What is certain?

[Colonello Buendia]

In my opinion the only real certainty is that there is thought. I don't know how much or what these thoughts are about but I can guarantee that there is such a thing as thought.

your thoughts, lol

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

This conclusion of yours is of course susceptible to the challenge that if, unbeknowst to you, the word 'thought' changed its meaning, you might actually be referring to something else, or even to nothing at all.

However, the good news is that the above is itself susceptible to the sort of considerations Wittgenstein raised in his book 'On Certainty', which I can heartily recommend.

http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/wittgenstein/section4.rhtml

[Colonello Buendia]

thanks for the recommendation. good rebuttal actually, let's say that the only certainty is that there is something that we call thought.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Once more, all the words in that sentence could change their meanings unbeknown to you (or your memory of them could be defective).

There is a much better way of establishing certainty than this.

[Volderbeek]

Certainty is the sort of thing that you need to have some of to have any. We need some base line assumptions (axioms) and then work up from there.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Which axioms cannot therefore be certain...

Oops, not a good start...

[Colonello Buendia]

AAAAARGH! we're going round in circles! My view is that the only certainty is that there is something that I and many humans call thought it is an abstract concept but it must occur for this conversation to happen, even if it is some madman sitting about programing us to do so for it is still thought going into the equation

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

StateSux:


AAAAARGH! we're going round in circles! My view is that the only certainty is that there is something that I and many humans call thought it is an abstract concept but it must occur for this conversation to happen, even if it is some madman sitting about programing us to do so for it is still thought going into the equation


Now, this looks like an empirical issue (and is thus a matter of fact), which is subject to doubt, and hence not certain.

You are in an impossible position here. There is no solution available if you begin where you are trying to begin.

[Colonello Buendia]

You're sooooo much better at philosophy than me

[Volderbeek]

Which axioms cannot therefore be certain...

Oops, not a good start...

I said they were assumptions. Besides, how can you be certain about your lack of certainty; that statement is self-defeating. Certainty, like I said, is something you need some of to have any.

[Volderbeek]

AAAAARGH! we're going round in circles! My view is that the only certainty is that there is something that I and many humans call thought it is an abstract concept but it must occur for this conversation to happen, even if it is some madman sitting about programing us to do so for it is still thought going into the equation

It's well within your rights to assert the certainty that you can think, despite what self-righteous philosophers like Rosa here say. In fact, you can take it a step further, and assert that your thought coheres and can separate truth from fiction.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:



Besides, how can you be certain about your lack of certainty;


Because I understand the English language.



I said they were assumptions.


No, you said this:



We need some base line assumptions (axioms) and then work up from there.


This indicates that you do not understand either the word "assumption" or the word "axiom" --, or perhaps both.

So, an even worse place to start...

[Holden Caulfield]

Nietzsche who i believe may be better at this than even mighty Rosa:

1) animality of humans
2) thought
3) rebellion

[gilhyle]

Instead of asking 'What is certain' ?.....ask 'What is "certain" ? '

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hewhodoessomethingorother:


Nietzsche who i believe may be better at this than even mighty Rosa:

1) animality of humans
2) thought
3) rebellion


You are right; he is better at producing b*llocks than me.

I know when I am beaten...:(

[Nietzsche is one of the few philsophers I like, however. But, what the hell...]

[Sleeping Dragon]

Godel's incompleteness theorem, if it is applicable to philosophy at all, suggests that axiomatic attempts at truth are impossible. That is my position, nothing can ever be known for certain or proven to be true beyond all doubt, it can only be disproven. Thus nothing can be known for certain by following axioms as if these contain errors these errors will be copied continuously and may continue to infect people forever as a virus infects a species.

If one believes in the utility of axioms the only thing in my opinion that can be said to be known for certain is the existance of an external world that is apparent to us through sensations and that things appear to exist in it including ourselves. Some of these are subjective beings like ourselves and others are objective realities that exist independantly of being perceived and may be perceived by subjective beings. Whether these impressions are false appearances or not is less certain. This can be derived from our sensations, these being the origin of our impressions which are in turn the origin of our ideas. Our ideas influence our behavior and to the extent that they do they have an objective presense as they are apparent to subjective beings.

It also seems certain that we are manifestations of this external world and that it is conscious of itself through us and that this phenomenon of consciousness dramatically increases it's complexity. I believe no one should stray too far from ideas that can be derived from sensations as these are easily justified and safer to use as a foundation than recklessly making copies of random people. Still our perceptions are composed of a limited set of experiences and due to their locality errors may exist as different things exist in different places and so what one perceives is largely dependant upon their immediate environment and they may not know that elsewhere things are radically different if they do not perceive them.

Also the way an individal species is physically constructed and so which specific sense organs are present or enhanced depends upon that species previous environment over it's entire history on earth and what was shown to be useful to the organism. Due to this what we perceive may itself be rather limited as phenomena exist that are invisible or somehow difficult to directly perceive due to some inherent physical anomaly such as electical waves through a conductor, electomagnetic fields, X-rays, subatomic particles or black holes to name a few. However we would not know of the existance of such things unless they were somehow apparent but some things may be less apparent or more difficult to perceive in some way than others.

There is also the possibility of perceiving reality falsely by imposing false dichotomies where none exist or simply on accident by believing another that errored or erring due to some illusion that is present locally. Illusions may be due to many reasons and it may be difficult to know when and where they are present if we are not aware of them.

Most likely thought exists due to communication being valuable in our evolutionary past. Patterns made by variables like light, soundwaves, fluids or solids recorded by our sense organs are interpreted by the right hemisphere (and to a lesser extent the left) and these electrical patterns are transformed into soundwaves by our left hemisphere (and to a lesser extent the right) and the received soundwaves are then retransformed into electrical waves where they are decifered as relating to an others sensations of objects.

Communication can also remove errors in addition to generate them by exposing logical fallacies when they occur. If communication did not exist we would not error but what we perceived may only be locally true. Communication allows us to perceive things independantly of our own sensations by relying upon anothers sense organs but the soundwaves received and emitted are uncertain as they are capable of erring. An idea however can only be claimed to err if it deviates radically from what one perceives. If two people perceive different enough areas they may both think the other has erred when they have not simply do to illusions of locality.

It is also very possible that all the things everyone says are simply random sequences of symbols symbolizing nothing as they are nothing more than recordings of local environs. A child copying an adult or group of adults who had exclusively flawed ideas and these existing immortally as a false culture would be an example. The entire system of justification for capitalism is another example as is the entirely of all education systems founded upon lecturing, reading or notation. I do think it is possible to know what is true just very difficult due to the complex nature of reality.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Unfortunately Godel's incompleteness theorem depends solely on Cantor's diagonalisation argument, which is itself dependendent on interpreting sets as Platonic objects.

Once that assumption is dropped, Cantor's argumemt falls, and with it goes Goedel's theorem.

More details here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Godel_letter.htm (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Godel_letter.htm)

But there is something rather odd in using a proof to show that nothing can be proved.

[RebelDog]

You people have unwittingly come up with the answer: change is certain!

[DJFreiheit]

One thing I am certain of is uncertainty.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

RebelDog:


You people have unwittingly come up with the answer: change is certain!


How do you know?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DJF:


One thing I am certain of is uncertainty.


Then you are uncertain of this; in which case there is no reason to believe it.

[RebelDog]

RebelDog:



How do you know?

Well, what can possibly stay the same? Every entity has forces acting on it all the time and nothing can resist those forces at any moment in time, never mind indefinitely. Can you contradict this?

[DJFreiheit]

DJF:



Then you are uncertain of this; in which case there is no reason to believe it.

I cant help thinking about the uncertainty of it.

[Holden Caulfield]

Hewhodoessomethingorother:



You are right; he is better at producing b*llocks than me.

I know when I am beaten...:(

[Nietzsche is one of the few philsophers I like, however. But, what the hell...]

i like your replies, i think one thing we can be certain of is Rosa giving answers that leaves most people scratching their heads for a bit...

and also

hewhodoessomethingorother?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

RebelDog:


Well, what can possibly stay the same? Every entity has forces acting on it all the time and nothing can resist those forces at any moment in time, never mind indefinitely. Can you contradict this?

How do you know that in some distant part of the universe there isn't a changeless object?

You can't know this. You might infer its falsehood from other scientific principles, but they themselves are not absolutely certain. Nor has their validity been checked for the entire universe, and for all of time. How could that be done anyway?

Remember, I do not have to prove this, just raise a doubt, and it's not certain.

Anyway, the past does not change...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hewhoquestionshisnewname:


hewhodoessomethingorother?

Is this a question from Hewhoshouldreadwhatipostmorecarefully?

[Holden Caulfield]

Rosa: run away with me,

we can read Nietzsche under the stars,

human emotion is a certainty,

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hewhooffersagirlagoodtime:


human emotion is a certainty,

I doubt it.

[Holden Caulfield]

emotion is a certainty, even if one has intellect placed over their emotion the emotion still exsists no matter how repressed or unconcious it may be,

Rosa being mean is a certainty?
Rosa, is Rosa, is Rosa

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HeWhoWhoHe: You are assuming that the word "emotion" remains the same from minute to minute, and that you remember it correctly, even if it does.


Rosa being mean is a certainty?


I am actually being nice; wait till I get really mean.

And my real name might not be "Rosa"...

[RebelDog]

How do you know that in some distant part of the universe there isn't a changeless object?

You can't know this. You might infer its falsehood from other scientific principles, but they themselves are not absolutely certain. Nor has their validity been checked for the entire universe, and for all of time. How could that be done anyway?

Remember, I do not have to prove this, just raise a doubt, and it's not certain.
From this statement it would follow that there is no point in asking anything if it can be contradicted "in some distant part of the universe." If all anyone can ever do is "infer" something and never declare an objective truth how can you declare " the past does not change..."? Physicists can already untangle paired photons which means a photon is made to have an actual spin quality upon wave collapse billions of years into the past. The history of that photon has now been changed billions of years later. How can you be sure someone will not travel back to 2005 from the future and tell you to never register at Revleft and thus never debate this? Surely different observers in different frames of reference cannot even agree on an objective past history anyway?

[Sleeping Dragon]

Plato Cantor and Godel shall be remembered long after you are totally forgotten. How dare you attack people who have done so much more than you will ever do. Dependendent? The language your using, english (and all other languages) contains circular definitions that will never be resolved because the words are defined as a set of other words which are themselves sets of still other words. So nothing you say really means anything at all because it is formally impossible to understand what even the most insignificant word means as currently no definitions exist that do not contain circular arguments.

"The genetic fallacy is a fallacy of irrelevance where a conclusion is suggested based solely on something or someone's origin rather than its current meaning or context. This overlooks any difference to be found in the present situation, typically transferring the positive or negative esteem from the earlier context." (from wikipedia)

What you are saying may be true and to an extent I agree with you, being a materialist and opposed to Platonism. I do see the value though in considering other perspectives significantly different from mine in case they reveal errors in the way I think. However you are using unfair arguments to arrive at this conclusion. Godel refuted beyond all doubt the absolute certainty of Russell and Whiteheads Principia Mathematica. What have you ever done? Annoy a bunch of revolutionaries with shallow criticisms. It's just a disguise for dogmatism.

I am aware of the work of Cantor. He was one of the most influential mathematicians of all time, unlike you. Cantor was just way over your head. Same with Plato, though I understand he was flawed. If you want to go all the way back why not start with the Pythagoreans? Plato was always but a bad copy of Pythagoras and his followers. They weren't allowed to write anything down and that's why it was continued through Plato who was formally a heretical pythagorean as he gained power by writing things down. Otherwise there would never have been a trace of it left except for through oral traditions the way Pythagoras would have wanted it.

[Holden Caulfield]

for starts im gonna imagine that you said for your 'wait til i get mean bla bla' bit you really ment 'this is just foreplay'
but yeah anyhoo



And my real name might not be "Rosa"...

i am referancing the persona i know through this magical internet to be 'Rosa' not actually your being, you could be a 12 year old boy or 80 year old woman for all i know, i care not what you are i only care about what i know to be 'Rosa'

emotion is not words emotion is feeling, we could forget the words but could we forget the feeling even if we could not express them to others through speech, the use of the word emotion is needed to express my point to others but if it didnt exsist and i couldn't make my point the 'things' the word emotion signifies would still exsist

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

RebelDog:


From this statement it would follow that there is no point in asking anything if it can be contradicted "in some distant part of the universe." If all anyone can ever do is "infer" something and never declare an objective truth how can you declare " the past does not change..."? Physicists can already untangle paired photons which means a photon is made to have an actual spin quality upon wave collapse billions of years into the past. The history of that photon has now been changed billions of years later. How can you be sure someone will not travel back to 2005 from the future and tell you to never register at Revleft and thus never debate this? Surely different observers in different frames of reference cannot even agree on an objective past history anyway?

This is a thread about 'certainty', not about scientific knowledge.

In that case, it is legitimate to question the a priori and dogmatic claim that change is universal (dreamt up by Heraclitus when there was hardly any evidence in its favour).

We may assume everything changes, or even hope that it does, but the plain fact is that we just do not know.

And, I wouldn't pin too many hopes on quantum entanglement, if I were you; there is little evidence in its favour as yet, and what little exists is decidedly local, and not universal -- and largely theoretical/speculative.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

SleepingDrag:



Plato Cantor and Godel shall be remembered long after you are totally forgotten.


So? That does not mean they, or you, are right.



How dare you attack people who have done so much more than you will ever do. Dependendent? The language your using, english (and all other languages) contains circular definitions that will never be resolved because the words are defined as a set of other words which are themselves sets of still other words. So nothing you say really means anything at all because it is formally impossible to understand what even the most insignificant word means as currently no definitions exist that do not contain circular arguments.

That sort of attitude would mean that we should all accept Ptolemy and Aristotle's model of the universe, for who are we to question such great minds?



The language your using, english (and all other languages) contains circular definitions that will never be resolved because the words are defined as a set of other words which are themselves sets of still other words.


1) I was not using any definitions.

2) We do not need to use them to understand words.

3) The word 'proof' is part of language too, as are 'circular' and 'definition'. But you were quite happy to use them without defining them to make a point about proof. Odd you can do that, but I am not allowed to...



What you are saying may be true and to an extent I agree with you, being a materialist and opposed to Platonism. I do see the value though in considering other perspectives significantly different from mine in case they reveal errors in the way I think. However you are using unfair arguments to arrive at this conclusion. Godel refuted beyond all doubt the absolute certainty of Russell and Whiteheads Principia Mathematica. What have you ever done? Annoy a bunch of revolutionaries with shallow criticisms. It's just a disguise for dogmatism.


No, you are the dogmatist (and a rather emotional one, too); I merely raised legitimate doubts.

And, as a mathematician myself, I have a formal disproof of Godel's theorem, which, if you are lucky, I will publish one day.

Until then, you should at least try to familiarise yourself with the alternative view (outlined at the link I provided earlier) -- unless, I was right and you really are a dogmatist.

In which case, I recommend you go back to sleep.


I am aware of the work of Cantor. He was one of the most influential mathematicians of all time, unlike you. Cantor was just way over your head..

You really do like to mouth-off don't you? And in total ignorance of the fact that I am a mathematician (with degrees in Philosophy, too -- which I only mention to counter your claim that Cantor is way beyond me).



Same with Plato, though I understand he was flawed. If you want to go all the way back why not start with the Pythagoreans? Plato was always but a bad copy of Pythagoras and his followers. They weren't allowed to write anything down and that's why it was continued through Plato who was formally a heretical pythagorean as he gained power by writing things down. Otherwise there would never have been a trace of it left except for through oral traditions the way Pythagoras would have wanted it.


Unfortunately, recent research has shown that all of Pythagoras's 'discoveries' were in fact made by others:

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n04/burn02_.html

And as great a ruling-class theorist as Plato was, it is a little out of place trying to defend him at a left-wing site.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HeWhoNeedsABucketOfColdWaterThrownOverHim:



for starts im gonna imagine that you said for your 'wait til i get mean bla bla' bit you really ment 'this is just foreplay'
but yeah anyhoo



Eh?



i am referancing the persona i know through this magical internet to be 'Rosa' not actually your being, you could be a 12 year old boy or 80 year old woman for all i know, i care not what you are i only care about what i know to be 'Rosa'



I might not be a 'persona', but an annoying computer programe. Some already think I am:

http://www.socialiststeve.me.uk/rosa.htm



emotion is not words emotion is feeling, we could forget the words but could we forget the feeling even if we could not express them to others through speech, the use of the word emotion is needed to express my point to others but if it didnt exsist and i couldn't make my point the 'things' the word emotion signifies would still exsist


You may or may not be right, but you will no doubt notice you have to use words to articulate these thoughts, even to yourself, all of whose meanings could change, as could your memory of them, from momnet to moment.

So, for all you know, when you use the word 'emotion' you might in fact mean 'coffee grinder'.

[Holden Caulfield]

i do not have to use words to myself, i use recollections which, from facial expressions we can empathise with people with no words being used as we know what it is like to feel the emotion, regardless of any order of letters we use to signify them, we have to use words to express things over the internet we have to used a phonological social construct to express to other over the phone but i real life emotion by whatever name is certain and undeniable

you may well be a computer program: you posess that extreme level of logic which seems to make alot of what you say illogical, like the super computers in things like i-robot,

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HeWhoWillNotBeTold:



i do not have to use words to myself, i use recollections which, from facial expressions we can empathise with people with no words being used as we know what it is like to feel the emotion, regardless of any order of letters we use to signify them, we have to use words to express things over the internet we have to used a phonological social construct to express to other over the phone but i real life emotion by whatever name is certain and undeniable



You will note you have to use words once more to make this point, the meaning of which will depend on the meanings of the words it contains; so for all you now you could have meant:



`Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

"Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!"

He took his vorpal sword in hand:
Long time the manxome foe he sought --
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.

And, as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,
Came whiffling through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as it came!

One, two! One, two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went galumphing back.

"And, has thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!'
He chortled in his joy.





you may well be a computer program: you posess that extreme level of logic which seems to make alot of what you say illogical, like the super computers in things like i-robot,


Then agian, your use of the word 'could' suggests you are not certain -- which makes my point for me.

[Holden Caulfield]

didnt say could, said 'may'
1-0 to hewhoisalwaysrightnomatterhowmuchherealiseshecanne verwin

you have to use words, this is the internet it is a construct, nothing is real never mind the words or their meanings, this example is in no way ecologically valid, the feeling that the word 'sad' signifies to us is still the feeling the word signifies no matter what the word is or if no word exsists for it

[Sleeping Dragon]

I'm sorry, the mistake was mine. I didn't realize i had typed incompleteness theorem, I meant his refutation of principia mathematica alone. I am not saying that Cantor, Plato or Godel were not flawed. This was all the result of a misunderstanding caused by me. Just consider what I said without the reference to Godel, which I said does not necessarily even apply at all. Sorry to bother you, I just misinterpreted what you said.

[gilhyle]

Nothing is certain, except by reference to a standard of certainty. Establish your standard of certainty.....you will find it is itself uncertain, in some sense and your religious sense of certainty which comes only from the blindness of faith and exists in you only as a hunger is of no great significance.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HeWhoCopiesRosa'sSpoofingOfHisName:


didnt say could, said 'may'


Are you certain? The words you used to make that claim could have changed in meaning since you posted that -- if you did.



you have to use words, this is the internet it is a construct, nothing is real never mind the words or their meanings, this example is in no way ecologically valid, the feeling that the word 'sad' signifies to us is still the feeling the word signifies no matter what the word is or if no word exsists for it


And these thoughts require words, too -- so they fall foul of the point I was making above.

As indeed will any reply you make to this.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Nothing is certain, except by reference to a standard of certainty. Establish your standard of certainty.....you will find it is itself uncertain, in some sense and your religious sense of certainty which comes only from the blindness of faith and exists in you only as a hunger is of no great significance.


Are you sure about that...?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Sleeping D:


I'm sorry, the mistake was mine. I didn't realize i had typed incompleteness theorem, I meant his refutation of principia mathematica alone. I am not saying that Cantor, Plato or Godel were not flawed. This was all the result of a misunderstanding caused by me. Just consider what I said without the reference to Godel, which I said does not necessarily even apply at all. Sorry to bother you, I just misinterpreted what you said.


I do not see how this affects anything I said; none of Godel's work succeeds in refuting Pricipia.

That work is defetive for other reasons.

[gilhyle]

Gil:



Are you sure about that...?
No

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I think you need to go on a special course to learn to express your answers more concisely.

[Holden Caulfield]

thoughts do not require words, there must have been thought before words so that we could construct words to express ourselves better to others,

i think that your poont falls foul of sense and I think you know you are wrong and that your name spoofing is out of desperation, (:lol:)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HeWhoUsesWordsToTellUsWeDoNotNeedWords:


thoughts do not require words, there must have been thought before words so that we could construct words to express ourselves better to others,


Well, that is controversial, and not something over which you can be certain.

But, even if you were right, you will find, as you have here, that you need words to express the content of a thought, and as soon as you do that the above difficulties will cut in.

On the other hand, if you do not use words (or if you think that you do not need to use words here), you will not even be able to raise a question as to the fixity of the content of your thoughts from moment to moment, since you will have no words with which to do that.

In that case, you will be in a worse position than someone who argues that thoughts are necessarily linguistic.

So, your latest ploy is in fact a step backwards.



i think that your poont falls foul of sense and I think you know you are wrong and that your name spoofing is out of desperation,


Sure...

[apathy maybe]

Having just browsed that thread I have to say that most of you (not Rosa of course) have missed the point.

As far as I can tell, there is no certainty. Take Descartes reductionism, you cannot assume anything to be the case, because there might be a deceiving master intelligence that is manipulating your environment or thoughts or anything else. (Brain in a vat, or the Matrix.)

Once you get there, you cannot prove anything! Maths becomes potentially meaningless (if you are interested, you can do your own research as to why) etc.

However, you cannot take Descartes route out (of assuming a perfect 'good' God), because his arguments were fundamentally flawed (I won't bother going into this now). So what are you left with? Well, nothing.

Of course, such skepticism does one no good at all in the "real world" (assuming such a thing exists). We are make assumptions all the time (based on previous experience, biological imperative etc.). This is "pragmatically rational", but not actually "logically rational", have a look over Hume's arguments against induction for more thoughts on that.

(Actually, just read everything philosophical from Hume that you can, if anything is certain, it is certain that reading Hume will do you good.)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

On the contrary, we can be certain of some things. [And I gave a clue at the start how this might be established.]

All I was doing in the above was showing that traditional approaches to this problem descend into confusion.


Take Descartes reductionism, you cannot assume anything to be the case, because there might be a deceiving master intelligence that is manipulating your environment or thoughts or anything else. (Brain in a vat, or the Matrix.)


These suppositions self-destruct, for if we cannot trust anything, then the very words in which this possibility is expressed are equally suspect, and that means that this 'possibility' it is without content, and hence it is not even a possibility.

[Holden Caulfield]

you are far too nihilistic,

[apathy maybe]

And what, pray, is wrong with being nihilistic?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HeWhoShouldReadWhatIPosted:


you are far too nihilistic,


No, my purpose was explained in my reply to Apathy Maybe; here it is again:




On the contrary, we can be certain of some things. [And I gave a clue at the start how this might be established.]

All I was doing in the above was showing that traditional approaches to this problem descend into confusion.




Take Descartes reductionism, you cannot assume anything to be the case, because there might be a deceiving master intelligence that is manipulating your environment or thoughts or anything else. (Brain in a vat, or the Matrix.)


These suppositions self-destruct, for if we cannot trust anything, then the very words in which this possibility is expressed are equally suspect, and that means that this 'possibility' it is without content, and hence it is not even a possibility.



It is important to show that traditional approaches to this question (whether sceptical or not) cannot achieve what they want to achieve, even if they could say what that was.

Hence, an entirely new approach is required.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

AM:


And what, pray, is wrong with being nihilistic?


It, too, is traditional.

[apathy maybe]

That doesn't exactly answer the question. After all, Trotskyism is "traditional" as well.

[Colonello Buendia]

As far as I can tell, there is no certainty. Take Descartes reductionism, you cannot assume anything to be the case, because there might be a deceiving master intelligence that is manipulating your environment or thoughts or anything else. (Brain in a vat, or the Matrix.)

but even in the case of there being a master intelligence, there is still thought of some sort...I'm sounding like a theist:crying::scared: Rosa pointed out earlier that thought may actually be something else earlier on but let's say that the thing that most people call thought.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

AM:


That doesn't exactly answer the question. After all, Trotskyism is "traditional" as well.


Well, Trotskyism is not a philosophy, so it does apply.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

StateSux:



As far as I can tell, there is no certainty. Take Descartes reductionism, you cannot assume anything to be the case, because there might be a deceiving master intelligence that is manipulating your environment or thoughts or anything else. (Brain in a vat, or the Matrix.)



I have already covered that, with this:


These suppositions self-destruct, for if we cannot trust anything, then the very words in which this possibility is expressed are equally suspect, and that means that this 'possibility' it is without content, and hence it is not even a possibility.

[Colonello Buendia]

to doubt the existence of what we call thought is to doubt our ability to doubt

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Statesux:


to doubt the existence of what we call thought is to doubt our ability to doubt


You are assumiomg that such doubts will respect the meaning of teven these words, which it won't.

Hence, my attempt above to block such sceptical attacks with a new approach: radical doubt self-destructs.

[gilhyle]

On the contrary, we can be certain of some things. [And I gave a clue at the start how this might be established.]

Go on Rosa, show us the trivia that can be established with 'certainty'.....enter the realm of faith.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Don't need to; you already know, since you know how to use the word, just like the rest of us.

It's that simple.

[gilhyle]

Indeed....which means nothing is certain. There is no sentence that can be uttered, no word used, no communication undertaken, the meaning of which is 'certain'

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Indeed....which means nothing is certain. There is no sentence that can be uttered, no word used, no communication undertaken, the meaning of which is 'certain'


Including these sentences -- so we can ignore them.

[Awful Reality]

In my opinion the only real certainty is that there is thought. I don't know how much or what these thoughts are about but I can guarantee that there is such a thing as thought.

I agree completely. By the way, that's called solipsism. Anyway, I came to that conclusion one night, at about 2 AM doing homework, looking at my computer and thinking.

My reasoning went as follows:

I looked at my computer and saw that it was white. But I thought, what if it isn't white? What if it's just black and I only can see it as white? That got me thinking: What if it is white, but you see the same object as I see black, we just both associate the word "white" with these different colors, what if, say, Marx (because I must invoke him) saw it as I see red, or you see green. And then, how do I even know if my computer exists, as I can only sense it in my mind? How do I know that anything exists, that all is my hallucination. But to be hallucinating, one must have a mind to process these "hallucinations." And so, as de Carte said, "I think; therefore I am"

Whew.
Philosophy. Fun stuff.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Unfortunately, as I have shown. this line of reasoning self-destructs.

[apathy maybe]

Rosa, you know why many people don't take what you say seriously all the time?

Because while you can destroy lines of argument, your alternatives are rather lacking.

OK, you have shown that the thought experiment on 'thought' "self-destructs", fine well we are not left with anything then. But you also say that some things are "certain", but you refuse to say what things.



Indeed....which means nothing is certain. There is no sentence that can be uttered, no word used, no communication undertaken, the meaning of which is 'certain'
Including these sentences -- so we can ignore them.
And, just as equally, we can ignore your sentences and your writing.

See the problem there?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

AM:


Rosa, you know why many people don't take what you say seriously all the time?


Because it is so much easlier than trying to refute me.



Because while you can destroy lines of argument, your alternatives are rather lacking.



I have made no secret of the fact that I think all philosophical theories (not 99%, but 100%) are full of hot air. In that case, I am just being consistent when I offer no alternative 'theory'.



well we are not left with anything then


Yes we are; as I pointed out to Gil:



Don't need to; you already know, since you know how to use the word, just like the rest of us.

It's that simple.


I endeavour to destroy philosophy in order to encourage you to return to using language as you were socialised to do. So, if you consider how we use the word 'certain' (in its many and diverse ways, and in different areas of discourse) that is all you need to know about what is certain.

There are no hidden secrets lying behind the use of our words that philosophers are uniquely well-equipped to find. That is because there are none.

That explains why they have got nowhere in 2500 years.

Everything lies open to view; you just have to refuse to be bamboozled by the crass arguments of traditional philosophy.


And, just as equally, we can ignore your sentences and your writing.


Not so; this is because I am not arguing in support of a doctrine that self-destructs, whereas you lot are.



See the problem there?


There isn't one.

There are no philosophical 'problems' which are not merely a result of the misuse of language.

[Awful Reality]

Unfortunately, as I have shown. this line of reasoning self-destructs.

How so?

[Awful Reality]

Including these sentences -- So we can ignore them.

I don't think that that's a logical conclusion at all- you can't refute a claim on the basis that it's true, as you do here. Furthermore, we aren't saying that nothing exists or is certain, we are only allowing for the possibility as such.

And the very basis of my argument is that these sentences only have meaning when processed in thought- ergo they can be "real" as I see them, but in truth they are nothing at all.

[apathy maybe]

OK, Rosa, thanks! I'll try and remember what you are trying to do in future. And feel free to gently remind me if I start miss-using words into the future.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Fourth International:


How so?

Systematic doubt, of the sort you find in Descartes, always stops short of language. So, such sceptics never question whether the meanings of the words they use are not also subject to doubt, which, if everything is so subject, ought to be.

But then, if we cannot trust the meanings of the words we use, then the words used to express these very doubts cannot be trusted, either. [There is no way they can be given an exemption certificate if all words are under suspicion.]

And if that is the case, the sentences in which these words appear fall apart, since they contain words whose meanings are now indeterminate.

This means that these doubts have no content; that is, the sentences expressing those doubts are vacuous, or, at least, of indeterminate sense -- they now say nothing to us.

The bottom line is therefore that such doubts self-destruct for they undermine the very language in which they are expressed.

Is that a little clearer?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

AM:


And feel free to gently remind me if I start miss-using words into the future.

Well, unless you are deliberatley careless, you will only do that if and when you next succomb to the temptation to do a little traditional philosophy.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Fourth International:


I don't think that that's a logical conclusion at all- you can't refute a claim on the basis that it's true, as you do here. Furthermore, we aren't saying that nothing exists or is certain, we are only allowing for the possibility as such.


One can reason hypothetically in logic, mathematics, philosophy, and everyday life, and assume for the purposes of argument that a falsehood is true (or that a sentence of indeterminate truth-value is true), just to see where that leads.

Take a simple example. Let's say you know it's not raining, but someone else thinks it is. So, you argue: 'Look if it is raining, the streets will be wet'. You direct the other person to the window, where he/she sees the streets are dry, thereby correcting a false belief. [I have deliberately made this example trite so that the tactic is not obscured. In mathematics and logic this is called indirect proof, or reductio ad absurdam.]

Now, Gil was trying to make a specfic point about certainty, something I believe to be false, but I assumed it was true and derived a paradoxical conclusion from it. Gil claimed that:

G1: Nothing is certain.

Now we can ask, is G1 itself certain? If it is not, then we have no good reason to accept it. For all we know it could be wildly inaccurate.

On the other hand, if it is certain then it becomes false, and we have every reason to reject it.



And the very basis of my argument is that these sentences only have meaning when processed in thought- ergo they can be "real" as I see them, but in truth they are nothing at all.


Well, you only have access to your thoughts if they are expressed in language, and then the difficulties I mentioned kick in.

[Hit The North]

"Everything lies open to view" - Rosa Lichtenstein

"All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided." - Karl Marx

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:



"All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided." - Karl Marx


We're not talking about science here.

So, go back to sleep.

[Volderbeek]

Because I understand the English language.

WTF is that supposed to mean?!


This indicates that you do not understand either the word "assumption" or the word "axiom" --, or perhaps both.1. I used the parentheses there to indicate axioms were an example. I'm not saying they're identical to assumptions

2. Dictionary.com again:


ax·i·om http://cache.lexico.com/g/d/premium.gif http://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pnghttp://cache.lexico.com/g/d/speaker.gif (https://secure.reference.com/premium/login.html?rd=2&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdictionary.reference.com%2Fbrowse%2 Faxiom) /ˈækhttp://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngsihttp://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngəm/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[ak-see-uhhttp://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngm] Pronunciation Key - Show IPA Pronunciation –noun 1.a self-evident truth that requires no proof. 2.a universally accepted principle or rule. 3.Logic, Mathematics. a proposition that is assumed without proof for the sake of studying the consequences that follow from it.It doesn't look like I'm the one having trouble with the English language.

[Volderbeek]

Nothing is certain, except by reference to a standard of certainty. Establish your standard of certainty.....you will find it is itself uncertain, in some sense and your religious sense of certainty which comes only from the blindness of faith and exists in you only as a hunger is of no great significance.

Saying that nothing is certain or that everything is certain is equally meaningless (indeterminate being). Certainty only takes its meaning as being opposed to doubt (determinate being). Sometimes you have to assume certainty, but you need to be able to doubt to be certain and vice versa.

[Hit The North]

We're not talking about science here.



Oh, so not every thing is open to view. You need to express yourself more clearly :lol:

[Holden Caulfield]

[quote=Rosa;This indicates that you do not understand either the word "assumption" or the word "axiom" --, or perhaps both.[/quote]


WTF is that supposed to mean?!

1. I used the parentheses there to indicate axioms were an example. I'm not saying they're identical to assumptions

It doesn't look like I'm the one having trouble with the English language.

it is a certainty; no wonder that the workers!! aren't flooding to our cause when we revert to pissy intellect jousting over word choice, for fucks sake, if you take the pss out of the vocab of fellow comrades how the fuck do you think you will be able to communicate to a mass workers movement,

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:



Oh, so not every thing is open to view. You need to express yourself more clearly


You are obviously having problems understanding the use if restricted quantifiers.

That is, if you know what they are.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantification

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:



WTF is that supposed to mean?!



Which word don't you understand?


It doesn't look like I'm the one having trouble with the English language.

Who said you were? I merely said I understood English, just as I understand that dictionaries are not normative.

You clearly think they are.


I used the parentheses there to indicate axioms were an example. I'm not saying they're identical to assumptions


Here is what you said:


We need some base line assumptions (axioms) and then work up from there.

I think it a reasonable inference to make that you think assumptions are axioms.

In logic and mathematics, assumptions include those propositions assumed to be true for the purposes of the arguement. Axioms held true per se.

So, axioms are assumptions, but assumptions are not axioms, as you seemed to think.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HeWho...:


it is a certainty; no wonder that the workers!! aren't flooding to our cause when we revert to pissy intellect jousting over word choice, for fucks sake, if you take the pss out of the vocab of fellow comrades how the fuck do you think you will be able to communicate to a mass workers movement,

Who is this directed at? Volderbeek, or myself?

Either way, I'd appreciate it if you dropped the abusive tone.

[gilhyle]

There is nothing wrong with what V's usage of the term axiom which is a much looser phrase, subject to more varied usage than you allow........and by the way dictionaries are normative.....your obviously not familar with their role in the development of national capitalist economies.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


There is nothing wrong with what V's usage of the term axiom which is a much looser phrase, subject to more varied usage than you allow........and by the way dictionaries are normative.....your obviously not familar with their role in the development of national capitalist economies.


1) You allege dictionaries are not normative, but what you are expressing is a ruling-class, bourgeois view. That is why they had to role they had in capitalism -- something you seem not to be aware of.

2) If you can find a logic text that uses the word 'axiom' as V used it, I might reconsider, but since you haven't opened a logic book in years (or if you did, you were half-asleep), I won't be holding my breath on that one.

Axioms may be a sub class of assumptions, but not the other way round.

[Volderbeek]

it is a certainty; no wonder that the workers!! aren't flooding to our cause when we revert to pissy intellect jousting over word choice, for fucks sake, if you take the pss out of the vocab of fellow comrades how the fuck do you think you will be able to communicate to a mass workers movement,

Don't try to to justify anti-intellectualism with an abhorrent position like workerism. Workers need to gain a revolutionary consciousness, and intellectualism is the only route to that.

[Volderbeek]

Which word don't you understand?

:glare: I meant how does that relate what I said about certainty?


Who said you were? I merely said I understood English, just as I understand that dictionaries are not normative.

You clearly think they are.Of course I do. You said they summarized use, and norms are created by common use. Am I missing something here?


I think it a reasonable inference to make that you think assumptions are axioms.Well, I did say "base line assumptions," but I'll grant you that it is reasonable to interpret it that way. I'm just saying now that that's not what I meant to imply.

[Dystisis]

I wonder how mathematics goes into the 'problem' of certainty.

If, for example, we can say that nothing is certain as we are just experiencing what our senses tells our mind, does that include mathematical reasoning? I see mathematics such as 1+1=2 as obvious, and it has to be real because it is a universal truth. Nothing can go beyond it... if you have one apple and gain another apple you will have a couple of apples. Of course this can also be applied to this sense of uncertainty, I think - what is really an apple. But when you bring it to a microscopic level, find the smallest possible entity available in the universe, then have one of that and add another one, the result will be simply 2.

Anyone understand what I mean? Hopefully someone has thought more of this than I.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:



I meant how does that relate what I said about certainty?



You had said:



Besides, how can you be certain about your lack of certainty;


To which I replied:



Because I understand the English language


Now, this is how it relates to what you said: we call such a response on planet earth "an answer". You will need to check to find out what they call it on your home planet.


Of course I do. You said they summarized use, and norms are created by common use. Am I missing something here?


No, they also record the religious, mystical and philosphical use of words, which is what is being contested here.

So, they cannot be normative in philosophical discussion about such meanings.

Check out, say, 'negation'; you will find no dictionary defines this word as it is used in dialectics.

Does that mean you are forced to accept such a definition?

Of course not.

Same here.



Well, I did say "base line assumptions," but I'll grant you that it is reasonable to interpret it that way. I'm just saying now that that's not what I meant to imply.


Fine, but just watch your step.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dystisis, you have actually hit on a good example of certainty.

But, you needn't complicate matters with scientific side issues. The rule you give is as certain as anything could be.

[gilhyle]

I wrote:


dictionaries are normative

You replied:


Gil:
1) You allege dictionaries are not normative.....

Sometimes I really wonder about you Rosa.:rolleyes:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:



Sometimes I really wonder about you Rosa.


Yes, that extra 'not' is a typo, and shouldn't be there.

You read into my other posts things that are not there, so why couldn't you have mentally delete this word?

[Volderbeek]

Now, this is how it relates to what you said: we call such a response on planet earth "an answer". You will need to check to find out what they call it on your home planet.

So you give a cryptic answer and then claim I come from another planet for not understanding it. :confused:


No, they also record the religious, mystical and philosphical use of words, which is what is being contested here.

So, they cannot be normative in philosophical discussion about such meanings.I didn't try to use it to prove my philosophy right, just to express my meaning more clearly.


Check out, say, 'negation'; you will find no dictionary defines this word as it is used in dialectics.

Does that mean you are forced to accept such a definition?

Of course not.

Same here.I would certainly use the dictionary definition, since the dialectical definition is very similar to others, but just used in a different sense. I wouldn't try to, however, claim the word apple describes bananas.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:


So you give a cryptic answer and then claim I come from another planet for not understanding it.

Well, I suppose you visitors to this planet have not quite grasped the concept of an answer, and thus consider them all cryptic.

[One would have thought that on Planet Dialectic a cryptic answer would be a model of clarity compared to the gobbledygook one finds in Hegel's 'Logic'.]


I didn't try to use it to prove my philosophy right, just to express my meaning more clearly.


But, you failed to give a sense to the nominal use of the word 'Being', to depict all that there is (which is what I assume you were trying to do). This is a traditional move, which is just asumed to be legitimate, but never justified.


I would certainly use the dictionary definition, since the dialectical definition is very similar to others, but just used in a different sense. I wouldn't try to, however, claim the word apple describes bananas.

There is no dialectical sense to negation that even remotely resembles the dictionary definition (you are quite at liberty to prove otherwise, as opposed to merely asserting it), but even if it did, you would still not regard the dictionary definition as normative, for that would mean you could not use negation in its full dialectical sense.

[Dystisis]

Dystisis, you have actually hit on a good example of certainty.

But, you needn't complicate matters with scientific side issues. The rule you give is as certain as anything could be.
I did it to clarify. An apple is a more "fluid" example than the 'smallest unit possible', applying mathematics to the apple example (1 apple + 1 apple = 2 apples) only works in an almost metaphorical way (not sure how to explain it,) as an apple is not a complete form in itself. No apple is alike any other. The only thing that is a 'complete' form (can not be subdivided) in itself is the theoretically smallest unit/diameter possible. Therefore here the 1 can be applied correctly, as it is truly a 1.

This is off topic though.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well apples may vary, but the application of the (ordinary) counting rule does not.

[Dystisis]

Well apples may vary, but the application of the (ordinary) counting rule does not.
This is true. However, as I said, if someone insist on being obnoxiously correct, they're actually doing an error when trying to count two apples together (using the same value) as they are not physically equal. Obviously I understand the (most of all economic) needs for humans to count like this - applying theoretical sections or groups to/of things and counting using those standards like a metaphor for equal units.

It doesn't change the fact that the only place that goes beyond the theoretical application is with the smallest diameter physically possible, which of course everything consists of.

What you are talking about is counting applied theoretically, what I am talking about is the only physically correct application, I think. :)

As far as certainty, the theoretical application also holds water because it functions sort of like an allegory for the physically correct application. And this does, as you say, not vary.

All this (of physical/actual application of counting) is speculation based on the assumption that the universe is not infinite.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Counting apples applies to the application of a rule; the applciation of the rule in the same way is what constitutes +1 each time, irrespective of the object counted, so long as it falls under the same count noun.

So, one apple could be red and another sky blue pink, it would not matter, so long as both are correctly describable as apples.

Think of the way we count other things, like rivers, or islands, or planets. There are no 'equal units' here, just an equal application of the same rule.

[Dystisis]

I totally agree. What you said, the examples you gave, is what I referred to as the theoretical application of numbers. Another word for it is applied mathematics.

I call it theoretical because: The values are given by people, and they could be frequent to change. For example, you said it yourself: No river is alike another, it is only because humans choose to categorize them together that we can have one river and add another, thus end with two.

The amounts here are useful to serve as an image and purpose, but they are not really more than that. There is little ground in physical reality, as it's a subjective view. We can use math as a tool for our own purposes, when using amounts theoretically.

Now, everything is 'certain'. So this is really how far we need go if we are to simply discuss this particular subject, I agree with you totally.
---
What I wanted to add was that the above is certain because the mechanisms of addition and subtraction, and the whole mathematical system/numeral system itself is certain. But the above isn't an example of counting in itself (which I really consider to be the most relevant), it's an example of applied mathematics.

As I've said, counting is possible in the realm of the smallest units possible. This is the only place you will find physically equal units. Therefore, this is really the only place where mathematics describes f.ex. addition perfectly.
---
If I understand correctly the point you're making, it's that we use the counting system on set categories as well, and the counting or numerical system is of course fixed/certain. I understand this but as I've said these are only images of how the "perfect" system works, it is theoretical for us.

Hope I didn't cause more confusion.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, I am not sure what you mean by a 'perfect' system.

We can count functions, lines, planes and even numbers themselves. And when we are counting 'theoretically', we are still applying a rule, and one derived from oiur ordinary counting practices.

[Dystisis]

Well, I am not sure what you mean by a 'perfect' system.
I did not say "a perfect system". What I said was that the only "perfect application" of numbers are at an unknown sub-atomic level where all units of matter are equal. Don't you see what I mean? This is the only place where 1 unit of matter truly equals the other units of matter, so when two of these units combine they become 2 (both physically and theoretically). Giving us the foundation of numbers, as well as of course the foundation of matter.

We can and do say the same about larger objects as well, but if you want to be physically precise it is incorrect as 1 car/apple/river is not equal to another car/apple/river other than in human theory.

It is key to think about numbers as amounts, not to confuse them with the symbols or the particular system we use to define them.

We can count functions, lines, planes and even numbers themselves. And when we are counting 'theoretically', we are still applying a rule, and one derived from oiur ordinary counting practices.
Not completely sure what you mean, but maybe this is a response: We can count fictional things, or things we imagine, and here physics does not apply. This is different because if we imagine two circles we can also "imagine" that they are 100% equal. So it is not physically incorrect to count them together like it is to count 2 cars. I fear we're talking past each other though.

You said that when we are counting (even "theoretically") we are applying a rule. This is true, and it is this rule that I said was "certain". It is a given, it does not have anything to do with human practices it's a (or the, in my opinion) law of nature.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, but you are still, I think, confusing the application of the counting rule with a different rule, one we might use to identify objects (as the same or nearly the same).

By counting functions I mean something like, the square function (one), the sine function (two), the logarithm function (three), and so on.

These are not remotely like one another, but we can still count them, since they fall under the same general term.

We can thus count things that are totally unlike. Think about counting injuries, causes of death, objects in a lost and found, plays on in Broadway over a space of 25 years, ways of travelling from New York to Tokyo, insurance claim excuses, and so on.

But, I am not sure what you mean when you say 'it' is a law of nature; what is?

[Volderbeek]

Well, I suppose you visitors to this planet have not quite grasped the concept of an answer, and thus consider them all cryptic.

Ugh, never mind. :rolleyes:


[One would have thought that on Planet Dialectic a cryptic answer would be a model of clarity compared to the gobbledygook one finds in Hegel's 'Logic'.]Hey, that looks like a good name for my blog. Now, it doesn't really have a name.


But, you failed to give a sense to the nominal use of the word 'Being', to depict all that there is (which is what I assume you were trying to do). This is a traditional move, which is just asumed to be legitimate, but never justified.The word "being"? I think you're referring to a different topic. But then I do see how they're all sort of running together.

I'm using Being in the sense that Hegel did (since that's where I'm getting this from). It basically means something that exists. What's the problem?


There is no dialectical sense to negation that even remotely resembles the dictionary definition (you are quite at liberty to prove otherwise, as opposed to merely asserting it), but even if it did, you would still not regard the dictionary definition as normative, for that would mean you could not use negation in its full dialectical sense.Dictionary.com yet again:


ne·ga·tion http://cache.lexico.com/g/d/premium.gif http://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pnghttp://cache.lexico.com/g/d/speaker.gif (https://secure.reference.com/premium/login.html?rd=2&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdictionary.reference.com%2Fbrowse%2 Fnegation) /nɪˈgeɪhttp://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngʃən/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[ni-gey-shuhhttp://cache.lexico.com/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngn] Pronunciation Key - Show IPA Pronunciation –noun 1.the act of denying: He shook his head in negation of the charge. 2.a denial: a negation of one's former beliefs. 3.something that is without existence; nonentity. 4.the absence or opposite of something that is actual, positive, or affirmative: Darkness is the negation of light. 5.a negative statement, idea, concept, doctrine, etc.; a contradiction, refutation, or rebuttal: a shameless lie that demands a negation.

I told you and the dictionary to play nice, but I see that's about as practical as bringing peace to Iraq.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:



Ugh, never mind.


I can find you a translation manual on the internet, if your mastery of earthling-speak is not up to the job.



Hey, that looks like a good name for my blog.


Yes, it will confirm you are a space cowboy, if nothing else.



I'm using Being in the sense that Hegel did (since that's where I'm getting this from). It basically means something that exists. What's the problem?



He adopted the Greek use of this term (with added Hermetic spin), which in turn was a nominalisation of the verb 'to be'.

In this case, therefore, Hegel and the Greeks invented a name for something they failed to show exists (just like the word 'God' names nothing; that is it is not the name of anything in existence).


I told you and the dictionary to play nice, but I see that's about as practical as bringing peace to Iraq.

Once more, dictionaries also capture the use to which philosophers put certain words, which cannot therefore be used to solve a philosophical problem, since that use contains that very problem.

And, this dictionary fails to capture the 'sublated' notion of negation; does that mean you have to accept it?

Of course not.

Same here.

So, this dictionary has picked a fight with you, not me.

We should bang your heads together.

[Jhé]

there is only one thing, body, entity, force, piece of stuff, cosmic wonder.....

thats certian


and that is the infinate and incredible force that is Love

[Jhé]

how can thought be certain if it is someting that inhabits reality reality in itself is extremely questionable and has many versions, cosmological, quantum, classical etc


unless thought it an external thing that doesnt exist within the universe and any version of reality?

[Dystisis]

there is only one thing, body, entity, force, piece of stuff, cosmic wonder.....

thats certian


and that is the infinate and incredible force that is Love
That's quite romantic. However, what do you mean by that? I am afraid that behind those beautiful words you really haven't got any argument. Love, in the most common use of the word, is the feelings of attachment people develop to their surroundings. It is a process in the brain, hardly a law of nature or anything equal, unless you prove otherwise?

In my opinion the only certain thing are calculations... these are constant and you can say "sure my senses might be wrong but that doesn't change the fact that 1+1=2 or when I have one dot and gain another that will leave 2 dots". Or logic, or whatever you call it. In my opinion it's all based on numbers.

[Jhé]

Love as a force, as a power and as a supreme state is certain.

Nearly everything is clouded from this i think.

And no i dont have any evidence. I have the best evidence. The unwavering affection i feel for the ones i love is enough evidence for me :P

[Volderbeek]

Yes, it will confirm you are a space cowboy, if nothing else.

Damn straight, just like Spike from Cowboy Bebop:

http://img54.imageshack.us/img54/9793/spikespiegelm01vh2.jpg


He adopted the Greek use of this term (with added Hermetic spin), which in turn was a nominalisation of the verb 'to be'.

In this case, therefore, Hegel and the Greeks invented a name for something they failed to show exists (just like the word 'God' names nothing; that is it is not the name of anything in existence).
I don't think the ancient Greeks could've gotten anything from an English word...

As to being, it just refers to something that exists. That's what philosophy explores: the nature of existence. You've used this concept of existence several times in your post, but fail to tell us the nature of your usage. If there's anything going unexplained, it's that.


Once more, dictionaries also capture the use to which philosophers put certain words, which cannot therefore be used to solve a philosophical problem, since that use contains that very problem.

And, this dictionary fails to capture the 'sublated' notion of negation; does that mean you have to accept it?Didn't you just say this:


There is no dialectical sense to negation that even remotely resembles the dictionary definition (you are quite at liberty to prove otherwise, as opposed to merely asserting it)And I did prove otherwise. Sublation is something different. A negation is a negation. Sublation happens when something is both negated and preserved dialectically.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:



I don't think the ancient Greeks could've gotten anything from an English word...



Well spotted; so it's a good job they had their own term, which traditional philosphers apropriated, and distorted, as Marx noted.



As to being, it just refers to something that exists.


But, it is a present participle, not a noun.


Didn't you just say this:


No. You need to pay attention.



And I did prove otherwise. Sublation is something different. A negation is a negation. Sublation happens when something is both negated and preserved dialectically.


But, no dictionary will tell you this (unless it's a Hegel dictionary etc.).

[Volderbeek]

Well spotted; so it's a good job they had their own term, which traditional philosphers apropriated, and distorted, as Marx noted.

So all this is based on the meaning of one word, and that word went through several translations. If anything, that just makes it all the more likely they were all talking about the same thing.


But, it is a present participle, not a noun.And this means I can't use it as a noun synonymous with existence why?


No. You need to pay attention.It's not a good idea to lie about something when the contrary evidence is on the same damn page...


But, no dictionary will tell you this (unless it's a Hegel dictionary etc.).I just quoted a definition that matched it perfectly. Negation that is. Sublation is different. It was used to translate the German word aufheben. And this is what Wikipedia says about that:


the German verb aufheben means both "to cancel" and "to keep"

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:



So all this is based on the meaning of one word, and that word went through several translations. If anything, that just makes it all the more likely they were all talking about the same thing.



Or even more likely, they ween't talking about anything at all.


And this means I can't use it as a noun synonymous with existence why?

And how do you know it is synonymous with anything, let alone 'existence'?


It's not a good idea to lie about something when the contrary evidence is on the same damn page...

Can I suggest you stop doing it then?


I just quoted a definition that matched it perfectly. Negation that is. Sublation is different. It was used to translate the German word aufheben. And this is what Wikipedia says about that:

That just means it is not synonymous with negation and we are back where we were before you decided truth was contained in dictionaries.



the German verb aufheben means both "to cancel" and "to keep"


Yes, just like 'bank' means a place of institutionalised theft, the side of a river and how to turn an aeroplane. Three words, all typographically identical.

In that case, we have in 'aufheben' two words, not one --, conflated by the dim author of the Wiki article (and that even dimmer mystic Hegel).

Here is what an expert had to say about this:



"Date: Fri, 24 Mar 95 21:12:19 EST From: Larry Horn. Subject: Re: 6.430 Words that are their own opposites; Jane Edwards calls our attention to Abel's and Freud's contributions to our topic, citing this passage from Lepschy (1982) on Carl Abel's Gegensinn der Urworte (1884) inter alia:

"'His theory on the importance and interest of words with opposite meanings (which were, he suggested, particularly frequent in the early stages of languages) finds its place in a long tradition of studies, from the Stoic's grammar and the etymologies [I]e contrario [...], to the chapter in Arab linguistic tradition devoted to the [...] contraries, or words of opposite meanings [...] to the medieval Jewish grammarians' discussions on parallel phenomena in Hebrew [...] to Christian biblical scholars who at least since the 17th century examine cases of 'enantiosemy' in the Sacred, classical, and modern languages, commenting on words like Hebrew berekh 'he blessed' and 'he cursed', Greek argo's 'swift' and 'slow', Latin altus 'high' and 'deep' [...] Nearer to Abel, in the first part of the 19th century, we find the German romantics meditating on opposite meanings [...] and it is impossible not to remember Hegel's comments on a key term in his logic, aufheben, which means both 'to eliminate' and 'to preserve', illustrating a coexistence in language of opposite meanings which has great speculative import.' Lepschy also writes that Abel's ideas 'were taken seriously by people of the calibre of Pott, Steinthal, and Schuchardt', and that Freud repeatedly quoted Abel's work, viewing it 'as a linguistic confirmation' of his own theory that 'for the unconscious, opposites are equivalent to each other.' (pp.28-29)

"I also delve into Abel and Freud in the 'Negation East and West' section of my book, A Natural History of Negation (Chicago, 1989; cf. esp. pp.93-94).

"I ended up taking a rather sceptical stance toward both Abel's thesis that 'primitive languages' tend to contain a significant number of Urwoerte that simultaneously denote two contraries and Freud's borrowing of Abel's work as evidence for the 'antithetical meaning of primal words' as reflected in the absence of the law of contradiction within dreams ('Hearing the analysis and insist of a dream character 'It's NOT my mother', the analyst immediately translates 'So it IS his mother'.) The nature of the examples marshalled by Abel and Freud, unfortunately, are such as to raise the eyebrows of even the most fervent megacomparativist among us, although some of them (Lat. clamare 'cry' vs. clam 'softly') are indeed cute. Some do involve what another poster just asked about, albeit with the inaccurate label 'palindrome' -- the idea being that the sounds or letters of one word can be reversed to produce an antonym [or in some of the Abel-Freud cases, a synonym] of that word, and many involve cross-linguistic pairs: Ger. Topf 'pot'/Eng. 'pot', Ger. Ruhe 'rest'/Eng. 'hurry', 'care' vs. 'wreck'. (If THIS is what Pott and Schuchardt 'took seriously', I'm disappointed, especially in the former, who had the good taste to discover the phenomenon of negative polarity.) In my book, I also -- like Lepschy -- try to deal with the Hegelian notion of aufhebung, arguing that whatever its importance for the theory of dialectic, this particular antilogy/auto-antonym/enantioseme does not comfortably sit on the Abel-Freudian roster of primal antithetical words. Indeed, the strongest examples of this phenomenon we have (cleave, sanction, etc.) are remarkably non-primal. And some of the others mentioned by Abel/Lipschy/Edwards -- as other posters on this thread have observed -- are simply misdiagnosed (Lat. 'altus', for one). The case of the Hebrew berekh 'he blessed/he cursed' I imagine is just like the use of Fr. sacre' 'blessed, cursed' -- whether we want to invoke irony, euphemism, or some other trope to explain this development (cf. the Eumenides, et al.). In none of these cases is the thesis of an unconscious identification of opposites particular economical or explanatory, although it does make a nice story. (The relevant Freud papers are 'The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words' [1910] and 'Negation' [1925], both of course to be found in Strachey's Standard Edition; the passage from Hegel's Logic on Aufhebung is also discussed by Walter Kaufmann in his Hegel (1995, pp.192-93).) Larry."


And here is what WVO Quine had to say about such 'double meanings':




"A distant kin of [this appeal to alteriety] is occasionally encountered in an owlish allusion to 'identity of opposites.' [With respect to an earlier example of this] we have seen that each [half] is accounted for without appealing to any mystical principle. A case for identity of opposites that is invariably cited is altus, Latin for both 'high' and 'deep'. What we actually have here, however, is a case rather of parochial outlook on our part. What is objective about height and depth is distance from top to bottom. We call it height or depth according to our point of view; Latin simply tells us how it is with no thought of opposites.

"Another tempting case for the identity of opposites is cleave: 1. adhere, 2. sever. However, Skeat argues that this is a convergence of two words, independent in origin....

"May identity of opposites be manifested not only by sameness of word for opposite senses, but also for sameness of sense for opposite words? Well there is fast...and its opposite loose: there are fast women, I am told, and loose women, and no clear distinction between them. A little and a lot are opposites, but quite a little is quite a lot." [Quine (1990), pp.51-52. On this, see Skeat (1993), p.84.]


So, mystics have been looking for such 'hidden meanings' in language for millennia. No surprise then that you are doing the same.

Larry Horn's book 'The Natural History of Negation' goes into more detail; I suggest you consult it.


References at my site, here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_01.htm (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_01.htm)

Of course, you'd know all this if you bothered to educate yourself before you mouthed-off.

[The Feral Underclass]

My mind is quite certain about many things. We know we are born and that we are alive. We also know that we die. I am also certain that I do not like raw mushrooms.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks TAT; I am certain you are certain about many more things, though...

[Dystisis]

My mind is quite certain about many things. We know we are born and that we are alive. We also know that we die. I am also certain that I do not like raw mushrooms.
Have you ever watched The Matrix? ;)

Those things, you are not truly certain about. Hypotethically speaking, you can only rely on your senses when it comes to judging things that aren't mathematically or logically obvious. And your senses can be tricked or misinforming. You then use your brain to analyze what your senses tell you.

I think one of your remarks are true though. We know that we are alive, I think. Not sure.

Ps. I do not like raw mushrooms either. Or was it chicken?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, the Matrix is a very badly confused film.

But, even if it weren't, it cannot affect those things of which we are certain, for if it did, then the certainty you might now have that you watched the film, or remember it correctly, would go with it too.

[BurnTheOliveTree]

Can we be certain of our ability to make logical sense and rational conclusions?

If not, this entire debate is meaningless.

-Alex

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Burn:



Can we be certain of our ability to make logical sense and rational conclusions?

If not, this entire debate is meaningless.



Only if you know how to use the English language correctly.

Or, of course, other languages in which the same thought is expressible.

[Black Cross]

^^I think there's a little more to it than that (If that has anything to do with it at all).

[Volderbeek]

And how do you know it is synonymous with anything, let alone 'existence'?Because I'm using it that way...


That just means it is not synonymous with negation and we are back where we were before you decided truth was contained in dictionaries.I never claimed it was, unless that's what you meant by "dialectical sense of negation". And truth is contained in dictionaries, as well as encyclopedias, thesauruses, and whatnot. You can't really be wrong when you're just documenting word usage (unless you do that wrong).


Yes, just like 'bank' means a place of institutionalised theft, the side of a river and how to turn an aeroplane. Three words, all typographically identical.

In that case, we have in 'aufheben' two words, not one --, conflated by the dim author of the Wiki article (and that even dimmer mystic Hegel).
I don't think it really matters how many words it is or isn't. Some words have multiple meanings while some meanings can be expressed with multiple words. My point is that the word expresses Hegel's meaning, and can be found in the dictionary, just not in the English one.


So, mystics have been looking for such 'hidden meanings' in language for millennia. No surprise then that you are doing the same.:glare: I'm not trying to argue for identity of opposites from the ambiguity of certain words. That would be a terribly weak argument, and it doesn't even explain the concept correctly. I believe that's what we call a strawman.

[Volderbeek]

A distant kin of [this appeal to alteriety] is occasionally encountered in an owlish allusion to 'identity of opposites.' [With respect to an earlier example of this] we have seen that each [half] is accounted for without appealing to any mystical [sic] principle. A case for identity of opposites that is invariably cited is altus, Latin for both 'high' and 'deep'. What we actually have here, however, is a case rather of parochial outlook on our part. What is objective about height and depth is distance from top to bottom. We call it height or depth according to our point of view; Latin simply tells us how it is with no thought of opposites.This strawman hacking actually provides a good explanation of unity of opposites. Distance is necessarily composed of opposites: a starting point and an ending point. It's abstracted from both, but if you were at the starting point (assuming you're going up), you would be deep. If at the end, you're high. Either way though, you'd be high relative to some other deeper point and vice versa. So it turns out you'd be high and deep simultaneously.

[Volderbeek]

Well, the Matrix is a very badly confused film.

At least we can agree on one thing. The sequels were much worse; you say Hegel uses strings of meaningless words...

[Volderbeek]

Can we be certain of our ability to make logical sense and rational conclusions?

I think we have to assume so. How would we be certain that we can be illogical and irrational?

[BurnTheOliveTree]

I think we have to assume so. How would we be certain that we can be illogical and irrational?


Exactly, we have to just take it for granted. So the debate's meaningless really, everyone has started out with a given premise in the search for a given premise.

Rosa:

That's a non-answer. I'm sure you've got a sophisticated wittgenstein-esque point behind it, but I happen to not be a mind-reader, and it'd be cool for you to actually explain what you mean once in a while.

-Alex

[Dystisis]

At least we can agree on one thing. The sequels were much worse; you say Hegel uses strings of meaningless words...
When I talked about the film I didn't intend to actually discuss the films production. I meant the main idea behind the movie (the first at least,) that it's possible that the universe we are living in is a simulation, or in fact our own senses "tricking" us. Obviously I am aware that the Matrix is not the first production with this theme, but it is one of the recently more famous.

And that we for some reason "must" decide that it can not be so is stupid! What else is this if not a search for whatever truth there is (philosophy).

Personally, though, I do not really take that much of a fascination for the whole "simulation" scenario that is illustrated in the matrix, etc. Not that it isn't an interesting theory, but... it just adds another layer, there would still be some sort of truths behind that original universe that isn't discussed. So it is an interesting theory but seems rather pointless.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:

"you say Hegel uses strings of meaningless words..."

As do his clones, like you.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:



Because I'm using it that way...



Use does not define meaning, otherwise we would have to accept the ideological use of 'human nature' put out by ruling-class hacks.


I never claimed it was, unless that's what you meant by "dialectical sense of negation". And truth is contained in dictionaries, as well as encyclopedias, thesauruses, and whatnot. You can't really be wrong when you're just documenting word usage (unless you do that wrong).

In that case, you will have to accept an awful lot of ruling-class crap as 'truth'.

And scientists would just look stuff up in dictionaries and encylcopedias instead of performing experiments, etc.


I don't think it really matters how many words it is or isn't. Some words have multiple meanings while some meanings can be expressed with multiple words. My point is that the word expresses Hegel's meaning, and can be found in the dictionary, just not in the English one.


And how do you know these 'words with multiple' meanings are not many words each with their own meanings, like 'bank'?

And dictionaries record the confused use that ruling-class hacks like Hegel put on words.

So, they can't be used to sell us this odd idea of yours.


I'm not trying to argue for identity of opposites from the ambiguity of certain words. That would be a terribly weak argument, and it doesn't even explain the concept correctly. I believe that's what we call a strawman.


I am glad to hear it; but that just means you now have no argument at all.

[Hit The North]

R:
Use does not define meaning, otherwise we would have to accept the ideological use of 'human nature' put out by ruling-class hacks.
Words are tools. Of course use defines meaning. What it doesn't do is guarantee truth or accuracy.

Take the example you use: it's actually through the realisation that the ruling class uses the term "human nature" ideologically that we grasp its real meaning. That doesn't mean we have to agree to the truth of the concept's assertions.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:



Of course use defines meaning.


So, if a capitalist hack uses the phrase 'human nature' in such a way that it implies human beings are selfish, you'd accept that, would you?

Or, if someone used 'God' to mean 'That being which necessarily exists' (a la Descartes and Leibniz), you'd accept that, too, I suppose.

And if I use "BuBuBU" to confuse you, "BuBuBu" would mean "Citizen Z is confused", would it?

Use and meaning are connected, but there is no strict implication from the one to the other.

You are probably confusing 'idiosyncratic, one-off use' with 'customary use'. Now, the latter sort of use is more intimately connected with meaning, but even then, the link is not straightforward.

You are also probably operating with your own idiosyncatic understanding of 'meaning'. On that see here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1084430&postcount=15


Take the example you use: it's actually through the realisation that the ruling class uses the term "human nature" [I]ideologically that we grasp its real meaning. That doesn't mean we have to agree to the truth of the concept's assertions.

But, you have already conceded that use determines meaning, so there can be no such thing as 'the real meaning' of a word, on your view.

[And, it is not possible to assert a concept, or even the 'truth' of a concept. A sentence or a clause, yes, but not a concept.

Unless you think a concept is a sentence, or a clause.

Still less is it possible for a concept to make assertions, as you alleged. You seem also to be confusing concepts with human beings, who can assert things.

But, we already know you are confused, since my use of "BuBuBu" after all means "Citizen Z is confused".]

[Hit The North]

Still less is it possible for a concept to make assertions, as you alleged. You seem also to be confusing concepts with human beings, who can assert things.Well you make the same error in another thread on the use of the word "nigger" where you argue that the word itself is racist. Ahem, surely only people can be racist! So neither of us is perfect.

So maybe I'm not using the term concept in what you regard as the correct technical meaning. I'm arguing that the bourgeois notion of "human nature" is a conceptual construct which includes a number of key assertions about what people are essentially like.

Nevertheless, I would argue that you are confusing meaning with truth.

To use one of your examples, I cannot even begin to assess the truth of the proposition that God exists without first grasping the meaning of what God is to the person making the claim. But my understanding of the meaning of the use of the word "God" does not in the slightest bit commit me to accepting the truth value of the claim.

Meaning is always inter-subjective. Truth is objective.


But, you have already conceded that use determines meaning, so there can be no such thing as 'the real meaning' of a word, on your view.

Yes, you've got me there. Maybe i should have said that it gives us a fuller understanding of the meaning; or that it discloses another level of meaning.

[crimsonzephyr]

Love is certain

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Well you make the same error in another thread on the use of the word "nigger" where you argue that the word itself is racist. Ahem, surely only people can be racist! So neither of us is perfect.

I did not allege that a concept was this or that, but that a certain word was racist.

Are you having difficulties reading -- again?


So maybe I'm not using the term concept in what you regard as the correct technical meaning. I'm arguing that the bourgeois notion of "human nature" is a conceptual construct which includes a number of key assertions about what people are essentially like.

I do not disagree.

But, it is not a question of me deciding what is the correect technical use of a term, your use suggests you think concepts can assert things.

Are they intelligent, perhaps, in your scheme of things? Do they utter phrases, or type sentences? If not, how can concepts 'assert' things?


Nevertheless, I would argue that you are confusing meaning with truth.

To use one of your examples, I cannot even begin to assess the truth of the proposition that God exists without first grasping the meaning of what God is to the person making the claim. But my understanding of the meaning of the use of the word "God" does not in the slightest bit commit me to accepting the truth value of the claim.

Meaning is always inter-subjective. Truth is objective..

This seems to mean you think truth exists in the outside world, a bit like say tables and chairs.

And I take your point about 'God'; it certainly helps me understand what you mean.

But, according to you, use determines meaning, so the real meaning of 'God' is whatever Descartes and Leibniz (or even Anslem and Augustine) say -- and they tell us that necessary existence is one of 'his' properties, and part of the meaning of the term 'God'.

So, that must mean, on your view, that God must exist.

But not on my view...

But, you have an answer:



Yes, you've got me there. Maybe i should have said that it gives us a fuller understanding of the meaning; or that it discloses another level of meaning.


So, use does not determine meaning, then? In addition, we have to ask for an explanation of meaning.

Surprise, surprise, for this is Wittgenstein's view (if we can so describe it), and partly my own!

[It is also implied by several things Marx said about language.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hardee, I think you are right -- it certainly can be.

[Hit The North]

I did not allege that a concept was this or that, but that a certain word was racist.Except that it is only racist in the context of it's use. If one black person uses it to address another, how is the word racist?


This seems to mean you think truth exists in the outside world, a bit like say tables and chairs.
Well if God existed in the outside world like table and chairs then the assertion that he does exist would be true. Or at least as true as the assertion that tables and chairs exist.

But, according to you, use determines meaning, so the real meaning of 'God' is whatever Descartes and Leibniz (or even Anslem and Augustine) say -- and they tell us that necessary existence is one of 'his' properties, and part of the meaning of the term 'God'.
Then that is what it means to them. They still have to prove it. Surely even you can understand the difference between belief and truth.


So, use does not determine meaning, then? If use doesn't determine meaning - what does?


In addition, we have to ask for an explanation of meaning.Sure. Or we could ask for the meaning of explanation. And be here all night.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:



Except that it is only racist in the context of it's use. If one black person uses it to address another, how is the word racist?



So, words have no meaning before they are used? Is that what you believe?


Well if God existed in the outside world like table and chairs then the assertion that he does exist would be true. Or at least as true as the assertion that tables and chairs exist.

So, you are using 'truth' as a synonym for 'exist'?


Then that is what it means to them.

As I noted earlier, you are running together two different sene of the word 'meaning'.

Here is what I advocated earlier that you should have consulted:


But, I think the problem here is that the word 'meaning' itself has many different meanings, and we are at cross purposes because we each have in mind a different alternative here.

I have posted this before, but here goes again:

(1) Significance or importance: as in “His Teddy Bear means a lot to him.”

(2) Evaluative import: as in “May Day means different things to different classes.”

(3) Point or purpose: as in “Life has no meaning.”

(4) Linguistic meaning: as in “‘Vixen’ means female fox.”

(5) Aim or intention: as in “They mean to win this strike.”

(6) Implication: as in “Winning that strike means the boss won’t try another wage cut again in a hurry.”

(7) Indicate, point to, or presage: as in “Those clouds mean rain.”

(8) Reference: as in “I mean him over there.”

(9) Artistic theme: as in “The whole meaning of this novel is to examine political integrity.”

(10) Conversational focus: as in “I mean, why do we have to accept a measly 1% rise in the first place?”

(11) An expression of sincerity or determination: as in “I mean it, I really do want to go on the demonstration!”

(12) The content of a message, or the import of a sign: as in “It means that the strike starts on Monday”, or “It means you have to queue here.”

(13) Interpretation: as in “You will need to read the author’s novels if you want to give any meaning to her latest play.”

(14) The import of a work of art: as in “Part of the meaning of that play was to change our view of drama.”

This does not exhaust its meanings, and some of the above overlap.

I was using this word in sense (4); you perhaps in senses (1), (2), (3), (5), ...(9)?

I have had debates like this before, and they never get anywhere becuse of this equivocation.


You have thus switched from sense 4) above to 1) (perhaps).

4) is connected with use in the way we resolved earlier, but 1) can't be.

Someone may hold particular words in certain ways, but their use cannot affect that; they might use a word because of its idiosyncratic sense they attach to it, but not the other way round.

To distinguish these two, philosophers of language have dubbed 1) the 'tone' a word carries.

But use cannot affect tone; tone may help decide why someone uses a word, but use cannot affect the tone that a word already has for that user (and which prompted that use, perhaps).

4) is connected with communication, and so with use (given the other things we decided also apply).



They still have to prove it. Surely even you can understand the difference between belief and truth.


Sure, but what would there be to prove to anyone if they meant the word in sense 1)?


If use doesn't determine meaning - what does?


Ah, now, you have hit on a PhD's worth of answers there.

There are a whole load of factors that determine meaning in sense 4), and many that decide on the others (not all of which are the same).

Use is certainly one factor with 4), but so are others, like syntax and logical grammar (to mention just two).

And we already decided that explanation of meaning is also important.



Sure. Or we could ask for the meaning of explanation. And be here all night.


Fortunately, most of us know how to explain things. It's meaning that is the tricky thing here (as the list above, at least, shows), not explanation.

[Apollodorus]

If I may do that very annoying thing and reply to some of the posts on the first page (I tried to read the whole thing but by about page 4 I was completely lost). Alright?


This conclusion of yours is of course susceptible to the challenge that if, unbeknowst to you, the word 'thought' changed its meaning, you might actually be referring to something else, or even to nothing at all.

However, the good news is that the above is itself susceptible to the sort of considerations Wittgenstein raised in his book 'On Certainty', which I can heartliy recommend.

Indeed, StateSUx may have used the word 'thought' incorrectly. The most obvious counterargument to that (and it has probably already been used in this topic, no idea) is that even if the word thought changed its meaning, the meaning of the sentence itself remains the same. The argument is still valid.

The other counterargument, a more elegant one in my opinion, is that if StateSUx made a mistake using the word 'thought' when the word 'thought' had changed its meaning, then something must exist that makes the mistake. You see, I can play word games and undermine your arguments just as you can do to everyone else. ;)

The Cartesian aphorism has endured four-hundred and fifty years of what could perhaps be the most rigorous scrutiny of any statement made in philosophy ever. Refuting it will not be an easy task.

And yes, Wittgenstein was a brilliant philosopher. Not as good as Plato of course, but still very good.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Apollodorus:



the meaning of the sentence itself remains the same.


That is not possible; but even if it were, it too could have changed.

Given this line of attack, there is no way of knowing if it has, or it hasn't.



The Cartesian aphorism has endured four-hundred and fifty years of what could perhaps be the most rigorous scrutiny of any statement made in philosophy ever. Refuting it will not be an easy task.



Not so; it is susceptible to many different attacks, not the least of which is the one I mentioned.

Descartes just takes the meaning of the words he uses for granted, and never questions whether the evil demon might not fool him into misreading them, mis-remembering them, or even into thinking they mean something when they do not.


And yes, Wittgenstein was a brilliant philosopher. Not as good as Plato of course, but still very good.

The thing with Wittgenstein is that he invented a new way of doing philosophy that shows that Plato's work is just hot air.

[Apollodorus]

Apollodorus:

That is not possible; but even if it were, it too could have changed.

Given this line of attack, there is no way of knowing if it has, or it hasn't.

Is not meaning the information coded in words to induce thoughts in the mind of the receiver of the words which are similar to those in the sender? Accepting this, would that not mean that my understanding of the meaning of words is what defines this meaning? Therefore, unless my thoughts change, then the meaning does not change. Of course, they could, but then we would be speaking of something completely different, and Descartes' aphorism would remain unchallenged.



Not so; it is susceptible to many different attacks, not the least of which is the one I mentioned.

'Je pense donc je suis' is quite probably the most famous quote in all of philosophy. If everyone sees the attacks against it are adequate, then why is it so well known and held in such high regard?



Descartes just takes the meaning of the words he uses for granted, and never questions whether the evil demon might not fool him into misreading them, mis-remembering them, or even into thinking they mean something when they do not.

In that case, then there must exist something which has been fooled. All your arguments have hitherto relied upon the very thing which you are attempting to repudiate.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Apollodorus:



Is not meaning the information coded in words to induce thoughts in the mind of the receiver of the words which are similar to those in the sender?


Unless it is a secret message of some sort (like those that spies are supposed to send one another), there is nothing coded into language, for if there were, we would all need the same coding manual to 'encode' things, and a language into which they must be coded and then decoded.

But, then, the same problem would arise for that second language, and so on.

On the other hand, if we did not understand the words we use the same, then no communication would occur. But, we need not suppose that language has anything coded into it for that to occur.

But this does not apply to Descartes, who is talking to himself, and who supposes there is an evil demon who misleads him.

In that case, he has to trust his memory, and his memory of the meaning of the words he uses. But, these will be among the targets of that demon. So, Descartes cannot trust the meaning of the words he uses; they could all change in the ways I suggested, or have no meaning at all.



Therefore, unless my thoughts change, then the meaning does not change.


This assumes that language itself is not an expression of thought, and that they are separate items. Unfortunately, your own use of the word 'thought' indicates that this is not so.

But, even if this were not so, Descartes has no way of knowing that his thoughts about anything have not been altered, for he has to rely on his memory once more.

Even worse, he has to rely on the meaning of the word 'thought', which might have changed, too.


Of course, they could, but then we would be speaking of something completely different, and Descartes' aphorism would remain unchallenged.

Not so, for every word in that aphorism could have been altered, as could his memory of it.

So, on day one he might write/think these words (in Latin or French, of course): "I think therefore I am", and really mean "He drinks because he can", which words really mean "She blinks since I don't" the next day -- or even "BuBuBu", and so on.


'Je pense donc je suis' is quite probably the most famous quote in all of philosophy. If everyone sees the attacks against it are adequate, then why is it so well known and held in such high regard?


It is famous, I agree, but scores of philosophers have attacked it, not the least because it looks like an argument, but it is invalid ("I am" does not follow from "I think" unless, as Descartes puts it, he is a 'thinking substance'; but that has yet to be established -- Descartes just assumed it to be true, guaranteed by God!).

So, it is one of the most useless things ever said by anyone.



In that case, then there must exist something which has been fooled. All your arguments have hitherto relied upon the very thing which you are attempting to repudiate.


That assumes that the meaning of 'fooled' has remained the same.

[Apollodorus]

Unless it is a secret message of some sort (like those that spies are supposed to send one another), there is nothing coded into language, for if there were, we would all need the same coding manual to 'encode' things, and a language into which they must be coded and then decoded.

But, then, the same problem would arise for that second language, and so on.

On the other hand, if we did not understand the words we use the same, then no communication would occur. But, we need not suppose that language has anything coded into it for that to occur.

The meaning is encoded in the sounds. We do all have the same coding manual: all English speakers understand certain strings of sounds to mean the same thing.



But this does not apply to Descartes, who is talking to himself, and who supposes there is an evil demon who misleads him.

It applies to us. He has encoded his thoughts into dots and lines, so that these thoughts can travel in time to our minds. Indeed, the demon may have intercepted these thoughts: and Descartes might have written something completely different. In that case, it would not be Descartes aphorism, but the Demon's aphorism; nevertheless, it is still the same aphorism, albeit with a different author.



In that case, he has to trust his memory, and his memory of the meaning of the words he uses. But, these will be among the targets of that demon. So, Descartes cannot trust the meaning of the words he uses; they could all change in the ways I suggested, or have no meaning at all.



But, even if this were not so, Descartes has no way of knowing that his thoughts about anything have not been altered, for he has to rely on his memory once more.



Not so, for every word in that aphorism could have been altered, as could his memory of it.

So, on day one he might write/think these words (in Latin or French, of course): "I think therefore I am", and really mean "He drinks because he can", which words really mean "She blinks since I don't" the next day -- or even "BuBuBu", and so on.

This may indeed have occurred. Which would mean that Descartes originally intended to encode the thought 'Mes chausettes sont blanches.' which was changed, by the demon, to 'Je pense donc je suis'. Therefore, your argument only argues against the truth of whatever Descartes was trying to say, 'My socks are white', and not what he actually did say, 'I think, therefore, I am.'



This assumes that language itself is not an expression of thought, and that they are separate items. Unfortunately, your own use of the word 'thought' indicates that this is not so.

From what I understand, you say that language is indiscriminate from thought. Then how could meaning change?



It is famous, I agree, but scores of philosophers have attacked it, not the least because it looks like an argument, but it is invalid ("I am" does not follow from "I think" unless, as Descartes puts it, he is a 'thinking substance'; but that has yet to be established -- Descartes just assumed it to be true, guaranteed by God!).

Saying that the argument is invalid is misunderstanding Descartes' logical style. Per se, it means nothing. But considering we are humans and not computers and we have pragmatic ability: that is, to understand more than is explicitly said in a sentence, we do not need Descartes to spell out every detail in the argument. I am not even sure if it can be written out in an explicit, logical way. It was intended to be an axiom, it was intended to be intuitive, it was intended to be a solution to the epistemological problem of criterion. And so far, it has been the best, most successful attempt at such a thing.



That assumes that the meaning of 'fooled' has remained the same.

Explain why it does.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Apollodorus:



The meaning is encoded in the sounds. We do all have the same coding manual: all English speakers understand certain strings of sounds to mean the same thing.



Is this 'meaning' encoded in English, or some other langauge? But, when did we all go to language class to learn it? [And how do you know all this, but the rest of us do not.]


It applies to us. He has encoded his thoughts into dots and lines, so that these thoughts can travel in time to our minds. Indeed, the demon may have intercepted these thoughts: and Descartes might have written something completely different. In that case, it would not be Descartes aphorism, but the Demon's aphorism; nevertheless, it is still the same aphorism, albeit with a different author.


And what if the evil demon scews things up so that not only Descartes, but all of us, decode these messages differently each time? Including the word 'encoded'?


Which would mean that Descartes originally intended to encode the thought 'Mes chausettes sont blanches.' which was changed, by the demon, to 'Je pense donc je suis'. Therefore, your argument only argues against the truth of whatever Descartes was trying to say, 'My socks are white', and not what he actually did say, 'I think, therefore, I am.'


But what if the demon fooled Descartes into thinking he intended this, when he actually intended something else, or perhaps nothing at all?

And, the doubt I introduced here is also directed against the word 'truth' you are using and against 'trying to say'. Not to mention 'actually'.



you say that language is indiscriminate from thought. Then how could meaning change?



Well, how could thought change?

Language changes because of social change.


Saying that the argument is invalid is misunderstanding Descartes' logical style. Per se, it means nothing. But considering we are humans and not computers and we have pragmatic ability: that is, to understand more than is explicitly said in a sentence, we do not need Descartes to spell out every detail in the argument. I am not even sure if it can be written out in an explicit, logical way. It was intended to be an axiom, it was intended to be intuitive, it was intended to be a solution to the epistemological problem of criterion. And so far, it has been the best, most successful attempt at such a thing.


Not so; Descartes used a 'therefore', but the consequent does not follow from the antecedent, so his use of 'therefore' was not justified.

And it can't be an axiom if it has a 'therefore' in it.

And what if Descartes' 'intuition' was messed up by the demon? Or, what if your 'intuition' is not the same as Descartes' -- and how could you tell either way?

Moreover, far from this being the most successful attempt yet, Descartes saying is almost as stupid as some of the inanities George W comes out with.


Explain why it does.

I think that is pretty obvious.

[Apollodorus]

Is this 'meaning' encoded in English, or some other langauge? But, when did we all go to language class to learn it? [And how do you know all this, but the rest of us do not.]

It is basic linguistics. Let us take the example of this object:

http://img138.imageshack.us/img138/1096/cricketballdd7.png

In English the object is known by the sound sequence /bɔːl/ (IPA). Hearing the sound sequence /bɔːl/ will induce a thought similar to the picture above, but it will only induce that thought in the minds of English speakers. Similarly, the sound sequence /ləʊd/ will induce the same image in Latvian speakers. This is meaning. To answer your question, yes it is encoded in English, but it is also encoded in other languages as well, albeit using different sound sequences. These connections are made by hearing this sound sequence while perceiving the meaning it contains.



And what if the evil demon scews things up so that not only Descartes, but all of us, decode these messages differently each time? Including the word 'encoded'?

I keep saying this: if Descartes wrote something else, and the demon screwed with it, then we still get Je pense donc je suis. Verily, it may be Je pense donc je suis today, and Mes chausettes sont blanches tomorrow, but that changes nothing: the counter-argument I used in my first reply in this topic are still pertinent. Saying that the aphorism may change is merely changing the aphorism and not refuting it.



But what if the demon fooled Descartes into thinking he intended this, when he actually intended something else, or perhaps nothing at all?

That is besides the point. It is not a matter of intended to say, it is a matter of what was said. What was said was Je pense donc je suis, and no matter who said this or who intended to say this, the aphorism is the same.



And, the doubt I introduced here is also directed against the word 'truth' you are using and against 'trying to say'. Not to mention 'actually'.

We are not arguing about what I am writing, we are arguing about what Descartes wrote. Simply saying 'that argument does not count because an evil demon may have fiddled with the words' is avoiding the matter.



Well, how could thought change?

Because the evil demon has been changing it. This is your argument I am clarifying, not mine.



Not so; Descartes used a 'therefore', but the consequent does not follow form the antecedent, so his use of 'therefore' was not justified.

And it can't be an axiom if it has a 'therefore' in it.

And what if Descartes' 'intuition' was messed up by the demon? Or, what if your 'intuition' is not the same as Descartes' -- and how could you tell either way?

You misunderstand his style. Discours de la Methode is not a text of analytic philosophy, the logic is not as rigorous as the works of later philosophers. Je pense donc je suis was never intended to be a logical syllogism, but rather an aphorism.



I think that is pretty obvious.

My argument was:

1. Descartes was fooled by a demon.
2. Something can be fooled only if that something exists.
3. Therefore, Descartes exists.

How do definitions come into that at all? No, it is not pretty obvious.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Apollodorus:



Hearing the sound sequence /bɔːl/ will induce a thought similar to the picture above


I doubt this, but even if I am wrong, what has this got to do with 'encoding'?

Perhaps this:



To answer your question, yes it is encoded in English, but it is also encoded in other languages as well, albeit using different sound sequences. These connections are made by hearing this sound sequence while perceiving the meaning it contains.



But you are confusing 'encoding' with 'conditioned response'.



I keep saying this: if Descartes wrote something else, and the demon screwed with it, then we still get Je pense donc je suis.

But not if the demon screws with the meaning of these words, as you now claim to understand them, or as Descartes understood them (and you seem to assume you two understand this sentence the same way).


Saying that the aphorism may change is merely changing the aphorism and not refuting it.


It may not be an aphorism; it could be the label on a bottle of Coca Cola, for all you know.

And, the demon might screw with the meaning of 'aphorism', too.

I hope you are getting the message: whatever you say, I can just throw in this demon to screw with your words, and your memory.


It is not a matter of intended to say, it is a matter of what was said. What was said was [I]Je pense donc je suis, and no matter who said this or who intended to say this, the aphorism is the same.

But, Descartes might have misremembered saying this, or writing it, or have been fooled into thinking he wrote it when the demon actually wrote it. On top of that, the meanings of all the words used could have been altered by that demon.


Discours de la Methode is not a text of analytic philosophy, the logic is not as rigorous as the works of later philosophers. Je pense donc je suis was never intended to be a logical syllogism, but rather an aphorism.


You are right, and it is all the worse for that. [But aphorisms do not contain 'therefores'. That word gives this away as a very poor piece of logic.]


My argument was:

1. Descartes was fooled by a demon.
2. Something can be fooled only if that something exists.
3. Therefore, Descartes exists.


You could have been fooled into thinking 'fooled' meant 'baked beans', for all I know, or for all you know (when all you have to go on is that possibly defective memory of yours that the demon keeps screwing with).

And, this cannot be a proof, for the premisses could be false. If you think they are true, you could have been baked beaned into thinking just that.

[LudicrousCommunistDancer]

My argument was:

1. Descartes was fooled by a demon.
2. Something can be fooled only if that something exists.
3. Therefore, Descartes exists. Also, how do you know that using reason is the correct way to find the truth? How do you know you are not on drugs affecting your own thinking? If you use reason then all beliefs are justified by other ones, but then you run into Agrippa's Trilemma.

1 You have an infinite chain of different beliefs, each one justifying the next, in which case no belief is ultimately justified because of the apparent impossibility of actually giving an infinite chain of reasons.
2 You have one or more basic assumptions, which contradicts rationality because you can't just assume whatever you want.
3 You have a circle of beliefs (Ex: I am hot because I am fly. I'm fly because I have cooties. I have cooties because I am hot.) in which case you are using circular logic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LCD, Descartes appealed to 'God' to guarantee that his thoughts would lead to truth (if they were always 'clear and distinct'). Unfortunately, he relied on his thoughts to prove 'God' exists. But, he 'proved' the latter before he knew he could trust his thoughts! So his whole project was bogus from end to end.

[Trenches Full of Poets]

1. Descartes was fooled by a demon.
2. Something can be fooled only if that something exists.
3. Therefore, Descartes exists.

1: Prove that he was fooled by a demon.
2: Or maybe they are fooled by their own perception?
3: Faulty Logic.

It should read like this

1: Descartes was fooled by a demon
2: "To be fooled" denotes the capacity for being fooled. "To be" denotes capacity.
3: Ergo, Descartes "was"- he had the capacity "to be" fooled.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trenches Full: neither Apollodorus nor Descartes needs to prove he/they were/are fooled by a demon. It is an assumption, not a theorem.

The problem is that this assumption is far more problematic than either will admit.

[BurnTheOliveTree]

Descartes never seriously applies scepticism - at one point in the meditations, he literally says that those things he can perceive clearly and distinctly must be true.

Also, he takes for granted his ability to make logical deductions correctly.

Not to be anal, but nobody made a real effort to answer my earlier point:

How is it that we can be 100% sure of our ability to reach a rational conclusion?

If we can't, certainty can't be established by any form of logical argument, because it rests on the baseless axiom that we can definitely reach sound logical conclusions.

Rosa - For example, can you be certain that philosophy is based on mis-use of language? If so, how? How do you answer the deceiving demon idea?

-Alex

[Apollodorus]

I doubt this, but even if I am wrong, what has this got to do with 'encoding'?

...you are confusing 'encoding' with 'conditioned response'.

I used the word 'encode' as a sort of symbolic allegory. Just as text is converted into code, it is encoded; so to are thoughts and ideas converted into text. If you did not understand this, I apologise. If (more probably) you are just nitpicking at my choice of words: this is not poetry or literature, it is an informal philosophical discussion. Whether or not my words are official terms is irrelevant, as long as you understand the words I use, then they serve their purpose.



But, Descartes might have misremembered saying this, or writing it, or have been fooled into thinking he wrote it when the demon actually wrote it. On top of that, the meanings of all the words used could have been altered by that demon.



But not if the demon screws with the meaning of these words, as you now claim to understand them, or as Descartes understood them (and you seem to assume you two understand this sentence the same way).

Let us go back to the scenario you suggested earlier. Let us suppose Descartes wrote something else, and some time in between him writing it and me and you reading it the evil demon intercepted it and inconspicuously changed it to something else. Not only has the meaning of the words as Descartes understood them changed, but the very words themselves. The result of this scenario, or one in which only the meaning changes, is Je pense donc je suis. By the principle of causality, the result of all this is the phrase 'I think, therefore I am', which means exactly what I think it means. Meaning, you see, is determined by the understanding of the reader of the words, not by the words themselves. Therefore, whatever I understand to be the meaning of the words is the meaning of the words. This is why you get different interpretations of language, not completely random interpretations (thanks to your so called 'conditioned response'), but differing interpretations nonetheless. Of course, by tomorrow the evil demon may have changed my understanding of the words, or the demon may even have done so since I began posting this, but that is besides the point. The aphorism in question is what I understand it to be at the moment, and not what I understand it to be tomorrow, or indeed, what Descartes understood it to be. Do you follow?

And if I may predict and answer your counter-argument before you post it: I understand that the reliance upon the 'principle of causality', as I worded it above, is a weak-spot in the argument. However, if you choose to disregard the principle of causality, then you may as well disregard your reasoning as well. Without assuming the principle of causality exists, we may as well post anything at all, with the logic being just as legitimate.



It may not be an aphorism; it could be the label on a bottle of Coca Cola, for all you know.

If I may repeat myself: 'Meaning, you see, is determined by the understanding of the reader of the words, not by the words themselves.'


And, the demon might screw with the meaning of 'aphorism', too.



You could have been fooled into thinking 'fooled' meant 'baked beans', for all I know, or for all you know (when all you have to go on is that possibly defective memory of yours that the demon keeps screwing with).



I hope you are getting the message: whatever you say, I can just throw in this demon to screw with your words, and your memory. [Indeed, you might be a multiple personality, for all you know.]

I thought I already answered this:


We are not arguing about what I am writing, we are arguing about what Descartes wrote. Simply saying 'that argument does not count because an evil demon may have fiddled with the words' is avoiding the matter.



You are right, and it is all the worse for that. [But aphorisms do not contain 'therefores'. That word gives this away as a very poor piece of logic.]

Just because the aphorism per se contains faulty logic, does not mean the ideas behind it are illogical. Rarely do aphorisms per se contain logic which could be described as exemplar.


Also, how do you know that using reason is the correct way to find the truth? How do you know you are not on drugs affecting your own thinking?

That argument is contradictory. You used reason to deduce the possibility that reason may not be the correct way to find the truth. Supposing the conclusion of the argument is true, that would mean one of the necessary axioms is false.


If you use reason then all beliefs are justified by other ones, but then you run into Agrippa's Trilemma.

1 You have an infinite chain of different beliefs, each one justifying the next, in which case no belief is ultimately justified because of the apparent impossibility of actually giving an infinite chain of reasons.
2 You have one or more basic assumptions, which contradicts rationality because you can't just assume whatever you want.
3 You have a circle of beliefs (Ex: I am hot because I am fly. I'm fly because I have cooties. I have cooties because I am hot.) in which case you are using circular logic.

Is not this the same as the problem of criterion?


1: Prove that he was fooled by a demon.

What Rosa said. I assumed that he was in order to demonstrate that he would still exist. If I was to assume that there is no evil demon, then I need not argue, because I am not arguing against the position of scepticism, not for it. If anyone needs to prove the existence of an evil demon, it is Rosa, not me.

Come to think of it, it is the second premise which you should be pointing the finger at. It appears to me that it is based upon Descartes' aphorism.

I just wanted to jump ship before Rosa starts crying: 'Unsound logic! Unsound logic!' I mean, she has already hinted at it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Apollodorus:



I used the word 'encode' as a sort of symbolic allegory. Just as text is converted into code, it is encoded; so to are thoughts and ideas converted into text. If you did not understand this, I apologise. If (more probably) you are just nitpicking at my choice of words: this is not poetry or literature, it is an informal philosophical discussion. Whether or not my words are official terms is irrelevant, as long as you understand the words I use, then they serve their purpose.


Linguistic texts are converted into code because the former are already a language, and there is an encoding manual. This cannot apply to language itself, otherwise there would have to be a language in which language was encoded, and a coding manual. But, where is this encoding language and where is this manual? And who wrote the manual (and what language did this linguistic Adam/Eve use in the meantime)?

And your access to thought is via langauge, so the same difficulties apply there too.



Let us suppose Descartes wrote something else, and some time in between him writing it and me and you reading it the evil demon intercepted it and inconspicuously changed it to something else.


Even worse: while Descartes was writing, or thinking what he did, the demon was screwing around with his words. In that case, Descartes might have thought he was writing 'I think therefore I am', when in reality he was writing 'BuBuBu'.

And the same applies to everything you have ever thought, remembered, written, and argued.


Meaning, you see, is determined by the understanding of the reader of the words, not by the words themselves.

In that case, what does this mean: "NN thought that the speed mice inconsiderable sunset the colour red was twice acidic, but not Tarquin on between three o'clock recidivist it squared on before, if grinder."

If meaning is determined by the receiver of these words (i.e., in this case you), what do they mean?



This is why you get different interpretations of language, not completely random interpretations (thanks to your so called 'conditioned response'),


But, most of what we say to one another is perfectly well understood, without interpretation.

Otherwise, the interpretation itself will need interpreting, and so on.


I understand that the reliance upon the 'principle of causality', as I worded it above, is a weak-spot in the argument. However, if you choose to disregard the principle of causality, then you may as well disregard your reasoning as well. Without assuming the principle of causality exists, we may as well post anything at all, with the logic being just as legitimate.

Perhaps by 'principle of causality' the demon has convinced you that you really mean 'everything is uncaused'; or even 'BuBuBu'?


'Meaning, you see, is determined by the understanding of the reader of the words, not by the words themselves.'

But that means I can 'understand' your words any way I like. Surely you can't believe that?


Just because the aphorism per se contains faulty logic, does not mean the ideas behind it are illogical. Rarely do aphorisms per se contain logic which could be described as exemplar.

But this one contains a 'therefore', and the consequent does not follow from the antecedent.

In that case, it is no more reliable than if I were to say 'Rome wasn't built in a day, therefore it saves time'.

Now, you would not accept this as true/valid just because I called it an 'aphorism', and pointed to countless gullible idiots who accepted it.

Same with Descartes incoherent jottings.

[Holden Caulfield]

i have it, (i may have already been dicusssed but i cant be arsed reasing through 149387 posts)

Reason is ceetain, even if it is unreason then it points to reason exsisting, a person cannot be a person without reason as to reason is to be conscious even if reason is what we call opinion it is still internalised reason, even if the reason is wrong based on false information from a construct of the world we form ourselves then reason still exsists albeit reason formed for things that aren't certain,

not thought as thought changed, not emotion as emotion changes, but reason which is constant

if anybody can rebuff my claim without using reason then i will step off my podium, until then i claim victory over this thread and dominace intellectually (and asthetically) over its many posters,

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HC:


Reason is certain, even if it is unreason then it points to reason exsisting, a person cannot be a person without reason as to reason is to be conscious even if reason is what we call opinion it is still internalised reason, even if the reason is wrong based on false information from a construct of the world we form ourselves then reason still exsists albeit reason formed for things that aren't certain,

not thought as thought changed, not emotion as emotion changes, but reason which is constant

if anybody can rebuff my claim without using reason then i will step off my podium, until then i claim victory over this thread and dominace intellectually (and asthetically) over its many posters,

We have already covered this.

If there is an all-powerful evil demon, then for all you know: when you use the word 'reason' you really mean 'baked potato'.

[Holden Caulfield]

im not talking of words, you reason that words are a construct yet you must use reason to point to the flaw in my point, you dont have to use words, for this medium you must use words but it isnt the only way to convey, however through reason is the only way,

you must use reason, you reason therefore you are conscious, so reason is universal to us all, as long as humans exsist to ponder exsistance reason will be present

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HC:


im not talking of words, you reason that words are a construct yet you must use reason to point to the flaw in my point, you dont have to use words, for this medium you must use words but it isnt the only way to convey, however through reason is the only way,

you must use reason, you reason therefore you are conscious, so reason is universal to us all, as long as humans exsist to ponder exsistance reason will be present

Unfortunately, to make this point you have to use words, the meanings of which this demon could be screwing around with.

[Black Cross]

Unfortunately, to make this point you have to use words, the meanings of which this demon could be screwing around with.

And yet you, I, and everyone else in this thread understand him quite well.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BC:


And yet you, I, and everyone else in this thread understand him quite well.

But, if there is an evil demon screwing around with our words, then when you use the word 'understand', you might in fact mean 'dead squirrel'.

[Apollodorus]

Linguistic texts are converted into code because the former are already a language, and there is an encoding manual. This cannot apply to language itself, otherwise there would have to be a language in which language was encoded, and a coding manual. But, where is this encoding language and where is this manual? And who wrote the manual (and what language did this linguistic Adam/Eve use in the meantime)?

And your access to thought is via langauge, so the same difficulties apply there too.

Allegory. Allegory. Please read what I write.



Even worse: while Descartes was writing, or thinking what he did, the demon was screwing around with his words. In that case, Descartes might have thought he was writing 'I think therefore I am', when in reality he was writing 'BuBuBu'.

How are these scenarios different from the one I mentioned? Whether the intervention occurred during the composition of the work, or after, we are still left with the same result. In fact, one can not be sure that Descartes ever existed at all: all his works may have been written by the evil demon. Even so, it would only change the 'by-line', so to speak, of Discours de la Methode, not the actual work itself.



And the same applies to everything you have ever thought, remembered, written, and argued.

Please stop bringing me into this argument. Because this argument is not about me. It is about Descartes. I am not defending the fact that everything I have ever thought, remembered, written or argued; I am defending Descartes, or, as the case may be, the evil demon pretending to be Descartes.



In that case, what does this mean: "NN thought that the speed mice inconsiderable sunset the colour red was twice acidic, but not Tarquin on between three o'clock recidivist it squared on before, if grinder."

If meaning is determined by the receiver of these words (i.e., in this case you), what do they mean?

I interpret the words to be an attempt at proving the statement 'Meaning is determined by the understanding of the reader of the words.' I understand that the author was not intending for the words per se to mean anything.

But I suspect that you meant for me to interpret out of context. In that case I would suggest that perhaps 'NN' is a person, initials perhaps: N.N. I also understand that N.N. is quite muddled: yet a series of images pop out of his muddled thoughts: mice in motion, a red sunset (perhaps the mice are running silhouetted in front of the sunset, along the crest of a hill?). The sunset is so red that it reminds N.N. of acidic solutions when universal indicator is applied. Then it speaks of Tarquin, who N.N. might have afternoon tea with: coffee, due to the word 'grinder'. Perhaps this Tarquin is boring, a 'square', and constantly talks about the same thing.

Maybe not. But I bet I was right about the red/acidic thing. There is no doubt about that. Even when you try to create a series of random words, there are still relations between them.



But, most of what we say to one another is perfectly well understood, without interpretation.

Thanks to 'conditioned response', as you put it. Hold up a ball and say /bɔːl/ to a baby enough times and eventually it will understand.

If this is not so, explain why language gets its meaning. Explain how people come to know of this meaning. Explain why infants can not talk but older children and adults can.



Otherwise, the interpretation itself will need interpreting, and so on.

Not so. Once it has been converted from abstract strings of noises to information which the brain can process, no further interpretation is required.



Perhaps by 'principle of causality' the demon has convinced you that you really mean 'everything is uncaused'; or even 'BuBuBu'?

Before Newton's First Law was written down by Newton, did the law exist? Did things just accelerate because they thought it was a good idea, or did they operate according to a lex non scripta? Just because the words 'principle of causality' really mean 'everything is uncaused' does not mean there is no such thing as the principle of causality.



But that means I can 'understand' your words any way I like. Surely you can't believe that?

Yes, I do. People frequently misunderstand what I say. Either they do not hear me correctly, or they believe I meant something which I did not. It happens all the time, surely it happens to you.



But this one contains a 'therefore', and the consequent does not follow from the antecedent.

In that case, it is no more reliable than if I were to say 'Rome wasn't built in a day, therefore it saves time'.


Your example, however, makes no sense. It possesses little meaning per se, and none beyond that. Now, I am sure you will say that Je pense donc je suis possesses no meaning as well. And yet, you seem to understand the idea behind it enough to reject it. If you do not understand the idea behind it, then you should not be criticising that which you do not understand.



Same with Descartes incoherent jottings.

You call Descartes a fool and me a 'gullible idiot', and yet the only argument you have hitherto presented is, as I said earlier: 'that argument does not count because an evil demon may have fiddled with the words'. Do you really believe that is adequate?

[Holden Caulfield]

HeWhoWhatever:



Unfortunately, to make this point you have to use words, the meanings of which this demon could be screwing around with.

well to make your point you have to use reason, and even if my words are screwed around with by a demon then the reason behind them is still sound, and even if the reason is twisted and becomes unreason it still points to the exsistance of reason,

back to the top of the pile,

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Apollodorus:


Allegory. Allegory. Please read what I write.

At some point, allegories have to be interpreted, but as yet you have no language into which this can be done which is not subject to the strictures you have already imposed on them (that is, that they too are codes).


How are these scenarios different from the one I mentioned? Whether the intervention occurred during the composition of the work, or after, we are still left with the same result. In fact, one can not be sure that Descartes ever existed at all: all his works may have been written by the evil demon. Even so, it would only change the 'by-line', so to speak, of Discours de la Methode, not the actual work itself.

But, how do you know it's the 'same result'?

For all you know, Descartes/'the Demon' could have been writing about cookery, or nothing at all.


Please stop bringing me into this argument. Because this argument is not about me. It is about Descartes. I am not defending the fact that everything I have ever thought, remembered, written or argued; I am defending Descartes, or, as the case may be, the evil demon pretending to be Descartes.

Unfortunately, you are part of this, for you keep trying to arrive at certain conclusions about someone called 'Descartes' -- hence, for all you know, all your words could change their meaning by the second, and your memory could be being made to play tricks on you.

So, while you might now imagine you know what the word 'thought' means, it could in fact mean 'squashed tomato', and later 'Rosa is right to keep bringing me into this...'. You have no way of knowing any of this, or its opposite, or of knowing what 'knowing' means, or of grasping what 'meaning' implies.

down this route lies the solution to your predicament[/B].]


I interpret the words to be an attempt at proving the statement 'Meaning is determined by the understanding of the reader of the words.' I understand that the author was not intending for the words per se to mean anything.

As I noted earlier, you are confusing speaker's meaning with linguistic meaning.


But I suspect that you meant for me to interpret out of context. In that case I would suggest that perhaps 'NN' is a person, initials perhaps: N.N. I also understand that N.N. is quite muddled: yet a series of images pop out of his muddled thoughts: mice in motion, a red sunset (perhaps the mice are running silhouetted in front of the sunset, along the crest of a hill?). The sunset is so red that it reminds N.N. of acidic solutions when universal indicator is applied. Then it speaks of Tarquin, who N.N. might have afternoon tea with: coffee, due to the word 'grinder'. Perhaps this Tarquin is boring, a 'square', and constantly talks about the same thing.

I have news for you: NN does not exist, and I made this up. So there is nothing there to 'understand'.

But, even if you were right, it is your understanding of English that allows you to play around with such words, and attempt to grasp what your 'interlocutor' here is trying to say.

But, even then, you have no way of knowing if you interpreted them aright.

In fact, when I invented the above nonsensical sentence, I actually intended this: "I aim to give Apollodorus something to think about...".

Now, if my intentions (which you failed to spot, by the way) determined meaning, then "NN thought that the speed mice inconsiderable sunset the colour red was twice acidic, but not Tarquin on between three o'clock recidivist it squared on before, if grinder" must mean "I aim to give Apollodorus something to think about...".

[I]Hence, you were not even close.

There is far more to meaning than intention; there is syntax, grammar, and the lexicon (among many other things).


Hold up a ball and say /bɔːl/ to a baby enough times and eventually it will understand

What has programming a baby got to do with linguistic meaning? You are not suggesting (I hope!) that if you were to condition a baby to think the word "Don't" means "Do", that the English language would thereby have changed!

Conditioning has much to do with learning a language, but little or nothing to do with meaning.


explain why language gets its meaning

There is no one answer to that request, but as the above shows, conditioning has nothing to do with it.


Once it has been converted from abstract strings of noises to information which the brain can process, no further interpretation is required.

You are now confusing 'process' with 'understand'. And, you have helped yourself to 'information' too. Information is expressed by language, not conveyed by it.

So, if someone asks you the time, and you reply "It's noon" --, there's the information right in front of you.

If information were contained in language, as a code of sorts (which seems to be what you are maintaining), then it would need to be interpreted in another language to make it manifest, as we need language itself to decode a cipher. But, you haven't got that extra language.

If you mean a code that does not need decoding, then it is not a code.


Before Newton's First Law was written down by Newton, did the law exist? Did things just accelerate because they thought it was a good idea, or did they operate according to a lex non scripta? Just because the words 'principle of causality' really mean 'everything is uncaused' does not mean there is no such thing as the principle of causality.

What do you mean "did the law exist"?

If it is a 'law', it will need to be written down somewhere; in which case, it should not be called 'Newton's law' but named after whoever wrote it down -- if it already 'existed'.

If you mean: did nature behave in ways described by Newton's law before he wrote it down, physicists tell us it did, but since they change their minds every fifty years or so, I'd not pin too much on that.

However, nature is not intelligent, so it cannot 'obey' any laws, even if there were any. To suppose otherwise is to anthropomorphise reality. And reality is not a book; so 'laws' cannot exist until they are invented.

But, if the evil demon has his/her/its way, by 'principle of causality' you might in fact mean 'My socks are wet', or, indeed, nothing at all.


Yes, I do. People frequently misunderstand what I say. Either they do not hear me correctly, or they believe I meant something which I did not. It happens all the time, surely it happens to you.

Yes, we have a word in language -- "misunderstand" -- that caters for this.

Now, try to misunderstand that word...

If you do, then your argument self-destructs (for your post above will lack a sense, since you will have undermined your own point by using a word you misunderstood).

If you do not, your argument self-destructs, again (since, we would then have at least one word you did not and could not misunderstand).

Either way, your argument self-destructs.


Your example, however, makes no sense. It possesses little meaning per se, and none beyond that. Now, I am sure you will say that Je pense donc je suis possesses no meaning as well. And yet, you seem to understand the idea behind it enough to reject it. If you do not understand the idea behind it, then you should not be criticising that which you do not understand.

Well, how do you know that 'I think therefore I am' contains any meaning per se?

1) If we can all understand words any which way we please, according to you, then there can be no such things as 'meaning per se'.

2) For all you know 'I think therefore I am' could mean 'Rome wasn't built in a day, therefore it saves time', the switch effected by that demon.

3) If there is no such thing as meaning per se (in that we can all decide for ourselves what words mean, according to you), then it could mean the above -- indeed, if I am allowed to make your words mean whatever I like (again according to you), what is to stop me interpreting this sentence that way?

And it's not so much that I do not understand Descartes (but, I have been reading and studying this stuff for longer than most RevLefters have been alive), or that you seem not to be able to explain it to me, it is that there is nothing there to understand.

If there were, you would have found it easy to explain it to me (and in words I could, according to you, interpret in any way I like).

In fact, if we can all do this, if we can all make of anyone's words mean what we like, how do you know you interpreted Descartes correctly, or that anyone has -- or that there is anything there to understand?


You call Descartes a fool and me a 'gullible idiot', and yet the only argument you have hitherto presented is, as I said earlier: 'that argument does not count because an evil demon may have fiddled with the words'. Do you really believe that is adequate?

Just like all ruling-class hacks, Descartes was an idiot -- I stand by that.

You have yet to show otherwise, and in words I cannot interpret in any way I like (thus refuting your claim that we can all do this).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HeWhoKeepsTrying:


well to make your point you have to use reason, and even if my words are screwed around with by a demon then the reason behind them is still sound, and even if the reason is twisted and becomes unreason it still points to the exsistance of reason,

1) You do not know that; I might have guessed, or used something you know nothing about.

2) Even if you were right, you have to use the word 'reason' to make you point, and, once more, for all you know, you could mean 'Rosa is right, and Descartes is an idiot, or, indeed, nothing at all.

[Holden Caulfield]

if i keep going we will develop a pickle of a circular argument, so i respectfully stand down convinced of my own devinity,

(if you have guessed then you have consistantly guessed and formed reason from the development)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No, it could be all random guesswork.

And the word 'consistenty' might mean, for all you know, if the demon has his/her/its way: 'steamed carrots'.

[Black Cross]

if i keep going we will develop a pickle of a circular argument...

I disagree, i think we have already made it to that point.

The only thing happening in this thread is Rosa trying to convince us that demons change the meanings of our words (though i am sure Rosa's possessed) and the only reason we understand each other is because we are really good at guessing; what we are really talking about, instead, is making some sort of stew with carrots, potatoes and dead squirrels.

[Holden Caulfield]

dont be silly everybody knows that Rosa is a computer program,

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Marxist-Rev:


The only thing happening in this thread is Rosa trying to convince us that demons change the meanings of our words (though i am sure Rosa's possessed) and the only reason we understand each other is because we are really good at guessing; what we are really talking about, instead, is making some sort of stew with carrots, potatoes and dead squirrels.

In fact, what I am doing is reducing Descartes strategy (and that of others who think like him) to absurdity.

I certainly do not believe what I have posted here -- I am just applying Descartes' method rigourously, in order to see it self-destruct.

-------------------------------

HeWhoProgrammedRosa:


dont be silly everybody knows that Rosa is a computer program,

My program tells me to deny this...

[Module]

Although I have only read the first page so far...
Lots of things are certain. It is certain that 1 + 1 = 2, for instance, if the premise is 'logic' (...or something).

[Comrade-Z]

I just read this entire thread, and I don't feel like I am any closer to answering the question, "What is certain?"

Not only that, but I also have a new question to wrestle with: "What is meaning?"

This is frustrating.

I've seen Rosa talk about how she thinks that a lot of things aren't certain. Most of it sort of made sense to me. But then she said that "many" things were indeed certain, in response to TAT, who said that he was certain that he was born, that he will die, and that he doesn't like raw mushrooms. And Rosa said that he must be certain about many more things as well.

What would those things be, do you think? Please please please please answer this question with a response that I will probably be able to understand (instead of just saying, "It should be obvious," because it's not for me). I am not a very intelligent being, apparently, because I didn't understand a lot of this thread, so you'll really have to spell it out for me.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrade Z, please do not get me wrong -- I think plenty of things are certain.

As I noted in my last thread, I have only pushed Descartes' systematic doubt to its limit to show that it actually self-destructs, so that we are not tempted to follow in his footsteps.

The solution to this 'problem', if such it might be called, can be found in Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty'. His method is implicit in my comments, even if I have pushed this much further than he would have done.

http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/documents/WittOnScepticism.pdf

http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/documents/WittgensteinianEpistemology.pdf

If you want to know what things are certain, you only have to examine how and when you would use that word -- for in such uses of that word, and the explanations you might give in relation to such, it gains its meaning. It does not gain its meaning from the odd uses to which philosophers put it.

Doubt can only exist where there is knowledge.

So, if someone doubts a certain bird is a Robin, he/she will need to know what a Robin is in order to be able to question the status of the specimen on hand. If that person does not know what a Robin is, then his/her doubt is devoid of content.

If everything is doubted -- as my posts above show, all our words would lose their meaning, and that includes the word "doubt".

So, such systematic doubts are devoid of content -- and they thus self-destruct.

[Holden Caulfield]

to doubt reason is to reason that reason doesn't exsist,

any argument you rebuff this with will self-destruct,

finally i win

[Comrade-Z]

If you want to know what things are certain, you only have to examine how and when you would use that word -- for in such uses of that word, and the explanations you might give in relation to such, it gains its meaning. It does not gain its meaning from the odd uses to which philosophers put it.

Doubt can only exist where there is knowledge.

Interesting. I read a little bit of that first link, so let me see if I'm getting this right:

For example:

I'm pretty certain in an ordinary, everyday sense that I wear glasses. I have no strong reasons to doubt that I wear glasses (for instance, if I couldn't see that I was wearing my glasses, that wouldn't be as much a reason to doubt that I wear glasses, as a reason to doubt that my vision was still working properly). But I also can't say that "I know" that I wear glasses, because saying that "I know" something implies that there was some doubt about that thing in the first place? Is this right?

So what is the difference between being "certain" about something and "knowing" something is true? Are you implying that these concepts are quite different?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HeWhoCan'tSeeThePoint:


to doubt reason is to reason that reason doesn't exsist,

any argument you rebuff this with will self-destruct,

finally i win

If there is an evil demon, then all the words you are using might not mean what you think they do.

So, instead of posting what you think you have, you could in fact have posted this:


Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe

So, when you say you think you have won, you might really have said:


And the mome raths outgrabe

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrade Z, being certain is tantamount to saying you'd be gob-smacked if it turned out you were mistaken, but you still think you aren't.

But, it really depends on the examples you choose.

So, if you said "I am certain I put my keys in my pocket" when you discovered they weren't there, you would in effect be saying something like "I am either going mad or someone has knicked them --, or they fell out". Or such like.

If video evidence, say, was forthcoming that you had in fact left your keys in a pub, or bar, then you might blame the drink, or stress, for your defective memory.

That is how we would ordinarily proceed, which is our best guide to what we mean when we use such words.

[Which illustrates the fact that when we think about how we ordinarily proceed, philosophical 'problems' vanish -- as just so much hot air.]

If you lost your keys, the last person you'd want to help find them is a philosopher.

Philosophical 'certainty' is not related to ordinary certainty, and is, I would argue, an empty notion (since it is based on a new use of this word in relation to radical scepticism, which self-destructs).

The use of the verb 'to know' is, alas, far more complex.

You have to consider uses like "know how", "know that", "know whether", "know who"..., as well as the use of "know", meaning to be acquainted (i.e., the french verb 'connaitre', as opposed to 'savoir') -- as in "I know Tony Blair personally, and he is a liar." 'Certain' would be out of place when talking about acquaintance.

However, I do not think we need to get sidetracked here to understand certainty (which is not expressed as a verb).

Of course, you could say "I know I put my keys in my pocket...", and apart from rhetorical flourish, you'd more or less mean the same as when you used 'certain' in its place.

But, if you know how to, say, ride a bike, the use of 'certain' would be misplaced: "I am certain how to ride a bike..."? I think not.

[Comrade-Z]

[Which illustrates the fact that when we think about how we ordinarily proceed, philosophical 'problems' vanish -- as just so much hot air.]

If you lost your keys, the last person you'd want to help find them is a philosopher.

Philosophical 'certainty' is not related to ordinary certainty, and is, I would argue, an empty notion (since it is based on a new use of this word in relation to radical scepticism, which self-destructs).

Okay, that makes sense. It seems to me like this was the kernel of what you were trying to prove in this thread, and I totally agree. Much clearer now. Thanks!

[BurnTheOliveTree]

Not to be anal, but nobody made a real effort to answer my earlier point:

How is it that we can be 100% sure of our ability to reach a rational conclusion?

If we can't, certainty can't be established by any form of logical argument, because it rests on the baseless axiom that we can definitely reach sound logical conclusions.

Rosa - For example, can you be certain that philosophy is based on mis-use of language? If so, how? How do you answer the deceiving demon idea?

-Alex


Still no reply to this point, I will try once more.

Also Rosa, I do not see that you can just ignore philosophical certainty because it's not ordinary. Sure in everday life we'll claim to be certain that we can see our hands in front of us, philosophical certainty's a separate concept, but you're just dodging the question as it is.

-Alex

[Mod-ist]

nothing in life is certain, not even the fact that you are alive right now. this could all be a fragment of your imagination. sorry about being abstract but i think very laterally about these things.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Burn, sorry, I failed to see your original question for some reason.


Not to be anal, but nobody made a real effort to answer my earlier point:

How is it that we can be 100% sure of our ability to reach a rational conclusion?

If we can't, certainty can't be established by any form of logical argument, because it rests on the baseless axiom that we can definitely reach sound logical conclusions.

Rosa - For example, can you be certain that philosophy is based on mis-use of language? If so, how? How do you answer the deceiving demon idea?

-Alex

I am not sure the word "certain" applies here -- all I can say is: you produce a philosophical argument, and I will show you the misuse of language involved.

I do, however, have a general argument that shows that traditional philosophy as a whole is non-sensical, but as it is over 70,000 words long, you might not have the motivation and/or stamina to work your way through it:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm

As far as the demon is concerned, I do not believe in them, so Descartes irrational quandary is his alone.

My response to radical doubt, however, was outlined above.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Teh Flip (now Mod-ist); we have in fact been through this in this thread, where it has been shown that radical doubts, like the one you express, in fact self-destruct.

By the way, is your name wrong? Or just ironic?

[Holden Caulfield]

nothing in life is certain, not even the fact that you are alive right now. this could all be a fragment of your imagination. sorry about being abstract but i think very laterally about these things.

stop watching the matrix and take the blue pill,

[Kronos]

nothing in life is certain, not even the fact that you are alive right now. this could all be a fragment of your imagination. sorry about being abstract but i think very laterally about these things.



Ah yes, the core of Cartesian philosophy. I admire Rosa's efforts to clear the confusion in this thread. She did a far better job than I ever could. However, I would like to take a shot at this nonsense myself. I am confident that I can either confuse any Cartesian to the point where he abandons Descartes completely, or agree with me in that Descartes metaphysics is so meaningless, it cannot be true or false in the first place.

Like Nietzsche, I will approach this problem as if it were a cold bath; quickly in....and quickly out.

TF, I want to show you a circularity in the above quote that inevitably proves the existence of an objective reality that cannot be the result of illusion, or demonic trickery.

You say that reality could be a "figment of the imagination". If this is true, then there is at least one certainty so far, according to your logic: that imagination exists.

If imagination exists, what is it that is imagined? A false world? If this is true, then what is imagined is not false, that is, the false world is a real illusion. This illusion must exist, and it must exist objectively. If this illusion was not absolutely real, then it is possible that the imagination does not know the real, false world, but only knows the true, real world. In this sense, the true, real world would be that there is a brain in a vat...and not, as the classic dilemma implies, a false reality created by that brain in the vat.

Confusing? Indeed it is.

When Descartes claims that he knows he exists because he can doubt his existence, what he is doubting is not the reality he is aware of, because even if such a reality were an illusion, the possibility of knowing this illusion, this false world, implies by necessity that there must be an objective thing of which there can be knowledge of. Here, Descartes must move onto the "vat" dilemma and concede that the vat exists objectively and absolutely because the illusory reality is known.

Suffice it to say that however one tangles himself in Descartes argument, it must eventually reduce itself to having the requirement of a real, objective reality that exists without reliance on the mind. His argument cannot prove that "mind" exists certainly, while "substance" might be only illusion, because in order for an illusion to be possible, there must be a substantial object which is the subject of that illusion. The mind cannot exist independently of the real world because if it did, it would have no subject to perceive as an illusion.

Also I would suggest checking out Spinoza, if only as an antidote to Descartes. However, you must not rest on Spinoza indefinitely. Spinoza is good for one thing and one thing only- demolishing dualism. Dualism, since its inception with Plato, is perhaps the most poisonous, malicious philosophy ever invented. Its entire foundation is based on a horrible misuse of language, and this was no accident. The ruling classes have used the "logos" since the dawn of civilization to subordinate the working classes. You can find an excellent summary of this idea in Rosa's work. If you don't feel like reading it (and it is very dense...I do agree), I can explain the idea in very simple terms.....something I think Rosa is too smart to do. (relax Rosa and go read some Wittgenstein)

I leave you with a quote from one Arthur Schopenhauer.

"It is because of the enormous intellectual inequality between men that the words of one man are taken as revelation by another man."

Translation: the ordinary working classes have been fooled by the language games of the ruling classes and their hacks- the priests, the mystics, the theologians.

Descartes was one such hack.

"I think therefore I am" should have read "I make shit up that will confuse the working classes, for the king, in exchange for the permission to not have to work."

[BurnTheOliveTree]

I am not sure the word "certain" applies here -- all I can say is: you produce a philosophical argument, and I will show you the misuse of language involved.

I do, however, have a general argument that shows that traditional philosophy as a whole is non-sensical, but as it is over 70,000 words long, you might not have the motivation and/or stamina to work your way through it:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm (http://www.anonym.to/?http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm)

As far as the demon is concerned, I do not believe in them, so Descartes irrational quandary is his alone.

My response to radical doubt, however, was outlined above.


I'll endeavour to read it when I get a spare hour or so, I barely have time to piss these days. :) Not that I'm complaining, it's only because I'm Lysander in a production of Midsummer Night's Dream. (Couldn't resist showing off a bit)

I like your "doubt entails knowledge" response a lot, it's very simple and compelling. However, and I hate to bring this line of argument into the debate again because it is so destructive, how can you be sure that, in the first instance, your logical deduction that one must know a robin to doubt a robin is sound? It looks sound, it seems sound, logically we can see that it works, but what is the foundation of our logic itself?

Do you see what I'm driving at?

-Alex

[Kronos]

So, if someone doubts a certain bird is a Robin, he/she will need to know what a Robin is in order to be able to question the status of the specimen on hand. If that person does not know what a Robin is, then his/her doubt is devoid of content.- Rosa


how can you be sure that, in the first instance, your logical deduction that one must know a robin to doubt a robin is sound?

Do you see what I'm driving at?- BTOT

Drive further, BTOT.

Can you doubt a twannzle? No, not yet, because that term has no meaningful correspondence to behavior or the world. It signifies nothing at this point. Now if I pointed at an event, say, a frog sitting on a log, and said "I call that a twannzle", and you said "okay, I see it, and I know what you call it now", at this point you can doubt the twannzle exists and assume it is an illusion. But this assumption can only be made after the fact that you are introduced to the word and the event it corresponds to. The same is true for the robin.

It is impossible to isolate any one thing from the rest of the world and suppose that it can be an illusion. In the case of the robin, your doubting the robin exists would necessarily involve many others doubts: you would have to doubt that your mother took you for a walk through the park that day when you were four. You would have to doubt that while on this walk, she pointed at an object and said to you "this is a robin". Hell, you would even have to doubt that your mother even existed.

When I say "drive further" I mean move this argument to its most extreme conclusion, as I did in my last post in this thread. Even in supposing that the entire world is an illusion, you would end up having to posit some kind of objective thing which produces this illusion- if even a "brain in a vat".

The problem with cartesian idealism is that through such radical doubt, it forces itself to take up an even more absurd position- that there is no object to be mistaken as real, and that the mind is experiencing itself while it is tricking itself. So, if the world might be an illusion, according to the cartesians, then it must be that there is only mind. How could mind possibly have the capacity to experience an illusion if there is no such thing which can be mistaken as real?

Is the mind real, but then maybe not real? Well which is it?

The robin must be real in order for you to doubt it. "Real" as in "an object independent of the mind", not real as in- the term my mother used while pointing at the object and saying to me "that is a robin". The meaning of "robin" is not in the term, but in the corresponding behavior which accompanies the use of the term.

[Kronos]

Oh and check this out, BTOT. Let's say this demon did exist who was tricking you. From his perspective, how can the demon know that you exist and that you aren't an illusion? Couldn't there be another demon tricking the demon who was tricking you? See how absurd this argument becomes if you push it?

[cappin]

Real doubt of certainty/knowledge/affirmation and the many lovely anomalies you can pull from the thesaurus is to suppose you haven't experienced something that you have.

To ask yourself if you're seeing water in the desert or if you're imagining there to be can be absolutely reasonable; but in asking yourself if you have ever known a desert from a hallucination, or a cane from a magical wand, you would have to already accept the fact that there is real and unreal and admit to having experienced one from the other.

[BurnTheOliveTree]

Kronos - I understand this, I am not a cartesian. Not to be rude, but you utterly missed the point of what I was saying.

The "doubt requires knowledge argument" works, but only if you presuppose the reliability of our logical deduction. It is a logical deduction that doubt requires knowledge, and as yet no one has been able to provide certain ground for it. That's my point.

Now, as I said, I'm not a cartesian, and I don't go in for any brain-in-vat hypotheses, but I think your rebuttal of the argument was very poor:


Oh and check this out, BTOT. Let's say this demon did exist who was tricking you. From his perspective, how can the demon know that you exist and that you aren't an illusion? Couldn't there be another demon tricking the demon who was tricking you? See how absurd this argument becomes if you push it?

Well, yes, there could be, but if there is, then that only serves to further confound the lack of any possible knowledge in this hypothetical. And your incredulity at it does nothing to diminish the argument's strength I'm afraid, absurd or no.

-Alex

[Kronos]

The "doubt requires knowledge argument" works, but only if you presuppose the reliability of our logical deduction. It is a logical deduction that doubt requires knowledge, and as yet no one has been able to provide certain ground for it. That's my point.

I'll try one more time. If you still don't understand, I'm not sure I can help you.

For doubt NOT to "require knowledge", it would have to be a doubt that literally doubts nothing. This is impossible. The very inference itself NECESSITATES something that exists. What would you be doubting if not what YOU THINK is real?

You cannot say "I doubt that chair exists, but I can't have any knowledge of the chair that I am sitting here doubting."


And your incredulity at it does nothing to diminish the argument's strength I'm afraid, absurd or no.


No. I demolished the argument in one post, but I had to bring it back to life after Rosa killed it the first time. Perhaps I shouldn't have beaten a dead horse.

Never mind. Believe what you will.

[BurnTheOliveTree]

Kronos - First, calm down man, there's no need to be aggressive to me about this. Second, you need to actually consider what I am telling you - your argument is correct, but only if you presuppose that your capacity to reason correctly is infallible.

You are using your logic to try to prove to me that you need knowledge to doubt, yes? Logically, to you, that sounds fine and works and is practically self-evident. But you have not established certainty yet, because you are working with a baseless assumption that you can reason correctly and soundly. How can you be certain that you can think straight, in simpler terms?

Please try to address the point I'm actually making - I can't help but feel that you have an idea of the classic brain-in-a-vat sceptic and want to refute him rather than me.

-Alex