any attempt to depict the "specific characteristics" of anything in particular can even begin.

This, of course, immediately stops the dialectical roller-coaster in its tracks because no element in this metaphysical wild goose chase is ascertainable before all the rest have been -– meaning, of course, that none ever will be. Since one half of this open-ended meander through endless epistemological space involves the completion of an infinite task, neither option is viable. Therefore, the entire process cannot end, and so it cannot begin.

Even HEX-lovers admit that their approach delivers only "partial" truths (at best). To be sure, these are supposed to edge humanity ever-closer to "absolute truth" (if tested in practice); nevertheless, the infinitary nature of the task ahead completely undermines the whole endeavour. Each element in the Totality in effect lies at the centre of a set of 'concentric circles' (or 'spheres', if we move into a metaphorical 'third dimension') with infinitely expanding regions of ever-broader 'interconnections' emanating outward from that centre.

See my final paragraph below



Unfortunately, the indefinite expansion of the radii of each of these circles of "partial knowledge" would have no discernible effect on the remaining level of ignorance. This is because the difference between a large finite number of facts (representing the current status of "partial knowledge") and the infinite number of facts constituting "Absolute" knowledge, is itself infinite.

If a finite cardinal of arbitrary size is subtracted from the smallest transfinite cardinal, the latter remains the same size (always assuming, of course, that post-Cantorian cardinal number theory is itself correct -- I will pass no comment on that here).

Hence, the following would be true (for arbitrarily large n):

Ào - 10^n = Ào

So, even if humanity accumulated knowledge (in terms of facts and/or theories) comparable to that depicted by the real number above (i.e., the power of ten), the difference between that number and the smallest 'infinite' cardinal would itself still be infinite.

You've lost me here. I only have one GCSE in mathematics so I wouldn't know about post-Cantorian cardinal number theory



This means that no matter how far science advances, humanity would still be no nearer "absolute" knowledge than it is at present, or than it was 20,000 years ago. In that case, clearly, the "asymptotic progress" metaphor is a highly (i.e., infinitely) misleading picture of the progress of scientific knowledge.

In the final analysis, therefore, dialectics possesses its own version of Kant's unknowable Noumenon -– but one that has been given a temporal twist and projected into the 'infinite' future.

According to dialecticians, since the entire nature of the part is determined by its relation to the whole -- and vice versa --, and since we do not, and never will know the whole, we cannot, and will not ever know the part. In which case, dialecticians should say (rather like the character Manuel from Fawlty Towers): "Fundamentally, we know nothing" -- i.e., "Fundamentally, we are infinitely ignorant of everything".

Hence, there seems to be little point in bragging about dialectic's ability to penetrate to the heart of reality -- or to grasp the "thing-in-itself" -- if it now turns out that the results of this particular example of dialectical-bravado have to be postponed forever.

In that case, if the road to epistemological Nirvana is paved with such god-like intentions, human ignorance must always remain infinite.

So, the dialectical 'Totality' (even if we knew what it was, which we do not) would condemn humanity to infinite ignorance.

Of course, if we try to limit the 'Totality' to human history, that won't work either, for human history is connected with much that has happened in the solar system, and thus with countless processes beyond.

Not necessarily. I think one might be able to draw a distinction between knowing something and knowing something completely and absolutely. If so, then we can attempt to understand things in their inter-relation, gaining knowledge while ever condemned to not knowing anything completely and absolutely. In terms of human society, which is highly complex and always changing, this doesn't really sound like much of an objection against dialectics. Besides, Adorno already covered this

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Hegel doesn't "negate" the law of identity, as far as I am aware

Unfortunately for you, he does try to do this, then he double negates it to obtain the 'other' of an 'other'. The first negation of he links with the 'law of contradiction' and the finititude of finite beings, and thus with change and then with their demise, mand the second negation with what they change into. This is how 'contradiction' is supposed to drive change.


Partly because of tradition, and partly because the idea of a contradiction does best express what is meant - something which is lost in words like "antagonism" or "struggle" etc

What exactly is 'lost'?


I am only trying to give a definition

Well, it's not a very good one.


You will have to explain this

Since 'dialectical contradiction' is based on a defective series of moves in Hegel, which means there is no rationale behind it's use, your appeal to 'structural causation' is compromised.


I haven't read what you have written in your essays (why would I want to?) so I won't pass judgement on any of this

The second argument stands on its own, here it is again:


2) Even if this were not so, if everything is interconnected, then change cannot be the result of internal factors. On the other hand, if change were the result of internal factors, then everything cannot be interconnected. [This is in fact a corollary of the previous point.] So, you have a choice: abandon the interconnected 'Totality', or ditch the doctrine that the cause of change is these obscure 'internal contradictions'.

LH:


This is the first time I have heard the Tractatus called "Wholist" (where has the 'W' come from?) As far as I am aware, this "wholism" is not what I mean by "totality". Reducing the world to a collection of facts (is this not what he means?) and reducing the meaning of every proposition to a central propositional structure is not what Hegel had in mind

Read the opening few propositions of the Tractatus.

And Wittgenstein reduces nothing to a collection of facts; he actually says: 'the totality of facts'. Here it is:


The world is all that is the case.

The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also what is no the case.

Tractatus 1-1.12.

And, I realise this is not what Hegel had in mind; I merely referred to it to counter your claim (which you failed to substantiate) that analytic philosophy is not holist.

I note you ignored the fact that Quine (and Davidson, among many others) are holists.


I only have one GCSE in mathematics so I wouldn't know about post-Cantorian cardinal number theory

Indeed, as I said to you at the Political Crossfire forums, it is only those who are ignorant of logic who buy into dialectics -- seems we can add in here: a rather poor mathematics education.

The idea is very simple, if you subtract a finite number from an infinite number, the latter stays infinite.

Here's an example. The counting numbers are both infinite and made up of odd and even numbers. But the odd numbers and the even numbers are also infinite. Now, if you subtract the odd numbers from the counting numbers you end up with the even numbers, and thus with a set of infinite numbers.

So, a fortiori, if you now subtract merely all the odd numbers less than say one hundred trillion from the counting numbers (and this set of odd numbers is plainly finite), you end up with an infinite set.


Not necessarily. I think one might be able to draw a distinction between knowing something and knowing something completely and absolutely. If so, then we can attempt to understand things in their inter-relation, gaining knowledge while ever condemned to not knowing anything completely and absolutely. In terms of human society, which is highly complex and always changing, this doesn't really sound like much of an objection against dialectics. Besides, Adorno already covered this

But this falls into the same quandary, for you cannot know that you know this partially until you know everything, for each part is conditioned by the whole. Until you know the whole, all knowledge is subject to infinite doubt, and thus carries with it an infinite probability that is is completely wrong.