Abstraction - is it valid method of thinking [Archive]

View Full Version : Abstraction - is it valid method of thinking

bloody_capitalist_sham

2nd June 2008, 23:16

trivas7

3rd June 2008, 00:05

Philosophically, abstraction is the thought process wherein ideas are distanced from objects or processes. Generalizations are abstractions. Whenever you're thinking conceptually, you're usually abstracting.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstraction

Induction and deduction are important different ways of abstracting.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstraction)

Hit The North

3rd June 2008, 00:13

Marx writes about this aspect of his method in the introduction to Grundrisse - in the section called The Method of Political Economy.

You can locate it here: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm#3

Rosa Lichtenstein

3rd June 2008, 02:40

Abstraction has yet to be explained philosophically or scientifically by anyone -- and the process remains a complete mystery to this day.

And no wonder; it was invented by ancient Greek ruling-class theorists, who, unfortunately, did not notice that this process turned general words into the names of abstract particulars, thus destroying the capacity language has for expressing generality.

Marx gestures at using this process, but he never showed how he could, or even how he actually did, use it. His remarks are thus no more substantive than are the hand movements of stage magicians.

No wonder he chose not to publish Grundrisse. He did not need this mythical process, anyway; ordinary language already contains enough resources for expressing generality as it is.

I have traced the source of this idea, and explained how and why this mythical process cannot work, here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_01.htm

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_02.htm

Rosa Lichtenstein

3rd June 2008, 02:42

BCS, the things you tell us are abstractions are not. They are general words. No mystery there.

Rosa Lichtenstein

3rd June 2008, 02:52

Incidentally, for those of you who like shorter essays, I have summarised my arguments here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Summary_of_Essay_Three_Part_One.htm

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Summary_of_Essay_Three_Part_Two.htm

Dean

3rd June 2008, 04:29

What i understand of abstraction is very basic. It's like finding something about a thing, and then making the key idea of that thing independent of the original thing.

like, hammering a fence together, in the abstract is labour power.

Or for example, value is an abstraction of many things inside of a commodity.

or Classes are an abstraction of individuals relationship to certain modes of production.

and historical epochs are abstracted into societies being ruled by one class or another.

What im trying to say is, for marxism, abstraction seems to be really really important.

Is, however abstraction scientific and is it the best method of thinking out important ideas?
Of course. Abstraction is part of a system of inquiry into nature and its laws and tendancies. Evolution is an abstraction of genetic perpetuation and comparison, but it is a very useful approach to understanding a vast array of processes.

Is it the best method? I couldn't tell you. Class may be a great concept when it comes to deciding whether or not revolution ought to occur. But when we look specifically at a victim of the revolution, perhaps a capitalist who is being killed, it may not be very meaningful. It doesn't prove that he deserves to die, but in a general sense it indicates that he shouldn't have power over others.

I think there are places and discussions where abstraction is necessary. And it could be argued that all of our linguistic and symbolic concepts are abstractions, since we could always break things down into smaller, more atomized and specific processes. So I guess the argument about abstraction is ultimately defeatist.

Can anyone explain to me, or give me a link to a simple reader or book which explains why i should except abstraction, because i seem to say it alot these days, but cant even begin to actually argue WHY i should use this way of thinking.

Thanks!

Sorry, I don't have any links :bored:

bloody_capitalist_sham

3rd June 2008, 11:08

BCS, the things you tell us are abstractions are not. They are general words. No mystery there.

Okay, but i was under the impression "value" and "labour power" were abstractions of real material things.

Rosa Lichtenstein

3rd June 2008, 14:16

Well, the ancient Greeks invented 'abstract ideas' because they thought that there was a world behind 'appearances' that was more real than the material world around us, one that was inaccessible to the senses, but was accessible to thought alone (i.e., their thought).

They did this to provide 'philosophical' justification for the status quo, for these 'abstract ideas' represented either 'God's' thoughts, or the 'rational core' of the world (thus implying nature was the product of mind). This then allowed ruling-class thinkers in every subsequent mode of production to argue that the class structure of the day was 'god'-ordained, 'rational' or 'natural' (using different arguments as each mode of production came and went).

Now, to answer Dean; scientists do not use 'abstractions', they use general terms, which they introduce by stipulation, or by extending the meaning of terms already in use (by metaphor, or analogy, etc.).

Moreover, they could not use abstractions.

Admittedly, this way of putting things might differ from the way that scientists themselves theorise about what they do. But once more: their practical activity belies whatever post hoc rationalisations they might advance concerning the nature of their own work.

In seeking to advance scientific knowledge scientists report neither on the results of their processing of mental entities, nor on the contents of their heads -- and they certainly do not require the same with respect to the heads of others in their field, nor anywhere else for that matter. On the contrary, as far as their work goes, researchers develop new theories at the very least by extending the use and application of publicly accessible scientific language, theory and technique. And they do the former by means of analogy, metaphor and the novel employment of familiar general terms already in the public domain -- allied to the construction of specific models and 'thought experiments', alongside various other rhetorical devices.

[Naturally, this does not mean that these features are unrelated to advances in technique motivated by the development of the forces of production, etc.]

Despite this, it could be objected that the above comments thoroughly misrepresent the way that knowledge advances. In fact (but edited down) the objection could run as follows: scientists attempt to discover the underlying nature of objects and processes in the world in order to reveal the laws and regularities (etc.) that govern objective reality. To take one example: an animal's essential nature -- arrived at by increased use of abstract terms -- turns out to be its DNA (or whatever). Another example could be the way that Physicists extend knowledge by developing more general and abstract theories expressed in increasingly complex mathematical formulae.

But, this cannot be correct; scientists manifestly did not discover DNA by the use of greater or more refined abstractions. They used the theoretical and practical advances of others (which themselves were not arrived at by abstraction), and augmented them with their own ideas (often they were those of a team, or research tradition) and the results of other innovative experiments -- all of which were based on cooperative work and observation -- assisted by the use of models and yet more 'thought experiments', all expressed in a public language in this material world.

None of these (save the penultimate one) remotely looks like a mental process, still less an abstractive one. And as far as 'thought experiments' are concerned, these are typically carried out in the public domain, too, and in an open fashion, in a common language. Any alleged mental processes that accompany them are likewise connected with the innovative use of language -- but with the volume turned down.

Of course, it could be argued that no one supposes that abstraction is "done in the head", just as it could be acknowledged that scientists do indeed employ a theoretical/public language in their work. It might therefore be maintained that scientists still endeavour to form abstract ideas based on their use of resources such as these, and in this way.

Again, this is not what scientists actually do. The above is a myth put about by professional Philosophers and amateur metaphysicians.

And this brings us to the heart of the problem, for this approach to language in fact fragments knowledge. This is because it is surely impossible for Abstractor A to decide whether or not he or she possesses the same general idea (of anything) as Abstractor B. This is not just because no one has access to the thoughts of another, but because it has yet to be established that one and all share the same understanding of the word "same". And how might that be determined, for goodness sake?

The problem, of course, began much earlier. Traditional theorists saw language as fundamentally representational (that is, its primary role was to re-present the thoughts of the 'gods', or the 'rational order', to humanity), which helped create a series of 'problems' that could not be solved (and have remained unsolved to this day). In ancient and feudal society, only the elite could abstract the 'correct' divine representations, and commonality was imposed by divine fiat, or state/church authority.

Later, in nominally 'equal', bourgeois society, theorists could not rely on such crudities, hence it was impossible for theorists to guarantee that the thoughts represented in each bourgeois skull would agree with those contained in any other. This abstract Humpty Dumpty, fragmented by representationalism, could not, it seems, be put back together again. Not even the 'objective' or 'inter-subjective' concepts of Kant and Hegel could repair the damage, since it is plainly impossible to tell if one Kantian/Hegelian means the same by the words they use to depict the contents of their privatised skulls as any another Hegelian/Kantian. Just calling such fragmented concepts "objective" would have no more effect on the problem than a "keep off" sign would have on a swarm of locusts.

Abstractionism thus could provide knowledge with no objective foundation. But worse, it threatened subjectivity too, for Abstractor A would not now be able to tell if the fresh deliverances of today's abstractions were the same as, or were different from, the increasingly stale ones arrived at only yesterday, in his/her 'consciousness'. Memory would be little help here, for it too is subject to the same constraints.

Naturally, the adoption of traditional thought-forms like these (representationalism and abstractionism) has had a disastrous effect on dialecticians, too, for it is now impossible to decide if dialectician A means the same as dialectician B about anything whatsoever, let alone with regard to their respective 'abstractions'.

On the other hand, dialecticians at least say they accept Marx's emphasis on the social nature of language, but in fact one and all have adopted a bourgeois-individualist theory of the origin of meaning. According to this approach, we all represent the world to ourselves first (by means of "images" and/or abstractions), and then try to share our ideas with others second. Unfortunately, this would destroy communication; except by sheer coincidence, no two dialecticians would share the same ideas about anything, making communication impossible.

Of course, had dialecticians not bought into traditional thought, and had they adopted instead the communicational model of language proposed by Marx and Engels (wherein each of is socialised into the use of language and we are all taught what our words mean, so that when we try to represent the world to ourselves, we have something common to share with others), none of this would have happened.

Naturally, if this mysterious abstractive skill had ever been important in the history of science then we would find evidence of it in the work of great scientists. Alas there is none.

However, even the attempt to investigate the truth of that particular assertion would automatically bring into question the role of abstraction in science. This is because such an inquiry would have to examine the documents and writings (etc.) of scientists -- not their brains. Indeed, any recognition of the relevance of the linguistic production of such scientists, their equipment and techniques (etc.), their social surroundings -- as opposed to the contents of their heads -- would show that in their practical activity no historian (whatever theoretical and/or philosophical views he or she might otherwise protest) actually believes that abstract ideas underpin scientific knowledge.

Here, as elsewhere, actions speak louder than abstractions.

Now, if we base an account of science on language employed in the public domain, on the general terms actually used (and ignore the philosophical hype built around what is done), a materialist understanding of science becomes possible, for now we would have an investigation carried out in a public arena, not one obsessed with an uncheckable and mysterious process that supposedly goes on in the head (which still defies description to this day).

So, for example, the theory of evolution was built on evidence and on language already in the public domain -- when writing his book, Darwin did not think once to report on the secret activity of his brain. And, those who either agreed with him, or who took exception to his theory, did not think once to criticise the contents of his head.

Same with Marx; he used general terms already in the public domain, extended their meaning in the way that scientists have always done, in order to develop his theory.

To understand his work, not one of us needs to try to access his alleged mental 'abstractions'. And even if we tried, none of us would be able to say that we had arrived at the same 'abstractions' as he had, or even as one another. How could we? None of us has access to his brain, or to that of anyone else!

So, in Marx there are abstractions anywhere in sight (despite the tradition built up around him, and despite some of the things he says) -- so this whole way of viewing reality needs to be ditched, and we need to stop looking at science and at Marx through the eyes of ruling-class hacks.

To be sure, this is a controversial view, but only because this ancient mode-of-thought has dominated 'western' philosophy, and has similarly dominated the thought of the majority of Marxists, even those who post here. And, we now know why:

The ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class...

bloody_capitalist_sham

3rd June 2008, 21:22

Okay rosa, thank you. What about when Marxist's use the terms "abstract" and "concrete" to talk about things. again like, discussing concepts of "value contained in a commodity" and a the "concrete substance the commodity is made of".

Within other scientific fields, like the process of evolution, is that the same of the process of commodity production (material, concrete stuff) and the creation of new values into the society (abstract?).

What i am very confused on, is when we say a term like "value", is that materialist to do so, or is it idealist.

I know it must be painfully obvious to some of you, but im really struggling to understand why there is a difference between "abstract and concrete" and how we differentiate them given that we are materialists.

I find because i know nothing of philosophy, even though i try to think about complex issues, i am at a disadvantage because of terms which Marx used came from an education in a time where philosophy was key.

Can we say things like "value" in concrete terms, or is it okay and scientific to talk in abstract terms?

is Evolution an abstraction too?

Rosa Lichtenstein

3rd June 2008, 21:44

BCS:

What about when Marxist's use the terms "abstract" and "concrete" to talk about things. again like, discussing concepts of "value contained in a commodity" and a the "concrete substance the commodity is made of".

Well, Marx was trained in traditional ruling-class thought, and never fully shook it off.

His use of terms like 'abstract' and 'concrete' need to be viewed in that light -- we need to translate the terms you mention into less prejudicial forms. Hence, to help you out, I would need to see the entire passage from which you have quoted these phrases.

What I am very confused on, is when we say a term like "value", is that materialist to do so, or is it idealist.

Well, no, because Marx expalined these notions in materialist terms; so just as scientists today talk about, say 'forces', when pressed to explain what they mean, they have to resort to materialist language -- to the interaction between bodies in nature, or 'particles' in fields.

I know it must be painfully obvious to some of you, but im really struggling to understand why there is a difference between "abstract and concrete" and how we differentiate them given that we are materialists.

You are not alone; I have yet to meet anyone who understands these terms (or who can explain them without the use of even more impenetrable jargon).

I suggest you interpet 'concrete' to mean 'real and material', and 'abstract' to mean 'general term we use to make sense of capitalism'.

Can we say things like "value" in concrete terms, or is it okay and scientific to talk in abstract terms?

We can say what we like, but if we want to be clear we have to be careful of what we say. I personally do not like to use the word 'concrete'. If I speak of 'value' I just leave it at that, and explain it in theoretical terms, without the use of 'concrete'.

Is Evolution an abstraction too?

It's the name of a process in nature; why do you even need to so much as consider the use of the word 'abstraction' in reference to it?

trivas7

4th June 2008, 00:06

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 01:10

Trivas, as if to prove me right, that the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class, says this:

There is a world behind appearances. It's exposition and explication is the object of science. Appearances don't explain themselves.

Appearances are indeed explained by yet more appearances. What do you think scientists see down their microscopes, telescopes, or in their bubble-chambers, except more appearances?

'What about theory?', I hear you say.

Well, every single theory has to be written down somewhere, and as such it becomes an appearance. This is true even of mathematics.

So, not even theory can get 'behind' the material world -- despite what you might have read in the works of ruling-class hacks.

And, since you are such a smarty-pants, you might like to tell us where this 'hidden' world is, and how you know?

In your sock drawer? Out past Alpha Centauri?

Sounds a bit too much like 'heaven' to me.

[No wonder I call dialectics the opiate of petty-bourgeois elements in Marxism.]

Anyway, it's nice to know you too have surrendered your thought to those nasty ruling ideas Marx warned us about.

In your case, that warning was clearly a waste of time.

Dystisis

4th June 2008, 01:28

Well, every single theory has to be written down somewhere, and as such it becomes an appearance. This is true even of mathematics.
You seem to have a limited knowledge of physics if you insist on using the word "appearances" and scientists "seeing" things... This is but one of our senses. Further, I would not call mathematics a theory, as from your post you seem to do. Additionally, mathematics can not just be "seen", it is also heard in rhythm and the frequencies of the tones, for example. One of the interesting things about mathematics is that it does indeed transcend any one sensory information source. In this context I'd think of mathematics as the language we use to talk about the organization of the universe.

trivas7

4th June 2008, 02:12

Well, every single theory has to be written down somewhere, and as such it becomes an appearance.
Now that's a positively dialectical move!:lol:

trivas7

4th June 2008, 02:41

from Alan Woods's "Reason in Revolt":

Abstraction is absolutely necessary. Without it, thought in general would be impossible. The question is: what sort of abstraction? When I abstract from reality, I concentrate on some aspects of a given phenomenon, and leave the others out of account. A good mapmaker, for instance, is not someone who reproduces every detail of every house and paving-stone, and every parked car. Such an amount of detail would destroy the very purpose of the map, which is to make available a convenient scheme of a town or other geographical area. Similarly, the brain early on learns to ignore certain sounds and concentrate on others. If we were not able to do this, the amount of information reaching our ears from all sides would overwhelm the mind completely. Language itself presupposes a high level of abstraction.

The ability to make correct abstractions, which adequately reflect the reality we wish to understand and describe, is the essential prerequisite for scientific thought. The abstractions of formal logic are adequate to express the real world only within quite narrow limits. But they are one-sided and static, and are hopelessly inadequate to deal with complex processes, particularly movement, change and contradictions. The concreteness of an object consists of the sum-total of its aspects and interrelationships, determined by its underlying laws. It is the task of science to uncover these laws, and to get as close as possible to this concrete reality. The whole purpose of cognition is to reflect the objective world and its underlying lawfulness and necessary relationships as faithfully as possible. As Hegel point out, "the truth is always concrete."

But here we have a contradiction. It is not possible to arrive at an understanding of the concrete world of nature without first resorting to abstraction. The word abstract comes from the Latin "to take from." By a process of abstraction, we take from the object under consideration certain aspects which we consider important, leaving others to one side. Abstract knowledge is necessarily one-sided because it expresses only one particular side of the phenomenon under consideration, isolated from that which determines the specific nature of the whole. Thus, mathematics deals exclusively with quantitative relations. Since quantity is an extremely important aspect of nature, the abstractions of mathematics have provided us with a powerful instrument for probing her secrets. For this reason, it is tempting to forget their real nature and limitations. Yet they remain one-sided, like all abstractions. We forget this at our peril.

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 02:59

Trivas, getting desperate, quoting Woods (another comrade who has bought into ruling class ideas):

from Alan Wood's "Reason in Revolt":

An appalling book, taken apart at my site:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2004.htm

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

But, even so, Woods gestures at answering the serious difficulties I raised above, and neither has you, my desperate friend.

Here are several more for you to just ignore (taken from Essay Three Part One, at my site):

(1) How is it possible, in the privacy of the mind, for each lone abstractor to know if he or she has arrived at the correct abstract notion of anything at all (by whatever method they claim to have used)? With what, or with whom, can any of their results be checked? No one has access to a single 'abstraction' that anyone else has produced, nor has anyone ever been trained to perform this feat correctly. Does a single human being posses so much as a diploma in this mythical skill?

An appeal to the existence of a public language would be to no avail, for on this basis no one would be able to tell whether Abstractor A meant the same as Abstractor B by his or her use of words or concepts like "Substance", "Being", or "Nothing".

And it is even less use appealing to the 'logic of concepts', that drive 'thought' along, as, say, Hegel might have done. Not only is it unclear what his jargon actually means, even if all he said were crystal clear, since he was the first to dream much of it up, 'thought' cannot inevitably be driven along these lines (otherwise we would not now have to read Hegel to help it along). Finally, of course, 'thought' can only take this route if it too accepts without question the logical classical/Hegelian blunders outlined in this Essay, in which case 'thought' deserves all the confusion it receives as a result.

Moreover, if abstractions are arrived at in a more law-like way, as the 'mind' tries to grapple with scientific knowledge, a là Hegel, how would it still be possible for one mind to check the results of any other to see if either or both had arrived at the same ideal result?

(2) If abstractions are produced by a 'subtractive' process (as more and more particular features are disregarded) to produce increasingly general terms, who decides which parts should be subtracted first, second or third? For example, do we abstract a cat's whiskers first, its curiosity or its purr? Do we ignore its position or its number? And if this is all done 'in the mind', who is to say that everyone does exactly the same things to exactly the same subtracted parts in the same order and in the same manner?

Naturally, if 'abstractions' are cobbled-together by a process of generalisation, or law-like development, then the same questions would still apply.

(3) The actual process of mental subtraction is somewhat difficult to conceive too. When we ignore the various parts of the objects we are supposedly performing this trick upon, is it like a sort of mental striptease? But, if we take away too much, how might we know whether the rest of this ceremony is being performed on the same object with which we began? We might all start with a chaffinch, say, but after the feathers, beak, claws, colour, song, wings, size and number have been stripped away, how might we distinguish the amorphous mass left behind from an similarly processed Axolotl? Or indeed, from the Crab Nebula?

Of course, abstractionists are never this crude (at least, not in public); they restrict themselves to rather more well-behaved "concepts", "categories" and refined "ideas", ones they trust to reason, or better still, to 'dialectical/speculative' thought. But these shadowy beings are even more obscure. Does, therefore, the concept of Robin Redbreast have wings, a head and a stomach full of worms? If not, then we might wonder if this concept genuinely applies to him. If it does, we might wonder (even more) what the difference between him and his concept is.

Worse still, any conclusions drawn about the 'concept' of Robin Redbreast, or indeed birds in general, would apply to that concept, and not to its supposed feathered external correlate. That is, unless we are to suppose that, just like a Black Magic doll, whatever we do to the concept, we do to the real object(s) it is said to mirror. Now, Idealists might not be able to distinguish reality from illusion in this regard, but materialists would be unwise to follow them into the same dense fog -- or, indeed, adopt a philosophical technique that cannot tell fact from fancy, or a frog from fog.

And how exactly does one dissect a concept? Do they each have an 'objective' anatomy, ones that any rank amateur can poke or prod?

Nevertheless, this traditional tale is deeply engrained in our culture -- you will even find psychologists who will say that all of us can form "abstractions", even if they go rather quiet when asked to fill in the details -- so much so that experience has taught me, in polite company, not try to deny that such 'phantoms' exist, or risk being treated as one who has just confessed to murder.

Truth be told, this Emperor has no clothes, abstract or concrete; indeed there isn't even so much as a single drop of blue blood in 'his' veins -- as both halves of this Essay seek to demonstrate. Worse, there isn't even an Emperor, clothed or otherwise.

This ruling idea has been on the epistemological throne long enough; it is time to wheel out a very material guillotine.

--------------------------

Now, care to deal with my objections, or are you going to withdraw into your dogmatic sulk once more?

Now that's a positively dialectical move!

Exactly why, and how?

Do tell...

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 03:15

Dystisis:

You seem to have a limited knowledge of physics if you insist on using the word "appearances" and scientists "seeing" things... This is but one of our senses. Further, I would not call mathematics a theory, as from your post you seem to do. Additionally, mathematics can not just be "seen", it is also heard in rhythm and the frequencies of the tones, for example. One of the interesting things about mathematics is that it does indeed transcend any one sensory information source. In this context I'd think of mathematics as the language we use to talk about the organization of the universe.

Look, I not only have degrees in Philosophy, I have one in mathematics, so I am not ignorant of Physics.

Of course, scientists use other senses: they listen, smell, taste and feel things -- but, what they record with their senses is how things appear to them.

And, where did I say mathematics is a theory? I did say it had to be written down like a theory, but that does not mean it is a theory, any more than your signature is a theory.

But, the way you talk, you seem to think mathematics is a theory of the universe.

I deny that. It's a method we use to help us understand nature.

To be sure it is a language, as you say, but, since it has to be put into physical form for us to be able to read it and to follow it, it is part of the world of appearances.

That is the only point I wished to make in this context.

But, you surely do not think that there are mathematical objects out there in the universe -- perfect lines, planes, and manifolds; actual scalar or vector fields (with real or complex numbers floating about in Banach space) --, partial differential equations drifting past the Crab Nebula, perhaps?

And, these mathematical objects cannot be abstracted into existence, since they share nothing with anything in the material world. Real circles are not at all like mathematical cycles; mathematical lines are not made of anything, unlike real lines.

And how on earth would you 'abstract' into existence a Hermite Polynomial, or an Abelian Group, for goodness sake?

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 03:30

Keep it up comrades; the more you try to argue in favour of abstract ideas, the more you confirm Marx's claim that ruling-class ideas always rule.

Zurdito

4th June 2008, 12:36

my take is that abstraction is important because the universe is not just the sum of its parts, little enlightened self-interested cogs working away rationally, which can be understood by simply looking at them in themselves. fromw hat I've read this approach si pretty discredited even in the natural sciences. and this approach is very much the approach of the bourgeoisie, this Newtonian rationalism was at the heart of emancipation from feudalism and the triumph of the reduction of human interaction to one of exchange value.

instead, things have meaning due to the relationships between them, and these relationships which give something its qualities do not physically exist, so therefore you can't understand something by simply observing it empirically. for example, a planetary system oeprates through a set of relationships between planets and stars, which give a meaning to those things which surpasses anything you can extrapolate by just taking them all as individual building blocks and coming up with a "sum of the parts".

For example a proletarian is a proletarian, and granted his historical role, due to his relationship with other people and with the means of production - an abstract concept when we think of it as a whole. When a proletarian fights against a capitalist, it's the relationship between them which causes this and which gives this fight its meaning and historical significance, and which causes the two camps to behave in a way which can't be explained by looking at both of them individually and then analysing them together as the result of a simple interaction ebtween those two building blocks.

The relationship between them in itself has meaning, this is an abstraction, but it's the key to understanding what's really going on.

Hit The North

4th June 2008, 13:15

BCS:
Can anyone explain to me, or give me a link to a simple reader or book which explains why i should except abstraction, because i seem to say it alot these days, but cant even begin to actually argue WHY i should use this way of thinking. Firstly, why do these discussions always end up in a discussion of natural science and mathematics? The OP is asking if abstraction is a valid form of thinking in reference to Marxism. Thus, whether abstraction is necessary for the investigation of evolution or magnetic fields is somewhat moot.

Let’s examine what Marx’s research program actually consisted of. This is outlined in the Grundrisse and can be described as a broad study of society, as indicated by these themes:

1. The abstract characteristics common to all forms of society, taking into account their historical aspect.
2. The main constituent elements of the internal structure of bourgeois society, upon which the basic social classes rest, capital, wage labour, landed property. Town and country. The three great social classes and the exchange between them. Circulation. Credit.
3. Crystallization of bourgeois society in the form of the State. The ‘unproductive’ classes. Taxation. Public debt. Public credit. Population. Colonies. Emigration.
4. International relations of production. International division of labour. International exchange. Exports and imports. Exchange.
5. The world market and crises.

In other words, Marx was embarking upon a sociological research program. The question then becomes whether abstraction has a role to play within a methodology attempting to grasp (understand and explain) social reality.

According to Marx it does. Above, Rosa mentions the use of scientific instruments such as microscopes for investigating the natural world. The point is that in the social world, we cannot isolate phenomena in a laboratory and scrutinize it with electron-microscopes. We therefore have to develop other means of investigation. In the Introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx discusses two ‘moments’ of thinking, or analyzing, social phenomena – an analytical moment and a synthetic moment which begins and ends with the ‘concrete’. The analytical moment breaks down what we are studying into its simpler component parts. The synthetic moment brings them back together, establishing their mutual connections and providing a more complex and concrete knowledge of our original abstraction. For instance, the ‘education system’ is an abstraction comprising of simpler, more concrete components like schools, colleges, teaching staff, administrative staff, students, parent-teacher associations, etc. In order to fully understand how the education system works we need to strip it down into these analytically separate elements. The second moment of analysis, the synthetic, is where we begin to show the connections and exchanges between the more concrete elements and as we move up towards a more concrete and integrated knowledge of the education system itself. Beyond that, we need to establish knowledge of the interconnections between the education system and its place within the general totality which is society to fully understand it.

You should read the Introduction for yourself as Marx explains it better than me. What her shows, is that abstraction is an unavoidable moment within out thinking, but one which needs overcoming in order for us to establish real knowledge about the social world.

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 13:44

You make several assumptions that are not warranted:

1) The abstract characteristics common to all forms of society, taking into account their historical aspect.

Why are these 'abstract', and not just common elements? What do you gain by calling them abstract?

In contrast, what you lose, however, is the generality Marx sought to locate in capitalism -- in that now, these common elements are turned into abstract particulars, thus losing their generality -- as I pointed out in my earlier post.

2. The main constituent elements of the internal structure of bourgeois society, upon which the basic social classes rest, capital, wage labour, landed property. Town and country. The three great social classes and the exchange between them. Circulation. Credit.

3. Crystallization of bourgeois society in the form of the State. The ‘unproductive’ classes. Taxation. Public debt. Public credit. Population. Colonies. Emigration.

4. International relations of production. International division of labour. International exchange. Exports and imports. Exchange.

5. The world market and crises.

Why ruin the theory by calling these 'abstractions? But, these have been 'abstracted' from nowhere, since the process is a myth -- you certainly have not told us how this is to be carried out.

Above, Rosa mentions the use of scientific instruments such as microscopes for investigating the natural world. The point is that in the social world, we cannot isolate phenomena in a laboratory and scrutinize it with electron-microscopes.

I was, of coure, responding to a specific point made about the physical and biological sciences.

But even so, in the social sciences, researchers have to examine appearances, and they have to report their findings to the rest of us as appearances (in writings etc.). So, no abstractions are evident even here.

For instance, the ‘education system’ is an abstraction comprising of simpler, more concrete components like schools, colleges, teaching staff, administrative staff, students, parent-teacher associations, etc. In order to fully understand how the education system works we need to strip it down into these analytically separate elements.

'The education system' is not an abstraction, since it is a title given to the things you list. Certainly, no one has ever constructed the 'education system' out of schools etc., by a process of abstraction -- or if they have, you forgot to say who did this, and when -- and how we could ever arrive at the same results, years after that mythical person's heroic mental gymnastics, if we have no access to his/her thoughts.

If it is an 'abstraction' (performed in the mind of each individual) how can you show that you mean the same by it as any other dialectician? Do you possess a universal mind probe?

And, the things you list as 'concrete' entities (schools, colleges, etc.,) are no more concrete that the 'education system' is abstract. Schools consist of parts too, as does the education system; so you have no basis on which to classify the one as abstract but the others as concrete.

Once more, you have signally failed to respond to the serious difficulties I have posed for this way of looking at the world -- yet again, I suspect you cannot answer them.

The ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class -- so, well done for once again pinning your colours to that particular mast.

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 13:48

Z, I note that you too just ignore the serious objections I have raised against this ruling-class way of looking at reality.

Head still in the sand, is it?

Hit The North

4th June 2008, 15:03

Why are these 'abstract', and not just common elements? What do you gain by calling them abstract?I'm just following Marx's usage here. What do you think he meant? I think he's referring to those characteristics found generally within all forms of society (relations of production, for instance), abstracted from their concrete determinations within history. So we can talk about the capitalist relations of production, but we need to distinguish between the concrete manifestations of this between particular societies - French and American, for example.

In contrast, what you lose, however, is the generality Marx sought to locate in capitalism -- in that now, these common elements are turned into abstract particulars, thus losing their generality -- as I pointed out in my earlier post.Possibly, in the rarefied and exacting terminology of analytic philosophy. But that's your cross to bear. Like Marx, I'm not that bothered by your semantics.

Why ruin the theory by calling these 'abstractions? But, these have been 'abstracted' from nowhere, since the process is a myth -- you certainly have not told us how this is to be carried out.
You misunderstand. I was listing Marx's own research program in order to emphasise its sociological content, not claiming that these things were abstractions.

But even so, in the social sciences, researchers have to examine appearances, and they have to report their findings to the rest of us as appearances (in writings etc.). So, no abstractions are evident even here.I'm not sure I understand your point. Are you saying that all theoretical thinking, once externalised as text, is appearance? That seems like a trivial point. Of course, you won't be arguing that all social reality is a text and therefore mere appearance, will you?

'The education system' is not an abstraction, since it is a title given to the things you list. Certainly, no one has ever constructed the 'education system' out of schools etc., by a process of abstraction -- or if they have, you forgot to say who did this, and when -- and how we could ever arrive at the same results, years after that mythical person's heroic mental gymnastics, if we have no access to his/her thoughts.
It is, using the usage of Marx. The same could be said of evolution. You call it a process, but this is not a singular one. Evolution is the abstract term we give to a multiplicity of concrete processes in the relationship between and within species as they adapt to their eco-system.

And, the things you list as 'concrete' entities (schools, colleges, etc.,) are no more concrete that the 'education system' is abstract. Schools consist of parts too, as does the education system; so you have no basis on which to classify the one as abstract but the others as concrete.Correct. I said "more concrete". Perhaps my terminology is incorrect at this point - and misrepresents Marx's position. How Marx puts it is like this:

It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage labour, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, division of labour, prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage labour, without value, money, price etc. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception [Vorstellung] of the whole, and I would then, by means of further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts [Begriff], from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations.
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm

Once more, you have signally failed to respond to the serious difficulties I have posed for this way of looking at the world -- yet again, I suspect you cannot answer them.Your suspicion may be correct. But I'm here to clarify what role abstraction plays in the work of Marx and discuss this with other Marxists, not to play philosopher with you.

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 16:19

CZ:

I'm just following Marx's usage here. What do you think he meant? I think he's referring to those characteristics found generally within all forms of society (relations of production, for instance), within history. So we can talk about the capitalist relations of production, but we need to distinguish between the concrete manifestations of this between particular societies - French and American, for example.

As I pointed out, that usage ruins his own analysis, since it turns those general features into the names of abstract particulars, removing generality from his theory.

And all this talk about "abstracted from their concrete determinations" is little more than hand gesturing -- in 2500 years, no one has yet been able to say how this process works -- you just take it all on a blind act of faith.

Possibly, in the rarefied and exacting terminology of analytic philosophy. But that's your cross to bear. Like Marx, I'm not that bothered by your semantics.

This has nothing to do with analytic philosophy; it was a point made by the nominalists -- which you'd know if you knew as much philosophy as you seem to know waffle.

And I note, once more, that you can only make your 'theory' seem to work by your sloppy use of language.

I also note, that you do not complain about Marx's 'semantics' when he makes fine distinctions between, say, the relative form of value and the equivalent form in Kapital. 'Semantics' is OK there, apparently.

Truth be told, you ony complain about 'semantics' when it punches gaping holes in your half-baked 'theory.

On other occasions you are quite happy to make 'semantic' points about the word 'contradiction', for example.

And if you knew your logic, you would know I am making a syntactical, not a semantic point -- that is, one that appeals to features in the ordinary language of the working class -- the language you turn your back upon when it suits you.

This is indeed how ancient Greek thinkers proceeded; as I noted in an earlier post in this thread, they had material interests in developing theories about a hidden, abstract world behind appearances, accesssible to thought alone. So, they had to take the ordinary langauge of their day, and then do precisely what you are now doing -- syntactically altering the use of general words so that they became the names of abstract particulars. This shielded their theories from ready disconformation, and that is why such theories have lasted 2500 years. They are based on a systematic distortion of language, as Marx indicated:

"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

So, once more, Marx's approach is my approach -- but not yours. It's a pity, howver, that he lost this earlier clarity of vision.

I'm not sure I understand your point. Are you saying that all theoretical thinking, once externalised as text, is appearance? That seems like a trivial point. Of course, you won't be arguing that all social reality is a text and therefore mere appearance, will you?

No, that is not my point; it is the simple observation that social sciences cannot be based on abstractions carried out in the minds of researchers, since they have to write their results down. In that case, they have to appeal to the meaning of words already in the public domain, not to obscure and uncheckable 'abstactions' carried out in their heads.

The same could be said of evolution. You call it a process, but this is not a singular one. Evolution is the abstract term we give to a multiplicity of concrete processes in the relationship between and within species as they adapt to their eco-system.

It is certainly the title we give to a process, but once more, apart from slavishly copying tradition (a tradition unfortunately Marx also copied), why do you want to call this an abstraction?

And I am aware of this quotation from Marx; I have this to say about it (in Essay Three Part One):

In fact, Marx does not actually do what he says he does in this passage; he merely gestures at doing it, and his gestures are about as substantive as the hand movements of stage magicians. This is not to malign Marx. Das Kapital is perhaps one of the greatest books ever written; but it would have been an even more impressive work if the baleful influence of traditional thought had been kept totally at bay.

Perhaps you would like to tell us precisely where Marx does what he says he does with 'population'?

He left no record of these 'mental gyrations', and they would have been no use to us even if he had, for such privatised thoughts in the minds of long dead individuals are now in principle inaccessible to us.

Which fact underlines what a crazy view of knowledge this ruling-class theory represents -- it delivers the 'results' of uncheckable mental gymnastics, that no one else can share.

What I propose puts the whole thing in the public domain, where the results and the method used are checkable.

This is something you keep ignoring.

But, this is a bit odd for the modertor of the Philosophy section to say:

Your suspicion may be correct. But I'm here to clarify what role abstraction plays in the work of Marx and discuss this with other Marxists, not to play philosopher with you.

I am not playing 'philosopher' since I am attacking an ancient philosophical view that practically everyone (except nominalists -- but they had their own ruling-class hang-ups, anyway) in the history of philosophy has accepted: abstractionism. It is indeed one of the ruling ideas, as Marx noted.

And I am not attacking it to improve it, or replace it with another philosophical theory, but to show that this branch of traditional myth-making does not work either.

But, anyway, we all know the real reason why you are backing-off; you always lose.

trivas7

4th June 2008, 17:28

And all this talk about "abstracted from their concrete determinations" is little more than hand gesturing -- in 2500 years, no one has yet been able to say how this process works -- you just take it all on a blind act of faith.

As if one needed to know how consciousness emerges from brain states before proceeding to think.

And if you knew your logic, you would know I am making a syntactical, not a semantic point -- that is, one that appeals to features in the ordinary language of the working class -- the language you turn your back upon when it suits you.
Would that you were only making a syntactical point, then you'd be saying nothing re Marx's method.

This is indeed how ancient Greek thinkers proceeded; as I noted in an earlier post in this thread, they had material interests in developing theories about a hidden, abstract world behind appearances, accesssible to thought alone. So, they had to take the ordinary langauge of their day, and then do precisely what you are now doing -- syntactically altering the use of general words so that they became the names of abstract particulars.
All abstractions are generalizations, not particulars.

So, once more, Marx's approach is my approach -- but not yours. It's a pity, howver, that he lost this earlier clarity of vision.
Would that your approach was Marx's, then we could agree to something.

No, that is not my point; it is the simple observation that social sciences cannot be based on abstractions carried out in the minds of researchers, since they have to write their results down.
Who is saying that social science is based on abstractions?

I am not playing 'philosopher' since I am attacking an ancient philosophical view that practically everyone (except nominalists -- but they had their own ruling-class hang-ups, anyway) in the history of philosophy has accepted: abstractionism. It is indeed one of the ruling ideas, as Marx noted.
But still you need to abstract to condemn abstractionism.

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 17:59

Trivas:

As if one needed to know how consciousness emerges from brain states before proceeding to think.

This has nothing to do with the point I was making; you need to try to read more carefully.

Moreoever, independently of scientific knowledge, there is no way for anyone to check whether Abstractor A has abstracted the same concepts as Abstractor B, or even if they mean the same by the word 'same' -- or even if one or both have hit on the 'right' abstraction, or not.

How could anyone decide?

Is there a 'Novice Abstractor's Standardisation Board' we can appeal to?

Abstactionism thus collapses into radical scepticism.

Would that you were only making a syntactical point, then you'd be saying nothing re Marx's method.

But Marx is usually scrupulously careful over his use of words, except when it comes to philosophy and abstraction.

So, it is a legitimate point to raise that he does not need these syntactic monstrosities. Das Kapital would not be affected if Marx had never heard of 'abstractions'. Quite the reverse, in fact, the syntatcic mess these introduce into his work threaten to ruin the scientific points he wished to make.

All abstractions are generalizations, not particulars.

Unfortunately for you, the syntax of the sentences dialecticians themselves use says the opposite, that they are indeed the names of abstract particulars. The details have been summarised here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1035997&postcount=2

This has since been updated in a clearer form here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Summary_of_Essay_Three_Part_One.htm

The full details are here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_01.htm

I have no doubt you will ignore these awkward facts too.

So, the use to which these are put in dialectics belies your bluff and ignorant denial.

Would that your approach was Marx's, then we could agree to something.

But, we do not even know if your approach is that of Marx -- even though there is enough prima facie evidence that it isn't, since he was no dogmatist, whereas you are.

Who is saying that social science is based on abstractions?

CZ.

But still you need to abstract to condemn abstractionism.

No so -- no more than a doctor needs to catch a disease in order to eradicate it.

Hit The North

4th June 2008, 18:33

Who is saying that social science is based on abstractions?CZ.Where do I say this?

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 20:12

CZ (now):

Where do I say this?

CZ (before he was rumbled):

The OP is asking if abstraction is a valid form of thinking in reference to Marxism.

And then you proceed to outline Marx's alleged social science:

Let’s examine what Marx’s research program actually consisted of. This is outlined in the Grundrisse and can be described as a broad study of society, as indicated by these themes:

1. The abstract characteristics common to all forms of society, taking into account their historical aspect.
2. The main constituent elements of the internal structure of bourgeois society, upon which the basic social classes rest, capital, wage labour, landed property. Town and country. The three great social classes and the exchange between them. Circulation. Credit.
3. Crystallization of bourgeois society in the form of the State. The ‘unproductive’ classes. Taxation. Public debt. Public credit. Population. Colonies. Emigration.
4. International relations of production. International division of labour. International exchange. Exports and imports. Exchange.
5. The world market and crises.

In other words, Marx was embarking upon a sociological research program. The question then becomes whether abstraction has a role to play within a methodology attempting to grasp (understand and explain) social reality.

Bold added.

Then we get the confused Hegelian gobbledygook:

We therefore have to develop other means of investigation. In the Introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx discusses two ‘moments’ of thinking, or analyzing, social phenomena – an analytical moment and a synthetic moment which begins and ends with the ‘concrete’. The analytical moment breaks down what we are studying into its simpler component parts. The synthetic moment brings them back together, establishing their mutual connections and providing a more complex and concrete knowledge of our original abstraction. For instance, the ‘education system’ is an abstraction comprising of simpler, more concrete components like schools, colleges, teaching staff, administrative staff, students, parent-teacher associations, etc. In order to fully understand how the education system works we need to strip it down into these analytically separate elements. The second moment of analysis, the synthetic, is where we begin to show the connections and exchanges between the more concrete elements and as we move up towards a more concrete and integrated knowledge of the education system itself. Beyond that, we need to establish knowledge of the interconnections between the education system and its place within the general totality which is society to fully understand it.

You should read the Introduction for yourself as Marx explains it better than me. What he shows, is that abstraction is an unavoidable moment within out thinking, but one which needs overcoming in order for us to establish real knowledge about the social world.

Bold added.

So, unless you disagree with the above confused thinking, the answer is plain for all to see.

Hit The North

4th June 2008, 22:16

Yes, I know I wrote all that. The question is where did I argue that "social science is based on abstraction"?

Feel free to point it out any time soon.:rolleyes:

Dystisis

4th June 2008, 22:59

Look, I not only have degrees in Philosophy, I have one in mathematics, so I am not ignorant of Physics.

Of course, scientists use other senses: they listen, smell, taste and feel things -- but, what they record with their senses is how things appear to them.

And, where did I say mathematics is a theory? I did say it had to be written down like a theory, but that does not mean it is a theory, any more than your signature is a theory.

But, the way you talk, you seem to think mathematics is a theory of the universe.

I deny that. It's a method we use to help us understand nature.

To be sure it is a language, as you say, but, since it has to be put into physical form for us to be able to read it and to follow it, it is part of the world of appearances.
As I have said I do not consider mathematics a theory at all, I wrote that I consider it a language we can use to describe the organization of the universe. Using mathematics, such a broad word, is perhaps a mistake.

Perhaps you can elaborate on how it is mathematics, or numbers and geometry which is more specifically what I am thinking of, can help us understand nature... how is this? Could it mean that matter is ultimately organized, not unlike numbers themselves?

But, you surely do not think that there are mathematical objects out there in the universe -- perfect lines, planes, and manifolds; actual scalar or vector fields (with real or complex numbers floating about in Banach space) --, partial differential equations drifting past the Crab Nebula, perhaps?

And, these mathematical objects cannot be abstracted into existence, since they share nothing with anything in the material world. Real circles are not at all like mathematical cycles; mathematical lines are not made of anything, unlike real lines.
If I think there are mathematical objects out there in the universe? Funny idea, I would be interested in finding a mathematical object.:laugh: No...

I think I have discussed with you before on where numbers can correctly be used describing matter, which is on the ultimate microscopic scale. As with all things, what exists on the microscopic scale is reflected in larger scales such as "middle world"... We can not draw a 100% straight line, but it can be a representation (for us, a word in the language of mathematics) of the organization that exists on the smallest scale. The circle is a topic of it's own, I won't go there.

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 23:06

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th June 2008, 23:10

Dystisis:

As I have said I do not consider mathematics a theory at all, I wrote that I consider it a language we can use to describe the organization of the universe. Using mathematics, such a broad word, is perhaps a mistake.

Well, we largely agree on that, then.

You might like to reflect on how mathematics can describe the world if there are no numbers in reality, no mathematical circles, planes or matrices, etc. What exactly is it describing?

Perhaps you can elaborate on how it is mathematics, or numbers and geometry which is more specifically what I am thinking of, can help us understand nature... how is this? Could it mean that matter is ultimately organized, not unlike numbers themselves?

We need to start a new thread on this, I think. Otherwise this thread will be derailed.

Hit The North

5th June 2008, 00:25

On the point of what we mean by abstraction. This is the first sentence in the Wikipedia entry and is, in my opinion closest to how "ordinary people" employ it in their "ordinary language"

Abstraction is the process or result of generalization by reducing the information content of a concept or an observable phenomenon, typically in order to retain only information which is relevant for a particular purpose. For example, abstracting a leather soccer ball to a ball retains only the information on general ball attributes and behaviour.

It then goes on to inform:
Similarly, abstracting an emotional state to happiness reduces the amount of information conveyed about the emotional state. Computer scientists use abstraction to understand and solve problems and communicate their solutions with the computer in some particular computer language.

Reading further, we discover that the word "abstraction" has been used in a number of attenuated ways in different disciplines.

Comrades who are interested can find it here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstraction#Abstraction_used_in_philosophy

Hit The North

5th June 2008, 00:39

CZ:

The question is where did I argue that "social science is based on abstraction"?

Do I have to do everything for you?

Your argument clearly implies that an alleged social science cannot be a science unless if adopts what you view as Marx's abstractive method:

You should read the Introduction for yourself as Marx explains it better than me. What he shows, is that abstraction is an unavoidable moment within out thinking, but one which needs overcoming in order for us to establish real knowledge about the social world.

Notice that: "real knowledge".

So, social science for you must adopt this method, and it must deal with/yield abstractions. Anything else ain't real knowledge, and hence isn't real social science -- for you.

Of course, now that you have been rumbled, you might want to modifiy these rather rash statements.

But, I think we can expect pigs to fly first...

Firstly, you seem to be employing a similar reading strategy to my scribblings as you do to Marx. The quote you select clearly states that the level of abstraction needs to be overcome in order to produce real knowledge - i.e. knowledge of the real.

Second, I don't believe that all social science applies this method recommended by Marx. So even if I was claiming that Marxist social science is "based on abstraction" (which I do not claim) it would not be the same as claiming that "social science is based on abstraction".

Thirdly, yes in the competition between Marxist historical materialism and bourgeois forms of sociology, I would claim that the former produces superior knowledge to the latter.

But then, I'm biased. Damn that class struggle instinct!

Rosa Lichtenstein

5th June 2008, 02:15

CZ:

This is the first sentence in the Wikipedia entry and is, in my opinion closest to how "ordinary people" employ it in their "ordinary language"

Can we see the results of the survey you carried out on ordinary folk to see if they do indeed theorise in this way about a process that defies description even to this day?

However, I note also that you are happy to appeal to ordinary language when it suits you -- I will remember to throw that back in your face when the occasion arises.

Reading further, we discover that the word "abstraction" has been used in a number of attenuated ways in different disciplines.

Yes, and we must thank you for such diligent research, which carried you all the way out as far as Wikipedia (you really are a first rate social scientist, aren't you?) -- and for inadvertently confirming that 'abstraction' is indeed one of the 'ruling ideas'.

But, I defy you, or even those from the other 'disciplines' you allude to, to say what this mythical process of abstraction actually is, and how it avoids the difficulties I outlined, which, in your class-compromised, and logically-challenged state of mind, even now you ignore.

Firstly, you seem to be employing a similar reading strategy to my scribblings as you do to Marx. The quote you select clearly states that the level of abstraction needs to be overcome in order to produce real knowledge - i.e. knowledge of the real.

I.e., you do think that genuine knowledge in the social sciences does indeed require abstraction.

Looks like you ignore your own words as you do Marx's.

Second, I don't believe that all social science applies this method recommended by Marx. So even if I was claiming that Marxist social science is "based on abstraction" (which I do not claim) it would not be the same as claiming that "social science is based on abstraction".

In that case you will be withdrawing this, I take it:

You should read the Introduction for yourself as Marx explains it better than me. What he shows, is that abstraction is an unavoidable moment within out thinking, but one which needs overcoming in order for us to establish real knowledge about the social world.

It is all the same to me whether you are confused now about your own ideas, or were earlier -- or even both.

Who can say? Certainly not your good self.

Thirdly, yes in the competition between Marxist historical materialism and bourgeois forms of sociology, I would claim that the former produces superior knowledge to the latter.

I agree, but then HM only does that because it does not rely on abstractions, despite what the dialectical brochure says.

But then, I'm biased. Damn that class struggle instinct!

Don't knock it -- that 'instinct', if you give it free reign, will prompt you, too, to throw off this ruling idea: abstraction.

However, the signs so far are not too good -- your commitment to class-compromised dogma is your greatest stumbling block.

Damn those ruling ideas...

Dean

5th June 2008, 02:52

Ghaile

5th June 2008, 03:00

Abstraction is nothing but rotten liberalism.

Rosa Lichtenstein

5th June 2008, 03:31

Dean, you need to address the serious weaknesses I have located in this theory, not repeat tired, 2000 year old ruling-class formulae.

In the sense of studies done, say, with a microscope, a human looks at a cell and translates the objects seen into abstract concepts (i.e. a cell wall) which are then utilized by comparing other abstract concepts (i.e. the intrusion a certain protein may be able to make based on the microscopic scene). Here, the cell wall, the movement of the protein, the inside and outside of the cell are all abstract concepts.

I deny this; what happens is that observers make sense of what they see using a public language which contains familiar general words.

The movement of proteins cannot be represented by abstract 'concepts', since, to repeat, Abstractor A would have no way of knowing whether or not Abstractor B had formed the same 'concepts' as he/she had, or whether they had formed the same ones from only minutes ago, or even the 'right' concepts. There is no way of checking the abstract conceptual contents of anyone's head. In that case, scientific knowledge cannot be based on abstraction.

But I went over all this; you just ignored it!

A case could be made that abstractions are not used in scientific arguments. for instance, the scientist has seen the movement of the protein, and so that is a foregone conclusion. But I think that argument would be weak. If an abstraction is a construct of the mind created by a translation of core facts which we cannot deny (say our vision) then most of human activity is driven by it.

Not so, for the reasons I outlined. And you assume, without proof, that 'most human activity' is 'driven' by this mysterious process (which you have yet to describe to us in anything other than vague terms). I deny any of our thought is so 'driven', and for the reasons I gave.

I think the best argument you could use against abstraction would be to say that abstractions which are not well-established should not be utilized, or an "abstraction tree" (the acceptance of an abstraction's accuracy based on the assumption of other abstractions) suffers from being convoluted and less grounded in certainty.

No, the best arguments are the ones I have already used, which you have just ignored.

But we simply can't ignore that our minds thing symbolically, and those symbols are used for scientific advancement. Christ, even machines use the substitution of an internal variable when confronted with data streams..

We certainly use symbols in everyday language (but they are not the least bit abstract), but the 'mind' does not use symbols -- for who or what lives inside our heads to view them?

Machines process electronic pulses, they do not use symbols. They might output symbols, but these are symbols for us, not for machines (unless you think that human beings live inside machines to view these symbols).

gilhyle

14th June 2008, 13:51

This is a converation I have avoided - it being a very good one without me sticking my oar in. But I just cant resist asking a question, which is this: Rosa, does your model allow for any description of the nature of the difference in the level of generality between, lets say, the concept of exchange Value and the concept of market prices ? Or between the terms market price and prices of production ? etc. Or is it the case that you say merely that not all the terms used are at the same level of generality and that there is no requirement in the manner I suggest to describe the differences in level of generality...just that each term has its own meaning ? Or is your stance otherwise ?

Rosa Lichtenstein

14th June 2008, 13:59

Gil:

Rosa, does your model allow for any description of the nature of the difference in the level of generality between, lets say, the concept of exchange Value and the concept of market prices ? Or between the terms market price and prices of production ? etc. Or is it the case that you say merely that not all the terms used are at the same level of generality and that there is no requirement in the manner I suggest to describe the differences in level of generality...just that each term has its own meaning ? Or is your stance otherwise ?

'Level of generality'...?

What the hell is that supposed to mean?

Perhaps, in your own sweet way you mean 'domain of quantification'?

If so -- yes.

NoValue

16th June 2008, 00:38

'Level of generality'...?

as a dialectician ,a fact that makes me be and seen in a different level of generality than be or seen like a human i ll try to explain this by allready doing so in this answer.
:confused::cool:

Rosa Lichtenstein

16th June 2008, 00:56

NoV:

'Level of generality'...?

as a dialectician ,a fact that makes me be and seen in a different level of generality than be or seen like a human i ll try to explain this by allready doing so in this answer.

I am sorry, but that makes no sense.

NoValue

16th June 2008, 01:03

NoV:

I am sorry, but that makes no sense.

Yes but i made sence of what gil is saying and he may make sence of what i am sayin...
so the ":confused:" emotion was for you
and the ":cool:" emotion was for gil

:confused::cool:

Rosa Lichtenstein

16th June 2008, 01:26

NoV:

Yes but i made sence of what gil is saying and he may make sence of what i am sayin...

How do you know that Gil understands you?

Anyway, what Gil is able to piece together from your posts has no bearing on what I can make of them, and I can make very little of them most of the time.

Now, I am not denying that you know what you want to say, but you will need to find someone who can, say, translate your native language into clear English, otherwise much of what you say is just a waste of time.

gilhyle

16th June 2008, 23:55

Wow...I see someone knows how to fiddle with his levels of generality ? Neat. :cool::cool: I think you've messed up the level of abstraction of this thread while you were at at it. And they were running along so well.:crying: Ah well, cant make an omelette....:laugh:

Thanks for the answer, Rosa.

Rosa Lichtenstein

16th June 2008, 23:58

Gil:

Wow...I see someone knows how to fiddle with his levels of generality ? Neat. I think you've messed up the level of abstraction of this thread while you were at at it. And they were running along so well. Ah well, cant make an omelette

Do you get commission for writing this sort of stuff? Like £1 per word, or something?

I only ask, since you mystics are all rather good at it -- you, however, being the gold medallist in this event.