What is Contradiction?

[heiss93]

What is the meaning of contradiction as use in Dialectics? At its simplest it means simple A and ~A. But it is also used to mean political conflict, differences, internal driving forces, motion. It seems that the term contradiction is extended to mean almost everything.

Is there any concise definition of what is meant by Contradiction when used dialectically?

[Guest1]

Opposing forces or processes.

[gilhyle]

I dont think there is any useful short definition.

On the one hand, a dialectical contradiction is not an analytic contradiction. On the other hand, a dialectical contradiction is not a synonym for contrary tendencies.

One way to understand what dialectical contradiction means is to imagine that if we were confined to thinking/speaking in terms of stable entities in a world where entities were actually subject to change, then to describe the situation to which a dialectical contradiction refers we would need to be able to say of that supposedly stable entity both that it both was x and was not x, where x is a characteristic of the stable entity. It is for this reason that it is called a 'contradiction' although not a logical contradiction. Thankfully, we are not confined in that way. With some difficulty, we find ways of expressing dialectical contradictions without falling foul of the basic logical law of identity.

Another way to understand a dialectical contradiction is to say that if we could only think and speak in terms of what is to come, rather than what is, then to describe the things to which a dialectical contradiction refers we would need to be able to speak of potentialities (i.e. what is becoming) as entities, as Aristotle virtually did.

Bringing these two ideas together, we can see that a dialectical contradiction is a way of speaking about things which situates them simultaneously both spatially and temporally, both as what they have become/are and what they have not yet become but are becoming.

Dialectical contradictions are, therefore, the key feature of the way in which we grasp the dynamic and structural aspects of reality in a single conceptual framework.For the most part dialectical contradictions are littered throughout our speech and are unproblematic. We all know from experience that things are not stable and unchanging over time. We also Know that things are parts of processess, situations in which they must end up as something other than what they now are.

When we speak over short time horizons we can often ignore that. SImilarly when we speak over very long time horizons we can also ignore it and talk only about the process. However, we live mostly in the intermediate time frames in which it matters both what a thing is now, what it once was and what it is becoming.

[Kronos]

Well I disagree that there are "natural" contradictions, or material contradictions. A contradiction is a logical incompatibility between propositions, and such things only exist in language. Language is not a material, so while a proposition represents a material event, or fact, or state, if it is contradicting to another proposition, it does not mean the material which the proposition represented is contradicting. In other words, either "A or not-A" is only an idea, not a real state. Also, if one let "A" mean "that river I stepped in", if they ever stepped in that river again it would be "not-A", since the material river is in constant change. Language only approximately describes changing events, and these changing events do not change because of contradiction.

This whole Hegelian idea of communism evolving as a synthesis of the thesis of capitalism and the antithesis of the struggling proletariat is horribly ambiguous and obscure. These two competing modes of production do not contradict each other....they are only different. It is the idea derived by the struggling proletariat that "communism is necessary" as a "solution" to the "problem" of capitalism. The problem of capitalism has nothing to do with some unfolding dialectic that proves it contradicts anything- the problem of capitalism is that it is a system where there exists unnecessary components in production (capitalist parasites), and is therefore inefficient.

I hate to replace one philosopher with another (since all of it is sophistry), but you Hegelers should really check out Spinoza.

[Awful Reality]

Two opposing forces, in Hegelian terms a Thesis and an Antithesis.

[gilhyle]

A contradiction is a logical incompatibility between propositions, and such things only exist in language.

The above would be absolutely correct if you just inserted the word 'logical' before the first occurence of the word contradiction.....but if you did that it would show that your argument does not prove (or even compellingly support) any conclusion.

Many words have more than one usage. Your argument is analogous to arguing that there are no such things as black swans because swans are white. A dialectical contradiction is a different thing than a logical contradiction....simple as that.

Now you evidently dont think there is any validity in dialectical models, but that is an entirely different issue, for another thread. And on that thread an argument that dialectics cannot exist because logic exists (which is effectively what you argue above) will be evidently inadequate

[Kronos]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectics

I am willing to discuss any of the subjects mentioned in the article, at your discretion.

[Luís Henrique]

Well I disagree that there are "natural" contradictions, or material contradictions.


Two opposing forces, in Hegelian terms a Thesis and an Antithesis.

There are material contradictions - which are of course a different thing from logical contradictions - but they are not "two opposing forces" - otherwise a game between Tottenham Hotspurs and Manchester United would be a contradiction.

A material contradiction is a situation in which the continued existence of something requires some factor that in the long term undermines that very existence. For instance:

The development of capitalism requires a growing proletariat - but the existence of a huge proletariat will destroy capitalism.

Accumulation of capital requires substituting dead labour for living labour - but as only living labour provides surplus value, the substitution of dead labour for living labour will drive profit rates down.

These are material contradictions. They give birth conflicts, but they, in themselves, are not such conflicts.

Luís Henrique

[Kronos]

A material contradiction is a situation in which the continued existence of something requires some factor that in the long term undermines that very existence.

The key term there, LH, which proves the confusion of the Hegelian dialectic is "something". What is this "something" that has "the continued existence"?

In your example of capitalism/communism, you say that communism is the resolution of the problem of capitalism, so, what is the "something" that "continues to exist" after a communist revolution? Do you see the obscure use of the term "something" in Hegel's own demonstration? Of course, Hegel escapes these criticisms by even more obscurity- "the "something" that remains and is evolving through the dialectic is "absolute spirit."

Not hardly.

Rather than pitting the two systems against each other as "contradictions", it would be clearer to simply view them as distinct.

Please take a look at Althusser's concept of "overdetermination". In summary, it is the same idea of dialectic but without the Hegelian dichotomy. Althusser was a Marxist/Spinozist.

[Luís Henrique]

The key term there, LH, which proves the confusion of the Hegelian dialectic is "something". What is this "something" that has "the continued existence"?

Sorry, I am not talking about Hegelian dialectics. "Something" is just a word that applies to anything whose continued existence demands its own undermining.


In your example of capitalism/communism, you say that communism is the resolution of the problem of capitalism, so, what is the "something" that "continues to exist" after a communist revolution?

I did not say that communism is the resolution of the problem of capitalism, not I believe that capitalism is a problem, or, even less, that it "has" a problem that can be solved.

What are you trying to ask? Evidently, except for capitalism itself and the things that are eventually destroyed during revolution, everything else "continues to exist". I don't see how this is a problem raised by my assertions.


Do you see the obscure use of the term "something" in Hegel's own demonstration?

No, that's not the problem with Hegel.


Of course, Hegel escapes these criticisms by even more obscurity- "the "something" that remains and is evolving through the dialectic is "absolute spirit."

I am really not interested in discussing Hegel. He was made of straw.


Rather than pitting the two systems against each other as "contradictions", it would be clearer to simply view them as distinct.

I don't think communism is the contradiction of capitalism, or the other way round. I think you really missed everything I wrote above; perhaps you should read it again?


Please take a look at Althusser's concept of "overdetermination". In summary, it is the same idea of dialectic but without the Hegelian dichotomy. Althusser was a Marxist/Spinozist.

Maybe, but this has nothing to do with the concept of material contradiction.

Luís Henrique

[gilhyle]

A material contradiction is a situation in which the continued existence of something requires some factor that in the long term undermines that very existence.

I think what LH said is correct, but doesnt get us far enough. It defines a 'material contradiction' (I prefer the term dialectical contradiction) as a 'situation'. To clarify, a dialectical contradiction is not a 'situation', it is a relationship.

Now I think it is more or less clear that LH meant just that, since he speaks of 'something' and 'some factor'. The 'something' requires the 'factor' to exist for the 'something' to exist, but the continued existence of the 'some factor' means that ultimately, the 'something ' ceases to exist.

I dont think Kronos' objection that we need to know what 'something' refers to works, since we are talking here about formal analysis in which substantive realities are abstracted from to identify the form - if Kronos was right the objection would also be valid against logic and algebra. After the first day, no one objects in math "yeah but what does 'a' refer to ?"

However, LH's way of putting it might be thought to confine unity to co-existence. Co-existence is a complex idea, with a lot of spatial metaphor built into it. We can take any spatial metaphor out by changing the concept to one of mutual dependence. In that case, the two elements don't have to exist at the same time but - for example - may occur sequentially, one after the other.

But it is also important to acknowledge that the 'something' and the 'factor' are both abstractions. Each changes over time and therefore their relationship changes over time, so the relationship is not a single relationship of mutual dependence - that relationship too changes over time.

Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that they are in contradiction only by reference to a totality within which they are each involved. That concept of totality defines a process, which in turn defines the 'something' and the 'some factor'. Thus it is only within the Marxist analysis that capitalism is what it is (a social relationship dividing the worker from her tools) and therefore can have any relationship of mutual dependence on anything else.

Furthermore, it is only by reference to that totality that we can begin to develop a conception of the emergence and the working out of dialectical contradictions.

In all these ways we see the mutual inter-dependence of the different dialectical 'laws' of being, which in turn reflects the dual reality we repeatedly experience (NB - this is a critical phenomenology not a metaphysics, there is no claim that the world is like this, but that this is its reality within our reality) that nothing just exists and knowledge must be abstracted from reality and cannot just be a picture of it. It is only by placing all these elements together that we get any useful pattern. To define, as LH does, a dialectical contradiction in isolatin from the other dialectical 'laws' by reference to its outcome is to loose what is useful in dialectics, which is the pattern of elements.....but remember also that none of this is VERY useful and all of it is quite banal, made problematic if looked at too ponderously.

[Kronos]

I just wanted to bring these excerpts to your attention, and see what you think.


In contemporary analytic philosophy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy) an event or state of affairs is said to be overdetermined if there are more than one distinct, sufficient causes of it. Whereas there may unproblematically be recognised many different necessary conditions of the event's occurrence, no two distinct events may lay claim to be sufficient conditions, since this would lead to overdetermination. A much used example is that of firing squads, the members of which simultaneously firing at and 'killing' their targets. Apparently, no one member can be said to have caused the victims' deaths, since they would have been killed anyway.


The Marxist philosopher (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_philosophy) Louis Althusser (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Althusser) imported the concept into Marxist (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist) politics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics) in an influential essay, "Contradiction and Overdetermination". Drawing, in an unusual combination, from both Freud and Mao Zedong (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao_Zedong), Althusser used the idea of overdetermination as a way of thinking about the multiple, often opposed, forces active at once in any political situation, without falling into an over-simple idea of these forces being simply "contradictory."


An analysis understood in terms of interdependent practices helps us to conceive of how society is organised, but also allows us to comprehend social change and thus provides a theory of history (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History). Althusser explains the reproduction of the relations of production (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relations_of_production) by reference to aspects of ideological (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideological) and political (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political) practice; conversely, the emergence of new production relations can be explained by the failure of these mechanisms. Marx’s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Marx) theory seems to posit a system in which an imbalance in two parts could lead to compensatory adjustments at other levels, or sometimes to a major reorganisation of the whole. To develop this idea Althusser relies on the concepts of contradiction and non-contradiction, which he claims are illuminated by their relation to a complex structured whole. Practices are contradictory when they grate on one another and non-contradictory when they support one another. Althusser elaborates on these concepts by reference to Lenin’s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lenin) analysis of the Russian Revolution of 1917 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Revolution_of_1917).
Lenin posited that in spite of widespread discontent throughout Europe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europe) in the early 20th century (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/20th_century), Russia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia) was the country in which revolution occurred because it contained all the contradictions possible within a single state at the time. It was, in his words, the ‘weak link’ in a ‘collection of imperialist states’. The revolution is explained in relation to two groups of circumstances: firstly, the existence within Russia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia) of large-scale exploitation in cities, mining districts, etc., disparity between urban industrialisation and medieval conditions in the countryside, and lack of unity amongst the ruling class; secondly, a foreign policy which played into the hands of revolutionaries, such as the elites who had been exiled by the Tsar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsar) and had become sophisticated socialists (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialists).


This example is used by Althusser to reinforce his claim that Marx (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Marx) did not see social change as the result of a single contradiction between the forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Means_of_production) and the relations of production (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relations_of_production), but rather held a more complex view of it. The differences between events in Russia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia) and Western Europe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Europe) highlight that a contradiction between forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Productive_forces) and relations of production (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relations_of_production) may be necessary, but not sufficient, to bring about revolution. The circumstances that produced revolution in Russia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia), mentioned above, were heterogeneous, and cannot be seen to be aspects of one large contradiction. Each was a contradiction within a particular social totality. From this, Althusser draws the conclusion that Marx’s concept of contradiction is inseparable from the concept of a social whole. In order to emphasise that changes in social structure relate to numerous contradictions, Althusser describes these changes as "overdetermined (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overdetermination)", using a term taken from Sigmund Freud (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sigmund_Freud). This interpretation allows us to account for how many different circumstances may play a part in the course of events, and furthermore permits us to grasp how these states of affairs may combine to produce unexpected social changes, or ‘ruptures’.


If you see what I see here, you might concede that the typical "dialectical materialism" method employed to explain and understand the developments in history is far too simplified to be accepted. Such a narrow dichotomy cannot account for all changes. It is not as simple as "capitalism requires a growing class of proletariats > growing class of proletariats destroy capitalism." I do agree with gilhyle in that all this can become quite banal. I really only wanted to suggest, with the help of the material above, that change isn't a result of "contradiction" necessarily.

[gilhyle]

Well in my opinion Althusser is a whole other topic. His use of terms from dialectical modes of thinking is merely a product of the ideological ruse he was engaged in and the terms are quite inappropriate. You rightly point to Althusser's dependence on Spinoza, to which I would add Kant. Furthermore, he can only be understood as a covert gloss on contemporary debates in French philosophy around 1) Deleuze's rejection of Hyppolite's analysis of Hegel, 2) Lacan's fundamental revision of Freud and 3) the suspicion that Levi Strauss had made a fundamental breakthrough in creating a legitimate practice of structuralist sociology.

ALthusser operated mainly by covert replication of the contemporary debates around these issues, substituting Marx as the object of discussion for respectively Hegel, the subject and society.

Althusser generated a debate around his own formulations which simply stopped in the late 1970s without being resolved. The debates around 1) - 3) above were resolved in some sense but the resolution of those didnt impact on Althusser because his reference to those debates had been covert. Consequently, Althusser remains an anomalous artefact.

However, all that said, Althusser represents an attempt to argue that it is not true that the 'understanding' (i.e. thinking solely in terms of the relations of determinate things) is inadequate and an attempt to show that it is possible to reconceive what Marx was getting at purely in those terms.

The best riposte to those speculations on his part is the fate of those who attempted to implement his sociology ...interesting but unsatisfying - people like Machery.

I'd have to say that if you are tempted in that direction, Wittgenstein is a significantly better advocate. But all these 20th century philosophical revisionists are notable for heaping complexity on the rejection of 'grand theory' (or at least elements of it), thus gaining for themselves the capacity to make universal generalisations which generally have the character of denying to others the right to make universal generalisations !!! That complexity makes them tough to engage with cos it is necessary to spend a lot of time working through their particular conceptual framwork.....only justified if they have political influence.

As to my comment that this is banal...my point is that the 'doctrine of being' (of which the concept of dialectical contradiction is a part) is a relatively minor part of the dialectical perspective, the heart of which is how to make the transition from the understanding of essence to the adoption of a rounded picture, i.e. the transition from abstract to concrete thinking which involve the constitution of revolutionary marxist science....however that is another story

[Kronos]

I see you are familiar with Althusser enough to have established an opinion about him. I personally have only recently discovered him, having been attracted to him, naturally, because he was a Marxist.

I am also interested in the "structural" approach to Marxism, which I believe might be a kind of revisionism well suited in reapplying Marxist principles in new, modern, technological contexts. A "techno-psychological" approach, if you will, which places emphasis on semiology, especially, in this post-industrial age of virtual reality.

Next I become attracted to Lacan, who I believe creates a framework complimentary to a system which addresses and explains the effects of consumer fetishism, which, ironically, even modern Marxists are guilty of. I think a large majority of academics, scholars, philosophers, and intellectuals, following the post-structural-modernism age, are essentially fetishists, occupied with mental-masturbation and producing nothing but excessive verbiage and tired repetitions of prior philosophies, without even knowing it. Essentially it is my opinion that philosophy was ended with Marx. While psychology may continue to develop with the sciences, philosophers should be gagged, I think. When I picked up a book written by Deleuze, in less than forty-five seconds I determined that he was writing a whole lotta nothing. Of course, his fans would reply "so because you didn't understand it, it was nonsense?" Correct, and not only that, but you didn't understand it either. Modern philosophers and readers suffer from a subtle kind of neurosis originating from an obsession with intellectual fetishism. They don't realize what they are doing. It might be similar to what Lacan called the mirror stage, only here, consumers are mirroring the intellectuals they themselves fixated on.

But back to the "contradiction" discussion. I still hold my position that Hegel's dialectic was not correct or incorrect, but utterly meaningless. The basis of this arises from my contention that nature is not teleological, is not developing toward ends, is not at odds with itself, does not contradict itself, does nothing contrary to itself, did not begin, will not end, does not resolve, evolve, absolve, or devolve. There is an esoteric kernel at the heart of Hegel's philosophy....a kind of hermeneutic sublimation which communists don't realize. As atheists, they are inadvertently trying to replace a God with a spirituality....and this is their secret attraction to Hegel. The communist gets a warm fuzzy when he ponders such things as the "evolution of absolute spirit", which is the apex of Hegel's philosophy.


As to my comment that this is banal...my point is that the 'doctrine of being' (of which the concept of dialectical contradiction is a part) is a relatively minor part of the dialectical perspective, the heart of which is how to make the transition from the understanding of essence to the adoption of a rounded picture, i.e. the transition from abstract to concrete thinking which involve the constitution of revolutionary marxist science

I understand what you are saying, but I disagree that there is some "essence" which can be discovered by projecting dialectical techniques in thinking, toward the future. There is no "concrete" totality which can be reached at any any point in time. At best, revolutionary politics can look back in time, analyze various circumstances surrounding various revolutions, draw conclusions, adjust policies, and try again. I think Sartre sums it up quite well, in that existence precedes essence, meaning, a dialectical approach, to be valid and have relevance, can only work backwards.

What we can do is work with real examples, and maybe I can find a way to make Hegel's dialectic seem like an illegitimate theory concerning the examples provided. Produce a situation in history where you believe a change occurred because, and only because, of internal contradictions.

[gilhyle]

Recognition of dialectical contradiction does not require that. But I put it right back to you: show me any complex historical change that can be explained by the causal impact of one thing acting on another.....invariably the explanations require reference to totalities and those totalities cannot be grasped as Althusser grasps totalities because his totalities are static structures.

[Luís Henrique]

I think what LH said is correct, but doesnt get us far enough.

I am well aware of the shortcomings of my definition. In fact, its only important quality is the one demanded in the OP: conciseness.

However, we have got habituated with a de facto ban on meaningful discussion of materialist dialectics; the tradition is to equate it to Hegelianism, add some epythets ("mysticism", for instance), invoke Wittgenstein, bash people trying to discuss it, rinse and repeat until discussion is dead. This caused us to never be able to come with any definition, good or not, of "contradiction" in this forum.

I hope we can do better.


It defines a 'material contradiction' (I prefer the term dialectical contradiction) as a 'situation'. To clarify, a dialectical contradiction is not a 'situation', it is a relationship.I prefer "material contradiction" as it helps making a difference between materialist dialectics and Hegelianism. And yes, "situation" is an imprecise term; relation is probably better, though contradictions are possibly (a particular case of) "relations between relations" rather than just relations.


However, LH's way of putting it might be thought to confine unity to co-existence. Co-existence is a complex idea, with a lot of spatial metaphor built into it. We can take any spatial metaphor out by changing the concept to one of mutual dependence. In that case, the two elements don't have to exist at the same time but - for example - may occur sequentially, one after the other.I think I have a problem with that. What exactly "mutual dependence" means, if the two "elements" do not occur simultaneously?


Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that they are in contradiction only by reference to a totality within which they are each involved.Exactly. Material contradictions are internal to something; it is this "totality" (I would prefer "system" because of the idealist conotations of the word "totality") that is contradictory. This is another reason not to conflate them with conflicts.

Luís Henrique

[Kronos]

gilhyle, I just lost a lengthy post while trying to post it and I can't make myself do it again. Here is the quote from the article, one more time:


This example is used by Althusser to reinforce his claim that Marx (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Marx) did not see social change as the result of a single contradiction between the forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Means_of_production) and the relations of production (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relations_of_production), but rather held a more complex view of it. The differences between events in Russia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia) and Western Europe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Europe) highlight that a contradiction between forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Productive_forces) and relations of production (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relations_of_production) may be necessary, but not sufficient, to bring about revolution. The circumstances that produced revolution in Russia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia), mentioned above, were heterogeneous, and cannot be seen to be aspects of one large contradiction. Each was a contradiction within a particular social totality. From this, Althusser draws the conclusion that Marx’s concept of contradiction is inseparable from the concept of a social whole.

[Hit The North]

I am well aware of the shortcomings of my definition. In fact, its only important quality is the one demanded in the OP: conciseness.

However, we have got habituated with a de facto ban on meaningful discussion of materialist dialectics; the tradition is to equate it to Hegelianism, add some epythets ("mysticism", for instance), invoke Wittgenstein, bash people trying to discuss it, rinse and repeat until discussion is dead. This caused us to never be able to come with any definition, good or not, of "contradiction" in this forum.

I hope we can do better.



We certainly have the opportunity to do this while Rosa is away.

[Hit The North]

This may be a little off-topic but... I like the thinking behind these comments of Luis:


I prefer "material contradiction" as it helps making a difference between materialist dialectics and Hegelianism.


I would prefer "system" because of the idealist conotations of the word "totality"

Because, for me, one of the difficulties I have with the presentation of dialectics amongst the most prominent Marxist scholars is the way in which discussion is mired in Hegelian concepts and terminology. I would prefer to concentrate on the "rational kernel" which Marx refers to and, crucially, this may demand transforming the language - or mode of expression - we employ in order to make our ideas intelligible.

So I have some sympathy for Rosa's position in that I understand the mystification which is produced by "coquetting" with modes of expression peculiar to Hegel. The difference is that she sees nothing of substance behind the jargon, whereas I can't escape the feeling that fundamental truths are being hidden behind the jargon - i.e. in the true meaning of the term "mystification".

[Luís Henrique]

We certainly have the opportunity to do this while Rosa is away.

To those who weren't here at the time - or were, but hadn't noticed a pattern - the following is the best discussion I managed to have with Rosa about the issue:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/inevitable-downfall-capitalism-t60581/index3.html?highlight=brummaire

(So, the definition I used in this thread had already been made in these forums...)

It may be useful to read that to see what degree of difficulty there was in discusssing such issues in Rosa's presence; this was, as I said, the very best I could obtain. Other attempts were by far more frustrating.

Luís Henrique

[gilhyle]

I just lost a lengthy post while trying to post it and I can't make myself do it againI hate it when that happens.


I am well aware of the shortcomings of my definition. In fact, its only important quality is the one demanded in the OP: conciseness.Not criticising you, just playing while the cats away.

ANyway, I prefer dialectical because, in my view, 'dialectical' does have a precise meaning which differentiates the result from all metaphysics. I think 'materialist' looses that provisional and intrinsically pragmatic character that all generalisations about forms of thinking have to have...but maybe that will turn out to be another discussion.....but maybe not. You say:


would prefer "system" because of the idealist conotations of the word "totality"but the problem with the concept of system is that it is very difficult to differentiate it from 'structure' which it resolves into.

Finally, Kronos...you quote again your quote. THe problem with your quote is that it suggests ALthusser sets up a very simplistic straw man. I think ALthusser did set up a straw man, but I dont think it was that simple. HOwever, take it as written. Engels writings are very clear that 'in the final analysis' it is the contradiction between forces and relations which are the basis of change. Some writers like SInger or Callinicos (the latter following ALthusser, though he doesnt like to refer to that anymore) say this concept of the final analysis is meaningless.....maybe so , maybe not (I think not) ....but it is the approach of Marx and Engels and not simplistic as suggested and not involving a singular conception of cause as suggested. Right or wrong, meaningless or not, it certainly allows for heterogenous causal forces: no argument with that. The problem is for Althusser to conceptualise heterogenous causal forces in a non-dialectical manner as part of a single explanatory act.

[Luís Henrique]

but the problem with the concept of system is that it is very difficult to differentiate it from 'structure' which it resolves into.

Ah... I don't think so. "System" allows for internal dynamics, while "structure" seems to be rather static.

Luís Henrique

[Hit The North]

Luis and gilhyle

Could you identify what you think are the key material contradictions of the capitalist system?

[Luís Henrique]

Luis and gilhyle

Could you identify what you think are the key material contradictions of the capitalist system?

I sure can try...

1. Capitalism can only function if there is a class of people that produces surplus value, that is, a class of people whose material interests imply the demise of capitalism;

2. Capitalism's growth requires the sale of an always increased amount of commodities, but it does not directly produce an increase of consuming power for such commodities;

3. Capitalist competition requires companies to substitute more and more dead labour for living labour, and this undermines the production of surplus value;

4. Capitalism requires a specific commodity - labour force - to be not produced by capitalist methods, which means that a commodity that is increasingly social in all its aspects must be produced by petty private methods.

Luís Henrique

[gilhyle]

Well, call me a traditionalist, but my view is that the most general contradiction of capitlaism is that "all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become means of domination and exploitation of the producers" Capital Vol 1, p.799, Penguin Edition.


"System" allows for internal dynamics, while "structure" seems to be rather static .....indeed, but 'system' is teleological - as structure is - whereas totality is not......but, look, this is a minor point., unless of course we are discussing 'totality'.....happy to switch :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GIL:


One way to understand what dialectical contradiction means is to imagine that if we were confined to thinking/speaking in terms of stable entities in a world where entities were actually subject to change, then to describe the situation to which a dialectical contradiction refers we would need to be able to say of that supposedly stable entity both that it both was x and was not x, where x is a characteristic of the stable entity. It is for this reason that it is called a 'contradiction' although not a logical contradiction. Thankfully, we are not confined in that way. With some difficulty, we find ways of expressing dialectical contradictions without falling foul of the basic logical law of identity.

Well, you of all people should know that this is not even remotely correct. The 'law of identity' (LOI, which concerns the alleged relation between an object and itself) is in no way connected to the 'law of non-contradiction' (LOC, which concerns the truth-functional relation between a proposition and its own negation).

As I have pointed out to you before, it is only because you have swallowed the confused ideas found in Hegel (and his assumption -- undefended -- that the alleged 'negation' of the LOI implies the LOC), that you can come out with such stuff.

As you should also know, a combination of modal and temporal logic can cope with change; so we do not need 'dialectical logic' to begin with.

In fact, ordinary language handles change far better than both formal and 'dialectical' logic (indeed, dialectics cannot explain change at all -- that was established here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=986357&postcount=2))

So, apart from redefining the word (a là CYM -- as 'opposing forces' -- a definition that cannot work anyway; see the link below), dialecticians have nothing to offer us here.

This means, naturally, that dialectics lacks both motivation and rationale.

Small wonder then that it has presided over 150 years of almost total failure. It is well past its sell-by date (which was 2400 BC, if that).

The idea that there are such things 'dialectical contradictions' is taken apart here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_03.htm

The doctrine of change through 'internal contradictions' is demolished here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_01.htm

The fanciful idea that opposing forces may be equated with contradictions is rubbished here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_02.htm

The rest of you mystics do not seem to know much logic, but yet you seem happy to pontificate about it.

No doubt you will be telling brain surgeons their job next week

[gilhyle]

DOnt think you got what I said...rather you reduced it to the familar. However, the familar is comforting.....on which topic, welcome back ! Too quiet without you. x

The job of a brain surgeon is to fix brains.....put down that cup o' tea and fix them brains, surgeon!....see rosa its easy to tell people their job, whats hard is to do it.:)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil, as usual, you duck the difficult logical issues -- and, even though you seem to know more about brain surgery than logic, I congratulate you on that even more impressive skill you have of inserting your head deep into Hegelian sand.

[gilhyle]

As you should also know, a combination of modal and temporal logic can cope with change; so we do not need 'dialectical logic' to begin with.

In fact, ordinary language handles change far better than both formal and 'dialectical' logic (indeed, dialectics cannot explain change at all -- that was established here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/../showpost.php?p=986357&postcount=2))Well, from here in the sand, what your saying is unclear, is it formal logic or language that handles change ? And what does 'handles change' mean ?

WHat I am talking about is developing a critical self-consciousness of the way in which forms of thinking actually operate to limit what we think and how an awareness of the basic dialectical patterns (inter alia the way in which terms that refer change their sense because they change their reference) and the way in which dialectical methodologies such as theories articulated at different levels of abstraction (e.g. what is true for capitalism per se is often not true for capitalism in practice, but can still be understood not as a counterexample to but as a form of appearance of capitalism) can assist us to understand things more clearly and avoid the fetishization of form that dominant ideologies rely on......none of this has anything to do with formal logic, which is about implication etc., logical relations which are quite inadequate for understanding how theorization occurs.

What your logic cannot do is model theorising and what your ordinary language (itself a fetishised form since you exclude the commonsense dialectical awareness we all actually carry around with us unnamed) does not do is model theorising sufficiently .........and (sorry to be emotive) the pathetic mysitificatory, semi-religious concept of language games illustrates that perfectly. The heart of that concept is mystery.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Well, from here in the sand, what your saying is unclear, is it formal logic or language that handles change ? And what does 'handles change' mean ?

This shows, once more, how little attention you pay to anything that is not ruling-class trype.

In what I posted, I am responding to the sorts of things dialectical dunces say about logic, language and change, so these are not the words I would prefer to use.

Hence, as soon as you tell me what you and your mystical friends mean by the odd things you/they say about logic, language and change, I will enlighten you as to my intentions.

But, I have been asking you this sort of thing for nigh on two years now, and every time you duck and run for cover -- behind another sand dune, I suspect.

Or we get this sort of gobbledygook:


WHat I am talking about is developing a critical self-consciousness of the way in which forms of thinking actually operate to limit what we think and how an awareness of the basic dialectical patterns (inter alia the way in which terms that refer change their sense because they change their reference) and the way in which dialectical methodologies such as theories articulated at different levels of abstraction (e.g. what is true for capitalism per se is often not true for capitalism in practice, but can still be understood not as a counterexample to but as a form of appearance of capitalism) can assist us to understand things more clearly and avoid the fetishization of form that dominant ideologies rely on......none of this has anything to do with formal logic, which is about implication etc., logical relations which are quite inadequate for understanding how theorization occurs.

Have you programmed a computer to churn this stuff out?

Or, has that diet of yours -- high in silicates -- affected the language module in your brain?


What your logic cannot do is model theorising and what your ordinary language (itself a fetishised form since you exclude the commonsense dialectical awareness we all actually carry around with us unnamed) does not do is model theorising sufficiently .........and (sorry to be emotive) the pathetic mysitificatory, semi-religious concept of language games illustrates that perfectly. The heart of that concept is mystery.

'My logic'? You praise me too highly. I have yet to re-model it.

Just give me a few years, though...

And your contempt for the material language of the working class (in preference for that of ruling-class hacks) has taken just revenge on you, for you seem quite incapable of writing clear English.

Always assuming, of course, that it was English, and not a pidgin version of Hegelese, or Venusian...

Now, if you can enrol on a crash course in English, and translate the above so that earthlings like me can follow it, I'd appreciate it.

That is, if you are not too busy burrowing in that dune...

[And I do not use 'language games', nor do I refer to them, unless in debate, when I trash the notion -- Wittgenstein's authority or no. So, your latest attempt at invention has back-fired -- rather like your many others.]

[trivas7]

What is the meaning of contradiction as use in Dialectics? At its simplest it means simple A and ~A. But it is also used to mean political conflict, differences, internal driving forces, motion. It seems that the term contradiction is extended to mean almost everything.

Is there any concise definition of what is meant by Contradiction when used dialectically?

Briefly, contradiction is one of the important categories of dialectics, so you would do well to have a firm grasp of them.

From Alexander Spirkin's Dialectical Materialism:


In the whole world there is no developing object or process in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability or change, old or new, etc. The dialectic principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. The necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, expressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposing objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary, constantly in conflict, fighting each other.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas, none of this works, as I have shown here many times.

For example (but in relation to Mao, but it is easy to translate this into a critique of dialectrics in general):


[B]Just like other dialecticians, Mao is thoroughly confused:


"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute."* [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted in my Essays. Bold emphasis added.]

Here are a few more confused DM-worthies:


"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels* (1954), pp.17, 62.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] internally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58. Emphases in the original.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

All this seems to suggest that objects and processes not only change because of their internal opposites, but that they change into them (and, according to Lenin, they change into all of them!), and that they also produce these opposites while they change --, or they do so as a result of that change. As we shall see, all this presents DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches.

To see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two "internal opposites" O* and O**, and thus changes as a result.

But, O* cannot itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist, according to this theory, O* could not change, for there would be no opposite to bring that about.

And it is no good propelling O** into the future so that it now becomes what O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless O** is already there in the present to make that happen!

But, if object/process A is already composed of a dialectical union of O* and not-O* (i.e., O**) and O* 'changes' into not-O*, how can it do this if not-O* already exists? All that seems to happen is that O* disappears. Thus, O* does not change into not-O*, it is just replaced by it.

At the very least, this account of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-O* itself came about. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere.

It cannot have come from O*, since O* can only change because of the operation of not-O*, which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a 'reversed' version of the negation of the negation) will merely reduplicate the above problems.

[FL = Formal Logic.]

Now, it could be objected that all this seems to place objects and/or processes into fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians make of FL. Hence, the above argument is entirely misguided -- or so it could be claimed.

In that case, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites" O* and O**, and thus develops as a result.

The rest still follows. Hence, if object/process A is already composed of a changing dialectical union of O* and not-O* (i.e., O**) and O* 'develops' into not-O* as a result, where then is the change? All that seems to happen is that O* disappears.

Thus, O* does not change into not-O* it is just replaced by it, since not-O* already exists!

The only way to read this to avoid the above difficulty is to argue that despite this, O* still 'develops' into not-O*. But that cannot work, for not-O* must already exist for this to happen, and that would mean that there would now be two not-O*s where once there was only one!

It would also mean, incidentally, that all the while not-O* must remain the unchanged (which denouement would violate the DM-thesis that all things are always changing, and changing onto one another!).

Of course, it could be argued that not-O* 'develops' into O* while not-O* 'develops' into O*. But if that were so, while it was happening, these two would no longer be 'opposites' of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite" to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate object/process" while that is taking place". Naturally, that would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently 'subjective' once more.

But even this will not work. Let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites" O* and O**, and thus develops as a result. On this scenario, O* would change into an intermediary, but not into not-O* (which is, as we saw above, O**), contradicting the DM-worthies quoted earlier.

No, O* would have to change into an intermediary -- say O*1 --, and it would remain in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-O*1 in existence to make it change any further.

Anyway, even if O*1 were to change into not-O*1 itself (as we suppose it must, given the doctrine laid down by the DM-prophets), then all the earlier problems would reappear, for this could only take place if not-O*1 already exists to make it happen. But not-O*1 cannot already exist, for O*1 has not changed into it yet!

It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the point; in the real world things manifestly change. For example, it might be the case that John is a boy, but in a few years time it will be the case that John is a man. Now, the fact that other individuals are already men, does not stop John changing into one, as the above claims. So, John can change into his opposite even though that opposite already exists. Or so it could be claimed.

Maybe so, but according to the DM-worthies above, John can only change because of a struggle between opposites. Are we now really supposed to believe that "John is a man" is struggling with "John is a boy" -- or that manhood is struggling with boyhood?

Furthermore, John's 'opposite' is whatever he becomes (if he is allowed to develop naturally). But, as noted above, that opposite cannot now exist or John would not need to become him!

So, in ten or fifteen years, John will not just become any man, he will become a particular man. Let us call the man that he becomes Manj. In that case, this opposite must exist now or John will not change into him (if the DM-worthies above are to be believed). But, if that is so, John cannot become Manj since he already exists!

[This is, of course, just a concrete example of the argument above.]

Consider another hackneyed example: water turning into steam at 100oC (under normal conditions). Are we really supposed to believe that the opposite that water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? It must do so if the above DM-worthies are to be believed. So, while you might think it is the heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really happens according to these wise old dialecticians is that steam makes water turn into steam!

In that case, save energy, and turn the gas off!

Let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it. To identify it we shall call it W1, and the steam molecule it turns into S1. But, if the DM-worthies above are correct, S1 must already exist, otherwise W1 could not change into it. But if that is so, where does S1 disappear to? In fact, according to the above worthies, since opposites turn into one another, S1 must change into W1! So while you are boiling a kettle, according to this Superscientific theory, steam is turning back into the water you have just boiled, and at the same rate!

One wonders therefore how kettles manage to boil dry.

This must be so, otherwise, when W1 turns into S1 -- which already exists or W1 could not change -- there would have to be two S1s where there used to be one! Matter created from nowhere!

Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and to any and all other examples of change).

None of this, of course, is to deny that change occurs, only that DM cannot account for it.

Whichever way we try to re-package this 'Law' we end up with insuperable problems.

However, Mao attempted to revise Hegel, Engels and Lenin by the invention of principle and secondary contradictions (arguably to allow him to indulge in class-collaboration with the Goumindang):


'For instance, consider the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Take one aspect, the Kuomintang. In the period of the first united front, the Kuomintang carried out Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers; hence it was revolutionary and vigorous, it was an alliance of various classes for the democratic revolution. After 1927, however, the Kuomintang changed into its opposite and became a reactionary bloc of the landlords and big bourgeoisie. After the Sian Incident in December 1936, it began another change in the direction of ending the civil war and co-operating with the Communist Party for joint opposition to Japanese imperialism.'

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/...-1/mswv1_17.htm

But how can contradictions themselves change? Presumably, if they do, they too must be UO's.

[UO = Unity of Opposites.]

Let us assume then that the 'Primary' contradiction P1 changes into 'Secondary' contradiction S1.

But what brings about this change?

[MAD = Materialist Dialectics.]

Given the DM-theory of change, P1 must itself be composed of at least two further opposites, say: P* and P**, one of which P1 must turn into (since, as we saw, it is part of this MAD-theory that all things change into their opposites).

Hence, P1 turns into, say, P**.



But, once more: why did P1 change into P**?

Well, this must be because there is a 'contradiction' between P* and P** (or, perhaps, between P1 and P**).

But, in that case, if all things turn into their opposites, P* must change into P**, too! [But, P** already exists, so how can anything turn into it?]

There must therefore be two P**'s -- say P**a and P**b, for both of these to turn into, collectively or severally.

So, P1 and P* turn into one or other of P**a or P**b, while P** remains the same (or, it becomes one of these two, too).

But, that means that P** is either changeless (shock! horror!) or it too changes into one of the options that have already been selected for P* or P1 to become.

But, once more, P**a and P**b already exist, so P** cannot change into either of them!

Putting that 'difficulty' to one side for now, this can only mean that P1, which used to be made up of at least P* and P**, turns into P**, while P* turns into P**, too --, or it turns into something else (but into what and how?), or it disappears, or it does not change.

So, either P1 and P* merge into one entity (as they both become P**) or they turn into one or other of P**a or P**b -- or, third P** possibility (say, P**c) pops into existence as they (both?) change into it!

But if this is so, it is not easy to see how P1 could be part of the action. It must contain all these things (as internal opposites) if it is to turn into them, and yet that can only mean that it turns into one of its own parts! Once more, how can it do that if they too already exist?

Putting this to one side, too: the changes wrought in P1 and P* could not have been the result of a 'struggle of opposites', since this new opposite (i.e., P**c) does not yet exist!

On the other hand, if that opposite does exist (so that it can 'struggle' with one or both of the other two, and thereby cause the given change), neither P1 nor P* could change into it, since it already exists, too! So, these two cannot change, either.

Either that or there must be something else for one or both to change into -- but even then the same problems would simply return.

In that case, this 'theory' seems to imply that things either merge, disappear, or are created ex nihilo -- or they do not change!

Anyway, why should anything change from a P-type contradiction into an S-type, to begin with?

On this theory, this would only happen if, say, P1 already contained an S-type contradiction for it to change into. [Recall that on this 'theory', internal opposites cause change and things change into their opposites!] But where on earth did that S-type contradiction come from?

Given the above reasoning, for this to happen, P** (from earlier) must be an S-type contradiction, otherwise P1 (or P*) could not change into it. But, as we saw, P** already exists, so nothing can change into it!

Once more, these seem to be the only options available to MIST's: either P1 (or P*) merges with P**, or it (they) disappear into thin air -- or there are at least 3 versions of P** (P**a, P**b and P**c) for one or other to change into.

But these three (P**a, P**b and P**c) cannot exist, since if they did, P* and P1 could not change into them. But if they don't exist, they cannot struggle with anything in order to bring about the required change!

So, yet again, nothing actually changes (or nothing causes it!).

In that case, not only can this scenario not work, we still do not know why anything should alter from the one into the other sort of contradiction, or into anything whatsoever.

And these difficulties do not go away if concrete examples are substituted for the schematic letters used above. So, for example, why did the "primary contradiction" between China and Japan (referred to by Mao) change? On sound MAD-lines, it could only do so as a result of its own 'internal contradictions'. In that case, this "primary contradiction", C/J, must have had internal opposites C/J* and C/J**; the rest follows as before.

[MIST = Maoist Dialectician.]

More details can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm

and here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

More specifically here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2...-Explain-Change

This was taken from here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=986357&postcount=2

So, you really need to stop quoting tired old formulae that do not, and never did, work.

[trivas7]

Trivas, none of this works, as I have shown here many times.

It's more than clear to me that for you it doesn't work. Therefore I've decided you're a hopeless revisionist.

Please spare us with yet again another expostulation shown here many times.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


It's more than clear to me that for you it doesn't work. Therefore I've decided you're a hopeless revisionist.

There is no science that is above revision, and none that has not thrown off the mysticism it once accepted.

This can only mean that for you, Marxism is not a science.

[But we already know that dialectical Marxism is a dogma in your eyes -- and one you cannot defend.]


Please spare us with yet again another expostulation shown here many times.

Spare us then your repetition of tired old nostrums that do not work, and have been shown not to work.

Unless, that is, you can point out the error of my ways...

Think you are up to it?

[gilhyle]

Gil:
.....And I do not use 'language games', nor do I refer to them, unless in debate, when I trash the notion ...]

Glad to hear it, one possible mystification down, now, just an infiniity of options to go.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Glad to hear it, one possible mystification down, now, just an infiniity of options to go.

1) I agree; the next to go are those ruling-class nostrums you found in Hegel. [Some hope!]

2) How do you know they are 'infinite'?

3) Can you stop attributing to me ideas you just make up. I have brought this to your attention many times now over the last two years. You never apologise or withdraw them; you just wait a few weeks and invent a few more. But, you are a quick as lightening when you think you have found an error in my posts.

[gilhyle]

How do you know they are 'infinite'?

The correct question is why do I believe they are infinite in number, not how do I 'know' they are infinite in number. But thats a by the way. The answer is that I speculate that just as human language is open and capable of infinite new sentences, we are also capable of an infinite number of mystificatory inventions for ideological purposes. Given enough time and enough historical failure to pass on to a form of social organisaton that ceases to encourage mystification, we (i.e. the species) will continue to invent new methods of mystification, whether in religious, philosophical, poetic or folk psychological form. They will all conform to a few patterns, but the variation is potentially endless. In retrospect - even if that point of reflection is the moment of the end of the species - that number will of course be limited and finite. But they are portentially limited, i.e. there will never be a point where all forms of mystification have found expression so that we can then deal with all existing ones and show rationally where they all fail. The closest we can get to that is to focus on certain generic forms of mystification which tend to be shared. However, the attempt rationally to combat even those forms is a quixotic adventure. Mystification is a problem of this world, to be resolved by its transformation not by debate within it.


You never apologise or withdraw Debate is never promoted by ascribing wrong ideas to anyone and I apologise (sincerely) for any mis-ascription of ideas to you.

However, your case is a special one since you engage in extended criticism of the ideas of others and, in doing so, rely heavily on highly philosophical assumptions which you often do not articulate. To deal with you (and I use that term in its positive as well as its negative sense) your criticisms must be revealed as flowing from your beliefs. You have decided to delay the positive articulation of your own views until you have completed the criticism of dialectial materialism (see your post on some thread where you reference Alex Callinicos and Cohen). That is a misguided methodology. Criticisms do not stand alone. They stand only in service of a proposition. We do not share a sufficient framework of rationality within capitalist society to be able to carry out a criticism of a complex point of view, such as that of Hegel without doing so from within the articulation of an alternative point of view - that is 'critique' as Marx understood it. But you do not do that. Consequently, I occasionally seek (belatedly ad half heartedly) to poiint to the positive propositions that are the intrinsic concomitants of your negative criticisms. Some of the readers of your criticisms on this board who find them attractive are unaware of the kind of perspective your approach comes from (and leads back to) and that is important in assessing both the positive and negative aspects of your insights. Consequently, I must (insofar as I engage earnestly) continue to ascribe ideas to you until you articulate your own - and dont tell me they are on your website, they arent.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil, now:


The correct question is why do I believe they are infinite in number, not how do I 'know' they are infinite in number.

Gil, earlier, but in a much sloppier frame of mind:


Glad to hear it, one possible mystification down, now, just an infiniity of options to go.

No qualifiactions in sight here concerning 'beliefs', just the usual dialectical bravado, accompanied by assertive posturing that could only have been based on assumed 'knowledge'.


The answer is that I speculate that just as human language is open and capable of infinite new sentences, we are also capable of an infinite number of mystificatory inventions for ideological purposes.

No need to be shy; there's a very simple mathematical proof to show that such sentences can be paired one-one with the reals, which I am sure you know --, or would know if you could access that assertive alter ego of a few days ago (which you now seem to have mysterously abandoned).

Don't tell me Rosa has once again slapped some materialist humility into you?!


Given enough time and enough historical failure to pass on to a form of social organisaton that ceases to encourage mystification, we (i.e. the species) will continue to invent new methods of mystification, whether in religious, philosophical, poetic or folk psychological form. They will all conform to a few patterns, but the variation is potentially endless. In retrospect - even if that point of reflection is the moment of the end of the species - that number will of course be limited and finite. But they are portentially limited, i.e. there will never be a point where all forms of mystification have found expression so that we can then deal with all existing ones and show rationally where they all fail. The closest we can get to that is to focus on certain generic forms of mystification which tend to be shared. However, the attempt rationally to combat even those forms is a quixotic adventure. Mystification is a problem of this world, to be resolved by its transformation not by debate within it.

Jesus H Christ, and I thought I was boring! You should consider working with chronic insomniacs; you have a natural gift to send people to slee...

Sorry, I drifted off there.


However, your case is a special one since you engage in extended criticism of the ideas of others and, in doing so, rely heavily on highly philosophical assumptions which you often do not articulate.

Name one, and if you are right, I will repudiate it immediately, and repent in sackcloth and Gilhyles.


That is a misguided methodology. Criticisms do not stand alone. They stand only in service of a proposition. We do not share a sufficient framework of rationality within capitalist society to be able to carry out a criticism of a complex point of view, such as that of Hegel without doing so from within the articulation of an alternative point of view - that is 'critique' as Marx understood it. But you do not do that. Consequently, I occasionally seek (belatedly ad half heartedly) to poiint to the positive propositions that are the intrinsic concomitants of your negative criticisms. Some of the readers of your criticisms on this board who find them attractive are unaware of the kind of perspective your approach comes from (and leads back to) and that is important in assessing both the positive and negative aspects of your insights. Consequently, I must (insofar as I engage earnestly) continue to ascribe ideas to you until you articulate your own - and dont tell me they are on your website, they arent.

I am glad you have read every single word of the 1.3 million at my website, but I digress in good old Gil-ish fashion.

However, and quite unexpectedly, I disagree with you about Hegel -- it is very easy to demolish his ideas since he was a logical and philosophical incompetent, a genuine Donald Duck of Dialectics. Thales, as a callow youth, would have found him a doddle.

But, no 'point of view' is needed other than a working class refusal to accept the sort of ruling-class bullsh*t you seem to dote on.

That is, in between your meals heavily laced with silcates...

They help comrades make things up, I hear.

[PRC-UTE]

Jesus H Christ, and I thought I was boring! You should consider working with chronic insomniacs; you have a natural gift to send people to slee...


What is said wasn't boring at all. It may have used some academic language, but was another way of saying that mysticism does no service to the working class movement, as its rule will be the first in history that will not require mysticisim to maintain its power.

[gilhyle]

Name one, and if you are right, I will repudiate it immediately, and repent in sackcloth and Gilhyles.

Here is a philosophical perspective you have that would require a lot of justification :

[QUOTE]But, no 'point of view' is needed other than a working class refusal to accept the sort of ruling-class bullsh*t you seem to dote on.[QUOTE]

[PRC-UTE]

But, no 'point of view' is needed other than a working class refusal to accept the sort of ruling-class bullsh*t you seem to dote on.

Are you serious?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

PRC, I know it isn't not boring to reasonable comrades like you; what I said was merely a rhetorical flourish. When Gil is in dialectical waffle mode, I cannot resist winding her/him/it up


Are you serious?

Hyperbolic -- but serious --, yes.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Here is a philosophical perspective you have that would require a lot of justification :

You will be telling me that an order for an extra pint of milk is 'philosophical' next.

But:


Here is a philosophical perspective you have that would require a lot of justification :

That needs even more justicfication; let's see if you can summarise your answer sufficiently enough for me not to doze off before I get to the end of it.

[Die Neue Zeit]

The Marxist critique of materialism in Marx's day was (to crudely summarise) that materialism of the time only studied the existence of matter whereas Marx and Engels inserted the subjectivity of humanity as central to a process. Love or hate dialectics, it doesn't change the fact that they would not have arrived at their conclusions without it.

Thanks for that clarification against vulgar materialism, comrade. Nevertheless, I prefer to use the term "subjective dynamics" as opposed to "dialectics," which has the fetish of binary analysis.

You yourself praised my geocentric model over the reductionist base-superstructure. The former is based on "subjective dynamics" (so yes, ideas are important).

[gilhyle]

....a rhetorical flourish....

Dialectics pulls us into the social world, rhetoric comforts and consolidates us in our inadequate solipsism.

Here is another piece of philosophy for you, philosophical logic this time, from this thread :


The 'law of identity' (LOI, which concerns the alleged relation between an object and itself) is in no way connected to the 'law of non-contradiction' (LOC, which concerns the truth-functional relation between a proposition and its own negation).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Dialectics pulls us into the social world, rhetoric comforts and consolidates us in our inadequate solipsism.

I rather think that our position as social agents 'pulls' us into the social world, but just call me a sentimental old materialist for such marxist thoughts.

And rhetoric is useful for taking the piss out of you ruling-class dupes.


Here is another piece of philosophy for you, philosophical logic this time, from this thread :

I see you have given up with the other red herring, and now are trying your luck on this one.

Logic is not philosophy.

But, silly me for expecting you to know that...

Will I never learn.

[gilhyle]

Gil:
Logic is not philosophy.

And there is another piece of philosophy, see Rosa, your writings are studded with philosophical claims - you trained in philosophy, you object to dialectics because of your own philosophy, your very claim that you dont rely on philosophy is itself a philosophical claim, put forward philosophically and defended with a range of arguments that are entirely philosophical in character. Your are completely embedded in philosophy and unable to escape it at all. You dont speak the romaticised language of the workers which you idolise in an idealist fashion, you speak the language of analytical philosophy. Thats why you like Callincos cos he speaks the same language you do. Thats why you like Wittgenstein, cos he speaks that language also. Your whole project is one of defence of an ordinary language philosophy with a gapping self-referential failure at its heart in that it denies its own philosophical character

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil, obviously suffering from an "Aha, that's another example of philosophy' tic:


And there is another piece of philosophy, see Rosa, your writings are studded with philosophical claims -

Says who? You?

Oh well, that settles it, then.


you trained in philosophy, you object to dialectics because of your own philosophy, your very claim that you dont rely on philosophy is itself a philosophical claim, put forward philosophically and defended with a range of arguments that are entirely philosophical in character. Your are completely embedded in philosophy and unable to escape it at all. You dont speak the romaticised language of the workers which you idolise in an idealist fashion, you speak the language of analytical philosophy. Thats why you like Callincos cos he speaks the same language you do. Thats why you like Wittgenstein, cos he speaks that language also. Your whole project is one of defence of an ordinary language philosophy with a gapping self-referential failure at its heart in that it denies its own philosophical character

You mistake my use of philosophy to help destroy it for my own alleged acceptance of some of its assumptions.

That is about as knuckle-headed as someone saying: "Aha, you Marxists are all hypocrits, since you use money, run publishing houses, and sell books, etc., -- so you must all be supporters of the capitalist system".

Are you that stupid, Gil?

I have to say that the case for your defence gets weaker with each of your posts.

And, at every turn, all my arguments contain or end with an appeal to the ordinary language of the working class, and not, as you allege (with no proof -- see, you are making stuff up again -- you just can't resist it, can you?) an idealised version of it. I use ordinary language examples, literally hundreds of times, right throughout all my essays.

Furthermore, I merely use the results of analytic philosophy to help tie you mystics in knots (which is not difficult to do, given the seriously impoverished logical and conceptual tools Hegel left all those who think he has anything of use to tell humanity).

Like Wittgenstein, I regard all the philosophical results of analytic philosophy as nonsensical (as, for example, is outlined in Cora Diamond's work). So, Wittgenstein is only an analytic philosopher in so far as his method helps bring it to an end. The sooner the better, in my view.

In comparison, you have prostituted yourself with the language and thought-forms of the boss-class.

And you have the gall to point your grubby, class-compromised fingers at me!

Kettle calling the sterilising dish 'sooty', in my opinion.

And as far as Alex is concerned, I do not like his philosophy (easily the worst part of his work), just his take on historical materialism (a scientific, not a philosophical theory).

So, you are wrong once more.

This is getting to be a bad habit with you.

I blame dialectics...

[gilhyle]

Gil, ....
You mistake my use of philosophy to help destroy it for my own alleged acceptance of some of its assumptions.

....I merely use the results of analytic philosophy to help tie you mystics in knots ....Like Wittgenstein, I regard all the philosophical results of analytic philosophy as nonsensical (as, for example, is outlined in Cora Diamond's work). So, Wittgenstein is only an analytic philosopher in so far as his method helps bring it to an end. .

I wonder if you have the slightest regard to a) how problematic that stance is (the idea of 'using' the 'results' of philosophy while considering them 'nonsensical'.) and b) how completely philosophical the Wittgensteinian method is.

You talk about mysticism, this is the mysticism of the Cathars in secular form...... It is completely incoherant because, as I have pointed out to you many times, You have no regard to the meaning of the term 'nonsensical'....... and that disregard is itself a characteristically analytical philosophical stance.

What you try to wish into existence, simply by claiming you already embody it, is something that has to be created by the historical process.

[Zurdito]

To answer the OP in crude terms, contradiction is when two things try to acheive different things which negate each other, i.e. the acheiving of one means the failure of the other. a marxist believes this, because we believe that class struggle is the driving force of history, i.e. the primary contradiction in society is contradiction in the interests of the accumulating class and the producing class.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


I wonder if you have the slightest regard to a) how problematic that stance is (the idea of 'using' the 'results' of philosophy while considering them 'nonsensical'.) and b) how completely philosophical the Wittgensteinian method is.

Only about as 'problematic' as is using Marx's method to help end capitalism.

And, as Cora Diamond (and those associated with her: Rupert Read, John Conant, Juliet Floyd, etc.) have shown, this claim is about as accurate as WMD dossiers tend to be:


b) how completely philosophical the Wittgensteinian method is.

Once more, W's method is 'philosophical' only in so far as Marxism is pro-capitalist -- they both seek to end either.

http://www.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/Faculty.nsf/FHPbI/B036D5A8E130A6F385256ABE0067158C?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=1#_Section1

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/publications.htm

http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/conant.html


You talk about mysticism, this is the mysticism of the Cathars in secular form...... It is completely incoherant because, as I have pointed out to you many times, You have no regard to the meaning of the term 'nonsensical'....... and that disregard is itself a characteristically analytical philosophical stance.

What the hell have the Cathars got to do with anything? Your mysticism is Hermetic (and shot-through with aprioristic, dogmatic ruling-class thought-forms):

http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/magee.htm

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=NFIOpySKxw0C&dq=hegel+hermetic+magee&pg=PP1&ots=KaIOAQy7_c&sig=iQEZvG4U4C8Q6CpDrEfKoJLFRqM&hl=en&prev=http://www.google.co.uk/search%3Fhl%3Den%26sa%3DX%26oi%3Dspell%26resnum%3D 0%26ct%3Dresult%26cd%3D1%26q%3DHegel%2BHermetic%2B Magee%26spell%3D1&sa=X&oi=print&ct=title&cad=one-book-with-thumbnail


It is completely incoherant because, as I have pointed out to you many times, You have no regard to the meaning of the term 'nonsensical'

This is a bit rich coming from someone who confused the meaning of words with the sense of propositions (and who still does not know the difference).

And you haven't seen my PhD work on 'nonsense' -- so you can shut your mystical cake-hole.


What you try to wish into existence, simply by claiming you already embody it, is something that has to be created by the historical process.

Ah, more aprioristic dogma.

Well, I suppose we can be grateful that you are at least consistently dogmatic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


To answer the OP in crude terms, contradiction is when two things try to acheive different things which negate each other, i.e. the acheiving of one means the failure of the other. a marxist believes this, because we believe that class struggle is the driving force of history, i.e. the primary contradiction in society is contradiction in the interests of the accumulating class and the producing class.

Thankyou for that Z -- we can always rely on you to assume the role of naive dialectician, somewhat equivalent to those who think that passages from the Bible, or quotes from the local pastor, are the answer to all life's problems.

As my posts here have shown, this 'definition' does not work.

You need, therefore, to stop reeling-off comforting dialectical platitudes, and address the serious problems this incoherent notion (i.e., 'dialectical contradiction') faces.

[Zurdito]

I haven't read your posts int his thread Rosa, because judging by your past form on dialectics, I can have a guess that the thread descended into nitpicking over biological minutiae.

The OP asked "what is contradiction", i.e., within the tradition of dialectical materialism. I answered it - that annoys you, because you rest on the asusmption that the question can't be answered, let alone in every-day language.

It's ironic isn't it, because my answer didn't even claim that dialectical "contradiction" applies to the real world, I simply explained what is meant when someone uses the term - as the OP requested. Surely it's then up to him to decide if he thinks it's rubbish or not.Personally, I have no trouble seeing how the concept applies to the historical development of human society. Whether it applies to physics or not I won't presume to judge.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


I haven't read your posts int his thread Rosa, because judging by your past form on dialectics, I can have a guess that the thread descended into nitpicking over biological minutiae.

Ok, stay ignorant.

And, the last time we 'debated', it did not 'descend' as you say. I raised substantive objections to Engels's first 'law', derived from chemisrty, physics, biology and everyday experience. You just could not answer my criticisms, truth be told.

In addition, I pointed out that key terms were left undefined, making that law completely vague and subjective.

Same with Lenin's belief in Santa Claus.


The OP asked "what is contradiction", i.e., within the tradition of dialectical materialism. I answered it - that annoys you, because you rest on the asusmption that the question can't be answered, let alone in every-day language.

The question can no more be answered than can this: "What is the precise nature of God?" -- as I have shown

But like simple-minded Christians, you prefer to cling on to naive and comforting beliefs.


It's ironic isn't it, because my answer didn't even claim that dialectical "contradiction" applies to the real world, I simply explained what is meant when someone uses the term - as the OP requested. Surely it's then up to him to decide if he thinks it's rubbish or not.Personally, I have no trouble seeing how the concept applies to the historical development of human society. Whether it applies to physics or not I won't presume to judge.

But, the term has no meaning; so you are mistaken yet again.

No more than this has:

"Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe."

[trivas7]

You need, therefore, to stop reeling-off comforting dialectical platitudes, and address the serious problems this incoherent notion (i.e., 'dialectical contradiction') faces.
Rosa, browbeating those you think disagree with you isn't an argument. I agree with Gil that you have no philosophical legs to stand on. You'd have to rewrite all of Marx's ouvre in your own pristine logic sans a whiff of Hegel in order to make your argument cogent. It's not enough to be against something as you state:

However, to give an analogy, we can surely be highly critical of Newton's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isaac_Newton) mystical ideas (http://www.alchemylab.com/isaac_newton.htm) while accepting the scientific nature of his other work. The same applies here.

You'd have to expound Marxism scientifically per your own pristine, un-Hegelian logic. I.e., show how the class struggle and historical materialism is logical. Until you can do so, your @nti-dialectics don't convince, they are built on sand.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Rosa, browbeating those you think disagree with you isn't an argument. I agree with Gil that you have no philosophical legs to stand on. You'd have to rewrite all of Marx's ouvre in your own pristine logic sans a whiff of Hegel in order to make your argument cogent. It's not enough to be against something as you state:

Look, sunshine, you weren't here when the above debate took place, so you have no opinion on it.

And, I have no need to re-write Marx's work (Why would I want to do that, anyway? All I have to do at present is ignore the mystcial sections, and concentrate on the scientific parts -- mercifully they outnumber the former by a huge margin). I freely admit Marx had absorbed far too much Hegel in his early work. The point is that in Das Kapital, according to Marx's own words, every trace of Hegel has been removed.


You'd have to expound Marxism scientifically per your own pristine, un-Hegelian logic. I.e., show how the class struggle and historical materialism is logical. Until you can do so, your @nti-dialectics don't convince, they are built on sand.

Now, if I were to skim read, say Das Kapital, and merely say 'it does not work' we both know what you'd say in response.

Same here: unless you can say why my ideas do not work, your comments are peurile -- at best.

And, you do not need an ounce of logic to write or re-write historical materialism --whether or not it is dialectical 'logic' or fomal logic (in fact, 'discursive logic' already shows that the scientific parts of Marx's theory are sound).

[The fact that you think this shows how little of my work you have actually read -- or grapsed.]

You really are scratching around, looking desperately for something, anything, negative to say about my ideas (no matter how irrelevant it is to my actual work) -- not doing too well, so far, are you?

Quit now before you make an even bigger fool of yourself.

In the meantime, may I suggest you look up 'relevant' in the dictionary?

[gilhyle]

I charged you with being embedded within philosophy, you denied that, but admitted that you do engage with its practice, but only for the purpose of undoing it (sorry Im not replicating your exact words - look above for those). You cite Diamond (a professor of philosophy indeed an academic studying Wittgenstein, Frege and the philosophy of language, moral and political philosophy, and the relationship between philosophy and literature who has served as a Director of Graduate Studies in a Department of Philosophy since 1990), in support of your view.

But you dont explain - and you need to - how the mere intention to end philosophy or break with philosophy can be achieved by a practice entirely contained within the terms of reference of philosophy, as is the case with Wittgenstein, if your assertions are to have any force.

You dont explain that, anymore than you can explain how you have constructed a critique of a set of writings that you think are nonsense, a problem I have previously pointed out to you.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ah, Gil drags herself/himself off the canvas after another pummelling from Rosa:


I charged you with being embedded within philosophy, you denied that, but admitted that you do engage with its practice, but only for the purpose of undoing it (sorry Im not replicating your exact words - look above for those). You cite Diamond (a professor of philosophy indeed an academic studying...

And I 'charge' you with stupidity, and with good cause. You plainly cannot read. Go back and try again -- only this time, take that fetching Wellington Boot off your head. It is clearly affecting your eyes.


But you dont explain - and you need to - how the mere intention to end philosophy or break with philosophy can be achieved by a practice entirely contained within the terms of reference of philosophy, as is the case with Wittgenstein, if your assertions are to have any force.

You dont explain that, anymore than you can explain how you have constructed a critique of a set of writings that you think are nonsense, a problem I have previously pointed out to you.

Yes, yes, and I suppose you are dim-witted enough to believe that a doctor, say, who eradicates a disease is also infected with that disease.

[If the above reasoning is too quick for you, I'll type it slower next time.]

Now, we can keep this up for weeks if you like; we both know you always fold first.

No stamina, unlike us working class revolutionaries.

[Nice cut and paste job from Cora's site, by the way.

Met her once, 20 or so years ago...]

[gilhyle]

Now, we can keep this up for weeks if you like; we both know you always fold first.

there are times Rosa when you appear to understand that what we are talking about is a politics that is needed by billions and there are times when you appear to be trapped in the need to win like an aspirant bully in a playground. Yes I will always stop before you, just as one claimant before Solomon would rather give up the child........I recognise the ability of conversation about philosophy to become politically useless and to descend into mere flaming and abuse. End of thread as far as I am concerned, since you have had nothing to say for the last couple of posts, except to follow some Beckettian motto - you cant go on, but you will go on.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil, getting personal now that his/her rationality has run out:


there are times Rosa when you appear to understand that what we are talking about is a politics that is needed by billions and there are times when you appear to be trapped in the need to win like an aspirant bully in a playground. Yes I will always stop before you, just as one claimant before Solomon would rather give up the child........I recognise the ability of conversation about philosophy to become politically useless and to descend into mere flaming and abuse. End of thread as far as I am concerned, since you have had nothing to say for the last couple of posts, except to follow some Beckettian motto - you cant go on, but you will go on.

And yet you come back for more of the same pain from me regularly.

Moreover, even if I had nothing to say -- it would still be more than you.

[Remember, never pick a fight with a logician -- especially a working class one -- or you will always have to storm off in a huff like this.

Have a nice fume...]