Anti-Duhring

[Die Neue Zeit]

[Sorry, Rosa, but even this non-dialectician is compelled to force you into tackling head on the very "Pauline" founder of what is known today as "Marxism," who combined Karl Marx and Frederich Engels' scientific socialism with August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht's classical social democracy - albeit while standing on his head. :D ]

"Only owing to Anti-Dühring did we learn to read and understand Capital the right way."

http://www.revleft.com/vb/scrapping-dialectics-would-t79634/index6.html


Whoever said that is an idiot; the Tokyo telephone directory would have been better than 'Anti-Duhring' in this respect. In its 'philosophical' capacity, it is without doubt one of the worst books ever written by a Marxist.


http://www.isreview.org/issues/59/feat-engels.shtml

A week ago, I wrote to the International Social Review making the above point to them: that this book is (philosophically) among the very worst ever written by a Marxist.

Let's see if they publish it.

Preliminary thoughts (of course, in the polemical style of his most well-known disciple)? ;)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Preliminary thought: throw the 'philosophical' content of this execrable book on top of Hume's bonfire.

[Die Neue Zeit]

^^^ Maybe it just wasn't dynamic enough for you. :D

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No, the problem with this book is that it was ever written.

[gilhyle]

What may be most interesting about this book is why Engels felt the need to get into all this philosophical stuff at all. What was characteristic of Duhring was the claim that there are formal principles, which form a logical structure which are valid for all reality - thus suggesting an expanded realm for logical analysis.

It is that claim that led Engels to go into philosophical matters. Logic, for Engels is tautological and trivial. Significant principles are abstracted from reality and not prior to it. Funnily enough in making this point, Engels begins by referrig to Hegel's "delirious fantasies" (MECW 25 P. 34)

Equally ironic in the context of recent discussions on this board is how Engels immediatley goes on to reject philosophy: "we need no philosophy for this purpose but only positive knowledge of the world" (MECW 25 P. 35) and then goes on to affirm the partial and limited nature of all human understanding of reality as against any philosophical perspective that insists on its own absolute character, something Marx and Engels never believed in.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Too bad then that Engels showed he was a philosophical incompetent in this execrable book...

[gilhyle]

Well you would be right Rosa if Engels was engaged in your beloved practice of philosophy. But he isnt. He is engaged in critique. And what is striking in that regard is the pages of detailed review of Duhring's views which, in philosophical terms, involved only in reestablishing the legitimacy of Kant's antinomies against Duhrings optimistic rationalism (MECW 25 P. 39-78), and Kant was not quite bad at philosophy.

But I prefer Engels' other parrallel theme in these pages - namely that rather than develop our conceptions of motion, evolution and life from Hegel's Logic, we should instead develop our conceptions of those things not from either philosophy or ordinary discourse, but from science.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Well you would be right Rosa if Engels was engaged in your beloved practice of philosophy. But he isnt. He is engaged in critique. And what is striking in that regard is the pages of detailed review of Duhring's views which, in philosophical terms, involved only in reestablishing the legitimacy of Kant's antinomies against Duhrings optimistic rationalism (MECW 25 P. 39-78), and Kant was not quite bad at philosophy.

1) His 'critique' shows he was a philsophical incompetent.

2) He also propounded dialectiacl theses, which confirm his status as the George W Bush of philosophy.

3) Kant was systematically confused.


But I prefer Engels' other parrallel theme in these pages - namely that rather than develop our conceptions of motion, evolution and life from Hegel's Logic, we should instead develop our conceptions of those things not from either philosophy or ordinary discourse, but from science.

Well, that is both your problem and your punishment.

[gilhyle]

Well there can be no doubt that in the fullness of time the contradiction whereby Kant is still thought of as a great philosopher rather than as a 'systematically confused' person while your own contributions go unrecognised will be resolved in some synthesis satisfying to both justice and logic.

It is important to have some regard to the context within which Engels propounds these dialectical theses. The most important point is that while replicating Hegel's idealism, Duhring rejected the dialectic. It is precisely the influence of Duhring in the German workers movement on the basis of these formulations which required Engels to formulate generalities that he had otherwise generally avoided. that is the sense in which we must call Engel's propositions 'critical' rather than positive, i.e. they are not so much his own doctrines as his rejection of the opposing views.

So it is Duhring's proposition that (dialectical) contradiction = absurdity which leads Engels to formulate the alternative view that (dialectical) contradiction is a characteristic of the understanding of change. Contradiction on this view, might be seen as that characteristic of a descriptive proposition of a state or condition, when the object of the proposition is changing. This would be to talk about the proposition, i.e. to look at the matter formally.

What is interesting/confusing/challenging is that Engels does not speak of the characteristic of the proposition, but of the characteristic of the object....we could talk about that. But to do that might be to miss the prior moment of the argument, which is the proposition: let there be a term 'dialectical contradiction', and let that term be the name of the characteristic which is common to all objects in a process of change and not present in objects not subject to change. hus Engels counterposes an alternative critical option to Duhring's identification of contradiction with absurdity., let contradiction be change.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil (still siding with ruling-class hacks):


Well there can be no doubt that in the fullness of time the contradiction whereby Kant is still thought of as a great philosopher rather than as a 'systematically confused' person while your own contributions go unrecognised will be resolved in some synthesis satisfying to both justice and logic.

Not so; Marx already told us he was -- I have merely confirmed it.

Want to know how and where he did?

You only have to grovel...


It is important to have some regard to the context within which Engels propounds these dialectical theses. The most important point is that while replicating Hegel's idealism, Duhring rejected the dialectic. It is precisely the influence of Duhring in the German workers movement on the basis of these formulations which required Engels to formulate generalities that he had otherwise generally avoided. that is the sense in which we must call Engel's propositions 'critical' rather than positive, i.e. they are not so much his own doctrines as his rejection of the opposing views.

So it is Duhring's proposition that (dialectical) contradiction = absurdity which leads Engels to formulate the alternative view that (dialectical) contradiction is a characteristic of the understanding of change. Contradiction on this view, might be seen as that characteristic of a descriptive proposition of a state or condition, when the object of the proposition is changing. This would be to talk about the proposition, i.e. to look at the matter formally.


1) It matters not what Engels's reason was (as if we did not know already!), the bottom line is that he was way out of his depth philosophically.

2) We have yet to be told what a 'dialectical contradiction' is -- and we have only been waiting for 200 years.

3) This 'theory' cannot explain change -- as I have shown -- or if this 'theory' is correct, change cannot happen.


What is interesting/confusing/challenging is that Engels does not speak of the characteristic of the proposition, but of the characteristic of the object....we could talk about that. But to do that might be to miss the prior moment of the argument, which is the proposition: let there be a term 'dialectical contradiction', and let that term be the name of the characteristic which is common to all objects in a process of change and not present in objects not subject to change. hus Engels counterposes an alternative critical option to Duhring's identification of contradiction with absurdity., let contradiction be change.

Nice a priori digmatics -- but where's the proof, and where is the explanation of what a 'dialectical contradiction' actually is.

You know, you'd be better off posting a blank space for all the contribution you have made to understanding these terminally obscure Hermetic concepts.

[trivas7]

What is interesting/confusing/challenging is that Engels does not speak of the characteristic of the proposition, but of the characteristic of the object....we could talk about that. But to do that might be to miss the prior moment of the argument, which is the proposition: let there be a term 'dialectical contradiction', and let that term be the name of the characteristic which is common to all objects in a process of change and not present in objects not subject to change. hus Engels counterposes an alternative critical option to Duhring's identification of contradiction with absurdity., let contradiction be change.
AFAIK contradiction is one of the movements of the dialectical process carried out by all objects, no? What real world objects aren't subject to change?

[Hyacinth]

What is interesting/confusing/challenging is that Engels does not speak of the characteristic of the proposition, but of the characteristic of the object....we could talk about that. But to do that might be to miss the prior moment of the argument, which is the proposition: let there be a term 'dialectical contradiction', and let that term be the name of the characteristic which is common to all objects in a process of change and not present in objects not subject to change. hus Engels counterposes an alternative critical option to Duhring's identification of contradiction with absurdity., let contradiction be change.
If all you mean by “contradiction” is change, then why call it a “contradiction”? We already have a perfectly good word for change, namely “change”. :)

[trivas7]

If all you mean by “contradiction” is change, then why call it a “contradiction”? We already have a perfectly good word for change, namely “change”. :)
The principle of contradiction reflects the dualistic relationship within a whole; the unity of opposites and their struggle. It is the inner dynamic, the how of change, not change itself, which is matter in motion.

[Hyacinth]

The principle of contradiction reflects the dualistic relationship within a whole; the unity of opposites and their struggle. It is the inner dynamic, the how of change, not change itself, which is matter in motion.
So radioactive decay is to be explained with reference to “the unity of opposites and their struggle”?


Radioactive decay is the process in which an unstable atomic nucleus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_nucleus) loses energy by emitting radiation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiation) in the form of particles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_radiation) or electromagnetic waves (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum). This decay, or loss of energy, results in an atom of one type, called the parent nuclide transforming to an atom of a different type, called the daughter nuclide.

[trivas7]

So radioactive decay is to be explained with reference to “the unity of opposites and their struggle”?
Your joking, correct? :lol:

If not, what is the whole within which the process of radioactive decay takes place?

[Hyacinth]

Your joking, correct? :lol:
No, I’m being quite serious. I’d like you to explain to me how dialectics explains radioactive decay, because frankly I’m at a loss.

If not, what is the whole within which the process of radioactive decay takes place?
Well, what is it?

[Hyacinth]

Also, if dialectics is so integral to understanding change, why aren’t the natural science departments riddled with dialecticians? In fact, it makes me wonder how we’ve made any progress in science at all without them.

[gilhyle]

Rosa describes the concept of dialectical contradiction as 'obscure'. I think there is a significant element of truth in that....although I much prefer the word 'vague', which is less emotive. Something may be 'vague' and its a problem or 'vague' and its not a problem. The issue here is whether the vagueness of the concept of dialectical contradiction is a problem.

Now Hyacinth asked why have the concept if it is equivalent to change ? Reasonable question. I think the answer given by Trivas is essentially correct although it is useful for a moment to try to state it without using other terminology from the same tradition. For that reason, it seems to me useful to acknowledge that what Engels is arguing is that it can be observed, as a general matter, that change is not accidental, change is necessitated or patterned.

We could understand that commonplace observation in terms of mechanical conceptions of cause, i.e. an immediate proximate prior event which in some sense led to a subsequent event. Now that is itself a highly problematic conception but I wont go into those difficulties in any detail here. But it is fair to say that as an answer it is both 'vague' and problematic and anyone who thinks otherwise can go off and read the fate of Aristotle and 17th century mechanical philosophy.

But Engels wants to reject Duhrings ideas in another way - without relying on a concept of cause. He wants to say merely that change, generally, is not accidental but happens as a matter of broader, longer processes. Notably this conception covers not only what is locally predicatbly caused but what is locally accidental but the necessity of which can be analysed if viewed collectively.

This is indeed a 'vague' thing to say. But then the concept of 'change' is also vague and to add the idea of dialectical contradiction is merely to add one highly general conception to another highly general conception. Now we dont find the conception of change intrinsically problematic. We dont find it problematic notwithstanding the fact that we are talking about phenomena that we cant - at this level of abstraction - define very clearly or formally.

Why then is it so problematic to differentiate between purely accidental, trivial changes which are not capable of serious study and those which are capable of study ? There seems nothing intrinsically unacceptable in a conceptualisation which suggests there is a general characteristic common to all necessitated or patterned changes and that therefore Duhring is wrong to suggest that the understanding of change reduces thinking to absurdity.

[Hyacinth]

For that reason, it seems to me useful to acknowledge that what Engels is arguing is that it can be observed, as a general matter, that change is not accidental, change is necessitated or patterned.

We could understand that commonplace observation in terms of mechanical conceptions of cause, i.e. an immediate proximate prior event which in some sense led to a subsequent event. Now that is itself a highly problematic conception but I wont go into those difficulties in any detail here. But it is fair to say that as an answer it is both 'vague' and problematic and anyone who thinks otherwise can go off and read the fate of Aristotle and 17th century mechanical philosophy.
If not here could you perhaps get to it somewhere, because this is an important issue. Why isn’t causation (mechanistic or otherwise, there are other conceptions of it [a look through either the Wikipedia page on causation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality), or else the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html)will reveal that]) adequate to account for change?

Moreover, how is a dialectical contradiction a better account?

As well, why isn’t the concept of a dialectical contradiction subject to the same criticisms as traditional accounts of causality (e.g. Hume’s criticism of causation)?

The cause for a dialectical account of change rests upon answering these questions.

This is indeed a 'vague' thing to say. But then the concept of 'change' is also vague and to add the idea of dialectical contradiction is merely to add one highly general conception to another highly general conception. Now we dont find the conception of change intrinsically problematic. We dont find it problematic notwithstanding the fact that we are talking about phenomena that we cant - at this level of abstraction - define very clearly or formally.
Actually, apart from the issues that philosophers have with various conceptions of change, I don’t think that the concept of change is at all problematic in ordinary language. We all understand what we’re talking about when we talk about something changing. If change was a problematic concept we wouldn’t be able to effectively communicate with it.

The same is not true of the notion of a dialectical contradiction. And it isn’t just a matter of it being a technical term, but more due to the fact that no account of a dialectical contradiction has been given in non-dialectical language (at least that I know of, I’d be more than happy to be shown wrong).

Why then is it so problematic to differentiate between purely accidental, trivial changes which are not capable of serious study and those which are capable of study ? There seems nothing intrinsically unacceptable in a conceptualisation which suggests there is a general characteristic common to all necessitated or patterned changes and that therefore Duhring is wrong to suggest that the understanding of change reduces thinking to absurdity.
You’re absolutely correct, there is nothing wrong in differentiating between accidents and patterned changes. Duhring (if he did assert what you attribute to him) was indeed wrong. This is not the point of contention. The issue is whether the notion of a dialectical contradiction can account for change at all, and if so can it account for it better than causal (or other non-dialectical) accounts of change?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Rosa describes the concept of dialectical contradiction as 'obscure'. I think there is a significant element of truth in that....although I much prefer the word 'vague', which is less emotive. Something may be 'vague' and its a problem or 'vague' and its not a problem. The issue here is whether the vagueness of the concept of dialectical contradiction is a problem.

There are several different kinds of vagueness. For example, someone could say "The march begins at 1pm or 2pm, I'm not sure...". In principle, this sort of vagueness can be rectified.

On the other hand, someone could say "I am not sure what 'god' is, whether 'he' is a person, or spirit, or something else - or even whether 'he' is a 'he'..."

This sort of vagueness is irresolvable.

The latter sort of vagueness afflicts Hegel's work (and thus the term 'dialectical contradiction').

And worse -- 'propositions' found in Hegel's work are non-sensical, since they are based on a systematic distortion of language.

No wonder, then, that Hegel could not explain change, since he is not talking about it, but about something else -- "change" (or its equivalent in German) --, which he has signally failed to define, or even characterise, and which bears no relation to the word as it is ordinarily used.

In that case, he might just as well have used "BuBuBu".

As Marx noted:


We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

And distorted language is without meaning; it's 'propositions' lack sense, and are incapable of being given a sense.

But this is what ruling-class thinkers like Hegel (and erstwhile radicals who feed off them, like Engels) have always done.

Small wonder then that Marx said the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class.

I note, finally, that not even Gil can tell us what a 'dialectical contradiction' is.

And Trivas is even worse; he is content just to repeat the same tired old phrases, which have been shown not to work.

[trivas7]

But then the concept of 'change' is also vague[...]
Change is matter in motion. What is vague re this definition?

[trivas7]

Well, what is it?
This tells me you don't know enough re radioactivity to discuss it.


Also, if dialectics is so integral to understanding change, why aren’t the natural science departments riddled with dialecticians? In fact, it makes me wonder how we’ve made any progress in science at all without them.
You err to think that dialectics is a set of ideas applied to the world. This is mechanical, idealist thinking.

[gilhyle]

Trivas7

Quote:
Originally Posted by gilhyle http://www.revleft.com/vb/revleft/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showthread.php?p=1170847#post1170847)
But then the concept of 'change' is also vague[...]
Change is matter in motion. What is vague re this definition?
I think the concept of change is intrinsically vague and there is no harm in recognising that. For example, If someone says that change is matter in motion, does that cover change of state from solid to liquid and liquid to gas, does it cover changing your mind ? Does it cover change of location where the object itself is otherwise unchanged ? Furthermore we might ask, can someone provide a formal definition of change so that we can test whether it always involves the motion of matter. One might observe as Hyacinth does that we have no problem using the concept of 'change', but without an independent definition of change how can we figure out whether that usage is correct. Is it sufficient that some people think that they can use the term correctly. What if there is disagreement on the usage. For example there have in the past been philosophical views to the effect that nothing ever changes and that everything constantly changes - they cant both be right and which is (if either) would depend on what precisely 'change' means.

All these are questions testing whether we have a clear idea of what change means. And they illustrate that we use the term without knowing precisely what it means. Some might argue that that is a problem. I would disagree with this. I think we can use the concept of 'change' without dealing with these issues. But my explanation as to why we can do that is because change is a legitimately vague general concept - and one of many, many intrinsically vague terms we constantly use in both everyday speech and in scientific practice.

Rosa rightly differentiates between different kinds of vagueness some of which are unproblematic and others are. That comment itself however could be examined at length to see if it itself resolves the issue or displaces it to the consideration of the different types of vagueness. We could go down that route and it might indeed be interesting. But lets not for the moment. After all if we end up discussing whether we can get a clear idea of the distinction between problematic and unproblematic versions of vagueness, or if that distinction itself is in danger of being vague, have we really made progress ? Lets stick to Engels....and for that reason lets leave Hegel aside, just for a bit, particularly given that Hegel is problematic as between Engels and Duhring. Duhring likes Hegel, except the dialectics, while Engels dislikes Hegel, except for the dialectics.

For Engels, what is interesting in Hegel is that Hegel denies what Duhring affirms - namely that the logic of statics and the logic of the analysis of dynamics must be unrelated.

Hyacinth has commented as follows (among other things):

You’re absolutely correct, there is nothing wrong in differentiating between accidents and patterned changes. Duhring (if he did assert what you attribute to him) was indeed wrong. This is not the point of contention. The issue is whether the notion of a dialectical contradiction can account for change at all, and if so can it account for it better than causal (or other non-dialectical) accounts of change?
What I would say to this is that it is worth looking carefully at what Engels said to see if he seeks to 'account' for change in the sense that that question might imply. There are a couple of options here. Engels might indeed by suggesting a 'Philosophy of Nature' - a set of a priori dogmatics which lays down a range of general features that are common to all change in the material world. If he was doing that, then he would probably be suggesting some sort of strict framework which, if true, would be something scientists generally would need to know to do their job properly. In that case Hyacinth's question about scientists studying radioactivity etc. would be a relevant and troubling question.
On the other hand, if Engels is saying something less than that then the question might not be so pressing, depending on what precisely Engels uses this idea of dialectical contradiction for.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Lets stick to Engels....and for that reason lets leave Hegel aside, just for a bit, particularly given that Hegel is problematic as between Engels and Duhring. Duhring likes Hegel, except the dialectics, while Engels dislikes Hegel, except for the dialectics.

You have yet to show that Engels is worth bothering with.

[gilhyle]

Sorry for posting at such length, but I want to labour this point a bit.
Two sets of ideas more familar to us today are at stake in this debate with Duhring. Firstly structuralist analysis, which takes a static view of society explaining how its various elements hold up the whole 'structure', but which by the consequence of its very success cannot explain how the whole edifice constantly changes.

Secondly, there are those who say that the positive content of the dialectical theory is found merely by conceptualising change as caused by contrary tendencies.

Duhring seems at one point close to the first position, but tries to adopt this second approach of counterposed tendencies.

Duhring's view that static analysis and dynamic analysis cannot be linked and that the best we can do is postulate change as an unanalysable conflict of tendencies is what leads him to criticise Marx's Capital for using general terms not as general principles but as abstract categories (which Duhring claims explain nothing because they contain everything) .....and it is that POLITICAL outcome of the postulation of general philosophical theories which forces Engels to respond to Duhring and which therefore determines the character of Engels work

Now if you are going to criticise someone, other than tangental ad hominem arguments and the mere articulation of an alternative vision, the best way to criticise someone is to engage with their claims at their own level of abstraction and by examining their own sequences of reasoning. This is what Engels does and it is clear therefore that his articulation of general dialectical ideas in Anti Duhring are moulded as the inverted image of the arguments of his opponent.

Therefore it is at least possible that the appearance of Engels work whereby it appears a general account of change may prove wrong. Rather what his account might be is an inversion of the claims of Duhring, claiming that there is a link between the analysis of statics and dynamics precisely because Duhring denies that. The content of his claim would not be a description of what change is but rather a claim that it is possible to have a unified approach to the understanding of dynamic and static objects of thought by use of the concept of dialectical contradiction. Clearly if Engels believed in a priori dogmatics he would articulate his dialectical views for that reason and that would be their character, but the evidence from this text is that Engels is motivated to reject dogmatic ideas of his opponent, denies the importance of philosophy, chastises Duhring for neglecting 'facts' and proof in favour of general phrases (MECW 25 P.115) and advocates scientific study instead

On that view, the further claim that this is an ADEQUATE account of change for any other purpose than the denial of Duhring's contrary claim could be rejected. At least, we can say that we need to pay attention to see what weight other than the mere denial of Duhring's theses Engels places on this idea of dialectical contradiction.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Once more, since I have shown that dialectics cannot explain change, this post of yours is a waste of space.

[Hyacinth]

You err to think that dialectics is a set of ideas applied to the world. This is mechanical, idealist thinking.
So you concede (contra Engels et al.) that dialectics doesn’t explain all change?

What sort of change does dialectics explain?

[Hyacinth]

On the other hand, if Engels is saying something less than that then the question might not be so pressing, depending on what precisely Engels uses this idea of dialectical contradiction for.
If dialectical contradictions are not meant to be a whole scale philosophy of nature that accounts for all change (this is what I think you’re getting at, though correct me if I’m wrong) then what sort of change is it suppose to explain? And my previous questions stand: why is the dialectical account of social (?) change better than a causal account thereof?

[Hyacinth]

Two sets of ideas more familar to us today are at stake in this debate with Duhring. Firstly structuralist analysis, which takes a static view of society explaining how its various elements hold up the whole 'structure', but which by the consequence of its very success cannot explain how the whole edifice constantly changes.
I think you’re taking the term “structure” in structural analysis too literary. There is no reason why a structural analysis must be static, and hence unable to account for change.

Consider, for example, an architectural analogy. Certain structures can be unstable and hence prone to collapse. Isn’t this exactly what is claimed of capitalism? One can argue that structurally capitalism is unstable because of certain structural features (waged labour, exploitation, the business cycle, markets in general, etc. etc. etc.) and hence prone to collapse.

I fail to see how such a structural analysis can’t explain change.

As well, for all the continued talk of dialectical contradictions I have yet to hear an explanation of it that isn’t circular (i.e. that doesn’t appeal to dialectical language).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Indeed, and consider a structural account of, say, a hurricane which physicists might use to predict how one might develop and change.

http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Library/Hurricanes/Images/hurricane_section.gif

Of course, there are many other such dynamic structures scientists and engineers study, such as simple harmonoc motion:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/74/Simple_harmonic_motion_animation.gif

http://www.physics.uoguelph.ca/tutorials/shm/sinewave.gif

http://www.physics.uoguelph.ca/tutorials/shm/Animation1.gif

http://www.physics.uoguelph.ca/tutorials/GOF/GOF1.gif

http://www.physics.uoguelph.ca/tutorials/GOF/GOF3X.gif

And, oddly enough, no dialectics anywhere in sight...

[Die Neue Zeit]

That is why, Rosa, I prefer dynamic materialism over both dialectical and historical materialism. Marxism could learn a lot from theory development, especially in physics. :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I am not sure that historical materialism [HM] cannot cope with physics; in fact quite the reverse.

Thus, I think you new name is probably just an alternative title for HM.

[gilhyle]

Firstly, Hyacinth, I am conscious that I am not answering your question of what is wrong with causal social analysis. But that question was not the focus of Anti-Duhring so I would like to leave that for later - lets consider whether anything useful is done in Anti Duhring and then see whether your question is still pressing when that is clear.

As to the point about structuralism and Rosa's (very pretty) pictures, the point Duhring makes is that "as long as present day mechanics holds good....it cannot be explained at all how how it is possible to pass from immobility to motion." (MECW Vol 25 P. 52) Engels counters this with various points - firstly with examples from other sciences where analogous transitions are studied and secondly by articulating a general conception of dialectical contradiction, i.e. a claim that there is a general characteristic common to patterned change which is capable of study.

In giving examples, I was using the same method of arguing by analogy to other sciences to illustrate that there is a problem, notwithstanding Engels point that other sciences do study change. My reference was not to structural analysis as such, but to structural analysis in sociology and its pretty close to Sociology 101 to acknowledge that the sociological theories developed very strongly in the 1950s and 1960s (and now becoming a bit more popular again) had serious problems with analysing change.

Let me just give an example from a very innovative book published in the 1980s :

"One of the most common assumptions about space sometimes explicit, more often implicit is that human spatial organisation is the working out of common behaviioural principles through a hierarchy of different levels. Thus from the domestic interiior, or even rom the individual space, through to the city or region it is assumed that similar social or psychological forces shape space, differing only in involving lage numbers of people and larger physical aggregates. the assumptionis so common that it ddeserves a name: we call it the continuum assumption. If the continuum assumption were true the analysis of interiors would simply be a matter of taking the principles and techniques for the analysis of aggregaes and applyingthem on smaller scale. Unfortunately, this would led us to overlook a very fundamental fact, one which when taken account of adds a whole new dimension to the system. We might call it the fact of the boundary" P.144 Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson The Social Logic of Space

Now this example does not illustrate much; what it illustrates is the challenge that is involved in going from the analysis of equilibrium situations to the analysis of change, something often done by dynamic equilibrium type analysis.....and sometimes done in other less easily classifiable ways. Why is that important ? It is important because duhring is claiming that there is a fundamental problem with analysing change and Engels is denying that, claiming instead that science analyses change all the time. BUT Engels is conceding one point (which Duhring might actually prefer he did not concede) namely that there is a problem around coming up with a general idea of how change is studied within the science of capitalist society. Engels is not claiming that science does not study change, rather he is claiming that we can short circuit Duhring's issues by recognsing that there is a common characteristic of change that is open to study.

In summary then, Duhring has made a generalisation about science, that part of its practice cannot be understood. That claim forces Engels to make a claim at the same level of generality or fall into bluster. He makes, contra duhring, the general claim that all patterned change shares characteristics which are open to appreciation, description and analysis, even if that analysis is not the same as the analysis of statics, even dynamic equilibria (which is what Rosa's graphics mostly are).

This is a very abstract point. I suggest that it leaves any reasonable reader with more questions than answers, firstly wondering whether it might not be better just to remain silent on why change can be analysed by science, ignore Duhring and let science get on with it and secondly concerned at the undefined nature of dialectical contradiction, particularly by the fact that it is vague and, by definition, not susceptible to a formal description itself (Graham Priest notwithstanding - thats another story).

The answer to that really depends on what Engels goes on to do with the idea. What he does do is to go on to defend Marx against further criticisms of Marx's Capital made by Duhring based on his anti-dialectical philosophy. Indeed, Anti-Duhring should be seen as primarily a polemical defence of Volume One of Capital, published just ten years earlier. It is rarely seen that way but that is really what it is about.

What Duhring goes on to do is to pick key arguments out of Capital and suggest that the argument fails because Marx deduced his conclusions from the application of dialectical laws.

Engels reply to that is to say that Duhring gets that completely wrong because a) Duhring misunderstands the character of the law and b) misreads Marx as relying on the relevant dialectical law for proof, when Marx in fact does the opposite, namely to deduce (using that term loosely) his conclusion from his analysis (using that word loosely) of the economy and then merely to acknowledge that those conclusions illustrate (i.e. fall under) that law.

if we recognise that, e see that Engels is actually arguing that dialectical laws are not used by Marx to deduce anything and their content would make that inappropriate. Here is the irony - it is Engels who argues against using dialectics as a Philosophy of Nature. Now that, of course, leaves open what the putative dialectical laws are for, in Engels mind. I wont go into that further at this point (though I have in part already answered it), but want to just note that whatever he thinks dialectical laws are for, he does not believe that their purpose is to allow deduction of conclusions about matters otherwise subject to scientific study......at least that is what he is arguing in the Anti Duhring. His precise purpose in the Anti Duhring is to reject the charge that Marx had relied on dialectical laws for purposes of proof in Capital. He considers this suggestion a serious misrepresentation of Marx's (and his) method.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


As to the point about structuralism and Rosa's (very pretty) pictures, the point Duhring makes is that "as long as present day mechanics holds good....it cannot be explained at all how how it is possible to pass from immobility to motion." (MECW Vol 25 P. 52) Engels counters this with various points - firstly with examples from other sciences where analogous transitions are studied and secondly by articulating a general conception of dialectical contradiction, i.e. a claim that there is a general characteristic common to patterned change which is capable of study.

Not so; Engels never tells us what a 'dialectical contradiction is', and neither have you.

Even worse, not one of you mystics has told us how they help explain motion and change, when it is clear that they would in fact prevent it.

The rest of your post merely shows how out of touch you are, and how little you are aware of it. For example:


Engels is actually arguing that dialectical laws are not used by Marx to deduce anything and their content would make that inappropriate. Here is the irony - it is Engels who argues against using dialectics as a Philosophy of Nature. Now that, of course, leaves open what the putative dialectical laws are for, he does not believe that their purpose is to allow deduction of conclusions about matters otherwise subject to scientific study

Not so; Anti-Duhring is full of a priori dogmatics, imposed on nature and society, from which Engels derived numerous universal and omni-temporal theses. For example:


"Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically." [Engels (1976) Anti-Duhring, p.28.]

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted….

"A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphasis added.]

"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but a complex of processes, in which things apparently stable…, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away…." [Engels (1892) Socialism: Utopian And Scientific, p.609. Bold emphasis added.]

And anyone who can read the sections on 'Dialectics' and conclude:


it is Engels who argues against using dialectics as a Philosophy of Nature.

has lost all touch with reality.

But, what can one expect of someone who prefers mysticism to Marxism?

[trivas7]

Trivas7
For example, If someone says that change is matter in motion, does that cover change of state from solid to liquid and liquid to gas, does it cover changing your mind ? Does it cover change of location where the object itself is otherwise unchanged ?
Insofar as solids turn into liquids and gas, your mind changes state, etc. you are describing change. I don't see the problem with this definition of change. Dialectics isn't about change per se but the how of change, its logic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Insofar as solids turn into liquids and gas, your mind changes state, etc. you are describing change. I don't see the problem with this definition of change. Dialectics isn't about change per se but the how of change, its logic.

You are, of course, ignoring the not insignificant fact that dialectics cannot even explain change -- or, put differently:if dialectics were true, change could not occur.

[trivas7]

You are, of course, ignoring the not insignificant fact that dialectics cannot even explain change -- or, put differently:if dialectics were true, change could not occur.
Purely metaphysical thinking. Dialectics is a way of thinking, not a proposition re the world subject to truth value.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Purely metaphysical thinking.

Why?


Dialectics is a way of thinking, not a proposition re the world subject to truth value.

It may be a 'a way of thinking', but the thoughts it generates cannot explain one of its core ideas: universal change.

It cannot even explain how and why water boils!

In the past, such 'ways of thinking' were abandoned when they were shown not to work.

We need to do the same with this useless 'theory'.


not a proposition re the world subject to truth value

This is a dodge religionists use when it is pointed out to them that the Book of Genesis, for instance, cannot explain origins.

And what exactly is its use if it isn't 'objective'?

Well, we already know the answer to that one -- just like theology, it's a source of consolation for the fact that Dialectical Marxism is to success what George W Bush is to peace in the Middle East.

So, no wonder you use the same dodge as religionists.

[trivas7]

And what exactly is its use if it isn't 'objective'?
Its use was to burst the bonds of the limitations of formal logic in order to account for the fact that things, life and society are in a state of constant motion and change. In this sense Marxism is shot through with subjectivity.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Its use was to burst the bonds of the limitations of formal logic in order to account for the fact that things, life and society are in a state of constant motion and change. Marxism is shot threw with subjectivity.

1) You know no logic, and neither did Engels, so you/he are in position to judge the 'limitations' of 'Formal Logic'.

2) This idea that 'Formal Logic' has certain 'limitations' was dreamt-up by Hegel; dialecticians en masse uncritically copied him (mainly because they too are ignorant of logic).

Hegel's errors in this regard are summarised here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

3) 'Formal Logic ' has no 'limitations' -- or, if you know of any, lets' hear them.

4) 'Formal Logic' can account for change. On that, see here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Summary_of_Essay_Four_Part_One.htm

5) Dialectics cannot account for change -- as I have shown here many times. You just keep ignoring this.

6) Marxism is not shot through with 'subjectivity' -- I'd like to see you prove otherwise.

[This is mainly because the term 'subjectivity', as used by dialecticians, is hopelessly vague.]

[trivas7]

1) You know no logic, and neither did Engels, so you/he are in position to judge the 'limitations' of 'Formal Logic'.

6) Marxism is not shot through with 'subjectivity' -- I'd like to see you prove otherwise.

No need to keep repeating yourself.

If dialectics is null and void there is no materialist conception of history, no doctrine of the conditions of the liberation of the proletariat and no need to account for economics beyond that of Smith and Ricardo.

[Hyacinth]

Purely metaphysical thinking. Dialectics is a way of thinking, not a proposition re the world subject to truth value.
So you essentially concede that dialectics has nothing to do with the world, and that it is not a proposition (and hence in no need of refutation or the like since it doesn’t make any claims to begin with; so in this respect it is sort of like [bad] poetry). I’m glad we’re on the same page. :)


If dialectics is null and void there is no materialist conception of history, no doctrine of the conditions of the liberation of the proletariat and no need to account for economics beyond that of Smith and Ricardo.
Wait a minute... I’m confused here. If there are no dialectical propositions, and dialectics makes no claims about the world, how can the fact that it is nonsense have any impact on the world at all? :confused:

Why does dialectics being nonsense mean that there is no materialist conception of history? After all, a materialist conception of history (i.e. historical materialism) does make claims about the world, and does consist of propositions. Given that dialectics, as per your own admission doesn’t, then it has no relevance to historical materialism (or anything else for that matter). Mutatis mutandis for what you said about economics, liberation, etc.

In fact, given that there are no dialectical propositions, how can those be “null and void”?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


If dialectics is null and void there is no materialist conception of history, no doctrine of the conditions of the liberation of the proletariat and no need to account for economics beyond that of Smith and Ricardo.

So you keep saying, but we have yet to see the proof.

Moreover, historical materialism [HM] can explain social change, since it uses words from ordinary language -- and not in ways that cause problems --, whereas dialectics cannot --as I have shown.

So, if HM depended on dialectics, it would not be able to explain change.

Conclusion, HM does not depend on dialectics.

Now, you can show this line of reasoning is defective by showing that dialectics can explain change -- or, alternatively, you can try to show where my proof that it cannot, goes wrong.

Since you have done neither, and show no signs you are capable of doing so, we can asssume you cannot.

Finally, I note that just like other dialecticians, when pressed to do so, you cannot tell us why 'Formal Logic' has limitiations, or even what these are.

[trivas7]

After all, a materialist conception of history (i.e. historical materialism) does make claims about the world, and does consist of propositions.
What are these claims?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas (in dire need of a crass course in Marxism):


What are these?

Here's one:


The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.

Looks like an empirical proposition to me, and indeed one that is true.

Perhaps you think it is merely 'subjective'?

Oh no, here are some more:


Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master(3) and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm

How irresponsible of Marx to make claims about the real world!

Tut Tut...:ohmy:

[trivas7]

Here's one:

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
Looks like an empirical proposition to me, and indeed one that is true.

Oh no, here are some more:

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master(3) and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.
Clearly you don't know what an empirical proposition is.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Clearly you don't know what an empirical proposition is.

Enlighten me then.

And I am still waiting to hear you explain the 'limitations' of Formal Logic.

[Empirical proposition: what is proposed by an indicative type or token sentence concerning matters of fact. Beat that!]

[gilhyle]

Well, that is where debates on this site get a bit unreal for me. If you actually READ the Anti Duhring, the key sections relevant to dialectics are the sections already discussed concerning dialectical contradiction and Sections XII concerning Quantity/Quality and Section XIII concerning the negation of the negation.

Each of those sections has the same form. Engels cites a quotation from Duhring charging Marx with having relied on a dialectical law. Engels in each case denies that Marx does rely on that law, he denies that it would be appropriate to rely on that law and then he explains what the law is. Now this can simply be read there and my purpose on this thread was to just look at what Engels wrote - not look at isolated quotes but look at the overall document at its overall purpose and see its elements in that context. This is the only way to read properly, trying to leave aside the layers of preconceptions from subsequent history.

The fact is that Engels is trying to prove that Marx did not rely on dialectical laws and he is articulating dialectical laws as laws that should not be relied on to prove empirical claims, and are not relied on by Marx. Now rather than re-do debates we have had before at greater levels of generality I think it is worthwhile to look at each of those sections and see what each section says.

Now, is that a wrong way to proceed ? If so why ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


If you actually READ the Anti Duhring, the key sections relevant to dialectics are the sections already discussed concerning dialectical contradiction and Sections XII concerning Quantity/Quality and Section XIII concerning the negation of the negation.

For my sins, I have read it, and dozens of times, taking detailed notes. And yes, I did feel unclean as a result...

In the philosophical sections, Engels, like Hegel, just takes a handful of jargonised phrases for granted, and does not tell the reader what on earth they mean -- and neither have you.


The fact is that Engels is trying to prove that Marx did not rely on dialectical laws and he is articulating dialectical laws as laws that should not be relied on to prove empirical claims, and are not relied on by Marx. Now rather than re-do debates we have had before at greater levels of generality I think it is worthwhile to look at each of those sections and see what each section says.

This is what 'the official brochure' would have you believe, and you have clearly fallen for it --, but all along, Engels relies on a priori dogmatic 'propositions', all the while denying he is doing this.

I gave a few examples earlier, but they pepper his work, and that of nearly every other dialectician.

Hundreds of examples (no exaggeration) here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2002.htm

[Hyacinth]

What are these claims?
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.

[trivas7]

Well, that is where debates on this site get a bit unreal for me.

I found this article enlightening re Anti-Duhring:

http://www.marxist.com/georg-lukacs.htm


It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.
This quote is from Preface of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. It states the materialist conception of history, I deny that it is a claim re the world: only empirically verifiable statements are claims re the world. Which this is not.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


I deny that it is a claim re the world: only empirically verifiable statements are claims re the world. Which this is not.

What do you mean by 'verifiable'? A proposition can be verifiable, but yet not capble of being verified by us. For example:

There is a cuff link on Pluto.

That is verifiable, even if we might never verify it.

Here are a few more claims 're the world' which were at the time they were made verifiable:


A spectre is haunting Europe -- the spectre of communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.


To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London and sketched the following manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.


In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.

All from here:

http://www.anu.edu.au/polsci/marx/classics/manifesto.html

All of these were verifiable in Marx's day, even if they had not actually been verified.

I think you are confusing 'verifiable' with 'verified'.

And, a claim about the world can be false (hence not 'verifiable' in your sense); eg:

The Nile is shorter than the Thames.

This is manifestly 'about the world', but is false. Hence it is not only falsifiable, it has been falsified.

[If is it were not 'about the world', we would not be able to tell it was false.]

Looks like your philosophy of logic is no better than your logic.

And we are still waiting to hear from you what the 'limitations' of formal logic are.

[Mania]

If dialectics is null and void there is no materialist conception of history, no doctrine of the conditions of the liberation of the proletariat and no need to account for economics beyond that of Smith and Ricardo.

Really?


In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.

In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production – antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of existence – but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation.K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy

That approach is a materialist one, which doesn't resort to obscure philosophies but is able to explain what antagonisms exist in society via a materialist approach.

Introducing dialects to explain complex social/economic phenomena confuses the issues even more.

Solid historical materialism is all that is needed.

[Hyacinth]

This quote is from Preface of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. It states the materialist conception of history, I deny that it is a claim re the world: only empirically verifiable statements are claims re the world. Which this is not.
Not so. The proposition that people’s consciousness is determined by their social being, rather than vice versa, if true has certain implications for the how people behave. Hence we can make predictions based off of it. If it were the case the proposition were false it could be falsified by waiting to see if said predictions came true or not.

Were this claim truly metaphysical, and hence not falsifiable/verifiable, it would be the case that the world would look no different no matter what the truth value of said proposition.

[gilhyle]

Well I have studied four different subjects to a reasonably advanced level and one experience of mine is common to all four. When I studied philosophy it was my experience that even major philosophers were commonly mis-represented in secondary texts, or at least under-described, and that it is essential to read the original to have a good basis for understanding. In doing economics, I found that you should repeat a statistical or equilibrium analysis yourself - the devil is in the detail, dangerous simplifying assumptions are common and errors in statistical compilation are common (and zero sum nonchalance is wrong - they dont balance out). In studying law I found that reading the original judgement is essential and critically assessing the original judgement requires something no-one almost ever does - reviewing the original evidence. In studying history, I found (something commonly understood in that discipline at least !) that secondary sources were a very poor substitute for primary sources.

Furthermore I have found that in reading any writer a basic principle of economy applies - identify the intent of the author, identify the general tenor of his/her argument and identify any major tensions in the argument. When a text fits in with one or all of those three, treat it with respect. When a particular sentence does not fit in with those frameworks, treat it with suspicion because infelicities of composition are common in everyone's writings and are invaraibly exaggerated by the time and space that separates you from that author. This warning particularly applies if the anomalous sentence suits your purpose. Good scholarship requires caution. The common experience of one's views being distorted by a sentence being quoted out of context confirms this caution..

Therefore I am very slow to say that one does not need to read the original carefully and I am very slow to take one-liners from a text or any single phrase as proof of anything - sometimes its the best evidence available but then we should draw conclusions only with caveats of caution.

Consequently, we should pay close attention to the fact that in consideriing the law of quantity/quality, Engels is driven by Duhring having argued that "Contradiction is a category which can only appertain to a combination of thoughts but not to reality " [MECW 25 P. 110] and that "the antagonism of forces .....the basic form of all actions....does not in the slightest degree coincide with the idea of absurd contradiction"

The first thing to note is that it is Duhring, not Engels who initiated this methodology of making generalisations, whether a prior or analytic, and arguing that socialists should think within those limits, which significantly exceed the ordinary constraints of logic. It is this argument by Duhring which clearaly requires Engels to respond at that level. It is Duhring's introduction of a philosophical method, which requires Engels to reply with statements that have a philosophical form. Engels does not submit to this constraint without complaint. He complains about Duhring's philosophical method, using the word 'advantage' with evident irony, commenting that Duhring's method: "..has the further advantage that it offers no real foothold to an opponent, who is consequently left with almost no other possibility of reply than to make similar summary assertions in the grand style, to resort to general phrases and finaly thunder back" [MECW V.25 P. 115] Worth noting !!

I have already made these points, which I here repeat and already drawn attention to the treatment of contradiction in MECW 25 PP110-113.

By the way, in the widely sold Peking Foreign Languages Press edition of 1976, the pagination is PP 150-155 and the relevant link is here : http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch10.htm I quote from the MECW translation, which is slightly different from the marxists.org translation in places.

While I think there is one further thing to be considered about Engels treatment of dialectical contradiction, it is useful to go on first to look at how the law of quantity/quality i and negation/negation are dealt with and then consider how contradiction is dealt with in the light of that, because there are certain points that the treatment of quantity/quality and negation/negation forcefully illustrate which will help us in understanding what Engels means by dialectical contradiction.

When dealing with quantity/quality Duhring argues that Marx's method in Capital is characterised by a method of 'all is to be sought in each and each in all' (MECW V.25 P113) and further as containing 'mysterious dialectical rubbish' (Ibid) and as 'contriving dialectical miracles' (MECW V. 25 P. 114) .

For Engels it is a 'blunder' [Ibid] to identify marxist and hegelian dialectics, as Duhring does. But what Engels cannot deny is that Marx does indeed refer to the Law of the Transformation of Quantity into Quality, as Duhring points out.

Marx does indeed write that the possessor of money turns into a capitalist only when the amount of money involved exceeds a certain quantity, and then observes "Here as in natural science is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel in his Logic that merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences." The cross reference is not given precisely in Vol. 25. The correct cross reference is to MECW Volume 35 P.313. In the Lawrence and Wishart edition reprinted from 1954 on the reference is P. 292. In the alternative Penguin translation the page reference is P. 423. In the Peking edition it is P.308. The relevant link is here: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch11.htm The marxists.org version of the text has the advantage of including a reference to the 22nd June 1867 letter from Marx to Engels in which Marx gives some of the background to this citation of Hegel. That is in footnote 5 on that page.

So what is Engels to do given that Marx does indeed make use of the law ? Duhring is surely right that Marx proves his point by making reference to a dialectical law ? What would be the point of refering to a law if not to prove a point ? Well no, not as far as Engels is concerned. Engels explains "Herr Duhring attributes to Marx the opposite of what he really said " (MECW V.25 P116), and goes on to explain that Marx is arguiing not that transformation of moneyed persons into capitalists is proven by reference to the Law of Q/Q but rather that it is the Law which is supported by the fact that the addition of quantity causes a qualitiative transformation in this particular case supports the law. The law, he is arguing, cannot be relied on to prove the fact, but the fact supports the law. Now this, it seems to me a very important distinction that should be traced through any reading of Engels' uses of general laws - are they relied on to prove or are they cited as conclusions, i.e. as having been illustrated or exemplified by something independently established. Indeed, I suspect (and I throw it out as a testable proposition) that Engels never relies on a general dialectical law to prove any empirical claim, but instead always points to the manner in whch the independently established understanding exemplifies the relevant law.

That is certainly what he goes on to do, using the example of carbon compounds. It is quite clear that he is not proving that there are an homologous series of carbon compounds which vary by the addition of further quantities of the elements common to the whole series. He merely summarises the understanding of carbon compounds which has been independently proven in scientific experiments. What he is doing is pointing out that the carbon series complies with the law. It is not claimed that the comliance is necessary, which is important because if there was a discernable necessity in the compliance one could predict the pattern of such compounds by application of the law to the known conditions of the necessity of compliance with the law. But this conceptual framework is just not there is Engels elaboration of the example. Rather, Engels just claims that the pattern of transformation of quantitive change does occur - not that it always or, under any specifiable conditions, necessarily occurs....but merely that it does occur. He goes no further .....that is the END of his treatment of the transformation of quantity into quality.

Rosa suggests that we should look carefully for Engels relying on dialectical laws while denying that he does. Well, I see Engels relying on the science of Chemistry (i.e. the scientific analysis of carbon independent of any formal reliance on dialectical laws) and I see no reliance in this section on the law of Q/Q to prove any more particular propositions. Could anyone who sees a sentence or paragraph in this section on Q/Q which seems to them to do otherwise, please point that out.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


The first thing to note is that it is Duhring, not Engels who initiated this methodology of making generalisations, whether a prior or analytic, and arguing that socialists should think within those limits, which significantly exceed the ordinary constraints of logic. It is this argument by Duhring which clearaly requires Engels to respond at that level. It is Duhring's introduction of a philosophical method, which requires Engels to reply with statements that have a philosophical form. Engels does not submit to this constraint without complaint. He complains about Duhring's philosophical method, using the word 'advantage' with evident irony, commenting that Duhring's method: "..has the further advantage that it offers no real foothold to an opponent, who is consequently left with almost no other possibility of reply than to make similar summary assertions in the grand style, to resort to general phrases and finaly thunder back" [MECW V.25 P. 115] Worth noting !!

You must be congratulated (1) for writing (at last!) a post that stretches across more than a handful of paragraphs -- and (2) for managing to ignore the serious charges I laid at Engels's door.

For you, the first is almost unique, the second is, alas, almost stereotypical.

The fact that Eggels makes numerous a priori, dogmatic claims is not just a feature of Anti-Duhring, and it is a joke to suggest that he is merely responding to the agenda set by Duhring -- Engels does this in all his 'philosophical' works, and in many letters.

Here is what I have written about him in Essay Two:


The projection of DM-theses onto nature is not just an aberration of modern-day dialecticians; every DM-classicist has indulged extensively in the sport. For example, it can be found right throughout Engels's writings; indeed, in his classic text Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, he had this to say:

"Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically." [Engels (1892), pp.407, repeated in Engels (1976), p.28.]

To this may be added the following comment:

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954), p.211. Bold emphases added.]

But, how could Engels possibly have known all of this? How could he have known that nature does not operate "metaphysically", say, in distant regions of space and time, way beyond the edges of the known Universe of his day? Indeed, how could he have been so sure that, for example, there are no changeless objects anywhere in the entire universe? How could he have been so certain that the "life of nature" is in fact the result of a "conflict of opposites" -- or that some processes (in the whole of reality, for the whole of time) were not governed by non-dialectical factors? Where is his "carefully" collected evidence about every object and event in nature, past, present and future?

Notice that Engels did not say that "all the evidence collected" up until his day supported these contentions, or that "those parts of the world of which scientists" of his day were aware behaved in the way he indicated; he just referred to nature tout court, without qualification (i.e., "throughout nature" and "everywhere in nature"). In line with other DM-theorists, Engels signally failed to inform his readers of the whereabouts of the large finite set of "careful observations" upon which these wild generalisations had been based.

To be sure, he did say that nature itself confirms DM, but that looks more like a manifesto claim than a summary of the evidence -- especially if the 'evidence' he actually bothered to produce does not in fact support his theses, as we will see in later Essays.

And Engels didn't stop there; he made equally bold statements about other fundamental aspects of nature:

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted….

"A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases added.]

"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but a complex of processes, in which things apparently stable…, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away…." [Engels (1892), p.609. Bold emphases added.]

"Dialectics is the science of universal interconnection….

"The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa…[operates] in nature, in a manner fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or quantitative subtraction of matter or motion….
"Hence, it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion…. In this form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious.

"Motion in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe….

"Dialectics, so called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature…. [M]otion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature….

"The whole theory of gravity rests on saying that attraction is the essence of matter. This is necessarily false. Where there is attraction, it must be complemented by repulsion. Hence already Hegel was quite right in saying that the essence of matter is attraction and repulsion….

"The visible system of stars, the solar system, terrestrial masses, molecules and atoms, and finally ether particles, form each of them [a definite group]. It does not alter the case that intermediate links can be found between the separate groups…. These intermediate links prove only that there are no leaps in nature, precisely because nature is composed entirely of leaps." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 63, 69, 211, 244, 271. Bold emphases added.]

Once more, Engels forgot to say how he knew all these things were true. For example, how could he possibly have known that:

"Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphasis added.]

Neither matter without motion nor motion without matter is inconceivable, contrary to what Engels says. In fact, the contrary doctrine that matter is naturally motionless was itself imposed on nature by Aristotle; Engels's obverse imposition is no less unimpressive, and no less Idealist.

And here is another a priori deduction based only on the 'concepts' involved:

"[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence…[t]hen we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.]

Clearly, Engels possessed a truly remarkable skill: that of being able to say precisely what the fundamental features of reality are for all of space and time based on the alleged meanings of a few words. Indeed, Engels's claims about motion are all the more impressive when it is recalled that he made them in abeyance of any supportive evidence -- let alone a significant body of evidence. As it turns out (this will be demonstrated below), evidence would have been unnecessary anyway.

As we have already seen, all that an aspiring dialectician like Engels needs to do is briefly 'reflect' on the supposed meaning of a few words, and substantive truths about fundamental aspects of nature, for all of space and time, spring instantly to mind. Or, more honestly, all he/she has to do is copy such thoughts from Hegel. As we will also see, this is a key feature of ruling-class forms-of-thought, imported into the workers' movement by incautious non-workers like Engels.

Surprisingly then, the only 'evidence' that supports Engels's interpretation of motion is this highly compressed argument, which is itself based on a consideration of what a few innocent-looking words must mean. Pressed for a justification of this line of reasoning, all that Engels could possibly have offered by way of substantiation would have been a rather weak claim that this is what the word "motion" really means. Clearly, such a rejoinder would immediately give the game away since it would reveal that substantive truths about motion had indeed been derived from the meanings of words, and nothing more.

As noted above, an appeal to evidence would be irrelevant, anyway. This is because the examination of countless moving objects would fail to confirm Engels's assertion that they occupy two places at once -- no matter what instruments or devices were used to carry out these hypothetical observations, and regardless of the extent of the magnification used to that end, or the level of microscopic detail enlisted in support. No observation could confirm that a moving object is in two places at once, and in one of these and not in it at the same time. This, of course, explains why in Engels's day there was no scientific evidence whatsoever that supported his belief in the contradictory nature of motion, and thus why he listed none. This picture has not altered in the intervening years (indeed, no book or article on DM ever quotes any) --, and this situation is not likely ever to change.

It could be objected to this that if, say, a photograph were taken of a moving object, it would show by means of the recorded blur, perhaps, that such a body had occupied several places at once. In that case, therefore, there is, or could be, evidence to support Engels's claims.
However, the problem with this is that no matter how fast the shutter speed, a camera can't record an instant in time, merely an interval. Clearly, to verify the claim that a moving object occupies at least two places in the same instant, a physical recording of an instant would be required. Since instants (i.e., in the sense required) are mathematical fictions, it is not possible to record them.

Moreover, not even a mathematical limiting process could capture such ghostly 'entities' in the physical world, whatever else it might do in theory. But even if one could be found that did this, no camera (or radar device, or piece of equipment) could record it. Hence, even if an appeal to mathematical limiting processes was both viable and/or available, it would be of no assistance. No experiment could conceivably substantiate any of the conclusions Engels reached.

And that explains why he and those who accept these ideas have to force this view of motion onto nature.

[The many errors this passge contains are exposed here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2005.htm]

Consider another passage, this time taken from a letter written by Engels:

"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975), pp.457-58.]

There are several puzzling things about this passage (which will have to be left until later), but how could Engels possibly have known that concepts and things interrelate in the way he alleges? In fact, if he were right, in order for him to conclude what he does about "things" (with which he admits knowledge of his (or perhaps any other) day never coincides), he must have extrapolated way beyond the state of knowledge in the late nineteenth century -- and, as the next quotation below indicates, way beyond any conceivable state of knowledge.

Worse still: if things never "coincide" with their own concepts, then on that basis alone Engels could not have known that even this much was correct. Plainly, if he did know this, then at least one concept -- namely the one Engels was using -- would have coincided with its object.

Clearly, such semi-divine confidence could only have arisen from: (1) Engels's own imposition of this a priori thesis on to nature, and/or (2) from the a priori Idealist principles Engels admits he lifted from Hegel -- but not from perusing the 'book' of nature, or from collecting evidence, either "patiently" or impatiently.

As should seem obvious, if reality is permanently beyond our grasp then anything anyone says about 'it' must of necessity be imposed on 'it' (that is, if we insist on depicting things in such obscure ways).

The next passage from Engels simply underlines this point:

"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.233-35.]

But, if no concept (ever) matches reality fully, how could Engels have known any of this? How could he possibly know that "All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, or that it is essentially absolute..."? Either he was in possession of such absolute knowledge when he wrote this (which would have meant, once again, that at least one concept matched reality, namely this one), or he was himself infinitely wrong.

Of course, we know the answer to this question already: Engels was able to foist all this on reality because that is exactly what Hegel did, and it is exactly what traditional Philosophers have always done; he simply copied them.

However, no doubt the infinite (or even large finite) amount of evidence that Engels meant to include in Dialectics of Nature, which would have been necessary to justify these quasi-theological claims, and which has been mislaid in the meantime, will turn up one day.

Engels, F. (1888), Ludwig Feuerbach And The End Of Classical German Philosophy, reprinted in Marx and Engels (1968), pp.584-622.

--------, (1892), Socialism: Utopian And Scientific, in Marx and Engels (1968), pp 375-428.

--------, (1954), Dialectics Of Nature (Progress Publishers).

--------, (1976), Anti-Dühring (Foreign Languages Press).

Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1968), Selected Works In One Volume (Lawrence & Wishart).

--------, (1975), Selected Correspondence (Progress Publishers, 3rd ed.).

Practically every single dialectician, from Engels to Zizek, from Plekhanov to Ollman, from Lenin to Gilhyle, does the same -- they impose their a priori shemas on the world, just like the born again Idealists they are. Proof here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2002.htm


and goes on to explain that Marx is arguiing not that transformation of moneyed persons into capitalists is proven by reference to the Law of Q/Q but rather that it is the Law which is supported by the fact that the addition of quantity causes a qualitiative transformation in this particular case supports the law. The law, he is arguing, cannot be relied on to prove the fact, but the fact supports the law. Now this, it seems to me a very important distinction that should be traced through any reading of Engels' uses of general laws - are they relied on to prove or are they cited as conclusions, i.e. as having been illustrated or exemplified by something independently established. Indeed, I suspect (and I throw it out as a testable proposition) that Engels never relies on a general dialectical law to prove any empirical claim, but instead always points to the manner in whch the independently established understanding exemplifies the relevant law.

1) Marx's reference to this 'law', is as he himslef points out in Kapital, just anohter example of him 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon.

2) Engles does not tell us what a 'quality' is, so it is impossible to decide if the examples he gives are apposite or not.

3) Whatever is done with this 'law' the facts of nature and society refute it:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

Small wonder then that Marx abandoned it.


Rosa suggests that we should look carefully for Engels relying on dialectical laws while denying that he does. Well, I see Engels relying on the science of Chemistry (i.e. the scientific analysis of carbon independent of any formal reliance on dialectical laws) and I see no reliance in this section on the law of Q/Q to prove any more particular propositions. Could anyone who sees a sentence or paragraph in this section on Q/Q which seems to them to do otherwise, please point that out.

The quotations above show that Engels does far more than you suggest.


Therefore I am very slow to say that one does not need to read the original carefully and I am very slow to take one-liners from a text or any single phrase as proof of anything - sometimes its the best evidence available but then we should draw conclusions only with caveats of caution.

And yet you are happy to conclude that Marx and Engels agreed on the dialectic based on just such isolated quotations!

And we are still waiting on a clear explanation of a 'dialectical contradiction'.

[trivas7]

[/I]That approach is a materialist one, which doesn't resort to obscure philosophies but is able to explain what antagonisms exist in society via a materialist approach.

You err to think that dialectics resorts to "obscure philosophies". Historical materialism is the dialectic of the materialist conception of history. This is what makes it a science.

[trivas7]

Were this claim truly metaphysical, and hence not falsifiable/verifiable, it would be the case that the world would look no different no matter what the truth value of said proposition.
Verifiable doesn't mean that predictions based on it come to pass. That makes soothsaying a science. If the claim were verifiable why don't all bourgeois sociologists and scientists simply verify it and acknowledge it as fact? Because there's no way to verify it experimentally.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Because there's no way to verify it experimentally.

And how do you know?

And why do 'experiments' matter? Social science uses other ways to verify its propositions.

And, once more, you are confusing 'verifiable' with 'verified'.

I gave several examples of indicative sentences from Marx which were verifiable, even if some or all of them have not yet been verified.

You have dealt with this in your usual way -- by ignoring it.


Historical materialism is the dialectic of the materialist conception of history.

So you keep saying, but you go very quiet when asked to prove it, or even show that Marx accepted this.

[trivas7]

And we are still waiting to hear from you what the 'limitations' of formal logic are.
The following by Marx is an example of dialectical logic:


At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or -- what is but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution.


What is this statement expressed in formal logic?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or -- what is but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution.

1) This is from his pre-Das Kapital stage, at which point Marx abandoned these Hegelian, and inexplicable categories -- as I have shown here many times.

2) You will note anyway that Marx does not use the word 'contradiction' here; what he says in this passage is quite acceptable to us genuine materialists.

3) Moreover, even if the offending phrase were in this passage, an example does not explain the term 'dialectical contradiction' any more than a passage from the Bible explains who/what 'god' is -- not that this passage even tries to explain it.

But, we still lack a clear explanation (or even any explanation) of what these mysterious entites actually are.

So, instead of prevaricating, why don't you tell us?

If dialectics were quite a wonderful as you seem to think, that should be a doddle.

Who knows, you might get lucky, and be the first person in 200 years to explain it...

4) If this were a 'dialectical contradiction' then according to the dialectical prophets I quoted in that other thread, the "material productive forces of society" must change inot the "existing relations of production" and vice versa!

Well, do they?

No wonder Marx eliminated this Hegelian twaddle from Das Kapital!

Numerous quotes from the aformentioned Dialectical Holy Men -- to show that they believed nature and society were suffused with 'unities of opposites'/'internal contradictions', and that struggle was between such opposites, and that these opposites turn onto one another -- were listed here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1167402&postcount=249


What is this statement expressed in formal logic?

Why does it have to be in Formal logic (it can be translated into the formal mode, but that would tell us less than the ordinary language version)?

Where do I say that Marx can be translated into Formal logic?

What I do say is that dialectical logic cannot handle change whereas Formal Logic can -- not that we have to use the latter (since ordinary language is far more useful and flexible).

So, can we see your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot handle change?

And I note you are still ignoring my point that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The first sentence would be:

(x)(y)Et[Mxt & Ryt -> Cxyt]


At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production

Where '(x)' and '(y)' are universal quantifiers; 'E' is the existential quantifier; 't' is a temporal variable (standing for 'a certain stage in development'); 'M( )' is a predicate variable standing for 'material productive forces'; 'R( )' is the same but standing for 'relations of production'; and 'C( )' the same too but standing for '...comes into conflcit with... at that time'; '->' is the implication arrow, i.e., 'if..then'.

The rest can be translated along similar lines -- but to little avail, as I pointed out in my previous post.

I am reading the word 'existing' here (as in "existing relations of production") as 'at the same time as'. If this is rejected, then the quantifiers will need to be adjusted, or an 'existence' predicate introduced -- but, that is just a mere technicality.

But, it is worth noting that formal logic does not imply that the relations of production turn onto the forces of production, as dialectical 'logic' would have it.:lol:

[trivas7]

But, it is worth noting that formal logic does not imply that the relations of production turn onto the forces of production, as dialectical 'logic' would have it.
At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production thus revolutionizing them. This is what can't be expressed in formal logic, thus its limitation.

[gilhyle]

Sorry to hear that response, Rosa. See, Im not interested at this point in whether someone called 'Engels' deduced anything from dialectical laws....what I am interested in is whether the Anti Duhring does that.

And when I actually read the text....what do I see ? I see that text as actually arguing the opposite, at least in the parts I have just looked at.

I think it would helpful, constructive even, to look at the part I just looked at and see if you can find Engels IN THAT PART of Anti Duhring (i.e the part dealing with Q/Q) drawing conclusions from dialectical laws rather than relying on indepedently established understandings to exemplify dialectical laws.

In that way, collectively, it becomes possible to move beyond 'oh yes he did' / 'oh no he didnt'....without relying on external reference to arguments you or some other writer may have made elsewhere, all of which just raises a whole load of other related but not identical issues.

As I said in my last text, its important to go back to primary sources....and if we did it together, perish the thought, but we might find areas of agreement.

For example, I dont know what conclusions you draw from the fact that Engels explicitly opposes the use of dialectical laws to prove things (at this point). I dont know what conclusions you draw from the proposition (which you seem from your previous two posts to hold - correct me if Im wrong ) that rather than consistently advocating reliance on dialectical laws Engels either a) sometimes advocates that and sometimes advocates the opposite (I have, in this reading, still to move on to any section of the Anti Duhring where he does that) or b) advocates non-reliance but accidentally falls into it. Im not sure which, if either of those you believe or whether you have any regard at all to the fact that Engels at times (as I have just read) rejects reliance on dialectical laws to prove things.

[trivas7]

^^Gilhyle, you are pissing in the wind if you think Rosa is going to engage you in any of this. Idees fixes are just that.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Sorry to hear that response, Rosa. See, Im not interested at this point in whether someone called 'Engels' deduced anything from dialectical laws....what I am interested in is whether the Anti Duhring does that.

For sure he/it does the quotes I gave show that.


I see that text as actually arguing the opposite, at least in the parts I have just looked at

And that is a feature of the writings of all dialecticians; they say thay are not doing this, then they proceed to do the opposite.

Deductions speak louder than words...


I think it would helpful, constructive even, to look at the part I just looked at and see if you can find Engels IN THAT PART of Anti Duhring (i.e the part dealing with Q/Q) drawing conclusions from dialectical laws rather than relying on indepedently established understandings to exemplify dialectical laws.

Yes, he uses it to interpret organic chemisrty in a certain light -- had he looked at all the evidence from chemistry, he would not have concluded as he did.

He also used Q/Q to interpret the ambiguous fighting skills of the mamelukes, and he used it to impose his view on boiling water -- all in the same Q/Q section of Anti-D. You forgot to mention these in your long post!

Classic examples of imposing this 'law' on specially selected examples.

Unfortunately, none of the instances he quotes work anyway.


As I said in my last text, its important to go back to primary sources....and if we did it together, perish the thought, but we might find areas of agreement.

Fine sentiments -- which you reject when it comes to Das Kapital and Marx's rejection of dialectics as you understand it.


For example, I dont know what conclusions you draw from the fact that Engels explicitly opposes the use of dialectical laws to prove things (at this point). I dont know what conclusions you draw from the proposition (which you seem from your previous two posts to hold - correct me if Im wrong ) that rather than consistently advocating reliance on dialectical laws Engels either a) sometimes advocates that and sometimes advocates the opposite (I have, in this reading, still to move on to any section of the Anti Duhring where he does that) or b) advocates non-reliance but accidentally falls into it. Im not sure which, if either of those you believe or whether you have any regard at all to the fact that Engels at times (as I have just read) rejects reliance on dialectical laws to prove things.

Once more you have opted to believe what he says, and not look at what he does.

That is about as unwise as relying on what George W says, but ignoring what he does.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Gilhyle, you are pissing in the wind if you think Rosa is going to engage you in any of this. Idees fixes are just that.

You are a fine one to talk -- you refuse to enage at any level, and just post one-liners, like this:


Thus the limitations of formal logic.

So, you think the relations of production turn into the forces of production, and vice versa, that factories, and railway systems etc., actually turn into class relations of ownership, etc., and vice versa?

Are you that confused?

I fear you are.:ohmy:

And you are the one with the idees fixes -- who dogmatically clings to ancient and mystical ways of viewing reality, pontificating about formal logic from a position of total ignorance.

You demand answers of me, but you refuse to respond to any of mine -- for example, we still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.

[trivas7]

So, you think the relations of production turn into the forces of production, and vice versa, that factories, and railways systems etc., actually turn into class relations of ownership, etc., and vice versa?

No, these are your words. I put it correctly: At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production thus revolutionizing them (the relations of production).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas -- with yet another one-liner:


No, these are your words. I put it correctly: At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production thus revolutionizing them (the relations of production).

But, according to the Dialectical Holy Men (who I quote at length in that other thread -- now repeated below; I even provided the link!), whatever is in struggle turns into that which it struggles against.

Now Marx certainly did not believe that, but your loopy theory implies it.

It implies that the forces of production turn into the relations of production!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here it is again (quoted to assist your failing memory):


"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Hegel (1975), p.174.]

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and. their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., p.212-13.]

"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Ibid., p.179.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [i]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285. The translation in the edition I have consulted reads differently from the one Lenin used; Hegel is referring to "tones" here, not "things", as the reference to "harmony" indicates.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical,—under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]

"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature....

"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes." [Stalin (1976b), pp.836, 840.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....

"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....

"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end....[Ibid, pp.311-18.]

"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….

"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite.” [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]

"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]

"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]

"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), 94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.]

"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….

"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]

"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….

"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….

"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….

"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other...'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels.]

"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.

"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, expressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....

"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]

"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'

"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.

"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.

"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)

"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.

"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.' [Rob Sewell.]

References and links can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...Explain-Change

It would not be difficult to double or even treble the length of this list of quotations (as anyone who has access to as many books and articles on dialectics as I have will attest), all saying the same thing.

[trivas7]

But, according to the Dialectical Holy Men (who I quote at length in that other thread -- now repeated below; I even provided the link!), whatever is in struggle turns into that which it struggles against.

It implies that the forces of production turn into the relations of production!
This shows me that you don't know what you're talking about. It behooves you to know how dialectics works re the social process before criticizing it as a science.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


This shows me that you don't know what you're talking about. It behooves you to know how dialectics works re the social process before criticizing it as a science.

In that case, you must disagree with the dialectical classicists (and others) I quoted above, which means that you now have no theory of change.

At least Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov had a theory of change (even if it does not work) -- you do not.

However, far from me not 'knowing what I am talking about', this 'theory' of yours implies opposites in struggle change into one another, and that the forces of production must therefore change into the relations of production, and vice versa; hence I rather think you do not know your own 'theory'!

You have never really given this any thought until now have you? So it is easier to bad-mouth me than face the crazy consequences of the theory you have uncritically swallowed.

And we still await (1) an explanation of 'dialectical contradiction', (2) an admission that you confused 'verifiable' with 'verified', and (3) your refutation of my proof that your 'theory' cannot explain change.

[trivas7]

And we still await (1) an explanation of 'dialectical contradiction', (2) an admission that you confused 'verifiable' with 'verified', and (3) your refutation of my proof that your 'theory' cannot explain change.
Your battle is really with philosophy qua philosophic -- anyone's philosophy as such -- and not dialectics per se, R.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Your battle is really with philosophy qua philosophic -- anyone's philosophy as such -- and not dialectics per se, R.

Indeed, but whereas the ideas of the philosophical 'greats' (such as, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Anselm, Aquinas, Suarez, Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley, Hume, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer...) fall apart with great difficulty, those of philosophical incompetents (like Hegel, Engels, and Lenin) fall apart almost of themselves. Even you should be able to see that their 'theory' of change does not work.

So, and once more: we still await (1) an explanation of 'dialectical contradiction', (2) an admission that you confused 'verifiable' with 'verified', and (3) your refutation of my proof that your 'theory' cannot explain change.

[gilhyle]

Well. Rosa, I dont think just refering me to your website is quite reasonable. To engage with any writer involves unpacking the rhetorical structure that person builds up, engaging with their particular formulatiions and, therefore, restructuring one's own understanding to create a sphere of engagement. For me to do that with Engels, and for you to do that with Engels is a reasonable demand on both of us - as all three of us share a common tradition (however disparate the points in that tradition from which we each come.) But to ask me to orientate to your text rather than the ground between us both (namely Engels' text) is unreasonable.

However, lets not ramble on about that. I am somewhat focused on what I think is your view that Engels relies on dialectical laws to prove conclusions. I find that somewhat difficult to envisage since he is actually arguing that one should not rely on dialectical laws to draw conclusions.....it seems somewhat unlikely that any writer would rely on reference to a dialectical law to prove that one should not rely on reference to dialectical laws ! The error would be somewhat transparent to say the least.


But perhaps, as the part of Anti Duhring concerned with philosophy develops, it broadens out to other issues where this form of argument (which Engels has argued is false) can slip into his methodology. Lets consider what he goes on to say about the law of the negation of the negation.


Here again, you may be surprised to learn we begin by reading about a claim by Duhring that Marx relied on a dialectical law to prove a conclusion. ....in this case the conclusion that capitalism will be succeeded by socialism. Duhring complains that "The Hegelian negation of the negation in default of anything better and clearer has in fact to serve here (i.e. in Part VIII of Volume One of Capital - GH) as the midwife to deliver the future from the womb of the present" [MECW V.25 P.120) Once again, Engels sneers at the very idea that Marx would rely on a dialectical law in this way....it seems to him a ridiculous idea. Once again, Engels faces a problem....because once again there is the undeniable fact that Marx does indeed refer to the Law of the negation of the negation. Once again, Engels thinks he has a way to defend Marx against this charge which he, Engels, considers scurilous, of relying on a dialectical law to prove that socialism will follow capitalism.


But before going on to that, let us just note for the record what Marx actually wrote, the odd fact now and then never going amiss. It comes just after one of the most stirring passages in Vol One of Capital, a passage less often quoted by revolutionaries than it should be, no doubt because the 20th century was a century of voluntarism among revolutionaries. Marx explains how the development of capitalist accumulation, having turned all labourers into proletarians then goes on, via the centralisation of capital, to the point where the socialisation of production becomes incompatible with "their capitalist integument". With evident glee Marx continues: "Thus integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." (MECW Vol 35 P.750). Great stuff ! But then on Marx goes, in his excited condition, poor lad, embarrassingly to state the following : " The Capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation." (MECW Vol 35 P. 751.) Let us again add in the alternative references, should anyone have difficulty finding it: Lawrence and Wishart edition: P.715, Penguin/NLB Edition P. 929. and the link: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch32.htm

Seems once more that Duhring has a point. Surely this time Engels (who according to Rosa believes that its OK to draw conclusions from dialectical laws ) will just concede, admit Marx drew a conclusion from a dialectical law and defiantly respond that there is nothing wrong with that ! But no ! Once again, Engels enters into battle to prove that Marx did no such thing and that is not what dialectical laws are, anyway.....Strange behaviour you would think for a man who, so Rosa tells us (and she has apparently proven this !), believes after all that it IS ok to refer to dialectical laws to prove more particular things.

Engels first explains how Duhring has actually misunderstood the role of the concept of property in the manner in which he reads this text by Marx. Ah you might think, Engels sidesteps the embarrassing issue...but no ! On he goes after that, to make once again the same point he had already made in relation to the law of Q/Q. Engels argues "...by characterising the process as the negation of the negation , Marx does not intend to prove that the process was historically necessary. On the contrary: only after he has proved from history that in fact the process has partially already occured, and partially must occur in the future, he, in addition characterises it as a process which develops in accordance with a definite dialectical law." (MECW Vol 25 P. 124).

And even that isnt the end of the matter. Engels, who according to Rosa can be proven to have believed that it is OK to prove propositions by appeal to dialectical laws, then goes on to say that having suggested that Marx would try to deduce a fact from a dialectical law, has shown that he (Duhring) has a "total lack of understanding of the nature of dialectics". (MECW 25 P. 125)

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that trying to reconcile Rosa's claim that Engels believed that dialectical laws can be used to prove things and what is written here by Engels is getting very difficult. Apparently what we have before us now (in black and white on the page) is the words of a man - Engels - who Rosa tells us can be proven to have BELIEVED that dialectical laws can legitimately be used to prove things, actually telling us that he believes that anyone who thinks that dialectics can be used as a "...proof-producing instrument, as limited mind might look upon formal logic or elementary mathematics.." (Ibid) has a total lack of understanding of the nature of dialectics.

Could it possibly be that the extended evidence before our eyes - the long articulated passages, repeated in different sections of the book - should bear more weight than isolated sentences taken out of context ? Could it possibly be that whatever Engels did in practice (and we can go through all his texts on this thread, if need be, to find out what he did in practice), what he actually BELIEVED was what he deliberately, reflectively wrote, at length, namely that dialectical laws are NOT to be used as a proof producing instrument. Engels goes on for a further page to reemphasise that dialectics is not about 'proof'.

Then, as he did previously with the Law of Q/Q, he proceeds to explain what the law of the negation of the negation is....and I can now go on to that, but this post is already too long.

(BTW interesting is it not, that on both cited occasions on which Marx has used a dialectical law he has included a strictly unnecessary aside referencing laws of nature...but that is by the by.)

[trivas7]

So, and once more: we still await (1) an explanation of 'dialectical contradiction', (2) an admission that you confused 'verifiable' with 'verified', and (3) your refutation of my proof that your 'theory' cannot explain change.
But any reply is moot because you eschew philosophy.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Well. Rosa, I dont think just refering me to your website is quite reasonable.

And your referring anyone to Anti-Duhring is even less reasonable, if not positively cruel.


I find that somewhat difficult to envisage since he is actually arguing that one should not rely on dialectical laws to draw conclusions.....it seems somewhat unlikely that any writer would rely on reference to a dialectical law to prove that one should not rely on reference to dialectical laws ! The error would be somewhat transparent to say the least.

Dear me; it takes about a dozen or so reminders these days before a point sinks in with you: Yes I know what he says, but what he actually does belies this.


Here again, you may be surprised to learn we begin by reading about a claim by Duhring that Marx relied on a dialectical law to prove a conclusion. ....in this case the conclusion that capitalism will be succeeded by socialism. Duhring complains that "The Hegelian negation of the negation in default of anything better and clearer has in fact to serve here (i.e. in Part VIII of Volume One of Capital - GH) as the midwife to deliver the future from the womb of the present" [MECW V.25 P.120) Once again, Engels sneers at the very idea that Marx would rely on a dialectical law in this way....it seems to him a ridiculous idea. Once again, Engels faces a problem....because once again there is the undeniable fact that Marx does indeed refer to the Law of the negation of the negation. Once again, Engels thinks he has a way to defend Marx against this charge which he, Engels, considers scurilous, of relying on a dialectical law to prove that socialism will follow capitalism.

Yes, this was in Marx's 'coquetting' phase, so why the fuss?


Seems once more that Duhring has a point. Surely this time Engels (who according to Rosa believes that its OK to draw conclusions from dialectical laws ) will just concede, admit Marx drew a conclusion from a dialectical law and defiantly respond that there is nothing wrong with that ! But no ! Once again, Engels enters into battle to prove that Marx did no such thing and that is not what dialectical laws are, anyway.....Strange behaviour you would think for a man who, so Rosa tells us (and she has apparently proven this !), believes after all that it IS ok to refer to dialectical laws to prove more particular things.

Engels is clearly ambivalent here, and this is why (from Essay Two):

For all their claims to be radical, when it comes to Philosophy, DM-theorists are surprisingly conservative (but worryingly incapable of seeing this, even after it has been pointed out to them). At a rhetorical level, such conservatism is camouflaged behind what appear to be a set of disarmingly modest denials --, which are then immediately ignored.

The quotations recorded below (and in Note 1) show that DM-theorists are anxious to deny that their system is wholly or even partly a priori, or that it has been imposed on the world and not merely read from it. However, the way that dialecticians actually phrase their ideas contradicts these superficially honest claims, showing quite clearly that the opposite is in fact the case.

This inadvertent dialectical inversion -- wherein what DM-theorists say about what they do is the reverse of what they do with what they say -- neatly mirrors the distortion to which traditional philosophy has subjected language (outlined in Essay Three Parts One and Two, and in Essay Twelve).

However, unlike dialecticians, traditional metaphysicians were open and candid about what they were doing; indeed, they brazenly imposed their a priori theories on reality and hung the consequences.

Because dialecticians have a novel (but nonetheless defective) view both of Metaphysics and FL (on the latter, see here), they seem oblivious of the fact that they are just as ready as traditional metaphysicians are to impose their ideas on the world, and equally blind to the fact that in so-doing they are aping the alienated thought-forms of those whose society they seek to abolish.

Naturally, this means that their 'radical' guns were spiked before they were loaded; with such weapons, it's small wonder then that DM-theorists fire nothing but philosophical blanks.

[FL = Formal Logic; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

Dialectics is a conservative theory precisely because its adherents have adopted the distorted methods, a priori thought-forms and meaningless jargon of traditional Philosophy.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2002.htm

So, Engels would naturally deny he is using dialectics to derive things (since that would make him an idealist), but then he proceeds to do the exact opposite.

And where have I said this:


so Rosa tells us (and she has apparently proven this !), believes after all that it IS ok to refer to dialectical laws to prove more particular things

You see, you are once again up to your old tricks, inventing things to put in my mouth. And, just like before, you won't apologise, but it is safe to say that you will pull this trick many more times...


Engels first explains how Duhring has actually misunderstood the role of the concept of property in the manner in which he reads this text by Marx. Ah you might think, Engels sidesteps the embarrassing issue...but no ! On he goes after that, to make once again the same point he had already made in relation to the law of Q/Q. Engels argues "...by characterising the process as the negation of the negation , Marx does not intend to prove that the process was historically necessary. On the contrary: only after he has proved from history that in fact the process has partially already occured, and partially must occur in the future, he, in addition characterises it as a process which develops in accordance with a definite dialectical law." (MECW Vol 25 P. 124).

But, where have I said that Marx derives theses from a priori truths? Hence, it is very easy for Engels to see Duhring off at this point. That is because Marx does not do what Duhring says. I agree with you on this.

But, that has no bearing on my claim that Engels, just like practically every other dialectician, is happy to impose dogmatically a priori theses on nature and society.

I gave you several exampls, and referred you to my site for literally hundreds more.

Deal with those, not with examples drawn from Marx which were not part of my allegations.


And even that isnt the end of the matter. Engels, who according to Rosa can be proven to have believed that it is OK to prove propositions by appeal to dialectical laws, then goes on to say that having suggested that Marx would try to deduce a fact from a dialectical law, has shown that he (Duhring) has a "total lack of understanding of the nature of dialectics". (MECW 25 P. 125)

And, once more I have never claimed Marx did this, and far from it being a "total lack of understanding of the nature of dialectics", it is integral to its apriorism.

You just keep accepting Engels word for it, but ignore his actual practice.

Again, I have made this point several times -- your short-term memory is not too good tonight. Is it ever?


Apparently what we have before us now (in black and white on the page) is the words of a man - Engels - who Rosa tells us can be proven to have BELIEVED that dialectical laws can legitimately be used to prove things, actually telling us that he believes that anyone who thinks that dialectics can be used as a "...proof-producing instrument, as limited mind might look upon formal logic or elementary mathematics.." (Ibid) has a total lack of understanding of the nature of dialectics.

Not so, as I have just said: it is intergal to the aprioristic methodology dialecticians have inherited from Hegel -- which is why they all do it.

Moreover, I have never asserted this:


"...proof-producing instrument, as limited mind might look upon formal logic or elementary mathematics.."

It is in your interest, once again, to misrepresent what I have said; I would never claim that anyone could 'prove' anything using dialectics, since it is impossible to use such a confused system to prove anything.

What I have said is that Engels is quite happy to impose dialectics on nature and society as an a priori schema, and I gave you several examples. This allows him to 'derive' theses that are true for all of space and time, based on Hegelian jargon, or Hegelian thought-forms.


Could it possibly be that the extended evidence before our eyes - the long articulated passages, repeated in different sections of the book - should bear more weight than isolated sentences taken out of context ? Could it possibly be that whatever Engels did in practice (and we can go through all his texts on this thread, if need be, to find out what he did in practice), what he actually BELIEVED was what he deliberately, reflectively wrote, at length, namely that dialectical laws are NOT to be used as a proof producing instrument. Engels goes on for a further page to reemphasise that dialectics is not about 'proof'.

No isolated sentences; Engels work is peppered with such things.

And I note once more that you question my alleged appeal to 'isolated' passages, taken 'out of context' to establish my claims, while you are quite happy to do this with respect to the alleged agreement between Marx and Engels over their acceptance of dialectics.

Again you apply a double standard.


Then, as he did previously with the Law of Q/Q, he proceeds to explain what the law of the negation of the negation is....and I can now go on to that, but this post is already too long.

But Engels did not derive the Q/Q 'law' from evidence, he copied it from Hegel, who likewise imposed it on a few carefully selected examples (which do not work anyway), and which examples Engels also copied!

And the same goes for the other 'laws' -- all copied from Hegel, with only a defective 'logical' argument to back them up, and no evidence.

You need to deal with this -- points I have made many times -- rather than bang on about irrelevant issues, as you regularly do.


(BTW interesting is it not, that on both cited occasions on which Marx has used a dialectical law he has included a strictly unnecessary aside referencing laws of nature...but that is by the by.)

All in his 'coquetting' phase, so we can take them with a pinch of non-dialectical salt.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


But any reply is moot because you eschew philosophy.

However, unlike you, I do not just post one-liners, or just flatly reject philosophy. In general I explain why I take the line I do -- I try to engage in argument (unless comrades become abusive or start lying --, or make stuff up, like Gil, here).

So, this is just a cop-out on your part.

Once more: we still await (1) an explanation of 'dialectical contradiction', (2) an admission that you confused 'verifiable' with 'verified', and (3) your refutation of my proof that your 'theory' cannot explain change.

[gilhyle]

Gil:
And where have I said this:


so Rosa tells us (and she has apparently proven this !), believes after all that it IS ok to refer to dialectical laws to prove more particular things



You see, you are once again up to your old tricks, inventing things to put in my mouth. And, just like before, you won't apologise, but it is safe to say that you will pull this trick many more times...

I think your grasp of syntax is letting you down there. The full quote is as follows:


Strange behaviour you would think for a man who, so Rosa tells us (and she has apparently proven this !), believes after all that it IS ok to refer to dialectical laws to prove more particular things.


The verb 'believes' clearly refers back to 'man'. However, I can see how you might have misread it. My own syntax is rather germanic. But be assured that there is no intention to suggest that YOU believe that it is OK to refer to dialectical laws to prove more particular things. You patently do not....and nor do I and nor does Engels.

But let me come back in a moment on the substantial points you make in your post.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


I think your grasp of syntax is letting you down there. The full quote is as follows:

Not so, I have never claimed this of Engels.

Your grasp of reality is letting you down.


The verb 'believes' clearly refers back to 'man'. However, I can see how you might have misread it. My own syntax is rather germanic. But be assured that there is no intention to suggest that YOU believe that it is OK to refer to dialectical laws to prove more particular things. You patently do not....and nor do I and nor does Engels.

Note my previous comment.

What a pity you do not subject the confused ramblings of Hegel and Engels to such scrutiny.

If you did, you'd become a materialist almost immediately...


But let me come back in a moment on the substantial points you make in your post.

If it's like your other posts, don't bother.

Just post a few pages from Enid Blyton -- we might as well have proper fiction instead.

http://i66.photobucket.com/albums/h248/stuarttil/noddy.jpg

[gilhyle]

Well that is an interesting clarification. I certainly believed that you believed that Engels had the practice of refering to dialectical laws to prove things and further believed that that was OK. But no....interesting.

You have an alternative reading of the Anti Duhring which needs consideration at this point. Let me TRY to restate what that perspective is, based on your last post but one, and see if you agree that that is your suggestion. The core of your suggestion is that Engels does the reverse of what he says he does. This suggestion would be, I think, that Engels says that he never uses dialectical laws to prove things (and believes that he does not do so), but actually does use dialectical laws to prove things. Not quite sure if the last part is precise. The word you use in your post is to 'impose' dialectical laws. Your phrase is to suggest that Engels is: "happy to impose dogmatically a priori theses on nature and society."

To test this reading of Anti Duhring, we could do with just a bit more clarity on what 'impose' means. No doubt its on your website, but if you can summaraise that here, that would be helpful. Let me set the scene a bit and then you can, if you will, elaborate just a little on what 'impose' means for you in this context.

Can I refer you back to my earlier post where I sugested a distinction I thought relevant, keeping in mind that in that post of mine 'he' refers to Engels and the relevant law was the law of Q/Q. The quote from my ealier post is:


The law, he is arguing, cannot be relied on to prove the fact, but the fact supports the law. Now this, it seems to me a very important distinction that should be traced through any reading of Engels' uses of general laws - are they relied on to prove or are they cited as conclusions, i.e. as having been illustrated or exemplified by something independently established. Indeed, I suspect (and I throw it out as a testable proposition) that Engels never relies on a general dialectical law to prove any empirical claim, but instead always points to the manner in whch the independently established understanding exemplifies the relevant law.

Against that background, I think it would be useful to differentiate between your concept of 'imposition' and my concept of exemplification. in order to be as precise as possible in the reading of Anti Duhring. By the way, if this helps, I am aware of your text in I think 4(b)(2) of Essay Two about 'imposition' and what that means in relation to Engels general claims linking matter and motion (something you then come back to in Essay 13), but what I dont have a handle on, from any of that that, is how this applies to the Law of Q/Q or the Law of the Negation of the Negation, as used by Engels in Anti Duhring. What would it mean to read Engels in Anti Duhring as 'imposing' the Laws of Q/Q or N/N ? Or maybe you think his use of those laws in that particular text is unproblematic and that his putative flaws lie elsewhere.

(Personal note: I had a plastic Noddy toy as a child, one of my favourite toys, which I still keep. Noddy was smarter than people think.)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Well that is an interesting clarification. I certainly believed that you believed that Engels had the practice of refering to dialectical laws to prove things and further believed that that was OK. But no....interesting.

Well, when it comes to my work, you clearly live in a world of your own -- or you automatically go into 'invent' mode (just like other DM-fans).

This is not the first time, nor will it be the last.

See, here is another example:


You have an alternative reading of the Anti Duhring which needs consideration at this point. Let me TRY to restate what that perspective is, based on your last post but one, and see if you agree that that is your suggestion. The core of your suggestion is that Engels does the reverse of what he says he does. This suggestion would be, I think, that Engels says that he never uses dialectical laws to prove things (and believes that he does not do so), but actually does use dialectical laws to prove things. Not quite sure if the last part is precise. The word you use in your post is to 'impose' dialectical laws. Your phrase is to suggest that Engels is: "happy to impose dogmatically a priori theses on nature and society."

Far from it not being 'precise', I actually told you this:


It is in your interest, once again, to misrepresent what I have said; I would never claim that anyone could 'prove' anything using dialectics, since it is impossible to use such a confused system to prove anything.

Bold added.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1172858&postcount=77

Now, I await your next studied attempt to misrepresent that, too.

You might be happy with the sloppy use of words, but that does not mean you should attribute that dialectical fault to me.


but if you can summaraise that here, that would be helpful. Let me set the scene a bit and then you can, if you will, elaborate just a little on what 'impose' means for you in this context.

As I have said to you many times already, if there were the slightest hint from you that you were prepared to engage in fair debate, or you stopped lying about me and my work, I might be inclined to respond.

And if you even so much as attempted to respond to my requests of you, I might be even more inclined to reciprocate,

However, over the last two years here you have in fact done the opposite, time and again; so why you now expect me to help you out here is a mystery.

Read it for yourself in this 71,000 word Essay:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm

And if you can't be bothered: frankly I do not care.


The law, he is arguing, cannot be relied on to prove the fact, but the fact supports the law. Now this, it seems to me a very important distinction that should be traced through any reading of Engels' uses of general laws - are they relied on to prove or are they cited as conclusions, i.e. as having been illustrated or exemplified by something independently established. Indeed, I suspect (and I throw it out as a testable proposition) that Engels never relies on a general dialectical law to prove any empirical claim, but instead always points to the manner in whch the independently established understanding exemplifies the relevant law.

Once more, you forget where Engels got this a priori law; he did not obtain it from an exhaustive analysis of the evidence, or even from perusing a tiny fraction of it. He pinched it from Hegel, who similary imposed it on what little 'evidence' he had 'gathered'. No wonder I call dialectics 'Mickey Mouse Science'!

Had either of them examined a wider selection of evidence, this 'law' would have been stillborn:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

Hence, it is disingenuous of you now to say Engels merely 'illustrates' this 'law'. He does no such thing -- he uses the a priori 'truth' of this 'law' to interpret a few lame examples from nature and society.


Against that background, I think it would be useful to differentiate between your concept of 'imposition' and my concept of exemplification. in order to be as precise as possible in the reading of Anti Duhring. By the way, if this helps, I am aware of your text in I think 4(b)(2) of Essay Two about 'imposition' and what that means in relation to Engels general claims linking matter and motion (something you then come back to in Essay 13), but what I dont have a handle on, from any of that that, is how this applies to the Law of Q/Q or the Law of the Negation of the Negation, as used by Engels in Anti Duhring. What would it mean to read Engels in Anti Duhring as 'imposing' the Laws of Q/Q or N/N ? Or maybe you think his use of those laws in that particular text is unproblematic and that his putative flaws lie elsewhere.

Not so, the pseudo-logical origin of N/N in Hegel's 'logic' shows that Engels has once again imported an a priori 'law' into Marxism, and imposed it on what little evidence he considered (which evidence does not 'illustrate' this 'law' anyway).

You argue as if you think Hegel had written a book of empirical science, on a par with Darwin's masterpiece, and not a book full of forced terminological dodges, word magic and a priori dogma.

Or that Engels had not uncritically lifted most of his ideas from it.


Personal note: I had a plastic Noddy toy as a child, one of my favourite toys, which I still keep. Noddy was smarter than people think.

On this showing, he was certainly smarter than you...

Get the toy to do your next post; we might then see a marked improvement.

[gilhyle]

Goodness me such petulance :cool: One of the things Noddy used to learn from his many interesting experiences was how pointless it was to be so constantly annoyed and how he ended up doing himself more harm than anyone else. :rolleyes:

The version of Marx's and Engels subjective self-awareness involved in what you propose is quite bizarre. Marx apparently believed himself a pupil of Hegel, thought he had a dialectical method but (besides certain lapses) didnt actually have one. Engel thought that the dialectical method did not involve drawing conclusions from a priori laws, but actually did do that. Engels thought he agreed with Marx....but didnt. Marx hid the fact that he disagreed with Engels. The complete absence of any principle of economy in these speculations makes this very difficult to take seriously.

However be that as it may, there are a few ideas here that I might be able to make some use of. Firstly, there is the idea that just because the intellectual origins of the idea of dialectics laws used by Marx and Engels come from Hegel that those laws are not capable of a legiitimate role. One must however trace this kind of idea through to how those ideas are used if this claim is to have any force....after all the whole issue is about how to think - if the ideas of dialectics of dialectics do not lead to bad thinking, where they come from is irrelevant.

Secondly I perceive a distinction between exemplification, as I have referred to, and what you describe as follows :


he uses the a priori 'truth' of this 'law' to interpret a few lame examples from nature and society

Here the use of the word 'interpret' may mean something more than 'impose'. But again, it seems to me that 'interpret' requires some conclusion. It suggests that what Engels does is to say here is an example from science, it complies with (lets say) the Law of Q/Q and then he would need to conclude ....therefore, something or other is the case.

Now this seems to be a relevant point. Engels did not seem to use the Law of Q/Q to say anything about the world, except that the law sometimes applies. So that chapter of Anti Duhring counts against this claim. Let us see if the relevant section on the Law of N/N also counts against it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Goodness me such petulance One of the things Noddy used to learn from his many interesting experiences was how pointless it was to be so constantly annoyed and how he ended up doing himself more harm than anyone else.

After more than two years of your tricks (and there are some more in this latest post of yours), can you expect anything else from me other than contempt?


The version of Marx's and Engels subjective self-awareness involved in what you propose is quite bizarre. Marx apparently believed himself a pupil of Hegel, thought he had a dialectical method but (besides certain lapses) didnt actually have one. Engel thought that the dialectical method did not involve drawing conclusions from a priori laws, but actually did do that. Engels thought he agreed with Marx....but didnt. Marx hid the fact that he disagreed with Engels. The complete absence of any principle of economy in these speculations makes this very difficult to take seriously.

Marx declared himslef a pupil of Hegel in the past tense. His comments in Das Kapital tell us he no longer was.

And, of course, if you are going to try to summarise my claims in such a misleading way, as I predicted you would, then no wonder they make little sense to you. The fault is, however, in you, not me.

And here is yet another distortion (one that I have corrected here and elsewhere several times -- you wonder why I recommend Noddy over you as a debating partner!):


Firstly, there is the idea that just because the intellectual origins of the idea of dialectics laws used by Marx and Engels come from Hegel that those laws are not capable of a legiitimate role. One must however trace this kind of idea through to how those ideas are used if this claim is to have any force....after all the whole issue is about how to think - if the ideas of dialectics of dialectics do not lead to bad thinking, where they come from is irrelevant.

My argument is not the genetic fallacy, as you seem to believe. As I have said here several times (most recently in the 'Scrapping dialectics' thread), and in my Essays, my argument in fact proceeds from a demonstration that not one single dialectical idea/concept/principle makes a blind bit of sense, to the conclusion that they thus can have no application.

Then, I trace the source of the problem to the a priori dogmatics contained in ruling-class thought, of which Hegel is one of the worst offenders.

As I note in Essay Fourteen:


In order to short-circuit accusations that this commits the so-called 'genetic fallacy' (i.e., in that it seems to argue that DM is incorrect just because it is a ruling-class theory), it merely needs pointing out that I am not claiming that the provenance of this mystical theory is sufficient to invalidate it. Quite the contrary. What has been established in my Essays is that DM is far too confused for anyone to be able to say whether it is correct or not, independently of where it originated.

The point of tracing DM back to its mystical roots is to expose the role it has played, and still plays, in screwing with our movement. In which case, it is no surprise that DM had helped turn Dialectical Marxism into such a long-term failure.

But, you'd know all this if you bothered to acquaint yourself with my ideas before pontificating about them.


Here the use of the word 'interpret' may mean something more than 'impose'. But again, it seems to me that 'interpret' requires some conclusion. It suggests that what Engels does is to say here is an example from science, it complies with (lets say) the Law of Q/Q and then he would need to conclude ....therefore, something or other is the case.

Now this seems to be a relevant point. Engels did not seem to use the Law of Q/Q to say anything about the world, except that the law sometimes applies. So that chapter of Anti Duhring counts against this claim. Let us see if the relevant section on the Law of N/N also counts against it.


Well, if you knew the background to my claims, you'd get the point.

But as you have decided to remain dialectically ignorant, I have a mind to leave you in the Hermetic pit of your own choosing.

And, even if I had the inclination to do so, it is not easy communicating complex ideas to one such as you, who knows about as mcuh logic as a coffee grinder.

Stick to Noddy books -- they seem more your level.

[gilhyle]

Havent time to answer your last post....just wanna move on here to bring the Lw of N/N into it.

The actual treatment of the Law of the Negation of the Negation occurs between P 125 and P. 132 of MECW 25. Let us see if Engels uses it to prove anything or interpret anything, and if so what. Engels' first example is a grain of barley which 'turns into' a plant and then more grains. He defines a meaning for 'negation' as involving ceasing to exist. But it isnt immediately clear that the concept of ceasing to exist is sufficient to grasp the concept of negation. Negation appears to involve ceasing to exist as part of process. It is clear that if a grain of barley were simply destroyed, that would not meet Engels definition. The point is clearly to have a name for a conception of the cessation which specifically conceives the cessation as part of a process. The question is whether this is a legitimate thing to do. Are we allowed to differentiate within the class of all cessations of existence between those cessations which are part of a process and those which are not.

It is already clear that the discussion of the Law of N/N goes further than the discussion of the Law of Q/Q. The discussion of the Law of Q/Q was not difficult to grasp, since the use of the terms quantity and quality were both unproblematic. When Engels talks about the addition of another quantity of an element to a carbon compound, we have little difficulty knowing what he is talking about. When he talks about two different carbon compounds as being qualitatively distinct then that is easily grasped. (Although some might want to argue - as Rosa does sometimes seems to on her site - that a change from solid to liquid and from liquid to gas is not or may not be a change of quality and that the concept of quality is not as clear as it seems.)

But we cannot say that about the concept of negation. Engels definition of negation is not quite so commonsensical. But nor is it the case that it entirely beyond understanding. It is an extension, or rather refinement, of concepts we do use more commonly. But the precise class of cessations of existence it aims to select are hard to define On the one hand we dont want to confine the class too much, or it would become a teleological concept. On the other hand, we do need to exclude those cessations whcih dont involve any process. One might say that the barley process is teleological because it has evolved to be so. Fine, but the process whereby it evolved to have those features was not teleological. Furthermore, Marx's example of the emergence of socialism is not teleological. So it is not the case tht the negation of the negation refers to those cases where something ceases as part of a process pre-determined to lead to the emergence of something else related to it. No, Engels makes it clear that he is not concerned with what happens with any absolute necessity but with those cases where the 'negation of the negation' actually occurs, irrespective of how certain it was to happen.

But what is the 'negation of the negation' ? What it appears to be is that object one actually ceases to exist, object two exists in part because object one ceased to exist and then object two ceases to exist leading to the existence of object three.

Lets see if the further examples fit this definition. I leave aside the mathematical example, because it is a thread all on its own. From history Engels takes the example of primitive common ownership/private property in land and then advanced common ownership of land. He follow that with another "example" (MECW 25. P. 128) This example is particularly interesting because it shows (as did the maths example) that for Engels the concept of the negation of the negation is not JUST a material process. He refers to the emergence of 'primitive materialism' in ancient greece. Then came idealism and its doctrine of the soul which is in turn later replaced by a new materialism. His final example is the replacement of equality by inequality and then by equality - a process he shows Duhring acknowledging.

The point he repeatedly emphasises in each of these examples is that the cessation of the second object does not lead to the reestablishment of the firrst. This seems, for him to be the key idea. He emphasises that he is saying nothing about the particular processes that lead to this outcome (MECW Vol 25. P.131) He emphasises this. Rather his point is to classify together all processes in which a cessation is so arranged that a second cessation "remains or becomes possible" (MECW Vol 25. P.131).

Now after all that we get the text in which Engels tries to explain the negation of the negation:

" Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea." MECW Vol 25 P.132

There are clearly issues with the use of the term 'negation' in the naming of this. Those arent fundamental - language is pliable and constantly evolving. Words come to mean what we designate them as meaning as long as we develop a practice of using them that way. But the key issue is whether there is a potential class of cessations of existence which share this characteristic that can usefully be differentiated from other cessations of existence. Engels believes that such processes occur "everywhere and every day" and it certainly seems true that whether in the form of historically evolved developmental processes evolutionary processes or historical processes or even geological processes, things in this world commonly cease to exist in ways which influence what happens subsequently. It seems only to involve accepting that that influence on subsequent events can happen twice in a linked sequence to have grasped what the idea of the negation of the negation means.

Why it exists is another matter, one not explored by Engels because here Engels treatment of Philosophy just ends !!! There is a short conclusion, but no more substantive claims no conclusions drawn a priori etc. What is significant about the conclusion is that it once again emphasises why Engels ever engaged in this exercise - namely to prove Duhring wrong, not to prove anything of any complexity about the world. The world has been interpreted as a place where sometimes, often, the addition of a further quantity of an element leads to the emergence of something qualitatively different and as a place where the manner in which something ceases to exist can have an influence on what happens after that (and that there can be chains of such influence). Hard to see those interpreations of the world as very problematic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Let us see if Engels uses it to prove anything or interpret anything, and if so what. Engels' first example is a grain of barley which 'turns into' a plant and then more grains. He defines a meaning for 'negation' as involving ceasing to exist. But it isnt immediately clear that the concept of ceasing to exist is sufficient to grasp the concept of negation. Negation appears to involve ceasing to exist as part of process. It is clear that if a grain of barley were simply destroyed, that would not meet Engels definition. The point is clearly to have a name for a conception of the cessation which specifically conceives the cessation as part of a process. The question is whether this is a legitimate thing to do. Are we allowed to differentiate within the class of all cessations of existence between those cessations which are part of a process and those which are not.

The actual treatment of the Law of the Negation of the Negation occurs between P 125 and P. 132 of MECW 25. Let us see if Engels uses it to prove anything or interpret anything, and if so what. Engels' first example is a grain of barley which 'turns into' a plant and then more grains. He defines a meaning for 'negation' as involving ceasing to exist. But it isnt immediately clear that the concept of ceasing to exist is sufficient to grasp the concept of negation. Negation appears to involve ceasing to exist as part of process. It is clear that if a grain of barley were simply destroyed, that would not meet Engels definition. The point is clearly to have a name for a conception of the cessation which specifically conceives the cessation as part of a process. The question is whether this is a legitimate thing to do. Are we allowed to differentiate within the class of all cessations of existence between those cessations which are part of a process and those which are not.

It is already clear that the discussion of the Law of N/N goes further than the discussion of the Law of Q/Q. The discussion of the Law of Q/Q was not difficult to grasp, since the use of the terms quantity and quality were both unproblematic. When Engels talks about the addition of another quantity of an element to a carbon compound, we have little difficulty knowing what he is talking about. When he talks about two different carbon compounds as being qualitatively distinct then that is easily grasped. (Although some might want to argue - as Rosa does sometimes seems to on her site - that a change from solid to liquid and from liquid to gas is not or may not be a change of quality and that the concept of quality is not as clear as it seems.)

But we cannot say that about the concept of negation. Engels definition of negation is not quite so commonsensical. But nor is it the case that it entirely beyond understanding. It is an extension, or rather refinement, of concepts we do use more commonly. But the precise class of cessations of existence it aims to select are hard to define On the one hand we dont want to confine the class too much, or it would become a teleological concept. On the other hand, we do need to exclude those cessations whcih dont involve any process. One might say that the barley process is teleological because it has evolved to be so. Fine, but the process whereby it evolved to have those features was not teleological. Furthermore, Marx's example of the emergence of socialism is not teleological. So it is not the case tht the negation of the negation refers to those cases where something ceases as part of a process pre-determined to lead to the emergence of something else related to it. No, Engels makes it clear that he is not concerned with what happens with any absolute necessity but with those cases where the 'negation of the negation' actually occurs, irrespective of how certain it was to happen.

But what is the 'negation of the negation' ? What it appears to be is that object one actually ceases to exist, object two exists in part because object one ceased to exist and then object two ceases to exist leading to the existence of object three.


What is the point of this? It is not directed at anything I have said, since I deny anyone can prove anything with dialectics, least of all Engels.

You have once again ignored what I had to say, and thus, once more signalled your aim not to engage in dabate.


There are clearly issues with the use of the term 'negation' in the naming of this. Those arent fundamental - language is pliable and constantly evolving. Words come to mean what we designate them as meaning as long as we develop a practice of using them that way. But the key issue is whether there is a potential class of cessations of existence which share this characteristic that can usefully be differentiated from other cessations of existence. Engels believes that such processes occur "everywhere and every day" and it certainly seems true that whether in the form of historically evolved developmental processes evolutionary processes or historical processes or even geological processes, things in this world commonly cease to exist in ways which influence what happens subsequently. It seems only to involve accepting that that influence on subsequent events can happen twice in a linked sequence to have grasped what the idea of the negation of the negation means.

Why it exists is another matter, one not explored by Engels because here Engels treatment of Philosophy just ends !!! There is a short conclusion, but no more substantive claims no conclusions drawn a priori etc. What is significant about the conclusion is that it once again emphasises why Engels ever engaged in this exercise - namely to prove Duhring wrong, not to prove anything of any complexity about the world. The world has been interpreted as a place where sometimes, often, the addition of a further quantity of an element leads to the emergence of something qualitatively different and as a place where the manner in which something ceases to exist can have an influence on what happens after that (and that there can be chains of such influence). Hard to see those interpreations of the world as very problematic.

Bold added.

And that is because you too prefer ruling-class apriorism, just like Engels.

[gilhyle]

Not trying to avoid debate at all....quite happy to debate. Just wanted to get to the end of the treatment of Philosophy in the Anti Duhring....which is after all my purpose here : just to look at the Anti Duhring and see what scope there is there for a prior dogmatic principles to be used in the discussion.

The worst things I found there a sentence which had a very general form, namely saying that negation of the negation goes on every day and all over the world and, secondly, I found a lack of clarity in the definition of what a dialectical contradiction is, but supported by an explanation as to why it was not capable of formal definition. I also found a use of the term 'negation' which is a bit hard to grasp.

SO there is a general claim that might have been used as an a priori argument and a couple of concepts which are very vague and would justify being questioned as to whether they were sufficiently clear for any purpose. None of this amounts to finding an argument ANYWHERE in the text that actually relied on an a priori principle. Indeed, there is extended argument that such a usage would be invalid (though I now understand your argument that that occurs despite the opposite practice being present).

What is most interesting, therefore, about the Anti Duhring text is that, given what Engels wants to show, he doesnt need any a priori dogmatics to prove his points, which makes it unlikely that he would fall into it.

At this point I consider your argument as follows:


What has been established in my Essays is that DM is far too confused for anyone to be able to say whether it is correct or not, independently of where it originated.

as still available as an option. On the face of it, the Law of Q/Q is reasonably clear. The constituent terms are in common usage and the example of carbon compounds is hard to misunderstand. I think I understand that law.

The situation in relation to the law of N/N and with the concept of dialectical contradiction is less clearcut. I think there is a requirement for a bit more examination of the Anti Duhring before drawing any firm conclusion about those two, though on the face of what is said in the relevant pages of exposition the two concepts each seem vaguely comprehensible and may not need to be more than that to work.

But that depends on what Engels thinks they are usable for. What the exposition of those concepts has been used for is to defend Marx's usage of the Law of Q/Q and the Law of N/N.

One other possible line of confusion is in what a law means. I find it quite clear in Anti Duhring what a dialectical law is not, but I do not (so far) find it very clear what it is for and therefore what it is.

Now what points of yours am I ignoring ? I think its more or less covered.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Not trying to avoid debate at all...

But you have responded to none of my arguments.


None of this amounts to finding an argument ANYWHERE in the text that actually relied on an a priori principle. Indeed, there is extended argument that such a usage would be invalid (though I now understand your argument that that occurs despite the opposite practice being present).

This is very disingenuous of you, for we both know where Engels got the N/N -- from an a priori principle Hegel conjured out of thin air.

You argue as if you think Engels invented this notion.


What is most interesting, therefore, about the Anti Dühring text is that, given what Engels wants to show, he doesn't need any a priori dogmatics to prove his points, which makes it unlikely that he would fall into it.

You mean, "he doesn't need any dialectics at all".

The ideas he defended in Marx are all drawn from Historical Materialism, and stand on their own two feet.


On the face of it, the Law of Q/Q is reasonably clear. The constituent terms are in common usage and the example of carbon compounds is hard to misunderstand. I think I understand that law.

Not one bit of it; 'quality' is not defined, neither is 'node'/'leap'. The phrase 'addition of matter and energy' is left vague, and the thermodynamic boundary of the system to which energy is 'added' is also left undefined.

Any scientist producing a law this vague and ill-defined would lose all credibility.

In dialectical, Mickey Mouse Science, apparently, this is all OK.


The situation in relation to the law of N/N and with the concept of dialectical contradiction is less clear-cut. I think there is a requirement for a bit more examination of the Anti Dühring before drawing any firm conclusion about those two, though on the face of what is said in the relevant pages of exposition the two concepts each seem vaguely comprehensible and may not need to be more than that to work.

But that depends on what Engels thinks they are usable for. What the exposition of those concepts has been used for is to defend Marx's usage of the Law of Q/Q and the Law of N/N.

Once more, another a priori 'law' copied from Hegel. You are continually ignoring this salient fact.


Now what points of yours am I ignoring ? I think its more or less covered.

The ones you usually ignore -- those you cannot answer.

There is little point me repeating them, since you will just ignore them some more. However, a clue to your insincere question can be garnered from this comment of yours:


Havent time to answer your last post
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1173271&postcount=85

This is a dodge you are continually pulling.

And we know why: you have absolutely no intention of 'debating' this -- you just want to defend the standard, dogmatic line.

[gilhyle]

OK

Well you say you dont commit the genetic fallacy (actually its not always a fallacy to my mind), but if I understand your argument correctly, the suggestion is that we must have regard to the origin of the ideas in Hegel, but we must first establish that they are too meaningless to be grasped any other way. I havent reached that point in this reading of the Anti Duhring. Im still reading the text, which is based on the view that Hegel is completely wrong BUT, Engels thinks, something has been salvaged from that. This is an argument, by Engels, against continuity with Hegel. Consequently, I agree with what I understand to be a view similar to your position (but not identical to it) that the ideas must be assessed first and only taken as continuous with Hegel if they fail to stand alone. Where he got N/N from doesnt matter if it makes sense (though reading Hegel can be useful for educational purposes, but thats a point at a different level).

You say quality is not defined. But it is a widely used term and is not used by Engels in any sense that is at variance with its ordinary usage that I can spot, so why should he have to define it more than anyone else who uses the term ? He does not define it, that is true. But what is the problem. Do you define every single word you use, I dont ? Addition is also a well understood phrase. Negation and dialectical contradiction are not in this category. Seems to me they do need some further work than is given in Engels section - he defines them, but really only in one sentence each.

Anti Duhring does not use the concept of node/leap in the section on the Law of Q/Q...unless you can show me otherwise ?

What is your issue with addition of energy to matter; where does that occur in the section on Q/Q ?

A definition of the thermodynamic boundary is not needed for Q/Q to make sense. At least I cant see why. The concept of boundary is not needed surely for the carbon compounds example.

....And by the way its true, I dont have your time for this. I am giving it far more time in the last few days than I can afford. So dont assume dishonesty just cos someone has other demands on them. doesnt follow.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Well you say you dont commit the genetic fallacy (actually its not always a fallacy to my mind), but if I understand your argument correctly, the suggestion is that we must have regard to the origin of the ideas in Hegel, but we must first establish that they are too meaningless to be grasped any other way. I havent reached that point in this reading of the Anti Duhring. Im still reading the text, which is based on the view that Hegel is completely wrong BUT, Engels thinks, something has been salvaged from that. This is an argument, by Engels, against continuity with Hegel. Consequently, I agree with what I understand to be a view similar to your position (but not identical to it) that the ideas must be assessed first and only taken as continuous with Hegel if they fail to stand alone. Where he got N/N from doesnt matter if it makes sense (though reading Hegel can be useful for educational purposes, but thats a point at a different level).

Ah, but it does matter if Hegel's argument is defective, and if the 'laws' Engels borrowed from his are entirely dogmatic and a priori.

You are not suggesting that if a fatal error were found in say Darwin's work that that would have no effect on the status of the claims of modern-day Darwinians? How can it not fail to have a knock-on effect?

Same with Engels.


You say quality is not defined. But it is a widely used term and is not used by Engels in any sense that is at variance with its ordinary usage that I can spot, so why should he have to define it more than anyone else who uses the term ? He does not define it, that is true. But what is the problem. Do you define every single word you use, I dont ? Addition is also a well understood phrase. Negation and dialectical contradiction are not in this category. Seems to me they do need some further work than is given in Engels section - he defines them, but really only in one sentence each.

But, this is meant to be cutting edge science; in no other science would such sloppy work be tolerated.

However, if you are right here, then there would be countless examples of qualitative change where no quantitative change was in evidence.

I gave several examples in the Q/Q thread and many more at my site.

The problem is that Hegel and Engels accepted this as a 'law' before they had examined an adequate body of evidence (in effect thay looked at a few badly described examples!), and what they did examine was hightly superficial --, and in the end their 'evidence' does not even support this 'law'!

Anyone who has done genuine science knows how much work and attention to detail has to go into changing even limited areas of knowledge, let alone report the discovery of a new 'law'.

So, not only does this 'law' have none of its terms defined (see below), it relies on a display of 'evidence' that would be laughed out of court even if it were presented in a High School science report.

No wonder I call it 'Mickey Mouse Science'.

Now I have covered all this in extensive detail in Essay Seven, and some of it has been posted in that earlier thread (and some in the 'Scrapping Dialectics' thread -- repeated below). I suggest you familiarise youself with the facts before you make an even bigger fool of yourself in future.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/quantity-quality-t66709/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/stalin-materialism-t66588/index.html

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

Here is what I posted in the 'scrapping dialectics' thread:


As far as the other examples dialecticians use to illustrate this 'Law' are concerned: there are far too few in number that actually work (even if the above difficulties are ignored) to justify the epithet "Law" being attached to one and all. If in comparison, say, Newton's Second Law of motion worked as fitfully as this 'Law' does (or was as vaguely-defined and/or as non-mathematical), physicists would be right to refuse to describe it as a law. Hence, if the rate of change of momentum was proportional to the applied force in only a few instances (and even then this was the case only if key terms were either ignored, ill-defined or twisted out of shape), no one would take it seriously.

But, this is Mickey Mouse Science, after all.

In general, however, the examples usually given by DM-fans to illustrate this 'Law' are almost without exception either anecdotal or impressionistic. If someone were to submit a paper to a science journal purporting to establish the veracity of a new law with the same level of vagueness, imprecision, triteness, lack of detail/mathematics, and overall theoretical naivety, it would be rejected at the first stage. Indeed, dialecticians would themselves treat with derision any attempt to establish, say, either the truth of classical economic theory or the falsity of Marx's own work with an evidential display that was as crassly amateurish as this --, to say nothing of the contempt they would show for such theoretical wooliness. In such circumstances, those who might be quick to cry "pedantry" at the issues raised in this and other Essays published at this site would become devoted pedants, and nit-pick with the best.

Now, anyone who has studied or practiced real science will know this to be true. It is only in books on DM (and internet discussion boards) that Mickey Mouse material of this sort seems acceptable.

Hence, this 'Law' can be made to work in a few selected instances if we bend things enough (and if we fail to define either "quality", "node", or "leap" -- and if we ignore Hegel's own 'definition' of a quality into the bargain). In contrast there are countless examples where this 'Law' does not apply, no matter how we try to twist things.

Why Engels's first 'Law' was ever called a law is therefore something of a Dialectical Mystery.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1156361&postcount=46


Look, JR, this useless 'law' only works because practically every single one of its significant terms has been left hoplessly vague and obscure.

No one seems to know what 'quality' means (or rather, as soon as anyone tries to define it, several classic examples that Engels and other fans of the dialectic refer to no longer work), or how long a 'node' (or 'leap') is supposed to last. Furthermore, the thermodynamic dimensions of the system to which 'matter or energy' is supposd to be added have been left vague, too. Moreover, no one seems to know what 'added' means here (does it mean expended' or 'incorporated'?).

Consider an example: you push a crate along a rough floor. Energy has been 'added' (expended) in/to the system (but, what system though?), but you can do this all day long, and nothing new will emerge. Blow the crate up (energy 'added' -- but to what?), and you get change.

The thermodynamic boundaries are also vague, as I said (so much so that we have no idea to what the energy or matter has been 'added'). Here is how I have made this point clear in Essay Seven:




Consider the Bombardier Beetle:


"Bombardier beetles store two separate chemicals (hydroquinone and hydrogen peroxide) that are not mixed until threatened. When this occurs the two chemicals are squirted through two tubes, where they are mixed along with small amounts of catalytic enzymes. When these chemicals mix they undergo a violent 'exothermic' chemical reaction. The boiling, foul smelling liquid partially becomes a gas and is expelled with a loud popping sound...." [Wikipedia.]

If the original system is the said beetle, then we have here a change in quality (this animal has turned into noxious beetle), where once we had an ordinary insect, but for no change in matter or overall energy in that animal (contradicting Engels). Sure matter is subsequently lost, but before that happens, the beetle has already changed (or it would not happen!).

Even more annoying, the above change is part of that beetle's 'development', so this example is not susceptible to the challenges we met earlier.

Or consider another --, and one more familiar to most dialecticians than the Bombardier Beetle is --, the Widget in certain cans of beer:


"A can of beer is pressurised by adding liquid nitrogen, which vaporises and expands in volume after the can is sealed, forcing gas and beer into the widget's hollow interior through a tiny hole -- the less beer the better for subsequent head quality. In addition, some nitrogen dissolves in the beer which also contains dissolved carbon dioxide.

"The presence of dissolved nitrogen allows smaller bubbles to be formed with consequent greater creaminess of the subsequent head. This is because the smaller bubbles need a higher internal pressure to balance the greater surface tension, which is inversely proportional to the radius of the bubbles. Achieving this higher pressure is not possible just with dissolved carbon dioxide because of the greater solubility of this gas compared to nitrogen would create an unacceptably large head.

"When the can is opened, the pressure in the can quickly drops, causing the pressurised gas and beer inside the widget to jet out from the hole. This agitation on the surrounding beer causes a chain reaction of bubble formation throughout the beer. The result, when the can is then poured out, is a surging mixture in the glass of very small gas bubbles and liquid.

"This is the case with certain types of draught beer such as draught stouts. In the case of these draught beers, which before dispensing also contain a mixture of dissolved nitrogen and carbon dioxide, the agitation is caused by forcing the beer under pressure through small holes in a restrictor in the tap. The surging mixture gradually settles to produce a very creamy head." [Wikipedia.]

Change in quality, no change in quantity.

It could be argued that there is a difference in matter and/or energy in this can, namely the rung pull and gases near the opening. That is undeniable, but are they significant? What causes the change in quality is the Widget, not the ring pull. This can be seen by the fact that in cans where there is no Widget, the above does not happen.

However, someone could still object that the above differences in matter/energy are relevant to the subsequent change in quality; after all, they set in motion those very changes.

There are several problems with this response. First, we saw above (in Note 5) that there was no question-begging way to define the energy locale of such DM-changes.

Secondly, it is questionable that the removal of a ring pull, and the loss of small quantities of vapour amounts to the addition/removal of matter or energy from the beer/Widget ensemble itself. This, naturally, raises issues touched on in Note 5, and above. What exactly is the DM-system here? Until we are told, this objection itself cannot succeed. Even after we are told, that cannot help but beg the question (as noted above), for it will be plain that any new demarcation lines will have been drawn in order to save this 'Law', making it eminently subjective.

Finally, after the ring pull has been removed, and the small quantity of vapour has escaped, the beer/Widget ensemble will undergo a qualitative change for no new matter or energy input into that system, violating the first 'Law'. Anyone who objects to the 'line' being drawn just here (i.e., corralling-off this system at the Widget/beer boundary just after the ring pull has been removed) will need to advance objective criteria for it to be re-drawn somewhere else.

Now, if that boundary is re-drawn to include the removed ring pull and the escaped vapour, then, once more, no new energy or matter will have been added to that system (i.e., the beer/Widget/ring-pull/vapour ensemble) even while it will have undergone a qualitative change.

Anyway, the aforementioned ring-pull could be removed by a battery-operated device inside the can, controlled by an internal timer, meaning that the resulting change in quality was occasioned by no new energy 'added' to the can/beer/widget/battery-device system.

So, this law is far too vague and imprecise for anyone to be able to say if it applies to 'ideas' or not. And it is entirely unclear how it might be repaired.

[Even if we were able to answer the many other objections to this 'law' that I have raised in the aformetnioned Essay.]

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

It's high time we forgot Engels (or Hegel) ever mentioned it.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1156238&postcount=44

And as far a 'node' is concerned, I have argued this:


On the other hand, if dialecticians take the trouble to re-define the word "node" just to accommodate these awkward non-dialectical facts (we noted earlier that in certain circumstances this is sometimes called a "persuasive definition"), it would become increasingly difficult to distinguish DM from stipulative conventionalism. But, as we will see in later Essays, there is in fact no problem with this (since scientists do this sort of thing all the time), but it does mean that dialecticians will have to abandon their claim that DM is 'objective', and that it is not conventional.

So, DM-theorists could specify a minimum time interval during which a phase or state of matter transition must take place for it to be counted as "nodal". In the case of boiling water, say, they could decide that if the transition from water to steam (or vice versa) takes place in an interval lasting less than k seconds/minutes (for some k), then it is indeed "nodal". Thus, by dint of such a stipulation, their 'Law' could be made to work (at least in this respect). But, there is nothing in nature that forces any of this on us -- the reverse is, if anything, the case. Phase/state of matter changes, and changes in general take different amounts of time; under differing circumstances even these alter. If so, as noted above, this 'Law' would become 'valid' only because of yet another stipulation and/or foisting, which would make it eminently 'subjective'.

However, given the strife-riven and sectarian nature of dialectical politics, any attempt to define DM-"nodes" could lead to yet more factions. Thus, we are sure to see emerge the rightist "Nanosecond Tendency" -- sworn enemies of the "Picosecond Left Opposition" -- who will both take up swords with the 'eclectic' wing: the "it depends on the circumstances" 'clique' at the 'centrist' "Femtosecond League".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Anti Duhring does not use the concept of node/leap in the section on the Law of Q/Q...unless you can show me otherwise ?

What is your issue with addition of energy to matter; where does that occur in the section on Q/Q ?

It appears in 'Dialectics of Nature' -- but, if you are saying that it does not feature in Engles's understanding of this 'law' in Anti-Duhring, then that is even worse, for that 'law' would then have no content at all. [But see the next post for passages from Anti-Duhring.]


A definition of the thermodynamic boundary is not needed for Q/Q to make sense. At least I cant see why. The concept of boundary is not needed surely for the carbon compounds example.

Oh yes it is; but I will let you find out why. [However, I given some reasons in the previous post, above.]


And by the way its true, I dont have your time for this. I am giving it far more time in the last few days than I can afford. So dont assume dishonesty just cos someone has other demands on them. doesnt follow.

I make time by not wasting it on ruling-class rubbish -- you should give it a try...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, in Anti-Duhring, Engels has this to say:


We have already seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations — in which quantitative change suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative transformation — Herr Dühring had a little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this line. We gave there one of the best-known examples — that of the change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0° C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water.

Bold added.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch10.htm

Looks pretty 'nodal' to me. And his talk of 'quantitiative change in temperature' suggests the addition of energy, too.

Engels then says:


In proof of this law we might have cited hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society.

Where are these 'hundreds of facts'? Engels just makes this up. The 'law' is a priori, and Engels has simply lifted it uncritically from Hegel.

And later we find this:


Here therefore we have a whole series of qualitatively different bodies, formed by the simple quantitative addition of elements, and in fact always in the same proportion. This is most clearly evident in cases where the quantity of all the elements of the compound changes in the same proportion. Thus, in the normal paraffins CnH2n+2, the lowest is methane, CH4, a gas; the highest known, hexadecane, C16H34, is a solid body forming colourless crystals which melts at 21° and boils only at 278°. Each new member of both series comes into existence through the addition of CH2, one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen, to the molecular formula of the preceding member, and this quantitative change in the molecular formula produces each time a qualitatively different body.

Bold added.

Looks like the 'addition' of matter/energy to me.

But, I thought you were congratulating yourself for going back to this text to find out what Engels actually said.

Looks like you screwed up here too.

[gilhyle]

You are not suggesting that if a fatal error were found in say Darwin's work that that would have no effect on the status of the claims of modern-day Darwinians?

No indeed. Good example. There are quite serious problems with Darwin's work, but none of them are fatal. Inded darwin survives the limitations of his own view quite brilliantly, because there is a profound insight at the heart of the perspective. What I take Engels to be saying is that there are serious problems with Hegel, but that the understanding of dialectics he developed as part of his philosophy is not fatally damaged by that.


But, this is meant to be cutting edge science; in no other science would such sloppy work be tolerated.

Actually I dont think it is meant to be cutting edge 'science' in the sense you mean.


there would be countless examples of qualitative change where no quantitative change was in evidence.

I dont think Engels denies this or wishes to deny it. Rather he is interested only in those cases where quantitative change turns into qualitative change. Similarly he has no problem accepting that there are events that could be described as involving 'addition' where no qualitative change follows.


So, this law is far too vague and imprecise for anyone to be able to say if it applies to 'ideas' or not.

We can only say whether it applies based on our independent study of the relevant subject matter. The clarity is provided by that process of study. By that route we get to the point of placing a clearly understood (hopefully) event within a vaguely defined set of events.


Ok, in Anti-Duhring, Engels has this to say:


Quote:
We have already seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations — in which quantitative change suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative transformation — Herr Dühring had a little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this line. We gave there one of the best-known examples — that of the change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0° C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water.
Bold added.


As I read the text, the term nodal is used to refer to Hegel's concept, used as a name, but there is no significant reliance on it there. that said, I might be willing to defend this term, if I was to reread the relevant passages in the Dialectics of Nature, which I have long since forgotten....but Im reading anti duhring for now.


Anyone who has done genuine science knows how much work and attention to detail has to go into changing even limited areas of knowledge, let alone report the discovery of a new 'law'.

I think Engels would agree with you on this. That was indeed his constant theme in correspondence with Kautsky, Schmidt, Lavrov and others - study the facts in detail, immerse yourself in it, draw no conclusions from abstract principles, avoid all schematism.


In contrast there are countless examples where this 'Law' does not apply, no matter how we try to twist things.

Thats not a problem for a dialectical law, since it has no predictive role. Yes but there are countless situations where any law or general term does not apply. So what ? Unless he claims it does.....and he doesnt claim that.


I make time by not wasting it on ruling-class rubbish -- you should give it a try...

Well I find that the ruling class rubbish that gets in my way is mostly working for a living....now if only I had an Engels to pay my way.....then you'd never hear the end of me defending my benefactor :cool:





I suggest you familiarise youself with the facts before you make an even bigger fool of yourself in future.

A fool I was born and a fool I'll die. :cool: Thanks to relativism I never have to be anyone else. Phew !

Im off to Noddy land. zzzzzzzzzz

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


There are quite serious problems with Darwin's work, but none of them are fatal. Inded darwin survives the limitations of his own view quite brilliantly, because there is a profound insight at the heart of the perspective. What I take Engels to be saying is that there are serious problems with Hegel, but that the understanding of dialectics he developed as part of his philosophy is not fatally damaged by that.

You miss the point -- which was to counter a claim you made. The errors I have located in Hegel, not the ones Engels missed because he knew no logic, undermine his entire work, and this cannot fail to have a knock-on effect on Engels's use of Hegel's ideas, howsoever he modified them.


Actually I dont think it is meant to be cutting edge 'science' in the sense you mean.

Indeed, my irony was deliberate, since dialctics is in fact Mickey Mouse Science.


I dont think Engels denies this or wishes to deny it. Rather he is interested only in those cases where quantitative change turns into qualitative change. Similarly he has no problem accepting that there are events that could be described as involving 'addition' where no qualitative change follows.

Then it can't be a law, as he says.

Of course, in Dialectics of Nature, he worded this law far more strictly:


"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added.]

Are you suggesting he abandoned this? Dialectical Marxists since Engels day certainly hold to this stricter version of this 'law', and attribute it to Engels.

But anyway, without these strictures, why call it a 'law'?


We can only say whether it applies based on our independent study of the relevant subject matter. The clarity is provided by that process of study. By that route we get to the point of placing a clearly understood (hopefully) event within a vaguely defined set of events.

But the examples themselves do not help (how can they help define 'quality', 'node', 'addition of energy' and the boundaries of the system?) -- and the need for 'interpretation' introduces an element of subjectivity into what is supposed to be an objective 'law'.


As I read the text, the term nodal is used to refer to Hegel's concept, used as a name, but there is no significant reliance on it there. that said, I might be willing to defend this term, if I was to reread the relevant passages in the Dialectics of Nature, which I have long since forgotten....but Im reading anti duhring for now.

Well the wording indicates Engels also accepts it:


We have already seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations — in which quantitative change suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative transformation — Herr Dühring had a little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this line. We gave there one of the best-known examples — that of the change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0° C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water.

Bold added.

Engels refers to his own use of the boiling water example, and to these phase changes as 'turning points' -- these are nodal 'leaps' by any other name.

As he argued in Dialectics of Nature:


"The visible system of stars, the solar system, terrestrial masses, molecules and atoms, and finally ether particles, form each of them [a definite group]. It does not alter the case that intermediate links can be found between the separate groups…. These intermediate links prove only that there are no leaps in nature, precisely because nature is composed entirely of leaps." [Engels (1954), p.271. Bold emphases added.]

And in the other passage I quoted, the qualitative changes he refers to are certainly sudden (you are not suggesting they are gradual, I hope):


Here therefore we have a whole series of qualitatively different bodies, formed by the simple quantitative addition of elements, and in fact always in the same proportion. This is most clearly evident in cases where the quantity of all the elements of the compound changes in the same proportion. Thus, in the normal paraffins CnH2n+2, the lowest is methane, CH4, a gas; the highest known, hexadecane, C16H34, is a solid body forming colourless crystals which melts at 21° and boils only at 278°. Each new member of both series comes into existence through the addition of CH2, one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen, to the molecular formula of the preceding member, and this quantitative change in the molecular formula produces each time a qualitatively different body.

So, given the above, it is pretty clear that Engels believed there were 'leaps'/'nodes', and this is certainly how he has been interpreted down the years.


That was indeed his constant theme in correspondence with Kautsky, Schmidt, Lavrov and others - study the facts in detail, immerse yourself in it, draw no conclusions from abstract principles, avoid all schematism

And yet the 'evidence' he gives in support of these 'laws' is a joke. So, once more, what he might have said he believed is belied by what he actually did.


Thats not a problem for a dialectical law, since it has no predictive role. Yes but there are countless situations where any law or general term does not apply. So what ? Unless he claims it does.....and he doesnt claim that.

Why then call it a 'law'?


Well I find that the ruling class rubbish that gets in my way is mostly working for a living....now if only I had an Engels to pay my way.....then you'd never hear the end of me defending my benefactor

Then you have my sympathy -- as Marx said, your mode of being determines your consciousness, and that explains why you dote so much on ruling-class dross.


A fool I was born and a fool I'll die. Thanks to relativism I never have to be anyone else. Phew !

Ah, you accept the 'law of identity', too, I see...


Im off to Noddy land. zzzzzzzzzz

You never left.

[gilhyle]

The errors I have located in Hegel, not the ones Engels missed because he knew no logic, undermine his entire work, and this cannot fail to have a knock-on effect on Engels's use of Hegel's ideas, howsoever he modified them.

Indeed, but the point I was making is merely that those conclusions you have drawn, on which you rely, are not self-evident. Others disagree with you and it is a reasonable position, right or wrong, to think that certain of Hegel's ideas could survive the rejection of his system - depending on the basis on which one rejected it. Consequently, nothing can be concluded decisively from tracing the historical origins of Engels ideas....rather they must be rejected/accepted in their own terms.


my irony was deliberate, since dialctics is in fact Mickey Mouse Science.


My absence of irony was also deliberate - it is particularly important in considering what Engels was doing that he was NOT engaged in cutting edge science but was merely interpolating a view at a particular point in scientific development at which the analysis of change in nature was still problematic (in the 1870s) in a way in which it actually was not even by the 1890s. (Though I can still vaguely recall reading someone....was it Velikovsky....in the 1980s when static conceptions of the planet still had an ideological hold in some areas of study.)


in Dialectics of Nature, he worded this law far more strictly:

He may well have done so but did he need to ? Sorry to say this but the question must be looked at 'dialectically' ; it depends on what he was using the law for. If the stricter version could be stated and held to it would of course be more useful. But it is the weaker version which captures the heart of the point.


in the other passage I quoted, the qualitative changes he refers to are certainly sudden (you are not suggesting they are gradual, I hope)

The essential point does not rest on whether they are gradual or sudden. This kind of discussion replicates the discussions years ago in evolutionary theory about gradual evolution, which were all kinda pointless - doesnt matter. Speed of change varies: its not important at this level of generality. [I used that phrase on purpose :) ]


Why then call it a 'law'?

I think we can show why, in the sense of showing what he meant and how it differs from what you take a 'law' to be. Then that would be the point: why cant he use the term 'law' in a different way than you, given how unclear that term is !


you accept the 'law of identity', too, I see...

Human beings, constantly changing, constantly confined within the possibilities of their past, constantly themselves and never just what they always were......try and tell me the Law of Identity captures that reality.....I dont think you'll bother.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Others disagree with you and it is a reasonable position, right or wrong, to think that certain of Hegel's ideas could survive the rejection of his system - depending on the basis on which one rejected it. Consequently, nothing can be concluded decisively from tracing the historical origins of Engels ideas....rather they must be rejected/accepted in their own terms.

Of course people disagree, that is why Marx said the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class, for the boundaries of that disagreement are set to the parameters laid down by that class.

Hence, Engels slipped into this mode of thought seamlessly; he uncritically appropriated his three 'laws' from Hegel as a priori truths -- that is, he accepted dogmatic principles that were based on a style of thought that had dominated 'western' philosophy for 2400 years, and still does: a priori thesis-mongering.

And that is my point; he derived general truths about nature and society from dogma lifted from Hegel. Despite what he said, he was not interested in the scientific study of reality, but in the imposition of an a priori scheme on it.

Which is precisely how and why ruling ideas come to rule even the minds of great revolutionaries. Even they, like you, cannot see when they are doing it; it seems so natural to think this way.


Consequently, nothing can be concluded decisively from tracing the historical origins of Engels ideas....rather they must be rejected/accepted in their own terms.

Not so; if they are based on a priori dogma, much can be concluded, as Marx noted:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]

This ancient style of reasoning reflects the way the ruling class has always seen reality: behind appearances there is a hidden world (which, coincidentally, always seems to rationalise and justify class division), accessible to thought alone, which philosophers alone can access and delineate with their baroque schemas and specially-invented jargon, all based on systematic linguistic distortion and abstraction.

Anti-Dühring just represents the scrag end of this style of thought.


it is particularly important in considering what Engels was doing that he was NOT engaged in cutting edge science but was merely interpolating a view at a particular point in scientific development at which the analysis of change in nature was still problematic (in the 1870s) in a way in which it actually was not even by the 1890s. (Though I can still vaguely recall reading someone....was it Velikovsky....in the 1980s when static conceptions of the planet still had an ideological hold in some areas of study.)

He certainly thought he was, and his epigones definitely represent him that way, That explains all the eulogies he receives as the 'greatest intellect of the age'.

Your reference to Velikovsky is amusing. He was merely challenging uniformitarianism in geology, a doctrine that dominated that branch of science from the 1830 to the 1980s, after the pioneering work of Hutton and Lyell.

But even uniformitarians believed in change, gradual change based on known laws and processes operating today.

This explains why Engels liked his nodal 'leaps' -- something you seem to deny -- it challeged uniformitarianism.

But even Velikovsky's catastrophic changes were externally induced; they weren't the result on 'internal contradiction' -- whatever those mysterious beings are.


He may well have done so but did he need to ? Sorry to say this but the question must be looked at 'dialectically' ; it depends on what he was using the law for. If the stricter version could be stated and held to it would of course be more useful. But it is the weaker version which captures the heart of the point.

He most certainly did; he needed a universal and modal aspect for it to be a law, and he needed to tie that in with material change.

['Modal' here, not 'nodal', note.]


But it is the weaker version which captures the heart of the point.

It does not capture the heart, it removes it! For there is no way the weaker version is a law.

And the version in Dialectics of Nature certainly shows the way he was thinking, and why he called it a 'law', and why he was prepared to impose it on the few examples he managed to scrape together.

He clearly wanted to ape Newton's three laws of motion.

And what would we think of those laws if they had been worded in the wishy-washy way you prefer to read Engels now eviscerated 'laws'?


The essential point does not rest on whether they are gradual or sudden. This kind of discussion replicates the discussions years ago in evolutionary theory about gradual evolution, which were all kinda pointless - doesn't matter. Speed of change varies: its not important at this level of generality. [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…." [I]Philosophical Notebooks, pp.221-22.]

And, ironically, I think the reason you are still a fool, is that you believe all this guff.

[Hit The North]

Yes it does, for one of its corollaries is that if something changes, then anything identical with it will change equally quickly. This law captures change far better than the vguae and meaningless terms one finds in Hegel.

That doesn't appear to say anything, except if something changes then it changes. No explanation. Not even any description.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

CZ:


That doesn't appear to say anything, except if something changes then it changes. No explanation. Not even any description.

That is because you, like Trotsky, have confused identity with equality.

[Hit The North]

CZ:


That doesn't appear to say anything, except if something changes then it changes. No explanation. Not even any description.
That is because you, like Trotsky, have confused identity with equality.
Eh :confused:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

CZ:


Eh

It's quite straight-forward.

The 'Law of Identity' is no enemy of change, as dialecticians try to tell us (having copied this odd idea off Hegel, who simply dreamt it up), and this is so for at least two reasons.

1) If something changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self. So, far from denying change, this 'law' allows us to determine if and when it has occurred.

2) If an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly.

The latter of these two seems to have puzzled you, but it shouldn't when you read the lame-brained and repetitive things dialecticians have said about this 'law', which most confuse with the principle of equality.


"[T]he first of [the universal Laws of Thought], the maxim of Identity, reads: Everything is identical with itself, A = A…." [Hegel (1975), p.167.]

"In this remark, I will consider in more detail identity as the law of identity which is usually adduced as the first law of thought.

"This proposition in its positive expression A = A is, in the first instance, nothing more than the expression of an empty tautology." [Hegel (1999), p.413.]

"Abstract Identity (a = a…) is likewise inapplicable in organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from itself….The law of identity in the old metaphysical sense is the fundamental law of the old outlook: a = a." [Engels (1954), pp.214-15.]

"The 'fundamental laws of thinking' are considered to be three in number: 1) The Law of Identity… [which] states that 'A is A' or A = A…." [Plekhanov (1908), p.89.]

"…Hegel elucidates the one-sidedness, the incorrectness of the 'law of identity' (A = A)…." [Lenin (1961), p.134.]

"Formal Logic starts from the proposition that A is always equal to A. We know that this law of identity contains some measure of truth…. Now…when we go to reality and look for evidence of the truth of the proposition: A equals A…we find that the opposite of this axiom is far closer to the truth." [Novack (1971), pp.32-33.]

"Formal Logic asserts: 'A is A'. Dialectical Logic is not saying 'A is not-A'…. It says: A is indeed A, but A is also not-A precisely so far as the proposition 'A is A' is not a tautology but has real content." [Lefebvre (1968), p.41.]

"The Law of identity is usually expressed in the form, A is A. That is, each thing is identical with itself." [Somerville (1946), p.183.]

"The Aristotelian conception of the laws basic to correct thinking may be stated as follows: 1. Law of Identity: Each existence is identical with itself. A is A…." [Somerville (1967), pp.44-45.]

"Classical, Aristotelian logic takes as its fundamental premise the Law of Identity, the statement that a thing is identical with itself. Expressed in a formula: A is A…. In Aristotle's formal logic A is A, and never non-A. In Hegel's dialectics A is A as well as non-A." [Baghavan (1987), pp.75-76.]

"The biggest contradiction of all lies in the fundamental premises of formal logic itself…. The basic laws…are:

1) The law of Identity ('A' = 'A')…." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.90-91.]
"Dialectics, or the logic of motion, is distinct from formal or static logic. Formal logic is based on three fundamental laws:

"(a) The law of identity: A is equal to A; a thing is always equal to itself." [Mandel (1979), p.160.]

"The laws of logic are based on two main propositions. The first is that of identity or of self-conformity. The proposition very simply states: 'A is A,' that is every concept is equal to itself. A man is a man, a hen is a hen, a potato is a potato. This proposition forms one basis of logic." [Thalheimer (1936), pp.88.]

"...If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971), p.20.]

"[In FL] things are defined statically, according to certain fixed properties -– colour, weight, size, and so on. This is denoted by the expression 'A is equal to A'." [Rees (1998), p.272.]

"The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that 'A' is equal to 'A'."[Trotsky (1971), p.63.]


There are countless sites in the internet that say the same thing (irony intended).

References to the above works can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2006.htm

My comment was merely aimed at showing that this 'law' can cope with change, since if A is identical with B, it will share all the properties B has, and so will change at a rate equal to that of B (let alone at a rate equal to itself).

And there are plenty of identical particles in nature; for example, every electron is identical to every other electron (the same is true of photons).

As Steven French notes:


"It should be emphasised, first of all, that quantal particles are indistinguishable in a much stronger sense than classical particles. It is not just that two or more electrons, say, possess all intrinsic properties in common but that -- on the standard understanding -- no measurement whatsoever could in principle determine which one is which." [French (2006)]

That quote came from his SIEP article:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-idind/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identical_particles

[gilhyle]

I understand all this seems quite devatating to you, but from where I sit you just slip from one argument to another. You say his is dogmatic, I say he describes himself as anti-dogmatic and seeks to prove only anti-dogmatic propositions. You say, ah yes but he derives his laws from Hegel. Hegel is dogmatic and therefore so is Engels. I say that that doesnt follow, cos it is possible to take a non-dogmatic idea from a dogmatic writer. You then say, ah yea but in Engels case he did use those ideas for a dogmatic purpose....which gets us back to the beginning of the circle to go around again, with nothing established.

If I take a Newtonian model of what a law is to be laws which specify conditions under which regularities persist (roughly) Now let me take something Engels wrote about Economic laws:


It is Adam Smith’s great merit that it is just in the chapters of Book I (chapters VI, VII, VIII) where he passes from simple commodity exchange and its law of value to exchange between materialised and living labour, to exchange between capital and wage-labour, to the consideration of profit and rent in general—in short, to the origin of surplus-value—that he feels some flaw has emerged. He senses that somehow—whatever the cause may be, and he does not grasp what it is—in the actual result the law is suspended: more labour is exchanged for less labour (from the labourer’s standpoint), less labour is exchanged for more labour (from the capitalist’s standpoint). His merit is that he emphasises—and it obviously perplexes him—that with the accumulation of capital and the appearance of property in land—that is, when the conditions of labour assume an independent existence over against labour itself—something new occurs, apparently (and actually, in the result) the law of value changes into its opposite. It is his theoretical strength that he feels and stresses this contradiction, just as it is his theoretical weakness that the contradiction shakes his confidence in the general law, even for simple commodity exchange; that he does not perceive how this contradiction arises, through labour-power itself becoming a commodity, and that in the case of this specific commodity its use-value—which therefore has nothing to do with its exchange-value—is precisely the energy which creates exchange-value. Ricardo is ahead of Adam Smith in that these apparent contradictions—in their result real contradictions—do not confuse him. But he is behind Adam Smith in that he does not even suspect that this presents a problem, and therefore the specific development which the law of value undergoes with the formation of capital does not for a moment puzzle him or even attract his attention. We shall see later how what was a stroke of genius with Adam Smith becomes reactionary with Malthus as against Ricardo’s standpoint.

Here he is speculating that there is a law - the law of value - which he definitely believes applies to capitalism, but which is 'suspended' in some sense, i.e. he is not defining a regularity like Newton, but still thinks there is a law.



Quick google: I see there was an article by some guy called J.P Burket on Marx's Conception of an Economic Law of Motion in a Journal called History of Political Economy 2000, vol. 32, no2, pp. 381-394 (1 p.1/4) has tried to compare and contrast Marx's and Newton's concept of a law.

But I dont have access to that.

[trivas7]

Quick google: I see there was an article by some guy called J.P Burket on Marx's Conception of an Economic Law of Motion in a Journal called History of Political Economy 2000, vol. 32, no2, pp. 381-394 (1 p.1/4) has tried to compare and contrast Marx's and Newton's concept of a law.

But I dont have access to that.Google 'Marx's Conception of an Economic Law of Motion' or here's the .pdf link:

http://www.uri.edu/research/isiac/lawofmot.pdf

IMO Marx's refers to 'laws' in the Hegelian, not Newtonian sense. I disagree with the author that what Marx's was doing in Capital is providing a model of capitalism, but rather its inner dialectical structure.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


I understand all this seems quite devatating to you, but from where I sit you just slip from one argument to another. You say his is dogmatic, I say he describes himself as anti-dogmatic and seeks to prove only anti-dogmatic propositions. You say, ah yes but he derives his laws from Hegel. Hegel is dogmatic and therefore so is Engels. I say that that doesnt follow, cos it is possible to take a non-dogmatic idea from a dogmatic writer. You then say, ah yea but in Engels case he did use those ideas for a dogmatic purpose....which gets us back to the beginning of the circle to go around again, with nothing established.

But, you are the one who has been forced onto the back foot, since nearly every one of your claims about this execrable book has been shown to be false or irrelevant.


You say, ah yes but he derives his laws from Hegel. Hegel is dogmatic and therefore so is Engels.

But, why does Engels accept any of these Hegelian 'laws' to begin with?

Has he carried out a thorough examination of the evidence? No.

Has he uncritically accepted several defective lines of reasoning from Hegel? Yes.

Does he point to any limitations in these 'laws'? No.

Does he tell us what their key terms mean? No.

Does he impose them on situations where they do not apply? Yes.

All this looks pretty dogmatic to me -- as dogmatic as anything a Christian Fundamentalist would try to pull.


I say that that doesnt follow, cos it is possible to take a non-dogmatic idea from a dogmatic writer.

Eh? If these 'laws' are based only on a priori dogma, how can they not be dogmatic themselves, whoever uses them?

Especially given the considerations I listed above.


You then say, ah yea but in Engels case he did use those ideas for a dogmatic purpose

Where have I said that?

I predicted you'd slip back into invention mode again soon, and I was right.


which gets us back to the beginning of the circle to go around again, with nothing established

Not so.

We have established that the things you said about Engels application of these 'laws' were defective. For example, that Engels accepts the nodal status of Q/Q (which you denied), that he acknowledges this law depends on the input of matter/energy (which inputs are left vague, and the boundary condidtions left non-existent, again, which you questioned), and that it must have a modal/universal aspect to it, or it cannot be a 'law'.

In the event we have also established that you either do not know what the word 'law' means, or you are relying on an idiosyncratic notion of this word (one not shared by anyone else in the nineteenth century) in order to try to wriggle out of the corner into which you have painted yourself.

We have also established that you think a 'law' can have countless exceptions and still be a law -- and yet you have failed to give another example taken from any of the sciences of another genuine law which can be abrogated in this way far more times that it is observed.

Moreover, you have yet to tell us what you/Engels means by 'quality', 'the addition of energy', 'node'/'leap', or what the boundary conditions are to the Q/Q 'law -- or even what you mean by 'law'. [But, see below.]

All in all, a pathetic show, but one consistent with the naive faith you have in this mystic creed, and its attendant Mickey Mouse Science.

And then you have the cheek to turn it around on me, when you are the dissembler here!


Here he is speculating that there is a law - the law of value - which he definitely believes applies to capitalism, but which is 'suspended' in some sense, i.e. he is not defining a regularity like Newton, but still thinks there is a law.

But what does he mean by a 'law' (Newton certainly meant more than a regularity; I think you have him confused with Hume)? And what do you mean by 'law'?

A mere tendency is not a 'law'. And regularity is no help, since you admit the Q/Q law has countless exceptions. [So does the N/N 'law', but we can come back to that.]


Quick google: I see there was an article by some guy called J.P Burket on Marx's Conception of an Economic Law of Motion in a Journal called History of Political Economy 2000, vol. 32, no2, pp. 381-394 (1 p.1/4) has tried to compare and contrast Marx's and Newton's concept of a law.

But I dont have access to that.

Well, your ignorance of the history of science is beginning to show here, and your last munute, desperate attempts to find something -- anything (!!) --, that will help you out is as revealing as it is demeaning.

Why you even refer us to an article that you have not read!

Truth be told, it is you who is squirming, not me.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that Trivas, but how it helps Gil or Engels (with respect to Q/Q, etc.), is far from clear.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

As far as Engels and Hegel's preference for Kepler over Newton (which Burkett uncritically accepts), van Heijenoort has this to say:


In the second preface to the Anti-Dühring, written in September 1885, hence after many years of 'moulting', Engels states:


"[ ... ] Hegel emphasized that Kepler, whom Germany let starve, is the real founder of modern mechanics of heavenly bodies and that Newton's law of gravitation is already contained in all three Kepler's laws, even explicitly in the third one. What Hegel shows with a few simple equations in his Naturphilosophie, § 270 and additions (Hegel's Werke, 1842, volume VII, pages 98 and 113-115), appears again as a result of modern mathematical mechanics in Gustav Kirchhoff's Vorlesungen über mathematische Physik, 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1877, page 10, and in a mathematical form which is essentially the same as the simple one first developed by Hegel." [1935, pages 11-12.]

Let us open the two books mentioned by Engels at the pages he indicates. In Kirchhoff's book we do find the derivation of Newton's law of attraction from Kepler's three laws, as it can still be found in any elementary textbook of mechanics. It requires two or three pages and makes use of the integral calculus and elementary differential equations. Now, in Hegel we read something much shorter:


"In Kepler's third law, A^3/T^2 is the constant. Let us write it A.A.^2/T^2 and, following Newton, let us call A/T^2 the universal gravitation; then the expression of the action of this so-called attraction is inversely proportional to the square of the distance." [1842, pages 98-99.]

In these puerile lines, Hegel does not see, among other things, that the variable distance between the planet and the sun is not the semi-major axis of the ecliptic orbit. On page 115, also mentioned by Engels, the same error, with a few others added for good measure, is repeated. Hegel's greatness rests on other achievements than these absurdities dictated by a deep-rooted and violent prejudice against the Englishman Newton as well as by an inveterate lack of understanding of mathematical methods.

Half a century later, after many years of personal 'moulting', with the correct derivation under his eyes in Kirchhoff's book, Engels does not see Hegel's mistakes. Much worse, he states that the two derivations are 'essentially the same'. No, indeed, we cannot say that Engels learned much more mathematics from physics books than from mathematical treatises.

What should we retain from all this? Engels does not show the slightest aptitude for mathematics; he does not know any of its developments in the nineteenth century; his judgments in the philosophy of mathematics are based on conceptions prevalent ninety or a hundred years before the time he was writing, while this interval had seen tumultuous and far-reaching progress; even so far as eighteenth century mathematics is concerned, he never comes into intimate contact with it; he only knows its problems through Hegel, a rather poor guide in that domain. Nevertheless, as we shall see now, Engels does not hesitate to pronounce sweeping judgments on mathematics and its philosophy.

This can be accessed at my site, or at the Marx Internet Archive:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Heijenoort.htm

http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/heijen/works/math.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

This is quite a good article, and the author makes a strong case for not interpreting Marx as adopting a Newtonian view of 'law', but the alternative, that he accepts a Hegelian view, is even worse, for Hegelian 'laws' are necessary beings, and Marx certainly did not intend that.

I still think a case can be made for interpreting Marx as a Newtonian, even if only to save himself from himself.

However, how this helps Engels is far from clear, for by no stretch of the imagination is the Q/Q a necessary 'law', even though Engels defines it this way in Dialectics of Nature (and that is because it has more exceptions than exemplifications, and the latter only work because of the ill-defined notions it uses) -- and the same goes for the N/N.

The errors Burkett makes are minor, and not worth mentioning. What is more worrying is the things he leaves out. But this is not a thread about his work.

[Hit The North]

It's quite straight-forward.

The 'Law of Identity' is no enemy of change, as dialecticians try to tell us (having copied this odd idea off Hegel, who simply dreamt it up), and this is so for at least two reasons.

1) If something changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self. So, far from denying change, this 'law' allows us to determine if and when it has occurred.

2) If an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly.

The latter of these two seems to have puzzled you, but it shouldn't when you read the lame-brained and repetitive things dialecticians have said about this 'law', which most confuse with the principle of equality.

The only thing that puzzles me is why you think such empty formulations explain anything at all.


If an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly.

According to this gem of logic, if an one of a pair of identical twins changes - loses a limb in an accident, let's say - then the other twin will lose a limb equally quickly. Or does it only work with electrons and photons?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

CZ:


The only thing that puzzles me is why you think such empty formulations explain anything at all.

Once more:

1) I merely quoted them to show that this 'law' is no enemy of change.

2) There are more substantial tools that modern logic uses to explain change -- not the least of which are those derived from modal and temporal logic:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-temporal/

3) Dialectics cannot explain change at all -- it can't even explain boiling water or a bag of sugar!

4) Ordinary language beats even modern logic in its capacity to explain change -- and hence it wipes the floor with dialectics here too.


According to this gem of logic, if an one of a pair of identical twins changes - loses a limb in an accident, let's say - then the other twin will lose a limb equally quickly. Or does it only work with electrons and photons?

But identical twins are not identical -- even Trotsky knew that.

Perhaps you don't.

[trivas7]

I still think a case can be made for interpreting Marx as a Newtonian, even if only to save himself from himself.

Marx wasn't an astronomer. What does it even mean to say that Marx was trying to elucidate capitalism's 'Newtonian' laws of motion? I.e., what is 'Newtonian' re capitalism?

[Hit The North]

2) There are more substantial tools that modern logic uses to explain change -- not the least of which are those derived from modal and temporal logic:But I thought you argued that change should be explained through the accumulation of scientific evidence, not through the use of abstract philosophical 'laws' whether drawn from dialectics or formal logic.


But identical twins are not identical -- even Trotsky knew that.So it does only work with electrons and photons - things so simple that the possibility of variation has reached zero?

How does formal logic account for the fact that British capitalist society changes all the time but remains both British and capitalist?

[trivas7]

But I thought you argued that change should be explained through the accumulation of scientific evidence, not through the use of abstract philosophical 'laws' whether drawn from dialectics or formal logic.

IMO change is a philosophic, not a scientific category. But, that's just me. :lol:

[gilhyle]

Quote:
You then say, ah yea but in Engels case he did use those ideas for a dogmatic purpose
Where have I said that?


I took you as sayig that here.


Engels slipped into this mode of thought seamlessly; he uncritically appropriated his three 'laws' from Hegel as a priori truths -- that is, he accepted dogmatic principles

But Im happy to accept a clarification.

I also think it is quite a good artilcle and the use made of Marx's view on interest is quite right. But it does matter to this debate. If there was a particular use of the concept of law by Hegel that was taken over (in critical form) by Marx and Engels then that is very relevant to understanding of what Engels uses the various laws he cites for. That is what is at issue.

You see I completely missed you being able to contradict ANY of the summary readings I did of Anti Duhring. I dont think you did. Rather than contradict the reading I set out, what you did was to claim that DESPITE using his concept of dialectical contradiction and the law of Q/Q and N/N for anti-dogmatic purposes against Duhring, he fell into dogmatism, somehow. So it does matter what the conception of law Engels had is. It is also clearly true that there was an alternative conception of law active in the 19th century.

Furthermore what the article also shows is that that alternative conception of law, whether in Hegel or Marx, was - and is - problematic. And that is because it is a dialectical conception of law. But it is not necessarily a dogmatic conception of law - it certainly is in Hegel, but not necessarily in either Marx or Engels. Their revision of the concept of dialectics to make it undogmatic can extend to a revision of the Hegelian concept of law.

From that we can conclude that the mere fact that Engels uses the term 'law' does not necessarily imply a dogmatic intent or role for those laws. So we are still at the point that in the Anti Duhring there is no significant evidence of a dogmatic usage of dialectical concepts anywhere in the Anti Duhring that we have looked over. There is more to look over...but so far no dogmatism and most importantly no need for dogmatism given Engels Anti-Dogmatic line of argument against Duhring.

Im interested in the quote from Von Heijenoort. While I claim little expertise ....lets be clear, none !......I have always been les comfortable with what Engels said about Maths than other subjects. However, the fact that his writing on the topic was out of date is quite trivial in the scheme of things.....and while Hegel may well have been wrong on the details of his point, two things are true, Newton's laws are a 'reduction' of Galileo's and Kepler's laws which involve some change of the assumptions. But thats not worth arguing about.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Marx wasn't an astronomer. What does it even mean to say that Marx was trying to elucidate capitalism's 'Newtonian' laws of motion? I.e., what is 'Newtonian' re capitalism?

Well, Darwin wasn't either, but he was trying to develop a Newtonian theory.


IMO change is a philosophic, not a scientific category. But, that's just me.

Too bad then that philosophy can't explain change -- and dialectics is even worse.

Unless, of course, you can show where the error in my proof that it can't, is wrong.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

CZ:


But I thought you argued that change should be explained through the accumulation of scientific evidence, not through the use of abstract philosophical 'laws' whether drawn from dialectics or formal logic.

Indeed; science provides the premisses, logic knits them together.

Where's the problem?


So it does only work with electrons and photons - things so simple that the possibility of variation has reached zero?

No, it works with anything that is identical, and what these are is an empirical matter, not something for mystics like you to legislate for or against on an a priori basis.


How does formal logic account for the fact that British capitalist society changes all the time but remains both British and capitalist?

It would do this with a sophisticated application of model theory:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory

With a dash of set theory thrown in for good measure:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/set-theory/

You know -- the sort of thing you mystics know nothing about.

Now, let's see your rebuttal of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, in nature or society...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


But Im happy to accept a clarification

My words say it better than your misleading precis, so quote those in future, please.

When I attribute something to you, I almost invariably always quote you; you'd be well-advised to do the same with my words. But, you do not do evidence, do you?


You see I completely missed you being able to contradict ANY of the summary readings I did of Anti Duhring. I dont think you did. Rather than contradict the reading I set out, what you did was to claim that DESPITE using his concept of dialectical contradiction and the law of Q/Q and N/N for anti-dogmatic purposes against Duhring, he fell into dogmatism, somehow. So it does matter what the conception of law Engels had is. It is also clearly true that there was an alternative conception of law active in the 19th century.

Well, your selective blindness is now almost legendary.

I have been over this so many times now, the only possibilties are that (1) you cannot follow the argument; (2) you dogmatically stick to dogma yourself, or (3) you just like the attention you get from me.

And, it does matter what concept of a 'law' Engels possessed, and that is why you have refused to say, although you speculated at one time that he might have leaned toward a regularist approach.


Furthermore what the article also shows is that that alternative conception of law, whether in Hegel or Marx, was - and is - problematic. And that is because it is a dialectical conception of law. But it is not necessarily a dogmatic conception of law - it certainly is in Hegel, but not necessarily in either Marx or Engels. Their revision of the concept of dialectics to make it undogmatic can extend to a revision of the Hegelian concept of law.

It certainly was for Hegel, as Burkett shows, and it is most definitely problematic for Dialectical Marxists, if they attribute it (or one like it) to Marx.

But, even worse, it is fatal to Engels, for it confirms, yet again, the dogmatic nature of his 'theory'.


From that we can conclude that the mere fact that Engels uses the term 'law' does not necessarily imply a dogmatic intent or role for those laws. So we are still at the point that in the Anti Duhring there is no significant evidence of a dogmatic usage of dialectical concepts anywhere in the Anti Duhring that we have looked over. There is more to look over...but so far no dogmatism and most importantly no need for dogmatism given Engels Anti-Dogmatic line of argument against Duhring.

Not so; 'law' is manifestly dogmatic in Hegel, and if Engels appropriated it (or even modified it) it remains dogmatic, and unproven from nature. Indeed, it is superimposed on nature in the time-honoured a priori manner.


Im interested in the quote from Von Heijenoort. While I claim little expertise ....lets be clear, none !......I have always been les comfortable with what Engels said about Maths than other subjects. However, the fact that his writing on the topic was out of date is quite trivial in the scheme of things.....and while Hegel may well have been wrong on the details of his point, two things are true, Newton's laws are a 'reduction' of Galileo's and Kepler's laws which involve some change of the assumptions. But thats not worth arguing about.

I disagree that Newton's laws were a 'reduction' of anything -- they were an attempt to clarify and extend, and hence he gave the terms he used new meanings, out of which came a whole new scientific grammar enabling him and subsequent scientists to explain nature more extensively.

And I note that in your selective 'review' of Anti-Duhring, you left out all mention of this guff:


We have already noted that one of the basic principles of higher mathematics is the contradiction that in certain circumstances straight lines and curves may be the same. It also gets up this other contradiction: that lines which intersect each other before our eyes nevertheless, only five or six centimetres from their point of intersection, can be shown to be parallel, that is, that they will never meet even if extended to infinity. And yet, working with these and with even far greater contradictions, it attains results which are not only correct but also quite unattainable for lower mathematics.

But even lower mathematics teems with contradictions. It is for example a contradiction that a root of A should be a power of A, and yet A^1/2 = (the square root of A -- RL). It is a contradiction that a negative quantity should be the square of anything, for every negative quantity multiplied by itself gives a positive square. The square root of minus one is therefore not only a contradiction, but even an absurd contradiction, a real absurdity. And yet (the square root of minus one -- RL) is in many cases a necessary result of correct mathematical operations. Furthermore, where would mathematics — lower or higher — be, if it were prohibited from operation with (the square root of minus one -- RL)?

Yet more a priori dogmatics, this time imposed on mathematics. And there is plenty more of this confused banter.

Now, why on earth did you leave all mention of this out?:rolleyes:

[trivas7]

Trivas:
Well, Darwin wasn't either, but he was trying to develop a Newtonian theory.

What's a Newtonian theory?



Too bad then that philosophy can't explain change -- and dialectics is even worse.

Unless, of course, you can show where the error in my proof that it can't, is wrong.
Dialectics "explains" change philosophically, not scientifically.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


What's a Newtonian theory?

Newtonian theory with the indefinite article attached.

Next stupid question...


Dialectics "explains" change philosophically, not scientifically.

And yet, I have shown that it cannot explain change.

This must mean that you have a counter-refutation to my earlier refutation.

If so, let's see it...

[Hit The North]

Indeed; science provides the premisses, logic knits them together. Isn't that what dialecticians like Engels claim - that empirical investigation is necessary to establish the premises of change and dialectical logic "knits" them together?

Where's the problem? I don't understand what you mean by "knit them together".

No, it works with anything that is identicalBut if identical twins are not identical and, I presume that on the same basis two identical Ford Cortinas are not really identical and - while we're at it - two capitalist societies are not identical, and the only objects which you seem to offer as actually identical are sub-atomic particles, what exactly does
2) If an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly. tell us which is applicable to our phenomenal experience?

Further, even if we were to find two objects which were actually identical, by what alchemy does the change in one carry over into the exact change in the other?

[trivas7]

Newtonian theory with the indefinite article attached.

Next stupid question...

I see that you don't know what your talking re. This is an evasion, not even a stupid response.


And yet, I have shown that it cannot explain change.
If so, let's see it...
It explains it to my satisfaction, too bad you just don't like the explanation. But then, you don't put much stock in philosophy, do you?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

CZ:


Isn't that what dialecticians like Engels claim - that empirical investigation is necessary to establish the premises of change and dialectical logic "knits" them together?

He says this, but as I have shown here, he does not do this. Anyway, dialectical logic is useless. If Engels were using formal logic, I'd complain a lot less.


I don't understand what you mean by "knit them together".

It's a metaphor for what we can do in logic -- set up a theory, interpreted in a model.


But if identical twins are not identical and, I presume that on the same basis two identical Ford Cortinas are not really identical and - while we're at it - two capitalist societies are not identical, and the only objects which you seem to offer as actually identical are sub-atomic particles, what exactly does

Not so, as the articles I liked to would have told you, had you bothered to look, there are countless supra-atomic entities that are identical.


tell us which is applicable to our phenomenal experience?

Both are.


Further, even if we were to find two objects which were actually identical, by what alchemy does the change in one carry over into the exact change in the other?

The laws governing both, or the particulars associated with each case.

For example, imagine two children who lose their father. At one moment, they are identical in respect of being his childen. After he dies, they are identical in respect of losing their father.

Or, consider two comrades selling papers; comrade A has sold 3 and so has comrade B. They have both sold the most on their paper sale; so they are equally first. Comrade C now sells four papers to one individual, so comrades A and B are now equally second.

Or, consider two cheques for £25 written by A and B. The bank that issues the cheques goes bust; those two cheques are not equally valueless.

Or, consider twenty children who are told to stand in line, one behind the next, in two columns of ten. Suppose child A and child B stand at the front of each column. They are both identically first in line. Suppose now that child C and D, who were at the back of each line, are now told to go to the front. Child A and B are now identically second in line, and what is more they have changed without moving (an example of change with no change!).

There are countless examples like this (I list scores of these at my site).

But, try saying any of this in Hegel-speak!

Again, you, like other dialecticians, are transfixed by a metaphysical notion of 'change' and of 'identity', in that it can only happen one way, or can only be conceptualised in one way. But, there are all sorts of change in nature and society about which traditional philosphy has been blind, cases we are all familiar with, which ordinary language enables us to conceptualise. And the same applies to identity and difference.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


I see that you don't know what your talking re. This is an evasion, not even a stupid response.

Ask a stupid question, you get a stupid answer.

And you are a fine one to talk; you have been evading at least three challenges of mine for days. Here is an earleir comment of mine:


You demand answers of me, but you refuse to respond to any of mine -- for example, we still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1172575&postcount=67


It explains it to my satisfaction, too bad you just don't like the explanation.

This reminds me of the Scopes trial in 1925 when William Jennings Bryan was put on the stand by Clarence Darrow, and was masked a series of unanswerable questions about the Bible.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scopes_Trial

Bryan simply refused to reply, and told Darrow that the Bible was good enough for him, and he was quite happy with its explanation of creation.


But there is also an embarrassing side to Bryan: the ‘great commoner’ was a Bible-banging fundamentalist. When officials in Dayton, Tennessee decided to roast John Scopes for teaching evolution in 1925, they called in the ageing Bryan to prosecute. The week-long trial became a national sensation and reached its climax when the defence attorney, Clarence Darrow, called Bryan to the stand and eviscerated his Biblical verities. ‘Do you believe Joshua made the sun stand still?’ Darrow asked sarcastically. ‘Do you believe a whale swallowed Jonah? Will you tell us the exact date of the great flood?’ Bryan tried to swat away the swarm of contradictions. ‘I do not think about things I don’t think about,’ he said. The New York Times called it an ‘absurdly pathetic performance’, reducing a famous American to the ‘butt of a crowd’s rude laughter’. This paunchy, sweaty figure went down as an icon of the cranky right. Today, most Americans encounter the Scopes trial and Bryan himself in a play called Inherit the Wind. I once played the role of Bryan and the director kept saying: ‘More pompous, Morone. Make him more pompous.’

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n04/moro01_.html

You are just as dogmatic and closed-minded. A simple faith is OK for you, even though I have ripped your core theory to shreads.

You are indeed the William Jennings Bryan of RevLeft.

[trivas7]

You are just as dogmatic and closed-minded. A simple faith is OK for you, even though I have ripped your core theory to shreads.


It takes a philosophy to make a philosophical argument, R. Too bad ad hominems don't cut it.

[trivas7]

Since Hegel's death hardly any attempt has been made to develop science in is own inner inter-connection. The official Hegelian school had appropriated from the dialectics of the master only manipulation of the simplest tricks, which it applied to anything and everything often with ludicrous clumsiness. For it, the whole inheritance of Hegel was limited to a mere pattern by the help of which every theme could be correctly devised, and to compilation of words and turns of speech which had no other purpose than to turn up at the right time when thought and positive knowledge failed. This it came about that, as a Bonn professor said, these Hegelian understood nothing about anything, but could write about everything. its worth was in accordance. Meanwhile, these gentlemen were, in spite of their self-complacency, so conscious of their weakness that they avoided big problems as much as possible.The old pedantic science held the field by its superiority in positive knowledge. And when Feuerbach also gave notice that he was quitting the field of speculative conceptions, Hegelianism quietly fell asleep; and it seemed as if the old metaphysics, with its fixed categories, had begun to reign anew in science...

Here, therefore, was another problem to be solved, one which had nothing to do with political economy as such. How was science to be treated? One the one hand there was the Hegelian dialectics in the wholly abstract, "speculative" form in which Hegel had bequeathed it; on the other hand there was the ordinary, essentially metaphysical Wolffian method which had again become fashionable and in which the bourgeois economists had written their fat, disjointed tomes. This latter method had been so annihilated theoretically by Kant and particularly by Hegel that only laziness and the lack of any simple alternative method could make possible its continued existence in practice. On the other hand the Hegelian method was absolutely unusable in its available form. It was essentially idealistic, and the problem here was that of developing a world outlook more materialistic than any previously advanced. The Hegelian method started out from pure thinking and here one had to start from stubborn facts. A method which, according to its own admission, "came from nothing, through nothing, to nothing," was in this form completely our of place here.

Nevertheless, of all the available logical material, it was the only thing which could be used at least as a starting point. It had never been criticized, never overcome. Not one of the opponents of the great dialectician had been able to make a breach in its proud structure; it fell into oblivion, because the Hegelian school had not the slightest notion what to do with it. It was, therefore, above all necessary to subject the Hegelian method to thoroughgoing criticism.

What distinguishes Hegel's mode of thought from that of all other philosophers was the enormous historical sense upon which it was based. Abstract and idealist though it was in form, yet the development of his thoughts always proceeded in line with the development of world history and the latter was really meant to be only the test of the former. If, thereby, the real relation was inverted and put on its head, nevertheless its real content entered everywhere into the philosophy, all the more so since Hegel -- in contrast to his disciples -- did not parade ignorance, but was one of the best intellects of all time. He was the first who attempted to show an evolution and inner coherence, in history and while today much in his Philosophy of History may seem peculiar to us, yet the grandeur of the basis of his fundamental outlook is admirable even today, whether one makes comparison with his predecessors, or with anyone since his time who has taken the liberty of reflecting in general about history. Everywhere, in his Phenomenology, Aesthetics, History of Philosophy, this magnificent conception of history, penetrates, and everywhere this material is treated historically, in a definite even if abstractly distorted inter-connection with history.

This epoch-making conception of history was the direct theoretical prerequisite for the new materialist outlook, and thereby provided a connecting point for the logical method. Since this forgotten dialectics had led to such results even from the stand point of"pure thinking,", and had, in addition, so easily settled accounts with all preceding logic and metaphysics, in any case there must have been something more to it than sophistry and hair-splitting. But the criticism of this method, which all officially recognized philosophy had fought shy of and still does , was no trifle.

Marx was, and is, the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the Hegelian logic the kernel which comprised Hegel's real discoveries in this sphere, and to construct the dialectical method divested of its idealist trappings, in the simple shape in which it becomes the only true form of development of thought.

The working out of the method which forms the foundation of Marx's Critique of Political Economy we consider a result of hardly less importance than the basic materialistic outlook itself.

The criticism of economics, even according to the method employed, could still be exercised in two ways -- historically or logically. Since in history, as in its literary reflection, development as a whole proceeds from the most simple to the most complex relations, the historical development of the literature of political economy provided a natural guiding thread with which criticism could link up and the economic categories as a whole would thereby appear in the same sequence as in the logical development. This form apparently has the advantage of greater clearness, since indeed it is the actual development that is followed, but as a matter of fact it would thereby at most become more popular. History often proceeds by jumps and zigzags and it would in this way have to be followed everywhere, whereby not only would much material of minor importance have to be incorporated but there would be many interruptions of the chain of thought. Furthermore, the history of economics could not be written without that of bourgeois society and this would make the task endless, since all preliminary work is lacking. The logical method of treatment was, therefore, the only appropriate one. But this, as a matter of fact, is nothing else than the historical method, only divested of its historical form and disturbing fortuities. The chain of thought must begin with the same thing that this history begins with and its further course will be nothing but the mirror-image of the historical course in abstract and theoretically consistent form, a corrected mirror-image but corrected according to laws furnished by the real course of history itself, in that each factor can be considered at its ripest point of development, it its classic form.

In this method we proceed from the first and simples relation that historically, and in fact, confront us; therefore from the first economic relation to be found. We analyze this relation. Being a relation already implies that it has two sides related to each other. Each of these sides is considered by itself, which brings us to the way they behave to each other, their reciprocal interaction. Contradictions will result which demand a solution. But as we are not considering an abstract process of thought taking place solely in our heads, but a real happening which has actually taken place at some particular time, or is still taking place, these contradictions, too, will have developed in practice and will probably have found their solution. We shall trace the nature of this solution, and shall discover that it has been brought about by the establishment of a new relation whose two opposite sides we now have to develop, and so on.

Political economy begins with commodities, begins with the moment when products are exchanged for one another -- whether by individual or by primitive communities. The product that appears in exchange is a commodity. It is, however, a commodity solely because a relation between two persons or communities attaches to the thing, the product, the relation between producer and consumer who are here no longer united in the same person. Here we have an example of a peculiar fact, which runs through the whole of economics and which as caused utter confusion in the minds of the bourgeois economists: Economics deals not with things but with relations between persons and in the last resort between classes; these relations are, however, always attached to things and appear as things. This inter-connection, which in isolated cases, it is true, has dawned upon particular economists, was first discovered by Marx as obtaining for all political economy, whereby he made the most difficult questions so simple an clear that now even the bourgeois economists will be able to grasp them.

If now we consider commodities from their various aspects, commodities in their complete development, and not as the first laboriously develop in the primitive barter between two primitive communities, they present themselves to us from the two points of view of use value and exchange value, and here we at once enter the sphere of economic dispute. Anyone who would like to have a striking illustration of the fact that the German dialectical method in its present state of elaboration is at least as superior to the old, shallow, garrulous metaphysical method as the raiiway is to the means of transport of the Middle Ages, should read in Adam Smith or any other reputable official economist what a torment exchange value and use value were to these gentlemen, how difficult it was for them to keep them properly apart and to comprehend each in its peculiar distinctness, and should then compare the simple, clear treatment by Marx...

It is seen that with this method the logical development is by no means compelled to keep to the purely abstract sphere. One the contrary, this method required historical illustrations, continual contact with reality. Such proofs are accordingly introduced in great variety, with references to the actual course of history at different stages of social development as well as to the economic literature in which the clear working out of the determinations of economic relations is pursued from the beginning. The criticism of individual, more or less one-sided or confused modes of conception is then in essence already given in the logical development itself and can be briefly formulated.

-- Engels, "Review of Marx's Critique of Political Economy"(1859), in Ludwig Feuerbach, Appendix. 75-81.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ah, the revenge of our very own William Jennings Bryan, I see.

And, what possible relevance has this piece of hokum (of Engels's) you quoted got?

As I wrote in Essay Nine, Part Two:


There are in fact two main types of dialectician (which groups can, of course, over lap at the edges):

(1) Low Church Dialecticians [LCDs]: Comrades in this category cleave to the original, unvarnished truth laid down in the sacred DM-texts (written by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, or Mao). These simple souls are highly proficient at quoting endless passages from the holy books as an answer to everything and anything, just like the faithful who bow to the East or who fill the gospel halls around the world. Their unquestioning faith is as impressive as it is un-Marxist.

They may be naive, but they are at least consistently so.

[FL = Formal Logic.]

In general, LCDs are blithely ignorant of FL. Now, on its own this is no hanging matter. However, such self-inflicted and woeful ignorance does not stop them from pontificating about FL, or from regaling us with it alleged limitations -- charges based on ideas they unwisely copied from Hegel, surely the George W Bush of Logic.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Too bad ad hominems don't cut it.

There's nothing intrinsically wrong with 'ad hominems', either:


One of the most widely misused terms on the Net is "ad hominem". It is most often introduced into a discussion by certain delicate types, delicate of personality and mind, whenever their opponents resort to a bit of sarcasm. As soon as the suspicion of an insult appears, they summon the angels of ad hominem to smite down their foes, before ascending to argument heaven in a blaze of sanctimonious glory. They may not have much up top, but by God, they don't need it when they've got ad hominem on their side. It's the secret weapon that delivers them from any argument unscathed.

In reality, ad hominem is unrelated to sarcasm or personal abuse. Argumentum ad hominem is the logical fallacy of attempting to undermine a speaker's argument by attacking the speaker instead of addressing the argument. The mere presence of a personal attack does not indicate ad hominem: the attack must be used for the purpose of undermining the argument, or otherwise the logical fallacy isn't there. It is not a logical fallacy to attack someone; the fallacy comes from assuming that a personal attack is also necessarily an attack on that person's arguments.

Therefore, if you can't demonstrate that your opponent is trying to counter your argument by attacking you, you can't demonstrate that he is resorting to ad hominem. If your opponent's sarcasm is not an attempt to counter your argument, but merely an attempt to insult you (or amuse the bystanders), then it is not part of an ad hominem argument.

Actual instances of argumentum ad hominem are relatively rare. Ironically, the fallacy is most often committed by those who accuse their opponents of ad hominem, since they try to dismiss the opposition not by engaging with their arguments, but by claiming that they resort to personal attacks. Those who are quick to squeal "ad hominem" are often guilty of several other logical fallacies, including one of the worst of all: the fallacious belief that introducing an impressive-sounding Latin term somehow gives one the decisive edge in an argument.

But enough vagueness. The point of this article is to bury the reader under an avalanche of examples of correct and incorrect usage of ad hominem, in the hope that once the avalanche has passed, the term will never be used incorrectly again. I will begin with some invented examples, before dealing with some real-life misuses of the term at the end.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "This does not logically follow. By your own argument, the set of rodents is a subset of the set of mammals; and therefore, a weasel can be outside the set of rodents and still be in the set of mammals."

Hopefully it should be clear that neither A's argument nor B's argument is ad hominem. Perhaps there are some people who think that any disagreement is an ad hominem argument, but these people shouldn't be allowed out of fairyland.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "This does not logically follow."
B's argument is less comprehensive, but still not ad hominem.
A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "This does not logically follow. You evidently know nothing about logic."

B's argument is still not ad hominem. Note that B directly engages A's argument: he is not attacking the person A instead of his argument. here is no indication that B thinks his subsequent attack on A strengthens his argument, or is a substitute for engaging with A's argument. Unless we have a good reason for thinking otherwise, we should assume it is just a sarcastic flourish.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "You evidently know nothing about logic. This does not logically follow."

B's argument is still not ad hominem. B does not imply that A's sentence does not logically follow because A knows nothing about logic. B is still addressing the substance of A's argument.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "You evidently know nothing about logic."

B's argument is, most probably, still not ad hominem. The word "evidently" indicates that B is basing his opinion of A's logical skills on the evidence of A's statement. Therefore, B's sentence is a sarcastic way of saying that A's argument is logically unsound: B is attacking A's argument. He is not attacking the person instead of the argument.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "You know nothing about logic."

Even now, we can't conclude that B's reply is ad hominem. It could well be, and probably is, the case that B is basing his reply on A's argument. He is not saying that A's argument is flawed because A knows nothing about logic; instead, he is using A's fallacious argument as evidence to present a new argument: that A knows nothing about logic.

Put briefly, ad hominem is "You are an ignorant person, therefore your arguments are wrong", and not "Your arguments are wrong, therefore you are an ignorant person." The latter statement may be fallacious, but it's not an ad hominem fallacy.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "This does not logically follow. And you're an asshole."

B is abusive, but his argument is still not ad hominem. He engages with A's argument. There is no reason to conclude that the personal abuse of A is part of B's argument, or that B thinks it undermines A's argument.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "You're an asshole."

B's reply is not necessarily ad hominem. There is no evidence that's his abusive statement is intended as a counter-argument. If it's not an argument, it's not an ad hominem argument.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "You evidently know nothing about logic. And you're an asshole."

Again, B's reply is not necessarily ad hominem.
A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Fuck you."

Not ad hominem. B's abuse is not a counter-argument, but a request for A to cease the discussion.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Well, you've never had a good grasp of logic, so this can't be true."

B's argument here is ad hominem. He concludes that A is wrong not by addressing A's argument, but by appealing to the negative image of A the person.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Well, you're a moron and an asshole, so there goes your argument.
"
B's reply here is ad hominem and abusive.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Well, you're a rodent and a weasel, so there goes your argument."

B's argument here might appear on superficial inspection to be sound, but it is in fact ad hominem. He is using the terms "rodent" and "weasel" in different senses to those used by A. Although he tries to make it appear that he is countering A's argument by invalidating one of the premises, he is in fact trying to counter A's argument by heaping abuse on A. (This might also be an example of an ad homonym argument.)

A: "All murderers are criminals, but a thief isn't a murderer, and so can't be a criminal."
B: "Well, you're a thief and a criminal, so there goes your argument."

Harder to call this one. B is addressing A's argument, but perhaps unwittingly.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Wrong! If a weasel isn't a rodent, then it must be an insectivore! What an asshole!"

B's argument is logically fallacious, and he concludes with some gratuitous abuse, but nothing here is ad hominem.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "I'm sorry, but I'd prefer to trust the opinion of a trained zoologist on this one."

B's argument is ad hominem: he is attempting to counter A not by addressing his argument, but by casting doubt on A's credentials. Note that B is polite and not at all insulting.

A: "Listen up, asshole. All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "Yet another ad hominem argument. Ignore this one, folks."

A is abusive, and his argument is fallacious, but it's not ad hominem. B's reply, ironically, is ad hominem; while he pretends to deal with A's argument, in using the term "ad hominem" incorrectly, B is in fact trying to dismiss the argument by imputing that A is resorting to personal attacks.

A: "Listen up, asshole. All rodents are mammals, and a lizard isn't a mammal, so it can't be a rodent."
B: "Yet another ad hominem argument. Ignore this one, folks."

A's argument is sound, and not ad hominem. B's reply is again ad hominem.

A: "B is a convicted criminal and his arguments are not to be trusted."
B: "Yet another ad hominem argument. Ignore this one, folks."

A's argument is ad hominem, since it attempts to undermine all of B's (hypothetical) arguments by a personal attack. B's reply is not ad hominem, since it directly addresses A's argument (correctly characterising it as ad hominem).

A: "All politicians are assholes, and you're just another politician. Therefore, you're an asshole."
B: "Yet another ad hominem argument."

If you accept the premises, A's argument is sound. Either way, from the given context, we cannot conclude that it is ad hominem: it's not an attempt to undermine B's (hypothetical) arguments by abusing him, but instead an attempt to establish that B is an asshole. B's reply is ad hominem, since by incorrectly using the term "ad hominem", he is trying to undermine A's argument by claiming that A is resorting to personal attacks.

A: "All politicians are liars, and you're just another politician. Therefore, you're a liar and your arguments are not to be trusted."
B: "Yet another ad hominem argument."

If you accept the premises, A's argument is sound; but I think most of us would sympathise with B and class it as fallacious, and ad hominem.

This is because we do not accept the premise that all politicians are liars. There is a false premise that lies behind all ad hominem arguments: the notion that all people of type X make bad arguments. A has just made this premise explicit.

A: "All rodents are mammals, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal."
B: "That does not logically follow."
A: "*Sigh* Do I have to spell it out for you? All rodents are mammals, right, but a weasel isn't a rodent, so it can't be a mammal! What's so hard to understand???!?"
B: "I'm afraid you're mistaken. Look at it logically. If p implies q, then it does not follow that not-p implies not-q."
A: "I don't care about so-called logic and Ps and Qs and that stuff, I'm talking COMMON SENSE. A weasel ISN'T a mammal."
B: "Okay, this guy's an idiot. Ignore this one, folks."
A: "AD HOMINEM!!!! I WIN!!!!!"

Although the last line of B, taken out of context, might look ad hominem (and was seized upon as such by A), it should be clear that taken as a whole, B's argument is not ad hominem. B engaged thoroughly with A's argument. He is not countering A's argument by saying A is an idiot; on the contrary, having logically countered A's argument, and having seen A's reaction, he is arguing that A is an idiot.

Some real-life examples:

A: "I agree that the writing is first class, but I am left with the distinct impression that the author is using the game as a vehicle for self-aggrandizement rather than to entertain the player. "
B: "... let's refrain from ad hominem arguments, and accept that we have different tastes, shall we?"

A's argument was not ad hominem. "The author is using the game as a vehicle for self-aggrandizement" is the conclusion of his argument, not an attempt to undermine the said author's (unseen) arguments by casting aspersions on him.

A: "I can even handle misplaced apostrophes every now and then. Not excessive amounts of them, [...]"
B: "Perhaps double-check your grammar before you write a grammar rant that refers to 'amounts of apostrophes'."
C: " ...the ad hominem nature of [B's reply] takes the sanctimonious angle that any who criticize must be without stain."

B's reply was not ad hominem. It was not a counter-argument to A, but an attempt to point out what B saw as A's hypocrisy. C's use of language, by the way, demonstrates that he is clearly out of his depth.

A: "Can someone please direct me to the ad hominem attacks in the TADS competition game "Futz Mutz"?"

There are no ad hominem attacks in Futz Mutz. Just a lot of stupid abuse.

A: "OK, I've been following this thread for a while, and I hate to say it, but you're being an asshole. You're really taking this whole thing too personally, and seriously misconstruing everyone else's arguments. Nobody here is arguing that copyright infringement is ethically, morally, legally, or otherwise justifiable. They're simply arguing that equating it with theft is simplistic and inaccurate."
B: "...calling me an asshole is called an ad hominem attack, which does not show me wrong."

No, calling you an asshole is just abuse. A's argument is not ad hominem. A has carefully pointed out what he sees as the flaws in B's argument, and based on B's failure to acknowledge them and general behaviour, has concluded that B is an asshole. This conclusion is quite independent of A's treatment of B's arguments.

A: "But the capability is, of course, there, and if you 'fail to see' how any of the standard systems can handle realtime then you clearly have zero understanding of virtual machines."
B: "...your over-reaching ad hominim[sic] judgements about what people do and do not know..."

A's argument is not ad hominem: he is not attempting to undermine B's arguments by claiming that B knows nothing about VMs. Instead, based on B's arguments about VMs, he has reached the conclusion that B has no understanding of them, and presented this as a new argument. (B later even had the nerve to direct A to the Wikipedia page on ad hominem, which he clearly didn't understand.)

Bold added.

http://plover.net/~bonds/adhominem.html

Now, even though I have quoted the above, I do not endorse all it says, for ad hominem is only an informal fallacy, and it is not always even that. For example, if arguing 'to the man' shows that he/she is being inconsistent in some way, then it is a valid method of criticism.

And a personal attack can also work; both are illustrated here:

A: B says that all fools should be ignored. But B is a fool; therefore he should be ignored.

C: D says she believes p and q. But D also believes r, which implies not-p. Therefore D should abandon either p or r (or rational debate).

So, if it is indeed the case that you, like William Jenninings Bryan, are content with your simple faith, and cannot defend it, it is relevant to point this out -- especially when you make the same claim of my good self (when I do little other than defend my ideas).


It takes a philosophy to make a philosophical argument, R.

That is about as stupid as saying a doctor has to catch a disease to eradicate that disease.

It is possible to show that a philosophical theory, such as the 'theory' of change in dialectics is fallacious by showing that whatever is done with it, it cannot work -- as indeed I have done -- without doing any philosophy, just as a doctor can eradicate a disease without actaully having to catch it first.

So, once more:


And you are a fine one to talk; you have been evading at least three challenges of mine for days. Here is an earleir comment of mine:


You demand answers of me, but you refuse to respond to any of mine -- for example, we still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...5&postcount=67

Or, like William Jennings Bryan, are you merely content to say:


'I do not think about things I don’t think about':lol:

[gilhyle]

My words say it better than your misleading precis, so quote those in future, please.

I know that is your approach, but I fundamentally disagree with it. Paraphrase is essential to effective argument. In the matter you disputed above, for example, I presented a paraphrase and I still cant see the difference between the paraphrase and the original, which I subsequently quoted. Secondly, I would be quite skeptical of the role of quotation in your own essays. They present an appearance of attention to the original, but much more effective would be a rounded paraphrased presentation of what Engels argued for, which you dont do.

If I paraphrase what you say, and you do not object to the paraphrase, then we have evidence of a shared understanding of a point (which one or other may not agree with). If I quote you, I might well misunderstand what I am quoting. Paraphrase is therefore a constructive methodology if debate is intended to make progress.


Well, your selective blindness is now almost legendary.

This is interestingly depressing. It is as plain to me as day that I set out a reading of the sections on the Law of Q/Q and N/N and you didnt disagree with any of that. You now smell blood and want to move on to the area of Maths. I prefer to leave it out because any point that would need to be conceded in that regard, I already concede in relation to the Law of N/N while getting into the whole Maths things gets us into the Philosophy of Mathematics and that just diverts us from the central focus. However if there is any point relevant to the overall reading of the relevant sections that are contained only in the parts on Maths, feel free to draw them out.

I suspect you wont, because your methodology involves, instead of presenting Engels views, the discounting of that. Your argument is focused on finding a way to conclude that it does not matter what Engels argued for (i.e. anti-dogmatism) or what he thought he was doing, but that the truth of his position is supposedly hidden in the logical structure of his sentences and the origins of his views, irrespective of what his views were. (and , of course you approach Marx with the same methodology only drawing different conclusions.)

In a way, this difference is the fundamental point. For you [I paraphrase :)] what I am sayng is evasive, unacceptably vague and pointless. For me your argument is esoteric, characterised by chop logic and fantastically improbable speculations about what Marx's and Engel's 'real' methodologies supposedly was. And we both consider the other's argument as representing a ruling class ideological position and as involving the practice of philosophy [which we each for different reasons consider objectionable] !

I have no doubt that these views of each others argument reflect different philosophical assumptions. Any discussion over dialectics as presented in the classical tradition is merely a reflection of that difference. Because it is a reflection, it is necessarily inconclusive and rambling. What would be so much better would be to present your own views systematically and let them be tested.

I know the answer to that...but there is a difference between you and me. In my view, it politically pointless to present systematic views on philosophical issues. YOur long years of effort in the criticism of dialectics must reflect a view on your part that something positive can be achieved by presentation of views on these issues. My perspective leads to the conclusion that only the criticism of views presented by others is a legitimate activity and even that is hardly important enough to be worth the effort. You dont believe this kind of work is a waste, so you should set out your views rather than setting out the reflection of your views.

On laws, I note the following comment that the inherent laws of capitalism "impose themselves only as the mean of apparently lawless irregularities that compensate one another" [MECW 35 P.112]

By the way Trivas7, thanks for the link to the paper on law !

[trivas7]

It is possible to show that a philosophical theory, such as the 'theory' of change in dialectics is fallacious by showing that whatever is done with it, it cannot work -- as indeed I have done -- without doing any philosophy, just as a doctor can eradicate a disease without actaully having to catch it first.

It works for me fine. You don't eradicate a disease by pretending you can't catch it. Marxism isn't a boil and you have no philosophical scalpel with which to lance it.

Perhaps I should learn not to feed the trolls.

From Chris Matthew Sciabarra -- a libertarian(!) -- another definition of dialectics:


What is dialectics? Dialectics is the art of context-keeping. It counsels us to study the object of our inquiry from a variety of perspectives and levels of generality, so as to gain a more comprehensive picture of it. That study often requires that we grasp the object in terms of the larger system within which it is situated, as well as its development across time. Because human beings are not omniscient, because none of us can see the “whole” as if from a “synoptic” godlike perspective, it is only through selective abstraction that we are able to piece together a more integrated understanding of the phenomenon before us—an understanding of its antecedent conditions, interrelationships, and tendencies.

In social theory, the object of our inquiry is society social relations, institutions, and processes. Society is not some ineffable organism; it is a complex nexus of interrelated institutions and processes, of volitionally conscious, purposeful, interacting individuals—and the unintended consequences they generate. A dialectical approach to social theory is one that recognizes that a given social problem will often entail an investigation of related social problems. What makes a dialectical approach into a radical approach is that the task of going to the root of a social problem, seeking to understand it and resolve it, often requires that we make transparent the relationships among social problems. Understanding the complexities at work within any given society is prerequisite for changing it.

-- Chris Matthew Sciabarra, "Dialectics and Liberty"

[gilhyle]

Dunno what is going on here !! I posted a long post which I now repost in quotes below....Rosa posted a response saying she was cooking and would respond later and on my computer I now see neither post ! Both seem to have been deleted.



I got diverted from my intention to continue to read Anti Duhring. Having read the sections that are actually about dialectics [MECW 25 P. 110-134] and the earlier introductory remarks which introduce that MECW 25 P. 33 - 44), it is essential to go back then and look at the prefatory material and the introductory general remarks to see if those answer any of the questions raised.

And those questions are:

1. what is the purpose of dialectics (i.e. what are its laws meant to be used for)
2. If dialectical contradiction is not capable of formal definition, what general elaboration can we give of the concept ?
3. Similarly, can we pin down what negation of the negation means, given that 'negation' is used in a strange way.

And I dont rule out that we cannot.....that would say much about the Anti Duhring.

Its important to acknowledge that at the very beginning of his general remarks, Engels draws a contrast between his own perspective and that of those who believe in eternal values oreason and justice, which Engels characterises as ruling class ideologies. Engels contrasts his view with those who believe that socialism is the "expression of absolute truth" [MECW 25 P.20] This is by the way of reminding us, once again, how strange an idea it is that Engels could - even inadvertently - fall into a priori dogmatics.

What Engels goes on then to do is to try to give a summary idea of what dialectics is for ....and this is relevant to the first question above, which is in turn relevant to the question of what kind of law a materialist dialectical law might be and what the point might be of citing the law, as we have seen Marx do in Capital and seen Engels defend.

What Engels argues is that empiricism tends to see entities as rigidly fixed and to build their understandings on that. By contrast he argues that there is a tradition which sees things as constantly in flux "But this conception correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details" [Ibid P.21] without which and this is an important statement "we have not a clear idea of the whole picture" [P.21-22] Note carefully this idea that one can have a less clear and a more clear picture of the overall situation, that each can be valid, that the second can be better than the first and to become better it requires detail. He writes "In order to understand these details we must detach the from their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately" (P. 22) Thus he recognises the legitimacy of the methodological move undertaken by empiricist-influenced scientists who set out to identify and categorise distinct things and their regularities. But then he adds "...sooner or later (it) reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract,, lost in insoluble contradictions" [P.23] Notice, btw, that the reference is not to dialectical contradictions !

Interestingly, he uses the example of the foetus that has been at the heart of so many modern debates on abortion as his example of how origins, destinations, "motion" is lost sight of. His point being that it is "impossible" to determine "absolutely" moments of change. (Ibid)

We then get a repetition of the central idea later in the book used in the elaboration of the concept of dialectical contradiction (and which we need to come back to ) that "every organic being is every moment the same and not the same". One of the most puzling ideas then follows, that of interpenetration of opposites, but as no reliance is later placed on this we can leave it aside for now.

Dialectics we are then told thinks all these complexities and is proven by Nature. What is difficult with this is that the discussion was introduced by saying science has a problem at a certain point in its development. Is dialectics being introduced now as the way science will find its way out of that problem ? No ! For he immediately goes on to say that science itself discerns the same relationships However (P.24) he then says that the situation is confused, with some scientists moving beyond static ways of thinking and others not doing so. It is this very problem within science which, he explains, justifies turning to dialectics for "an exact representation of the universe" (P.24)

We could we understand this argument as follows but for one phrase (the word "exact) The argument would be that science is having trouble making a key transition from the static methodology to a more dynamic one. meanwhile, the argument would go, if we need a more adequate picture of the physical universe as a whole, we can appropriate some ideas from Philosophy. That philosophy itself is a dead dog, but it has left us an inheritance of some ideas which fill out the idea of the universe as a location where there is constant change. Since it is the grasping of change which is the problem of the moment (in the 1870s), dialectics proves very useful to allow us to anticipate the general picture of the universe which in due course science will develop in more detail. This philosphical inheritance has allowed a new materialism - anticipating those outcomes - to emerge.

But why would one want to anticipate those outcomes ? Why would one want a picture of the universe ? Why not just wait for science to do its job ? It is certainly not because the new dialectical materialism wishes to be a philosophy. No. "modern materialism....no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences" (P.26) Perhaps there is a play on words here - maybe the so-called modern materialism does not believe in a philosophy of the totality of reality, but in a science of that totality, generalising from the examples of the other sciences......No ! His answer to that is also in the negative: "As soon as each special science is bound to make clear its position in the great totality of things and of our knowledge of things, a special science dealing with this totality is superfluous." So WHY is there a need at all at this point in time for a general conception of the universe ?

His answer is that the development of class struggle has made conceptions of human history an ideological battleground between the contending classes. With the development of scientific socialism, a materialist conception of history has emerged. This involved situating capitalism in history as something that emerged and will, because of what it is, in due course disappear. To argue that convincingly it was also necessary to explain what capitalism is - to identify its ESSENCE.

Without going further, it is clear that Engels believes that it is in the context of developing and polemicising in support of those ideas against contrary ideas that it becomes useful to have a general conception of the universe which anticipates scientific discoveries and which highlights the importance of identifying inter-connections and analysing essences.

If we simply observe this perspective, plain on the face of the Anti Duhring (but so often ignored), we see that hidden right in front of us is the answer to the question what is dialectics for ? We see that the purpose of dialectics is polemical - its purpose is to anticipate the development of science in order to assist in socialists in situating the matierialist conception of history and Marxist political economy, in polemic against the opponents of those key ideas, as being consistent with the methodologies of the best natural science and as destined to fit into the best available views on the natural and social sciences.

That dialectics is polemical rather than systematic in character in its materialist form, that its formulation is justified by the a priori philosophies thrown at socialism by its ideological opponents and that its formulations are anticipations of scientific developments which will only make sense in so far as they are made redundant....all that is generally ignored both by the supporters of dialectics as well as its opponents.


Anyway, Im away until Sunday.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Yes, my response to an earlier post of yours seems to have disappeared!

I will summarise what I had to say.


I prefer to leave it out because any point that would need to be conceded in that regard, I already concede in relation to the Law of N/N while getting into the whole Maths things gets us into the Philosophy of Mathematics and that just diverts us from the central focus. However if there is any point relevant to the overall reading of the relevant sections that are contained only in the parts on Maths, feel free to draw them out.

I can understand you wanting to keep away from Engels's comments on mathematics, since it is quite clear here that he is intent on imposing a certain view on the subject matter, just as it is also clear that this confirms my view that Engels is dogmatist.


In a way, this difference is the fundamental point. For you [I paraphrase ] what I am sayng is evasive, unacceptably vague and pointless. For me your argument is esoteric, characterised by chop logic and fantastically improbable speculations about what Marx's and Engel's 'real' methodologies supposedly was. And we both consider the other's argument as representing a ruling class ideological position and as involving the practice of philosophy [which we each for different reasons consider objectionable] !

What is 'chop logic'? [I could respond that your argument is 'chop illogic', but what would that achieve?]

And far from my intepretation of Engels being 'esoteric' it is in fact consistent with the interpretation put on his ideas by later dialecticians (that he hold these laws to be universal, and necessary, and that he thinks Q/Q is nodal, etc.), even if they failed to note his dogmatism.

You are the one who excuses this dogmatism, explains away his lack of clarity and failure to be self-critical, etc.


I have no doubt that these views of each others argument reflect different philosophical assumptions. Any discussion over dialectics as presented in the classical tradition is merely a reflection of that difference. Because it is a reflection, it is necessarily inconclusive and rambling. What would be so much better would be to present your own views systematically and let them be tested.

I know the answer to that...but there is a difference between you and me. In my view, it politically pointless to present systematic views on philosophical issues. YOur long years of effort in the criticism of dialectics must reflect a view on your part that something positive can be achieved by presentation of views on these issues. My perspective leads to the conclusion that only the criticism of views presented by others is a legitimate activity and even that is hardly important enough to be worth the effort. You dont believe this kind of work is a waste, so you should set out your views rather than setting out the reflection of your views.

I have no philosophical assumptions, and the last sentence in the first paragraph is unclear.

[I did make one or two other points, but they simply repeated things I had said earlier which you merely hand-waved away.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas, still doing his William Jennings Bryan impression:


It works for me fine. You don't eradicate a disease by pretending you can't catch it. Marxism isn't a boil and you have no philosophical scalpel with which to lance it.

Ah, an attempt at an argument; well done!

But, who has pretended I can't catch it? The point is that you don't have to catch a disease in order to eradicate it.

Now, do try to concentrate!

And Marxism isn't a boil, I agree (and I never said it was, nor implied it); it is just covered with them, and, like Marx's carbuncles, they need lancing.

And I have indeed got the scalpel to do this -- you just ignore the results, since you want to keep the carbuncles.


Perhaps I should learn not to feed the trolls.

You are the one who came here with a dogmatic view, which you refuse to defend (mostly because you can't), and who posts one-liners and won't engage in debate.

So far from not feeding the trolls, you have done little else here but impersonate one.

And thanks for the Sciabarra quote, but I have read this sort of stuff so many tiems, I have lost count. And I do not buy it for the reasons I have set out here over the last two and a half years.

But, this does at least confirm that you can't think for yourself, and like to quote others, Low Church Dialectician that you are...

Now, WJB, let's see if you can think about things that you do not think about:


We still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


1. what is the purpose of dialectics (i.e. what are its laws meant to be used for)
2. If dialectical contradiction is not capable of formal definition, what general elaboration can we give of the concept ?
3. Similarly, can we pin down what negation of the negation means, given that 'negation' is used in a strange way.

And I dont rule out that we cannot.....that would say much about the Anti Duhring.

But, you are approaching this from an uncritical angle, as is apparent from the weak case for the defence you have pieced together so far. So, the last sentence is disingenuous to say the least.


This is by the way of reminding us, once again, how strange an idea it is that Engels could - even inadvertently - fall into a priori dogmatics.

But, Engels never leaves this perspective behind -- he is writing in a tradition that has been doing this for 2400 years. His many ''inadvertent' slips give this away. So much so, that they are not slips at all.

Here is a fine example (and one you seem to have uncritically swallowed yourself):


What Engels argues is that empiricism tends to see entities as rigidly fixed and to build their understandings on that. By contrast he argues that there is a tradition which sees things as constantly in flux "But this conception correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details" [Ibid P.21] without which and this is an important statement "we have not a clear idea of the whole picture" [P.21-22] Note carefully this idea that one can have a less clear and a more clear picture of the overall situation, that each can be valid, that the second can be better than the first and to become better it requires detail. He writes "In order to understand these details we must detach the from their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately" (P. 22) Thus he recognises the legitimacy of the methodological move undertaken by empiricist-influenced scientists who set out to identify and categorise distinct things and their regularities. But then he adds "...sooner or later (it) reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract,, lost in insoluble contradictions" [P.23] Notice, btw, that the reference is not to dialectical contradictions !

Bold added.

The Heraclitean tradition is no less dogmatic -- Heraclitus dreamt up this idea based on an invalid argument about stepping into a river. On the basis of that he pontificated about all of reality for all of time. Engels just swallowed this a priori conclusion. He does not question it, as any non-dogmatist would.

So, his view is no less 'one-sided'.


Interestingly, he uses the example of the foetus that has been at the heart of so many modern debates on abortion as his example of how origins, destinations, "motion" is lost sight of. His point being that it is "impossible" to determine "absolutely" moments of change. (Ibid)

But he fails to tell us what determing the absolute 'moment' of anything is, let alone of change, so we are unclear what he is ruling out.

And we may well wonder if Engels confused 'logic' would help in any way at all here; in fact, as I have shown, his view means that change cannot happen.

This again shows that you are not interested in a critical encounter with Engels, just concerned to re-package a tradition.

And here is another piece of a priori dogmatism:


We then get a repetition of the central idea later in the book used in the elaboration of the concept of dialectical contradiction (and which we need to come back to ) that "every organic being is every moment the same and not the same". One of the most puzling ideas then follows, that of interpenetration of opposites, but as no reliance is later placed on this we can leave it aside for now.

But, how does Engels know this?

He can't possibly know it. Hence, he is merely content to impose this view of nature.


Without going further, it is clear that Engels believes that it is in the context of developing and polemicising in support of those ideas against contrary ideas that it becomes useful to have a general conception of the universe which anticipates scientific discoveries and which highlights the importance of identifying inter-connections and analysing essences.

Engels does not question whether there are any 'essences', which is yet another example of his dogmatism.


We see that the purpose of dialectics is polemical - its purpose is to anticipate the development of science in order to assist in socialists in situating the matierialist conception of history and Marxist political economy, in polemic against the opponents of those key ideas, as being consistent with the methodologies of the best natural science and as destined to fit into the best available views on the natural and social sciences.

You forgot to add that dialectics anticipates dogmatically, for Engels is not prepared to allow even the science of his day to contradict as single thesis he lifted from Hegel. We can see this from his language, and from the fact that he is highly selective in the examples he chooses --, and even there, he has to force the phenomena into an a priori 'dialectical' mould.


That dialectics is polemical rather than systematic in character in its materialist form, that its formulation is justified by the a priori philosophies thrown at socialism by its ideological opponents and that its formulations are anticipations of scientific developments which will only make sense in so far as they are made redundant....all that is generally ignored both by the supporters of dialectics as well as its opponents.

And, it is not even good polemics. Not only is it hopelessly vague, it is not the least bit self-critical.

And that dogmatic fault seems to have rubbed off on you.

[trivas7]

The Heraclitean tradition is no less dogmatic

And here is another piece of a priori dogmatism:

Engels does not question whether there are any 'essences', which is yet another example of his dogmatism.

You forgot to add that dialectics anticipates dogmatically

And that dogmatic fault seems to have rubbed off on you.
You keep using this term. Do you mean anything by it other than as an expression of your personal opprobrium?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


You keep using this term. Do you mean anything by it other than as an expression of your personal opprobrium?

Look the term up if you are having difficulties with it.

Here, let me help you out:

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dogmatism

But, what about this:


We still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.

[trivas7]

Look the term up if you are having difficulties with it.

I see. Is it the unwarrantedness or the arrogance of said dialectics that you object to? Or is it OTOH the unexamined premises of dialects you think have not been accounted for?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Is it the unwarrantedness or the arrogance of said dialectics that you object to? Or is it OTOH the unexamined premises of dialects you think have not been accounted for?

Well, let me answer your questions when you deal with these:


We still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.

[The Author]

Radioactive decay is the process in which an unstable atomic nucleus (http://www.anonym.to/?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_nucleus) loses energy by emitting radiation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiation) in the form of particles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_radiation) or electromagnetic waves (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum). This decay, or loss of energy, results in an atom of one type, called the parent nuclide transforming to an atom of a different type, called the daughter nuclide.

Quantitative Change: an unstable atomic nucleus (http://www.anonym.to/?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_nucleus) loses energy by emitting radiation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiation) in the form of particles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_radiation) or electromagnetic waves (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum).

Qualitative Change: an atom of one type, called the parent nuclide transforming to an atom of a different type, called the daughter nuclide.

Negation of the atom of previous being into an atom of different being, an opposite being. Such movement and change explains the dialectic here in this concrete example of natural science.

In regards to social science, the dialectic is used to understand the nature of the contradictions between the opposing classes, the mode of production, the status of economic and political crises. Once the material conditions are understood, we use these conditions to change the world to our advantage. "The philosophers have only interpreted the world...the point is to change it."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Criticise-somethings-sometimes:

We have already established here and in other threads that this 'law' only appears to work because key terms have been left vague (such as 'quality', 'the addition of matter and/or energy', 'node'/'leap'), and the thermodynamic boundaries of the systems involved are undefined.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1173625&postcount=90

http://www.revleft.com/vb/quantity-quality-t66709/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/stalin-materialism-t66588/index.html

So, there's little use having more examples thrown at us until this branch of Mystical Mickey Mouse Science you lot have swallowed is made properly scientific.

The other stuff you added is just a rehearsal of the same tired old dogmas that have been demolished in these threads many times.

[Die Neue Zeit]

^^^ Rosa, you said the word "thermodynamic." Why not replace HM, which can't explain this, with dyna-mat?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JR, I am surprised you think HM should be able to explain anything from physics, let alone thermodynamics -- or, even that you think that I should think this.

[The Author]

Criticise-somethings-sometimes:

We have already established here and in other threads that this 'law' only appears to work because key terms have been left vague (such as 'quality', 'the addition of matter and/or energy', 'node'/'leap'), and the thermodynamic boundaries of the systems involved are undefined.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...5&postcount=90 (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1173625&postcount=90)

http://www.revleft.com/vb/quantity-q...709/index.html (http://www.revleft.com/vb/quantity-quality-t66709/index.html)

http://www.revleft.com/vb/stalin-mat...588/index.html (http://www.revleft.com/vb/stalin-materialism-t66588/index.html)

So, there's little use having more examples thrown at us until this branch of Mystical Mickey Mouse Science you lot have swallowed is made properly scientific.

The other stuff you added is just a rehearsal of the same tired old dogmas that have been demolished in these threads many times.

You've established nothing. Try as hard as you may, you still haven't demonstrated how dialectical materialism cannot be applied to the natural and social sciences. And you never will. Your entire effort is an exercise in futility.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Criticise-somethings-sometimes:


You've established nothing. Try as hard as you may, you still haven't demonstrated how dialectical materialism cannot be applied to the natural and social sciences. And you never will. Your entire effort is an exercise in futility.

Yes, we know that you dogmatists always say stuff like this, but when it comes to explaining to the rest of the sceptical world exactly why you think this, or where you think I go wrong, you go strangely quiet. Odd that...:rolleyes:

As I said to Trivas in an earlier post in this thread, you lot all resemble William Jennings Bryan:


This reminds me of the Scopes trial in 1925 when William Jennings Bryan was put on the stand by Clarence Darrow, and was masked a series of unanswerable questions about the Bible.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scopes_Trial

Bryan simply refused to reply, and told Darrow that the Bible was good enough for him, and he was quite happy with its explanation of creation.


But there is also an embarrassing side to Bryan: the ‘great commoner’ was a Bible-banging fundamentalist. When officials in Dayton, Tennessee decided to roast John Scopes for teaching evolution in 1925, they called in the ageing Bryan to prosecute. The week-long trial became a national sensation and reached its climax when the defence attorney, Clarence Darrow, called Bryan to the stand and eviscerated his Biblical verities. ‘Do you believe Joshua made the sun stand still?’ Darrow asked sarcastically. ‘Do you believe a whale swallowed Jonah? Will you tell us the exact date of the great flood?’ Bryan tried to swat away the swarm of contradictions. ‘I do not think about things I don’t think about,’ he said. The New York Times called it an ‘absurdly pathetic performance’, reducing a famous American to the ‘butt of a crowd’s rude laughter’. This paunchy, sweaty figure went down as an icon of the cranky right. Today, most Americans encounter the Scopes trial and Bryan himself in a play called Inherit the Wind. I once played the role of Bryan and the director kept saying: ‘More pompous, Morone. Make him more pompous.’

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n04/moro01_.html

You are just as dogmatic and closed-minded. A simple faith is OK for you, even though I have ripped your core theory to shreads.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1175356&postcount=121

So, it is reassuring to see that you too can say with Bryan: "I do not think about things I don't think about."

Which is, as you know, why I have advised you several times to change your name to the more accurate one that I have used here.

[Rawthentic]

Well, Rosa, can you show us how DM cannot be applied to the natural and social sciences?

It seems that from all you write, CEA has a strong point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Live for the What?:


Well, Rosa, can you show us how DM cannot be applied to the natural and social sciences?

Yep, done it here many times.

You need to show where I go wrong -- or are you perhaps yet another comrade who "does not think about things he doesn't think about"?


It seems that from all you write, CEA has a strong point.

And I suppose you'd be quite happy to accept from some critic of Marx, who gave no reasons for what he/she said, the following:


He's established nothing. Try as hard as he may, he still hasn't demonstrated how or why 'bourgeois' economics cannot explain capitalism. And he never will. His entire effort is an exercise in futility.

As we both know, if someone were to say this in OI, you and other comrades would round on him/her and demand proof.

You certainly would not say they 'had a strong case'.

Ok, put your proof where your hot air is.

[Rawthentic]

It's "Live for the People", stop the personal attacks, they only expose more who you are.

You've said over and over how it cannot be applied to social/natural sciences. But not proven it.

I am the one that began to ask for proof. I was expanding on CEA's point.

Now, I don't want to go over this again. If you cannot prove what you say "you've done already " (which I haven't seen), then I'll just not waste my time here.

[black magick hustla]

I am a student of the natural sciences and I wonder why, if dialectics are so useful, I haven't met dialecticians in the physics department.....

I don't know about the social sciences but dialectics can't be applied to the natural sciences because the natural sciences demand very precise definititions rather than just vague apriori laws that could work for anything and everything because they are so vague.

In fact, I can disprove CEA's argument of decay right now. I hereby declare that fundamentally nothing changes because quarks are the smallest subatomic particles that we know, and have a ridicolously long lifespan which almost translates to the fact that they never ever change.

[trivas7]

In fact, I can disprove CEA's argument of decay right now. I hereby declare that fundamentally nothing changes because quarks are the smallest subatomic particles that we know, and have a ridicolously long lifespan which almost translates to the fact that they never ever change.
"Long lifespan" doesn't equate to "the fact that they never ever change", sorry.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Live for the Pimple:


It's "Live for the People", stop the personal attacks, they only expose more who you are.

What personal attack?


You've said over and over how it cannot be applied to social/natural sciences. But not proven it.

Not so; I have shown time and again that this 'theory' us far too vague and imprecise for anyone to decide if it is true or false, that it cannot explain change, and that the claims made about it are as inaccurate as the average Iraq WMD dossier. Hence, as it stands, it cannot be used to explain nature and society, and so cannot be used to change either.

What we haven't yet seen is a single one of you mystics explain how it can be used in the areas you mention.


I am the one that began to ask for proof. I was expanding on CEA's point.

Now, I don't want to go over this again. If you cannot prove what you say "you've done already " (which I haven't seen), then I'll just not waste my time here

It was a waste of time the moment you began to type your original post.

You won't be missed...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


"Long lifespan" doesn't equate to "the fact that they never ever change", sorry.

So, you know that they do change, do you?

And, even if you were right, they cannot change through 'internal contradictions'.

Either way, Marmot is right.

[trivas7]

And, even if you were right, they cannot change through 'internal contradictions'.

So say you. Prove it.

[black magick hustla]

What are the internal contradictions of a quark?

[trivas7]

What are the internal contradictions of a quark?
One would be their six different flavors: up, down, charm, strange, top and bottom.

[black magick hustla]

One would be their six different flavors: up, down, charm, strange, top and bottom.

how are those "contradictions"?:rolleyes: And how are they internal.

[Hyacinth]

BTW, trivas, you've yet to explain to me how dialectics explains radioactive decay (as per: http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1170771&postcount=16).

[Hyacinth]

So say you. Prove it.
Unlike you I believe Rosa has indeed proven (or at least argued) for her position. Quite extensively.

[Hyacinth]

Luís Henrique, to his credit, has at least attempted to give an account of a dialectical contradiction, unfortunately I fail to see how such an account can explain change in general, such as the chance in physics which we’re discussing at the moment.

[Hyacinth]

I am a student of the natural sciences and I wonder why, if dialectics are so useful, I haven't met dialecticians in the physics department.....
Indeed. And since Marmot has brought it up, I'll repeat the question that I asked on page 1 of this thread which has yet to be answered:


...if dialectics is so integral to understanding change, why aren’t the natural science departments riddled with dialecticians? In fact, it makes me wonder how we’ve made any progress in science at all without them.

[The Author]

but when it comes to explaining to the rest of the sceptical world exactly why you think this, or where you think I go wrong, you go strangely quiet. Odd that...

Oh, so now "RevolutionaryLeft" constitutes the skeptical world? Please, outside of this forum, few people have ever heard or read of your theoretical drivel; nor would they show any interest in it if they did. If you think you're launching some kind of worldwide revolutionary change in scientific thought, you need serious psychological help.


I am a student of the natural sciences and I wonder why, if dialectics are so useful, I haven't met dialecticians in the physics department.....Yes, because everybody in the physics department is a Marxist....just like in the history department, and the chemistry department, and the mathematics department, and the philosophy department.... and so on and so forth. It's not like universities in capitalist societies actively encourage communist ideas in the mainstream. Scientists study the processes of change, using the principles of dialectics. Problem is, they don't consciously state they use dialectics. They just state change as is, without referring to Marxist lexicon.


I hereby declare that fundamentally nothing changes So in other words, there's no such thing as time? Space? Leaves do not become dirt? Genes do not mutate? Chemical compounds do not form and then break down? 1+1=/=2? That's an extremely interesting, and bold statement.


quarks are the smallest subatomic particles that we know, and have a ridicolously long lifespan which almost translates to the fact that they never ever change.Key words are "lifespan," and "almost." Which denotes that quarks have a finite character.

[trivas7]

how are those "contradictions"?:rolleyes: And how are they internal.
Those behaviors are antagonistic to each other. They are internal because they are self-caused, not caused by another.

[trivas7]

Unlike you I believe Rosa has indeed proven (or at least argued) for her position. Quite extensively.
Yes, I grant that her posts have been extensive. :lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Criticise-Somethings-Sometimes -- not too good at the name-calling, either, are you?


Oh, so now "RevolutionaryLeft" constitutes the skeptical world? Please, outside of this forum, few people have ever heard or read of your theoretical drivel; nor would they show any interest in it if they did. If you think you're launching some kind of worldwide revolutionary change in scientific thought, you need serious psychological help.

The rest of the sceptical world I left of inderterminate size, but it's nice to see you think it is the entire left. And you may indeed be right, for even if they too accept this mystical theory of yours, they also cannot explain a single one of its concpets with any clarity, or originality -- content, just like the other dialectical dupes here at RevLeft, merely to regurgitate tired old formulae which they uncritically lifted from the dialectical Holy Books --, none of which work.

But we are still waiting to see your incisive refutation of my arguments. Think you are up to it? It's about time I was put in my place...

And it may also be true that I need psychological help to find out why you lot are so irrational -- I have in fact called on professionals to try to diagnose why you mystics cling onto this theory long after it has been demolished -- apparently it has something to do with providing you saddos with consolation for the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism -- you know, as a sort of dialectical opiate.


So in other words, there's no such thing as time? Space? Leaves do not become dirt? Genes do not mutate? Chemical compounds do not form and then break down? 1+1=/=2? That's an extremely interesting, and bold statement.

Well, as I have shown, if your 'theory' is corect, this could not happen.

In so far as it does, nature, and not just history, has refuted dialectics.

Get over it..., or don't.

[And numbers do not change, so why you have posted this odd piece of arithmetic here is a mystery. I suspect we will have to rely on those professionals to tell us.]

[black magick hustla]

Yes, because everybody in the physics department is a Marxist....just like in the history department, and the chemistry department, and the mathematics department, and the philosophy department.... and so on and so forth. It's not like universities in capitalist societies actively encourage communist ideas in the mainstream. Scientists study the processes of change, using the principles of dialectics. Problem is, they don't consciously state they use dialectics. They just state change as is, without referring to Marxist lexicon.

This is the problem with you and other communists who have never opened a natural science book and instead have their mind full with philosophical drivel.

There is nothing ideological about physics, or mathematics, or chemistry. They don't require marxism to be understood because marxism is a social science (or religion, depending on who uses it). Your inability to understand why E=mc^2 has fuck to do with marxism is a problem. You strike me as somewhat arrogant for saying that dialecticians know better about how physicists should do their research. its really laughable because you are basically saying that someone who reads old philosophy books and muses about internal cotnradictions and change while staring at the wall is more equiped to know the nature of a quark than someone who uses a particle accelerator and does extensive notes on the issue.





So in other words, there's no such thing as time? Space? Leaves do not become dirt? Genes do not mutate? Chemical compounds do not form and then break down? 1+1=/=2? That's an extremely interesting, and bold statement.

Its not a bold statement because it depends on your definition of change and your semantic field. I stated that nothing fundamentally changes because quarks never change just to prove that I can also manipulate language like dialecticians do. Chemical compounds to form and break down but the electrons, the protons, and neutros generally don't change so you can really make the argument that nothing changes really. Change has a very specific meaning for chemists and that is why their concept of "change" is useful. However your concept of "change", which can be applied to anything from social situations to atomic decay is vague and intellectually dishonest.





Key words are "lifespan," and "almost." Which denotes that quarks have a finite character.

Maybe, but still you have to explain why are they dialectical. And besides, electron never change ever so there is another example.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Yes, I grant that her posts have been extensive.

About as extensive as yours have been evasive.

After all:


We still await a clear explanation of the term 'dialectical contradiction', just as we await your refutation of my proof that dialectics cannot explain change, and your acknowledgement that you have confused 'verifiable' with 'verified'.

[Hyacinth]

Oh, so now "RevolutionaryLeft" constitutes the skeptical world? Please, outside of this forum, few people have ever heard or read of your theoretical drivel; nor would they show any interest in it if they did. If you think you're launching some kind of worldwide revolutionary change in scientific thought, you need serious psychological help.
All Rosa is trying to do is bring Marxism in line with the rest of the world. Her wiritngs aren't directed at anyone outside the movement, largely because no one except some Marxists take dialectics seriously anymore. It has been debunked long ago. The fact that many in on the left still subscrible to such nonsense is a weakness for the left.


Yes, because everybody in the physics department is a Marxist....just like in the history department, and the chemistry department, and the mathematics department, and the philosophy department.... and so on and so forth. It's not like universities in capitalist societies actively encourage communist ideas in the mainstream. Scientists study the processes of change, using the principles of dialectics. Problem is, they don't consciously state they use dialectics. They just state change as is, without referring to Marxist lexicon.
So there's no need to refer to dialectics to explain change, that's all I wanted to hear. :)

[Hyacinth]

Scientists study the processes of change, using the principles of dialectics. Problem is, they don't consciously state they use dialectics.That being said, care to give us an example of this covert use of dialectics in science to explain change? After all, if it is indeed the case that scientists implicitly employ dialectics it shouldn't be too difficult to come up with examples.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


So say you. Prove it.

Done it; since you seem to have a poor short-term memory, here it is again:


"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Hegel (1975), p.174.]

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and. their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., p.212-13.]

"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Ibid., p.179.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [i]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285. The translation in the edition I have consulted reads differently from the one Lenin used; Hegel is referring to "tones" here, not "things", as the reference to "harmony" indicates.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical,—under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]

"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature....

"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes." [Stalin (1976b), pp.836, 840.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....

"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....

"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end....[Ibid, pp.311-18.]

"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….

"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite.” [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]

"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]

"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]

"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), 94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.]

"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….

"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]

"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….

"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….

"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….

"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other...'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels.]

"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.

"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, expressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....

"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]

"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'

"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.

"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.

"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)

"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.

"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.' [Rob Sewell.]

References and links can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...Explain-Change


It would not be difficult to double or even treble the length of this list of quotations (as anyone who has access to as many books and articles on dialectics as I have will attest), all saying the same thing.

Surprisingly, dialecticians (like Lenin and Engels and the rest quoted above) are decidedly unclear as to whether objects/processes change because of

(1) a contradictory relationship between their internal opposites, or because

(2) they change into these opposites, or even whether

(3) change itself creates such opposites.

[FL = Formal Logic; NON = Negation of the Negation: UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

All this seems to suggest that objects and processes not only change because of their internal opposites, but that they change into them (and, according to Lenin, they change into all of them!), and that they also produce these opposites while they change --, or they do so as a result of that change.

As we are about to see, the idea that there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and unities of opposites (etc.), which cause change, presents DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along the lines expressed in the DM-classics.

To see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two "internal contradictory opposites" O* and O**, and it thus changes as a result. [The same problems arise if these are viewed as 'external' contradictions.]

But, O* cannot itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist, according to this theory, O* could not change, for there would be no opposite to bring that about. As Gollobin notes:

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other...'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels.]

Hence, it is no good propelling O** into the future so that it is now said to be what O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless O** is already there in the present to make that happen!

So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O* (interpreting O** now as not-O*), how is it possible for O* to change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?

Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might allow dialecticians to paint their way out of this corner. Either:

(1) O* 'changes' into not-O*, meaning there would now be two not-O*s where once there was one: or:

(2) Either O* does not change, or it disappears. O* cannot change into what already exists -- that is, O* cannot change into its opposite, not-O*. In that case, O* either disappears, does not change at all, or changes into something else; or:

(3) Not-O* itself disappears to allow a new not-O* to emerge that O* can and does change into. If so, questions would naturally arise as to how the original not-O* could possibly cause O* to change if is has just vanished. Of course, this option merely postpones the evil day, for the same difficulties will afflict the new not-O* that afflicted the old.

Anyway, as should seem obvious, (2) plainly means that O* does not change into not-O*, it is just replaced by it. Option (1), on the other hand, has the original not-O* remaining the same (when it was supposed to turn into its own opposite -- O* -- according to the DM-classics), and options (2) and (3) will only work if matter and/or energy can be destroyed!

Naturally, these problems merely re-appear at the next stage as not-O* readies itself to change into whatever it changes into. But, in that case there is an added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O* in existence to make this happen. This means that the dialectical process will grind to a halt, unless a not-not-O* pops into existence to start it up again.

But what could possibly engineer that?

Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-O* itself came about in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too. [Gollobin above sort of half admits this, without realising his mistake.]

Now, not-O* cannot have come from O*, since O* can only change because of the operation of not-O*, which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a 'reversed' version of the NON) will merely reduplicate the above problems.

It could be objected that all this seems to place objects and/or processes in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians make of FL. Hence, on that basis, it could be maintained that the above argument is entirely misguided.

Fortunately, repairs are easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal/external opposites" O* and O**, and it thus develops as a result.

The rest still follows: if object/process A is already composed of a changing dialectical union of O* and not-O*, and O* 'develops' into not-O* as a result, then the above objections still apply. Once more: how is it possible for O* to change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?

Of course, it could be argued that not-O* 'develops' into O* while not-O* 'develops' into O*. [This objection might even incorporate that eminently obscure Hegelian term-of-art: "sublation". More on that presently.]

But if this were so, while it was happening, these two would no longer be 'opposites' of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite" to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently 'subjective', once more.

But even if this were the case, and such process were governed by "sublation", this alternative will not work.

Let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites" O* and not-O*, and thus develops as a result. On this scenario, O* would change/develop into a "sublated" intermediary, but not into not-O*, contradicting the DM-worthies quoted earlier. O* should, of course, change into not-O*, not into some intermediary.

Putting this minor quibble to one side, on this 'revised' view, let us assume that O* changes into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter, "O*(1)" (which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation' which also 'preserves'/'sublates').

If so, then O*(1) must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-O*(1) in existence to make it develop any further.

But, there has to be a not-O*(1) to make O*(1) change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt O*(1) from this essential requirement, and yet, if we do that, there would seem to be no reason to accept the version of events contained in the DM-classics, which tell us that all things/processes change because of the operation of opposites (and O*(1) is certainly a thing/process). Furthermore, if we do make an exemption here, then the whole point of the exercise would be lost, for if some things do and some things do not change according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which changes were and which were not subject to it.

This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively applied exemption certificate (issued to O*(1)) would mean that nothing at all could change, for everything in the universe is in the process of change, and is thus already a sublated version of whatever it used to be.

Ignoring this, even if O*(1) were to change into not-O*(1) (as we suppose it must, given the doctrine laid down by the DM-prophets), then all the earlier problems would simply reappear, for this could only take place if not-O*(1) already exists to make it happen! But not-O*(1) cannot already exist, for O*(1) has not changed into it yet!

It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the point; in the real world things manifestly change. For example, it might be the case that John is a boy, but in a few years time it will be the case that John is a man. Now, the fact that other individuals are already men, does not stop John changing into one, as the above argues. So, John can change into his opposite even though that opposite already exists.

Or so it could be claimed.

Maybe so, but according to the DM-worthies above, John can only change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now. Are we now really supposed to believe that "John is a man" is struggling with "John is a boy" -- or that manhood is struggling with boyhood?

Some might be tempted to reply that this is precisely what adolescence is, and yet, in that case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would have to be locked in struggle in the present. But, John-as-a-man does not yet exist, and so 'he' cannot struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if John-as-a-man does exist, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful self, then John-as-boy cannot change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already exists!

Of course, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is allowed to develop naturally). But, as noted above, that opposite cannot now exist otherwise John would not need to become him!

Now, in ten or fifteen years time, John will not become just any man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that John becomes "Man(J)". But, once again, Man(J) must exist now or John cannot change into him (if the DM-worthies above are to be believed), for John can only become a man if he is locked in struggle with his own opposite, Man(J). But, if that is so, John cannot become Man(J) since Man(J) already exists!

[This is, of course, simply a more concrete version of the argument given earlier.]

Consider another hackneyed example: water turning into steam at 100 degrees C (under normal conditions). Are we really supposed to believe that the opposite that water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? This must be so if the above DM-worthies are to be believed.

Hence, while you might think it is the heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really happens, according to those wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water turn into steam!

In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!

So, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it. To identify it, we shall call it "W1", and the steam molecule it turns into "S1". But, if the DM-worthies above are correct, S1 must already exist, otherwise W1 could not change into it! Again, if that is so, where does S1 disappear to if W1 changes into it?

In fact, according to the above worthies, since opposites turn into one another, S1 must change into W1 at the same time as W1 is turning into S1! So while you are boiling a kettle, according to this Superscientific 'theory', steam must be turning back into the water you are boiling, and at the same rate!

One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry.

This must be so, otherwise, as we saw above, when W1 turns into S1 -- which already exists, or W1 could not change -- there would have to be two S1s where there used to be one! Matter created from nowhere!

Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and to any and all other examples of DM-change).

This, of course, does not deny that change occurs, only that DM cannot account for it.

The same analysis can easily be applied to social change and this theory still won't work (the above is a general refutation anyway).

Just to take one example, the connection between, say, capitalism and communism (or better, Capitalist Relations of Production [CRAP]), and Socialist Relations of Production [SORP]) --, and the connection between the forces and relations of production (where it is patently obvious that neither of these change into the other (their opposites)!).

For the purposes of argument, let us assume that SORP does not actually exist in the here and now. But, given the above DM-theses, if CRAP is to change into SORP, SORP must already exist in the here-and-now for CRAP to change into it, and for that change to be produced by it.

But, if that opposite (SORP) already exists it cannot have come from CRAP (its 'opposite') since CRAP can only change because of the action of its own opposite (namely -- SORP!) -- unless, that is, SORP exists before it exists!

[The same comments would apply to 'potential SORP' (or even to some sort of 'tendency' to produce SORP, be this a 'sublated' tendency or actuality, it matters not), but the reader is left to work the details out for herself.]

So, this opposite (SORP) must have popped into existence from nowhere --, or it must always have been in existence, if DM is correct.

Now, this is not to deny change, nor is it to suggest that I do not want to see the back of CRAP, and the establishment of SORP; but if DM were correct, this will never happen.

Or, if it does, DM could not explain it.

To be sure, in the real world very material workers struggle against equally material Capitalists, but neither of these turn into one another, and they cannot help change CRAP into SORP, since neither of these is the opposite of CRAP or SORP, nor vice versa, either.

Now, smarty pants, where does this go wrong?

[Hyacinth]

Yes, I grant that her posts have been extensive. :lol:
(A *rolleyes* emoticon would really be handy) You know perfectly well that I’m referring to her essays which evidently you haven’t even bothered to look at. That having been said, you don’t even have to read Rosa to see that it is nonsense, an elementary understanding of philosophy of language (or just plain old common sense) would go a long way toward that.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


One would be their six different flavors: up, down, charm, strange, top and bottom.


Those behaviors are antagonistic to each other. They are internal because they are self-caused, not caused by another.

Can we have the proof that they are 'antagonistic?

And, once more, how are they 'internal'

Moreover, there are no 'internal contradictions' in an electrons or photons, and they never change.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hyacinth, Trivas had a brief glance at my opening page, misread one of the first sentences, then threw a tantrum, and now refuses to let his tender eyes look upon my evil work.

A card-carrying dogmatist -- 400 years ago, he'd have told others not to look down Galileo's telescope.

[Hyacinth]

One would be their six different flavors: up, down, charm, strange, top and bottom.

Wikipedia:

There are six different types of quark, usually known as flavors (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flavour_%28particle_physics%29): up (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Up_quark), down (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Down_quark), charm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charm_quark), strange (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strange_quark), top (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top_quark), and bottom (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bottom_quark). (Their names do not indicate anything about their properties, but were chosen arbitrarily based on the need to name them something that could be easily remembered and used.)
I'm afrad that contrary to what the [arbitrary] names of these quarks might suggest, that the up and down quarks are somehow "opposites".

Moreover, if you take a look at the various properties of these quarks, you won't find any opposite pairs.

[Hyacinth]

Hyacinth, Trivas had a brief glance at my opening page, misread one of the first sentences, then threw a tantrum, and now refuses to let his tender eyes look upon my evil work.

A card-carrying dogmatist -- 400 years ago, he'd have told others not to look down Galileo's telescope.
I don’t know whether to laugh or to weep.

[trivas7]

All Rosa is trying to do is bring Marxism in line with the rest of the world. Her wiritngs aren't directed at anyone outside the movement, largely because no one except some Marxists take dialectics seriously anymore. It has been debunked long ago. The fact that many in on the left still subscrible to such nonsense is a weakness for the left.

"[B]ring[ing] Marxism in line with the rest of the world" in Marxism is called revisionism.

You discredit Marxism when you discredit its theory. Without theory all practice is pointless. Look at the repute of Communism in China, e.g.

[Hyacinth]

"[b]ring[ing] Marxism in line with the rest of the world" in Marxism is called revisionism.

You discredit Marxism when you discredit its theory. Without theory all practice is pointless. Well, there you have it, Marxism is a religion, with a holy creed which was set in stone by the one and true prophet (Marx) for all time. Any attempt to rectify any mistakes Marx has made is “revisionism” (i.e. heresy).

As well, without the correct creed (theory) there is no salvation.

Look at the repute of Communism in China, e.g. Yes, indeed! The problem with the CCP is that they abandoned dialectics, that’s why they’ve returned to capitalism, it must be it!:lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hyacinth, you probably know I have already called Trivas the 'William Jennings Bryan' of RevLeft:


Trivas:


It explains it to my satisfaction, too bad you just don't like the explanation.

This reminds me of the Scopes trial in 1925 when William Jennings Bryan was put on the stand by Clarence Darrow, and was masked a series of unanswerable questions about the Bible.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scopes_Trial

Bryan simply refused to reply, and told Darrow that the Bible was good enough for him, and he was quite happy with its explanation of creation.


But there is also an embarrassing side to Bryan: the ‘great commoner’ was a Bible-banging fundamentalist. When officials in Dayton, Tennessee decided to roast John Scopes for teaching evolution in 1925, they called in the ageing Bryan to prosecute. The week-long trial became a national sensation and reached its climax when the defence attorney, Clarence Darrow, called Bryan to the stand and eviscerated his Biblical verities. ‘Do you believe Joshua made the sun stand still?’ Darrow asked sarcastically. ‘Do you believe a whale swallowed Jonah? Will you tell us the exact date of the great flood?’ Bryan tried to swat away the swarm of contradictions. ‘I do not think about things I don’t think about,’ he said. The New York Times called it an ‘absurdly pathetic performance’, reducing a famous American to the ‘butt of a crowd’s rude laughter’. This paunchy, sweaty figure went down as an icon of the cranky right. Today, most Americans encounter the Scopes trial and Bryan himself in a play called Inherit the Wind. I once played the role of Bryan and the director kept saying: ‘More pompous, Morone. Make him more pompous.’

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n04/moro01_.html

You are just as dogmatic and closed-minded. A simple faith is OK for you, even though I have ripped your core theory to shreads.

You are indeed the William Jennings Bryan of RevLeft.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1175356&postcount=121

Looks like he is determined to prove me correct!

[Die Neue Zeit]

JR, I am surprised you think HM should be able to explain anything from physics, let alone thermodynamics -- or, even that you think that I should think this.

“Social Democracy is not confined to simple service to the working-class movement: it represents ‘the combination of socialism and the working-class movement’ (to use Karl Kautsky’s definition which repeats the basic ideas of the Communist Manifesto); the task of Social Democracy is to bring definite socialist ideals to the spontaneous working-class movement, to connect this movement with socialist convictions that should attain the level of contemporary science, to connect it with the regular political struggle for democracy as a means of achieving socialism—in a word, to fuse this spontaneous movement into one indestructible whole with the activity of the revolutionary party.”

[Vladimir Lenin, Our Immediate Task (http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1899/articles/arg3oit.htm)]



The continued separation between the natural and social sciences is rather disturbing to me. As nutty as part of sociobiology is, at least it tries to connect the two science fields. However, underlying sociobiological premises are dynamic-materialist fundamentals!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JR, that quotation from Lenin does not say what you seem to think it says.

And I have no problem separating the sciences off from one another, no more than I have one over the division of labour.

It's who controls what that is the key -- not the separation.

And sociobiology is wall-to-wall b*llocks.

[Die Neue Zeit]

^^^ Um, it is only bullocks when applied to studying HUMAN behaviour. Nobody has had any issues with sociobiological analyses of animalia.

[trivas7]

^^^ Um, it is only bullocks when applied to studying HUMAN behaviour.
Why is this?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JR:


Nobody has had any issues with sociobiological analyses of animalia.

I have. Here's why:

http://www.royalinstitutephilosophy.org/articles/article.php?id=26

And you should try reading this:

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=9314

These expose serious weaknesses in the theory (some of which apply to human evolution, but not all).

This, howver, is far more serious:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darwinian_Fairytales

http://www.royalinstitutephilosophy.org/articles/article.php?id=7

http://www.encounterbooks.com/books/darwinianfairytales/

[JimFar]

There is also my post on Steven Pinker and sociobiology which appeared a while back in the Human Nature thread. See:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showthread.php?p=1100432#post1100432 (http://www.revleft.com/vb/../showthread.php?p=1100432#post1100432)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks once again for that Jim!

[Hyacinth]

There is also my post on Steven Pinker and sociobiology which appeared a while back in the Human Nature thread. See:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showthread.php?p=1100432#post1100432 (http://www.revleft.com/vb/../showthread.php?p=1100432#post1100432)
The link doesn't appear to be working for me. :(

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I think this is it:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1100432&postcount=44

[gilhyle]

Sorry to be coming back into a debate that has somewhat moved on. But Marmot has stated something along the lines that dialectics is to be rejected just because it is not precise, as natural sciences require. That is fine as far as it goes and it is very similar to arguments Rosa has made. And contrary to some defenders of DM, I think it is an important argument.

But there is a response, which is

1. Engels is not practising any of those natural sciences, he is doing something else
2. What Engels is doing is classifying the conceptual similarities between the sciences
3. He is classifying those similarities in order to engage in a polemic against dogmatic philosophical systems (such as that of Duhring)
4. The level of clarity he needs is the level necessary to carry out that critical debate with false philosophies.
5. He is not engaged in a scientific debate within any natural science. He is not doing science ! Therefore its standards and methodologies do not apply to him.

[gilhyle]

Rosa

The reason why I called your views esoteric is two-fold:

firstly you do seem to me to rely on the discernment of a logical structure in sentences from which you draw conclusions - I consider that esoteric in the sense that I dont accept that language simply has the structures of formal logic (I dont know if you accept that either, but it sometimes looks like it) and you seem to me to be finding a hidden 'knowledge' which is often at variance from what a reading of what is on the face of the material would suggest.

Secondly your views are esoteric in the sense that they involve a speculation that Engels contrary to his self-consciousness and intent slipped into a dialectical dogmatism in a way which characterised him while Marx, contary to his self-consciousness and intent rose out of a dialectical dogmatism to achieve a much better method.

And if you want an example of 'essences', your analysis of Marx and Engels is such an example. You are arguing (without using the words) that in essence Engels is a diaelctical dogmatist and, in essence Marx, is not, despite dialectical elements in Marx and extended anti-dogmatic passages in Engels. You know exactly what an essence is, you use the methodology regularly - but you dont name it as such.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


firstly you do seem to me to rely on the discernment of a logical structure in sentences from which you draw conclusions - I consider that esoteric in the sense that I dont accept that language simply has the structures of formal logic (I dont know if you accept that either, but it sometimes looks like it) and you seem to me to be finding a hidden 'knowledge' which is often at variance from what a reading of what is on the face of the material would suggest.

I agree, but that is how Hegel proceeded, and so did Engles and Lenin (among others), and they screwed up.

They all confused naming with describing, and they all committed crass errors even with the logic they say they lifted from Aristotle -- consciously using a formal theory they inherited from Medieval Roman Catholic theologians -- the Identity Theory of Predication. That is what led them into confusing naming with describing.

Moreover, I am amazed you think my analysis 'esoteric', when you are quite happy with Hegel's (albeit the 'rigth way up') 'analysis'. But, in the esoteric league table, Hegel is right at the top of the Premier Division (having won the title every year for nearly 200 years), whereas in comparison I barely scrape in at the bottom of Divison Two.

Moreover, I do not accept that ordinary language has the structure of Formal Logic (how could I? I am a Wittgensteinian), but the latter can be used to help us understand the inferences we make, and where Idealists like you and Hegel go wrong.


Secondly your views are esoteric in the sense that they involve a speculation that Engels contrary to his self-consciousness and intent slipped into a dialectical dogmatism in a way which characterised him while Marx, contary to his self-consciousness and intent rose out of a dialectical dogmatism to achieve a much better method.

Marx told us he had abandoned this loopy 'theory', whereas Engels remained mired in it.

So, no 'esotericism' there, either.

And I am not too sure what the term 'his self-consciousness' means either. Perhaps: that one or both of Marx and Engles were aware of the fact that they were not in a coma? That is the only meaning I can attach to it.

This phrase of yours is itself 'esoteric'!


And if you want an example of 'essences', your analysis of Marx and Engels is such an example. You are arguing (without using the words) that in essence Engels is a diaelctical dogmatist and, in essence Marx, is not, despite dialectical elements in Marx and extended anti-dogmatic passages in Engels. You know exactly what an essence is, you use the methodology regularly - but you dont name it as such.

I agree with Wittgenstein: 'essence' is expressed by grammar; there is nothing more beyond this. That is the only 'method' I use -- if you can call it that.

Now, if your 'theory' had presided over 150 years of success, you might have a case for clinging to this esoteric 'theory' of yours; but alas history has already passed its verdict.

So, we have little choice but to think things afresh.

[gilhyle]

Marx told us he had abandoned this loopy 'theory', whereas Engels remained mired in it.

See thats the thing (and this is pointlessly going over ground we have alredy gone over) Marx described his method as dialectical and referred to having rejected Hegel. Engels did the same thing. You differentiate between the two because Engels wrote more extensively on general issues of method using terms taken OUT of Hegel's system and restated in a new form. Thus you find in the differentiated weight of writings on the same topic a sign of a secret difference between two writers, who were closer in perspective than maybe any other two writers in history.

You develop that 'diagnosis' (for it is diagnosis of dysfunctionality since these men clearly intended to present themselves to the world as two representatives of the same view) and thus aim to reveal a supposed secret knowledge behind the appearance of consensus. The evidence that there is a secret numeric code hidden in the bible or that the Sistine chapel ceiling is a pattern of hebrew letters is, to my mind, as strong.....but there you go, we differ on that.

If your view relied on that diagnosis of the Marx-Engels relationship, it would, in my view be idiosyncratic in a fatal way. However, I dont think your view does rely on that. That is only incidental to your view. If you argued instead that Marx and Engels both were mired in dialectics but that Marx's view of history and political economy can be saved in a way Engel's view of natural science cannot be saved, you would be arguing a clearer and more defensible position. The somewhat half-baked biographical speculations would be throw aside. It would also be a more transparent position - leding as it would on the a clear imperative to go off and re-state Marxist political economy and the Marxist conception of history shorn of any dialectical usages.

The other half of your view is this idea that in terms of what can be said about general terms there is only what can be said as a matter of 'grammar', i.e. rules for use. Here I think is the substantial point of difference between you (and your old Pal Wittgenstein) on the one hand and Engels on the other. For he does believe - and the Anti Duhring does bring this out - that it is possible to enter into speculative comments about the inter-linkages of the various sciences and that there is something to be learned from that.

He is far more explicit on this in the Dialectics of Nature than in the Anti-Duhring and I was staying away from the former as it raises too many issue to allow us to proceed constructively within these confines. But let us at least note that in the Anti Duhring he uses the ideas of dialectics to try to show that there is a way to think about the inter-connection of the various sciences without falling into metaphysics. That is the polemical purpose of dialectics in the Anti Duhring.

Now you say that the generalisations he comes up with fall into metaphysics despite that and why ?.......if I understand correctly it is because you think that the only thing that can be said about general terms like matter and motion and essence etc is said by the grammatical rules which 'govern' (not your term) their use.

I think the point has been made in previous threads that grammar doesnt 'govern' use at all. Grammar is merely an inaccurate post-hoc rationalisation of dynamic linguisitic practices whose usage at a particular moment, nor its development over time, is effectively captured by the descriptive (dare I say Newtonian) rules which go to make up grammar. No credible student of linguistics thinks otherwise.

It does not take us long, following Wwittgenstein down his many routes, to reach the conclusion that Wittgenstein's perspective is a complete mystification of linguistic correctness, a mirror at the level of philosophy of the fetishisation of correct usage which had been imposed by the bourgeoisie on multifarious practices of speech that had infected Europe prior to the nation state. In the end, Wittgenstein can neither say what correct usage is in any particular case (without excluding usages that listeners and/or speakers find correct) nor say with any clarity what the origin or legitimacy of the rules, he believes in, derive from. (But I seem to remember you saying you did not believe in language games - am I right ?)

But then turn to what Engels is doing and contrast it with that mysterious philosophy ....and it is a philosophy. Engels' is saying that we can make rough and ready linkages between sciences, by making very general assumptions about matter and motion and those linkages will generate observations in the form of questions about the consistency of the different science with each other. He is only interested in doing that for a very particular purpose - a political purpose but he recognises that it does allow some interesting, if vague suggestions to be made. He is clear that those linkages have no provative force - they cannot be used to prove anything, ulike your Wittgenstein who thinks his dogmatic (but indiscernable ) grammars can be used to discern correct from incorrect usage.

Unlike Wittgenstein, thinking like a dogmatic philosopher who thinks he has worked out something every reasonable person must hold to, Engels understands that his suggestions will be not unlike early speculations about atoms, i.e. possible models unconnected to any method of verificataion. But they have, he believes, the potential to short-circuit the almost random process of discovery to which science is otherwise forced.

This latter bit of his view is of no great importance. The idea that scientific socialists could jump start scientific progress in this way is all very nice but of no great importance. Had the socialist movement continued to develop in the way it was developing in his day, there might have been some truth in this hope. But things have emerged otherwise. The natural sciences remain firmly embedded within the defence sector, the pharmaceutical business, the space programme etc, with their research programmes consequently dictated (but their methodological integrity mostly intact). There has proven to be no scope for the suggestive suppositions of a dialectical perspective to take hold, contrary to the personal experience of Engels' close colleague Schorlemmer. So be it. That proves Engels' dialectics somewhat redundant....but only for now and it doesnt prove it wrong or dogmatic..

[trivas7]

[B]Now, if your 'theory' had presided over 150 years of success, you might have a case for clinging to this esoteric 'theory' of yours; but alas history has already passed its verdict.

But isn't this that the height of idealism and non-Marxian in principle -- to believe that ideas make history, not flesh-and-blood men in particular social conditions?

Also, don't you need to show how Wittgenstein is compatible with Marxism if you claim to be a Wittgensteinian?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


See that's the thing (and this is pointlessly going over ground we have already gone over) Marx described his method as dialectical and referred to having rejected Hegel. Engels did the same thing. You differentiate between the two because Engels wrote more extensively on general issues of method using terms taken OUT of Hegel's system and restated in a new form. Thus you find in the differentiated weight of writings on the same topic a sign of a secret difference between two writers, who were closer in perspective than maybe any other two writers in history.

And why do I have to do that?

Because you keep ignoring what Marx himself said.

And I am touched by your naive acceptance of the view that these two strong and independent minds agreed on everything -- which must be the first time this has happened in human history.

I trust you can see the quasi-religious, semi-miraculous significance/imagery in this myth?

No, I thought you couldn't...

But we needn't speculate, for Marx kindly added a summary of his views (written by a reviewer), which he calls 'his method', in which there is not one atom of Hegel to be found.

Which means I was right: you ignore what Engels says to absolve him of dogmatism, and you also ignore what Marx said to implicate him in the loopy 'theory'.

No wonder I ignore what you have to say...


You develop that 'diagnosis' (for it is diagnosis of dysfunctionality since these men clearly intended to present themselves to the world as two representatives of the same view) and thus aim to reveal a supposed secret knowledge behind the appearance of consensus. The evidence that there is a secret numeric code hidden in the bible or that the Sistine chapel ceiling is a pattern of Hebrew letters is, to my mind, as strong.....but there you go, we differ on that.

But, you are the one who thinks there is a secret to be found, revealed to us by the mystic writings of that seer Hegel, buried only in Indo-European languages, in the predicative form of a sub-branch of indicative sentences -- not me.

I merely wish to expose your reliance on ruling-class myths such as these.


If you argued instead that Marx and Engels both were mired in dialectics but that Marx's view of history and political economy can be saved in a way Engel's view of natural science cannot be saved, you would be arguing a clearer and more defensible position. The somewhat half-baked biographical speculations would be throw aside. It would also be a more transparent position - leding ["leaning"? RL] as it would on the a clear imperative to go off and re-state Marxist political economy and the Marxist conception of history shorn of any dialectical usages.

Well, we needn't speculate, for Marx kindly added a summary of his views (written by a reviewer), which he calls 'his method', in which there is not one atom of Hegel to be found.

I can remind you of this fact as many times as it takes...


The other half of your view is this idea that in terms of what can be said about general terms there is only what can be said as a matter of 'grammar', i.e. rules for use. Here I think is the substantial point of difference between you (and your old Pal Wittgenstein) on the one hand and Engels on the other. For he does believe - and the Anti Dühring does bring this out - that it is possible to enter into speculative comments about the inter-linkages of the various sciences and that there is something to be learned from that.

This is not Wittgenstein's view; it is Geach's (or Hartley Slater's, and that of a few others) -- and, I'd like to see your objections to it.

Oops; you have none since you know far too little philosophy of logic.

Sorry to keep pointing that out...


He is far more explicit on this in the Dialectics of Nature than in the Anti-Dühring and I was staying away from the former as it raises too many issue to allow us to proceed constructively within these confines. But let us at least note that in the Anti Dühring he uses the ideas of dialectics to try to show that there is a way to think about the inter-connection of the various sciences without falling into metaphysics. That is the polemical purpose of dialectics in the Anti Dühring.

Now you say that the generalisations he comes up with fall into metaphysics despite that and why ?.......if I understand correctly it is because you think that the only thing that can be said about general terms like matter and motion and essence etc is said by the grammatical rules which 'govern' (not your term) their use.

I think the point has been made in previous threads that grammar doesn't 'govern' use at all. Grammar is merely an inaccurate post-hoc rationalisation of dynamic linguistic practices whose usage at a particular moment, nor its development over time, is effectively captured by the descriptive (dare I say Newtonian) rules which go to make up grammar. No credible student of linguistics thinks otherwise.

Ah, the good old appeal to authority. Ouch! -- it's the most powerful argument there is in philosophy.:rolleyes:

You win -- my views are unique. What a heinous crime!

Isn't it a good job Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, Scotus, Aquinas, Suarez, Descartes... refused to come up with any original ideas, but played safe and only agreed with the overall consensus.

Minor point: who said 'grammar "governs" use'? Or that they were in any way analogous to 'Newtonian' 'rules' (whatever they are)? Or that it does not change...? Not me.

More invention of your part -- so, you are back to your old tricks, as I predicted.


It does not take us long, following Wittgenstein down his many routes, to reach the conclusion that Wittgenstein's perspective is a complete mystification of linguistic correctness, a mirror at the level of philosophy of the fetishisation of correct usage which had been imposed by the bourgeoisie on multifarious practices of speech that had infected Europe prior to the nation state. In the end, Wittgenstein can neither say what correct usage is in any particular case (without excluding usages that listeners and/or speakers find correct) nor say with any clarity what the origin or legitimacy of the rules, he believes in, derive from. (But I seem to remember you saying you did not believe in language games - am I right ?)

Nice attempt to divert attention, and a good opportunity for you to demonstrate you have only a superficial reading in the Wittgenstein literature, which you have gladly taken.

And, of course, that paragon of working-class life -- Hegel -- is just the man to tell us what is acceptable usage, isn't he? As were Engels and Lenin, who incidentally accepted a Roman Catholic theory of meaning, to tell us of the secret code contained in predicative sentences. All so correct and above-board.


But then turn to what Engels is doing and contrast it with that mysterious philosophy ....and it is a philosophy. Engels' is saying that we can make rough and ready linkages between sciences, by making very general assumptions about matter and motion and those linkages will generate observations in the form of questions about the consistency of the different science with each other. He is only interested in doing that for a very particular purpose - a political purpose but he recognises that it does allow some interesting, if vague suggestions to be made. He is clear that those linkages have no probative force - they cannot be used to prove anything, unlike your Wittgenstein who thinks his dogmatic (but indiscernible ) grammars can be used to discern correct from incorrect usage.

Which 'grammars' of Wittgenstein's are we talking about?

Now, this is where you can show us (or rather, confirm) how superficial your knowledge of his work really is.


Unlike Wittgenstein, thinking like a dogmatic philosopher who thinks he has worked out something every reasonable person must hold to, Engels understands that his suggestions will be not unlike early speculations about atoms, i.e. possible models unconnected to any method of verification. But they have, he believes, the potential to short-circuit the almost random process of discovery to which science is otherwise forced.

Ah, I see you prefer the a priori superscience Engels tried to 'discover', buried away in a few predicative sentences, to Wittgenstein's expose of such Black Arts?

Fine; just admit it so that you can be given the right sort of therapy -- so we can diagnose which 'picture has held you captive'...


This latter bit of his view is of no great importance. The idea that scientific socialists could jump start scientific progress in this way is all very nice but of no great importance. Had the socialist movement continued to develop in the way it was developing in his day, there might have been some truth in this hope. But things have emerged otherwise. The natural sciences remain firmly embedded within the defence sector, the pharmaceutical business, the space programme etc, with their research programmes consequently dictated (but their methodological integrity mostly intact). There has proven to be no scope for the suggestive suppositions of a dialectical perspective to take hold, contrary to the personal experience of Engels' close colleague Schorlemmer. So be it. That proves Engels' dialectics somewhat redundant....but only for now and it doesn't prove it wrong or dogmatic..

A very wise friend of mine told me to tell you this:


See that's the thing (and this is pointlessly going over ground we have already gone over)

But, we have already established that Engels was an a priori dogmatist; but full marks for trying to deflect attention from that fact.

And that reminds me: is this "socialist movement" the same as that long-term failure I mentioned -- or is it an ideal 'movement', whose core theory has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that it is ideally 'successful', but in reality a very material flop -- or some other?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


But isn't this that the height of idealism and non-Marxian in principle -- to believe that ideas make history, not flesh-and-blood men in particular social conditions?

I agree, but that is not my argumnent.

But are you now going to to tell us that Dialectical Marxists do not act on their 'theory', and that its 'truth' has not been exposed by 150 years of practice/failure?

I fear you are...


Also, don't you need to show how Wittgenstein is compatible with Marxism if you claim to be a Wittgensteinian?

You see, if you actually read my work, and stopped pontificating about it in total ignorance, you would know I have already done this:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Wittgenstein.htm

[gilhyle]

Well Rosa I have no desire to go over old ground. I understand that you revel in the willingness to repeat, but I dont. I also differ from you in not being willing to claim that 'we' have already established anything. I happen to think there are fundamental issues with your reading of Marx on this point....and with your reading of Engels. But so what ? That debate (already had on another thread) is central to nothing.

As to Wittgenstein, I have enough respect for the man not to engage in serious debate on him without taking out his works again and refreshing my knowledge of his slip-sliding game-playing. (Believe it or not, I dont use those terms to criticise him - its just that is what he does as philosopher trapped within a discipline he wishes he wasnt committed to.) Why would I do that ? But go ahead start a thread and I'll reveal my ignorance if it seems relevant to socialism.

As to what that socialist movement is....it is the socialist movement which was so successful during Engels lifetime (an important point in reading his work), it is the movement that was shattered by the First World War and he defence of the Russian Revolution, which therein lost the culture to do Marxist theory and never got it back. More is the pity.....so wht was your point about it ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Well Rosa I have no desire to go over old ground. I understand that you revel in the willingness to repeat, but I dont. I also differ from you in not being willing to claim that 'we' have already established anything. I happen to think there are fundamental issues with your reading of Marx on this point....and with your reading of Engels. But so what ? That debate (already had on another thread) is central to nothing.

I repeat since you ignore.

And we have established what I say unless and until you can show where what I say is incorrect. If you can't (or won't), then the point stands -- until you summon up the courage or the fortitude to defend your 'theory'.


As to Wittgenstein, I have enough respect for the man not to engage in serious debate on him without taking out his works again and refreshing my knowledge of his slip-sliding game-playing. (Believe it or not, I dont use those terms to criticise him - its just that is what he does as philosopher trapped within a discipline he wishes he wasnt committed to.) Why would I do that ? But go ahead start a thread and I'll reveal my ignorance if it seems relevant to socialism.

Fair enough, but you will forgive my cynicism even here, for you have a proven track record of making stuff up, and not just about me.


As to what that socialist movement is....it is the socialist movement which was so successful during Engels lifetime (an important point in reading his work), it is the movement that was shattered by the First World War and he defence of the Russian Revolution, which therein lost the culture to do Marxist theory and never got it back. More is the pity.....so what was your point about it ?

Indeed, but under the auspices of this 'theory' it has gone steadily downhill ever since as workers the world over have learnt not to trust to you mystics.

The point, my dear, is quite plain: if truth is tested in practice, practice has refuted dialectics.

Details here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20010_01.htm

[gilhyle]

under the auspices of this 'theory' it has gone steadily downhill ever since as workers the world over have learnt not to trust to you mystics.

The socialist movement has not operated under the 'auspices' of dialectical materialism at all. Dialectical materialism has been, effectively, neutral in the history of socialism.

For example, Engels' Anti Duhring was a hugely influential text within the history of the Second International. And yet hardly one writer of any significance in that International in its major centres ever made an argument that relied on the dialectical laws set out in it.

Kautsky occasionally makes reference to these laws, but never relies on them. Plekhanov and Dietzgen famously articulated the ideas at length - but both are marginal figure within the Second International, although important in Russian political history and the early history of the SLP in the US respectively. Wilhem Liebknecht never relies on it. Jules Guesde, as far as I know, never relies on it. Nor, as far as I know, does August Bebel. Paul Lafargue makes the occasional reference. Labriola, Adler and Szabo all rejected it. Connolly, Morris and Hyndman placed no reliance on it. Bernstein famously opposed it. Luxembourg had little time for it. Lenin accepted it, but before the WW1 is important only for the Russian party. I could go on.

The actual influence of Engel's dialectics in the movement of his time was close to zero. What happened to the Second International was caused by the growth of the Labour Aristocracy, the First World War and the unwillingness of large sections of the leadership of the Second Internnational to oppose WW1 or defend the Russian Revolution....none of this had anything to do with Engels' Anti Duhring.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


The socialist movement has not operated under the 'auspices' of dialectical materialism at all. Dialectical materialism has been, effectively, neutral in the history of socialism.

This is a very odd argument, if by 'dialectical materialism' you mean 'dialectics'.

If you do, I am happy to agree that this 'theory' is useless, but I still think it has featured in the long-term decline of Dialectical Marxism (you can find the proof in Essay Nine Part Two, and Ten Part One).

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20010_01.htm

If you do not mean this, then I also agree (with a few resevations over such things as 'determinism'); but then my argument still stands, for dialectics (or 'materialist dialectics') has indeed presided over the long-term decline of Dialectical Marxism.

The extend of its causal role here is indeed open to debate, but it is not open to question.

Unless, of course, you are one of those dialecticians who thinks that everything in the entire universe is interconnected except the long term decline of Dialectical Marxism and its core theory!:rolleyes:


Lenin accepted it, but before the WW1 is important only for the Russian party. I could go on.

Yes, you could, but for the most important revolutionaries (Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, etc.) 'Materialist Dialectics' is central to their practice. To the hangers-on you mention, maybe not.

You also appear to think that the Second International was the be-all and end-all of revolutionary Marxism.

So it seems that you are caught in a dilemma: this theory you defend has either proven to be totally useless, or it has been used and has presided over 150 years of endless decline.

I am not sure which is the worst option.

But, the way you defend it, one would be forgiven for thinking it has been the non-existent deity's gift to success.:lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

By the way, just a minor thought about this:


Kautsky occasionally makes reference to these laws, but never relies on them. Plekhanov and Dietzgen famously articulated the ideas at length - but both are marginal figure within the Second International, although important in Russian political history and the early history of the SLP in the US respectively. Wilhem Liebknecht never relies on it. Jules Guesde, as far as I know, never relies on it. Nor, as far as I know, does August Bebel. Paul Lafargue makes the occasional reference. Labriola, Adler and Szabo all rejected it. Connolly, Morris and Hyndman placed no reliance on it. Bernstein famously opposed it. Luxembourg had little time for it. Lenin accepted it, but before the WW1 is important only for the Russian party. I could go on.

The actual influence of Engel's dialectics in the movement of his time was close to zero. What happened to the Second International was caused by the growth of the Labour Aristocracy, the First World War and the unwillingness of large sections of the leadership of the Second Internnational to oppose WW1 or defend the Russian Revolution....none of this had anything to do with Engels' Anti Duhring.

JR began this thread because of what Kautsky said about this execrable book:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1162263&postcount=1

So, maybe your knowledge of Kautsky is as poor as your knowledge of Engels...

[gilhyle]

Thanks for being so concerned about the possibility of my ignorance (perish the thought ! )....but no, JR's quote fits exactly with my interpretation. What I have pointed out is that Engels was forced to take up general questions of method because Marx had made explicit reference to dialectical laws (Q/Q and N/N) in Capital Volume One....Duhring had drawn on those references to to suggest that Marx ws applying Hegel's method in order to dogmatically derive his conclusions [a strangely familiar argument :cool:] and Engels had replied, in the course of his elaboration of Capital (incidentally, making use of an unpublished manuscript by Marx in the process) to show that Marx had derived the relevant conclusions by a process of developing a general conceptions and showing how they were reflected in contrary appearances etc. Engels then went on to show how dialectical laws involve only a process of exemplification (summation of results) rather than having the character of laws from which anything can be derived......Engels also went on to elaborate on a range of other problematic points in Marx's capital and placed it in the context of his and Marx's conception of scientific socialism.

So JR's quote from Kautsky is exactly right because what Kautsky acknowledges is tht the role of Anti Duhring was as a hugely influential polemical explanation of Capital ......and that is how Engel's elaboration of dialectics should be understood as.

In your cosmology, it is an explanation of what 'coquetting' (an opaque term) means.


it has been used and has presided over 150 years of endless decline

My point in the earlier post was that your history is insufficiently nuanced. The role of the materialist conception of dialectics in the Second International was totally different to its role in later periods. It cannot be said to have 'presided' at all. As to the later periods....I observe with interest that you consider Stalin a 'revolutionary'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


What I have pointed out is that Engels was forced to take up general questions of method because Marx had made explicit reference to dialectical laws (Q/Q and N/N) in Capital Volume One....Duhring had drawn on those references to to suggest that Marx ws applying Hegel's method in order to dogmatically derive his conclusions [a strangely familiar argument ] and Engels had replied, in the course of his elaboration of Capital (incidentally, making use of an unpublished manuscript by Marx in the process) to show that Marx had derived the relevant conclusions by a process of developing a general conceptions and showing how they were reflected in contrary appearances etc. Engels then went on to show how dialectical laws involve only a process of exemplification (summation of results) rather than having the character of laws from which anything can be derived......Engels also went on to elaborate on a range of other problematic points in Marx's capital and placed it in the context of his and Marx's conception of scientific socialism.

Indeed Marx did 'refer to these 'laws', and, as he said, he was merely 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon -- that is why those 'laws' appear in side comments, as Carver notes.

And, of course, Marx was not being dogmatic, but Engels was, in his application of those 'laws', without any attempt at proof, to selected 'examples' drawn from nature and society.


So JR's quote from Kautsky is exactly right because what Kautsky acknowledges is tht the role of Anti Duhring was as a hugely influential polemical explanation of Capital ......and that is how Engel's elaboration of dialectics should be understood as.

So, dialectics was an influence on Second International Marxism, contrary to your earlier allegations.


In your cosmology, it is an explanation of what 'coquetting' (an opaque term) means.

Not so; it is clear that both Engels and Kautsky failed to notice (just as you continue to forget about) Marx's use of this term (i.e., 'coquette'), and his quotation of a reviewer, who, according to Marx (not me) summarised 'his method', in which not one atom of Hegel occurs -- no Q/Q, non N/N, no 'contradictions', no 'unities of opposites', no 'Totality', etc.


My point in the earlier post was that your history is insufficiently nuanced. The role of the materialist conception of dialectics in the Second International was totally different to its role in later periods. It cannot be said to have 'presided' at all. As to the later periods....I observe with interest that you consider Stalin a 'revolutionary'.

By 'nuanced' you must mean that my head is not buried in the sand, unlike yours, I take it.

Or, are you, as I also allege, using dialectics to tell you that despite 150 years of appearances to the contrary, Marxism is a ringing success?

In that case, this theory is indeed a source of your own consolation -- since it tells you not to believe your own eyes.

And, where have I said Stalin was a 'revolutionary'?

Still making stuff up, I see.

[gilhyle]

And, where have I said Stalin was a 'revolutionary'?

My apologies... you never said it; thats what comes from posting in a hurry, you actually described Mao as a revolutionary....completely different ! :rolleyes:


Marx was not being dogmatic, but Engels was

Where is Engels dogmatic in the Antiduhring ?


dialectics was an influence on Second International Marxism, contrary to your earlier allegations

The question of the extent of the influence of dialectics on the Second International is not a matter for pedantic game playing, its a matter for historical analysis. The apparent inconguity you refer to is incorrectly understood by you as suggesting contrary views within my posts on the whether dialectics was influential or not. YOu wanna know what chop logic is....thats chop logic. The issue this apparent inconguity reflects is what if any influence the sections of the Anti Duhring had which are concerned with Duhring's claims about Marx's reliance on dialectics. The answer is that once the Lassalleans fell no-one took those claims seriously until the revival of neo-kantianism in the works of Adler, Bernstein etc and then took them seriously as criticisms of Marxism, from a perspective which like you claims there is an alternative way of presenting Marx's theories without the dialectical baggage..


By 'nuanced' you must mean that my head is not buried in the sand, unlike yours, I take it.

By nuanced I mean not treating 150 years of history of the socialist movement in a monolithic (and as Trivas has pointed out idealistic) manner.


it is clear that both Engels and Kautsky failed to notice (just as you continue to forget about) Marx's use of this term (i.e., 'coquette'),

Not at all true. Prove that they did not also 'coquette' with Hegel's phrasing ?


his quotation of a reviewer, who, according to Marx (not me) summarised 'his method', in which not one atom of Hegel occurs -- no Q/Q, non N/N, no 'contradictions', no 'unities of opposites', no 'Totality', etc

You ignore the simplest of explanations for this phenomenon - paraphrase. Personally I share the reviewer's desire to avoid Hegel's terms .... does that make me anti dialectical ? No. I find the reviewers description of the Marxist method both admirable and correct.....and dialectical.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


you actually described Mao as a revolutionary....completely different !

Mao may have sold out, but he at least led a revolution of sorts. What did Stalin ever do? So, your 'rolling eyes' are out of place.

The point is that the lot of them were dialecticians -- active Marxists are.

So are our leading theorists.


Where is Engels dogmatic in the Antiduhring ?

We have already been over this -- read my earlier posts.

You just ignored what I had to say -- as usual.


The question of the extent of the influence of dialectics on the Second International is not a matter for pedantic game playing, its a matter for historical analysis. The apparent inconguity you refer to is incorrectly understood by you as suggesting contrary views within my posts on the whether dialectics was influential or not. YOu wanna know what chop logic is....thats chop logic. The issue this apparent inconguity reflects is what if any influence the sections of the Anti Duhring had which are concerned with Duhring's claims about Marx's reliance on dialectics. The answer is that once the Lassalleans fell no-one took those claims seriously until the revival of neo-kantianism in the works of Adler, Bernstein etc and then took them seriously as criticisms of Marxism, from a perspective which like you claims there is an alternative way of presenting Marx's theories without the dialectical baggage..

I am still unclear what 'chop logic' is. Your example is unclear, and not an example of any sort of logic I recognise.

But, we already know you like to make stuff up.

And you need to make your mind up about Second International Marxism. One minute you say this:


For example, Engels' Anti Duhring was a hugely influential text within the history of the Second International. And yet hardly one writer of any significance in that International in its major centres ever made an argument that relied on the dialectical laws set out in it.

Kautsky occasionally makes reference to these laws, but never relies on them. Plekhanov and Dietzgen famously articulated the ideas at length - but both are marginal figure within the Second International, although important in Russian political history and the early history of the SLP in the US respectively. Wilhem Liebknecht never relies on it. Jules Guesde, as far as I know, never relies on it. Nor, as far as I know, does August Bebel. Paul Lafargue makes the occasional reference. Labriola, Adler and Szabo all rejected it. Connolly, Morris and Hyndman placed no reliance on it. Bernstein famously opposed it. Luxembourg had little time for it. Lenin accepted it, but before the WW1 is important only for the Russian party. I could go on.

Next you say this:


So JR's quote from Kautsky is exactly right because what Kautsky acknowledges is tht the role of Anti Duhring was as a hugely influential polemical explanation of Capital ......and that is how Engel's elaboration of dialectics should be understood as.

Not so much 'chop logic', then, as chopping and changing your own views.

Of course, you forget Plekhanov in your list, and the influence of dialectics on the determinism of that International.

But, hey, even if you are right, that is just more evidence that dialectics (and its Mickey Mouse 'Laws') are even more useless than I alleged.

However, the influence of dialectics (and its 'laws') on Third, Fourth and 'Fifth' International Marxism is not in doubt, I take it. Or on Stalinism, Maoism, and Libertarian Marxism.

All failures...


By nuanced I mean not treating 150 years of history of the socialist movement in a monolithic (and as Trivas has pointed out idealistic) manner.

Indeed, and I would criticise anyone who did this.

I wonder who you have in mind?


Prove that they did not also 'coquette' with Hegel's phrasing ?

I do not need to; all I need do is point out Marx did this, and told us he was doing it, and these two did not join with him in telling us they were doing it. I have no need to speculate about those other two, as you seem impelled to do.

But, let's be generous: I am glad you now acknowledge Marx at least did this.

The other point, minor though it is, I can concede to you.


You ignore the simplest of explanations for this phenomenon - paraphrase. Personally I share the reviewer's desire to avoid Hegel's terms .... does that make me anti dialectical ? No. I find the reviewers description of the Marxist method both admirable and correct.....and dialectical.

No, the simplest explanation is to accept what Marx said.

And, quite frankly, your claim that you prefer to avoid Hegelian terms is about as believable as Cherie Blair's recent claim that she and Tony are still socialists!:lol:

[gilhyle]

QUOTE]The other point, minor though it is, I can concede to you.[/QUOTE]

Wish I could figure out which point this was:)

Rolling eyes dont need to be warranted - Ill roll my eyes anytime I like :rolleyes:


We have already been over this -- read my earlier posts.

You just ignored what I had to say -- as usual.


Actually this is the one thing we have not covered in the earlier posts on this thread. Or I cant find it....namely any actual argument in the Anti Duhring that relies on a dogmatic pinciple to prove a conclusion.

By the way, you say the following:

you forget Plekhanov

just after you quote me inter alia as saying the following


Plekhanov and Dietzgen famously articulated the ideas at length - but both are marginal figure within the Second International, although important in Russian political history and the early history of the SLP in the US respectively

Didnt forget him.

You refer to
the influence of dialectics on the determinism of that International.


But the determinism of the Second International is mostly a myth invented by the ultra left of the Third International (Lukacs and Korsch) for their own purposes...thata deserves a separate thread...and even if that determinism existed, it was not influenced by dialectics, rather by the popular mechanical materialism of the period.

And you need to make your mind up about Second International Marxism

My point is quite clear - the Anti Duhring was a highly influential book, but not in the spreading of dialectical ideas, it was highly influential in defending the views previoulsy outlined in the Communist Manifesto and Capital.



In 1885, 8 years fter the Anti Duhring was published, Engels reflected on its influence and standing in a new preface. I have argued that the structure of the book - and the treatment of dialectics in particular - was driven by the need to combat Duhring's dogmatism and his charge against Marx that Marx was dogmatically relying on dialectical laws. By 1894 he admitted that "its subject matter.....is now practically forgotten" (MECW 25 P.8). So he structures the preface by asking the question why the book is still popular ? He explains that because of the very broad nature of Duhring's position Engels' polemical response had taken on a very general form: "my negative criticism became positive; the polemic was transformed into a more or less connected exposition of the dialecticl method and of the communist world outlook." (Ibid). What is relevant about that is that I have argued that the Anti Duhring has a polemical form. I hvee further argued that the character of the positive exposition of dialectical laws needs to be looked at as serving a polemical purpose.

The significance of that is that it counters the idea that Engels believes that there is a systematic or dogmatic purpose in expounding general dialectical principles. If Engels did believe that, he would need to expound such general dialectical principles in order to use them to prove some conclusion or other. However, if his purpose is purely polemical then the positive expositions of general dialectical ideas would occur only to exemplify the polemical points being made. I have argued that Engels formulation of general dialectical laws in the Anti Duhring should be seen as a polemical device at a particular moment in the history of the socialist movement where, on the one hand, many natural sciences were all-too-slowly moving into a new era of more dynamic analysis, while, on the other hand, some unacceptable philosophies were using the mechanical character of natural science at the time to back up dogmatic philosophical ideas.

Important comments later on in the preface confirm that the polemical rather than the systematic purpose is indeed Engel's purpose. he writes in 1894 "the advance of theoretical natural science may possibly make my work to a reat extent or even altogether superfluous. For the revolution which is bein gforced on theoretical natural science by the mere need to set in order the purely empirical discoveries, great masses of which have been piled up, is of such a kind that it must bring the diaectical character of natural processes mor nd more ot the consciousness even of those empiricists who are most opposted to it. The old rigid antagonisms the sharp impassable dividing lines are more and more disappearing. "(P.13) He comments "The recognition that these antgonisms and distinctions though to be found in nature are only of relative validity....this recognition is the kernal of the dilectical concpetiion of nature. " Then he points out, as he has pointed out elsewhere, that there is no need for an explicit conception of dialectics to understand nature this way. It only makes that task "easier". (P.14)

Thus we have conceptions of dialectics as a summary of results, as exemplifying universal propositions that cannot be used to prove anything, as rules of thumb that assist us in understnding nature better in the interim while science is developing and as apparently systematic a prior ideas that are actually only tools in polemic.

The second point to note about this preface is that the one aspect of his original text that Engels openly criticises is the parts on natural sciences. "There is much that is clumsy in my exposition and much of it could be expressed today in a clerer and more definite form. I have not allowed my self the right to improve this section and for that reson am under an obligation to criticise myself here instead." (Ibid P.11) He then goes on to explain why his own knowledge of mathematics and natural science was limited. While believing that he did not get it fundamentally wrong, he writes "I was sometimes unable to find the correct technical expression and in general moved with considerabbble clumsiness in the field of theoretical natural science." (Ibid)

He then goes on to explain that he could not just rely on general dialectical laws but had to convince himself in detail that "the same dialectical laws of motion apply " to nature as to history. Critically, he states "there could be no question of buildig the laws of dialectics into nataure but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it" (Ibid P.13) He also explains that Hegel's conception of dialectics was "mystic" (ibid) and that the actual dialectical laws are characterised by "complete simplicity and universality" (Ibid P.12).

This is significant. The idea here is that dialectical laws are universal BUT cannot be built into our conception of nature as such. If we ignore one side of this balanced formulation it is easy to accuse Engels of dogmatism. What else could it mean to say that dialectical laws are universal on the basis of inductive evidence, if one is not saying that they are a priori ? It seems obvious that to say that dialectical laws are universal is a dogmatic claim. And yet, almost in the same breath Engels says the opposite. The fact that he is convinced, in some unspecified general way that dialectical laws always apply, this does NOT lead him to conclude that one can rely on dialectical laws always being there.

This is a peculiar formulation which will confuse anyone brought up in analytical philosophy. Yet it is not hard to understand. Dialectical laws of motion can be formulated as suppositions without detailed knowledge of particular natural sciences. But to develop that supposition into an hypothesis and then to confirm that hypothesis you need to get deeply into the detail of the individual science.

That idea fits very well with the earlier idea of dialectical laws of motion as polemical tools, potentially rendered redundant by the progress of natural science. We get a very clear overall conception here of diaectical laws of nature, a conception of them as provisional, intrinsically vague, polemical rather than systematic, as summations of results rather than as a priori principles and as laws only in that sense of being generalisations and also as very simple ideas.

This conception then tells us what role dialectics played in the Second International - it played the role of facilitating the rejectiion of some dogmatic philosophies in the 1870s and died away once that task was complete, having limited influence for reasons suggested by Engels - namely the development of natural science and the absence of further need for those polemics.

When dialectics then re-emerged later as, apparently, something else in the writings of Plekhanov and others, then that is something which needs to be explained as a variation from Engels' poosition. What we now see is that dialectics has its own history within the socialist movement. It is not a homgenous 150 years of dominance of a single set of ideas. Rather it is a series of different sets of ideas at different times, linked to each other in the sense that one set of presentations becomes the historical origin of the next, but different in all essential respects because each presentation of dialectical ideas reflects the state of the movement at the time those ideas were presented. And in Engels case what is striking is how undogmatic diaelctical ideas were, how provisional, suppositional, polemical, self-effacing, anti-dogmatic, dialectical ideas were.


However, the influence of dialectics (and its 'laws') on Third, Fourth and 'Fifth' International Marxism is not in doubt, I take it. Or on Stalinism, Maoism, and Libertarian Marxism.

Each one deserves its own careful examination which will show that diaectics was rarely very influential - though occasionally it was and on each occasion in a distinctive formulation which requires a distinct characterisation.


the simplest explanation is to accept what Marx said

Indeed, and the best explanation, being the most economic, is the one that accounts for the most of what he says while ascribing the maximum consistency to him during periods of his life where he claimed consistency of views

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Wish I could figure out which point this was

That Engels's 'Laws' were not all that influential on Second International Marxism.

However, point taken about Plekhanov, but I cannot accept this:


But the determinism of the Second International is mostly a myth invented by the ultra left of the Third International (Lukacs and Korsch) for their own purposes...that deserves a separate thread...and even if that determinism existed, it was not influenced by dialectics, rather by the popular mechanical materialism of the period

As you say, that would require a separate thread.


Or I cant find it....namely any actual argument in the Anti Dühring that relies on a dogmatic principle to prove a conclusion.

Ah, now you see you have changed this. I was addressing this comment of yours:


Where is Engels dogmatic in the Antiduhring ?

But you have now changed this to:


any actual argument in the Anti-Dühring that relies on a dogmatic principle to prove a conclusion

But, you will recall that I had already taken you to task for attributing this to me, and I had to remind you that since dialectical theses make no sense, they can be used to prove nothing at all.

But that does not mean that Engels did not indulge in a priori dogmatic assertion in Anti-Dühring. I listed several examples, noted the dogmatic origin of such 'theses', and you largely ignored this -- or you tried to explain some of it away.


The significance of that is that it counters the idea that Engels believes that there is a systematic or dogmatic purpose in expounding general dialectical principles. If Engels did believe that, he would need to expound such general dialectical principles in order to use them to prove some conclusion or other. However, if his purpose is purely polemical then the positive expositions of general dialectical ideas would occur only to exemplify the polemical points being made. I have argued that Engels formulation of general dialectical laws in the Anti Dühring should be seen as a polemical device at a particular moment in the history of the socialist movement where, on the one hand, many natural sciences were all-too-slowly moving into a new era of more dynamic analysis, while, on the other hand, some unacceptable philosophies were using the mechanical character of natural science at the time to back up dogmatic philosophical ideas.

Once more, we have already covered this; while Engels says this or that of Dühring, and that or this of his own approach, the fact is that he is dogmatic too, as I have shown.


He then goes on to explain that he could not just rely on general dialectical laws but had to convince himself in detail that "the same dialectical laws of motion apply " to nature as to history. Critically, he states "there could be no question of building the laws of dialectics into nature but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it" (Ibid P.13) He also explains that Hegel's conception of dialectics was "mystic" (ibid) and that the actual dialectical laws are characterised by "complete simplicity and universality" (Ibid P.12).

Sure he says this, but he is quite happy to read his 'laws' into nature, and into specially-selected examples at that.


This is significant. The idea here is that dialectical laws are universal BUT cannot be built into our conception of nature as such. If we ignore one side of this balanced formulation it is easy to accuse Engels of dogmatism. What else could it mean to say that dialectical laws are universal on the basis of inductive evidence, if one is not saying that they are a priori ? It seems obvious that to say that dialectical laws are universal is a dogmatic claim. And yet, almost in the same breath Engels says the opposite. The fact that he is convinced, in some unspecified general way that dialectical laws always apply, this does NOT lead him to conclude that one can rely on dialectical laws always being there.

But, the 'inductive' evidence he gives in Anti-Dühring (and elsewhere) is a joke, It would be rejected as adequate 'evidence' in a first year undergraduate paper in any of the sciences, even in Engels's day.

Which is why I call it Mickey Mouse Science.

Now, you keep saying things like this, but fail to say why we should take someone who is ignorant of the scientific method, and of the detail and care required, at all seriously.

This suggests you too know nothing of the sciences and what constitutes adequate evidence and attention to detail.

And that in turn tells us you are concerned to defend this dogmatist with yet more of your own.

Or, in fact, just to bury your head in the sand.


This is a peculiar formulation which will confuse anyone brought up in analytical philosophy. Yet it is not hard to understand. Dialectical laws of motion can be formulated as suppositions without detailed knowledge of particular natural sciences. But to develop that supposition into an hypothesis and then to confirm that hypothesis you need to get deeply into the detail of the individual science.

But we are not fooled for a minute by such tawdry special-pleading.


Dialectical laws of motion can be formulated as suppositions without detailed knowledge of particular natural sciences.

You mean by this that any old amateur, who leafs through Hegel's 'logic', can simply dream up any old laws they like, and that's OK.

Or that we have to accept your pathetic excuse that those of us who reject such a cavalier approach to knowledge will be 'confused' by this?

But why is this no different from dogmatism (except, it is now 'amateur dogmatism'):


Dialectical laws of motion can be formulated as suppositions without detailed knowledge of particular natural sciences.

But, of course they are not 'suppositions' -- this a weasel word you have introduced merely to soften Engels's dogmatic approach to knowledge.

Had it been a mere 'supposition', Engels would, like other careful researchers, have defined his terms clearly, and would have examined contrary cases. He does none of these things, and assumes their universal validity (that can be seen by the way he applies his 'laws' to situations they do not even fit!).

He even tries to impose them on mathematics -- something you would like us to ignore (since it does not fit in with your dogmatic view of this book).


That idea fits very well with the earlier idea of dialectical laws of motion as polemical tools, potentially rendered redundant by the progress of natural science. We get a very clear overall conception here of dialectical laws of nature, a conception of them as provisional, intrinsically vague, polemical rather than systematic, as summations of results rather than as a priori principles and as laws only in that sense of being generalisations and also as very simple ideas.

What 'results' are they a 'summation' of? A handful of cases largely borrowed from Hegel or other Natürphilosophers.

If Darwin had proceeded like this, he'd have been a laughing stock.

And yet you have the cheek to sing Engels praises!


When dialectics then re-emerged later as, apparently, something else in the writings of Plekhanov and others, then that is something which needs to be explained as a variation from Engels' position. What we now see is that dialectics has its own history within the socialist movement. It is not a homogenous 150 years of dominance of a single set of ideas. Rather it is a series of different sets of ideas at different times, linked to each other in the sense that one set of presentations becomes the historical origin of the next, but different in all essential respects because each presentation of dialectical ideas reflects the state of the movement at the time those ideas were presented. And in Engels case what is striking is how Undogmatic dialectical ideas were, how provisional, suppositional, polemical, self-effacing, anti-dogmatic, dialectical ideas were.

Who said it was 'homogenous'?

Making stuff up again I see?

Whatever the mix, and whatever the changes, this body of theory has presided over 150 years of almost total failure. That is undeniable.


Each one deserves its own careful examination which will show that dialectics was rarely very influential - though occasionally it was and on each occasion in a distinctive formulation which requires a distinct characterisation.

I agree that these periods require careful examination; I have begun that task here (and I think I am the first person to have attempted it):

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm

There you will see that I have been able to show that this 'theory' has played its own not insignificant part in helping make Dialectical Marxism the long-term failure we see today.


Indeed, and the best explanation, being the most economic, is the one that accounts for the most of what he says while ascribing the maximum consistency to him during periods of his life where he claimed consistency of views

Not if he changed his mind, and tells us he did.

[gilhyle]

Now, you keep saying things like this, but fail to say why we should take someone who is ignorant of the scientific method, and of the detail and care required, at all seriously.That is the point - he is not engaged in what you refer to when you talk about science. He is engaged in something quite different - which is cross referencing different scientific disciplines to find common thematic issues recurring among them, notwithstanding the different subject matters. His methodologies are short cuts, rules of thumb, devices to highlight faultlines in science which would, in due course be overcome by the development of science itself. But he wants to anticipate aspects of those developments for polemical purposes, or rather he wants to show that Marx has only used dialectical concepts to anticipate and that Marx has not been engaged in any sort of dogmatic thinking.


If Darwin had proceeded like this, he'd have been a laughing stock.Worth recalling that Darwin was actually a laughing stock to many. He failed to define what a species was and he failed to explain how this evolutionary process he postulated could have happened. His book is profoundly unclear and speculative.....and not withstanding that it is one of the great works of science. Because what it does is to take a supposition, which had been around for over a century, turn it into a more complex but still unclear hypothesis and draw in some inductive evidence that tended to support that hypothesis.


this body of theory has presided over 150 years of almost total failureI can only repeat my reference to inconvenient facts - it has not consistently presided, it is not a single body of theory and the period has not been one of 'almost total failure' but rather a mixture of incredible success and disastrous decline.


he is quite happy to read his 'laws' into nature, and into specially-selected examples at thatThat is not dogmatism in my book. Dogmatism involves the reliance on a priori principles to draw conclusions that involve empirical claims. Speculatively dentifying a pattern and formulating a suggestion as to a commonality deriving form this pattern is not dogmatism. If that were the case, the concept of dark energy would be dogmatic.


This suggests you too know nothing of the sciences and what constitutes adequate evidence and attention to detail.What is adequate evidence for anything is one of the great unknowables both in science and common discourse. It fluctuates depending on what we want to believe and what we can find out. It is determined by the historical, social and political character of the moment. It is not given or known, but constantly fought over. Engels is a communist, engaged in a particular polemical task. It is that which determines the level of detail he requires. I argue, for example that the level of detail he uses in his carbon example is quite sufficient for the given purpose of polemicising against Duhring.


Who said it was 'homogenous'?

Making stuff up again I see?

YOu treat it as homogenous by quoting indiscriminately from works published often 100 years apart by people who represent the communist tradition and people who have betrayed that tradition, without regard to those differences.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


That is the point - he is not engaged in what you refer to when you talk about science. He is engaged in something quite different - which is cross referencing different scientific disciplines to find common thematic issues recurring among them, notwithstanding the different subject matters. His methodologies are short cuts, rules of thumb, devices to highlight faultlines in science which would, in due course be overcome by the development of science itself. But he wants to anticipate aspects of those developments for polemical purposes, or rather he wants to show that Marx has only used dialectical concepts to anticipate and that Marx has not been engaged in any sort of dogmatic thinking.

Ah, more special pleading.

What I have alleged is that he is an a priori dogmatist and that he engages in Mickey Mouse Science in the way he appeals to specially-selected examples to try to illustrate his bogus 'laws'.

And, the way he words things -- his selectivity, his attempt to superimpose his 'laws' on the phenomena (ignoring the many cases where they do not fit) -- makes him even an incompetent Mickey Mouse Scientist, as well as showing these are not 'rules of thumb' -- a phrase he never uses. He uses the word 'law'.

And, I'd like to see you try to apply your comments to his words on mathematics -- a topic you keep ducking, and with good reason.


Worth recalling that Darwin was actually a laughing stock to many. He failed to define what a species was and he failed to explain how this evolutionary process he postulated could have happened. His book is profoundly unclear and speculative.....and not withstanding that it is one of the great works of science. Because what it does is to take a supposition, which had been around for over a century, turn it into a more complex but still unclear hypothesis and draw in some inductive evidence that tended to support that hypothesis.

I am not sure it is correct to describe the reaction to Darwin a being 'laughed at'. Sure some bigots will have done this. But his ideas, even though derided, were taken very seriously. And that is because of the evidence and argument he presented.

But, even if he had been 'laughed at', this was not for lack of evidence (the main gripe was that he was challenging Genesis and that his theory of inheritance was incoherent). Had he been guilty of that, had he failed to produce adequate evidence, and had he been as sloppy as Engels, he'd still be a laughing stock among scientists to this day.

Sure, Darwin failed to define many things -- but Engels defined absolutely nothing at all. And, sure, there are places in the work where Darwin is speculative, and expresses doubts. But, that is what makes him non-dogmatic. For he does what Engels does not; he examines difficult cases, attempts a solution and admits where he cannot fully account for something.

Engels just ploughs on, considers none of the difficulties his 'laws' face, and even attempts to impose them on mathematics!


I can only repeat my reference to inconvenient facts - it has not consistently presided, it is not a single body of theory and the period has not been one of 'almost total failure' but rather a mixture of incredible success and disastrous decline.

1) Where have I said it was a "single body of theory"?

2) The Church of Rome has presided over 1500 or more years of European Christianity, in the sense that it has been the dominant institutional and intellectual form, but that does not mean that in has overwhelmed every area of Christianity, and at all times. That is the sense of 'presided over' I was using.

3) Nevertheless, dialectics has presided over 150 years of revolutionary (but not necessarily revisionist/reformist, i.e., Second International) Marxism -- that is undeniable.

4) What successes? 1917 is the only one I can think of and that was reversed pretty quickly. Can you point to any others?


That is not dogmatism in my book. Dogmatism involves the reliance on a priori principles to draw conclusions that involve empirical claims. Speculatively identifying a pattern and formulating a suggestion as to a commonality deriving form this pattern is not dogmatism. If that were the case, the concept of dark energy would be dogmatic.

Not necessarily; dogmatism in philosophy is the assertion of a priori theses -- something philosophers have been doing on and off now for 2400 years. And that is exactly what Engels does.

Sure, some then try to do things with such theses, but that merely compounds their dogmatism, it does not constitute it.


If that were the case, the concept of dark energy would be dogmatic.

Indeed, it is dogmatic; the difference is that scientists' theories are sensitive to evidence, whereas dialectics is not.


What is adequate evidence for anything is one of the great unknowables both in science and common discourse. It fluctuates depending on what we want to believe and what we can find out. It is determined by the historical, social and political character of the moment. It is not given or known, but constantly fought over. Engels is a communist, engaged in a particular polemical task. It is that which determines the level of detail he requires. I argue, for example that the level of detail he uses in his carbon example is quite sufficient for the given purpose of polemicising against Dühring.

I suggest you go into the university library and check out, say, the journal Nature. There you will see the kind of evidence that scientists count as adequate/inadequate.

What you will not find is the sort of Mickey Mouse Science that seems to impress Engels -- and you.

And I agree with you that science is a historical process, and that it is open to social negotiation, but that does not affect the argument. This is because, when that negotiation is over (for whatever reason), the evidence scientists require to establish a new principle and/or law is extensive, overwhelming, clear and well-defined.

Totally different from dialectics where it seems that a few paragraphs of trite, anecdotal or third-hand data (often mis-described) is all one needs.


YOu treat it as homogenous by quoting indiscriminately from works published often 100 years apart by people who represent the communist tradition and people who have betrayed that tradition, without regard to those differences.

Not so; I quote passages from later comrades who are openly alluding/referring back to the 'classics'.

That does not imply I think dialectics is homogenous (although in many areas it is fixed like the Platonic forms), only that it is to many revolutionaries; they will not allow it to change (they even call such an attempt 'Revisionism').

However, you must not misinterpret my method of engaging with the dialectical Neanderthals here with my own views. I quote the classics at them to show that they do not even know their own theory.

My Essays are more nuanced.

[Hit The North]

Can the last one to leave this thread please turn out the lights?

Thank you.

The Management. x

[gilhyle]

Only takes two Bob.....and sometimes only one :cool:

Dont be so worried about the environment, this bit of electricity spent wont kill the planet - but ignorance will.

[gilhyle]

QUOTE]Where have I said it was a "single body of theory"?[/quote]

Its not a matter of you having 'said' it, its a matter of how you treat it. Time and again in your essays I have seen you make a point and then illustrate it with a series of quotations taken from across that 150 years, that is treating it as one single body.

However, I hear you say


I quote passages from later comrades who are openly alluding/referring back to the 'classics'.

That does not imply I think dialectics is homogenous

But if you follow that through your polemic is going to become a lot more complex and difficult to sustain. That is part of the point of my emphasis on the specific reality of Anti Duhring.


He uses the word 'law'

Well as we discussed, that word had a differnet meaning for him than it has for you....and Newton.


Engels just ploughs on, considers none of the difficulties his 'laws' face

NO Engels does the opposite, his view is that if his examples dont work, his conclusion does not work. Thus, the part of your argument he would take seriously is the attempt to come up with examples that dont fit his laws.


What successes? 1917 is the only one I can think of and that was reversed pretty quickly. Can you point to any others?


The one within which Engels lived is the most important one - namely the building of the German SPD and the Second International and the election of socialist deputies to every parliament in Europe in the 19th century.


dialectics has presided over 150 years of revolutionary (but not necessarily revisionist/reformist, i.e., Second International) Marxism -- that is undeniable

'Undeniable'.....sound a bit a priori that, Rosa. I have denied it: dialectics played little role in the first fifty years of that 150.


dogmatism in philosophy is the assertion of a priori theses

Well I thnk not. Not so sure there is such thing as an a priori thesis. There is of course such a thing as an analytic thesis. But it is the method of proof, not the thesis, that is a priori. The affirmation of general claims is not dogmatic just because they are general in character.


I suggest you go into the university library and check out, say, the journal Nature. There you will see the kind of evidence that scientists count as adequate/inadequate.

Indeed, but you wont find many articles in Nature on Communism....the practice of communism within capitalist societies - the scientific discipline of communism requires different standards, which include the use of vaguer and more provisional theses, which cut across the the structures of science allowed by capitalism. These standards are not worse, but different. In the same way that at other stages of the development of even the natural sciences, other levels of clarity and proof applied

[gilhyle]

Want to go into what I think is the key point. I pick Essay Two at random.

From Essay Two, Rosa, you argue the following, beginning with a quote from Engels:.

"...."Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically." [Engels (1892), pp.407, repeated in Engels (1976), p.28.] To this," Rosa goes on "may be added the following comment: "Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954), p.211. Bold emphases added.]

Rosa immediately objects: " But, how could Engels possibly have known all of this? How could he have known that nature does not operate "metaphysically", say, in distant regions of space and time, way beyond the edges of the known Universe of his day? Indeed, how could he have been so sure that, for example, there are no changeless objects anywhere in the entire universe?4 How could he have been so certain that the "life of nature" is in fact the result of a "conflict of opposites" -- or that some processes (in the whole of reality, for the whole of time) were not governed by non-dialectical factors? Where is his "carefully" collected evidence about every object and event in nature, past, present and future?5

Notice that Engels did not say that "all the evidence collected" up until his day supported these contentions, or that "those parts of the world of which scientists" of his day were aware behaved in the way he indicated; he just referred to nature tout court, without qualification (i.e., "throughout nature" and "everywhere in nature"). In line with other DM-theorists, Engels signally failed to inform his readers of the whereabouts of the large finite set of "careful observations" upon which these wild generalisations had been based.

To be sure, he did say that nature itself confirms DM, but that looks more like a manifesto claim than a summary of the evidence -- especially if the 'evidence' he actually bothered to produce does not in fact support his theses, as we will see in later Essays."


Now the obvious question is if Engels had said 'all evidence collected', would this solve the problem ? As I read your essay, Rosa, you are saying that that would not solve the problem. Indeed, you go on to argue that denials of the a priori nature of the claims made by Engels and the insistence on its reliance on evidence are of no effect as they are contradicted by his supposed practice.

You immediately goes on to the following ( I delete the non Anti Duhring quotes):


" And Engels didn't stop there; he made equally bold statements about other fundamental aspects of nature:

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted….

"A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases added.]

[.........]

Once more, Engels forgot to say how he knew all these things were true. For example, how could he possibly have known that:

"Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases added.]

Your key argument in all this is the epistemological argument that certain things cannot be known, rather than the empirical argument that Engels actually failed to make clear that his conclusions were based on evidence collected. You emphasise that again and again. For example, once again relying on Anti Duhring:


And Engels didn't stop there; he made equally bold statements about other fundamental aspects of nature:

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted….

"A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases added.]

[.........]

Once more, Engels forgot to say how he knew all these things were true. For example, how could he possibly have known that:

"Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases added.]

The argument about why Engels caveats along the lines of ..all evidence collected..... dont work is therefore the critical one. Rosa has another go at it in the following:

"From recently published Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dühring, we find the following seemingly reasonable comment from Engels:

"The general results of the investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions. To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology, an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As Dühring proceeds from "principles" instead of facts he is an ideologist, and can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [ Marks and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original.]

And yet, on the same page we find Engels doing the very thing he has just accused Dühring of doing:

[Seems to be a quote missing here in Essay Two - GH]

And yet, as we will see, Engels is himself guilty of doing precisely what he has just accused Dühring of doing.

[......] "

Rosa,you then go on to quote one Jack Conrad from the Weekly Worker in a way which brings out this key argument:
" Here is another recent example:

"Engels unashamedly bases himself on Georg Hegel (1770-1831). But - and it is a big but - he set out to put the great philosopher onto his feet. Whereas Hegel idealistically developed the dialectic 'as mere laws of thought', Engels insisted that it is rooted in, and must be deduced from, the underlying dialectic found in the world of matter itself....

"Engels emphasises that it would be entirely wrong to crudely read the dialectic into nature. The dialectic has to be discovered in nature and evolving out of nature....

"Of course, that does not mean we should impose some a priori dialectical construct upon nature. The dialectic, as Engels explains time and again, has to be painstakingly discovered in nature....

"Engels did not make the laws of nature dialectical. He tried, on the contrary, to draw out the most general dialectical laws from nature. Not force artificial, preconceived, inappropriate notions onto nature." [Jack Conrad, Weekly Worker, 30/08/07. Bold emphasis added.]

And yet, on the same page Conrad then says this:

"Engels moves on to discuss dialectical categories such as necessity and chance, essence and appearance, causality and interaction, freedom and necessity. Formal and dialectical logic are also touched upon and shown to have a relationship. Dialectical logic is, needless to say, far superior. Like the moving image of film compared to a single-frame photograph. Dialectical logic grasps totality, interconnection, movement and the constancy of change." [Ibid.]

But, this all certainly looks "preconceived" (as indeed it was --by earlier mystics, including Hegel). As we have seen, Engels was perfectly happy to impose his 'Laws' on nature. "

Rosa your phrase here "...all certainly looks..." is indicative of an issue. If Engels is being charged with being inconsistent, then a substantial argument must be made. Is it a matter of him having merely placed the caveats in a separate part of his text than the generalisations ? Is it a matter of the wording of the generalisations ? Is the conclusion based merely on the fact that he uses words like 'law' and 'unthinkable' ?

Here is another text from Essay Two which relies on reference to the Anti Duhring and which takes up this issue.

"Having said that, the author of GOD makes all the usual moves, readily imposing dialectics on nature, and failing to ask of his 'theory' the sorts of questions raised at this site. Indeed, as far as I can determine, he does not even bother to cover his rear and argue that DM must grow from a patient examination of the evidence. It's apriorism then straight out of the starting blocks!

A few weeks after writing the above, however, I discovered this comment:

"'Not a single principle of dialectics can be converted into an abstract schema from which, by purely logical means, it would be possible to infer the answer to concrete questions. These principles are a guide to activity and scientific research, not a dogma.'" [Gollobin (1986), p.409, quoting the Soviet Encyclopedia.]

And several pages later he even quotes Engels:

"And finally, to me there could be no question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it...." [Engels (1976), p.13, quoted in Gollobin (1986), p.414. Bold emphasis added.]

Without a hint of irony, Gollobin then quotes a passage from Engels where the latter does the opposite of what he has just said:

"Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasing daily, and thus has shown that, in the last resort, nature works dialectically and not metaphysically." [Engels (1976), p.28, quoted in Gollobin (1986), p.414. Bold emphasis added.]

Hence, it is quite clear that Gollobin is either blind to the fact that Engels has imposed this view on nature, or he is being deliberately disingenuous. But, how could Engels possibly have known that nature works dialectically -- and not metaphysically --, say, in parts of the universe that the scientists of his day had not studied? It is quite clear that he could not possibly have known this, but he was quite happy to "build" this view into nature.As we are about to see, Gollobin is equally happy to do the same."

Now this seems to me inadequately clear. Rosa, you contrast 'discovering them [dialectical laws - GH] in it [nature - GH]' on the one hand and on the other hand proving dialectics by reference to nature. Now, it is not at all clear that these are opposite/contradictory approaches. If I say that I discover the laws of evolution by experiment on fruitflys and that I prove the laws of evolution by experiments on fruitflies, I seem not to be making to contrary statements but rather two similar statements. Thus if Engels say he discovers the laws of dialectics in nature and then says that proves laws of dialectics by reference to nature....he seems to be making similar rather than opposed claims. And yet in your text you use a quote about using nature as the proof of dialectics to show that Engels supposedly does the opposite to what he has just claimed when he says he discovers the laws of dialectics in nature.

We see the same issue, maybe better presented, in your discussion of another writer (and by the way I dont share Sean Sayers views and have never read Gollobin, though I have Bhagavan, to whom, if I understand you, you link him ):

"Here is Sean Sayers's impressive bid to join this ancient and conservative philosophical club -- but, first we note the (by now) familiar, almost de rigueur, disarming declaration, followed by its prompt abrogation:

"Dialectical materialism diverges from Hegelian dialectic at this point. Marx's dialectic is not an a priori deduction, but a summary of human knowledge. 'Nature is proof of dialectics' [Engels (1976), p.28] according to Engels. Colletti, Popper and company do not understand this. Their constant refrain is that dialectics is an a priori dogma….

"No doubt dialectical materialism can be used as a set of dogmatic principles from which to deduce things. But Marxists have been at pains to stress that dialectical materialism is not a universal formula which may be applied to generate significant conclusions a priori….

"Correctly understood, dialectical materialism is not a dogma. Indeed, it is rather Popper, Colletti and other such critics of dialectic who show themselves to be dogmatists by the terms of their criticisms. For they merely assert their philosophy, embodied in the principles of formal logic, and when confronted with the dialectical concept of contradiction reject it as 'absurd', and 'irrational' for failing to conform to formal logic.

"Philosophy and logic can never replace the need for a detailed investigation of the concrete and particular conditions under study. They can never replace the need for the fullest possible practical experience; and no philosophy makes this point more forcibly than dialectical materialism. According to it, philosophy is not a body of merely conceptual, logical or a priori truths. Philosophy has a twofold character: it summarizes, at the most general level, the results of human knowledge and experience; and it functions as a guide to further thought and action.

"There is no question here of using the principles of dialectics as 'axioms' from which to 'deduce' any concrete results. If anything, the process works the other way around, and philosophies are based upon results in the particular sciences…." [Sayers (1980a), pp.19-21. Bold emphases alone added. Engels's reference altered to conform to the edition used here.]

This seems admirably clear and disarmingly honest: it's the critics of DM who are the dogmatists; dialecticians never impose their ideas on reality. In fact, Sayers assures us that DM-theorists are the exact opposite of the caricature found in the writings of anti-dialecticians like Popper and Colletti.

Nevertheless, when we are met with claims like the following (in this case, just two pages after the above 'modest' disavowals), we might be forgiven for thinking that Sayers is living in some sort of dream world, alongside the rest of his conservative dialectical peers:

"Dialectical materialism, by contrast, is a philosophy of struggle and of conflict. Nothing comes into being except through struggle; struggle is involved in the development of all things; and it is through struggle that things are negated and pass away. Conflict and contradiction are inevitable…." [Ibid., p.23. Bold emphasis added.]

How could Sayers possibly know all this? This is not a summary of experience, nor of the available evidence, but a clear imposition on reality of things it might not possess, and of processes it might not exhibit. For example, where is the evidence that "contradictions" are "inevitable", or that "nothing" comes into being "except through struggle"? To be sure, Sayers quotes passages from Hegel in support, but apart from that dubious authority, where is his evidence?"

Now it seems to me clear from this that you, Rosa, consider dogmatic character as something which inheres in the form of the particular sentence. Contrary to my view that dogmatic character can only be discerned by examining use. That is why my readings of the Anti Duhring seem irrelevant to you - you do seem to think that it is obvious when a particular sentence has a dogmatic form, you seem to think that disavowals along side sentences which have a universal form become inconsistent with what is proposed if what is proposed is given a universal form. The essence of your criticism is therefore that whenever a sentence has a universal form, then we can legitimately object to that sentence (irrespective of limitations on its use or caveats published along side it) that it cannot be known.

[trivas7]

Want to go into what I think is the key point. I pick Essay Two at random.

Now it seems to me clear from this that you, Rosa, consider dogmatic character as something which inheres in the form of the particular sentence. Contrary to my view that dogmatic character can only be discerned by examining use. That is why my readings of the Anti Duhring seem irrelevant to you - you do seem to think that it is obvious when a particular sentence has a dogmatic form, you seem to think that disavowals along side sentences which have a universal form become inconsistent with what is proposed if what is proposed is given a universal form. The essence of your criticism is therefore that whenever a sentence has a universal form, then we can legitimately object to that sentence (irrespective of limitations on its use or caveats published along side it) that it cannot be known.
From what I can glean from her arguments, Rosa is saying that any positive theory put forward by Engels adds up to metaphysical speculation which is contrary to her Wittgensteinian project of speaking in ordinary language.

John Holloway's essay http://marxmyths.org/john-holloway/article.htm points out that Marx differs from Engels in his understanding of what constitutes a science. For Marx, science is negative. The truth of science is the negation of the untruth of false appearances. But in the post-Marx Marxist tradition, however, the concept of science is turned from a negative into a positive concept. Rosa understands that science can be expressed in Marx's sense as in Capital. But for Engels, OTOH, dialectics is the conceptualization of nature and society as being in constant motion -- a positive notion of science. To hypostasize dialectics into a positive natural law is what Rosa objects to AFAIK.

[gilhyle]

Yes Trivas I think you are correct about what Rosa objects to....though I have to say I also disagree with Holloway. Marxism is scientific in a very unusual and particular way. It is scientific in the sense of being an organised body of knowledge which depends on the best scientific ideas Capitalism produces BUT which it assimilates critically. Its scientific character is dependent on two structural relationships, on the one hand a relationship to a real and substnantial workers movement and on the other a relationship to bourgeois science. It refuses to retreat behind the achievements of bourgeois science and insists always on building on the best work in that tradition....but at the same time it does not rely on the discipline of the scientific community, rather it depends on the discipline of the socialist movement to constitute its standards of affirmation and judgement.

This actually changes what kinds of propositiions and theories it finds acceptable. It leads it to accept a large number of proviisional and vague ideas , given that they are needed for practical purposes.

Consequently, what I suspect I really disagree with Rosa on is whether Marxism represents a practice of science as accepted by capitalist society or whether it represents a constitutively dissident science which must set its own standards, while not falling below those of capitalism.

It is this absence of an explicit concept of a revolutionary science and the idea instead of the critic as the advocate of clear and unmuddled thinking which I reject in Wittgenstein. The concepts of grammar and de-mystification are themselves the mystificatory sides of Wittgenstein's perspective..this is something Marx had already criticised in his criticism of Bruno Bauer...however I await with interest the further development of Rosa's advocacy of Wittgenstein's perspective.

[trivas7]

Yes Trivas I think you are correct about what Rosa objects to....though I have to say I also disagree with Holloway. Marxism is scientific in a very unusual and particular way. It is scientific in the sense of being an organised body of knowledge which depends on the best scientific ideas Capitalism produces BUT which it assimilates critically. Its scientific character is dependent on two structural relationships, on the one hand a relationship to a real and substnantial workers movement and on the other a relationship to bourgeois science. It refuses to retreat behind the achievements of bourgeois science and insists always on building on the best work in that tradition....but at the same time it does not rely on the discipline of the scientific community, rather it depends on the discipline of the socialist movement to constitute its standards of affirmation and judgement.

There are more than a few ways to respond, gilhyle, let me start with what first strikes me.

First of all I don't believe that as you say Marxian science is dependent on bourgeois science. As you say, through struggle in the worker's movement practice is the Marxist touchstone of truth. But its raison d'etre as a science lies in its materialist conception of history, which didn't grow out of any bourgeois science I know of.



The differentiation of commodities into commodites and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constanly filying away from it. The elipsis is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it.

-- Capital Vo1. Ch.3

However strange this sounds (to my ear at least) this is close to Marx's description of his scientific method and how he reveals the untruth of the false appearances of the capitalist mode of production; his scientific method is not by experimenting with "a large number of provisional and vague ideas" to see what sticks. Viz., he reveals the contradictions of a process in motion and allows the possibility of reconciling them in a higher synthesis (i.e., socialism). This no bourgeois thinker did before Marx re capitalism. I have no doubt that Marxism isn't accepted by bourgeois thinkers of any stripe as scientific, and I dare say that most Marxists don't think so either. Neither do I think Marxism makes a very good fit with Wittgenstein's concerns. But personally if it's not objectively scientific in some sense I say: why bother? There are plenty of other creative projects and experiences to be had that fulfill my human needs and aspirations.

[gilhyle]

Small point: got a page reference for your quote from Capital ? Or a link ?

Well, working backwards, Marx's Capital is an exceptional work. It is the peak of revolutionary socialist science, to date. What is striking about it is that its methodology has never been replicated in the revolutionary socialist tradition. If you look at Engel's work, the work of Hilferding, Luxembourg, Preobrazhensky, Rosdolsky, Mandel, Fine, Aglietta, Robinson, Rubin, Weeks, Dobb etc etc ...whoever, so-called Marxist political economy at its best, it falls into two categories - exposition of Marx and attempted modernisation of his work which lives parasitically off his achievement of a certain methodology and secondly original work which consistently falls away from his methodology to more conventional methodologies.

For example you quote Marx's commitment to dialectical contradictions. Now consider this link:
http://www.revleft.com/vb/new-book-39-t62435/index.html?t=62435
The issue discussed there is in many ways the same issue as the Zeno's Paradox issue of the divisibility of time which is so closely related to the conception of what a dialectical contradiction is. Now Rosa, I suspect (but she can speak for herself), would have some sympathy for Kilman. At least someone with fviews like hers woud, I think, on the basis, as she indicates in her essays and another thread that the paradox disappears if we treat time as being as divisible as space. This is similar to what Kilman and Carchedi and others do to answer Bortkiewicz's, Okishio and Sraffa's revisionism. They just create two times. But it is not what Marx did....and as Foley argues in the link it is far from clear that it actually solves the problem. What Marx does is quite different and - in conventional scientific terms - very odd. He absracts from the temporal sequence in a way which isolates the 'problem'....without giving us the 'solution', what might be called the market clearing solution, which comes afterwards and which his Ricardian opponents want to include in the conceptualisation.


We cannot reasonanbly build a meta theory of what Marxist science is based solely on the work of one man. The work of others must also be covered.

If we then turn to works in the areas of history and sociology. It is generally true that Marxist works in these areas have consisted in taking the best historical scholarship from the capitalist academy and restructuring or reconceptualising it to bring out the class issues. On occasion, one or two Marxists have done original primary research, but their work along these lines has invariably been done within the strictures of the discipline of history of capitalism - and no harm in that since the bourgeoisie are very good at writing history.

But it is clear looking across the history of Marxist science that it does consist in such reconceptualisations of the given understandings. It is for that reason, essential critical rather than systematic science. No less scientific for that.

One element of it, is summary extrapolations from results. The materialist conception of history is one such generalisation. The dialectical version of materialism is another. The Marxist critique (note the word) of political economy is a third. These are presentations of conclusions which Marxists need to constantly re-create from the relentless and un-ending re-criticism of the dominant versions of science. They rely on the dominant science in the sense that such Marxist works aim to retain the insights of that science, but such Marxist works go beyond the dominant science whereever there is a false appearance which plays a role in sustaining the ideology of capitalism.

Now when it comes to the natural sciences, there really is a difficulty. Capitalism (while it distorts natural scientific research quite significantly) allows natural science significant scope for pure theory. On occasion, ideological concepts come in very strongly - in evolutionary theory the concept of the individual has long been problematic (and in socio-biology much so-called natural science falls into complete silliness). But generally it is both difficult to mount any significant critique of the natural sciences and (maybe more importantly) of little political importance to do so.

Consequently, the general conception of dialectics has little point. It does still have a point (and here I agree with your emphasis on Capital) in the understanding of Capital which does include seriously methodological difficulties.

As to the materialist conception of history, it is another thread, but key ideas in that conception are also intrinsically vague. For example, the concept of the 'level of development of the forces of production' is a key part of the materialist conception of history, but it is a fact about anyone advocating that view (as I do) that to have that concept does not involve being able to say what any level of the forces of production in any society actually is, using any unit of measure.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that Gil; I will be replying to you in the next day or so; I am a little busy with other things right now.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


John Holloway's essay http://marxmyths.org/john-holloway/article.htm points out that Marx differs from Engels in his understanding of what constitutes a science. For Marx, science is negative. The truth of science is the negation of the untruth of false appearances. But in the post-Marx Marxist tradition, however, the concept of science is turned from a negative into a positive concept. Rosa understands that science can be expressed in Marx's sense as in Capital. But for Engels, OTOH, dialectics is the conceptualization of nature and society as being in constant motion -- a positive notion of science. To hypostasize dialectics into a positive natural law is what Rosa objects to AFAIK.

Well, this is just the sort of reasoning that allows you DM-fans to ignore the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism, since this 'scientific theory' of yours 'allows' you to regard the appearance of failure as false. This, of course, 'allows' you (plural) to dismiss this failure as unreal, and that just means dialecticians never learn from history, and the whole sorry mess just takes nother spin across the flatlands of failure.

However, I have dealt with the 'appearance/reality' argument here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_02.htm#AppearanceAndReality

However, you will need to paste this into your address bar, since the anonymiser program RevLeft uses ignores everything after the '#' if you just click on that link.


From what I can glean from her arguments, Rosa is saying that any positive theory put forward by Engels adds up to metaphysical speculation which is contrary to her Wittgensteinian project of speaking in ordinary language.

Where on earth did you get the idea that I have some sort of policy of speaking in 'ordinary language'?

As usual, you just made it up.

And neither does Wittgenstein think this either.

What I have maintained is that it is possible to show that metaphysics (and its poor relation, dialectics) cannot work if the material language of the working class is used polemically against it/them.

And this is not so:


To hypostasize dialectics into a positive natural law is what Rosa objects to AFAIK

What I claim, and have shown, is that dialectics is far too confused to do anything with --, except perhaps throw on Hume's bonfire.

Why do you insist on putting your words in my mouth?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I have alleged in earlier posts that Engels engages in a priori dogmatics, and that his 'laws' are universal, and not the least bit hypothetical. Gil demurs, and suggests they are hypothetical, and not the least bit universal. Sure, he/she acknowledges that the odd passage or two could be construed along these lines, but the tenor of Anti-Duhring [AD] is non-dogmatic.

Ok, so let's have a look at the passages from AD which show that Gil is perhaps fooling him/herself more than his/her readers. The following quotations (taken merely from the first 190 pages of AD; page numbers refer to the Peking edition) are dogmatic, a priori, universal, law-like and not the least bit hypothetical (bold added):



It goes without saying that my recapitulation of mathematics and the natural sciences was undertaken in order to convince myself also in detail — of what in general I was not in doubt -- that in nature, amid the welter of innumerable changes, the same dialectical laws of motion force their way through as those which in history govern the apparent fortuitousness of events; the same laws which similarly form the thread running through the history of the development of human thought and gradually rise to consciousness in thinking man; the laws which Hegel first developed in all-embracing but mystic form, and which we made it one of our aims to strip of this mystic form and to bring clearly before the mind in their complete simplicity and universality. [pp.11-12.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/preface.htm#c1

It is however precisely the polar antagonisms put forward as irreconcilable and insoluble, the forcibly fixed lines of demarcation and class distinctions, which have given modern theoretical natural science its restricted, metaphysical character. The recognition that these antagonisms and distinctions, though to be found in nature, are only of relative validity, and that on the other hand their imagined rigidity and absolute validity have been introduced into nature only by our reflective minds — this recognition is the kernel of the dialectical conception of nature. It is possible to arrive at this recognition because the accumulating facts of natural science compel us to do so; but one arrives at it more easily if one approaches the dialectical character of these facts equipped with an understanding of the laws of dialectical thought. In any case natural science has now advanced so far that it can no longer escape dialectical generalisation.[pp.15-16.]

When we consider and reflect upon nature at large or the history of mankind or our own intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations and reactions in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away. This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.

But this conception, correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details of which this picture is made up, and so long as we do not understand these, we have not a clear idea of the whole picture. In order to understand these details we must detach them from their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately, its nature, special causes, effects, etc. This is, primarily, the task of natural science and historical research: branches of science which the Greeks of classical times on very good grounds, relegated to a subordinate position, because they had first of all to collect the material. The beginnings of the exact natural sciences were first worked out by the Greeks of the Alexandrian period, and later on, in the Middle Ages, by the Arabs. Real natural science dates from the second half of the fifteenth century, and thence onward it has advanced with constantly increasing rapidity. The analysis of nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organic bodies in their manifold forms — these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of nature that have been made during the last four hundred years. But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constants, not as essentially variables, in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the preceding centuries.[pp.24-25.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/introduction.htm

To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. "His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay'; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." [Matthew 5:37. — Ed.] For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.

At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees. [p.26.]

In like manner, every organic being is every moment the same and not the same, every moment it assimilates matter supplied from without, and gets rid of other matter; every moment some cells of its body die and others build themselves anew; in a longer or shorter time the matter of its body is completely renewed, and is replaced by other atoms of matter, so that every organic being is always itself, and yet something other than itself.

Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa.

None of these processes and modes of thought enters into the framework of metaphysical reasoning. Dialectics, on the other hand, comprehends things and their representations, ideas, in their essential connection, concatenation, motion, origin, and ending. Such processes as those mentioned above are, therefore, so many corroborations of its own method of procedure.[p.27.]

Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasing daily, and thus has shown that, in the last resort, nature works dialectically and not metaphysically. But the naturalists who have learned to think dialectically are few and far between, and this conflict of the results of discovery with preconceived modes of thinking explains the endless confusion now reigning in theoretical natural science, the despair of teachers as well as learners, of authors and readers alike. [p.28.]

Here Engels has his own fixed and rigid demarcation -- surely, if he were faithful to his own precepts, he should have argued that nature is both dialectical and metaphysical.


Counting requires not only objects that can be counted, but also the ability to exclude all properties of the objects considered except their number — and this ability is the product of a long historical development based on experience. [p.47.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch01.htm

Mathematical axioms are expressions of the scantiest thought-content, which mathematics is obliged to borrow from logic. They can be reduced to two:

1) The whole is greater than its part. This statement is pure tautology, as the quantitatively conceived idea "part" is from the outset definitely related to the idea "whole", and in fact in such a way that "part" simply means that the quantitative "whole" consists of several quantitative "parts". In stating this explicitly, the so-called axiom does not take us a step further. This tautology can even in a way be proved by saying: a whole is that which consists of several parts; a part is that of which several make a whole; hence the part is less than the whole — in which the inanity of repetition brings out even more clearly the inanity of content.[p.49.]

Leaps/Nodes

Gil had argued that the Q/Q 'law' in AD was not universal, nor did it involve these Hegelian 'leaps' or 'nodes'. Engels begs to differ:


This is precisely the Hegelian nodal dine of measure relations, in which, at certain definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap; for example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes at which — under normal pressure — the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where consequently quantity is transformed into quality. [p.56.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch02.htm

With this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state, and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules — including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms — chemistry — in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. — Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring. [pp.82-83.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch05.htm

And it is only after this, and in the course of still further explanations elucidating and substantiating the fact that not every petty sum of values is enough to be transformable into capital, but that in this respect each period of development and each branch of industry has its definite minimum sum, that Marx observes: "Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel in his Logic, that merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences." [p.159.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch10.htm

We have already seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations — in which quantitative change suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative transformation — Herr Dühring had a little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this line. We gave there one of the best-known examples — that of the change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water. [p.160.]

------------------------------------------

More Dogmatism

As if that were not enough, here is yet more:


When we speak of being, and purely of being, unity can only consist in that all the objects to which we are referring — are, exist. They are comprised in the unity of this being, and in no other unity, and the general dictum that they all are not only cannot give them any additional qualities, whether common or not, but provisionally excludes all such qualities from consideration. For as soon as we depart even a millimetre from the simple basic fact that being is common to all these things, the differences between these things begin to emerge — and whether these differences consist in the circumstance that some are white and others black, that some are animate and others inanimate, that some may be of this world and others of the world beyond, cannot be decided by us from the fact that mere existence is in equal manner ascribed to them all.

The unity of the world does not consist in its being, although its being is a precondition of its unity, as it must certainly first be before it can be one. Being, indeed, is always an open question beyond the point where our sphere of observation ends. The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved not by a few juggled phrases, but by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science. [p.54.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch02.htm

It is clear that an infinity which has an end but no beginning is neither more nor less infinite than that which has a beginning but no end. The slightest dialectical insight should have told Herr Dühring that beginning and end necessarily belong together, like the north pole and the south pole, and that if the end is left out, the beginning just becomes the end — the one end which the series has; and vice versa. The whole deception would be impossible but for the mathematical usage of working with infinite series. Because in mathematics it is necessary to start from definite, finite terms in order to reach the indefinite, the infinite, all mathematical series, positive or negative, must start from 1, or they cannot be used for calculation. The abstract requirement of a mathematician is, however, far from being a compulsory law for the world of reality.

For that matter, Herr Dühring will never succeed in conceiving real infinity without contradiction. Infinity is a contradiction, and is full of contradictions. From the outset it is a contradiction that an infinity is composed of nothing but finites, and yet this is the case. The limitedness of the material world leads no less to contradictions than its unlimitedness, and every attempt to get over these contradictions leads, as we have seen, to new and worse contradictions. It is just because infinity is a contradiction that it is an infinite process, unrolling endlessly in time and in space. The removal of the contradiction would be the end of infinity. Hegel saw this quite correctly, and for that reason treated with well-merited contempt the gentlemen who subtilised over this contradiction. [p.63.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch03.htm

Let us pass on. So time had a beginning. What was there before this beginning? The universe, which was then in a self-equal, unchanging state. And as in this state no changes succeed one another, the more specialised idea of time transforms itself into the more general idea of being. In the first place, we are here not in the least concerned with what ideas change in Herr Dühring's head. The subject at issue is not the idea of time, but real time, which Herr Dühring cannot rid himself of so cheaply. In the second place, however much the idea of time may convert itself into the more general idea of being, this does not take us one step further. For the basic forms of all being are space and time, and being out of time is just as gross an absurdity as being out of space. [p.64.]

The materialists before Herr Dühring spoke of matter and motion. He reduces motion to mechanical force as its supposed basic form, and thereby makes it impossible for himself to understand the real connection between matter and motion, which moreover was also unclear to all former materialists. And yet it is simple enough. Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. Motion in cosmic space, mechanical motion of smaller masses on the various celestial bodies, the vibration of molecules as heat or as electrical or magnetic currents, chemical disintegration and combination, organic life — at each given moment each individual atom of matter in the world is in one or other of these forms of motion, or in several forms at once. All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one or other definite form of motion. On the earth, for example, a body may be in mechanical equilibrium, may be mechanically at rest; but this in no way prevents it from participating in the motion of the earth and in that of the whole solar system, just as little as it prevents its most minute physical particles from carrying out the vibrations determined by its temperature, or its atoms from passing through a chemical process. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transferred. When motion is transferred from one body to another, it may be regarded, in so far as it transfers itself, is active, as the- cause of motion, in so far as the latter is transferred, is passive. We call this active motion force, and the passive, the manifestation of force. Hence it is as clear as daylight that a force is as great as its manifestation, because in fact the same motion takes place in both.

A motionless state of matter is therefore one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas — a "delirious fantasy" of the purest water. In order to arrive at such an idea it is necessary to conceive the relative mechanical equilibrium, a state in which a body on the earth may be, as absolute rest, and then to extend this equilibrium over the whole universe. This is certainly made easier if universal motion is reduced to purely mechanical force. And the restriction of motion to purely mechanical force has the further advantage that a force can be conceived as at rest, as tied up, and therefore for the moment inoperative. For if, as is very often the case, the transfer of a motion is a somewhat complex process containing a number of intermediate links, it is possible to postpone the actual transmission to any moment desired by omitting the last link in the chain. This is the case, for instance, if a man loads a gun and postpones the moment when, by the pulling of the trigger, the discharge, the transfer of the motion set free by the combustion of the powder, takes place. It is therefore possible to imagine that during its motionless, self-equal state, matter was loaded with force, and this, if anything at all, seems to be what Herr Dühring understands by the unity of matter and mechanical force. This conception is nonsensical, because it transfers to the entire universe a state as absolute, which by its nature is relative and therefore can only affect a part of matter at any one time. Even if we overlook this point, the difficulty still remains: first, how did the world come to be loaded, since nowadays guns do not load themselves; and second, whose finger was it then that pulled the trigger? We may turn and twist as much as we like, but under Herr Dühring's guidance we always come back again to — the finger of God. [pp.73-74.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch04.htm]

Now Darwin would not dream of saying that the origin of the idea of the struggle for existence is to be found in Malthus. He only says that his theory of the struggle for existence is the theory of Malthus applied to the animal and plant world as a whole. However great the blunder made by Darwin in accepting the Malthusian theory so naively and uncritically, nevertheless anyone can see at the first glance that no Malthusian spectacles are required to perceive the struggle for existence in nature — the contradiction between the countless host of germs which nature so lavishly produces and the small number of those which ever reach maturity, a contradiction which in fact for the most part finds its solution in a struggle for existence — often of extreme cruelty. And just as the law of wages has maintained its validity even after the Malthusian arguments on which Ricardo based it have long been consigned to oblivion, so likewise the struggle for existence can take place in nature, even without any Malthusian interpretation. For that matter, the organisms of nature also have their laws of population, which have been left practically uninvestigated, although their establishment would be of decisive importance for the theory of the evolution of species. But who was it that lent decisive impetus to work in this direction too? No other than Darwin. [p.86.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch05.htm

Life is the mode of existence of albuminous bodies, and this mode of existence essentially consists in the constant self-renewal of the chemical constituents of these bodies. [p.102.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch06.htm

But what are these universal phenomena of life which are equally present among all living organisms? Above all the fact that an albuminous body absorbs other appropriate substances from its environment and assimilates them, while other, older parts of the body disintegrate and are excreted. Other non-living, bodies also change, disintegrate or enter into combinations in the natural course of events; but in doing this they cease to be what they were. A weather-worn rock is no longer a rock, metal which oxidises turns into rust. But what with non-living bodies is the cause of destruction, with albumen is the fundamental condition of existence. From the moment when this uninterrupted metamorphosis of its constituents, this constant alternation of nutrition and excretion, no longer takes place in an albuminous body, the albuminous body itself comes to an end, it decomposes, that is, dies. Life, the mode of existence of an albuminous body, therefore consists primarily in the fact that every moment it is itself and at the same time something else; and this does not take place as the result of a process to which it is subjected from without, as is the way in which this can occur also in the case of inanimate bodies. On the contrary, life, the metabolism which takes place through nutrition and excretion, is a self-implementing process which is inherent in, native to, its bearer, albumen, without which the latter cannot exist. And hence it follows that if chemistry ever succeeds in producing albumen artificially, this albumen must show the phenomena of life, however weak these may be. It is certainly open to question whether chemistry will at the same time also discover the right food for this albumen. [pp.102-03.]

For that matter, there is absolutely no need to be alarmed at the fact that the stage of knowledge which we have now reached is as little final as all that have preceded it. It already embraces a vast mass of judgments and requires very great specialisation of study on the part of anyone who wants to become conversant with any particular science. But a man who applies the measure of genuine, immutable, final and ultimate truth to knowledge which, by its very nature, must either remain relative for many generations and be completed only step by step, or which, as in cosmogony, geology and the history of mankind, must always contain gaps and be incomplete because of the inadequacy of the historical material — such a man only proves thereby his own ignorance and perversity, even if the real thing behind it all is not, as in this case, the claim to personal infallibility. Truth and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field, as we have just seen, and as even Herr Dühring would realise if he had any acquaintance with the first elements of dialectics, which deal precisely with the inadequacy of all polar opposites. As soon as we apply the antithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow field which has been referred to above it becomes relative and therefore unserviceable for exact scientific modes of expression, and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely valid outside that field we really find ourselves altogether beaten: both poles of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error and error truth. Let us take as an example the well-known Boyle's law. According to it, if the temperature remains constant, the volume of a gas varies inversely with the pressure to which it is subjected. Regnault found that this law does not hold good in certain cases. Had he been a philosopher of reality he would have had to say: Boyle's law is mutable, and is hence not a genuine truth, hence it is not a truth at all, hence it is an error. But had he done this he would have committed an error far greater than the one that was contained in Boyle's law; his grain of truth would have been lost sight of in a sand-hill of error; he would have distorted his originally correct conclusion into an error compared with which Boyle's law, along with the little particle of error that clings to it would have seemed like truth. But Regnault, being a man of science, did not indulge in such childishness, but continued his investigations and discovered that in general Boyle's law is only approximately true, and in particular loses its validity in the case of gases which can be liquefied by pressure, namely, as soon as the pressure approaches the point at which liquefaction begins. Boyle's law therefore was proved to be true only within definite limits. But is it absolutely and finally true within those limits? No physicist would assert that. He would maintain that it holds good within certain limits of pressure and temperature and for certain gases; and even within these more restricted limits he would not exclude the possibility of a still narrower limitation or altered formulation as the result of future investigations. This is how things stand with final and ultimate truths in physics, for example. Really scientific works therefore, as a rule, avoid such dogmatically moral expressions as error and truth, while these expressions meet us everywhere in works such as the philosophy of reality, in which empty phrasemongering attempts to impose itself on us as the most sovereign result of sovereign thought.[pp.113-14.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch07.htm

True, so long as we consider things as at rest and lifeless, each one by itself, alongside and after each other, we do not run up against any contradictions in them. We find certain qualities which are partly common to, partly different from, and even contradictory to each other, but which in the last-mentioned case are distributed among different objects and therefore contain no contradiction within. Inside the limits of this sphere of observation we can get along on the basis of the usual, metaphysical mode of thought. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can only come about through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous origination and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is. [p.152.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch10.htm

If simple mechanical change of position contains a contradiction this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. We saw above that life consists precisely and primarily in this — that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also in the sphere of thought we could not escape contradictions, and that for example the contradiction between man's inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is — at least practically, for us — an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.

We have already noted that one of the basic principles of higher mathematics is the contradiction that in certain circumstances straight lines and curves may be the same. It also gets up this other contradiction: that lines which intersect each other before our eyes nevertheless, only five or six centimetres from their point of intersection, can be shown to be parallel, that is, that they will never meet even if extended to infinity. And yet, working with these and with even far greater contradictions, it attains results which are not only correct but also quite unattainable for lower mathematics.[pp.153-54.]

But even lower mathematics teems with contradictions. It is for example a contradiction that a root of A should be a power of A, and yet A^1/2 = . It is a contradiction that a negative quantity should be the square of anything, for every negative quantity multiplied by itself gives a positive square. The square root of minus one is therefore not only a contradiction, but even an absurd contradiction, a real absurdity. And yet is in many cases a necessary result of correct mathematical operations. Furthermore, where would mathematics — lower or higher — be, if it were prohibited from operation with?

In its operations with variable quantities mathematics itself enters the field of dialectics, and it is significant that it was a dialectical philosopher, Descartes, who introduced this advance. The relation between the mathematics of variable and the mathematics of constant quantities is in general the same as the relation of dialectical to metaphysical thought. But this does not prevent the great mass of mathematicians from recognising dialectics only in the sphere of mathematics, and a good many of them from continuing to work in the old, limited, metaphysical way with methods that were obtained dialectically. [p.154.]

And now let the reader admire the higher and nobler style, by virtue of which Herr Dühring attributes to Marx the opposite of what he really said. Marx says: The fact that a sum of values can be transformed into capital only when it has reached a certain size, varying according to the circumstances, but in each case definite minimum size — this fact is a proof of the correctness of the Hegelian law. Herr Dühring makes him say: Because, according to the Hegelian law, quantity changes into quality, "therefore" "an advance, when it reaches a certain size, becomes capital" {D. K. G. 498}. That is to say, the very opposite. [p.159.]

In proof of this law we might have cited hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus, for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital — production of relative surplus-value — deals, in the field of co-operation, division of labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx's phrase, a "new power", which is essentially different from the sum of its separate forces. [p.160.]

We might wonder at this stage how quality turns into quantity. Does the change of water into steam producer new matter? Does the taste of salty soup produce sodium chloride?

And there is more:


Herr Dühring's total lack of understanding of the nature of dialectics is shown by the very fact that he regards it as a mere proof-producing instrument, as a limited mind might look upon formal logic or elementary mathematics. Even formal logic is primarily a method of arriving at new results, of advancing from the known to the unknown — and dialectics is the same, only much more eminently so; moreover, since it forces its way beyond the narrow horizon of formal logic, it contains the germ of a more comprehensive view of the world. The same correlation exists in mathematics. Elementary mathematics, the mathematics of constant quantities, moves within the confines of formal logic, at any rate on the whole; the mathematics of variables, whose most important part is the infinitesimal calculus, is in essence nothing other than the application of dialectics to mathematical relations. In it, the simple question of proof is definitely pushed into the background, as compared with the manifold application of the method to new spheres of research. But almost all the proofs of higher mathematics, from the first proofs of the differential calculus on, are from the standpoint of elementary mathematics strictly speaking, wrong. And this is necessarily so, when, as happens in this case, an attempt is made to prove by formal logic results obtained in the field of dialectics. To attempt to prove anything by means of dialectics alone to a crass metaphysician like Herr Dühring would be as much a waste of time as was the attempt made by Leibniz and his pupils to prove the principles of the infinitesimal calculus to the mathematicians of their time. The differential gave them the same cramps as Herr Dühring gets from the negation of the negation, in which, moreover, as we shall see, the differential also plays a certain role. Finally these gentlemen — or those of them who had not died in the interval — grudgingly gave way, not because they were convinced, but because it always came out right. Herr Dühring, as he himself tells us, is only in his forties, and if he attains old age, as we hope he may, perhaps his experience will be the same. [pp.170-71.]

But what then is this fearful negation of the negation, which makes life so bitter for Herr Dühring and with him plays the same role of the unpardonable crime as the sin against the Holy Ghost does in Christianity? — A very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection.

With most insects, this process follows the same lines as in the case of the grain of barley. Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg by a negation of the egg, pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs. We are not concerned at the moment with the fact that with other plants and animals the process does not take such a simple form, that before they die they produce seeds, eggs or offspring not once but many times; our purpose here is only to show that the negation of the negation really does take place in both kingdoms of the organic world. Furthermore, the whole of geology is a series of negated negations, a series of successive chatterings of old and deposits of new rock formations. First the original earth crust brought into existence by the cooling of the liquid mass was broken up by oceanic, meteorological and atmospherico-chemical action, and these fragmented masses were stratified on the ocean bed. Local upheavals of the ocean bed above the surface of the sea subject portions of these first strata once more to the action of rain, the changing temperature of the seasons and the oxygen and carbonic acid of the atmosphere. These same influences act on the molten masses of rock which issue from the interior of the earth, break through the strata and subsequently cool off. In this way, in the course of millions of centuries, ever new strata are formed and in turn are for the most part destroyed, ever anew serving as material for the formation of new strata. But the result of this process has been a very positive one: the creation of a soil composed of the most varied chemical elements and mechanically fragmented, which makes possible the most abundant and diversified vegetation. [pp.172-74.]

In fact, butterflies and moths go through the following stages:

Adult → egg → pupa → chrysalis → adult
Which is the negation of which here? And which is the negation of the negation?

And what about organisms that reproduce by splitting, such as amoebae and bacteria? In any such spit, which half is the negation and which the negation of the negation? Indeed, what about vegetative (asexual) reproduction in general, where there are no opposites (no gametes)?

The litany continues:


It is the same in mathematics. Let us take any algebraic quantity whatever: for example, a. If this is negated, we get -a (minus a). If we negate that negation, by multiplying -a by -a, we get +a^2, i.e., the original positive quantity, but at a higher degree, raised-to its second power. In this case also it makes no difference that we can obtain the same a^2 by multiplying the positive a by itself, thus likewise getting a^2. For the negated negation is so securely entrenched in a^2 that the latter always has two square roots, namely, a and — a. And the fact that it is impossible to get rid of the negated negation, the negative root of the square, acquires very obvious significance as soon as we come to quadratic equations. — The negation of the negation is even more strikingly obvious in higher analysis, in those "summations of indefinitely small magnitudes" {D. Ph. 418} which Herr Dühring himself declares are the highest operations of mathematics, and in ordinary language are known as the differential and integral calculus. How are these forms of calculus used? In a given problem, for example, I have two variables, x and y, neither of which can vary without the other also varying in a ratio determined by the facts of the case. I differentiate x and y, i.e., I take x and y as so infinitely small that in comparison with any real quantity, however small, they disappear, that nothing is left of x and y but their reciprocal relation without any, so to speak, material basis, a quantitative ratio in which there is no quantity. Therefore, dy/dx, the ratio between the differentials of x and y, is dx equal to 0/0 but 0/0 taken as the expression of y/x. I only mention in passing that this ratio between two quantities which have disappeared, caught at the moment of their disappearance, is a contradiction; however, it cannot disturb us any more than it has disturbed the whole of mathematics for almost two hundred years. And now, what have I done but negate x and y, though not in such a way that I need not bother about them any more, not in the way that metaphysics negates, but in the way that corresponds with the facts of the case? In place of x and y, therefore, I have their negation, dx and dy, in the formulas or equations before me. I continue then to operate with these formulas, treating dx and dy as quantities which are real, though subject to certain exceptional laws, and at a certain point I negate the negation, i.e., I integrate the differential formula, and in place of dx and dy again get the real quantities x and y, and am then not where I was at the beginning, but by using this method I have solved the problem on which ordinary geometry and algebra might perhaps have broken their jaws in vain. [pp.174-75.]

Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. And though in 1754 Rousseau was not yet able to speak the Hegelian jargon {D. K. G. 491}, he was certainly, sixteen years before Hegel was born, deeply bitten with the Hegelian pestilence, dialectics of contradiction, Logos doctrine, theologies, and so forth. And when Herr Dühring, in his shallow version of Rousseau's theory of equality, begins to operate with his victorious two men, he is himself already on the inclined plane down which he must slide helplessly into the arms of the negation of the negation. The state of things in which the equality of the two men flourished, which was also described as an ideal one, is characterised on page 271 of his Philosophie as the "primitive state". This primitive state, however, according to page 279, was necessarily sublated by the "robber system" — the first negation. But now, thanks to the philosophy of reality, we have gone so far as to abolish the robber system and establish in its stead the economic commune {504} based on equality which has been discovered by Herr Dühring — negation of the negation, equality on a higher plane. What a delightful spectacle, and how beneficently it extends our range of vision: Herr Dühring's eminent self committing the capital crime of the negation of the negation! [pp.178-79.]

And so, what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general — and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important — law of development of nature, history, and thought; a law which, as we have seen, holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy — a law which even Herr Dühring, in spite of all his stubborn resistance, has unwittingly and in his own way to follow. It is obvious that I do not say anything concerning the particular process of development of, for example, a grain of barley from germination to the death of the fruit-bearing plant, if I say it is a negation of the negation. For, as the integral calculus is also a negation of the negation, if I said anything of the sort I should only be making the nonsensical statement that the life-process of a barley plant was integral calculus or for that matter that it was socialism. That, however, is precisely what the metaphysicians are constantly imputing to dialectics. When I say that all these processes are a negation of the negation, I bring them all together under this one law of motion, and for this very reason I leave out of account the specific peculiarities of each individual process. Dialectics, however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought. [pp.179-80.]

But someone may object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is a rose? — These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio — every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea. The infinitesimal calculus involves a form of negation which is different from that used in the formation of positive powers from negative roots. This has to be learnt, like everything else. The bare knowledge that the barley plant and the infinitesimal calculus are both governed by negation of negation does not enable me either to grow barley successfully or to differentiate and integrate; just as little as the bare knowledge of the laws of the determination of sound by the dimensions of the strings enables me to play the violin. [pp.180-81.]

Once again, therefore, it is no one but Herr Dühring who is mystifying us when he asserts that the negation of the negation is a stupid analogy invented by Hegel, borrowed from the sphere of religion and based on the story of the fall of man and his redemption {D. K. G. 504}. Men thought dialectically long before they knew what dialectics was, just as they spoke prose long before the term prose existed. The law of negation of the negation, which is unconsciously operative in nature and history and, until it has been recognised, also in our heads, was only first clearly formulated by Hegel. And if Herr Dühring wants to operate with it himself on the quiet and it is only that he cannot stand the name, then let him find a better name. But if his aim is to banish the process itself from thought, we must ask him to be so good as first to banish it from nature and history and to invent a mathematical system in which -a x -a is not +a^2 and in which differentiation and integration are prohibited under severe penalties. [pp181-82.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch11.htm

Engels quotes Spinoza, but forgot the proof that every determination is also a negation.

And, while he calls scientific laws "hypotheses", he pointedly does the opposite with his own 'laws':


The mechanical theory of heat, according to which heat consists in a greater or lesser vibration, depending on the temperature and state of aggregation, of the smallest physically active particles (molecules) of a body — a vibration which under certain conditions can change into any other form of motion — explains that the heat that has disappeared has done work, has been transformed into work. When ice melts, the close and firm connection between the individual molecules is broken, and transformed into a loose juxtaposition; when water at boiling point becomes steam a state is reached in which the individual molecules no longer have any noticeable influence on one another, and under the influence of heat even fly apart in all directions. It is clear that the single molecules of a body are endowed with far greater energy in the gaseous state than they are in the fluid state, and in the fluid state again more than in the solid state. The tied-up heat, therefore, has not disappeared; it has merely been transformed, and has assumed the form of molecular tension. As soon as the condition under which the separate molecules are able to maintain their absolute or relative freedom in regard to one another ceases to exist — that is, as soon as the temperature falls below the minimum of 100° or 0°, as the case may be, this tension relaxes, the molecules again press towards each other with the same force with which they had previously flown apart; and this force disappears, but only to reappear as heat, and as precisely the same quantity of heat as had previously been tied up. This explanation is of course a hypothesis, as is the whole mechanical theory of heat, inasmuch as no one has up to now ever seen a molecule, not to mention one in vibration. Just for this reason it is certain to be full of defects as this still very young theory is as a whole, but it can at least explain what happens without in any way coming into conflict with the indestructibility and uncreatability of motion, and it is even able to account for the whereabouts of heat during its transformations. Latent, or tied-up, heat is therefore in no way a stumbling-block for the mechanical theory of heat. On the contrary, this theory provides the first rational explanation of what takes place, and it involves no stumbling-block except in so far as physicists continue to describe heat which has been transformed into another form of molecular energy by means of the term "tied-up", which has become obsolete and unsuitable. [p.79.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch04.htm

For that matter, there is absolutely no need to be alarmed at the fact that the stage of knowledge which we have now reached is as little final as all that have preceded it. It already embraces a vast mass of judgments and requires very great specialisation of study on the part of anyone who wants to become conversant with any particular science. But a man who applies the measure of genuine, immutable, final and ultimate truth to knowledge which, by its very nature, must either remain relative for many generations and be completed only step by step, or which, as in cosmogony, geology and the history of mankind, must always contain gaps and be incomplete because of the inadequacy of the historical material — such a man only proves thereby his own ignorance and perversity, even if the real thing behind it all is not, as in this case, the claim to personal infallibility. Truth and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field, as we have just seen, and as even Herr Dühring would realise if he had any acquaintance with the first elements of dialectics, which deal precisely with the inadequacy of all polar opposites. As soon as we apply the antithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow field which has been referred to above it becomes relative and therefore unserviceable for exact scientific modes of expression, and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely valid outside that field we really find ourselves altogether beaten: both poles of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error and error truth. Let us take as an example the well-known Boyle's law. According to it, if the temperature remains constant, the volume of a gas varies inversely with the pressure to which it is subjected. Regnault found that this law does not hold good in certain cases. Had he been a philosopher of reality he would have had to say: Boyle's law is mutable, and is hence not a genuine truth, hence it is not a truth at all, hence it is an error. But had he done this he would have committed an error far greater than the one that was contained in Boyle's law; his grain of truth would have been lost sight of in a sand-hill of error; he would have distorted his originally correct conclusion into an error compared with which Boyle's law, along with the little particle of error that clings to it would have seemed like truth. But Regnault, being a man of science, did not indulge in such childishness, but continued his investigations and discovered that in general Boyle's law is only approximately true, and in particular loses its validity in the case of gases which can be liquefied by pressure, namely, as soon as the pressure approaches the point at which liquefaction begins. Boyle's law therefore was proved to be true only within definite limits. But is it absolutely and finally true within those limits? No physicist would assert that. He would maintain that it holds good within certain limits of pressure and temperature and for certain gases; and even within these more restricted limits he would not exclude the possibility of a still narrower limitation or altered formulation as the result of future investigations. This is how things stand with final and ultimate truths in physics, for example. Really scientific works therefore, as a rule, avoid such dogmatically moral expressions as error and truth, while these expressions meet us everywhere in works such as the philosophy of reality, in which empty phrasemongering attempts to impose itself on us as the most sovereign result of sovereign thought.[pp.113-14.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch07.htm

Dialectics always holds, Boyle's Law does not.

Indeed:


And so, what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general — and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important — law of development of nature, history, and thought; a law which, as we have seen, holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy — a law which even Herr Dühring, in spite of all his stubborn resistance, has unwittingly and in his own way to follow. It is obvious that I do not say anything concerning the particular process of development of, for example, a grain of barley from germination to the death of the fruit-bearing plant, if I say it is a negation of the negation. For, as the integral calculus is also a negation of the negation, if I said anything of the sort I should only be making the nonsensical statement that the life-process of a barley plant was integral calculus or for that matter that it was socialism. That, however, is precisely what the metaphysicians are constantly imputing to dialectics. When I say that all these processes are a negation of the negation, I bring them all together under this one law of motion, and for this very reason I leave out of account the specific peculiarities of each individual process. Dialectics, however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought. [pp.179-80.]

With this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state, and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules — including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms — chemistry — in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. — Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring. [pp.82-83.]

As I said, Engels was a dogmatist of the purest water.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I will deal with Gil's other comments later today.

[trivas7]

Small point: got a page reference for your quote from Capital ? Or a link ?

In my International Publishers edition it's p.106, the beginning of sec.2 'The Medium of Circulation' in Ch.3.


We cannot reasonanbly build a meta theory of what Marxist science is based solely on the work of one man. The work of others must also be covered.

I don't think we can build a metatheory of Marxian science at all. If dialectical materialism is faulty it ought to be abandoned, otherwise it is as Engels suggests:


It is [...] from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself.

-- Engels, Dialectics of Nature (1882), pp.26f.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

As I said, Trivas, Engels is a dogmatist -- just like you.

[trivas7]

As I said, Trivas, Engels is a dogmatist -- just like you.
And you are no Marxist.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Its not a matter of you having 'said' it, its a matter of how you treat it. Time and again in your essays I have seen you make a point and then illustrate it with a series of quotations taken from across that 150 years, that is treating it as one single body.

So, it is an inference based on my quotation of comrades right across the entire spectrum of revolutionary Marxists; is that it?

But why does that imply I think it a 'single body' of theory? If I quote metaphysicians from ancient Greece, the Middle Ages and today, would that imply I thought metaphysics is a 'single body of theory'? Surely not.


But if you follow that through your polemic is going to become a lot more complex and difficult to sustain. That is part of the point of my emphasis on the specific reality of Anti Dühring.

Not so; my analysis is highly complex, and will become more so over the next ten years.


Well as we discussed, that word had a different meaning for him than it has for you....and Newton.

Ah but the quotations I have given above show that his notion of a 'law' is even tighter than that used in the sciences. Hence, according to Engels, dialectics is not an hypothesis, as you allege.


NO Engels does the opposite, his view is that if his examples don't work, his conclusion does not work. Thus, the part of your argument he would take seriously is the attempt to come up with examples that don't fit his laws.

Can you quote a single difficulty he considers, or a single case where he says dialectics does not work?


The one within which Engels lived is the most important one - namely the building of the German SPD and the Second International and the election of socialist deputies to every parliament in Europe in the 19th century.

Well, according to you dialectical materialism was not all that important here, so this cannot be an example of a 'success'.

But, even so, the SPD was a failure. Are there any successes you can quote that this theory has was behind?

As far as history is concerned, whatever brand of dialectics on show, Dialectical Marxism is one long series of failures.


'Undeniable'.....sound a bit a priori that, Rosa. I have denied it: dialectics played little role in the first fifty years of that 150.

Not so, since I base it on the weight of evidence.

So, according to you, dialectics has only presided over 100 years of failure.

I can live with that.

But, since dialectics dominates Anti-Dühring, that can only mean that in those fifty years, Engels book was a failure (in the sense that the dialectics it contained fell largely on deaf ears). I can live with that too.


Well I think not. Not so sure there is such thing as an a priori thesis. There is of course such a thing as an analytic thesis. But it is the method of proof, not the thesis, that is a priori. The affirmation of general claims is not dogmatic just because they are general in character.

They are if they are a priori (as you alleged of my "undeniable").

And, this will do for me as a working definition:


This is only giving a new twist to the old favourite ideological method, also known as the a priori method, which consists in ascertaining the properties of an object, by logical deduction from the concept of the object, instead of from the object itself. First the concept of the object is fabricated from the object; then the spit is turned round, and the object is measured by its reflexion, the concept. The object is then to conform to the concept, not the concept to the object. With Herr Dühring the simplest elements, the ultimate abstractions he can reach, do service for the concept, which does not alter matters; these simplest elements are at best of a purely conceptual nature. The philosophy of reality, therefore, proves here again to be pure ideology, the deduction of reality not from itself but from a concept.

And when such an ideologist constructs morality and law from the concept, or the so-called simplest elements of "society", instead of from the real social relations of the people round him, what material is then available for this construction? Material clearly of two kinds: first, the meagre residue of real content which may possibly survive in the abstractions from which he starts and, secondly, the content which our ideologist once more introduces from his own consciousness. And what does he find in his consciousness? For the most part, moral and juridical notions which are a more or less accurate expression (positive or negative, corroborative or antagonistic) of the social and political relations amidst which he lives; perhaps also ideas drawn from the literature on the subject; and, as a final possibility, some personal idiosyncrasies. Our ideologist may turn and twist as he likes, but the historical reality which he cast out at the door comes in again at the window, and while he thinks he is framing a doctrine of morals and law for all times and for all worlds, he is in fact only fashioning an image of the conservative or revolutionary tendencies of his day — an image which is distorted because it has been torn from its real basis and, like a reflection in a concave mirror, is standing on its head. [pp.120-21.]

This is, of course, from Anti-Dühring. With a few tweaks here and there, it could very well have been written by me. [The first part, in a different idiom, encapsulates Wittgenstein's criticism of metaphysics -- and my criticism of dialectics.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch08.htm


Indeed, but you wont find many articles in Nature on Communism....the practice of communism within capitalist societies - the scientific discipline of communism requires different standards, which include the use of vaguer and more provisional theses, which cut across the structures of science allowed by capitalism. These standards are not worse, but different. In the same way that at other stages of the development of even the natural sciences, other levels of clarity and proof applied

But, as we have seen, according to Engels, his 'laws' are general and universal, and based on very little evidence.

No wonder you have to keep special-pleading for them.

These 'standards', I note, as far lower, than those that are applied in 'bourgeois science' -- some recommendation! But you dialecticians would treat with derision any attempt to establish, say, either the truth of classical economic theory or the falsity of Marx's own work with an evidential display that was as crassly amateurish as this --, to say nothing of the contempt you would show for such theoretical wooliness.

However, when it comes to economics, history or politics, we almost invariably quote evidence that matches that found in the sciences. It is only when we encounter this quasi-religious doctrine that we meet all this special-pleading and sub-standard 'science'.

The fact that you cannot see this suggests this is indeed an opiate for you.

It still remains, however, a genuine part of Mickey Mouse Science.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Now the obvious question is if Engels had said 'all evidence collected', would this solve the problem ? As I read your essay, Rosa, you are saying that that would not solve the problem.

Indeed, it would have suggested that Engels was not foisting his views on nature. The fact that he left it out is thus indicative of what he in the end does: foist his views on nature.


Indeed, you go on to argue that denials of the a priori nature of the claims made by Engels and the insistence on its reliance on evidence are of no effect as they are contradicted by his supposed practice.

The latter remark is by way of comment on the Mickey Mouse nature of what little 'evidence' DM-fans have quoted.

Experience arguing with you dialecticians over the last 25 years has taught me that if this is not added here, the next comment is generally "Ah, but we do have evidence!"

Hence, I am closing-off all escape routes.


Your key argument in all this is the epistemological argument that certain things cannot be known, rather than the empirical argument that Engels actually failed to make clear that his conclusions were based on evidence collected. You emphasise that again and again.

As I note later in the Essay (but in your obvious haste to skim-read my work, you missed this) -- in Note 1a:


Throughout this Essay, readers will find me continually asking the rhetorical question: "How could DM-theorist A, B or C possibly know X, Y or Z?"

The answer is clear in each case: they couldn't possibly know these things by any ordinary means, but only by bogus a priori legislation --, which means they must have been imposed on nature.

This question is asked continually in order to underline the fact that dialecticians en masse propound theses that cannot be substantiated by any conceivable body of evidence, no matter how large -- since they are universal, necessary and eternally true.

So, my argument is not 'epistemological', but rhetorical, and aimed at exposing the a priori methods dialecticians employ.


Seems to be a quote missing here in Essay Two - GH

There is in fact a paragraph here that should have been deleted. The one you quote next is the correct one:


And yet, as we will see, Engels is himself guilty of doing precisely what he has just accused Dühring of doing.

Gil:


Rosa your phrase here "...all certainly looks..." is indicative of an issue. If Engels is being charged with being inconsistent, then a substantial argument must be made. Is it a matter of him having merely placed the caveats in a separate part of his text than the generalisations ? Is it a matter of the wording of the generalisations ? Is the conclusion based merely on the fact that he uses words like 'law' and 'unthinkable' ?

I am not sure you have got the point -- I am saying that Conrad, Engels and the rest of you DM-fans have copied previous metaphysicians and mystics in imposing your 'theory' on nature. And Engels is being charged with inconsistency -- since he is inconsistent, declaring one minute:


"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976), Anti-Duhring, p.13. Bold emphasis added.]

The next doing the opposite.

Gil:


Now this seems to me inadequately clear. Rosa, you contrast 'discovering them [dialectical laws - GH] in it [nature - GH]' on the one hand and on the other hand proving dialectics by reference to nature. Now, it is not at all clear that these are opposite/contradictory approaches. If I say that I discover the laws of evolution by experiment on fruitflys and that I prove the laws of evolution by experiments on fruit flies, I seem not to be making to contrary statements but rather two similar statements. Thus if Engels say he discovers the laws of dialectics in nature and then says that proves laws of dialectics by reference to nature....he seems to be making similar rather than opposed claims. And yet in your text you use a quote about using nature as the proof of dialectics to show that Engels supposedly does the opposite to what he has just claimed when he says he discovers the laws of dialectics in nature.

Where do I say any of this? What I allege is that these 'laws' are not discovered in the facts but imposed on them. Where is the difficulty in that? Now, if you were to report on your experiment on fruit flies with this level of dogmatism and with this paucity of 'evidence' you'd rightly be called an idiot.

Sure, Engels says he discovers his laws in nature, just like other mystics say they 'discover' God in their dreams, or whatever. What Engels actually does is read his 'laws' into nature -- that is why I accused him of bad faith.

All this is explained in that Essay; you must have skimmed past those parts, or not read them at all (I suspect the latter).


Now it seems to me clear from this that you, Rosa, consider dogmatic character as something which inheres in the form of the particular sentence. Contrary to my view that dogmatic character can only be discerned by examining use. That is why my readings of the Anti Duhring seem irrelevant to you - you do seem to think that it is obvious when a particular sentence has a dogmatic form, you seem to think that disavowals along side sentences which have a universal form become inconsistent with what is proposed if what is proposed is given a universal form. The essence of your criticism is therefore that whenever a sentence has a universal form, then we can legitimately object to that sentence (irrespective of limitations on its use or caveats published along side it) that it cannot be known.

The dogmatism is there on the page; your devotion to your opiate prevents you from seeing it.

And, my criticism is not based simply on generality, otherwise I would have to reject science, but on the fact that these dogmas were not derived from nature, but from Hegel (who 'derived' them a priori). So, all a dialectician has to do is read Hegel's 'Logic'. Hence, dialectics derives not from a "patient empirical examination of the facts", but from studying Hegel! As far as evidence goes, that is it; that's all there is! The search for evidence begins and ends with dialecticians leafing through Hegel's Logic.

The rest is merely window-dressing based on a desire to look 'scientific' -- rather like Christian Fundamentalists try to make the Book of Genesis look 'scientific' by quoting a little 'evidence'.

Same sort of trick -- different opiate.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


And you are no Marxist.

Yet more dogmatism.

Thanks for proving my point!:)

[gilhyle]

Trivas

I don't think we can build a metatheory of Marxian science at all.
Its not only false theories that can be glossed on in the form of a meta theory. It seems to me quite legitimate - and indeed more a matter of history than philosophy - to ask what IS Marxist theory, where is it located within Captialist society, what does it do and how does it do it.

For example Rosa comments, with some rhetorical force,

These 'standards', I note, as far lower, than those that are applied in 'bourgeois science' -- some recommendation!
But ....needs must ! Marxist theory can only be what it can be given the material and social constraints that are upon it. There was a moment when the uneven development of capitalism in Europe and certain individual accidents created a possibility for a very smart guy to use some very unusual methodologies to create some very impressive theories. But for the most part communist theory falls way below that standard, and not just out of personal weakness but because the weight of capitalist social relations and ideology is against any blossoming of Marxist theory.

Should we treat this as fatal ? No. If we say that Marxism can live off the best work of the capitalist academy and acknowledge that the workers movement needs only a critical rather than a systematic scientific theory then we can see how Marxist theory can serve a vibrant workers movement.

Now there is a scetical view embodied, apparently, in the following quote from Rosa:

Well, according to you dialectical materialism was not all that important here, so this cannot be an example of a 'success'.

But, even so, the SPD was a failure. Are there any successes you can quote that this theory has was behind?


This argues that the SPD was a failure....on the contrary it was an incredible success. Of course it failed in some ultimate sense that events by-passed it. But that is the sense of failure in which we all always fail. And notice that this definition of failure is relative. In this sense all past communist movements are a failure cos they all led by definition to where we are now....which is a position of defeat. But by the same token we can imagine a future in which socialism is built, from the perspective of which all those movements, irrespective of the interim period turned out to have been a success.

Both those ways of looking at the matter are useless. In the terms Marx and Engels set for themselves - namely to build workers organisations capable of entering the poltiical arena on a class basis, the SPD was a huge success....it was a contemporary success.

Which brings me to this comment, Rosa.


So, according to you, dialectics has only presided over 100 years of failure.

I can live with that.

But, since dialectics dominates Anti-Dühring, that can only mean that in those fifty years, Engels book was a failure (in the sense that the dialectics it contained fell largely on deaf ears). I can live with that too.


Well besides the idea of 'presiding' which is wrong, except maybe for Maoism in the early 60s some Healyite Trotskyism and maybe Third Period Stalinism this is what I would argue and I dont think you do want to concede that point to me. Because once that point is conceded then the dominance of dialectics (such as it was) becomes analysable into two different political trends, on the one hand the stalinist mystification of Marxism for the purposes of defending the USSR and, secondly, the Trotskyist defence of the theory of degenerate workers states.....articulated also for the purposes of defending the USSR.....and that is a very different story to the story of 150 years of dogmatic socialist theory dooming the movement to failure !

Oh by the way on this:

All this is explained in that Essay; you must have skimmed past those parts, or not read them at all (I suspect the latter).

No contest...Im a skimmer at best; havent read much from start to finish for years. And with all due respect, until I see the need to try an Anti Duhring on your website for urgent political reasons, that is unfortunately how it will remain. Absent an urgent political task my trope is Attention Deficit Syndrome. Sorry about that .Back later on the main theme, if I have the energy

[trivas7]

Its not only false theories that can be glossed on in the form of a meta theory. It seems to me quite legitimate - and indeed more a matter of history than philosophy - to ask what IS Marxist theory, where is it located within Captialist society, what does it do and how does it do it.

If you mean that Marxism should always be self-critical and not become ossified in dogmatic formulae and practices, this is all well and good. Perhaps this is Rosa's cautionary role. But the Marx of history already has a foundation and at some point explanation has to come to an end. I don't find it particulary fruitful to consider whether of not Marxism has been successful or not at this historical juncture, perhaps in my naivete it suffices me to know that it is true. To quote from Plekhanov:


Attempts to show that Marxism must be "supplemented" by one philosopher or another are usually supported with the contention that Marx and Engels nowhere set forth their philosophical views. This reasoning is unconvincing, however -- apart from the considerations that even if these views indeed were not set forth anywhere that in itself provides no logical reason to replace them by the views of any random thinker who in the main holds an entirely different point of view. Moreover, it should be remembered that we have sufficient literary material at our disposal to form a correct idea of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels.[...]

He then goes on to point out where in Engel's and Marx's writings their philosophical views are found.



In short, there is no lack of material here; the only thing needed is the ability to make use of it, i.e., the need to have the proper training for its understanding. Present-day readers, however, do not have the training required for that understanding, and consequently do not know how to make use of the available material.

This is so for a variety of reasons. One of the principal reasons is that nowadays there is little knowledge, in the first place, of Hegelian philosophy, without which it is difficult to learn Marx's method, and, in the second place, of the history of materialism. Ignorance of the latter prevents present-day readers from forming a clear idea of the doctrine of Feuerbach, who was Marx's immediate precursor in the field of philosophy, and who in considerable measure worked out the philosophical foundation of what can be called the world outlook of Marx and Engels.

-- G.V. Plekhanov, Fundamental Problems of Marxism (1908).

[gilhyle]

What I allege is that these 'laws' are not discovered in the facts but imposed on them. Where is the difficulty in that?

I think there is a huge difficulty in that. Firstly, it is clear from your posts, I think, that it is not the universal form of the propositions which makes you think they are dogmatic. That is important and I think correct. For it is quite possible for an ordinary language statement to have an apparently dogmatic form and not be dogmatic at all. Many people who describe something as 'unthinkable' dont seriously propose that it is not possible to imagine a world in which that something occurs. They dont do that because such logical tests are a pointless game, for the most part. In the same way when someone assures you that if they meet some irritable nemesis they will kill him....it is rare that they are actually saying they will kill him in any literal sense. And so on....this point is hardly worth labouring.

If one is to ascribe dogmatism to Engels it must consist in the form of justification or the form of use and not in the logical form of the sentence. Hope I am right in thinking that you agree with that.

What I take you to be saying it that my argument about use is inadequate because however the dialectical laws are used, no matter how undogmatically (and that is also contested), they are justified in a dogmatic fashion, independently of how they are used - hence the inconsistency between anti-dogmatic assurances and dogmatic justification procedures that you see.

Now I am not at all sure that this is true. You quote Engels on the apriori method (nice irony) as follows

the a priori method, which consists in ascertaining the properties of an object, by logical deduction from the concept of the object On the face of it, this is what Engels does. Or at least he does something a bit like it. He starts with a concept of the object subject to change and a separate schematic concept (which he actually gets from philosophy - but that is not fundamental, the point is he doesnt get it from considering the object) and then he asserts that the object-as-changing conforms to the separate schematic concept ....and he proceeds to map characteristics of the object-as-changing to the separate schematic concept. You express this as 'imposing' the concept.

At first sight this seems a priori. However, my first argument in response has been that despite appearances it is not an a priori method of justification. It is not because it is never used to conclude anything about the object. Let me put that another way. The schematic concept remains a schematic concept of a general law and is never transformed as the definition of a prior justification requires into a concept of the object.

How can we assess whether my claim is true or not ? The answer should be in the extensive list of examples you cite above. Does the dialectical concept become a concept of the object ? Or does it remain an epiphenomenal observation ?

Your best example it seems to me from the list above occurs at P102-103 of the Anti Duhring where Engels makes some very general statements about the nature of life. (Also MECW Vol 25 P. 76-77). [Pick another example if you prefer another.] At first sight Engels appears to be, firstly, placing a scientific concept of life under the schema of dialectical contradiction ( Particularly in the following sentece "Life the mode of existence of an albuminous body, therefore consists primarily in the fact that every moment it is itself and at the same time something else and this does not occur as the result of process to which it is subjected from without as is the way in which this can occur also in the case of inanimate bodies ")

But if we look more carefully, we find that he is not applying the resulting dialectical conception to the objects at all. Rather he is applying it ONLY to Duhring's philosophcial definition of life. Duhring has said that the defining characteristic of life is metabolism. Engels wants to argue that he is wrong, that when examined in general, metabolism may be a necessary, but it is not a sufficient condition of life. In addition, at least some further features are common to all life, namely the assimilation of substances and their excretion.

This is NOT an a priori argument because it is not an argument about the science of life, rather it is a critical argument against a false conception of life. Engels goes on to say "Our definition of life is naturally very inadequate inasmuch as far from including all the phenomena of life, it has to be limited to those which are the most common and the simplest. From a scientific standpoint all definitions are of little value. In order to gain an exhaustive knowledge of what life is we should have to o through al the forms in which it appears from the lowest to the the highest. But for ordinary usage such definitions are are very convenient and in places cannot be dispensed with; moreover they can do no harm, provided their inevitable deficiencies are not forgotten" MECW 25 P77, Peking 1976Ed. P. 104.

Now what could be clearer. For you Rosa, they can do harm....for Engels they do not. For Engels, those who turn dialectics into a dogma have forgotten what must not be forgotten. For you Rosa, remembering is no salvation from universal statements. But what would be ? For Engels there are 'places' where such definitions cannot be dispensed with....namely when dealing with Duhring.... but they have no place in science. For you......

[gilhyle]

If you mean that Marxism should always be self-critical and not become ossified in dogmatic formulae and practices, this is all well and good.

No I dont mean that. Im not being clear. I mean that I know more or less what natural science is. In this society, natural science is the highest form of thinking capitalism is capable of, a form of thinking that is widespread, well funded, embodied in well established institutions etc, etc. I can do a sociology of natural science which locates it within this society, explains what it does and how it is reproduced etc.

I can do the same in relation to, lets say. alternative medicine, or anime or any other cultural product. In that sense Marxist theory is also a cultural product of capitalist society, it has a certain character within that society that an anthropologist might study, identifying its sources of funding and personel, the extent, limits and purpose of its projects of dissent from the mainstream, the social basis of its susceptibility to revisionism. And so on.

When you ask those questions you end up with information about what theory is available to the working class within capitalist society and you can consider what theory the working class needs to fulfill its historical role. And in that context, it becomes clear that dialectics is not a dissident pracice of natural science (that would be absurd). Rather dialectics is a critique of the philosophies of nature which are developed within capitalism as part of its ideological armoury. It is also a way for Marxists to try to construct a methodological self-consciousness in order to sustain Marxist methodologies within political economy sociology and history - something marxism needs because its intellectuals are subject to a constant pressure to dumb down to the standard but respectable methodologies of academic research.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Me:


These 'standards', I note, as far lower, than those that are applied in 'bourgeois science' -- some recommendation!

Gil:


But ....needs must ! Marxist theory can only be what it can be given the material and social constraints that are upon it. There was a moment when the uneven development of capitalism in Europe and certain individual accidents created a possibility for a very smart guy to use some very unusual methodologies to create some very impressive theories. But for the most part communist theory falls way below that standard, and not just out of personal weakness but because the weight of capitalist social relations and ideology is against any blossoming of Marxist theory.

What do you mean 'needs must?' We certainly do not accept such low standards from our critics, nor do we allow our work in economics, politics and history to sink to such low levels. The "weight of capitalist social relations and ideology" "against any blossoming of Marxist theory" seems not to apply in these areas, where comrades publish book after book, article after article, page upon page of detail, in many cases doing genuinely original work, and have done so now since the 1850s. They certainly know how to do evidence here, but not when it comes to dialectics. How odd!

Now, I present page after page of material that shows Engels and the rest are dogmatists, but suddenly that is not enough for you. On the other hand, a few paragraphs of 'evidence' is quite enough to satisfy you of the veracity of these Mickey Mouse 'Laws'. If now you applied the 'needs must' excuse to my work, it would now be established as containing a glittering set of truths. But, oh no: Engels's amateurish non-science is fine in your eyes, and far superior because of its terminally superficial evidential display.

This is special-pleading with a vengeance; you seem quite happy to accept any old excuse to get Engels and this rancid theory of yours off the hook.

Of course, I pointed all this out, but you like to merely skim-read anything I write, so missed it.

Fine, but then don't pretend you want to 'engage' with me on this.


Should we treat this as fatal ? No. If we say that Marxism can live off the best work of the capitalist academy and acknowledge that the workers movement needs only a critical rather than a systematic scientific theory then we can see how Marxist theory can serve a vibrant workers movement.

But it is fatal if even the thin evidence dialecticians present does not work. And once more, we do not suffer such appallingly low standards in the work of our critics. Would you accept such poor evidence off a free-market nut who argued that Marxist economics is invalid? Would you be happy with such special pleading? Is it not an insult to "a vibrant workers' movement" to pretend that such amateurish work is the best we can do, and them moan when it is picked apart as defective?

You certainly require far higher standards from me than you require of Engels. Rosa has to find lorry loads of data and present an absolutely water-tight argument --, but, even then, you'd ignore most of it (as indeed you have).

You truly are a dishonest dialectician -- just like the many others (in fact, just like all the others) I have 'debated' with over the years. You wonder why I get impatient and tetchy!

I'll comment on the other things you say tomorrow.

[trivas7]

I can do the same in relation to, lets say. alternative medicine, or anime or any other cultural product. In that sense Marxist theory is also a cultural product of capitalist society, it has a certain character within that society that an anthropologist might study, identifying its sources of funding and personel, the extent, limits and purpose of its projects of dissent from the mainstream, the social basis of its susceptibility to revisionism. And so on.
And you would end up with a bourgeois sociology of Marxism. I don't see what interest this would be to the labor movement or revolutionary Marxism. I suspect that the American Enterprise Institute and many other rightwing think tanks have already done this kind of research.


When you ask those questions you end up with information about what theory is available to the working class within capitalist society and you can consider what theory the working class needs to fulfill its historical role. And in that context, it becomes clear that dialectics is not a dissident pracice of natural science (that would be absurd). Rather dialectics is a critique of the philosophies of nature which are developed within capitalism as part of its ideological armoury.

No, I don't think this is what the role of dialectics qua methodolody is. It grew out of philosophic antecedents stretching back to Hericlitus and becomes full blown in Hegel, no radical he.


It is also a way for Marxists to try to construct a methodological self-consciousness in order to sustain Marxist methodologies within political economy sociology and history - something marxism needs because its intellectuals are subject to a constant pressure to dumb down to the standard but respectable methodologies of academic research.
I don't know what you mean to say here. AFAIK Marxist methodology ends in the unity of theory and practice and it isn't the domain of professional intellectuals as such. Professional intellectuals by and large don't trespass the interests of the ruling class. What has this to do with dialectics?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


This argues that the SPD was a failure....on the contrary it was an incredible success. Of course it failed in some ultimate sense that events by-passed it. But that is the sense of failure in which we all always fail. And notice that this definition of failure is relative.

A 'success' that in the end failed. So, not a success then.

But, even if you are right, and it was a 'success', since, according to you, the SPD was not into dialectics, this tells us that non-dialectical Marxism is a success. Moral: Marxists should ditch this theory if they want to enjoy success.

I can live with that too.


In this sense all past communist movements are a failure cos they all led by definition to where we are now....which is a position of defeat. But by the same token we can imagine a future in which socialism is built, from the perspective of which all those movements, irrespective of the interim period turned out to have been a success.

Unfortunately, Dialectical Marxism is going backwards.

Plainly, the results of "practice" have not been too kind to Dialectical Marxists. Indeed, they have been even less kind to Trotskyists -- comrades not known for their 'mass following'. Practice has not looked at all favourably on DIM-theorists of every stripe for close on a hundred years.

[DIM = Dialectical Marxists/Marxism.]

To reiterate: all Four Internationals have failed (or have vanished) or are failing -- indeed, even the League for the Fifth International has spilt (already!).

The 1917 revolution has been reversed; we are no nearer to (and arguably much further away from) a Workers' State now than Lenin was in and around 1918. Practically all of the former 'socialist' societies have collapsed (and not a single worker raised his or her hand in their defence). Even where avowedly Marxist parties can claim some sort of mass following (for example in Nepal, and parts of India), it is passive and electoral --, and those parties themselves have openly adopted reformism (despite the contrary-sounding rhetoric).

So, if truth is tested in practice, practice has delivered a rather clear verdict: 'Materialist Dialectics' does not work, so it cannot be true.

Do dialecticians draw this obvious conclusion?

Some hope!

In fact, this is a far more likely scenario:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Flying_Pigs.jpg

When confronted with such overwhelmingly disconcerting facts, dialecticians tend to respond in one or more of the following ways:

(1) They flatly deny that DIM has been an abject failure. Typically, such comrades point to 1917, or to the handful remaining 'socialist' states on the planet --, or, perhaps, to the few rays of hope there are in the world right now (i.e., Cuba, and more recently, Venezuela). Some even argue that none of the above failures refutes Marxism, often in the same breath as appealing to practice as a proof of their theory! [Psychologists call this "Cognitive Dissonance".]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_dissonance

(2) If they admit to failure, they blame it on "objective factors", or on other Marxist parties.

These are then often linked to the failures in strategy, tactics, and theory of the various revolutionary groups involved in previous debacles.



(3) They simply ignore the problem. This is the 'head-in-the-sand' syndrome only here applied to the results of practice. Or:

(4) They say it's too early to tell.

Now, there doesn't seem to be much point in dialecticians claiming that 'Materialist Dialectics' guides all they do, avowing that truth is tested in practice, if, when the latter reveals its long-term verdict, that verdict is denied, disregarded or explained away.

It might well be wondered, therefore, what sort of practice could possibly constitute a test of dialectics if, whatever the results, 'Materialist Dialectics' is always excused or exonerated? What precisely is being tested if the outcome of every 'test' must be the same (i.e., a "success"), otherwise it is ignored (or re-configured as just such a success)?

Indeed, exactly what form of practice has worked? What permanent successes can our side point to over the last 80 years -- or ever?

[B]Hence, it is pretty clear that not only has dialectics never been tested in practice, dialecticians are highly practiced at never actually testing it.

And they are even better at refusing to admit to this.

In that case, why not just declare that DIM is, and always has been a success, with or without any tests at all? [Of course, such a response would be an implicit acknowledgement that truth is not tested in practice, anyway.]

This would be a more honest and appropriate conclusion based on the sort of practice we have so far seen: that which constantly ignores the results of practice!

However, taking each of the above excuses one at a time:

Excuse 1: The flat denial that DIM has been an abject failure

Those who think DIM is a ringing success have so far failed to reveal where and how it enjoys this blessed condition.

[Presumably there is a Workers' State on the outer fringes of the Galaxy?]

Systematic denial of reality of this order of magnitude is difficult to counter -- without recourse to professional help.

In fact, there is no debating with hardcore Idealism of this sort -- i.e., with an attitude-of-mind that re-interprets the material world to suit such a comforting idea, but which then encourages its adepts to bury their heads in their own idea of sand.

Anyone who can look at the international situation and fail to see that our movement is not only deeply divided, it is in long-term decline -- and that the vast majority of workers have never been, and are not now "seized" by DIM --, is probably more of a danger to themselves.

Some might be tempted to point to 1917

However, the use of 1917 to illustrate the success of 'Materialist Dialectics' has already been batted out of the park here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm#1917

[Since the anonymiser RevLeft uses ignores anything after the '#' the above link need to be copied and pasted into the address bar.]

But, the fact is that, whatever the excuses, the former USSR is no more.

Reality has intervened and delivered its own untoward verdict on both DIM and the former USSR.

Confronted with this, some might want to argue that the failure of 1917 (or the long-term failure of dialectical Bolshevism in the former USSR) cannot be blamed even partially on 'Materialist Dialectics'. But, if that is the case, then it cannot also be argued that 'Materialist Dialectics' was even partially responsible for the success of the 1917 revolution (especially when the record shows that 'Materialist Dialectics' featured nowhere in it). On the other hand, if the short-lived success of 1917 is attributable (partly) to 'Materialist Dialectics', then so is the long-term failure of dialectical Bolshevism.

More or less the same can be said of the former "People's Democracies" in Eastern Europe; here the NON has taken a severe body blow as history proceeded to 'negate' the heroic work it had done 'negating' Capitalism in the late 1940s, courtesy of Russian tanks (but mysteriously, not courtesy of workers).

[NON = Negation of the Negation.]

So, it rather looks like history has refuted 'Materialist Dialectics' in this case, too.

Excuse 2: "Objective" factors

It is undeniable that objective factors have hindered the revolutionary movement. These include a relatively well-organised, ruthless, rich, powerful and focussed ruling-class, imperialism and an expanding growing economy -- compounded by racism, sexism, nationalism and sectionalism among workers --, and so on.

But, dialecticians are quite clear: the veracity of a theory can only be tested in practice. Now, since that requires the subjective input of active revolutionaries, this aspect of practice has plainly not worked.

Or, if it has worked, then the meaning of the word "success" must have changed.

We thus face three possible alternatives:

(A) 'Materialist Dialectics' has never actually been tried out, or put into practice.

(B) Revolutionaries have been using another theory all along (which fact they kept remarkably well hidden). Or,

(C) The theory they say is central to all they do is indeed a monumental failure.

Clearly, either of (A) or (B) would constitute a refutation of 'Materialist Dialectics' (in view of what dialecticians themselves say about practice), and (C) would be a fatally-damaging admission. Small wonder then that many DIM-fans opt for Excuse 3, below.

However, whenever revolutionaries reluctantly bring themselves to acknowledge the subjective side of failure, they often blame it on a lack of "revolutionary leadership" (but, this is then brazenly attributed to other parties/traditions, never their own).

But, to repeat: if 'Materialist Dialectics' is as central to Marxism as dialecticians believe, then it cannot be unrelated to DIM's long-term lack of success.

Once more: which party can claim the opposite over the last 80 years? Has anyone, anywhere won the mass of workers to their side? Or, helped create a Workers' State? Or, recorded even so much as a medium-sized success?

Despite this, many still claim that the failure of DIM is not connected in any way with 'Materialist Dialectics'. In fact, this is one of the most common criticisms made of my Essays: the allegation that dialectics is partly responsible for our failure.

Although, it must be said, those advancing this criticism almost invariably ignore the qualification I make (i.e., when I assert that DIM is "partly" to blame), no matter how many times they are told! Naturally, that allows them to attack this 'straw man', and thus my Essays, opening the way to yet another generation of failure!

Nevertheless, and despite the above, this is a rather odd objection (the claim that DIM has nothing to do with out failure). Isn't everything in the DIM-universe supposed to be inter-linked?

So, those dialecticians who are a little more honest than the rest, who acknowledge that that DIM has failed (in howsoever small a way), are faced with a dilemma: either they reject universal interconnectedness or they admit that the failure of DIM is connected with 'Materialist Dialectics'.

On the other hand, those who reject any connection at all between 'Materialist Dialectics' and the long-term failure of DIM, cannot claim in one breath that all things are inter-related, but in the very next deny any such link!

So, whether or not there have been "objective" factors, practice itself has refuted the subjective side of DIM: 'Materialist Dialectics'.

Moreover, since my Essays show that DM/'Materialist Dialectics' is not so much false as far too confused even to be assessed for its truth or falsity -- and thus it is incapable of being put into practice --, the long-term failure of DIM is no big surprise.

Under such circumstances, had DIM been a success, that would have been the surprise!

Faced with this, some comrades argue that DM/'Materialist Dialectics' does not feature in the day-to-day deliberations of revolutionaries, and even if it did, the above argument would be inapplicable anyway. If DM is too confused to put into practice (as I claim), it cannot have played even a partial role in the alleged long-term failure of DIM.

Or so it might be maintained.

However, as Essay Nine Part One shows, 'Materialist Dialectics'/DM has been used (rather like the incomprehensible dogmas of Christianity are still used, say, in times of war) to manipulate opinion, and thus deflect revolutionary cadres away from Marxism itself. Now, even a totally incomprehensible theory can be used to that end, especially one like 'Materialist Dialectics'/DM, which, because it pictures the world as fundamentally contradictory, sanctions any and all contradictory conclusions that can be derived from it.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

Evidence for this can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm#CaseStudies

[Since the anonymiser RevLeft uses ignores anything after the '#' the above link need to be copied and pasted into the address bar.]

Excuse 3: Ignore the problem

This is probably the safest alternative for dialecticians to adopt: completely ignore the problem (or, failing that, explain it away). It is certainly the option that inadvertently helps further the interests of the ruling-class, since it prevents the serious theoretical problems our movement faces from ever being addressed, guaranteeing another century of failure.

Indeed, the bosses could not have designed a better theory aimed at screwing around with our heads if they had tried, initiating in our movement a monumental waste of time as our best theorists vainly try to grapple with Hegel's fluent Martian, in order to make some sort of sense of it -- unsurprisingly, none so far!

And even if this were not the case, and success were indeed an unfailing criterion of truth, since there is as yet no socialist society on earth, we will only know if Marxism is correct after the event. So, this criterion cannot tell us whether Marxism is correct now. [Incidentally, that partially disposes of Excuse Four.]

However, judging from the way that dialecticians themselves disregard the deliverances of practice, this suggests that even they do not accept this criterion -- in practice.

For in practice, they ignore it.

Excuse 4: It's too early to tell

This we might call the 'Whistling In The Dark' excuse.

Now, to state the obvious, it is not easy being a revolutionary. Not only are we in the overwhelming minority, we face unremitting hostility from the capitalist press -- but, more often, even worse sectarian hostility from other revolutionaries --, and our ideas are openly rejected by the vast majority of workers (except in times of struggle, when a small minority sometimes listens). On top of that, we have to face up to the fact that our side has seen little other than failure -- and this is so even if we go back as far as the English and French revolutions!

So, in the face of that, it is little wonder that dialecticians tell themselves stories to restore their morale.

But, just like the Second Coming of Christ, the future seems continually to mock all such hopes anchored in the present.

Nevertheless, even Christians have to appeal to something tangible to convince themselves they are not in the grip of an irrational delusion of some sort (be this the 'signs of the times', or personal experiences of 'god', or whatever).

But, to what can dialecticians appeal?

So, those comrades who are tempted to reach for Excuse Four should pause for thought -- and that thought should contain one or both of the following items:

(1) Is there anything in the history of DIM to suggest dialecticians won't continue to screw up?

[If you think there is, PM me; I need a good laugh...]

(2) Is it really too early to decide that DIM inspires about as much confidence as a drug addict's promises to quit?

Truth "tested in practice", so we are told; but practice has faltered badly for most of the last 150 years.

What is the DIM-conclusion? Why -- dialectics is a monumental success!

And, the evidence for this is..., what?

Deadly silence.

Cue tumbleweed; cue rustling leaves; cue distant church bell...

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/tumbleweed_004.jpg

The evidence just keeps stacking up...

More to follow later today.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Well besides the idea of 'presiding' which is wrong, except maybe for Maoism in the early 60s some Healyite Trotskyism and maybe Third Period Stalinism this is what I would argue and I don't think you do want to concede that point to me. Because once that point is conceded then the dominance of dialectics (such as it was) becomes analysable into two different political trends, on the one hand the Stalinist mystification of Marxism for the purposes of defending the USSR and, secondly, the Trotskyist defence of the theory of degenerate workers states.....articulated also for the purposes of defending the USSR.....and that is a very different story to the story of 150 years of dogmatic socialist theory dooming the movement to failure !
This is not so as the evidence, which you refuse to read, shows.


No contest...Im a skimmer at best; haven't read much from start to finish for years. And with all due respect, until I see the need to try an Anti Dühring on your website for urgent political reasons, that is unfortunately how it will remain. Absent an urgent political task my trope is Attention Deficit Syndrome. Sorry about that . Back later on the main theme, if I have the energy

Then I harbour the same contempt for you as I would for someone who picked holes in Marx's ideas but who hadn't read his work, or who had merely skim-read parts of it.

You do not have to read my work, but only a fool passes comment on something without reading it.

You seem to be just such a fool.

On practically every level, your reading of AD has been shown to be wrong: Engels continually indulges in a priori dogmatism throughout the first 190 pages of AD (I gave up looking at that point), he regards his vague and imprecise 'laws' as superior to those found in the sciences, even though he presents us with a laughably thin array of highly dubious 'evidence' in support, he regards Q/Q and N/N as universally applicable (based on no evidence at all that they are), he does interpret Q/Q as nodal, when most things in nature change non-nodally.

So, in order to 'support' your own conclusions about AD, you clearly skim-read that book, too!

You are indeed a dialectician beneath contempt.


I think there is a huge difficulty in that. Firstly, it is clear from your posts, I think, that it is not the universal form of the propositions which makes you think they are dogmatic. That is important and I think correct. For it is quite possible for an ordinary language statement to have an apparently dogmatic form and not be dogmatic at all. Many people who describe something as 'unthinkable' don't seriously propose that it is not possible to imagine a world in which that something occurs. They don't do that because such logical tests are a pointless game, for the most part. In the same way when someone assures you that if they meet some irritable nemesis they will kill him....it is rare that they are actually saying they will kill him in any literal sense. And so on....this point is hardly worth labouring.

If one is to ascribe dogmatism to Engels it must consist in the form of justification or the form of use and not in the logical form of the sentence. Hope I am right in thinking that you agree with that.

I have no problem with scientific dogmatism, since scientists support what they say from evidence. The problem with dialecticians, as you have been told many times (but you keep missing it because of your skim-reading 'problem') is that they did not derive their 'laws' from nature, but from Hegel, who dreamt them up as part of a very long-winded bout of mystical word-juggling, and nothing more.

So, these 'laws' always were dogmatic; and they were so even before Engels read them, let alone after he inflicted them on Marxism.

And sure, his use of these 'laws' is also indicative of his dogmatism -- the long series of quotes I appended to an earlier post (which you have just ignored) confirms he uses them dogmatically, too.

You missed this because the brain disorder you admit to suffering from ("Attention Deficit Syndrome" -- whether this condition was compounded or caused by the Hermetic virus with which you inoculated yourself is unclear) prevents you from even reading Engels properly.


On the face of it, this is what Engels does. Or at least he does something a bit like it. He starts with a concept of the object subject to change and a separate schematic concept (which he actually gets from philosophy - but that is not fundamental, the point is he doesn't get it from considering the object) and then he asserts that the object-as-changing conforms to the separate schematic concept ....and he proceeds to map characteristics of the object-as-changing to the separate schematic concept. You express this as 'imposing' the concept.

At first sight this seems a priori. However, my first argument in response has been that despite appearances it is not an a priori method of justification. It is not because it is never used to conclude anything about the object. Let me put that another way. The schematic concept remains a schematic concept of a general law and is never transformed as the definition of a prior justification requires into a concept of the object.

How can we assess whether my claim is true or not ? The answer should be in the extensive list of examples you cite above. Does the dialectical concept become a concept of the object ? Or does it remain an epiphenomenal observation ?

Your best example it seems to me from the list above occurs at P102-103 of the Anti Dühring where Engels makes some very general statements about the nature of life. (Also MECW Vol 25 P. 76-77). [Pick another example if you prefer another.] At first sight Engels appears to be, firstly, placing a scientific concept of life under the schema of dialectical contradiction ( Particularly in the following sentence "Life the mode of existence of an albuminous body, therefore consists primarily in the fact that every moment it is itself and at the same time something else and this does not occur as the result of process to which it is subjected from without as is the way in which this can occur also in the case of inanimate bodies ")

But if we look more carefully, we find that he is not applying the resulting dialectical conception to the objects at all. Rather he is applying it ONLY to Dühring's philosophical definition of life. Dühring has said that the defining characteristic of life is metabolism. Engels wants to argue that he is wrong, that when examined in general, metabolism may be a necessary, but it is not a sufficient condition of life. In addition, at least some further features are common to all life, namely the assimilation of substances and their excretion.

This is NOT an a priori argument because it is not an argument about the science of life, rather it is a critical argument against a false conception of life. Engels goes on to say "Our definition of life is naturally very inadequate inasmuch as far from including all the phenomena of life, it has to be limited to those which are the most common and the simplest. From a scientific standpoint all definitions are of little value. In order to gain an exhaustive knowledge of what life is we should have to o through al the forms in which it appears from the lowest to the highest. But for ordinary usage such definitions are very convenient and in places cannot be dispensed with; moreover they can do no harm, provided their inevitable deficiencies are not forgotten" MECW 25 P77, Peking 1976Ed. P. 104.

Now what could be clearer. For you Rosa, they can do harm....for Engels they do not. For Engels, those who turn dialectics into a dogma have forgotten what must not be forgotten. For you Rosa, remembering is no salvation from universal statements. But what would be ? For Engels there are 'places' where such definitions cannot be dispensed with....namely when dealing with Dühring.... but they have no place in science. For you......

I am sorry, I failed to skim-read this, since I treat you with more respect than you deserve.

But, you are wrong. Engels begins in a tradition that goes back 2400 years, whereby theorists think they can derive fundamental truths about reality from examining the alleged meaning of a few words. Hence, he is quite as happy as Dühring and Hegel were to 'derive' such truths from his/their idiosyncratic understanding of words like "is", "exist", "being", "move", "place", "life", "death", "change", and so on. And that is what makes their work a priori and dogmatic.

And where have I said that 'universal statements' have no place in science?

Yet more invention.

What I have said, as well you know, is that the mythical process of 'abstraction' turns the general words that dialecticians use into the names of abstract particulars, which prevents their indicative sentences from being general to begin with.

As Marx noted, philosophers distort language as part of their a priori method, so no wonder then that all they come out with is arrant non-sense.


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

[gilhyle]

Rosa, well sorry you get so (apparently) pissed by the truth - but Im not gonna pretend that I have read your site when I havent and Im not going to pretend it is justified to read it from end to end if I think it isnt. I have said to you before I think your project is misplaced, Im not gonna pretend I think other wise out of 'respect'....that would be a hypocritical form of respect. On the other, I am quite happy to dip into your site where I can to clarify points and I see nothing wrong with doing that. And, indeed I have read more and more of it recently....but I aint gonna claim to have read and I aint shuttin up cos I havent.

I didnt ignore your quotations. I read through them -but as a resonse to me pointing out that a-prioriism is not self-evident for you to immediately respond with a series of almost unglossed quotations is ignoring what I had said. I went through all your Essay Two usages of AD....you didnt go through those in equal detail. Did you ignore them....no. Its a perfectly legitimate method for you to respond selectively to the points you think important: and for me to do the same. We can accuse each other of ignoring each other indefinitely. No one is actually ignoring anyone. So, calm.

Just one example on this. You say


your reading of AD has been shown to be wrong: Engels continually indulges in a priori dogmatism throughout the first 190 pages of AD (I gave up looking at that point), he regards his vague and imprecise 'laws' as superior to those found in the sciences, even though he presents us with a laughably thin array of highly dubious 'evidence' in support,

But I took one of your examples (you know the ones I supposedly ignored !!) and showed that Engels did not consider his dialectical view of the nature of life as superior to the scientific view, on the contrary he said clearly that his vague view was inferior, and used only cos it does no harm.

AFAIK Marxist methodology ends in the unity of theory and practice and it isn't the domain of professional intellectuals as such. Professional intellectuals by and large don't trespass the interests of the ruling class. What has this to do with dialectics?

Trivas...consider what is the unity of theory and practice. It is not something which simply means that al theory can be or should be manipulated to serve practice. On the other hand it is not the case that the unity of theory and practice consists simply in the theoretician having a subjective commitment to the cause. The unity of theory and practice must a) retain the scientific integrity of theory while also b) giving to the theory a form which serves the political purposes of the cause.

It is if you try and specify what that b) is that it becomes impossible to accept that Engels in engaged in the practice of natural science in AD, he patently is not. Rather he is engaged in a political polemic with Duhring and that fact influences what he says and how he says it. He uses dialectic summations of scientific progress to make a political point. In the same way, atheism as a positive thesis needs to be propounded only so long as there are religious believers. Without believers, atheism becomes a redundant proposition. In that sense atheism is not a positive theory, but a CRITICAL proposition - a rejection of a false theory. Similarly, the marxist dialectics is a correction of bourgeois ideology nothing more. It does not survive without an ideology to oppose.


What do you mean 'needs must?' We certainly do not accept such low standards from our critics, nor do we allow our work in economics, politics and history to sink to such low levels. The "weight of capitalist social relations and ideology" "against any blossoming of Marxist theory" seems not to apply in these areas, where comrades publish book after book, article after article, page upon page of detail, in many cases doing genuinely original work, and have done so now since the 1850s. They certainly know how to do evidence here, but not when it comes to dialectics. How odd!

Now, I present page after page of material that shows Engels and the rest are dogmatists, but suddenly that is not enough for you. On the other hand, a few paragraphs of 'evidence' is quite enough to satisfy you of the veracity of these Mickey Mouse 'Laws'. If now you applied the 'needs must' excuse to my work, it would now be established as containing a glittering set of truths. But, oh no: Engels's amateurish non-science is fine in your eyes, and far superior because of its terminally superficial evidential display.


I have said before the part of your criticism that has force against Engels is the part that takes his examples and says that these examples have been misunderstood and do not conform to the schema he suggests. Those arguments deserve to be tested one by one ....but to do that they must be separated out from your other claims, that Engels is dogmatic, that the origin of his ideas in Hegel dooms them to mysticism, etc.

As to the 'need must' phrase, this is the basic concept of scientific socialism: that we build the movement to achieve what can be achieved and to do what can be done. Trivas correctly says that academics rarely trespass outside interests of the ruling class. Well I disagree to this extent - there are many many works of history and socology and sometimes even economics which do that, while remaining within the framework of the bourgeois scientific disciplines. But my main point in reply is to respond that I am being misunderstood in the way I use the term 'intellectual'. I use this term as used in the classical Marxist tradition - and it does not mean professional academics. What it means is people who write theoretical works designed to serve the working class movement. Think of Dietzgen or Luxembourg or Mandel. It is them I am speaking about, their strengths their weaknesses their methods their social location their methodologies. Marxist theory begins, not ends, with the unity of theory and practice and that has become an incredibly difficult think for aspirant Marxists to achieve. It is imporant, as part of achieving that that we do not set our scientific standards either too high (thus creating material obstacles to any theoretical achievement) or too low (thus falling below the standards of objectivity required to make a theoretical contribution which assists the cause.


this tells us that non-dialectical Marxism is a success. Moral: Marxists should ditch this theory if they want to enjoy success.

Well the conclusion does not folow, as you well know, but the moral is partially true. Dialectics has a particularly limited role to play now that the practice of natural science and the practice of history writing has advanced as much as it has. Its residual role relates almost solely to the struggle to recover the theoretical contribution of Marx, free of the kinds of faux amis reformulations that people from Sraffa to Kilman impose on it.

But the dialectics of nature is of limited interest......but it was not wrong or mystical or dogmatic, it has just been superceded.

Which brings me back to the key point : what does dogmatism mean for you Rosa, cos it is not constituted by the origination of these ideas in Hegel, it is not constituted by the form of the sentences (since a priori dogmatism is a justification procedure) and it is not transparent to say that it is constituted by 'imposing' a set of ideas on nature - you need to be clearer about what differentiates imposition from non-impositional theorising. The only suggestion you give on that is the argument that


the mythical process of 'abstraction' turns the general words that dialecticians use into the names of abstract particulars,

Now if that is what you take your stand on, then I am happy to go back and look again at whether Engels turns general words in the names of abstract particulars.....but you do know, Rosa, dont you, that the only way to test that is to look at what those general words are USED for, cos it is only in usage that you can distinguish an abstract particular from other general words.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Rosa, well sorry you get so (apparently) pissed by the truth - but Im not gonna pretend that I have read your site when I haven't and Im not going to pretend it is justified to read it from end to end if I think it isn't. I have said to you before I think your project is misplaced, Im not gonna pretend I think other wise out of 'respect'....that would be a hypocritical form of respect. On the other, I am quite happy to dip into your site where I can to clarify points and I see nothing wrong with doing that. And, indeed I have read more and more of it recently....but I ain't gonna claim to have read and I ain't shuttin up cos I haven't.

How can you say this when I specifically said the following?


You do not have to read my work, but only a fool passes comment on something without reading it.

You seem to be just such a fool.

What I get 'pissed' at is the fact that you have sold your radial soul for this mess of sub-pottage -- pottage lite.


I didn't ignore your quotations. I read through them -but as a response to me pointing out that a-priorism is not self-evident for you to immediately respond with a series of almost unglossed quotations is ignoring what I had said. I went through all your Essay Two usages of AD....you didn't go through those in equal detail. Did you ignore them....no. Its a perfectly legitimate method for you to respond selectively to the points you think important: and for me to do the same. We can accuse each other of ignoring each other indefinitely. No one is actually ignoring anyone. So, calm.

Indeed, about as well as you skim-read everything else.


But I took one of your examples (you know the ones I supposedly ignored !!) and showed that Engels did not consider his dialectical view of the nature of life as superior to the scientific view, on the contrary he said clearly that his vague view was inferior, and used only cos it does no harm.

Ah, but you ignored the dogmatic context. Engels begins by telling us that nature works dialectically, and then he tells us that scientific 'laws' are merely hypotheses, whereas his 'laws' are not subject to such a caveat, and because of that they must be superior (you obviously skipped this), and are thus unqualifiedly 'laws' tout court:


The mechanical theory of heat, according to which heat consists in a greater or lesser vibration, depending on the temperature and state of aggregation, of the smallest physically active particles (molecules) of a body — a vibration which under certain conditions can change into any other form of motion — explains that the heat that has disappeared has done work, has been transformed into work. When ice melts, the close and firm connection between the individual molecules is broken, and transformed into a loose juxtaposition; when water at boiling point becomes steam a state is reached in which the individual molecules no longer have any noticeable influence on one another, and under the influence of heat even fly apart in all directions. It is clear that the single molecules of a body are endowed with far greater energy in the gaseous state than they are in the fluid state, and in the fluid state again more than in the solid state. The tied-up heat, therefore, has not disappeared; it has merely been transformed, and has assumed the form of molecular tension. As soon as the condition under which the separate molecules are able to maintain their absolute or relative freedom in regard to one another ceases to exist — that is, as soon as the temperature falls below the minimum of 100° or 0°, as the case may be, this tension relaxes, the molecules again press towards each other with the same force with which they had previously flown apart; and this force disappears, but only to reappear as heat, and as precisely the same quantity of heat as had previously been tied up. This explanation is of course a hypothesis, as is the whole mechanical theory of heat, inasmuch as no one has up to now ever seen a molecule, not to mention one in vibration. Just for this reason it is certain to be full of defects as this still very young theory is as a whole, but it can at least explain what happens without in any way coming into conflict with the indestructibility and uncreatability of motion, and it is even able to account for the whereabouts of heat during its transformations. Latent, or tied-up, heat is therefore in no way a stumbling-block for the mechanical theory of heat. On the contrary, this theory provides the first rational explanation of what takes place, and it involves no stumbling-block except in so far as physicists continue to describe heat which has been transformed into another form of molecular energy by means of the term "tied-up", which has become obsolete and unsuitable. [p.79.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch04.htm

For that matter, there is absolutely no need to be alarmed at the fact that the stage of knowledge which we have now reached is as little final as all that have preceded it. It already embraces a vast mass of judgments and requires very great specialisation of study on the part of anyone who wants to become conversant with any particular science. But a man who applies the measure of genuine, immutable, final and ultimate truth to knowledge which, by its very nature, must either remain relative for many generations and be completed only step by step, or which, as in cosmogony, geology and the history of mankind, must always contain gaps and be incomplete because of the inadequacy of the historical material — such a man only proves thereby his own ignorance and perversity, even if the real thing behind it all is not, as in this case, the claim to personal infallibility. Truth and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field, as we have just seen, and as even Herr Dühring would realise if he had any acquaintance with the first elements of dialectics, which deal precisely with the inadequacy of all polar opposites. As soon as we apply the antithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow field which has been referred to above it becomes relative and therefore unserviceable for exact scientific modes of expression, and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely valid outside that field we really find ourselves altogether beaten: both poles of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error and error truth. Let us take as an example the well-known Boyle's law. According to it, if the temperature remains constant, the volume of a gas varies inversely with the pressure to which it is subjected. Regnault found that this law does not hold good in certain cases. Had he been a philosopher of reality he would have had to say: Boyle's law is mutable, and is hence not a genuine truth, hence it is not a truth at all, hence it is an error. But had he done this he would have committed an error far greater than the one that was contained in Boyle's law; his grain of truth would have been lost sight of in a sand-hill of error; he would have distorted his originally correct conclusion into an error compared with which Boyle's law, along with the little particle of error that clings to it would have seemed like truth. But Regnault, being a man of science, did not indulge in such childishness, but continued his investigations and discovered that in general Boyle's law is only approximately true, and in particular loses its validity in the case of gases which can be liquefied by pressure, namely, as soon as the pressure approaches the point at which liquefaction begins. Boyle's law therefore was proved to be true only within definite limits. But is it absolutely and finally true within those limits? No physicist would assert that. He would maintain that it holds good within certain limits of pressure and temperature and for certain gases; and even within these more restricted limits he would not exclude the possibility of a still narrower limitation or altered formulation as the result of future investigations. This is how things stand with final and ultimate truths in physics, for example. Really scientific works therefore, as a rule, avoid such dogmatically moral expressions as error and truth, while these expressions meet us everywhere in works such as the philosophy of reality, in which empty phrasemongering attempts to impose itself on us as the most sovereign result of sovereign thought.[pp.113-14.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch07.htm

Dialectics always holds, Boyle's Law does not.

Indeed:


And so, what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general — and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important — law of development of nature, history, and thought; a law which, as we have seen, holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy — a law which even Herr Dühring, in spite of all his stubborn resistance, has unwittingly and in his own way to follow. It is obvious that I do not say anything concerning the particular process of development of, for example, a grain of barley from germination to the death of the fruit-bearing plant, if I say it is a negation of the negation. For, as the integral calculus is also a negation of the negation, if I said anything of the sort I should only be making the nonsensical statement that the life-process of a barley plant was integral calculus or for that matter that it was socialism. That, however, is precisely what the metaphysicians are constantly imputing to dialectics. When I say that all these processes are a negation of the negation, I bring them all together under this one law of motion, and for this very reason I leave out of account the specific peculiarities of each individual process. Dialectics, however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought. [pp.179-80.]

With this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state, and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules — including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms — chemistry — in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. — Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring. [pp.82-83.]

Once more, Engels was a dogmatist of the purest water.


I have said before the part of your criticism that has force against Engels is the part that takes his examples and says that these examples have been misunderstood and do not conform to the schema he suggests. Those arguments deserve to be tested one by one ....but to do that they must be separated out from your other claims, that Engels is dogmatic, that the origin of his ideas in Hegel dooms them to mysticism, etc.

As to the 'need must' phrase, this is the basic concept of scientific socialism: that we build the movement to achieve what can be achieved and to do what can be done. Trivas correctly says that academics rarely trespass outside interests of the ruling class. Well I disagree to this extent -- there are many many works of history and sociology and sometimes even economics which do that, while remaining within the framework of the bourgeois scientific disciplines. But my main point in reply is to respond that I am being misunderstood in the way I use the term 'intellectual'. I use this term as used in the classical Marxist tradition - and it does not mean professional academics. What it means is people who write theoretical works designed to serve the working class movement. Think of Dietzgen or Luxembourg or Mandel. It is them I am speaking about, their strengths their weaknesses their methods their social location their methodologies. Marxist theory begins, not ends, with the unity of theory and practice and that has become an incredibly difficult think for aspirant Marxists to achieve. It is important, as part of achieving that that we do not set our scientific standards either too high (thus creating material obstacles to any theoretical achievement) or too low (thus falling below the standards of objectivity required to make a theoretical contribution which assists the cause.

Much of this seems beside the point. Once again, you can only assert this by ignoring what Engels himself says. As I noted, because of you propensity to skim-read even Engels, this is hardly surprising


Well the conclusion does not follow, as you well know, but the moral is partially true. Dialectics has a particularly limited role to play now that the practice of natural science and the practice of history writing has advanced as much as it has. Its residual role relates almost solely to the struggle to recover the theoretical contribution of Marx, free of the kinds of faux amis reformulations that people from Sraffa to Kilman impose on it.

But the dialectics of nature is of limited interest......but it was not wrong or mystical or dogmatic, it has just been superseded.

Which brings me back to the key point : what does dogmatism mean for you Rosa, cos it is not constituted by the origination of these ideas in Hegel, it is not constituted by the form of the sentences (since a priori dogmatism is a justification procedure) and it is not transparent to say that it is constituted by 'imposing' a set of ideas on nature - you need to be clearer about what differentiates imposition from non-imposition theorising. The only suggestion you give on that is the argument that

I am sorry, why does it not 'follow'?

And, perhaps for you the dialectics of nature may have been 'superseded', but for most revolutionaries, I am sorry to have to tell you, this is not the case. It was not the case even for Engels.

And I note once more that you are quite happy to accept any old rubbish from Engels, but require me to be 'clearer' here and there.

Double standards yet again.


Now if that is what you take your stand on, then I am happy to go back and look again at whether Engels turns general words in the names of abstract particulars.....but you do know, Rosa, dont you, that the only way to test that is to look at what those general words are USED for, cos it is only in usage that you can distinguish an abstract particular from other general words

It is no good looking at how they are used if they are merely singular designating expressions. After all we do not argue: "Never mind what 'god' is, just check out how that word is used."

[Notice, I have ignored much of what you say, since you do that to my posts regularly.]

[gilhyle]

QUOTE]Notice, I have ignored much of what you say, since you do that to my posts regularly[/quote]

Thats not a problem.

I see nothing wrong with saying a) that scientific theories which we hold to be true, we do not hold to be eternally true and saying b) that there is dialectical law of the negation of the negation which is important and examples of which occur throughout nature and history.

All that would be wrong is for that to be the entirety of one's view. But it isnt the entirety of Engel's view. That what makes this use of quotations so ineffective. You have to read the whole section, as I did earlier. in this thread to show what Engels was doing throughout the relevant section.


am sorry, why does it not 'follow'?

Just because a strategy without a certain feature worked once, does not mean that in a different time and in many different places that feature should be abandoned in order to have a successful strategy. Furthermore, Engels presented his theory in the AD with dialectics and despite little take up of the explicitly dialectical ideas, the rest was taken up and used as part of a successful strategy. Consequently, if anything follows it is that you can include dialectics in your Marxist theory without it doing any harm.


Much of this seems beside the point.Yes much of this is beside your point....it was adressing Trivas' point.


perhaps for you the dialectics of nature may have been 'superseded', but for most revolutionaries, I am sorry to have to tell you, this is not the case. It was not the case even for Engels.


It was not the case for Engels....and Engels was right in that regard as far as I can see; he was facing a metaphysical philosopher and he science of his day was in many respects inadequate to deal with that issue.

I think that there are a lot of people in sects who get sold a version of dialectics that comes from stalinism, namely the mindless rehearsal of what Engels said, without reading what it was used for...but this lost its political importance after Lysenko and this dogmatic dialectics of nature is of little political importance cos even in those sects it plays little role and those sects play little role.

There is littlie in that that goes beyond the Dancing Wu Lu Masters......with a couple of exceptions, like the critique of sociobiology....and even then I always thought the holism of muchh of the supposed 'left wng' views in relation to evolution was quite inadequate. In principle, however, the critique of natural scientific theories using general dialectical laws remains a legiitimate activity which may on occasion be required.


After all we do not argue: "Never mind what 'god' is, just check out how that word is used."


Actually I would argue that way. Are you saying that merely using singular designating expressions makes a proposition a priori ?
(Back on Sunday)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


I see nothing wrong with saying a) that scientific theories which we hold to be true, we do not hold to be eternally true and saying b) that there is dialectical law of the negation of the negation which is important and examples of which occur throughout nature and history.

All that would be wrong is for that to be the entirety of one's view. But it isnt the entirety of Engel's view. That what makes this use of quotations so ineffective. You have to read the whole section, as I did earlier. in this thread to show what Engels was doing throughout the relevant section.

But Engels is not saying this, as I have shown.


Just because a strategy without a certain feature worked once, does not mean that in a different time and in many different places that feature should be abandoned in order to have a successful strategy. Furthermore, Engels presented his theory in the AD with dialectics and despite little take up of the explicitly dialectical ideas, the rest was taken up and used as part of a successful strategy. Consequently, if anything follows it is that you can include dialectics in your Marxist theory without it doing any harm.

But the evidence proves otherwise.


Yes much of this is beside your point....it was adressing Trivas' point.

It was beside Trivas's point, too.


It was not the case for Engels....and Engels was right in that regard as far as I can see; he was facing a metaphysical philosopher and he science of his day was in many respects inadequate to deal with that issue.

I think that there are a lot of people in sects who get sold a version of dialectics that comes from stalinism, namely the mindless rehearsal of what Engels said, without reading what it was used for...but this lost its political importance after Lysenko and this dogmatic dialectics of nature is of little political importance cos even in those sects it plays little role and those sects play little role.

There is littlie in that that goes beyond the Dancing Wu Lu Masters......with a couple of exceptions, like the critique of sociobiology....and even then I always thought the holism of muchh of the supposed 'left wng' views in relation to evolution was quite inadequate. In principle, however, the critique of natural scientific theories using general dialectical laws remains a legiitimate activity which may on occasion be required.

This seems to be largely incoherent. Indeed, it suggests you have run out of things to say -- if you ever had any.


Actually I would argue that way. Are you saying that merely using singular designating expressions makes a proposition a priori ?

No; read what I say for a change rather than what you think I say. [Some hope!]


Thats not a problem.

It is if I try to answer what you have to say, and you just ignore it, for it means we cannot engage with one another.

Anyway, as you can see from the above, I am returning the compliment.


(Back on Sunday)

Don't bother.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Since gilhyle and Rosa both talked about the world's first vanguard party - the SPD - this post on dyna-mat "totality" needs more discussion:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1165267&postcount=11

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Not with Gil, for he/she ignores most of what I say.

[Die Neue Zeit]

What is the relationship between a past class struggle and a particular class struggle in the present?

According to the Hegelian mumbo-jumbo (correct me if I'm wrong, Rosa), "totality" is the sum of all relationships between EVERYTHING, right down to the relationship between Napoleon's hair and Michaelangelo's Last Judgment painting in the Sistine Chapel. :rolleyes:

The problem with the Hegelian concept is that the particular relationship I explained above isn't exactly dynamic, since it deals with mere objects (you'd have to REALLY stretch out your thinking to beyond rational limits, and venture into the world of idealism).

In dyna-mat, the "totality" is limited to more rational relationships, such as the relationship between a past class struggle and a particular class struggle in the present.

Case in point: the relationships between the relative lack of class struggle during the formation of the SPD in Germany (the excitement over German unification under Prussian control) and the relative lack of class struggle today.

This means that the 1912 Bolshevik organizational model is NOT SUITABLE for Marxist organization in the developed world UNTIL a revolutionary situation (otherwise it becomes SECTARIAN), and that something akin to - but not exactly like - the organizational model of the international proletariat's first vanguard party - the SPD - is more appropriate (ie, working with democratic socialists but NOT "social-democrats" within the same organization). (http://www.revleft.com/vb/sozialdemokratische-partei-deutschlands-t79754/index.html)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, I'd like to agree with you about what Hegel believed, but he is far from clear (about anything, let alone this), and his latter-day disciples (Dialectical Marxists -- DIMs for short) are even less clear.

You can find the details here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2011_01.htm

But, we are in danger of derailing this thread, so you might need to start a new one on this.

[gilhyle]

But the evidence proves otherwise.

No it doesnt. The evidence proves that Engels used the concepts of dialectics to defeat Duhring and that the contemporary movement understood the critical character of his stance. Dialectics did its political work and was left at that.....available to be used again in the face of other dogmatic philosophers should they emerge.


Engels is not saying this, as I have shown

To copy without commentary is to show nothing. You quote separated passages. On te contrary, I have shown that Engels emphasises the superiority of scientific knowledge to dialectical understandings, that he emphasises the provisional character of the dialectical in extended passages. Your preference for selecting phrases that suit your purpose over extended passages that argue the opposite (ignoring the fact that the phrases can be reconciled to the explicit meaning of the passages but the passages cannot be reconciled to your interpretation of the phrases) is a bad method of reading. It leads you to charge Engels with inconsistency when a consistent reading is available - that is a bad method of reading. Its ideological. The correct method of reading is to ascribe inconsistency only when the consistent reading CANNOT be sustained. On the contrary, you rush to the reading based on internal inconsistency in Engels writings because that suits your purpose.


It was beside Trivas's point,

No its not beside Trivas' point at all. The challenge for Marxists to understand what dialectics is is primarily the challenge of understanding how Marxism exists within a capitalist society. Marxism as a political movement and as a set of ideas is an expression of contradictions within Captialist society. For that reason, Marxism itself has a contradictory character. It needs to be understand not in any Ennlightenment way as a movement that understands reality, illuminates people with understanding and therefore leads rationally to people supporting a better society. It needs to be understood as a product of conflict, looking for ways to struggle against what is dominant. Marxists are like guerrilla fighters in that they must work with what they have, break the rules of the capitalist methods of organising thinking - as they break the rules of the capitalist politics....but do so without loosing the scientific character of their thinking so as not to fall into mere utopianism.

One can have an Enlightenment conception of Marxism (as, arguably, Plekhanov did) where it is a science for society as a whole or one can have a purely critical de-classed conception of Marxism as was the view of the Frankfurt school or one can have a view of Marxism as a theory for class struggle (conducted on a scientific basis). The latter view will lead one to ask about dialectics why it re-emerged as a significant conception in the development of Communism in the 1870s....and the answer to that will come from recognising the unity of theory and practice in Marx's and Engels work. While Marx wrote scientific works, he did not write 'pure' theory : he wrote the critique of political economy for the purposes of class struggle. This IS the unity of theory and practice: theory that does not cease to be theory although developed in a relationship to practice. Engels' work assisted Marx in that project by defending Capital against a dogmatic philosophy which had gained significant influence in the working class movement on the basis of competing with and criticisimg Marx's theory.

So Rosa when you say this :


This seems to be largely incoherent.

You merely show that the limitations the dominant ideology imposes on scientific thinking are internalised in your case and you reject as 'incoherent' what is merely different....but go ahead and point to an actual incoherence if you can find it.

You then say:


read what I say for a change rather than what you think I say. [Some hope!]


Quote:
Thats not a problem.
It is if I try to answer what you have to say, and you just ignore it, for it means we cannot engage with one another.


What you say is correct if I ignore the KEY points in what you say. Not everything is of equal importance. I want to focus in on a key idea for you, namely the concept of what is dogmatic and a-priori. This is critical since I read Engels as using dialectics to fight dogmatism and you charge him with falling into dogmatism in the process. But when I try to find out what that means for you, what I seem to get is that it involves using ideas inherited from a mystical philosophical tradition (although that might be merely an accidental feature of a view), that it involves an idea of imposed ideas rather than derived (but it remains so far impossible to differentiate this concept from the one I just referred to and to locate the distinctive character of 'imposition' in a justification procedure) and you refer to certain logical features of propositions (abstract particulars), but this doesnt specify a justification procedure either.

This is the issue where the engagement between us needs to happen.




"totality" is the sum of all relationships between EVERYTHING

Totality can mean that, but usually does not. It is no part of Marxism to make any exceptional claims for the significance for class politics of what links all reality - such phenomena politically trivial - although various ideologies that might need to be combatted may claim otherwise. Usually it refers to the sense in which things otherwise identified as separate objects with only external relations are better conceived of as having internal relations. As such it is a complementary concept to the concepts of identity applied to anything within a complex heterogenous reality (such as ours), and forms a matrix of concepts with identity difference and relations. If one chooses to mystify the idea it can be made very mysterious, if one chooses to recognise that we all use concepts of totality (as also of identity etc.) every day in our speech then it isnt very complex or mysterious.

However it plays no significant role in the AD (although it lies behind the law of N/N.)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


No it doesnt. The evidence proves that Engels used the concepts of dialectics to defeat Duhring and that the contemporary movement understood the critical character of his stance. Dialectics did its political work and was left at that.....available to be used again in the face of other dogmatic philosophers should they emerge.

The passages I quoted speak for themselves. Sure Engels was arguing with Duhring, an equally dogmatic writer, but that does not mean that Engels was not being just as dogmatic in return.

You will need to do more than just flatly deny what I have alleged, and with the evidence to back it up.


To copy without commentary is to show nothing. You quote separated passages. On te contrary, I have shown that Engels emphasises the superiority of scientific knowledge to dialectical understandings, that he emphasises the provisional character of the dialectical in extended passages. Your preference for selecting phrases that suit your purpose over extended passages that argue the opposite (ignoring the fact that the phrases can be reconciled to the explicit meaning of the passages but the passages cannot be reconciled to your interpretation of the phrases) is a bad method of reading. It leads you to charge Engels with inconsistency when a consistent reading is available - that is a bad method of reading. Its ideological. The correct method of reading is to ascribe inconsistency only when the consistent reading CANNOT be sustained. On the contrary, you rush to the reading based on internal inconsistency in Engels writings because that suits your purpose.

I gave a commentary: I asserted these passages were dogmatic; they testify to that fact. You just deny it with no contrary argument or proof.

And putting words in capitals is just anotjher sign you have run out of arguments.


No its not beside Trivas' point at all. The challenge for Marxists to understand what dialectics is is primarily the challenge of understanding how Marxism exists within a capitalist society. Marxism as a political movement and as a set of ideas is an expression of contradictions within Captialist society. For that reason, Marxism itself has a contradictory character. It needs to be understand not in any Ennlightenment way as a movement that understands reality, illuminates people with understanding and therefore leads rationally to people supporting a better society. It needs to be understood as a product of conflict, looking for ways to struggle against what is dominant. Marxists are like guerrilla fighters in that they must work with what they have, break the rules of the capitalist methods of organising thinking - as they break the rules of the capitalist politics....but do so without loosing the scientific character of their thinking so as not to fall into mere utopianism.

One can have an Enlightenment conception of Marxism (as, arguably, Plekhanov did) where it is a science for society as a whole or one can have a purely critical de-classed conception of Marxism as was the view of the Frankfurt school or one can have a view of Marxism as a theory for class struggle (conducted on a scientific basis). The latter view will lead one to ask about dialectics why it re-emerged as a significant conception in the development of Communism in the 1870s....and the answer to that will come from recognising the unity of theory and practice in Marx's and Engels work. While Marx wrote scientific works, he did not write 'pure' theory : he wrote the critique of political economy for the purposes of class struggle. This IS the unity of theory and practice: theory that does not cease to be theory although developed in a relationship to practice. Engels' work assisted Marx in that project by defending Capital against a dogmatic philosophy which had gained significant influence in the working class movement on the basis of competing with and criticisimg Marx's theory.

I ignored all this since you ignored most of my stuff, and you say it is Ok to do so.


You merely show that the limitations the dominant ideology imposes on scientific thinking are internalised in your case and you reject as 'incoherent' what is merely different....but go ahead and point to an actual incoherence if you can find it.

Well, you struggle to make it coherent, and until you succeed, my descriptor stands.


What you say is correct if I ignore the KEY points in what you say. Not everything is of equal importance. I want to focus in on a key idea for you, namely the concept of what is dogmatic and a-priori. This is critical since I read Engels as using dialectics to fight dogmatism and you charge him with falling into dogmatism in the process. But when I try to find out what that means for you, what I seem to get is that it involves using ideas inherited from a mystical philosophical tradition (although that might be merely an accidental feature of a view), that it involves an idea of imposed ideas rather than derived (but it remains so far impossible to differentiate this concept from the one I just referred to and to locate the distinctive character of 'imposition' in a justification procedure) and you refer to certain logical features of propositions (abstract particulars), but this doesnt specify a justification procedure either.

This is the issue where the engagement between us needs to happen.

However, you keep raising issues I have responded to earlier, and since you do so without answering the points I make, or showing where I am wrong, I can only assume a) you can't answer them, or b) you are not interested in debate, but only concerned to defend a dogmatic set of beliefs by any means necessary, fair or foul or c) both.

So, you do not want engagement, as you have repeatedly shown.


Totality can mean that, but usually does not. Usually it refers to the sense in which things otherwise identified as separate objects with only external relations are better conceived of as having internal relations. As such it is a complementary concept to the concepts of identity applied to anything within a complex heterogenous reality (such as ours), and forms a matrix of concepts with identity difference and relations. If one chooses to mystify the idea it can be made very mysterious, if one chooses to recognise that we all use concepts of totality (as also of identity etc.) every day in our speech then it isnt very complex or mysterious.

The doctirine of 'internal relations' makes no sense -- unless you can show otherwise. It is, indeed, yet another dogmatic imposition on the phenomena.

And where in everyday speech do we use the Hegelian concept of 'totality' (even if we knew what the latter was).

And I'd like to see you define it without falling into all the familiar pitfalls of unrestricted quantification -- that is, if you are even aware of these.

[gilhyle]

ONe of the most disturbing aspects of your presence on this site is your willingness to go from serious argument to dismissive comments and back, without differentiation - your willingness to say something and then dismissively accept its inaccuracy later saying later that the person you were responding to deserved no better, or words to that effect, rather than presenting arguments and simply defending them.

Similarly, it is common for you to get very indignant and rely on references back precisely when things are about to get interesting.

For example you presented some quotes to suggest that Engels had a view that scientific theses were in some sense low grade while dialectical laws were of a higher standard. The quotes used to do this were not one quotation where Engels actually said that, but two separated quotations which you put together to conclude that, on the basis that the language could be suggestively contrasted.

I suggested two reasons why this was an unfair methodology, firstly that it can be done to anyone to make them seem to support a thesis they do not and secondly that there was an explicit passage to the contrary in Engels where he sets out his view that scientific knowledge is superior. To this you have only responded with claims that your quotes are self-evidently correct and claims that I have made are no arguments against you.

We also got close to focusing in on the meaning of your key claim that Engels' writings are a priori, but you simply will not engage to explain that concept in detail, although it is a key concept for you.

I have not only made arguments against each of your key arguments, I have also summarily referred back to them to draw your attention to them, but you just cant resist believing that your opponents wont engage. Its like a comfort blanket.

The way you like to engage is a scattergun technique, little bit of this, little bit of that, enough to create an impression that there is a major problem. But your arguments are full incidental and ancillary elements which you give weight equal to your key arguments. The effect of that is that your key arguments dont get focused on.

Fundamentally in this thread, we have established only this: that the intent of Engels AD was anti dogmatic (you have not disputed this reading, which I gave in a good bit of detail), that you think he fell into dogmatism nevertheless, that you will not define dogmatism and that you will not define the hermeneutic standards that you apply. Thereby, you protect your analysis from criticism, since you have insulated it from both what the AD says and from any criteria for the appropriateness of ascribing dogmatism.

There have been a few breaches in this. You referred to abstract particulars. But you wouldnt elaborate - knowing as you must that the presence of an abstract particular term does not constitute an a priori justification procedure. You referred to the origin of Engels' ideas in the work of Hegel, but you recongise that this is not enough to establish their a priori character.....but you make the point nevertheless, as if it mattered. (By the way You also ignore the fact that each of the two dialectical laws defended and the concept of dialectical contradiction had actually been taken up by Engels from use by Marx....but that again comes back to your idiosyncratic hermeneutics which insists that the interpretation of one term ('coquette') should be sufficient to supercede any other evidence, be it explicit use in Capital, use in Marx's letters or avowal by Engels that it was Marx's usage he was defending.) All this, for you just doesnt exist. All these arguments just dont exist because they dont suit you. So all you seem to say in response to these arguments is that these arguments have not been made

What you would like to do is go off and talk about Engels lack of knowledge of maths, cos his knowledge of that was weak. But this would prove nothing......except that his knowledge of maths was weak. What follows from that ? Nothing. But it provides you with grounds for more use of the incidental and the derivative to boost what is, at heart, an emotional argument.

The irony of this is that you insist on clarity on the part of Engels. But there really is no clarity in what you have said here. The key terms are still undefined, those being your understanding of a priori and your hermeneutic standards.

My excursions on to your site have found neither, either. If they are there, I havent found them.

Instead of this, you prefer to complain that you are not answered.

Have I left out anything significant....dont think so ?

BTW if the doctrine of internal relations makes no sense then there are no identities.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


ONe of the most disturbing aspects of your presence on this site is your willingness to go from serious argument to dismissive comments and back, without differentiation - your willingness to say something and then dismissively accept its inaccuracy later saying later that the person you were responding to deserved no better, or words to that effect, rather than presenting arguments and simply defending them.

Similarly, it is common for you to get very indignant and rely on references back precisely when things are about to get interesting.

1) On your own admission, you ignore most of my arguments, so you are in no position to judge.

2) You are the one who has been caught out, time and again, of fabricating words to put in my mouth.

3) I predicted several weeks ago we'd be presented with yet another of these emotive attacks on me (you seem compelled somehow to make these outburts from time to time), over which you spend more time than you actually spend handling my arguments.

This alone shows that you are emotionally attached to this 'theory' of yours, as I have alleged, and that you merely get upset when I attack your source of opiates, just like other Dialectical Druggies here.


For example you presented some quotes to suggest that Engels had a view that scientific theses were in some sense low grade while dialectical laws were of a higher standard. The quotes used to do this were not one quotation where Engels actually said that, but two separated quotations which you put together to conclude that, on the basis that the language could be suggestively contrasted.

I suggested two reasons why this was an unfair methodology, firstly that it can be done to anyone to make them seem to support a thesis they do not and secondly that there was an explicit passage to the contrary in Engels where he sets out his view that scientific knowledge is superior. To this you have only responded with claims that your quotes are self-evidently correct and claims that I have made are no arguments against you.

You claimed earlier that I had in fact only presented a few passages from AD in support of my allegation that Engels was a dogmatist. I then produced dozens of passages from the first 190 odd pages of that book to support my allegations, all of which confirm Engels as a dogmatist, and many of which controvert your own allegations that Engels was not presenting these theses as general laws but as 'hypotheses' of some sort.

Now you cut up rough because your own lies have been exposed, and in doing so, you have to ignore what Engels himself says, just as you ignored what Marx said in Das Kapital -- that he had completely excised Hegel form his book.

And then you have the cheek to moan about me!


We also got close to focusing in on the meaning of your key claim that Engels' writings are a priori, but you simply will not engage to explain that concept in detail, although it is a key concept for you.

I have not only made arguments against each of your key arguments, I have also summarily referred back to them to draw your attention to them, but you just cant resist believing that your opponents wont engage. Its like a comfort blanket.

The way you like to engage is a scattergun technique, little bit of this, little bit of that, enough to create an impression that there is a major problem. But your arguments are full incidental and ancillary elements which you give weight equal to your key arguments. The effect of that is that your key arguments dont get focused on.

1) Apparently, it is OK for you to ignore most of what I say, but it is a crime if I do the same to you. And then you accuse me of 'not engaging'! Yet more double standards.

2) I have explained, and in 75,000 words of detail, what I mean by a priori dogmatics, but apparently you want me to post it all here before you will read it. As I have said to you before: it's fine by me if you stay ignorant.

3) You have avoided key arguments, and then complained when I pointed this out to you, on the grounds that it was OK for you to do so. So you can stick your new found indignation where the dialectic does not shine.


Fundamentally in this thread, we have established only this: that the intent of Engels AD was anti dogmatic (you have not disputed this reading, which I gave in a good bit of detail), that you think he fell into dogmatism nevertheless, that you will not define dogmatism and that you will not define the hermeneutic standards that you apply. Thereby, you protect your analysis from criticism, since you have insulated it from both what the AD says and from any criteria for the appropriateness of ascribing dogmatism.

There have been a few breaches in this. You referred to abstract particulars. But you wouldnt elaborate - knowing as you must that the presence of an abstract particular term does not constitute an a priori justification procedure. You referred to the origin of Engels' ideas in the work of Hegel, but you recongise that this is not enough to establish their a priori character.....but you make the point nevertheless, as if it mattered. (By the way You also ignore the fact that each of the two dialectical laws defended and the concept of dialectical contradiction had actually been taken up by Engels from use by Marx....but that again comes back to your idiosyncratic hermeneutics which insists that the interpretation of one term ('coquette') should be sufficient to supercede any other evidence, be it explicit use in Capital, use in Marx's letters or avowal by Engels that it was Marx's usage he was defending.) All this, for you just doesnt exist. All these arguments just dont exist because they dont suit you. So all you seem to say in response to these arguments is that these arguments have not been made

What you would like to do is go off and talk about Engels lack of knowledge of maths, cos his knowledge of that was weak. But this would prove nothing......except that his knowledge of maths was weak. What follows from that ? Nothing. But it provides you with grounds for more use of the incidental and the derivative to boost what is, at heart, an emotional argument.

The irony of this is that you insist on clarity on the part of Engels. But there really is no clarity in what you have said here. The key terms are still undefined, those being your understanding of a priori and your hermeneutic standards.

I ignored most of this because:

1) You said it's Ok to do so, and

2) To further annoy you.

You ask for a defintion of 'dogmatism' but refuse to give one yourself of 'quality', 'node', 'contradiction', 'opposite', 'added', and the thermodynamic boundaries of the objects/processes to which Engels vaguely refers.

At every turn you special plead (that the 'dialectical' way of thinking is not answerable to the normal canons of reason, but is somehow above them all, all the while requiring that I conform to those norms, and while you make a ham-fisted attempt to nit-pick my arguments), ignoring those places where I have shown your allegations to be false (about Engels use of 'node', for example), and enjoing us to ignore Engels sub-amateurish dogmatism over mathematics.


My excursions on to your site have found neither, either. If they are there, I havent found them.

Instead of this, you prefer to complain that you are not answered.

Have I left out anything significant....dont think so ?

BTW if the doctrine of internal relations makes no sense then there are no identities.

You skim-read anyway, so it is no surprise you haven't 'found' them in my Essays.

[trivas7]

[...] if the doctrine of internal relations makes no sense then there are no identities.
Are you saying that the law of identity is some kind of second-order logic? Could you say more? Thanks.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Are you saying that the law of identity is some kind of second-order logic? Could you say more? Thanks.

It's no use asking Gil about logic, he/she knows even less than you.

[trivas7]

It's no use asking Gil about logic, he/she knows even less than you.
At least he knows how to put an argument together.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


At least he knows how to put an argument together.

You wouldn't know an argument if if bit you in the head.

[gilhyle]

Are you saying that the law of identity is some kind of second-order logic? Could you say more? Thanks.

The issue is one of 'dialectics' not a second order logic. It is an attempt to say something about why and when we use identity statements. It seeks to differentiate between relations which are internal and those which are external and to suggest that we use identity statements where (but not only where) we think that the relations involved are not merely external.

Consider the example of the practice of naming compounds, isotopes and elements as distinct identities. Why do we do it ? Why not just refer to the relevant numbers of protons and neutrons etc ?

There is a powerful 20th century analytical philosophical argument which says all this is nonsense, based on ignoring the fact that identity statements are all reducible to sets of statements that dont involve them.

Strangely for someone who doesnt do philosophy, Rosa may well be sympathetic to such 'philosophical' stances

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


There is a powerful 20th century analytical philosophical argument which says all this is nonsense, based on ignoring the fact that identity statements are all reducible to sets of statements that dont involve them.

Strangely for someone who doesnt do philosophy, Rosa may well be sympathetic to such 'philosophical' stances

Whether or not I do agree with these theorists, the ideas of analytic philosophers on such issues are infinitely preferable to the confused ramblings of the logical incompetents working in the Hegelian tradition, who have yet to tell us what an 'internal relation' is in comprehensible terms.

And who says I do not 'do' Philosophy? Back to invention again, I see.

[gilhyle]

On your own admission, you ignore most of my arguments

By my admission, I seek to get past your camouflage to engage with your core arguments.....and its when I get close that you get all coy and start wanting expend time and effort on less central points.


This alone shows that you are emotionally attached to this 'theory' of yours,

Actually if one of us is likely to be emotionally attached to one of these theories, it is less likely to be me who thinks the dialectical view is of limited relevance in restricted circumstances, a perspective I have refused to put serious effort into the elaboration of. It is more likely to be you who is emotionally attached to your view. If you were to turn around tomorrow and admit that your critique of dialectics is based on invald hermeneutic techniques, conceptual confusion between the a priori and the abstract particular and uncritical assimilation of Wittgenstein's Schopenhauerian naivety....I think you might have a certain emotional reaction looking back at your last twenty years. If I was led to say that I was wrong, my last twenty years look just fine :cool:


you seem compelled somehow to make these outburts from time to time

You will find that I respond emotionally when you disengage. Go back and check it out - its always after you go into a huff. Im just mirroring you.


I then produced dozens of passages from the first 190 odd pages of that book to support my allegations, all of which confirm Engels as a dogmatist, and many of which controvert your own allegations that Engels was not presenting these theses as general laws but as 'hypotheses' of some sort.

They show that to you, but reading is not such an empiricist process. Reading requires articulation. To present a reading, one must weigh and balance the interpretation of sentences, passages and whole works. One must weigh word choice against self-conscious intent. One must map argument against alternatives and place arguments both in historical and social context. It is not enough just to quote. And its not hard to see why. When I take your quotes and put them back in the texts from which they come, the overall argument of those texts turns out to be other than your quotations might suggest.

Furthermore, it would be quite surprising, given your thesis, if mere quotation would work. Remember that your argument is that he falls into dogmatism despite not intending to. One has to be very nuanced to draw that kind of subtle error out in any writer. I might, for example, think that Kants' Opus Postumum falls into stances inconsistent with the Critque of Pure Reason, but the onus is very much on me to show that, and it is not easy to show.

So when I respond to your quotations by selecting one and showing how it does not work, it is then up to you to come back and say why that is wrong or at least acknowledge that that one does not work and refer to another that works better ....and say why.

All these features intrinsic to effective debate are missing from your discourse here. At this kind of point you fall back into abuse. Unfortunately.


just as you ignored what Marx said in Das Kapital -- that he had completely excised Hegel form his book.

You wanna run past me again the quote where Marx SAYs in Kapital that he has excised Hegel, as distinct from (and it is very distinct from) presenting his method without referring to Hegel ?


Apparently, it is OK for you to ignore most of what I say, but it is a crime if I do the same to you.

Its fine for you to ignore this and that as long as you engage with the key points.


I have explained, and in 75,000 words of detail, what I mean by a priori dogmatics

Which essay ?


To further annoy you.

You only betray yourself by aiming to annoy someone trying to engage with you. Its pure defence mechanism stuff. Come on, work at it....we may both come away a little better for it.


You ask for a defintion of 'dogmatism' but refuse to give one yourself of 'quality', 'node', 'contradiction', 'opposite', 'added', and the thermodynamic boundaries of the objects/processes to which Engels vaguely refers.


I merely apply your standards to you. These are not standards I would apply, except as internal critique of an advocate of such standards....I have made that clear. I am quite happy for the key concepts of dialectics to remain vague. But you are not happy. What you demand of Engels, you should demand of yourself. Can you construct a critical argument on the basis only of terms that are clearly defined ? .....well then start with a priori and then apply that to the AD sections on the law fo Q/Q or the Law of N/N and identify there a justificaiton procedure that complies with your definition of a priori.


that the 'dialectical' way of thinking is not answerable to the normal canons of reason

I argue that it is not subject to the canons of natural science....the canons of reasoning apply to it.


ignoring those places where I have shown your allegations to be false (about Engels use of 'node', for example),

The only 'allegation' I made was that Engels does not rely on 'node' to present the Law of Q/Q, you came up with a quote where engels refers to Hegel as having such a concept, I argued that despite the presence of that reference, Engels still does not rely on the concept of node and I paraphrased what he said without reference to that concept and you then.......said I was ignoring you. What you should have done is show how, on your reading of the relevant text, Engels cannot (supposedly) make the points he needs to make without relying on that reference to Hegel and hence the concept of node. But you never did that....cant I think, but try if you want.

However, before you do you might reflect on whether it is a key argument or not. Does it really matter that much to the difference between our positions whether Engels used a concept of node in AD or not. Why would it be critical as between us ?


enjoing us to ignore Engels sub-amateurish dogmatism over mathematics

Same question here: what does it prove that Engels knew little maths. His chemistry examples were up to date. So what if his maths examples were not ? What does that prove that is central ? I suggest it proves only something that is peripheral.

Lets focus on the key point - a priori

[gilhyle]

And who says I do not 'do' Philosophy? Back to invention again, I see.

Why such sophism, you know well that you have distanced yourself from philosophy.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


By my admission, I seek to get past your camouflage to engage with your core arguments.....and its when I get close that you get all coy and start wanting expend time and effort on less central points.

I beg to differ; you miss out key arguments either because you are a sloppy reader, or you can't answer them, or both. You have been doing this consistently now for over two years.


Actually if one of us is likely to be emotionally attached to one of these theories, it is less likely to be me who thinks the dialectical view is of limited relevance in restricted circumstances, a perspective I have refused to put serious effort into the elaboration of. It is more likely to be you who is emotionally attached to your view. If you were to turn around tomorrow and admit that your critique of dialectics is based on invalid hermeneutic techniques, conceptual confusion between the a priori and the abstract particular and uncritical assimilation of Wittgenstein's Schopenhauerian naivety....I think you might have a certain emotional reaction looking back at your last twenty years. If I was led to say that I was wrong, my last twenty years look just fine

Not so; dialectics originated in alienated ruling-class mystical thought, and as such is already an sophisticated opiate. Your attachment to it, and your emotional response to my attacks on it are clear indications of your need for some form of mystical consolation, too. It is not I who dotes on ruling class dogma, but your good self.

And where is the Schopenhauerian influence in my work?


You will find that I respond emotionally when you disengage. Go back and check it out - its always after you go into a huff. Im just mirroring you.

You are the one who refuses to 'engage', on your own admission, not me.


They show that to you, but reading is not such an empiricist process. Reading requires articulation. To present a reading, one must weigh and balance the interpretation of sentences, passages and whole works. One must weigh word choice against self-conscious intent. One must map argument against alternatives and place arguments both in historical and social context. It is not enough just to quote. And its not hard to see why. When I take your quotes and put them back in the texts from which they come, the overall argument of those texts turns out to be other than your quotations might suggest.

Furthermore, it would be quite surprising, given your thesis, if mere quotation would work. Remember that your argument is that he falls into dogmatism despite not intending to. One has to be very nuanced to draw that kind of subtle error out in any writer. I might, for example, think that Kant's Opus Postumum falls into stances inconsistent with the Critique of Pure Reason, but the onus is very much on me to show that, and it is not easy to show.

So when I respond to your quotations by selecting one and showing how it does not work, it is then up to you to come back and say why that is wrong or at least acknowledge that that one does not work and refer to another that works better ....and say why.

All these features intrinsic to effective debate are missing from your discourse here. At this kind of point you fall back into abuse. Unfortunately.

I ignored most of this since it is not a "core argument" -- in my view.

I trust you will accept that as a valid reason; you use it on me all the time.


You wanna run past me again the quote where Marx SAYs in Kapital that he has excised Hegel, as distinct from (and it is very distinct from) presenting his method without referring to Hegel ?

Done it already. You can find my argument in many threads here. Find them yourself.


I merely apply your standards to you. These are not standards I would apply, except as internal critique of an advocate of such standards....I have made that clear. I am quite happy for the key concepts of dialectics to remain vague. But you are not happy. What you demand of Engels, you should demand of yourself. Can you construct a critical argument on the basis only of terms that are clearly defined ? .....well then start with a priori and then apply that to the AD sections on the law of Q/Q or the Law of N/N and identify there a justification procedure that complies with your definition of a priori.

No you don't. You excuse Engels at every turn for his sloppy use of language, his vagueness, and then require me to adhere to standards you reject anyway.

And I am clear in essays you either have not read, or have merely skim-read. So, on that basis, you accuse me of certain infelicities, without any evidence to back it up, but in the face of the overwhelming evidence I have produced that Engels is a confused bumbler, a philosophical incompetent and a Mickey Mouse scientist.


I argue that it is not subject to the canons of natural science....the canons of reasoning apply to it.

Engels in fact argues that dialectics is superior to science, and not the least bit hypothetical, as you alleged. So, in that case, we should require higher standards from it -- what we in fact get is a joke. And far from the canons of reason applying to his work, Engels's reasoning is a risible, and I am surprised you fall for it.

Well, maybe not: we know that mystics like you will accept any old b*llocks from your favoured Guru.


The only 'allegation' I made was that Engels does not rely on 'node' to present the Law of Q/Q, you came up with a quote where Engels refers to Hegel as having such a concept, I argued that despite the presence of that reference, Engels still does not rely on the concept of node and I paraphrased what he said without reference to that concept and you then.......said I was ignoring you. What you should have done is show how, on your reading of the relevant text, Engels cannot (supposedly) make the points he needs to make without relying on that reference to Hegel and hence the concept of node. But you never did that....cant I think, but try if you want.

However, before you do you might reflect on whether it is a key argument or not. Does it really matter that much to the difference between our positions whether Engels used a concept of node in AD or not. Why would it be critical as between us ?

Well, that shows how poorly you read my posts, since I came up with three quotes, one of which is quite unequivocal:


This is precisely the Hegelian nodal dine of measure relations, in which, at certain definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap; for example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes at which — under normal pressure — the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where consequently quantity is transformed into quality. [p.56.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch02.htm

With this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state, and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules — including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms — chemistry — in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. — Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring. [pp.82-83.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch05.htm

And it is only after this, and in the course of still further explanations elucidating and substantiating the fact that not every petty sum of values is enough to be transformable into capital, but that in this respect each period of development and each branch of industry has its definite minimum sum, that Marx observes: "Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel in his Logic, that merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences."[p.159.]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch10.htm

Bold added.

It is quite clear from the second of these, that Engels relies on Hegel's 'nodes', and says Hegel is right, and Duhring is wrong.

And, you must know that this is how he himself talks in 'Dialectics of Nature', and how he has been interpreted ever since. Your view, based on no evidence at all, is the fanciful one.

Moreover, this is an important point for several reasons.

1) It once again shows that Engels is being dogmatic, in that he imposes this view on nature tout court (the second quote confirms this), based on little or no evidence (and thus larhely on Hegel's say-so), and he failed to consider the countless cases where changes in 'quality' are non-nodal.

2) It illustrates how infinitely accommodating you are with Engels's sloppy work, and how you failed even to read AD accurately.

3) It also reveals how I back up what I say with evidence, you just repeat dogma.


Same question here: what does it prove that Engels knew little maths. His chemistry examples were up to date. So what if his maths examples were not ? What does that prove that is central ? I suggest it proves only something that is peripheral.

I am sorry, your question appears not to make sense: "what does it prove that Engels knew little maths". What the hell does that mean?

Engels knew very little mathematics, but he was quite happy to impose dialectics on it dogmatically. Hence, you keep trying to divert attention away from it.

And his chemistry was only slightly less suspect.


Lets focus on the key point - a priori

Some hope, with you...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Why such sophism, you know well that you have distanced yourself from philosophy.

Not so; I have rejected philosophical theses/theories, and tradictional philosophy. But I use Wittgensteinian philosophy (in his new sesne of that term) all the time.

This shows, yet again, how sloppy a reader you are.