Objective Truth

[trivas7]

The relativity of our knowledge doesn't rule out the existence of the absolute truth because objective truth is both relative and absolute.

It is absolute because it correctly reflects certain aspects of reality and relations within it; at the same time, the objective truth is relative because it never reflects reality fully and completely, and thus cannot embrace the entire content of the universe (whose truth content is inexhaustible).

Thus, although our knowledge is always relative, it is also objective and so absolute. Lenin wrote: "Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

But, what is the difference between truth and absolute truth?

And, how do you know there is such a thing as 'absolute truth' to begin with? Or even 'relative truth'?

The material you have posted is plainly dogmatic since you just assert it with no attempt to justify it. It is as if you have received it from 'on high' on tablets of stone, just like religionists claim to have.

Classic a priori dogmatics.

And then you dialectical mystics have the cheek to tell us in the next breath that you never impose your theory on reality!

By the way, I do not expect an answer to my questions. It is clear from your use of language that you have never really given this much thought, over and above believing all you have read in the Dialectical Gospels. And we already know that you "do not think about things you don't think about".

Small wonder then that I call it your opiate -- something you accept on faith because the Dialectical Prophets revealed it all to you, packaged into nice easy mantras for you to repeat, mindlessly.

[Decolonize The Left]

The relativity of our knowledge doesn't rule out the existence of the absolute truth because objective truth is both relative and absolute.

This is confusing. What's the difference between absolute truth and objective truth?


It is absolute because it correctly reflects certain aspects of reality and relations within it;

How does this make it absolute? And how is "correctly" determined?


at the same time, the objective truth is relative because it never reflects reality fully and completely, and thus cannot embrace the entire content of the universe (whose truth content is inexhaustible).

Then how is it objective? So far it seems like you have claimed that absolute truth is objective and relative, that objective truth is absolute and relative, and that truth is relative. But I fail to understand how you differentiate between these terms, how any of this is justified, or what you actually mean. I am in dire need of clarification.

- August

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

August, it's no good asking Trivas, he never answers -- he just delivers the Holy Dialectical Gospel to us undeserving materialists.

[Lynx]

Is there a relationship between truth and accuracy?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Accuracy is largely connected with measurement -- or rather it is ascertained by precise measurement --, and so it can only be used to set the parameters within which the truth or falsehood of an hypothesis or other empirical proposition is deemed to lie.

So, if a scientist has an hypothesis that an as yet unobserved object will have a mass of, say, 1.5985 x 10^12 kg +/- 0.1%, that sets the limits of accuracy [error bounds] of her predictions.

Of course, we speak about an accurate guess/prediction/description and the like, but then that is connected too with an after the event check. In that sense 'accurate' works rather like 'true', but with extra connotations connected perhaps with the detail given.

Our everyday observations about the world are not normally subject to accuracy constraints. So, if I say, for example, that the train to Manchester has just left the station, only an idiot would ask for its error bounds.

[trivas7]

This is confusing. What's the difference between absolute truth and objective truth?

Absolute truth is what is true always and forever, objective truth is truth independent, outside of, one's mind.


Then how is it objective? So far it seems like you have claimed that absolute truth is objective and relative, that objective truth is absolute and relative, and that truth is relative. But I fail to understand how you differentiate between these terms, how any of this is justified, or what you actually mean. I am in dire need of clarification.
t
Relative truth is what is true conditionally for a time. Objective I characterized above. Does that help?

[Decolonize The Left]

Absolute truth is what is true always and forever, objective truth is truth independent, outside of, one's mind.

Are absolute truth and objective truth contained within a greater truth? Are they mutually compatible? Exclusive?


Relative truth is what is true conditionally for a time. Objective I characterized above. Does that help?

Yes it does - but I am not finished questioning (see above).

- August

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas, once more: how do you know there are such things as 'absolute' and 'relative' truth?

[And, what is the difference between truth and 'objective' truth?]

That is, apart from your having found these timeless verities themselves in the Dialectical Gospels.

And thanks for proving yet again that you "do not think about things you don't think about".

---------------------

August, my apologies to you for saying that the Holy One here would not answer your questions; he obviously only avoids my queries because I do not respect him as The Prophet sent from the Gods of the Sacred Dialectic to enlighten ignorant humankind, and with great disrespect ask him blasphemous things he cannot answer.

[trivas7]

Are absolute truth and objective truth contained within a greater truth? Are they mutually compatible? Exclusive?

Truth is knowledge of an object or phenomenon which corresponds to reality, reflects an actual state of affairs. As it corresponds to reality, true knowledge "does not depend either on a human being or on humanity..." IOW, true knowledge is determined by the outside world which exists objectively, independent of us.

Absolute and relative truth are different way of talking re the same objective truth. They are dialectically related, insofar as relative truth becomes absolute.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ah, I was right. My lack of respect for the Gospel According to Trivas means I am verbote!

Either that, or St Trivas the Divine here does not know the answer to my basphemous questions.

[Black Sheep]

I would make a distinction, dividing "objective truth" to humanitarian (or something) objective truth, and universal objective truth.

Since humans are too imperfect (hitherto) to be able to understand or know THE (universal) objective truth.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Mauroprovatos, how do you know that there is such a thing as 'objective truth' to begin with?

And what is the difference between 'objective truth' and ordinary truth?

I tried to ask Trivas, but he is sulking.

[Decolonize The Left]

Truth is knowledge of an object or phenomenon which corresponds to reality, reflects an actual state of affairs.

Then what is knowledge? As far as I understand, within the domain of epistemology "knowledge" has as a fundamental condition - "truth" (the other two conditions are belief and justification). So if epistemology is correct, how could "truth be knowledge of an object or phenomenon which corresponds to reality?" To say that one "knows" something is already to say that such a thing is true...


As it corresponds to reality, true knowledge "does not depend either on a human being or on humanity..." IOW, true knowledge is determined by the outside world which exists objectively, independent of us.

How can "knowledge" (which is dependent upon their being a subject/person/brain to "know") 'depend neither upon a human being or on humanity?'


Absolute and relative truth are different way of talking re the same objective truth. They are dialectically related, insofar as relative truth becomes absolute.

But in this case wouldn't the "absolute truth" be synonymous with the "objective truth" and the "relative truth"? And if all these are the same, why differentiate?

- August

[apathy maybe]

The relativity of our knowledge doesn't rule out the existence of the absolute truth because objective truth is both relative and absolute.

It is absolute because it correctly reflects certain aspects of reality and relations within it; at the same time, the objective truth is relative because it never reflects reality fully and completely, and thus cannot embrace the entire content of the universe (whose truth content is inexhaustible).

Thus, although our knowledge is always relative, it is also objective and so absolute. Lenin wrote: "Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge."
To ignore all the other discussion that has happened in the thread, here are my thoughts on the matter.

First, what is truth? What, you can't answer that without relating it to human existence? Then there is no objective truth. (By the way, Plato was full of shit.)

Second, while I personally think that there is an "objective reality" as such, it is pointless discussing it, because we can never access it. Our perceptions of the world and the universe are affected not just by our experiences, values and so on, but by more obvious biological factors, such as if we can see well (or at all), and so on.

Anyway, I'm not even sure if I addressed what I quoted, possibly because what I quoted doesn't even make sense.

Did I mention that Plato was full of shit? (And in this case, it seems, so is Lenin.)

[trivas7]

Then what is knowledge? As far as I understand, within the domain of epistemology "knowledge" has as a fundamental condition - "truth" (the other two conditions are belief and justification). So if epistemology is correct, how could "truth be knowledge of an object or phenomenon which corresponds to reality?" To say that one "knows" something is already to say that such a thing is true...

The correspondence theory of truth (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correspondence_theory_of_truth) is that something mental corresponds or reflects objective reality. Truth is the mental grasp of some aspect of reality. IOW, truth is in the mind, not in the object.


How can "knowledge" (which is dependent upon their being a subject/person/brain to "know") 'depend neither upon a human being or on humanity?'
Because reality is independent of anyone's mind. Matter, whatever is known, exists objectively, independent of anyone's consciousness.


But in this case wouldn't the "absolute truth" be synonymous with the "objective truth" and the "relative truth"? And if all these are the same, why differentiate?
Yes, all truth is one, qualifying it as absolute or relative are just ways of helping us understand it better or looking at it from another angle. Often in the sciences different terms refer to the same thing.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


is that something mental corresponds or reflects objective reality.

And how could we/you know that if we/you cannot access 'objective reality' independently of thought/language?


Truth is the mental grasp of some aspect of reality. IOW, truth is in the mind, not in the object.

If so, there can be no 'objective truth' -- which you have failed to show exists anyway.

And if: "Truth is the mental grasp of some aspect of reality" how could we ever know this if we cannot experience the world independently of our attempt to do so?

We cannot put this down to 'practice' either, since the results of practice are subject to the same contraints.


Because reality is independent of anyone's mind. Matter, whatever is known, exists objectively, independent of anyone's consciousness.

But, if this it true, then that truth is confined to your own mind. So, how do you know this relates to 'objective reality'?


Yes, all truth is one,

How do you know this? To what does it 'correspond'?


qualifying it as absolute or relative are just ways of helping us understand it better or looking at it from another angle. Often in the sciences different terms refer to the same thing.

But, by your own words, this 'same thing' is trapped inside your mind. So, how can anyone tell if they have the same notion of 'truth' as you?

By the way, I don't expect you to answer the above since you are still sulking.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

AM:


Second, while I personally think that there is an "objective reality" as such, it is pointless discussing it, because we can never access it. Our perceptions of the world and the universe are affected not just by our experiences, values and so on, but by more obvious biological factors, such as if we can see well (or at all), and so on.

Well, you seem to be giving us an objective fact about objective reality. If so, you at least seem to have "access" to this objective fact.

And if so, there seems to be no good reason to accept your declaration that we can never "access" it -- for, if you are right then we can "access" it; on the other hand if you are wrong, we can anyway.

Which just goes to show that Kant was right: when we try to do metaphysics, us humans just talk gibberish.

[apathy maybe]

AM:
Well, you seem to be giving us an objective fact about objective reality. If so, you at least seem to have "access" to this objective fact.

If so, there seems to be no good reason to accept your declaration that we can never "access" it -- for, if you are right then we can "access" it; on the other hand if you are wrong we can anyway.

Which just goes to show that Kant was right: when we try to do metaphysics, us humans just talk gibberish.
Heh, I had a feeling you would comment on my post. I didn't give an "objective fact", I gave an opinion, something quite different.
As for Kant, I can't (and that is a totally unintentional pun, which I'll leave because it amuses me) claim to have read anything by that author. But assuming the most commonest definitions of "metaphysics", it is mostly gibberish. (And I would have to question what other beings can talk about it without talking "gibberish".)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

AM now:


I didn't give an "objective fact", I gave an opinion, something quite different.

AM earlier:


because we can never access it.

Looks pretty final to me.

How is this not your attempt to state an 'objective fact' about 'objective reality'?


As for Kant, I can't (and that is a totally unintentional pun, which I'll leave because it amuses me) claim to have read anything by that author. But assuming the most commonest definitions of "metaphysics", it is mostly gibberish. (And I would have to question what other beings can talk about it without talking "gibberish".)

Your not having read Kant just about says it all.

[RebelDog]

How can the universe exist without objective reality/truth? Surely the laws on what is possible in this universe are objective reality and they can be observed, studied and understood by humans. There are things we can all agree on because we are all constrained to by our existence in the same universe.

[trivas7]

How can the universe exist without objective reality/truth? Surely the laws on what is possible in this universe are objective reality and they can be observed, studied and understood by humans. There are things we can all agree on because we are all constrained to by our existence in the same universe.
Almost. Phenomena are the objective reality that the laws describe. The Marxist method is from phenomena to theory and back to phenomena/practice.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Phenomena are the objective reality that the laws describe.

And what is the difference between 'objective reality' and ordinary reality?

And how do you know that "Phenomena are the objective reality that the laws describe"?

Been reading those sacred tablets again?:lol:

Once more: By the way, I don't expect you to answer the above since you are still sulking.

[ships-cat]

This is a linguistic swamp as much as a phillisophical one. My (rather dim) understanding is that the original meaning of "truth" reflected the intentions of the speaker, not the surrounding "objective" reality. Hence if I say that Kippers are made out of Cheese, then I am telling the "truth"... provided that I genuinly believed this at the time I said it .

The term has more commonly been used to mean "correct" .. in the sense of an objective reality. (or at least, a commonly agreed perception).

Either way, the term 'relative truth' is flirting with being an oxymoron, and the term 'absolute truth' flirting with being a redundancy. (and on a side-note: the term "objective reality" is also a redundancy: either it is a reality, or it is a fantasy).

It's very difficult to use language to analyse the meaning of language... it's a bit like trying to use a microscope to look at itself.

< wanders off to make a Cheese and Kipper sandwhich >

Meow Purr :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

But, in that case we would not be able to distinguish between telling the truth and what is indeed true (or indeed false). And that in turn means we would never have good reason to change our beliefs.

[ships-cat]

That is true Rosa Lichtenstein... for a given value of "truth".

Meow Purr :)

[Dean]

Truth exists as a mode of human understanding. As such, it can only be subjective. There is objective reality (conceivably) but for something to be true or false, it must exist as a dynamic in the mind.

[Dean]

But, in that case we would not be able to distinguish between telling the truth and what is indeed true (or indeed false). And that in turn means we would never have good reason to change our beliefs.

This isn't true, by nature of the fact that the compulsion to change our ideas is not only tied up with our concept of truth. Also, if you use the term that reductively[sic] you are defeating its meaning.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SC:


for a given value of "truth".

You mean 'for a given meaning of "truth"', I presume.

But then, the word "truth" has many uses, so this is not surprising.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dean:


This isn't true, by nature of the fact that the compulsion to change our ideas is not only tied up with our concept of truth. Also, if you use the term that reductively[sic] you are defeating its meaning.

Why do you use the word 'compulsion' here? You make it sound like a psychological disorder.

And where did I deny that our propensity to adjust our beliefs is tied up with our concept of truth?

All I said was:


But, in that case we would not be able to distinguish between telling the truth and what is indeed true (or indeed false). And that in turn means we would never have good reason to change our beliefs.

Which was aimed at SC's narrow use of this term, not at every conceivable use of it.

And where have I used it 'reductively'?

I have not 'reduced' truth to anything, nor would I.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dean:


Truth exists as a mode of human understanding. As such, it can only be subjective. There is objective reality (conceivably) but for something to be true or false, it must exist as a dynamic in the mind.

Now, that is a good example of 'reductionism'.

Anyway, if "Truth exists as a mode of human understanding" then you would not be able to distinguish true from false beliefs, and you would be in the same predicament as SC.

And, what do you mean by 'objective reality'?

Moreover, if what you say about 'objective reality' is merely subjective (which it must be according to what you have posted), then it cannot be objective reality, can it?

[Dean]

Dean:



Now, that is a good example of 'reductionism'.
Right, but not reductionist to the point that the term is unusable.


Anyway, if "Truth exists as a mode of human understanding" then you would not be able to distinguish true from false beliefs, and you would be in the same predicament as SC.
Objectively, you're correct. Subjectively, however, truth and falsity are often very distinct and useful.


And, what do you mean by 'objective reality'?
That which truth aspires to as an ideal. What is.


Moreover, if what you say about 'objective reality' is merely subjective (which it must be according to what you have posted), then it cannot be objective reality, can it?

I said only the following of objective reality:

There is objective reality (conceivably)
And as such, all I have said is that one can conceive of a reality which is not shaped by the mind (objective). One's concept of reality cannot be objective, and I never indicated that we could describe objective fact.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dean:


Right, but not reductionist to the point that the term is unusable

Well, that remains to be seen; the signs are not too good, however.


Objectively, you're correct. Subjectively, however, truth and falsity are often very distinct and useful.

So you say, but how do you know that you can and do recall from day to day your own 'subjective' ideas about this alleged distinction?


That which truth aspires to as an ideal.

But, how do you know that what it allegedly 'aspires to' actually exists for it to aspire to.

In fact, you can't since you are trapped in a subjective bubble.

Indeed, all you have is one set of subjective ideas 'aspiring to' another set of subjective ideas.

'Objective reality' thus evaporates.


What is.

But you cannot even say this, except subjectively. So, we still do not know what 'objective reality' is.


There is objective reality (conceivably)

This just means that you have conceded the point. Given your subjectivism, 'objective reality' cannot be distinguished from subjective make-believe.


And as such, all I have said is that one can conceive of a reality which is not shaped by the mind (objective). One's concept of reality cannot be objective, and I never indicated that we could describe objective fact.

But, when you try to fill in the details, this "reality which is not shaped by the mind" turns out to be shaped by the mind, and worse, that you cannot distinguish 'subjective reality' from 'objective reality'.

Indeed, you do concede the point:


One's concept of reality cannot be objective, and I never indicated that we could describe objective fact

So, we still do not know what 'objective reality' is for you.

And I suspect you do not either.

[ships-cat]

Confusion and disorder reign ! :crying:

Nobody is sure of anything any more :o

My mission here is complete :D

Meow <teleport> Purr

[trivas7]

And what is the difference between 'objective reality' and ordinary reality?

I didn't mean to imply there's a difference, but often different disciplines speak of things from different angles.


And how do you know that "Phenomena are the objective reality that the laws describe"?

How do you know anything? Are you arguing that phenomena aren't objective?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SC:


Nobody is sure of anything any more

Not so; my aim was merely to show that your idea, and those of Dean's could not work.

On this see the thread on 'Certainty':

http://www.revleft.com/vb/certain-t70369/index.html

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


I didn't mean to imply there's a difference, but often different disciplines speak of things from different angles.

How does that obscure metaphor help here?

In fact, the 'different angles' trope make this distinction look entirely subjective, which is rather an odd thing to have to happen to one's attempt to tell us about 'objective' reality.


How do you know anything? Are you arguing that phenomena aren't objective?

It is not a question of what I do or do not know, or even how I know one or both, since, unlike you, I am not trying to reveal sacred truths to eagerly waiting humanity.

You are the one who posts dogmatic pronouncements like this, so you should be expected to explain how you know they are true, and not deflect attention on to what or how I know anything.

Now, if you were a minor deity of some sort, we could accept your word, and nod sagely at the Empyrean Verities you have kindly delivered to us benighted souls, but since I do not think you are a divine being, we are going to need a little more than your say so here.


Are you arguing that phenomena aren't objective?

I am not arguing anything; I am just asking how you know the things you claim to know.

Now, if you don't know these things, and have merely accepted them on faith, or if (as I suspect) you just made them up to make yourself look/sound profound, then you are indeed the dogmatist I have been alleging all along.

[trivas7]

I am not arguing anything; I am just asking how you know the things you claim to know.

Now, if you don't know these things, and have merely accepted them on faith, or if (as I suspect) you just made them up to make yourself look/sound profound, then you are indeed the dogmatist I have been alleging all along.
For the Marxist practice is the touchstone or criteria of truth, but frankly I have no idea how I know the things I claim to know -- I suspect the same is true for you. Such meta-theorizing is purely a philosopher's game and best left to the brain scientist.

You seem to believe that dogmatic pronouncements are somehow an alternative to knowledge, my view is that all knowledge is in some sense "just made up".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


For the Marxist practice is the touchstone or criteria of truth, but frankly I have no idea how I know the things I claim to know -- I suspect the same is true for you. Such meta-theorizing is purely a philosopher's game and best left to the brain scientist

Practice, unfortunately, cannot discriminate between good and bad theories, or between truth and error.

And here is why (this is taken from Essay Ten at my site; links and references can be found in that Essay):


As we have seen, dialecticians appeal to practice as their most important criterion of truth. But we will soon discover that, as far as DIM is concerned, not only is past practice best wiped from memory (since it has delivered little else but long-term failure), on-going practice is thoroughly depressing, at best. And the prospects of future practice are about as reassuring as a confirmed drug addict's promises to quit.

[PMT = Pragmatic Theory of Truth; COT = Coherence Theory of Truth; CTT = Correspondence Theory of Truth; DIM = Dialectical Marxism/Marxist.]

Nevertheless, a reliance on practice means that DM-epistemology has inherited many of the weaknesses of the PMT. In fact, is possible to show that the PMT collapses into the CTT, which in turn depends on the COT. And, as is well-known, the COT has always enjoyed a close, if not unhealthily incestuous relationship with Idealism.

Moreover, the idea that truth is confirmed in practice is dependent on the CTT, not the other way round.

This is because, if a theory, T, predicts that for some sentence "S" expressing a prediction P of T, and practice brings it about that what S says actually occurs, then in order to judge that P is indeed the case, P would have to be compared with relevant changes in reality. Manifestly, no one would try to guess whether S was true (i.e., that P was correct); and there is no way that more practice could confirm that S was indeed the case. So, the confirmation of the results of practice is dependent on correspondence relations, not the other way round.

To give a concrete example: if, say, party RR sets out to help win a strike by, among other things, mounting a series of meetings, distributing leaflets, organising marches, making collections, widening the dispute, advocating active picketing, and so on (on the basis of revolutionary theory predicting that one or more of these will win that strike) -- and that strike was won as a result --, the fact that those predictions had been successful could not itself be confirmed by yet more practice.

[Here "S" would be something like "Workers at the NN plant demand a 10% rise in wages and a 35 hour week, and party RR advocates the following: The strike at NN will only be won if we argue for public meetings, extensive leaflet distribution, well-supported marches, work-place and public collections, a widening of the dispute drawing in other workers, involving the surrounding community, active mass picketing...".]

A successful outcome would be clear from the way that the world had changed in line with earlier expectations (i.e., if the said workers received the 10% pay award and the 35 hour week). But who in their left mind would try to ascertain this by having another march, or holding more collections? In that case, practice cannot serve as a fundamental test of truth.

Of course, the above example is rather simplistic, but it was deliberately chosen to illustrate the point that even if practice were a criterion of truth, it would still be parasitic on the CTT. So, for instance, if party RR at some point in the future puts together a strategy to win a revolution (as and when that revolution was unfolding), and it was won successfully as a result, nobody still in command of their senses would think to confirm that the said revolution had actually been won by staging more practice --, such as another revolution!

Despite this, it is worth noting that practice is not a guarantor of truth anyway. Incorrect theories often make successful (practical and theoretical) predictions -- as, for example, Ptolemy's system did for many centuries. In fact, the allegedly superior Copernican system was no more accurate than the older theory had been. Indeed, Ptolemy's system was refined progressively in line with observation for over a thousand years, and it became more accurate as a result. Despite that, it was no nearer to what we might now regard as the 'truth'.

And, correct theories can sometimes fail, and they can do so for many years. For instance, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which was not observed until 1838 with the work of Friedrich Bessel, three hundred years after Copernicus's book was published.

Similarly, Darwin's theory of descent through modification made predictions that were at variance with patently obvious facts: the persistence of inherited variations. The latter were inconsistent with Darwin's own "blending"* theory of transmission. Given Darwin's account, new and advantageous variations should be blended out of a breeding population, not preserved or enhanced. It was not until the advent of genetically-based* theories of inheritance forty or so years later that Darwin's theory became viable.

Moreover, this new synthetic theory did not achieve success by preserving anything from the old blending theory (and, because of that fact, this defunct theory cannot be seen as an approximation to the 'truth', toward which later developments more closely inched this theory). Indeed, because of the difficulties his ideas faced, Darwin found he had to incorporate Lamarckian* concepts into later editions his classic book in order to rescue his theory. Hence, in the period between, say, 1865 and 1900 there were good reasons to reject Darwinism (as many serious biologists did). This means that the development of the most successful theory of the 19th century (and one of the most successful ever) actually contradicts the DM-account of truth, by making incorrect predictions. [*Links below.]

In addition, the elements that early Darwinists edited into or out of their theory did not move what was left of his theory closer to the 'truth', either. In fact, these changes achieved the opposite effect, since they relied on Lamarckian principles. Even worse, as Darwin himself noted, his theory was contradicted by (and is still contradicted by, and might always remain contradicted by) the fossil record. This massive obstacle is still largely ignored, downplayed, re-interpreted, or explained-away by Darwinians. The fact that 'orthodox' neo-Darwinism is probably incorrect however has not stopped Marxists of almost every stripe from hailing it as if it were the biological equivalent of the Holy Grail.

Furthermore, some theories can make both successful and unsuccessful predictions. Consider the 'contradictions' between Newtonian Physics and observation -- those that prompted both the discovery of Neptune and the 'non-discovery' of the planet Vulcan:


"The arguments which terminate in an hypothesis's positing the existence of some trans-Uranic object, the planet Neptune, and the structurally identical arguments which forced Leverrier to urge the existence of an intra-Mercurial planet, the planet 'Vulcan', to explain the precessional aberrations of our 'innermost' solar system neighbour are formally one and the same. They run: (1) Newtonian mechanics is true; (2) Newtonian mechanics requires planet P to move in exactly this manner, x, y, z, …; (3) but P does not move à la x, y, z; (4) so either (a) there exists some as-yet-unobserved object, o, or (b) Newtonian mechanics is false. (5) 4b) contradicts 1) so 4a) is true -- there exists some as-yet-undetected body which will put everything right again between observation and theory. The variable 'o' took the value 'Neptune' in the former case; it took the value 'Vulcan' in the latter case. And these insertions constituted the zenith and the nadir of classical celestial mechanics, for Neptune does exist, whereas Vulcan does not." [Hanson (1970), p.257.]

[More details in Hanson (1962). There are many other examples like this in the history of science. This claim will be documented more fully in a later Essay.]

It could be objected to this that these examples clearly ignore wider and/or longer-term issues. In the first case, the Ptolemaic system was finally abandoned because it proved inferior to its rivals in the long run. The same applies to Darwin's theory, which when combined with Mendelian genetics, is closer to the truth, something that is also true of Newtonian Physics, which has been superseded by the TOR.

[TOR = Theory of Relativity.]

All this is undeniable, but the above response is unfortunately double-edged: if it is only in the long run that we may determine whether or not a theory as successful, then that theory might never be so judged.

As we saw in Essay Three Part Two (summarised above), this is because future contingencies could always arise to refute that theory -- no matter how well it might once have seemed to 'work'. In fact, if history is anything to go by, this has been the fate of the vast majority of previous theories. Even though most, if not all, at one time 'worked', or were well-supported, the overwhelming majority were later abandoned. As Stanford notes:


"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl's phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology; from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories; from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease; from 18th Century corpuscular theories of light to 19th Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from Hippocrates's pangenesis to Darwin's blending theory of inheritance (and his own 'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to Wiesmann's germ-plasm theory and Mendelian and contemporary molecular genetics; from Cuvier's theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species or Lamarck's autogenesis to Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]

[See also Stanford (2000, 2003, 2006).]

So, if anything, practice shows that practice is unreliable!

Furthermore, if it is only in the long run that superior theories win out, or can be seen to be superior, then for most of the time inferior theories could make (and have made) successful predictions. In that case, we would have no way of telling the good from the bogus for most of the time.

The above observations apply equally well to dialectics. If dialectical Marxists have to wait for the revolutionary overthrow of Capitalism before they know whether their theory is correct, then they might not only have a long time to wait, they could find that Marx's caveat (reproduced below) in the end refutes everything (i.e., everything but that anti-deterministic pronouncement itself). Clearly, Marx and Engels would not have put this passage in the Communist Manifesto if practice always determined truth, and correct theories invariably worked -- whatever they might appear to have said elsewhere:


"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes." [Marx and Engels (1968b), pp.35-36. Bold emphasis added.]

Anyway, such long-term promissory notes cannot tell us today whether 'Materialist Dialectics' is now correct. Indeed, as noted earlier, this is one of the main weaknesses of pragmatic criteria: they are projective, not merely assertoric.

Furthermore, an appeal to the "closer approximation" of a particular theory to the truth would be to no avail (or, at least, of no help to fans of the 'dialectic'); as we have seen throughout this site, in this respect DM is not even in the running. This is partly because its own precepts condemn its adherents (and humanity) to infinite ignorance (on this, see below), and partly because its core theses make not one ounce of sense (on that see Essays Two through Eleven).

Of course, speculation about the length of humanity's sojourn in DM-inspired 'epistemological limbo' is a separate matter. The whole point of the exercise had been to use practice as a crucial test of the truth of theory. It is not now to the point to appeal to yet more theory (i.e., "approximation to the truth") to bail out the practice.

Part of the problem with this sort of alethic consequentialism is that conditions and circumstances change -- a fact which dialecticians would be the first to acknowledge. But, this minimal point of agreement only serves to weaken their case, for if they continue to pin their hopes on outcomes alone to vindicate their theory, then, as noted above, it might never be judged correct. Indeed, the opposite could turn out to be the case, especially if events unfold in unexpected ways -- a denouement clearly allowed for by Marx and Engels, as noted above, too.

Naturally, in such circumstances, an appeal would have to be made to mitigating factors to save the theory from any awkward facts that might emerge -- as Marxists in general do to explain the long-term failure of DIM.

But, if such additional (possibly theoretical) principles have to be deployed to reinterpret each and every apparently refuting outcome -- in order to explain why the latter do not actually disconfirm the theory, but 'conform' to it -- then pragmatic criteria are clearly irrelevant.

Now, there is nothing at all wrong with such claims -- except that the more of these there are the more it becomes apparent that pragmatic criteria are no use at all.

And this fact should be apparent even to hard-nosed Bolsheviks, if they but thought about their own practice with respect to practice. There seems to be little point in appealing to practice if the results have to be constantly reinterpreted when outcomes fall short of expectations -- as they almost invariably seem to do for us Marxists.

Indeed, when confronted with the glaring and long-term failure of DIM, dialecticians do just this -- they deny that it has been tested in practice and thus shown to fail, promptly appealing to "objective factors" to account for its long and sorry record. On the other hand, the few successes DIM has witnessed they happily attribute to 'Materialist Dialectics'. In that case, practice can only ever win: it is never used to account for failure, only success. Hence, practice and the theory that inspired it need never be altered, since they can never fail. And so this sorry theory staggers on through yet another half-century of defeat.

Once more, the reason for saying this is that pragmatic theories are eternal hostages to fortune. Because of that, those who appeal to practice as a test of truth should feign no surprise when future contingencies fail to match repeatedly dashed expectations.

More details here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20010_01.htm

So, in view of the fact that Dialectical Marxism has been such a long-term failure, practice has indeed refuted dialectics.


You seem to believe that dogmatic pronouncements are somehow an alternative to knowledge, my view is that all knowledge is in some sense "just made up".

Well, dialectics is 'made up' but genuine science and knowledge isn't.

And I do not think "dogmatic pronouncements are somehow an alternative to knowledge". Where on earth did you get that idea?

On the contrary, you seem to think they constitute knowledge, which is why you are a dogmatist.

[al8]

Rosa, from this segment of your self-quote;


Even worse, as Darwin himself noted, his theory was contradicted by (and is still contradicted by, and might always remain contradicted by) the fossil record.

Do you have some evidence or explanation of this?

[trivas7]

Practice, unfortunately, cannot discriminate between good and bad theories, or between truth and error.

I see. Then -- without all the verbiage -- what discriminates between good and bad theories/truth or error if not practice? ("Commitment to ideas" perhaps?)


And I do not think "dogmatic pronouncements are somehow an alternative to knowledge". Where on earth did you get that idea?

On the contrary, you seem to think they constitute knowledge, which is why you are a dogmatist.You keep accusing me of this yet I have no idea why. I suspect it's because you tend to project your curious Wittgensteinian predilections onto others and fear that, in truth, you yourself are the dogmatist. If you really thought I was spouting sacred truth why would you not simply ignore me?

[Dean]

So you say, but how do you know that you can and do recall from day to day your own 'subjective' ideas about this alleged distinction?
Memory serves as what proof? Consistency? What, in turn, is that useful for in regards to this discussion?




But, how do you know that what it allegedly 'aspires to' actually exists for it to aspire to.

In fact, you can't since you are trapped in a subjective bubble.

Indeed, all you have is one set of subjective ideas 'aspiring to' another set of subjective ideas.

'Objective reality' thus evaporates.
You don't know that objective reality exists. That's why I said "conceivably." I would guess from my sensory perception that there is a fact which is not exclusive to me, but I cannot be sure.




But you cannot even say this, except subjectively. So, we still do not know what 'objective reality' is.
No, I think it is clear. I am describing how a term is used, I am not describing any inalienable traits of reality.




This just means that you have conceded the point. Given your subjectivism, 'objective reality' cannot be distinguished from subjective make-believe.
No, from the start I said that my idea is based purely on my own - necessarily subjective - understanding. And it would be mystical to believe in an objective reality, but this is precisely why I am not opposed to emotive decision-making and logic.


But, when you try to fill in the details, this "reality which is not shaped by the mind" turns out to be shaped by the mind, and worse, that you cannot distinguish 'subjective reality' from 'objective reality'.
Not at all. There is no reason to believe, even if we were to conclude that the reality I talk of is exclusive to me, that it was my mind that shaped it. That is quite a leap.


So, we still do not know what 'objective reality' is for you.

And I suspect you do not either.
You may not know, but I actually have a pretty firm concept of it - and from my past discussions with others on subjectivism and objectivism, I think my understanding is shared by others. This, again, is why I support a more fluid, emotional theory rather than a dead, purely numerical one.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


I see. Then -- without all the verbiage -- what discriminates between good and bad theories/truth or error if not practice? ("Commitment to ideas" perhaps?)

Several things do, but practice isn't one of them (as you would know if you actually read something that challenged your dogmatic beliefs, for a change -- such as my posts).

You are the sort of person who, in the 1860s would have said something like: "Then -- without all the verbiage -- what condems capitalism to go into continual crises if not inflation, Herr Marx?"

If you can't be bothered to read challenging material, bog off to another board --, or, of course, stay ignorant.


You keep accusing me of this yet I have no idea why. I suspect it's because you tend to project your curious Wittgensteinian predilections onto others and fear that, in truth, you yourself are the dogmatist. If you really thought I was spouting sacred truth why would you not simply ignore me?

Now, I have demonstrated that you are the dogmatist here, by showing that you hold onto beliefs you cannot defend, or justify, with argument or evidence, which you accept just because you read them in the Dialectical Holy Books.

In what way then am I a 'dogmatist'?


If you really thought I was spouting sacred truth why would you not simply ignore me?

1) I came to this board nearly three years ago with the express intention of making life difficult for you mystics -- as I have told you several times.

So, if you post mystical and/or dogmatic gobbledygook here, I will demolish it, every time, without fail, ruthlessly, endlessly and aggressively.

Get used to it or don't.

2) If you want to post quasi-religious dogma, then I suggest you do so here:

http://worldwidechristiansonline.co.uk/

Or in OI/Religion.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dean:


Memory serves as what proof? Consistency? What, in turn, is that useful for in regards to this discussion?

Well, whatever else memory does, it is all you have to go on. So, how do you know that you mean the same by 'subjective' or even 'objective' from one day to the next?


You don't know that objective reality exists.

But, as you will see from this thread, I have been asking comrades what this term means. So, it is not so much that I do or do not know that "objective reality" exists, as the fact I do not know what the term "objective" means. So, my challenge is far more radical than merely questioning its 'existence'.


That's why I said "conceivably." I would guess from my sensory perception that there is a fact which is not exclusive to me, but I cannot be sure.

Unless you can say what it is you are trying to 'conceive', then for all you know you might be talking about coffee grinders.

And you can't know, either, for all you have is one 'subjective' idea to compare with another 'subjective' idea.

As I noted you are trapped in a 'subjective' bubble.


No, I think it is clear. I am describing how a term is used, I am not describing any inalienable traits of reality.

But, and on the contrary, all you are describing is your subjective view of how this word is used, and even worse, as you have subjectively characterised it.

You are still trapped in that bubble.


No, from the start I said that my idea is based purely on my own - necessarily subjective - understanding. And it would be mystical to believe in an objective reality, but this is precisely why I am not opposed to emotive decision-making and logic

As the above confirms.


Not at all. There is no reason to believe, even if we were to conclude that the reality I talk of is exclusive to me, that it was my mind that shaped it. That is quite a leap.

But, you have already admitted this: that all you have to offer are subjective opinions, even about 'reality'. So, the 'reality' you conceive of is, on your own admission, the product of your mind.


You may not know, but I actually have a pretty firm concept of it - and from my past discussions with others on subjectivism and objectivism, I think my understanding is shared by others. This, again, is why I support a more fluid, emotional theory rather than a dead, purely numerical one.

Or so your subjective 'memory' tells you. But we now know that all this is a product of your own imagination.

Still in that bubble, then...

[trivas7]

Several things do, but practice isn't one of them

Again, please name one of those things which discriminates between good and bad theories/truth or error (if you can).


So, if you post mystical and/or dogmatic gobbledygook here, I will demolish it, every time, without fail, ruthlessly, endlessly and aggressively.

Get used to it or don't.

Okay. Yes (but you still don't tell me why you think I'm a mystic, what constitutes dogmatic gobbledygook, etc., so I take my own counsel re this...). :p

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Again, please name one of those things which discriminates between good and bad theories/truth or error (if you can).

Internal consistency, correspondence with reality, ability to solve more problems, theoretical simplicity...

You need to read some philosophy of science.

You should in fact welcome this, for practice has refuted your mystical 'theory'. That suggests you should stop appealing to it.


Okay. Yes (but you still don't tell me why you think I'm a mystic, what constitutes dogmatic gobbledygook, etc., so I take my own counsel re this...).

Fine, say ignorant (I have actually told you, but like Gilhyle, you refuse to read stuff you do not like, and then complain that I have not told you).

[trivas7]

Internal consistency, correspondence with reality, ability to solve more problems, theoretical simplicity...

Yes, these are the methods bourgeois idealists use...:rolleyes:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Yes, these are the methods bourgeois idealists use...

Not so; Marxists have to use them, too, since their criterion ('tested in practice') does not work --, or if it does work, then practice has refuted Dialectical Marxism.

[trivas7]

Marxism has its own method of acquiring knowledge. The Marxist method is to go from the concrete to the abstract and back to the concrete. This is the dialectical method used in Capital.


Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided that it is correct (NB) (and Kant, like all philosophers, speaks of correct thought) -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly, and completely. From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice -- such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality.
-- Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks, 16

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ah, yet more dogmatics! Passages from the New Testament next, I presume?

But, unfortunately, this contradicts Lenin's other dogmatic assertion that truth is always concrete:


"[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth' is always concrete, never abstract…." [Lenin (1921), p.93.]

Lenin, V. (1921), 'Once Again On The Trade Unions, The Current Situation And The Mistakes Of Comrades Trotsky And Bukharin', reprinted in Lenin (1980), pp.70-106.

--------, (1980), On The Question Of Dialectics (Progress Publishers).

Copy available here:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1921/jan/25.htm

And yet, this cannot be correct either for that statement is abstract too.

In that case, if the statement that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract' is itself true, then it is false, since it is abstract, not concrete.

Has a single dialectical mystic noticed this glaring error in Lenin's 'theory'?

Are you joking! They are too bust trying not to "think about things they do not think about", like Trivas here.

[trivas7]

Lenin held a dialectical materialist, not a dogmatic, view of things. Truth is neither abstract nor concrete. Materialist dialectics tells us that there is a unity in the opposites of philosophical categories like the abstract and the concrete. Read Marx's Capital to see how it works.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Lenin held a dialectical materialist, not a dogmatic, view of things. Truth is neither abstract nor concrete. Materialist dialectics tells us that there is a unity in the opposites of philosophical categories like the abstract and the concrete. Read Marx's Capital to see how it works.

And yet, just like Engels and Hegel, he kept coming out with all these dogmatic statements. Odd that...

Unfortunately, for you, Lenin said "'truth' is always concrete, never abstract."

Alas, there is no 'unity of opposites' here.

So, which is correct? Is truth 'concrete', or abstract? Lenin seemed to believe both and neither.

Don't tell me you haven't given this any thought either!

Moreover, it's no use directing me to Das Kapital since we have already established that Marx abandoned this sort of talk in that book.

Moreover, this looks pretty dogmatic, too:


Materialist dialectics tells us that there is a unity in the opposites of philosophical categories like the abstract and the concrete.

And, good little dogmatist that you are, you swallowed this guff without a murmur, didn't you?

[trivas7]

Quoting one-liners out of context in no way establishes Lenin's philosophic bona fiides. Next you're going to try to convince me that Lenin thought himself the socialist Pope :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Quoting one-liners out of context in no way establishes Lenin's philosophic bona fiides. Next you're going to try to convince me that Lenin thought himself the socialist Pope

1) Dialecticians are always quoting this passage, and as a single liner 'out of context', too.

2) This quote appears in a published work, unlike the one you quoted (also 'out of context').

3) Lenin is quite clear in this passage (and he is in fact quoting Hegel -- but is Lenin's quote 'out of context', too?): "truth is always concrete, never abstract."

So, what did Lenin mean if his plain words do not actually mean what they say they mean?

4) Here is the context:


The reader will see that Bukharin’s example was meant to give me a popular explanation of the harm of one-track thinking. I accept it with gratitude, and in the one-good turn-deserves-another spirit offer a popular explanation of the difference between dialectics and eclecticism.

A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of “mediacies” and inter-relationships with the rest of the world. A tumbler is a heavy object which can be used as a missile; it can serve as a paper weight, a receptacle for a captive butterfly, or a valuable object with an artistic engraving or design, and this has nothing at all to do with whether or not it can be used for drinking, is made of glass, is cylindrical or not quite, and so on and so forth.

Moreover, if I needed a tumbler just now for drinking, it would not in the least matter how cylindrical it was, and whether it was actually made of glass; what would matter though would be whether it had any holes in the bottom, or anything that would cut my lips when I drank, etc. But if I did not need a tumbler for drinking but for a purpose that could be served by any glass cylinder, a tumbler with a cracked bottom or without one at all would do just as well, etc.

Formal logic, which is as far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring, and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined at random (a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing more.

Dialectical logic demands that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and “mediacies”. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity. Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in “self-movement” (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full “definition” of an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly, dialectical logic holds that “truth is always concrete, never abstract”, as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel. (Let me add in parenthesis for the benefit of young Party members that you cannot hope to become a real, intelligent Communist without making a study—and I mean study—of all of Plekhanov’s philosophical writings, because nothing better has been written on Marxism anywhere in the world.)

http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1921/jan/25.htm

Bold added.

So, did Lenin mean what he said, or not?


Next you're going to try to convince me that Lenin thought himself the socialist Pope

Well, he, like you and Engels, seemed to like pontificating about things he knew nothing about, such as logic and philosophy.

Moreover, he promulgated enough dogmas to convince anyone he was indeed trying to do Papal impersonations.

[trivas7]

Well, he, like you and Engels, seemed to like pontificating about things he knew nothing about, such as logic and philosophy.

Moreover, he promulgated enough dogmas to convince anyone he was indeed trying to do Papal impersonations.
You see papal pontification everywhere. My quote from Lenin is from here (http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/index.htm). He read Hegel, Aristotle, Feuerbach, and others especially during 1914-1916.

Lenin's method of analysis is entirely consistent with Marx's dialectical method in Capital.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


You see papal pontification everywhere.

As Marx said: the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class.


Lenin's method of analysis is entirely consistent with Marx's dialectical method in Capital.

!) How do you know it is?

2) Marx adandoned the dialectic, as Lenin understood it, as we have already established.

3) Any comment on Lenin contradicting you by telling us that truth is always concrete, never abstract -- or is this just another of those things 'you do not think about'?