Moral Relativism

[Dean]

This is just for those who agree that morality does exist. I will loosely define it for this argument as what "should be done" or what "is good / best."

From this standpoint, are morals relative - that is, is it moral to do something in some circumstances but not others? Alternatively, if something is immoral,, is it always immoral?

An easy example for this is the issue of homicide. Is it always wrong to kill another person, even in self-defense? Or is it only wrong when it is not for some specific gain like protection?

A third standpoint could be that it is always wrong to kill a person, but it is sometimes rational or acceptable - albeit immoral, or "imperfect" - to kill a person.

An argument for the more rigid standpoint is that killing a man unprovoked is always considered wrong, whereas killing a man who is a threat is considered acceptable - however, the man has undergone no real moral change. This is especially clear when one considers what motivates a man to kill - it is usually not intrinsic character traits, but rather socially adopted ones, and in those cases where the catalyst does stem from inherent traits, the person is always mentally disordered.

Basically, the Marxist concept - that man defines his actions from his economic conditions, and in turn forms his morality on his actions - is applied to human morality. Remember, the issue isn't what you would do, but what is right.

Thoughts?

[Os Cangaceiros]

Morality is indeed relative if looked upon from the perspective that all moral opinions are subjective evaluations on the part of the individual making them.

[rouchambeau]

Dean: Aristotle had an idea of ethics not unlike the one you are proposing, but he was anything but a relativist. Aristotle argued that there are certain virtues that moral people have, but that these virtues are not static and rigid; the proper amount of virtue depends upon the situation. For example, it is a virtue to be of good temper. When someone steels from you it is good to be pretty angry and not apathetic. However, if someone accidentally trips you, it would be foolish to get just as angry or angry at all. In these situations, what is moral is contingent upon the situation, but morality is not relative to cultures or individuals.

Again, what you're proposing isn't relativism at all.

[Dean]

Dean: Aristotle had an idea of ethics not unlike the one you are proposing, but he was anything but a relativist. Aristotle argued that there are certain virtues that moral people have, but that these virtues are not static and rigid; the proper amount of virtue depends upon the situation. For example, it is a virtue to be of good temper. When someone steels from you it is good to be pretty angry and not apathetic. However, if someone accidentally trips you, it would be foolish to get just as angry or angry at all. In these situations, what is moral is contingent upon the situation, but morality is not relative to cultures or individuals.

Again, what you're proposing isn't relativism at all.

It is relativistic, because what is moral changes based on the situation. Joseph Fletcher described a similar viewpoint in "Situation Ethics."

However, I don't agree with that viewpoint. I think morals are static, but rational actions are relative. I agree with this part of my post: "A third standpoint could be that it is always wrong to kill a person, but it is sometimes rational or acceptable - albeit immoral, or "imperfect" - to kill a person." I believe, for morals to have any integrity, they must stem from basic principles which make them fairly rigid. This is not relativistic; though I take the rationality of situtational consideration from situation ethics, I reject the notion that morality can be judged based on circumstances rather than inherent principles.

However, how you go about achieving those morals is either an extremely anal - obsessive view, where you never compromise them, or an extremely loose view where the means justify the ends. I think that how one go about achieving morality is aways either irrational and anal, or a compromise on some morals to uphold as many of these ideals as possible. Since morals are almost always imperfectly honored, it is therefore better to try to uphold as many of the most important morals as possible than to adhere to a negative policy where one never compromises morals, even if the result is that you fail to rescue some of the more important moral potentialities.

[Kronos]

There are philosophical problems in the subject of morals for both sides of the argument- in objectivism, which attempts to deduce moral truths through "a prior" reasoning, we can argue that such noumenal facts might not exist. For example, we could easily ask Kant, when he claims that morals are deonotological, to prove the basis from which he founds this claim; what makes it my duty to be "good"? Kant replies "transcendent a prior truths". I ask, if these truths are transcendent, how can you know them or that they exist. Kant scratches his head. Nice try though.

In moral relativism, we find that moral propositions collapse and have no epistemological relevancy. Relative moral propositions are laden with self-referential fallacies and therefore remain incoherent.

I think Wittgenstein sums it up quite well- there are no such things as moral propositions. Both objectivism and relativism are therefore meaningless. We should then make a break from epistemology and concern ourselves with acts that are useful....and not merely "right" or "wrong".

A comrade in another thread (forgot his name) took an approach I agree with. He called morals, from a marxist perspective, either "progressive" or "digressive". I like this, although the question remains- if communism is ever established, can we still define morals as progressive or digressive? That is, is such a definition relevant only "on the way" to communism, or is this definition stable at all times?

I have an affinity for Nietzsche and his idea that life is a will to power, that might makes right. I like to combine this idea with moral consequentialism....but within the framework of this idea of progressive and digressive morals. I think this simplifies the subject of morals and leaves the problems I mentioned above "on the shelf". Now our question becomes- is this act "good" in a revolutionary sense, not in a universal sense? We must not attempt moral acts that are universally good (even if that is possible), but contingently good for revolutionary causes.

A moral act can be judged as progressive or digressive according to its consequences regarding its usefulness in revolutionary activity. Now we must define "revolutionary" and submerge ourselves into philosophy once again. This is unfortunate I guess.

[Dean]

There are philosophical problems in the subject of morals for both sides of the argument- in objectivism, which attempts to deduce moral truths through "a prior" reasoning, we can argue that such noumenal facts might not exist. For example, we could easily ask Kant, when he claims that morals are deonotological, to prove the basis from which he founds this claim; what makes it my duty to be "good"? Kant replies "transcendent a prior truths". I ask, if these truths are transcendent, how can you know them or that they exist. Kant scratches his head. Nice try though.

In moral relativism, we find that moral propositions collapse and have no epistemological relevancy. Relative moral propositions are laden with self-referential fallacies and therefore remain incoherent.

I think Wittgenstein sums it up quite well- there are no such things as moral propositions. Both objectivism and relativism are therefore meaningless. We should then make a break from epistemology and concern ourselves with acts that are useful....and not merely "right" or "wrong".
This is more or less saying that there is no objective, non-human explanation for morals. That morality is based purely on mystical values. Well, I agree. This difference is this: do we discount the concept simply because it is a primarily emotional, rather than objective, scientific or physical concept? I don't think that is reasonable. We could also discount that there is really any good or importance on revolutionary theory this way, unless it can be "proven" - which we know most of them cant.



A comrade in another thread (forgot his name) took an approach I agree with. He called morals, from a marxist perspective, either "progressive" or "digressive". I like this, although the question remains- if communism is ever established, can we still define morals as progressive or digressive? That is, is such a definition relevant only "on the way" to communism, or is this definition stable at all times?
That seems like a fairly common concept of morals for these forums, though people wouldn't admit it. Often, oppression and destructivity are lauded if they can be useful to a revolution. However, I don't agree with that. For one, if you compare morals to revolutionary theory in the first place, you are basically saying that morality is equivalent to what is good. In other words, morality is the same thing to you as it is to anyone else - you just have a specific line drawn to accomodate to marxist - style morals. I don't think its a bad thing altogether, but I don't agree that you can usurp basic human rights and call it moral. For me, the only moral conditions are those which are revolutionary themselves - if they serve the revolution, but fail to meet the standards for what is acceptable in a post-revolutionary society, it is immoral, and not just that, it is quite possibly dangerous for the maintenance and progression of the revolution itself.


I have an affinity for Nietzsche and his idea that life is a will to power, that might makes right. I like to combine this idea with moral consequentialism....but within the framework of this idea of progressive and digressive morals. I think this simplifies the subject of morals and leaves the problems I mentioned above "on the shelf". Now our question becomes- is this act "good" in a revolutionary sense, not in a universal sense? We must not attempt moral acts that are universally good (even if that is possible), but contingently good for revolutionary causes.
I disagree with the comparison. The "might makes right" philosophy is a distinctly fascist concept, and communists believe that need make right. That is, that what is right is that which is needed by humans - not that which humans are able to do by force or might. I can see how a revolutionary might say that "might makes right" supports a revolutionary theory, but the fact is that if we are wrong - and that history is instead bound for much more sinister corporate - state structures, we are then saying that what is right is totally at odds with the communist / anarchist programs.


A moral act can be judged as progressive or digressive according to its consequences regarding its usefulness in revolutionary activity. Now we must define "revolutionary" and submerge ourselves into philosophy once again. This is unfortunate I guess.
Again, you are really saying that "morality is what is right" and "what is right is revolution." If you say "morality is what will happen" (like with Nietzsche) and "revolution will happen," you are making a very strange assertion for what morality should be.

[Invader Zim]

Of course morality is subjective; what one society would consider to be immoral is not necessarily agreed upon by another society. This is because morals are a social construct, and as a result they differ from one society to another and even from one individual to another. The abortion issue is a good example, in some societies it is considered immoral and as such is illegal, in others it isn't.

[Kronos]

This is more or less saying that there is no objective, non-human explanation for morals. That morality is based purely on mystical values. Well, I agree. This difference is this: do we discount the concept simply because it is a primarily emotional, rather than objective, scientific or physical concept? I don't think that is reasonable. We could also discount that there is really any good or importance on revolutionary theory this way, unless it can be "proven" - which we know most of them cant.

Dean, I don't really understand what you are asking in that quote. If you ask it again a little differently, maybe I will catch on.


Often, oppression and destructivity are lauded if they can be useful to a revolution. However, I don't agree with that. For one, if you compare morals to revolutionary theory in the first place, you are basically saying that morality is equivalent to what is good.

What is "good" is what is useful. Since what is useful pertains only to class interests, what is "good" for the proletariat is "bad" for the capitalist, naturally.


but I don't agree that you can usurp basic human rights and call it moral.

What are "basic human rights"? Previously you admitted that morals were "based on purely mystical values". Wouldn't rights also be based from the same thing? That is to say, if there is no agency "beyond man" that determines what is right and what is wrong, there can be no determination concerning what man should have and not have, regarding rights. We can certainly create ethical contracts and grant rights to people....but outside of such a contract, these rights do not exist.


The "might makes right" philosophy is a distinctly fascist concept, and communists believe that need make right.

"Might makes right" could be better expressed as "might makes alive, while weakness makes dead". A dead man is not moral. Also, if according to you, "need" makes right, would it then be permissible to give a killer a gun, rather than a knife, if he needed it to be more efficient at killing?


That is, that what is right is that which is needed by humans - not that which humans are able to do by force or might.

Again, what humans "need" is irrelevant to morals. But what they get is a matter of moral contract, and this contract is established through power.

If I say "I think that child should be given food to eat", I cannot assert that because he is starving, he ought not be. There is absolutely nothing outside my personal decision to give this child food that demands he "ought" to have food because of some "right" that exists beyond contract. Now, I can get away with saying something like "I don't like to starve and I suspect he doesn't either", and through this sympathy, I would want to get him some food. But I am not appealing to some kind altruism when I make that decision.


Of course morality is subjective; what one society would consider to be immoral is not necessarily agreed upon by another society.

IZ, you are speaking of cultural relativity, which has its own unique problems. If an individual in one culture commits an act that is deemed immoral by his culture, but not immoral by a neighboring culture, who decides what his act actually was? Let's say a tribesman doesn't scalp a tribesman from an enemy tribe, while making his "passage into manhood". Is this act immoral according to his tribe, but moral according to the opposing tribe? Now watch. If we define "being immoral" as "not complying with the rules of one's society", the opposing tribe cannot call his refusal to scalp an enemy tribesman a "moral" act, since despite the fact that he didn't scalp the enemy tribesman, he still didn't follow the rules of his society. See the dilemma?