Can History Be A Science?

[Oswy]

By 'history' I mean the scholarly investigations and corresponding accounts of past events and processes?

This question partly rests, of course, on how 'science' is characterised and there seems to be more than one way to do that. Any views on this subject?

[Black Dagger]

No - history is closer to a literary genre (esp. genres like biography) than a science.

Although historical writing and science do have some basic similarities (thesis, use of evidence, peer review etc.) - history attempts to retell/describe events for which there is little evidence. The historical 'record' as such is woefully incomplete, and inherently so - the 'past' cannot be recreated in a scientific manner - the remnants of it are but mere fragments - selectively preserved and open to the interpretation/use of historians for a variety of political purposes.
The past cannot be observed or recorded in a scientific manner without a 'time machine' - until then the best an historian can do is educated guesswork tied together with a persuasive argument (like any literary genre, humour and engaging prose helps the medicine go down) as to why their yarn about this or that is the most accurate/complete to date/whatever their claim is.

Much (though not all) history is an attempt to 'discover' the 'truth' of 'the past' (as if past events had a predetermined meaning or 'truth' that exists 'out there' just waiting to be 'uncovered' by the diligent historian - shout out to my homie Ranke!) - this is where pretensions of objectivity and 'science' tend to emerge. Historians also tend to teologically invent 'meaning' for events (often presented as 'truth' or 'fact'), but one that is nevertheless alien to the object(s) of study (inc. assertions - that is speculation - of an individuals personal motivations/feelings/state of mind, heavy use of inference as opposed to evidence), which makes historical writing far too incomplete (that is inadequate) and subjective to ever be considered a science.

Though personally i have no problems with people writing subjective histories (forgive the tautology) - the problem is merely when an author does not acknowledge their subjectivity in their work (or indeed engage with/explore it therein). Though i do have a problem with truth claims in historical writing - all the time - for the reasons i outlined above - 'Who's truth?! OUR TRUTH!!! WHO'S TRUTH?! OUR TRUTH!!!!' Besides one does not need to make a truth claim to make a persuasive argument - which to me is 'good' history (or at least a key component of it).

And no, using fragments of scientific methodology does not make historical writing 'scientific' in anything but the broadest (read: weakest) sense, and certainly does not make it a 'science'.

[Nakidana]

Hmm, but couldn't relics from the past be used as observations?

[Black Dagger]

Have you seen that episode of Futurama (Jurassic Bark) where Fry decides to take Bender to a museum exhibit, showing a reconstructed pizzeria from the 20th century?

Relics are objects removed from their context - without this context or other relics to explain the context (which could also be inaccurate) from which they derive we can only make educated guesses as to their use/meaning (see: the debate around supposed 'fertility idols' for an example of the problems with the use of relics in history).

This is not to say that observations about 'the past' cannot be derived from existing relics - but merely that given the lack of context for many of these items these observations have inherently limited usefulness - historians again must rely heavily on their powers of inference to explain (that is prescribe meaning to) them. Relics frequently do not possess direct explanatory power (and when they do this presents merely a particular explanation - perhaps not the only one - how can we know? Particularly when dealing with so-called 'prehistory')- that is a problem with historical sources generally - the job of the historian is thus to provide this explanation - to somehow craft a meaning from the fragments.

[Nakidana]

But scientists in other fields do use relics as observations. A perfect example would be scientists inferring evolution from old fossils. Of course they wouldn't be able to base evolution on fossils alone, but they're still used as "observations". And this is called science.

So I guess the difference lies in context? Fossils are not removed from context as evolution is still ongoing, but historical relics are removed from context as the conditions of that period do not exist any longer? :confused:

[Invader Zim]

A few months ago myself and Luis discussed this very topic, I took the line which Black Dagger has eloquently described here, and Luis articulately produced arguments for the opposing position.

As for relics, it is an interesting question and one which historians have traditionally done their upmost to avoid. Historians in the past have taken the exceptionally narrow minded position of advocating the primacy of the written word, and rejecting the viability of other forms of sources. But of course 'relics' can be used to bolster historical knowledge, but just like written documents they exist outside of their orgiional context and offer the exact same flaws as the written word.

My current research is on British abolitionism, and relics and historical artifacts of vital improtance in piecing together the history of the abolition movement. But these artifacts do not suddenly transform our understanding, they do not provide an extra truly 'scientific' means of transporting us into the past. As Black Dagger said, the objects lack context.

http://www.history.org/history/teaching/enewsletter/volume2/images/antislavery_medallion_large.jpg

This is a Wedgewood anti-slavery medallion. Its meaning is clear, but does it tell you anything more about anti-slavery sentiments in Britain than the sentiments espouced by Dr Thomas Coke contained in my signature line?


"I preached the late Colonel Bedford’s funeral sermon. But I said nothing good of him, for he was a violent friend of slavery, and his interest being great among the Methodists in these parts, he would have been a dreadful thorn in our sides, if the Lord had not in mercy taken him away."

- Rev. Dr. Thomas Coke, 6 April 1785

No.

[Nakidana]

This is a Wedgewood anti-slavery medallion. Its meaning is clear, but does it tell you anything more about anti-slavery sentiments in Britain than the sentiments espouced by Dr Thomas Coke contained in my signature line?

I guess not. But say you were to find millions of these all around Britain, could you not "infer" from those "observations" that anti-slavery sentiments were profound during that period?

I'm just trying to find out what you mean exactly when you say "out of context". What's the difference between historical relics and fossils for example? Are they not both out of context? Then how come using fossils to substantiate evolution is considered science but using historical relics to substantiate history is not? :confused:

EDIT: Reading through Black Dagger's first reply again I see he mentions the lack of evidence. So, the lack of observations makes it impossible to conduct research that could be considered scientific?

[Invader Zim]

But say you were to find millions of these all around Britain, could you not "infer" from those "observations" that anti-slavery sentiments were profound during that period?Say you found millions of written documents attesting to the exact same thing. In 1792 alone there were around 400,000 people who signed abolitionist petitions. The fact that the object is an item, rather than a document, doesn't increase or decrease its value as a historical source of information.


I'm just trying to find out what you mean exactly when you say "out of context".Ok, say you are at a dig and discover a sword like object in a grave. What does this tell you? That swords ave some for of religious symbolism? That is was custom to bury people with military tools? That it was simply a prized and beloved possession? That it was left there by error?

That is the context of the item, and historians can only make educated guesses as to what that context is. Say its not an item as obvious as a sword, say its an object that you can't identify? Or that it is an item which is seemingly out of place?


Are they not both out of context?A fossil doesn't really have a context, at least for this kind of discussion. If an organism dies, is coated in mud or whatever, remains there with layer after lay of sediment building up over millions of years until the organic material is mineralized. We can then find that fossil and learn about the anatomy of the organism through direct observation of remains of the organism. However the organism has not been placed there, it has no purpose, it is not a tool. If you find a historical 'relic' you are forced to guess what purposes the object was put to.

[Nakidana]

Ok, say you are at a dig and discover a sword like object in a grave. What does this tell you? That swords ave some for of religious symbolism? That is was custom to bury people with military tools? That it was simply a prized and beloved possession? That it was left there by error?

That is the context of the item, and historians can only make educated guesses as to what that context is. Say its not an item as obvious as a sword, say its an object that you can't identify? Or that it is an item which is seemingly out of place?

Okay, so you form a hypothesis. You make an observation (sword like object in a grave), and you form a hypothesis (custom to bury people with military tools) in order to explain that observation. That's the same way science proceeds. You make an observation (fossils), form a hypothesis (evolution), deduce a prediction from the hypothesis (we must find more layered fossils in digs) and test the prediction (look for fossils in dig sites).


However the organism has not been placed there, it has no purpose, it is not a tool. If you find a historical 'relic' you are forced to guess what purposes the object was put to.

Arf, I'm sorry but I still don't get your definition of context. It sounds like context is simply the historian asking "Why is this item here?" which is a question any scientist could ask as well.

[Black Dagger]

I had a long reply typed out but my tab decided to refresh for some reason :(


Arf, I'm sorry but I still don't get your definition of context.

Both relics and fossils have context (they're both from a particular time period, representative of particular things etc.)- but only relics have social context or meaning - history is the story of human society and relationships not an account of everything 'past' - but of the past of humans. Relics have a context within this human framework, most fossils do not.



It sounds like context is simply the historian asking "Why is this item here?" which is a question any scientist could ask as well.

Right, but simply asking questions or forming hypotheses does not make something a science - otherwise any humanities honours thesis would be 'science'. Basic similarities does not make two things analogous - this is a reductionist view of science.


Okay, so you form a hypothesis. You make an observation (sword like object in a grave), and you form a hypothesis (custom to bury people with military tools) in order to explain that observation. That's the same way science proceeds. You make an observation (fossils), form a hypothesis (evolution), deduce a prediction from the hypothesis (we must find more layered fossils in digs) and test the prediction (look for fossils in dig sites).

Only a small proportion of historical practice deals with relics (sword in a grave type stuff) - so making arguments about the nature of 'history' as a totality- from this POV - is fallacious.

Furthermore in your own explanation you've made a clear distinction between the methodology of historians and that of scientists.

In the first part of the paragraph you outline a historians approach - then claim that this is how 'science proceeds' - but in your outline of a scientific approach you've added several additional steps (read: differences between the historical and scientific approaches),

I.E.


...deduce a prediction from the hypothesis (we must find more layered fossils in digs) and test the prediction (look for fossils in dig sites).Historians don't deduce or test 'predictions' - historical writing is explanation, a hypothesis or argument for a specific version of events- this is one of the key difference between science and history. What you're describing here is in fact archaeology - which has some similarities with history - but is nevertheless a science.


Then how come using fossils to substantiate evolution is considered science but using historical relics to substantiate history is not?

This too is fallacious - you're basically asking - 'how come a scientific process is scientific but a non-scientific process is not?'

History is not a concrete knowledge in the same way much of science is; historians have very limited access to evidence and must frequently rely on untestable inference (and 'evidence' - that is historical sources- that exist are open to interpretation in ways in which scientific evidence is not); to not only report events ('describe a process') but imbue them with social meaning, emphasis, importance - all of which is subjective and completely detached from a scientific rationale - including speculation as to the mental states or motivations of deceased persons etc.

I addressed this all in my previous post:


The historical 'record' as such is woefully incomplete, and inherently so - the 'past' cannot be recreated in a scientific manner - the remnants of it are but mere fragments - selectively preserved and open to the interpretation/use of historians for a variety of political purposes.
The past cannot be observed or recorded in a scientific manner without a 'time machine' - until then the best an historian can do is educated guesswork tied together with a persuasive argument (like any literary genre, humour and engaging prose helps the medicine go down) as to why their yarn about this or that is the most accurate/complete to date/whatever their claim is.

...

Historians also tend to teologically invent 'meaning' for events (often presented as 'truth' or 'fact'), but one that is nevertheless alien to the object(s) of study (inc. assertions - that is speculation - of an individuals personal motivations/feelings/state of mind, heavy use of inference as opposed to evidence), which makes historical writing far too incomplete (that is inadequate) and subjective to ever be considered a science.

Relics don't 'substantiate' anything - they merely provide a basis for historians to attempt explanations, or to attempt to justify existing narratives/attempted explanations - history cannot be 'substantiated' in the same was as scientific knowledge and is not intended to be - which i guess is one of the reasons why history is in the arts faculty and not the sciences - because it's not nor is it intended to be, a science!

[Nakidana]

I had a long reply typed out but my tab decided to refresh for some reason :(

Every time that happens I feel like punching through my monitor. :glare:


In the first part of the paragraph you outline a historians approach - then claim that this is how 'science proceeds' - but in your outline of a scientific approach you've added several additional steps (read: differences between the historical and scientific approaches),

This too is fallacious - you're basically asking - 'how come a scientific process is scientific but a non-scientific process is not?'

History is not a concrete knowledge in the same way much of science is; historians have very limited access to evidence and must frequently rely on untestable inference (and 'evidence' - that is historical sources- that exist are open to interpretation in ways in which scientific evidence is not); to not only report events ('describe a process') but imbue them with social meaning, emphasis, importance - all of which is subjective and completely detached from a scientific rationale - including speculation as to the mental states or motivations of deceased persons etc.

Yeah, I guess the last two steps are lacking in history. The major difference seems to be the "testing" stage though. Falsification is a prerequisite for anything to be considered science, and with limited access to evidence (observations), as you pointed out, that would be quite impossible in most cases.

[Invader Zim]

You make an observation (sword like object in a grave), and you form a hypothesis (custom to bury people with military tools) in order to explain that observation.Ah, but your hypothesis, without the aid of a time machine, cannot be in any way tested.


You make an observation (fossils), form a hypothesis (evolution), deduce a prediction from the hypothesis (we must find more layered fossils in digs) and test the prediction (look for fossils in dig sites).Unfortunately when it comes to human history we can not test such predictions. We can look at numerous other items from other pre-literate communities and attempt to find trends. But a sword burried in the ground is still a sword buried in the ground, we can't ever know the exact thinking behind the thing being lobbed into a grave.

And basically what BD said.

[lombas]

In the curriculum of every historian theory of history should be taught. The question whether history is a science or, perhaps, an art, is a fundamental one; and historians are often very well disciplined in bringing the rules of the critique into practice (in their own research, for example), but not in answering the question whether what they are doing is scientific in the first place!

I think the answer is based on two variables. First, the interpretation or definition of 'science'. We can do this very strictly or very broadly. Second, whether history itself can then be called a science or not.

Let's look into the definition of 'science' and take the opinion of two prominent historians: Johan Huizinga and Paul Veyne.

According to Huizinga, science cannot be strictly defined and includes a sense of aestheticism. True, he says, the same goes for the arts, but what is so peculiar is that an artist takes his or her fantasy to be the norm - contrary to the historian, who claims the historical truth to be the normative guide in his research. Of course, this creates the problem of how historical truth can be known. Huizinga therefore asks for a thorough use of critique.

Veyne however defines science very strictly and happily admits history is in that way not a science (he believes scientific truths should be applicable in the present (like physics), which of course historical claims cannot). But he goes on telling that science does not end there. There is a difference between a science and a scientific community with applicable and acceptable rules (like critique), an infrastructure (journals, congresses, education forms, societies) &c. for all members. Is history supported by a scientific community? Yes, Veyne - and Huizinga for that part - concludes.

So sociologically history is a science. Epistemologically it is more an intellectual discipline.

[Nakidana]

Let's look into the definition of 'science' and take the opinion of two prominent historians: Johan Huizinga and Paul Veyne.

According to Huizinga, science cannot be strictly defined and includes a sense of aestheticism. True, he says, the same goes for the arts, but what is so peculiar is that an artist takes his or her fantasy to be the norm - contrary to the historian, who claims the historical truth to be the normative guide in his research. Of course, this creates the problem of how historical truth can be known. Huizinga therefore asks for a thorough use of critique.

Veyne however defines science very strictly and happily admits history is in that way not a science (he believes scientific truths should be applicable in the present (like physics), which of course historical claims cannot). But he goes on telling that science does not end there. There is a difference between a science and a scientific community with applicable and acceptable rules (like critique), an infrastructure (journals, congresses, education forms, societies) &c. for all members. Is history supported by a scientific community? Yes, Veyne - and Huizinga for that part - concludes.

So sociologically history is a science. Epistemologically it is more an intellectual disciple.

I think I'm in agreement with Veyne then. :) A fundamental aspect of science is the use of the scientific method. The method doesn't seem to be applicable when researching history (because of the lack of falsification) so I don't think it can ever be considered more than a social science.

Here's a good essay on understanding and defining science: http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/essays/sciunderstanding.htm

Tell me what you think...


Though i do have a problem with truth claims in historical writing - all the time - for the reasons i outlined above - 'Who's truth?! OUR TRUTH!!! WHO'S TRUTH?! OUR TRUTH!!!!' Besides one does not need to make a truth claim to make a persuasive argument - which to me is 'good' history (or at least a key component of it).

One thing I've been wondering though is that unless you're some kind of hardcore relativist, you've got to admit that there are some historical truths. We know for certain, through relics and documents, that some events have happened and that people have taken this or that action. I don't see how such events could be subjectively twisted.

[lombas]

I think I'm in agreement with Veyne then. :) A fundamental aspect of science is the use of the scientific method. The method doesn't seem to be applicable when researching history (because of the lack of falsification) so I don't think it can ever be considered more than a social science.

Here's a good essay on understanding and defining science: http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/essays/sciunderstanding.htm (http://www.mala.bc.ca/%7Ejohnstoi/essays/sciunderstanding.htm)

Tell me what you think...


First of all I would like to say that you don't have to disagree with Huizinga because you agree with Veyne, or vice versa.

Furthermore, I've read some chapters of the text you link to, and found it very interesting. However, I do not agree with the opinion that the element of falsification is missing in a scientific sense.

I'll give an example. In the history of the Low Countries there is the concept of pillarisation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pillarisation). This concept is a theory (or more a theoretical construction) that is, in itself, falsifiable. There is a claim: "Society in (country X) was built up by several pillars, based on religious and political differences, from (period Y) until (period Z)." In my Master thesis, for instance, I aim to explain that this theoretical construction does not fit for my subject - a Dutch woman, wife of a professor who moves to Ghent, who comes from a protestant and liberal background but is interested in catholicism and writes for catholic magazines. Thus, in historical reality, the effectiveness of many theoretical constructions is quite relative.

This is the reason why I believe history can not be considered a science, epistemologically (because sociologically I think it indisputably is): the fact that it has to make use of a posteriori theoretical constructions without knowing and being able to experience, in many cases, the historical reality itself. History cannot be a science because the framework from which it operates is a different one from that examined.

I'm not sure whether we have the same understanding of falsification or not, so if I didn't reply to your question specifically, please clarify.

:)

[Nakidana]

I'm not sure whether we have the same understanding of falsification or not, so if I didn't reply to your question specifically, please clarify.

:)

Let me be cheap and quote the essay I linked:


The concept goes something like this. Science begins with the development of a theory which contains in itself a means of being confirmed (i.e., tested). The major work of science involves subjecting such theories to rigorous and repeated testing, by making predictions based upon the theory and then conducting experiments or field work to see if these predictions do, in fact, take place. If they do not, then the theory has been falsified. It must be modified, recast, or abandoned, and the process begins again.

...

Any statement which cannot be so checked does not constitute a scientific statement and therefore is excluded from the enquiry. For example, the claim that the old Titan Prometheus made human beings out of mud is not a scientific claim. It may be true (please note this point), and the story may well encourage other stories, cults, poems, prayers, and so on. Many people may derive considerable emotional satisfaction from it. But this account generates no predictions which can be tested to confirm it independently by any form of experiment or measurement, and hence there is no way it could ever be falsified. Thus, that claim lies outside the realm of science.

By contrast, a claim that an object dropped from a certain height will fall towards the earth with a standard acceleration or that a set mixture of zinc and hydrochloric acid will produce a certain amount of hydrogen under certain conditions are claims that can be checked repeatedly by different people. If their results differ from the claim, then the statement has been falsified. Hence, those two claims above are scientific. The key idea here, one should note, is not whether the claims are true or false, but whether there is some means of checking them by observation publicly, repeatedly, and independently.

Basically I understand falsification as thus: You make a prediction based on a hypothesis, and then you try to prove that prediction wrong. If there is no way of proving it wrong, then it is not falsifiable.


However, I do not agree with the opinion that the element of falsification is missing in a scientific sense.

...

This is the reason why I believe history can not be considered a science, epistemologically (because sociologically I think it indisputably is): the fact that it has to make use of a posteriori theoretical constructions without knowing and being able to experience, in many cases, the historical reality itself. History cannot be a science because the framework from which it operates is a different one from that examined.

I'm not sure I understand your reasoning. How do you see scientific falsification being used in history? I mean, you kind of said it yourself. Examination of history takes place outside the historic reality, which makes it increasingly hard to falsify any predictions. You simply lack the observations needed to falsify them.


Thus, in historical reality, the effectiveness of many theoretical constructions is quite relative.

That's another thing. The teoretical constructions might be so relative that they're impossible to falsify. If there is no way of proving a theory wrong, then you can't call it science.

Sorry if this is too confusing or if I misunderstood. I think we agree, we just have a different terminology.

[Oswy]

No - history is closer to a literary genre (esp. genres like biography) than a science.

Although historical writing and science do have some basic similarities (thesis, use of evidence, peer review etc.) - history attempts to retell/describe events for which there is little evidence. The historical 'record' as such is woefully incomplete, and inherently so - the 'past' cannot be recreated in a scientific manner - the remnants of it are but mere fragments - selectively preserved and open to the interpretation/use of historians for a variety of political purposes.
The past cannot be observed or recorded in a scientific manner without a 'time machine' - until then the best an historian can do is educated guesswork tied together with a persuasive argument (like any literary genre, humour and engaging prose helps the medicine go down) as to why their yarn about this or that is the most accurate/complete to date/whatever their claim is.

Much (though not all) history is an attempt to 'discover' the 'truth' of 'the past' (as if past events had a predetermined meaning or 'truth' that exists 'out there' just waiting to be 'uncovered' by the diligent historian - shout out to my homie Ranke!) - this is where pretensions of objectivity and 'science' tend to emerge. Historians also tend to teologically invent 'meaning' for events (often presented as 'truth' or 'fact'), but one that is nevertheless alien to the object(s) of study (inc. assertions - that is speculation - of an individuals personal motivations/feelings/state of mind, heavy use of inference as opposed to evidence), which makes historical writing far too incomplete (that is inadequate) and subjective to ever be considered a science.

Though personally i have no problems with people writing subjective histories (forgive the tautology) - the problem is merely when an author does not acknowledge their subjectivity in their work (or indeed engage with/explore it therein). Though i do have a problem with truth claims in historical writing - all the time - for the reasons i outlined above - 'Who's truth?! OUR TRUTH!!! WHO'S TRUTH?! OUR TRUTH!!!!' Besides one does not need to make a truth claim to make a persuasive argument - which to me is 'good' history (or at least a key component of it).

And no, using fragments of scientific methodology does not make historical writing 'scientific' in anything but the broadest (read: weakest) sense, and certainly does not make it a 'science'.

Playing devil's advocate here I'd argue that just as historians only ever have incomplete 'fragments' with which to examine and explain the past, so the scientist only ever has an incomplete set of data to support (or test) their theory. I'd argue that much science is experimental and falsifiable in very limited ways (certain ideas, like the 'singularity' at the centre of a black-hole cannot be tested empirically and ideas in geology, such as plate tectonics is observational rather than experimental). Finally, I'd suggest that science can itself be accused of the potential for teleology and has been proven to be so in the past (such as complex scientific models of planetary movement to 'demonstrate' that the earth was at the centre of the solar system). Even the Newtonian model of planetary movement, which had the sun at the centre of the universe has proven inaccurate in light of relativity theory (the earth rotates around the sun and, at the same time, the sun rotates - to a much lesser degree - around the earth).

I suppose what I'm arguing for here is a more modest understanding of what counts for 'science' as it is practiced.

[Nakidana]

Playing devil's advocate here I'd argue that just as historians only ever have incomplete 'fragments' with which to examine and explain the past, so the scientist only ever has an incomplete set of data to support (or test) their theory.

But is that true? Are there not an unlimited amount of observations to be made regarding say the theory of gravity? All you have to do to test that theory is to throw a rock out your window. You can do it 5, 10, 15 times if you want to.

I don't think the same can be said about a given historical event. Unless you have a time machine you'll always be limited by the amount of written documents (observations) pertaining to the event.




I'd argue that much science is experimental and falsifiable in very limited ways (certain ideas, like the 'singularity' at the centre of a black-hole cannot be tested empirically and ideas in geology, such as plate tectonics is observational rather than experimental).

Ah, but is an experiment not an observation? If you throw a rock out a window you might say you were "testing" gravity, but what you were in effect doing was making an "observation" of gravity. You made a prediction and observed if nature reacted in accordance with that prediction.

Observing nature is testing. Let's take plate tectonics. You might make the prediction that tectonic plates would move in relation to each other. The "test" of this prediction would then consist in going into the field and observing whether or not the plates actually moved. If they didn't, your hypothesis would be wrong.

(Excuse my ignorance, I have no idea how scientists measure the movement of tectonic plates, but they do. :lol:)


Finally, I'd suggest that science can itself be accused of the potential for teleology and has been proven to be so in the past (such as complex scientific models of planetary movement to 'demonstrate' that the earth was at the centre of the solar system). Even the Newtonian model of planetary movement, which had the sun at the centre of the universe has proven inaccurate in light of relativity theory (the earth rotates around the sun and, at the same time, the sun rotates - to a much lesser degree - around the earth).

This is absolutely correct which is why it's essential for every scientist to be critical of research and theories, and be observant of where it comes from. That said, there is a reality out there and we do have a more accurate map of that reality due to science. Will there be bumps along the way? Of course, but as long as science is carried out the way it should be, using the scientific method and whatnot, then those mistakes will be corrected along the way.

That's why people have such high regards for science. They know it works and the results it can lead to. Take a look at the monitor in front of you as an example.


I suppose what I'm arguing for here is a more modest understanding of what counts for 'science' as it is practiced.

Of course, science doesn't and shouldn't have a static definition. That's why we have the study of assumptions, foundations and implications of science, aka the philosophy of science (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_science). :)

[lombas]

I'm not sure I understand your reasoning. How do you see scientific falsification being used in history? I mean, you kind of said it yourself. Examination of history takes place outside the historic reality, which makes it increasingly hard to falsify any predictions. You simply lack the observations needed to falsify them.

There are more sources than observations. In fact, for example in physics, the laboratory has an important role. For Aristotle, there was no way you could "do" science in a laboratory, because for him this would create a situation modifying the essence of things and thus not provide thorough knowledge. History uses material sources, which can disprove any hypothesis.



That's another thing. The teoretical constructions might be so relative that they're impossible to falsify. If there is no way of proving a theory wrong, then you can't call it science.

But in history, using material sources may disprove theories.

Sorry if this is too confusing or if I misunderstood. I think we agree, we just have a different terminology.[/quote]

Me too.

[Nakidana]

History uses material sources, which can disprove any hypothesis.

Yes, this is what I refer to as observations. Observations can be observations of any kind, data, relics, written documents, material sources, anything that can be observed.


But in history, using material sources may disprove theories.

Yeah, I was thinking the same thing, but then again we know that history is filled with theories that can never be falsified simply because the observations needed to falsify the theories aren't there. They're either open to interpretation, or history.

To quote what Black Dagger wrote further up:


History is not a concrete knowledge in the same way much of science is; historians have very limited access to evidence and must frequently rely on untestable inference (and 'evidence' - that is historical sources- that exist are open to interpretation in ways in which scientific evidence is not); to not only report events ('describe a process') but imbue them with social meaning, emphasis, importance - all of which is subjective and completely detached from a scientific rationale - including speculation as to the mental states or motivations of deceased persons etc.

[Oswy]

But is that true? Are there not an unlimited amount of observations to be made regarding say the theory of gravity? All you have to do to test that theory is to throw a rock out your window. You can do it 5, 10, 15 times if you want to.

I don't think the same can be said about a given historical event. Unless you have a time machine you'll always be limited by the amount of written documents (observations) pertaining to the event. Malangyar.

There may be an unlimited (or close to unlimited) amount of potential observations in a scientific experiment, but for obvious reasons they can't all be made use of in testing a theory - I could one day throw a rock out of my window and observe it falling upward into the sky; calling into question the theory of gravity as currently understood. Scientific theories thus have authority only contingently because there is always the potential for them to be falsified on the basis of data yet to be observed; hence my argument that science always rests on incomplete data as history rests on incomplete fragments.

This may be flawed somehow but I'll try it anyway:

If we regard science as a critical method which allows a series of particular observations to invoke a generalisation (particular observations of apples falling from trees allows us to invoke a generalisation that apples always fall from trees), then maybe we can regard history as doing something parallel, also making particular observations to invoke a generalisation (particular observations of economic crises producing radical political solutions in nation-states allowing us to invoke a specific relationship between economic crisis and the radicalisation of politics).

I haven't responded to the rest of your post because at the moment I don't know how to challenege it! But I'm very much enjoying your input, thanks.

[lombas]

Yes, this is what I refer to as observations. Observations can be observations of any kind, data, relics, written documents, material sources, anything that can be observed.



Yeah, I was thinking the same thing, but then again we know that history is filled with theories that can never be falsified simply because the observations needed to falsify the theories aren't there. They're either open to interpretation, or history.

To quote what Black Dagger wrote further up:

And that is why I am convinced history, epistemologically, is not a science.

:lol:

However, sociologically ... Well, anyway, I think we agree.

[Oswy]

If science is primarily characterised by theory which can be experimentally falsified, what of scientific theory regarding singularies at the centre of black-holes? As far as I'm aware there's no way that the existence of a singularity could be falisfied by experimentation. Is there a point at which science becomes speculative and if so does it cease being science?

[BanderaRoja]

In my opinion history is not one unitary field.

Some history is scientific. Marxism especially makes use of this. In order to accomplish goals and master our environment then we have to know how things work. Therefore we analyze how things happened in the past and apply it to the present. Obviously history has gaps and human knowledge is fallible. Thats why we are humans and not Gods. Nonetheless, there is still a lot of value to be culled from historical understanding.

At the same type I'm sympathetic to RG Collingwood's assertions that history is an art, similar to theatre, the main point of which is to re-enact the past and thereby gain understanding of historical thinking and emotion. Of course the historians subjectivity will play a role, but that is the act of the current generation constructing its own unique perspective. When people can't emotionally or aesthetically relate to or understand certain historical experiences because it is so removed from their own life, they tend to label it 'Dark Ages' or something along those lines. Thus the almost instinctual disapproval that most contemporary First World people express for Stalin's Russia or Mao's China without having even attempted to understand them. The spartan, scarce economic conditions at the time are so removed from current conditions that a wide gulf of understanding exists.

[Black Dagger]

Some history is scientific.

Which? And how is it?


Marxism especially makes use of this.

Historical materialism is not scientific - it makes predictions that cannot be falsified - rather it's a teleological (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleology) (by way of Hegel) enlightenment 'progress' metanarrative (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metanarrative). Beliefs in it's 'truth' is more theological than scientific - but marxism as a modernist philosophy views scientific knowledge as highest form of knowledge - the highest and most desireable 'truth' which can be attained - and so necessarily clings to absurd phrases like 'scientific socialism'; and promotes itself as a 'science' - in this sense marxism (like all things) is a product of its time.



Therefore we analyze how things happened in the past and apply it to the present.

That's not science. And further, our views of the past are heavily influenced by our views of the present - and in this case of your politics as a marxist - and so analysing the past and then applying it the present - in the context of marxism - is highly selective/self-serving/politically formed/presentist, not scientific.

[BanderaRoja]

Which? And how is it?

Any history that looks at apparent events. If we want to see which side won a particular battle, what economic events took place on a certain date, etc. our only limitation is the data we have to analyze. It is scientific because it empirically analyzes past events using independent data to come to conclusions.



Historical materialism is not scientific - it makes predictions that cannot be falsified How so? In terms of specific predictions, if someone says "The Soviet revolution will spread to France by 1920" this is fairly easy to verify or dismiss.

More broadly, if someone states "Fascism is the result of [x] economic change", its not to hard to look at historical examples of fascism and form a conclusion about the veracity of the statement.



- rather it's a teleological (by way of Hegel) enlightenment 'progress' metanarrative. Beliefs in it's 'truth' is more theological than scientific - but marxism as a modernist philosophy views scientific knowledge as highest form of knowledge - the highest and most desireable 'truth' which can be attained - and so necessarily clings to absurd phrases like 'scientific socialism'; and promotes itself as a 'science' - in this sense marxism (like all things) is a product of its time.1. A teleological metanarrative could also be called a structural theory. How is evolution not a teleological metanarrative? How does this exclude it from being scientifically tested or true?

2. I disagree, in my opinion belief in it is primarily scientific. How is it theological? We are not arguing from conviction, faith or inner zeal. There are real historical examples of class struggle that people look to to decide whether or not Marxist theory holds true or not. Just like people don't adhere to the theory of evolution based on inner conviction but rather on the plethora of fossil records.

3. 'Science' in the term 'scientific socialism' is meant to denote application of theory. Someone whose conception of class struggle is "bourgeoisie vs. workers" is still in the ideological sphere. Once one applies that principle to reality and determines who are the workers and who is the bourgeoisie, and what current material conditions are, that is the scientific element. At that point the theory can be tested against reality.

4.Yes, all things are a product of their time. Even postmodernity is the product of its time and of certain social conditions. How does that mean it is un-scientific? Even theories in the natural sciences are subject to this principle. Sometimes social conditions create false belief in pseudo-science. For example, false racial scientific theories have sometimes been in vogue. They can and have been scientifically proven false. That doesn't preclude such a theory from being true. Someone like Galileo Galilei was very much influenced by a Renaissance social perspective, but that doesn't mean his theories aren't verificiable or true. The same could be said for Marx.



That's not science. And further, our views of the past are heavily influenced by our views of the present - and in this case of your politics as a marxist - and so analysing the past and then applying it the present - in the context of marxism - is highly selective/self-serving/politically formed/presentist, not scientific.And why are fields of natural science so concerned with studying things at the nano-scale, or robotics, or consciousness, or medicine/biology? Primarily to serve the needs of people in the present. It seems to me what you are simply saying is that Marxism is revolutionary and not academic. Its interested with knowledge that has use-value, not just knowledge for knowledge sake. Natural science too is usually not merely cataloguing facts, it keeps a focus on studying things that have use or applicability to reality.

[Nakidana]

There may be an unlimited (or close to unlimited) amount of potential observations in a scientific experiment, but for obvious reasons they can't all be made use of in testing a theory - I could one day throw a rock out of my window and observe it falling upward into the sky; calling into question the theory of gravity as currently understood. Scientific theories thus have authority only contingently because there is always the potential for them to be falsified on the basis of data yet to be observed;

I'm not sure I understand where you're coming from. Why can't all the observations be made use of in testing a theory? Any day of the month you can go outside and test the theory of gravity. If the rock suddenly starts flying upward then scientists will have to take that observation into account and change the theory of gravity accordingly. It just so happens that gravity is considered a fact by the scientific community because it has been substantiated by such a large amount of testing. (Every day by 6 billion people)

Sure, the potential for science to be wrong is always there. But that possibility is an important aspect of science. If some scientific theory is suddenly found to be wrong, the scientists change that theory. That's how scientific enquiry works. Science isn't the truth and it doesn't claim to be. It is an approximation of the truth based on predictions and falsification.

That said, we shouldn't throw the theory of gravity out just because, for all we know, one day some stone dropped out the window might fly upward.


hence my argument that science always rests on incomplete data as history rests on incomplete fragments.

Here's how I see it: You have a limited amount of observations in history. In science you can always go out and test gravity, but in history you have no way of travelling back and testing your prediction. Sure you have some observations that can help lay out the fundamentals of a given historic event, but when you start connecting those observations and "imbuing them with social meaning", then much of it is simply subjective interpretation.

Sorry if this was not what you were talking about... :lol:


This may be flawed somehow but I'll try it anyway:

If we regard science as a critical method which allows a series of particular observations to invoke a generalisation (particular observations of apples falling from trees allows us to invoke a generalisation that apples always fall from trees), then maybe we can regard history as doing something parallel, also making particular observations to invoke a generalisation (particular observations of economic crises producing radical political solutions in nation-states allowing us to invoke a specific relationship between economic crisis and the radicalisation of politics).

But that's a massive prediction you've come up with there. The key point here is falsification. How will you ever falsify that prediction? Someone might point out a minor economic crisis that didn't radicalise politics, and you'd have to incorporate that into your hypothesis. Maybe you'd say that "under certain circumstances politics are not radicalised".

And then we're back to square one, because if your theory has an answer to everything, then there is no way of falsifying it. Whatever happens, your theory would be correct. That's not science.

Also there's the aspect, as BD pointed out, of imbuing social meaning to events. That is just completely unrelated to science.

[Comrade Wolfie's Very Nearly Banned Adventures]

Archaeology is the scientific aspect of history, well i think so and I am a lemon

[Oswy]

Malangyar,

I think we've missed each other somewhere.

I accept that history deals with 'fragments', i.e. incomplete evidence of the past. I'm asserting that science, similarly, uses an incomplete sequence of data as its evidence too.

Not every apple falling from every tree has been observed, this is an inescapable fact. It's thus possible that in some instances apples have fallen upwards into the sky. Regardless of how easily and often a scientist could make observations of apples falling from trees they can never claim to have made all possible observations - hence the incomplete evidence with which a scientific theory is tested against. It may seem like I'm being pedantic, but I'm really just trying to show that the incomplete evidence which historians are limited to is also a factor in scientific inquiry too.

EDIT: Here's another way of defending history as science:

Do we accept that the study of evolutionary history, or even current biology, is within the meaning of science? Discussion of how dinosaurs have evolved is based on fragmentary - and historical - evidence. What of biologists who study animal behaviour? Is it not science when scholars observe the behaviour of wolves, birds, fly-catching plants? How about the study of chimps and gorillas? - both social animals, like humans. Again, studies of wolves and chimps is necessarily based on incomplete data because not every possible observation can be made, let alone proven. If we can study chimp life as science why not human life? Sure, one form of animal life is perhaps more complex than another other, but the difference is one of complexity not essence.

When you say "But that's a massive prediction you've come up with there." isn't this a grey area? I'm thinking of the nature of the so-called 'inductive leap' which is, after all, a 'leap'.

[lombas]

Furthermore, I think this thread needs more Feyerabend.

[Nakidana]

Malangyar,

I think we've missed each other somewhere.

I accept that history deals with 'fragments', i.e. incomplete evidence of the past. I'm asserting that science, similarly, uses an incomplete sequence of data as its evidence too.

Not every apple falling from every tree has been observed, this is an inescapable fact. It's thus possible that in some instances apples have fallen upwards into the sky. Regardless of how easily and often a scientist could make observations of apples falling from trees they can never claim to have made all possible observations - hence the incomplete evidence with which a scientific theory is tested against. It may seem like I'm being pedantic, but I'm really just trying to show that the incomplete evidence which historians are limited to is also a factor in scientific inquiry too.

Yes, that's true, it's not possible to make all possible observations. The difference is that in science you can go back and make an unlimited amount of observations, at will, while in history you can never go back. You have the observations you have and then you interpret them.

My point is, history seems to be more incomplete than science.


EDIT: Here's another way of defending history as science:

Do we accept that the study of evolutionary history, or even current biology, is within the meaning of science? Discussion of how dinosaurs have evolved is based on fragmentary - and historical - evidence. What of biologists who study animal behaviour? Is it not science when scholars observe the behaviour of wolves, birds, fly-catching plants? How about the study of chimps and gorillas? - both social animals, like humans. Again, studies of wolves and chimps is necessarily based on incomplete data because not every possible observation can be made, let alone proven. If we can study chimp life as science why not human life? Sure, one form of animal life is perhaps more complex than another other, but the difference is one of complexity not essence.

I'm absolutely 100% sure that the research done on evolution is science. Fossils are far from the only evidence of evolution and you can in fact observe both macro and micro evolution in nature today.

Study of animal behaviour...you got me there, I honestly don't know. Apparently it's within the field of biology, which I think is considered science, but don't take my word for it. And you make a good point comparing animal behaviour to human behaviour.
I can't say, hopefully someone else can step in. :confused:


When you say "But that's a massive prediction you've come up with there." isn't this a grey area? I'm thinking of the nature of the so-called 'inductive leap' which is, after all, a 'leap'.

Hmm, yes I admit it is a grey area. What I was trying to point out though, was that the prediction you suggested was so broad, contained so many variables, that it would be impossible to falsify. And it would be open to many interpretations.

Whereas say, the theory of gravity, is a very simple theory to verify. Drop a stone, if it flies upwards, you've falsified he theory. This isn't open to any interpretation. It doesn't matter if I as a revolutionary do the experiment or some reactionary on the other side of the world does it.

[Nakidana]

1. A teleological metanarrative could also be called a structural theory. How is evolution not a teleological metanarrative? How does this exclude it from being scientifically tested or true?

If by "teleological metanarrative" is meant a grand narrative with a purpose, then evolution in its simplest form does not fit the bill. Very simply, evolution is the development, through various stages, of animal and plant species into other species not at all like them. It doesn't have a "purpose" as such and I don't see how it is a grand narrative.

:confused:

EDIT: Ah, excuse the double post.

[BanderaRoja]

If by "teleological metanarrative" is meant a grand narrative with a purpose, then evolution in its simplest form does not fit the bill. Very simply, evolution is the development, through various stages, of animal and plant species into other species not at all like them. It doesn't have a "purpose" as such and I don't see how it is a grand narrative.

:confused:

EDIT: Ah, excuse the double post.

Isn't the purpose the development of the animal/plant physiology so as to better survive in its environment? It certainly doesn't happen for no reason.

As I see it, dialectical materialism is simply a theory concerning the development, through various stages, of human social and economic structures. Its purpose is the development of society in such a way that better suits human needs and desires.

As I acknowledge, that *could* be the pseudo-scientific pipedream of Marx, the creation of certain social conditions. That doesn't mean it isn't scientifically falsifiable nor that it is false.

[Nakidana]

Isn't the purpose the development of the animal/plant physiology so as to better survive in its environment? It certainly doesn't happen for no reason.

Well, you don't have to add a purpose or reason to define the fact of evolution or make it falsifiable. If you're talking about the theory of evolution then you might be correct.


As I see it, dialectical materialism is simply a theory concerning the development, through various stages, of human social and economic structures. Its purpose is the development of society in such a way that better suits human needs and desires.

Let's not confuse biological evolution with evolution as a general "gradual development". Biological evolution, for example, also has the possibility of going in the "other" direction, from something more complex to something less complex.