Anonymous
18th June 2002, 22:39
When major newspapers around the world trumpet headlines such as "U.S., Russia to Cut Nuclear Arms," it should be cause for excitement, even celebration. It is certainly better to have fewer nuclear weapons than more. But before we bring out the champagne, it would be a good idea to read the fine print and examine more closely what the treaty will and will not do.
When the treaty is examined closely, it has more the feel of a public-relations effort than a solid step toward reducing nuclear dangers and fulfilling the longstanding promises of the two countries to engage in good-faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Even if this treaty is ratified and enters into force, we will keep on remaining in the danger zone that nuclear weapons pose to humanity and all life.
The nuclear weapons taken off active deployment will not necessarily be destroyed. Each side still retains thousands of short-range weapons, and there is serious concern about the Russian arsenal's vulnerability to theft or unauthorized use.
The treaty calls for reducing the size of the actively deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals from some 6,000 weapons on each side today to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012. This is approximately a two-thirds reduction in actively deployed long-range nuclear weapons, a move that is undeniably positive.
The treaty, however, has serious flaws. The nuclear weapons taken off active deployment will not necessarily be destroyed. It will be up to each country to determine what to do with these weapons. Many, if not most, of them will be placed in storage, ready to be rapidly redeployed if either country decides to do so.
There is also no immediacy to moving from current levels of strategic nuclear weapons to the promised lower levels. According to the terms of the treaty, each country needs only to reduce to the agreed upon levels by the year 2012. That also happens to be the year the treaty terminates unless extended.
The United States has been a proponent of making the nuclear reductions reversible. The major problem with this approach is that it leads the Russians to do the same, and thereby increases the likelihood that these weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists. It would be better for both countries to permanently dismantle the nuclear weapons removed from active deployment, thereby removing the risk of theft by terrorists.
The treaty deals only with strategic or long-range nuclear weapons. It does not seek to control or reduce tactical or short-range nuclear weapons. Each side still retains thousands of these weapons, and there is serious concern about the Russian arsenal's vulnerability to theft or unauthorized use. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, made partially public in January 2002, called for the development of so-called bunker buster nuclear weapons that would be far more likely to be used than the larger long-range nuclear weapons.
And even at the lowest level of 1,700 strategic nuclear weapons on each side, there will still be a sufficient number to destroy more than 3,000 cities.
President Bush claims, "This treaty will liquidate the legacy of the Cold War." That remains to be seen. By designing a treaty that will hold so many nuclear weapons in reserve and retain so many on active "hair-trigger" alert, the two sides are not exactly demonstrating a level of trust commensurate with their current friendly relations.
We still need an agreement that provides for deeper, more comprehensive and irreversible cuts with a far greater sense of urgency. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin ought to return to the negotiating table.
When the treaty is examined closely, it has more the feel of a public-relations effort than a solid step toward reducing nuclear dangers and fulfilling the longstanding promises of the two countries to engage in good-faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Even if this treaty is ratified and enters into force, we will keep on remaining in the danger zone that nuclear weapons pose to humanity and all life.
The nuclear weapons taken off active deployment will not necessarily be destroyed. Each side still retains thousands of short-range weapons, and there is serious concern about the Russian arsenal's vulnerability to theft or unauthorized use.
The treaty calls for reducing the size of the actively deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals from some 6,000 weapons on each side today to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012. This is approximately a two-thirds reduction in actively deployed long-range nuclear weapons, a move that is undeniably positive.
The treaty, however, has serious flaws. The nuclear weapons taken off active deployment will not necessarily be destroyed. It will be up to each country to determine what to do with these weapons. Many, if not most, of them will be placed in storage, ready to be rapidly redeployed if either country decides to do so.
There is also no immediacy to moving from current levels of strategic nuclear weapons to the promised lower levels. According to the terms of the treaty, each country needs only to reduce to the agreed upon levels by the year 2012. That also happens to be the year the treaty terminates unless extended.
The United States has been a proponent of making the nuclear reductions reversible. The major problem with this approach is that it leads the Russians to do the same, and thereby increases the likelihood that these weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists. It would be better for both countries to permanently dismantle the nuclear weapons removed from active deployment, thereby removing the risk of theft by terrorists.
The treaty deals only with strategic or long-range nuclear weapons. It does not seek to control or reduce tactical or short-range nuclear weapons. Each side still retains thousands of these weapons, and there is serious concern about the Russian arsenal's vulnerability to theft or unauthorized use. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, made partially public in January 2002, called for the development of so-called bunker buster nuclear weapons that would be far more likely to be used than the larger long-range nuclear weapons.
And even at the lowest level of 1,700 strategic nuclear weapons on each side, there will still be a sufficient number to destroy more than 3,000 cities.
President Bush claims, "This treaty will liquidate the legacy of the Cold War." That remains to be seen. By designing a treaty that will hold so many nuclear weapons in reserve and retain so many on active "hair-trigger" alert, the two sides are not exactly demonstrating a level of trust commensurate with their current friendly relations.
We still need an agreement that provides for deeper, more comprehensive and irreversible cuts with a far greater sense of urgency. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin ought to return to the negotiating table.