Ethics

[red eck]

I have just finished reading 'Practical Ethics' by Peter Singer. And I must say it's given me a lot to think about. I particularly like how effective the consideration of individuals interests can be at arriving at ethical decisions. Singer adopts utilitarianism, or more rather considers different types (absolute, preference and so on).
Utilitarianism is universal, as all interests are considered. Singer differentiates between sentient beings and persons and how that would affect any ethical weighing.

It enables reasoning for ethical decisions and challenges religious decrees or the liberal idealism of 'rights'. I think I'm impressed with utilitarianism, and I reckon everyone should read this book.

[Decolonize The Left]

I have just finished reading 'Practical Ethics' by Peter Singer. And I must say it's given me a lot to think about. I particularly like how effective the consideration of individuals interests can be at arriving at ethical decisions. Singer adopts utilitarianism, or more rather considers different types (absolute, preference and so on).
Utilitarianism is universal, as all interests are considered. Singer differentiates between sentient beings and persons and how that would affect any ethical weighing.

It enables reasoning for ethical decisions and challenges religious decrees or the liberal idealism of 'rights'. I think I'm impressed with utilitarianism, and I reckon everyone should read this book.

Utilitarianism huh? How about a thought experiment?

You are in a cabin in the mountains, with no contact to society or anyone other than the four other people in the cabin with you. You are the best surgeon in the world, with all tools necessary to perform safe and accurate surgery. One of the other people has a bad heart. Another has a bad liver. Another has a bad pancreas. If they do not receive transplants they will die within a day. The forth person is entirely healthy - with great organs.

Do you kill one to save three?

- August

[shorelinetrance]

Do you kill one to save three?
No, you let the sick die. Silly thought experiments don't prove anything.

[red eck]

Utilitarianism huh? How about a thought experiment?

You are in a cabin in the mountains, with no contact to society or anyone other than the four other people in the cabin with you. You are the best surgeon in the world, with all tools necessary to perform safe and accurate surgery. One of the other people has a bad heart. Another has a bad liver. Another has a bad pancreas. If they do not receive transplants they will die within a day. The forth person is entirely healthy - with great organs.

Do you kill one to save three?

- August

Assuming all other things are equal, then yes. That would be the most ethical thing to do.

Easy

[Decolonize The Left]

No, you let the sick die. Silly thought experiments don't prove anything.

I fail to see what this has to do with anything. The thought experiment was a direct reference to the philosophy of utilitarianism. You have contributed nothing of consequence.


Assuming all other things are equal, then yes. That would be the most ethical thing to do.

Easy

Indeed, it was simple and easy. I will now attempt to make it more difficult:

Same cabin, you are still super-surgeon. Only now, the three sick people are qualified: one is a rapist, the other a child molester, and the third a neo-Nazi.

The person who you would so easily kill to save three is a revolutionary leftist with a family at home and a history of dedication to the struggle for worker's rights.

Would you still kill this person to save three?

- August

[shorelinetrance]

Same cabin, you are still super-surgeon. Only now, the three sick people are qualified: one is a rapist, the other a child molester, and the third a neo-Nazi.

The person who you would so easily kill to save three is a revolutionary leftist with a family at home and a history of dedication to the struggle for worker's rights.

Would you still kill this person to save three?

- August
One is still lesser than 3. Kill the leftist. I'd rather have 3 able bodied men over one, but i see your point with this, seems hopelessly dependent on the qualitative attributes of the people in question.

[red eck]

Same cabin, you are still super-surgeon. Only now, the three sick people are qualified: one is a rapist, the other a child molester, and the third a neo-Nazi.

The person who you would so easily kill to save three is a revolutionary leftist with a family at home and a history of dedication to the struggle for worker's rights.

Would you still kill this person to save three?

- August

Now this is more interesting.

You would now have to start thinking about the consequences as well as the interests of all those concerned - and I just thought of another solution that was also available before: You could euthanise any one of the deviant (or otherwise) persons and use his good organs to save the lives of the other two. So the solution would be to euthanise the person who would be expected to cause the worst outcome. If all of the deviant persons were so extreme it was considered inevitable that they would all harm others prolifically, then perhaps killing them all would be the most ethical thing to do. If they are all only marginally unsocial (say, a bigot rather than a full blown skin-head), then euthanising the super-sugeon may still be the most ethical choice.

It depends really.

[red eck]

The relevance of utilitarianism is that it can form the foundation of any critique of Capitalism. Utilitarianism does not consider 'rights' (or property rights in particular) as something fundamental and unchallengeable.

Considering your hypothetical situation again with the 4 persons/3 ill; someone may have argued that it was the healthy person's right to keep his organs, therefore from this perspective, it would have been acceptable to allow the other three to die.

I think the utilitarian method reveals flaws with the 'rights' approach. In that other persons interests are considered irrelevant.

[mikelepore]

The utilitarian principle, seeking the greatest happiness of the greatest number, can't be made local to a cabin in the mountains. The principle that's consistent with the happiness of all people throughout the world is that we should have a rule against killing people, a rule which we are to follow even if we go away to the mountains.

Besides, even if someone has of a thought experiment in which utilitarianism gives an unreasonable result, it's still the case that utilitarianism was an attempt to find a workable formula that could be applied in practice, even if only sometimes applicable. That's better than a theory such as "nature" determining our rights, and these rights being forever unknowable but merely argued about, leaving us with no procedure to follow.

[Dean]

Complete bullshit. There is no reason to kill one to save three, fifty or a hundred. Human life cannot be quanitifiably judged for value. IT is not the number of humans alive that matter, but the quality of those lives - and even still, if you speak of neo-Nazis versus liberals, there is not reason to deliberately kill three to save another.

[red eck]

Human life cannot be quanitifiably judged for value.

Surely the lives of a 100 people have more say than the lives of 10?

That to me is clearly quantifiable.


IT is not the number of humans alive that matter, but the quality of those lives

Actually, it's individual's interests that are of concern in utilitarianism. Which broadly speaking does consider the 'quality' of a person's life.

So utilitarianism is still sound to me. And as far as I know, our best approach to Ethics.

[Lord Hargreaves]

Complete bullshit. There is no reason to kill one to save three, fifty or a hundred. Human life cannot be quanitifiably judged for value. IT is not the number of humans alive that matter, but the quality of those lives - and even still, if you speak of neo-Nazis versus liberals, there is not reason to deliberately kill three to save another.

Its easy to say "human life cannot be quanitifiably judged for value" but its hard to see the alternative when we are confronted with such thought experiments. If you refuse to kill 1 person to save the lives of 100 because you refuse to put a quantitative value on that 1 person's head, are you not simply committing this same error in your attitude to these other 100? They too all have lives with value that can't be measured quantitatively. Refusing to act in such a situation is no different than acting, since both require a moral valuation

We can say ultimately that no human life can be quanitifiably judged for value, but it doesn't follow that we can't make any comparative judgement whatsoever. What your life means to you must be roughly similar to what my life means to me, even if we can't really describe or value what our lives mean to us in-of-themselves

[Ratatosk]

So how do you propose to (non-trivially) compare different distributions of utility? You need some additional principles to do this. Is (10,10,10) better than (10, 5, 20)? If so, is (7,7,7) better than (10, 5, 20)? How about (10, 10, 10) vs. (9, 20, 20)? There is no natural way to linearly order all these distributions of utility. (Hell, even the concept of an individual's utility as something quantifiable is problematic.)

[Dean]

Its easy to say "human life cannot be quanitifiably judged for value" but its hard to see the alternative when we are confronted with such thought experiments. If you refuse to kill 1 person to save the lives of 100 because you refuse to put a quantitative value on that 1 person's head, are you not simply committing this same error in your attitude to these other 100? They too all have lives with value that can't be measured quantitatively. Refusing to act in such a situation is no different than acting, since both require a moral valuation
You ignore the moral relevance of action. The concept that you can judge the quantity of life as a meaningful moral value is a grotesque, anti-human mentality which ignore the basic premise of humanism.


We can say ultimately that no human life can be quanitifiably judged for value, but it doesn't follow that we can't make any comparative judgement whatsoever. What your life means to you must be roughly similar to what my life means to me, even if we can't really describe or value what our lives mean to us in-of-themselves
Right, but when it comes to 2 human beings versus one, the "numerical value" can't simply be added to discern worth. That is a sick joke.

[Lynx]

Thought experiments that involve humans playing god will give you inhuman rationales.

[Lord Hargreaves]

You ignore the moral relevance of action. The concept that you can judge the quantity of life as a meaningful moral value is a grotesque, anti-human mentality which ignore the basic premise of humanism.

I don't see action as having any moral relevance, no. This would seem to imply that, for instance, refusing to feed your child until they die is not as bad (or, since you seem to reject the relevance of consequentialism entirely, not bad at all) as feeding your child poision until they die, even though the results are identical. Its clear to me that action is not the important thing, but consequences and moral valuations are what counts.

If you refuse to kill one man in order to save one hundred (assuming you have no alternative etc. etc.) because you are against giving a value to that one human life, you are already implicitly making a valuation of the other 100 lives. Every other single life of those 100 lives is also a life that cannot be given an absolute value, yet you implicitly say they do when you say they are not valuable enough to override the one person. Your position is lose-lose on both angles because it is simply self-contradictory


Right, but when it comes to 2 human beings versus one, the "numerical value" can't simply be added to discern worth. That is a sick joke.

Why? As I said, making a comparative judgement on the value of two or more human lives doesn't mean we are making an absolute judgement of Human Life, which is a different issue

[Decolonize The Left]

Now this is more interesting.

You would now have to start thinking about the consequences as well as the interests of all those concerned

According to utilitarian theory, you should have been thinking about nothing but the consequences the whole time...


- and I just thought of another solution that was also available before: You could euthanise any one of the deviant (or otherwise) persons and use his good organs to save the lives of the other two. So the solution would be to euthanise the person who would be expected to cause the worst outcome. If all of the deviant persons were so extreme it was considered inevitable that they would all harm others prolifically, then perhaps killing them all would be the most ethical thing to do. If they are all only marginally unsocial (say, a bigot rather than a full blown skin-head), then euthanising the super-sugeon may still be the most ethical choice.

It depends really.

I apologize as my example was not clear - there are only two options in this situation: kill one to save three, or kill none and 'let' three die.


The relevance of utilitarianism is that it can form the foundation of any critique of Capitalism. Utilitarianism does not consider 'rights' (or property rights in particular) as something fundamental and unchallengeable.

True, but utilitarianism can also be used to justify capitalism should one adopt the argument that capitalism inevitably ends up benefiting most.


Considering your hypothetical situation again with the 4 persons/3 ill; someone may have argued that it was the healthy person's right to keep his organs, therefore from this perspective, it would have been acceptable to allow the other three to die.

I think the utilitarian method reveals flaws with the 'rights' approach. In that other persons interests are considered irrelevant.

You are correct that many will argue 'rights' in this situation, but you fail to understand that utilitarianism considers no interests what-so-ever. So you want to be President? You want to be a Nazi? You want to be a doctor? All irrelevant - all that matters is numbers. Will you, or will you not, produce greater happiness than others...

- August

[Decolonize The Left]

The utilitarian principle, seeking the greatest happiness of the greatest number, can't be made local to a cabin in the mountains.

It's a hypothetical situation designed to create an extremely difficult moral situation to test one's moral 'code.' And yes, it can be applied to a cabin as I have demonstrated on several posts.


The principle that's consistent with the happiness of all people throughout the world is that we should have a rule against killing people, a rule which we are to follow even if we go away to the mountains.

Utilitarianism is a rule - the rule of maximizing happiness. If you want another rule which forbids killing you are no longer a utilitarian. For example, if you could go back in time and kill Hitler, would you? Remember that you just demanded a rule against killing, but here you must consider that this rule might not apply, in which case it's no longer a rule.


Besides, even if someone has of a thought experiment in which utilitarianism gives an unreasonable result, it's still the case that utilitarianism was an attempt to find a workable formula that could be applied in practice, even if only sometimes applicable. That's better than a theory such as "nature" determining our rights, and these rights being forever unknowable but merely argued about, leaving us with no procedure to follow.

Why do you need a procedure to follow?


Complete bullshit. There is no reason to kill one to save three, fifty or a hundred. Human life cannot be quanitifiably judged for value. IT is not the number of humans alive that matter, but the quality of those lives - and even still, if you speak of neo-Nazis versus liberals, there is not reason to deliberately kill three to save another.

Dean, there are plenty of reasons to kill one to save three (or fifty, or a hundred, or a thousand, etc...). You are correct that it is the quality of those lives which matter, absolutely, quality over quantity. But how is one to determine the quality of the lives of others when one must act?

- August

[red eck]

True, but utilitarianism can also be used to justify capitalism should one adopt the argument that capitalism inevitably ends up benefiting most.- August

That's not an argument against Utilitarianism. But if it were true that capitalism benefited the most. It would not follow that Utilitarianism is at fault. I believe your argument to be a 'non sequitur'.


I apologize as my example was not clear - there are only two options in this situation: kill one to save three, or kill none and 'let' three die.- August

Utilitarianism will consider real life situations. I considered your hypothetical case, and now you are imposing arbitrary conditions forcing a limited number of outcomes. I presume you take the killing of the other three as the only 'realistic' outcome. From your previous posts, I gather you reject any system of ethics at all. In that case, how are you able to explain to me that Capitalism is bad?


You are correct that many will argue 'rights' in this situation, but you fail to understand that utilitarianism considers no interests what-so-ever. So you want to be President? You want to be a Nazi? You want to be a doctor? All irrelevant - all that matters is numbers. Will you, or will you not, produce greater happiness than others...- August

Wrong. Consideration of interests is kernel to Utilitarianism and preference Utilitarianism gives weight to a person's choice rather than the absolute 'units of happiness' approach. And indeed, Utilitarianism does provide an ethical justification for abortion; small family sizes; contraception etc.

[Decolonize The Left]

That's not an argument against Utilitarianism. But if it were true that capitalism benefited the most. It would not follow that Utilitarianism is at fault. I believe your argument to be a 'non sequitur'.

I had no argument in this case except to note that utilitarianism is a moral theory while capitalism is an economic theory - they both can be used in synergy or antagonistically. I even acknowledged that what you had said was true, I merely wished to point out that the opposite was also true.


Utilitarianism will consider real life situations. I considered your hypothetical case, and now you are imposing arbitrary conditions forcing a limited number of outcomes. I presume you take the killing of the other three as the only 'realistic' outcome. From your previous posts, I gather you reject any system of ethics at all. In that case, how are you able to explain to me that Capitalism is bad?

The whole situation was arbitrary - that's why it's a hypothetical situation. The idea is to construe the most difficult possible situation to test the limits of a moral theory, that is all.

I take no solution as the "only 'realistic outcome." You are the one defending utilitarianism - it is you who must face the challenges of a theory which attempts to disassociate every act from reality.

And you are correct that I do not abide by any "system of ethics." I have no interest in explaining to you why capitalism is "bad." I would explain to you why capitalism is destructive, self-contradictory, oppressive, and exploitative, but you already know this.


Wrong. Consideration of interests is kernel to Utilitarianism and preference Utilitarianism gives weight to a person's choice rather than the absolute 'units of happiness' approach. And indeed, Utilitarianism does provide an ethical justification for abortion; small family sizes; contraception etc.

I don't know where the abortion bit came from, for we were speaking of rights and interests.

"Rights," such as human rights, are merely a theoretical establishment of basic human interests. They are one interpretation of necessities embodied in the form of deontological moral codes. That is all.

Utilitarianism may attempt to factor in interests, but it does so to infinite regress and hence becomes useless. Consider:
I stumble across a moral situation and am a utilitarian. I am already embedded in the situation itself, changing it as I asses the current events. How can I incorporate all possible interests, possible futures of happiness/whatever, while I am engaging in my own interests and shaping my own future at that very moment?

- August

[Dean]

I don't see action as having any moral relevance, no. This would seem to imply that, for instance, refusing to feed your child until they die is not as bad (or, since you seem to reject the relevance of consequentialism entirely, not bad at all) as feeding your child poision until they die, even though the results are identical. Its clear to me that action is not the important thing, but consequences...
It is true that inaction does indicate a moral choice. But it is the deliberate choice that this or that group or person should die that I am against.


...and moral valuations are what counts.

If you refuse to kill one man in order to save one hundred (assuming you have no alternative etc. etc.) because you are against giving a value to that one human life, you are already implicitly making a valuation of the other 100 lives. Every other single life of those 100 lives is also a life that cannot be given an absolute value, yet you implicitly say they do when you say they are not valuable enough to override the one person. Your position is lose-lose on both angles because it is simply self-contradictory
The problem is not lack of value, it is the numerical judgement of human life. I do not belive that numbers can even begin to rationalize any loss of human life, to me that is a totally anti-humanist stance which ignores even the basic character of human existence.


Why? As I said, making a comparative judgement on the value of two or more human lives doesn't mean we are making an absolute judgement of Human Life, which is a different issue
A comparitive judgement is certainly absolute for those who lose their life in the fray.


Dean, there are plenty of reasons to kill one to save three (or fifty, or a hundred, or a thousand, etc...). You are correct that it is the quality of those lives which matter, absolutely, quality over quantity. But how is one to determine the quality of the lives of others when one must act?
That wasn't the point. My point is that the quality of human life is far too transcendent to be evaluated in this way.


I want you both to consider a few examples here.

First, a choice: Person X as well as 100 others will die in 5 minutes unless you reposition a bomb which is in a jail. As far as you have the capacity to reposition it, you will always put at least person X in mortal danger.
In this option, your action is only to save the other hundred, since you literally have no power over his death.

A train has two tracks it can go down, and you can't stop it: it will either hit one innocent person X, or 100 people that together played a part in some racist massacre (though among them there is varying participation, with at least a knowing, active role).
A group of 100 people with collectively dubious moral values, or a single "untainted" person? Also, what about a large group with at least one or two future mass-murders - is human life now worth more or less than later? Or an Einstein and a Beethoven versus a group of people who are lumpenproletarian?

You're at the controls of a train barrelling... ...you can choose between 2 deaths or 3 deaths. The two people are very young, and have at least 100 more years left collectively. The three people are elderly, and they are each with 10 years of their expected lifespan or past that.
Now, its not the number of lives, but the actual total length of human existence in consideration.

Same thing, 3 or 4, but we are now focusing on the conductor who has to choose. He knows that 5 of his loved ones are among the victims.
Here, the chooser knows that whatever he chooses, he will be responsible for the deaths of his loved ones, and those that live will know that he was responsible.

I think if anybody really looks at the dubious character of numerical valuation of human life, and the position that the chooser is in when he really intimately cares about the victims, it becomes clear that you can't choose one over the other with any certainly, or really expect others to.

[Decolonize The Left]

That wasn't the point. My point is that the quality of human life is far too transcendent to be evaluated in this way.

I assume you mean the way of utilitarian ethics? If so, I agree.


I want you both to consider a few examples here.

First, a choice: Person X as well as 100 others will die in 5 minutes unless you reposition a bomb which is in a jail. As far as you have the capacity to reposition it, you will always put at least person X in mortal danger.
In this option, your action is only to save the other hundred, since you literally have no power over his death.

Yes, I would choose to save the hundred.


A train has two tracks it can go down, and you can't stop it: it will either hit one innocent person X, or 100 people that together played a part in some racist massacre (though among them there is varying participation, with at least a knowing, active role).
A group of 100 people with collectively dubious moral values, or a single "untainted" person? Also, what about a large group with at least one or two future mass-murders - is human life now worth more or less than later? Or an Einstein and a Beethoven versus a group of people who are lumpenproletarian?[/quoted]

I would most likely choose to run over the racist murderers, the future mass-murderers, and.. well the last one sure is tough... given that the group's size isn't mentioned I'd run them over and spare the geniuses.

[quote=Dean;1250599]You're at the controls of a train barrelling... ...you can choose between 2 deaths or 3 deaths. The two people are very young, and have at least 100 more years left collectively. The three people are elderly, and they are each with 10 years of their expected lifespan or past that.
Now, its not the number of lives, but the actual total length of human existence in consideration.

I'd run over the old-folks.


Same thing, 3 or 4, but we are now focusing on the conductor who has to choose. He knows that 5 of his loved ones are among the victims.
Here, the chooser knows that whatever he chooses, he will be responsible for the deaths of his loved ones, and those that live will know that he was responsible.

This one is confusing, are you saying that my loved ones are in both groups? If so, then I'd run over the three.


I think if anybody really looks at the dubious character of numerical valuation of human life, and the position that the chooser is in when he really intimately cares about the victims, it becomes clear that you can't choose one over the other with any certainly, or really expect others to.

I chose in each situation with certainty, but then again, I'm not a utilitarian.

- August

[mikelepore]

It's a hypothetical situation designed to create an extremely difficult moral situation to test one's moral 'code.' And yes, it can be applied to a cabin as I have demonstrated on several posts.

If you can draw any boundaries you choose, instead of saying the greatest happiness of the human race, then utilitarianism isn't the only principle that breaks down. Democracy also breaks down, e.g., a lynch mob outnumbers the victim, they may vote that the victim's rights are canceled, and then use the noose. So the social boundary has to be large-scale society, and then views differ about whether that should mean nations, provinces, etc. -- but never an ad hoc group.

Society has to adopt rules without knowing what future contexts may arise. Society can't want to see if democracy gives the right results twenty years in the future, and, if it does, if people haven't elected a tyrant, then adopt a democratic process now. Since that's not possible, we can only say that, all other things being equal, democracy is expected to give better results than alternative methods, as far as we can estimate while not knowing what the particular issues might be. Utilitarianism is viewed similarly. If I am asked what advice I have for the people of the the future, about whether they should consider the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and I have to choose either yes or no, in complete ignorance of what controversy they will be evaluating, I would say yes.


Utilitarianism is a rule - the rule of maximizing happiness. If you want another rule which forbids killing you are no longer a utilitarian. For example, if you could go back in time and kill Hitler, would you? Remember that you just demanded a rule against killing, but here you must consider that this rule might not apply, in which case it's no longer a rule.

I didn't suppose that my generalization was perfect when I said we need "a rule against killing." A person might try to long essay about the exceptions, but for purposes of conversation a short version with defects will ordinarily be used. In that way I will contradict myself: Yes, I'm again killing; yes, I would kill Hitler. That's how people use their language -- it's not symbolic logic.

Circumstances that aren't analogous may produce misleading conclusions. To kill Hitler, who is actively engaged in killing others, is not analogous to killing a passive person because we want to transplant their organs.


Why do you need a procedure to follow?

Most people don't use any general principle at all to determine right. If they don't like to see their neighbors living in trailers, they'll pass a zoning ordinance against living in trailers. If it irritates them that some people drink whiskey, they'll pass a law against whiskey. They feel no need to have any algorithm. As a result, people fill prisons by the hundreds of thousands for victimlesss crimes.

Another problem with the way "free" countries define right is that abstract rights supercede concrete situations. If you starve to death, no crime has been committed, but if you avoid starving to death by stealing an apple from a millionaire, you have committed a crime.

Something is wrong with the way right is defined and implemented. In an attempt to diagnose the problem, people can "try on" various methods. Utilitarianism is one to be considered. I don't think it's a good definition of right, but it has some problem-solving usefulness.

[Ratatosk]

The problem is not lack of value, it is the numerical judgement of human life. I do not belive that numbers can even begin to rationalize any loss of human life, to me that is a totally anti-humanist stance which ignores even the basic character of human existence.That seems like the "you can't apply maths to humans because humans are special are maths is so cold and heartless" argument all over again.

The fact is that in order to be able to come up with a numerical evaluation of "utility", all you need is to assume that you can (pre-)order the events you want to consider according to preference, that you can make composite events corresponding to probabilistic combinations of two events and some mathematical assumptions about this operation.

The assumptions of this construction are by all means open to criticism. In fact, I think some of them restrict the possible use of this construction quite considerably (if you wanted to apply it to morality in general, you would in effect have to assume that all moral dilemmas can be solved). But what you cannot do is throw your hands up and say that it's false because it's "anti-humanist"! That's a complete non-argument. If this construction fails, and it does, it's because some of its assumptions are in general unrealistic, not because it's "anti-humanist" to apply numbers to people or something.

[red eck]

Starting from my earlier post:


The relevance of utilitarianism is that it can form the foundation of any critique of Capitalism. Utilitarianism does not consider 'rights' (or property rights in particular) as something fundamental and unchallengeable.- red eck


True, but utilitarianism can also be used to justify capitalism should one adopt the argument that capitalism inevitably ends up benefiting most.- August


That's not an argument against Utilitarianism. But if it were true that capitalism benefited the most. It would not follow that Utilitarianism is at fault. I believe your argument to be a 'non sequitur'.- red eck


I had no argument in this case except to note that utilitarianism is a moral theory while capitalism is an economic theory - they both can be used in synergy or antagonistically. I even acknowledged that what you had said was true, I merely wished to point out that the opposite was also true.- August

That's not what you said at all. Your argument was an attempt to present Utilitarianism as potential apologetics for Capitalism. My reply was to point out that Utilitarianism does not justify capitalism. If an argument is presented that claims 'Capitalism inevitably ends up benefiting most', then the job of the utilitarian would be to show that this was not the case by citing the major unequal consideration of interests that Capitalism involves. For an utilitarianism to justify Capitalism, he would have to demonstrate that all interests are considered equally within it, which it clearly does not. So in the end, utilitarianism can only disapprove of Capitalism.

Utilitarianism is universal, not relative, so therefore it cannot be applied in 'synergy or antagonistically' with anything. All that can go wrong for it are bad arguments and bad arguments do not render the consideration of interests obsolete as an ethical approach.


And you are correct that I do not abide by any "system of ethics." I have no interest in explaining to you why capitalism is "bad." I would explain to you why capitalism is destructive, self-contradictory, oppressive, and exploitative, but you already know this.- August

I chuckled at the "I have no interest in explaining to you why capitalism is bad" bit. Are you able to explain to people how Capitalism is bad? A Utilitarian can: 'Capitalism is bad because the interests of a minority are given far more precedence than the interests of the majority'. Quite a strong argument in my opinion. A right-winger may then try and argue that by serving the interests of the minority, you indirectly serve the interests of the majority. But that would be analogous to saying: 'by eating animals, you serve their interests also by having to reproduce them'. But if you reject ethics, or any coherent approach to ethics [in this case utilitarianism], then you really are going to struggle when having this debate, if explaining something so straightforward as 'Capitalism is bad' is made to be so needlessly complicated.

[Dean]

That seems like the "you can't apply maths to humans because humans are special are maths is so cold and heartless" argument all over again.
Well, thanks for being so condescending.


The fact is that in order to be able to come up with a numerical evaluation of "utility", all you need is to assume that you can (pre-)order the events you want to consider according to preference, that you can make composite events corresponding to probabilistic combinations of two events and some mathematical assumptions about this operation.I don't believe that there is an objective measurement for this system that doesn't turn the vague notion of human worth, and all the values that exist within that concept, into some very meaningless numbers. It's kind've like desire - you simply cannot quantify it, because there is no universal standard for how humans experience and characterize desire.


The assumptions of this construction are by all means open to criticism. In fact, I think some of them restrict the possible use of this construction quite considerably (if you wanted to apply it to morality in general, you would in effect have to assume that all moral dilemmas can be solved). But what you cannot do is throw your hands up and say that it's false because it's "anti-humanist"! That's a complete non-argument. If this construction fails, and it does, it's because some of its assumptions are in general unrealistic, not because it's "anti-humanist" to apply numbers to people or something.No, this is silly. I could talk about some specific economic concerns, like the address of human needs, and we could get a pretty good determination of what is worth more and maybe how we should direct production or distribution. But to apply it to human life is asinine, since there isn't the first numerical judgment which has meaning here! Just look at the responses given by AugustWest below. To put them all together in one ethics question would create a convoluted mess rife with emotional prejudice (since that is the only measurement we can use here), even if the systematic explanation of variables was laid out distinctly. And I guarantee you that when we inevitably find a strange mix of standards which put a group of 100 mostly innocent people on the chopping block against 50 other mostly innocents, we will still see the person choosing the higher numbers.


I assume you mean the way of utilitarian ethics? If so, I agree.
Not just Utilitarian, but the value judgment of X portion of life versus another portion Y.


Yes, I would choose to save the hundred.
...
I would most likely choose to run over the racist murderers,
Low-level members of Black Water corporate who insure that business is strong with basic accounting strategies?


the future mass-murderers,
As well as the majority who are innocent - is your own quantified life:death ratio less relevant than the future ratio? The point here is that the value judgment becomes modified by time, and the inevitable prejudice we have for the present (it's assumed that the group is mostly innocents, with a few mass murderes). Also, what if the issue is between Group 1 with 10 people, some of whom are pregnant or will inevitably bear children, thus "expanding" the number of humans, and Group 2 with 10 people who don't intend to have children?

Now consider this: 13 mass-murders in a group of 100 versus 1 innocent man. However, the mass-murderers all target <18 children specifically, and will not kill until after 18 years. It is assumed that they will kill around or more than 86 people, the difference of innocents between the groups here. Is defense of future humans, who currently only exist as an idea, more important than 86 lives?


and.. well the last one sure is tough... given that the group's size isn't mentioned I'd run them over and spare the geniuses.
It was supposed to say "100," but why should that matter? If you are judging by social / economic productiveness, then a million Lumpenproletarians can be considered worth less than an Einstein, given the knowledge we have. Are, say 50 Lumpens worth less alive / less deserving of life than Einstein and Beethoven, who in turn is worth less than say 100 Lumpens? Why??



This one is confusing, are you saying that my loved ones are in both groups? If so, then I'd run over the three.
Yes, since 5 of your loved ones are present, they must be in both groups.


I chose in each situation with certainty, but then again, I'm not a utilitarian.

Your attitudes are very interesting, to say the least. Perhaps the most interesting is your apparent lack of consideration - you pretty much immediately choose. And yet there are so many variable here! Just consider:
1. Number of those alive or dead
2. Amount of potential life you save in already present people
3. Number of future lives you save from mass murderers
4. Moral standing of those you save (apparently, the mild impurity of a hundred people dooms them when compared to one innocent person!)
5. Number of relatives (though you didn't choose between more or less, you made a conscious choice to doom at least 1 of them).

The point of all this is two-fold. Firstly, I want to exemplify how unclear the morality is here; there are so many value judgments and no clear guiding principles, each question is infinitely corruptible.

Secondly, I want you to really get inside the head of the conductor. For him, his own action in choosing specifically dooms people. For every second that he chooses not to do anything, he has not killed anyone. Yet, as soon as he acts, the death of whomever is unfortunate are transferred to his hand. If he switches back, he is still at fault. By choosing inaction, the horror that he witnesses is only a spectacle, he plays no part. Subsequently, he can forgo all the value judgments and tough calls that your stance suffers from. Perhaps most importantly, in reliving the terror, he experiences his past as a sad witness, perhaps impotent, but never as an active participant in the atrocity.

It is very easy to apply very specific standards to the valuations here, but they are inevitably flawed and short-sighted. But more importantly, they are totally detached from the reality that exists when you make these decisions. Preserving your own sanity and productive orientation toward society is probably much more relevant than any value judgment extracted from a complicated system of morality and numerical quantification of human life.

[Decolonize The Left]

If you can draw any boundaries you choose, instead of saying the greatest happiness of the human race, then utilitarianism isn't the only principle that breaks down. Democracy also breaks down, e.g., a lynch mob outnumbers the victim, they may vote that the victim's rights are canceled, and then use the noose. So the social boundary has to be large-scale society, and then views differ about whether that should mean nations, provinces, etc. -- but never an ad hoc group.

This is why hypothetical situations are so valuable. They cause the individual theory in question to be pressed to its limits and those proponents of said theory must confront that fact that their theory is not perfect, absolute, universal, true, etc...

It's a way to force people to be realistic about what they're talking about.


Society has to adopt rules without knowing what future contexts may arise. Society can't want to see if democracy gives the right results twenty years in the future, and, if it does, if people haven't elected a tyrant, then adopt a democratic process now. Since that's not possible, we can only say that, all other things being equal, democracy is expected to give better results than alternative methods, as far as we can estimate while not knowing what the particular issues might be. Utilitarianism is viewed similarly. If I am asked what advice I have for the people of the the future, about whether they should consider the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and I have to choose either yes or no, in complete ignorance of what controversy they will be evaluating, I would say yes.

Firstly, you contradict yourself. You begin to claim that one must make decisions without knowing the future contexts through which those decisions will reflect. You then claim that one can make said decisions based on 'expectations,' which is entirely future-oriented.

Secondly, we absolutely can make decisions based on future contexts, as we have an understanding of casual determinism and an ability to project processes into the future within our minds. For example, I remember it being warm outside when I came inside, so I will not put on my winter coat as I exit the house...

Thirdly, I'm not sure what you're arguing at this point.


I didn't suppose that my generalization was perfect when I said we need "a rule against killing." A person might try to long essay about the exceptions, but for purposes of conversation a short version with defects will ordinarily be used. In that way I will contradict myself: Yes, I'm again killing; yes, I would kill Hitler. That's how people use their language -- it's not symbolic logic.

No, it's just a poor use of language. You meant to say that you are against 'unjustified killing.' Of course, it is you who will determine what is justified and what is not...


Circumstances that aren't analogous may produce misleading conclusions. To kill Hitler, who is actively engaged in killing others, is not analogous to killing a passive person because we want to transplant their organs.

You are correct. But you said you wanted a 'rule against killing.' My example fit your rule. I never attempted to argue that all killing held the same moral weight, but it seems as though you do given that you wish to rule against it....


Most people don't use any general principle at all to determine right. If they don't like to see their neighbors living in trailers, they'll pass a zoning ordinance against living in trailers. If it irritates them that some people drink whiskey, they'll pass a law against whiskey. They feel no need to have any algorithm. As a result, people fill prisons by the hundreds of thousands for victimlesss crimes.

Ok - I agree. But you fail to ask why these people feel the way they do about folks living in trailers, or drinking whiskey, or whatever. Most likely, these people will argue that the above are wrong in some way and will attempt to justify this claim in some fashion. They will inevitably appeal to a rule of sorts.



Another problem with the way "free" countries define right is that abstract rights supercede concrete situations. If you starve to death, no crime has been committed, but if you avoid starving to death by stealing an apple from a millionaire, you have committed a crime.

Agreed.


Something is wrong with the way right is defined and implemented. In an attempt to diagnose the problem, people can "try on" various methods. Utilitarianism is one to be considered. I don't think it's a good definition of right, but it has some problem-solving usefulness.

The whole theory centers around a definition of right... If you wish to keep the practical aspects of weighing a situation for possible future scenarios then fine, but drop the utilitarian label (it means something else).

- August

[Decolonize The Left]

That's not what you said at all. Your argument was an attempt to present Utilitarianism as potential apologetics for Capitalism. My reply was to point out that Utilitarianism does not justify capitalism.

I never said it did justify capitalism, you even acknowledge that I didn't. I merely said it could be used to do so. This is not hard to understand, after all, Nietzsche was used to justify Nazi theory...


If an argument is presented that claims 'Capitalism inevitably ends up benefiting most', then the job of the utilitarian would be to show that this was not the case by citing the major unequal consideration of interests that Capitalism involves. For an utilitarianism to justify Capitalism, he would have to demonstrate that all interests are considered equally within it, which it clearly does not. So in the end, utilitarianism can only disapprove of Capitalism.

But individuals argue these points all the time - in fact, what appears to be the most pervasive belief about capitalism is that it benefits the majority of people.


Utilitarianism is universal, not relative, so therefore it cannot be applied in 'synergy or antagonistically' with anything. All that can go wrong for it are bad arguments and bad arguments do not render the consideration of interests obsolete as an ethical approach.

No moral theory is universal... this is not an argument. Not even Kant's Categorical Imperative is universal, and that was probably the closest. The first lesson of morality is that all morals are relative (because human beings create them, individual human beings, not the universe/God/one/whatever) - the question is what do you wish to do with this fact.


I chuckled at the "I have no interest in explaining to you why capitalism is bad" bit. Are you able to explain to people how Capitalism is bad?

I said this because it is childish to explain why capitalism is "bad."


A Utilitarian can: 'Capitalism is bad because the interests of a minority are given far more precedence than the interests of the majority'. Quite a strong argument in my opinion. A right-winger may then try and argue that by serving the interests of the minority, you indirectly serve the interests of the majority. But that would be analogous to saying: 'by eating animals, you serve their interests also by having to reproduce them'. But if you reject ethics, or any coherent approach to ethics [in this case utilitarianism], then you really are going to struggle when having this debate, if explaining something so straightforward as 'Capitalism is bad' is made to be so needlessly complicated.

Many problems:
1) Majority/minority is a term of quantity. According to this logic should capitalism serve 50.00000000000001% of the population's interests, then it is "good."
2) Your analogy makes no sense what-so-ever.
3) I do not reject ethics, I reject "universal" ethical theories.

- August

[Decolonize The Left]

Sorry for the wait Dean, but I needed to respond in order.


Not just Utilitarian, but the value judgment of X portion of life versus another portion Y.

Ok, I understand. I should also preface my responses to your ethical quandaries with the fact that I am not using any sort of theory/formula to answer these questions.


Low-level members of Black Water corporate who insure that business is strong with basic accounting strategies?

I am unclear as to the hypothetical situation here.


As well as the majority who are innocent - is your own quantified life:death ratio less relevant than the future ratio? The point here is that the value judgment becomes modified by time, and the inevitable prejudice we have for the present (it's assumed that the group is mostly innocents, with a few mass murderes).

I was not measuring numbers at all, simply writing down the first thing I thought I'd do as this is the situation I would find myself in should I be conducting a train at high speeds when suddenly confronted with such a scenario...


Also, what if the issue is between Group 1 with 10 people, some of whom are pregnant or will inevitably bear children, thus "expanding" the number of humans, and Group 2 with 10 people who don't intend to have children?

I'd probably run over those who do not intend to have children.


Now consider this: 13 mass-murders in a group of 100 versus 1 innocent man. However, the mass-murderers all target <18 children specifically, and will not kill until after 18 years. It is assumed that they will kill around or more than 86 people, the difference of innocents between the groups here. Is defense of future humans, who currently only exist as an idea, more important than 86 lives?

Nope, I'd probably run over the one.


It was supposed to say "100," but why should that matter? If you are judging by social / economic productiveness, then a million Lumpenproletarians can be considered worth less than an Einstein, given the knowledge we have. Are, say 50 Lumpens worth less alive / less deserving of life than Einstein and Beethoven, who in turn is worth less than say 100 Lumpens? Why??

I believe you are misunderstanding me. I am not saying that Einstein and Beethoven are "worth more" than X number of people. I am not saying they "deserve life" any more than X number of people.

You were asking me who I'd run over in a given situation and I told you. This is instinctual, not rational. Should I actually have been conducting said train, I would have no time what-so-ever to consider moral theories and ethical dilemmas - I would act.


Your attitudes are very interesting, to say the least. Perhaps the most interesting is your apparent lack of consideration - you pretty much immediately choose. And yet there are so many variable here! Just consider:
1. Number of those alive or dead
2. Amount of potential life you save in already present people
3. Number of future lives you save from mass murderers
4. Moral standing of those you save (apparently, the mild impurity of a hundred people dooms them when compared to one innocent person!)
5. Number of relatives (though you didn't choose between more or less, you made a conscious choice to doom at least 1 of them).

You are correct - I processed all that in a very short period of time.


The point of all this is two-fold. Firstly, I want to exemplify how unclear the morality is here; there are so many value judgments and no clear guiding principles, each question is infinitely corruptible.

Point taken.


Secondly, I want you to really get inside the head of the conductor. For him, his own action in choosing specifically dooms people. For every second that he chooses not to do anything, he has not killed anyone. Yet, as soon as he acts, the death of whomever is unfortunate are transferred to his hand. If he switches back, he is still at fault. By choosing inaction, the horror that he witnesses is only a spectacle, he plays no part. Subsequently, he can forgo all the value judgments and tough calls that your stance suffers from. Perhaps most importantly, in reliving the terror, he experiences his past as a sad witness, perhaps impotent, but never as an active participant in the atrocity.

I am not at fault for the train not working and placing me within a situation where I was forced to make a decision I would not want to make.

I gather that you are arguing inaction. This is problematic for several reasons:
1) Inaction is still a choice, still action. For after all, one chooses not to choose.
2) Life is active. One cannot 'see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil,' whenever one encounters problems.
3) You have assumed/posited that people are pure when they do not commit 'bad' or 'evil' or 'dangerous' or 'violent' acts. But you are what you do - if you choose to do nothing then you are nothing. But you are not nothing, you are something, hence your theory denies your existence, your life.

- August

[Ratatosk]

I don't believe that there is an objective measurement for this systemNeither do I, but not because it would be "anti-humanist".

that doesn't turn the vague notion of human worth, and all the values that exist within that concept, into some very meaningless numbers.If you believe that there is a linear ordering of different possible situation according to how desirable they are from a moral pov, and that this ordering satisfies some conditions (the desirability of a probabilistic combination of two events behaves like the weighted average of their desirabilities). The reason why the notion of such a number is problematic is because these two assumptions are unrealistic, not because it's "a totally anti-humanist stance which ignores even the basic character of human existence". That's just hand-waving.

No, this is silly. I could talk about some specific economic concerns, like the address of human needs, and we could get a pretty good determination of what is worth more and maybe how we should direct production or distribution. But to apply it to human life is asinine, since there isn't the first numerical judgment which has meaning here!Isn't that exactly the question?

Just look at the responses given by AugustWest below. To put them all together in one ethics question would create a convoluted mess rife with emotional prejudice (since that is the only measurement we can use here), even if the systematic explanation of variables was laid out distinctly. And I guarantee you that when we inevitably find a strange mix of standards which put a group of 100 mostly innocent people on the chopping block against 50 other mostly innocents, we will still see the person choosing the higher numbers.I dunno, but a standard that, other things equal, prefers to kill 100 mostly innocent people against 50 mostly innocent people is not a very reasonable one, is it?