Categorical Imperative

[jacobin1949]

Do you agree with the morals of Kant's Categorical Imperitive?

Are Hegelians bound by the Categorical Imperitive?

Kant's Categorical Imperative is based on the idea of noncontradiction. But hegelian logic proves that all existence is made up of contradictions and opposites. So doesn't this cancel out Kantian ethics?

[jacobin1949]

For example Kant held that to will lying for self-interest, destroys the element of promising. Thus you will both truth and lie.

Contradiction


But Hegelian logic shows that all truth contains untruth.

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by [email protected] 16, 2007 09:47 pm
But Hegelian logic shows that all truth contains untruth.
How exactly does truth "contain" untruth?

Luís Henrique

[Dros]

Kant's impertitive does not make any sense and has been thoroughly debunked.

One simple example: when you make an action there is no objective way to determine what imperative you "will". For instance, if I push you out of the way of a speeding car you did not see, did I will the rule "It is good to push people" or did I will "It is good to save people from speeding cars they do not see". There is no way to universally understand what maxim I have "willed".

[jacobin1949]

Originally posted by [email protected] 16, 2007 11:18 pm
Kant's impertitive does not make any sense and has been thoroughly debunked.

One simple example: when you make an action there is no objective way to determine what imperative you "will". For instance, if I push you out of the way of a speeding car you did not see, did I will the rule "It is good to push people" or did I will "It is good to save people from speeding cars they do not see". There is no way to universally understand what maxim I have "willed".

Kant's theory is based on the principle, not the actual action. So you are only judged by the principle from which you acted not hypothteical principles that would have justified it.

So if you had pushed him out of the way because you enjoy pushing people, Kant would consider it an immoral act.

In addition Kant does not say we shouldn;t do actions that are not "moral". Like a mother saving her child, but that act would have no moral worth.

Most debunking of Kant is based on twisting or misinterpreting his words. The problem with Kant is its a type of "moral hedonism". Its basically avioding pain, and getting pleasure. Except pain is immorality and pleasure is morality. No concern is taken for the Geist. Or other people.

Only Hegel has an logical debunking but in his refutation he his also preserving the rational core.

Thus truth and non-truth.

[jacobin1949]

Thesis: Utilitarianism of Hume-Bentham ENDS
Antithesis: CatImp of Kant MEANS
Synthesis: Hegel's Geist FATHERLAND

[Volderbeek]

Originally posted by [email protected] 16, 2007 05:37 pm
Kant's Categorical Imperative is based on the idea of noncontradiction. But hegelian logic proves that all existence is made up of contradictions and opposites. So doesn't this cancel out Kantian ethics?
"Hegelian logic" doesn't deny the law of noncontradiction. That's a popular misconception.

[Volderbeek]

Originally posted by [email protected] 16, 2007 05:37 pm
Do you agree with the morals of Kant's Categorical Imperitive?
Not at all. He doesn't consider acting immorally intentionally based on situation, or how to resolve conflicts. He sort of implies that all "rational" individuals will simply agree. In that way, it reminds me of objectivism.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:


"Hegelian logic" doesn't deny the law of noncontradiction. That's a popular misconception.

1) Hegel confused the alleged negation of the 'law of identity' with the 'law of non-contradiction'. So, his logic was based on a serious screw-up.

2) Dialectical logic is far too confused to admit or deny anything.

Now, can we leave this mystical rubbish to the religious among us?

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2...-Contradictions (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_02.htm#What-Are-Dialectical-Contradictions)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Jacobin, this triad is not Hegelian:


Thesis: Utilitarianism of Hume-Bentham ENDS
Antithesis: CatImp of Kant MEANS
Synthesis: Hegel's Geist FATHERLAND

On that, see here:

http://www.revleft.com/index.php?showtopic...st&p=1292097892 (http://www.revleft.com/index.php?showtopic=51512&view=findpost&p=1292097892)


But Hegelian logic shows that all truth contains untruth.

Ok, what is the 'untruth' in any of these:

"Mao is dead".

"Hitler was a Nazi".

"Marx was not made of cream cheese".

"Paris is in France".

"This is the fifth sentence in this list".


But Hegelian logic shows that all truth contains untruth.

Which is just one more reason to throw Hegel's entire work onto Hume's bonfire.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH, looks like your post has been lost.

I posted this in reply to it, but saved it first, so if it became lost, I could repost it:

LH, you must know by now that when fans of the dialectic says that X, Y or Z has been 'debunked' what they really mean is that some dialectical guru or other has merely said that X, Y, or Z is mistaken (period).

That ex cathedra statement is then accredited with semi-divine status, to be quoted as gospel forever more by all true believers.

In a similar vein, all my essays have been 'debunked' by comrades who have never read them.

So, 'debunked' is synonymous with 'ignored', or perhaps even 'condemned' (the dialectical equivalent of the list of disapproved/approved works the Catholics used to have), in dialectical circles.

[I must remember to set-up a Dialectical Phrasebook sometime, with all the odd things that DM-fans say translated into ordinary language, so that comrades who have not had their brains compromised in this way can understand the mystics among us, who have.]

Kant will, I think, survive the taunts of minnows like this.

[Dros]

Originally posted by [email protected] 17, 2007 12:30 am
Kant's theory is based on the principle, not the actual action. So you are only judged by the principle from which you acted not hypothteical principles that would have justified it.

So if you had pushed him out of the way because you enjoy pushing people, Kant would consider it an immoral act.

In addition Kant does not say we shouldn;t do actions that are not "moral". Like a mother saving her child, but that act would have no moral worth.

Most debunking of Kant is based on twisting or misinterpreting his words. The problem with Kant is its a type of "moral hedonism". Its basically avioding pain, and getting pleasure. Except pain is immorality and pleasure is morality. No concern is taken for the Geist. Or other people.

Only Hegel has an logical debunking but in his refutation he his also preserving the rational core.

Thus truth and non-truth.
Ok. So which principle did I act in? The point is it is impossible to tell. Humans are irrational. Kant makes no sense from any kind of materialist perspective. He presupposes so many flawed premises and I want nothing to do with him.

[Luís Henrique]

The problem is that there is not a Marxist ethic, so most Marxist end up with a semi-Kantian absolutist ethic, or, worse, rehash some kind of utilitarianism.

Whatever can be said against Kant, he beats Bentham et caterva singlehandedly.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by [email protected] 18, 2007 09:13 pm
Ok. So which principle did I act in? The point is it is impossible to tell.
Of course it is possible to tell: if you have the habit of pushing people for the pure pleasure of pushing people, it is highly possible that you were doing it once again. However, if you are known as someone who never pushes people, it is reasonable to deduce you did it in order to save the person's life.


Humans are irrational.

Humans are rational, although part of their behaviour is, yes, irrational.


Kant makes no sense from any kind of materialist perspective.

And how would a materialist ethic sound like?


He presupposes so many flawed premises and I want nothing to do with him.

Well, this is highly possible, but you haven't yet named any of these false premises.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 17, 2007 09:23 am
Ok, what is the 'untruth' in any of these:

"Mao is dead".

"Hitler was a Nazi".

"Marx was not made of cream cheese".

"Paris is in France".

"This is the fifth sentence in this list".
Marx wasn't made of cream cheese?! :o

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Marx wasn't made of cream cheese?!

But Engels was. :P

[jacobin1949]

Hegel does deny the law of non-contradiction. He restored Heraclitus to his rightful place. All of modern physics can be found in Heraclitus. As can the unity of opposites.

But the second you leave the Berlin lecture hall and step into the real world theres nothing "crazy" about it.

As for the Hegelian dialect. the synth-anti-theses is a little crude. But it is basically excepted by the 3rd law of dialectics.

According to formal logic, if a scientist conducts an experiment to test a thesis and it proves wrong. Then he has NOTHING.

But any scientists knows he has something, due to internal contradictions in A. So out of A and not A emerge not-not A, which is more than a simple restatement of A.

You can see Hegel's spirit in the story of the Soviet Union. Theres nothing mystical about it. The Spirit expressed itself through 1917 an fulfilled the historic role of smashing Anglo-French and Nazi Imperialism. However the smashing of world capitalism was not how the spirit intended to express itself through the USSR thus leading to 1991. No different then 1789 being revoked by 1815. But the spirit has still accomplished its historic task. Waterloo and 1989 can not be explained without Geist. Theres nothing "gnostic" or hermetic about that. Its just science. Geist is not ghost or spirit the way we know of it. Are you a gnostic any time you get the "gist" of an argument?

[Dros]

Of course it is possible to tell: if you have the habit of pushing people for the pure pleasure of pushing people, it is highly possible that you were doing it once again. However, if you are known as someone who never pushes people, it is reasonable to deduce you did it in order to save the person's life.

Why? Maybe I have had an unconcious urge toward violence that I have suppressed and aloud to manifest itself now. People act with multiple motives which they don't necessarily know about.


Humans are rational, although part of their behaviour is, yes, irrational.

Usually irrational.


And how would a materialist ethic sound like?

Good question. I don't have an easy answer.


Well, this is highly possible, but you haven't yet named any of these false premises.

See above.

[jacobin1949]

Kantian logic relies soley on reason and logic. An act for Kant is not "immoral" because God or the Bible says so, its immoral because it leads to a logical contradiction.

Kant shows what you SHOULD do. Because its hard or the majority may shrink from it does not change the fact that its duty. You can't refute an moral theory because its "hard"

As for the "maxim", only the actor knows the maxim. And the actor can not lie to or deceive his own reason. YOU know whether you fulfilled the CatImp or not. Its not like some trophy-committee needs to determine true motive.

And any time you break the CatImp your not committing a crime against God, but against you own reason.
People need a rigid, unyielding law not myth.

Don't ask questions, just do your duty. Thats Kant.

[jacobin1949]

If truth did not contain untruth. Then language could not exist.

[jacobin1949]

Ok, what is the 'untruth' in any of these:

"Mao is dead".

Mao Zedong thought guides China today.

"Hitler was a Nazi".

He was not a Socialist.

"Marx was not made of cream cheese".

Marx consumed dairy.

"Paris is in France".

Paris existed before there was a French nation.

"This is the fifth sentence in this list".

By asserting its objective existence, it violates its own sensory-knowledge.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Jacobin:


Mao Zedong thought guides China today.

How does that make "Mao is dead" in any way untrue?

Do you think he is still alive?


He was not a Socialist.

No, he was a National Socialist. Are you denying Hitler was a Nazi?


Marx consumed dairy.

But how do you know he consumed cream cheese?


Paris existed before there was a French nation.

That is why I put it in the present tense. So, what is the untruth in the use of the present tense here?


By asserting its objective existence, it violates its own sensory-knowledge.

What the hell does this mean?

What 'sensory-knowledge'? What 'objective existence' is it 'asserting'?

You will really try to say anything just to protect your sacred dialectic won't you, no matter how stupid it makes you look?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

J:


If truth did not contain untruth. Then language could not exist.

What is the 'untruth' in this?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

J:


Hegel does deny the law of non-contradiction.

Not so, he confused the negation of the law of identity with the law of non-contradiction. The one cannot be connected with the other.


He restored Heraclitus to his rightful place. All of modern physics can be found in Heraclitus. As can the unity of opposites.

Heraclitus was an mystical idiot, who derived a universal truth from what he thought possible about bathing in the same river!

The fact that Hegel fell for this guff should have told you he was an idiot too.

What? All of modern physics in Heraclitus, including the fact that electrons and photons are not a unity of internal opposites?

And that the Gravitational constant is 6.67300 × 10^-11 m^3 kg^-1 s^-2?

It's a puzzle then why we send students to university to study Physics and not Heraclitus.

And the 'Unity of Opposites' is no less confused; more on that here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2...on-of-Opposites (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm#Interpenetration-of-Opposites)


According to formal logic, if a scientist conducts an experiment to test a thesis and it proves wrong. Then he has NOTHING

I challenge you to find a single logic text that asserts this.

You, as with other dialecticians, just like [i]making stuff up about logic.


But any scientists knows he has something, due to internal contradictions in A. So out of A and not A emerge not-not A, which is more than a simple restatement of A.

Not so, any scientist will infer A from the negation of not A (if "A" is a proposition).

Ah, and now we have the simple faith of the dialectical mystic:


You can see Hegel's spirit in the story of the Soviet Union. Theres nothing mystical about it. The Spirit expressed itself through 1917 an fulfilled the historic role of smashing Anglo-French and Nazi Imperialism. However the smashing of world capitalism was not how the spirit intended to express itself through the USSR thus leading to 1991. No different then 1789 being revoked by 1815. But the spirit has still accomplished its historic task. Waterloo and 1989 can not be explained without Geist. Theres nothing "gnostic" or hermetic about that. Its just science. Geist is not ghost or spirit the way we know of it. Are you a gnostic any time you get the "gist" of an argument?

Nothing mystical about 'the Spirit', eh?

You are quite clearly a mystical idealist with all that talk of the 'task' performed by this 'Spirit'.

No surprise then that Hegel got all this guff from Jacob Boehme and a host of other Hermeticists:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/glenn_magee.htm

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by [email protected] 19, 2007 02:22 am
"Mao is dead".

Mao Zedong thought guides China today.
But the man Mao Zedong is dead. Of course, the word "dead" has more than a meaning; the sentence "Mao Zedong is dead" is not "a truth that contains untruth"; it is a sentence with two different meanings: 1. "There was a man called Mao Zedong, and he already died in the physical sence", and 2. "The deeds and ideas of the man called Mao Zedong are no longer relevant".

ETA: These two sentences have completely different veracity status: it could be that Mao was still alive, and his ideas were no longer relevant, and any other combination of .t. and .f.

So the relationship between them is anything, but dialectic (if they were dialectically related, the change on the truthness of one would affect the truthness of the other).


"Hitler was a Nazi".

He was not a Socialist.

This is not much different: the Nazis used the word "socialism" for practical reasons, but "National Socialism" was never socialism in any recognisable sence. So saying, "Hitler was a National Socialist" is not saying he was a socialist.

In fact, the name "National Socialist" itself is a lie; negating it is the kind of "negation of negation" that Aristotle was able to deal with.


"Marx was not made of cream cheese".

Marx consumed dairy.

Which is not the same as being "made of cream cheese". Cream cheese is only part of dairy, dairy was only a part of Karl Marx's diet... and eating something is not the same as being made of something. Otherwise cows would be made of grass.


"Paris is in France".

Paris existed before there was a French nation.

True. And perhaps France will disappear before Paris.

Now tell us, where is the "untruth" of,

"As of 2007, Paris is/was in France"?

We are dealing with imprecision here, not with contradictions.


"This is the fifth sentence in this list".

By asserting its objective existence, it violates its own sensory-knowledge.

Sorry, I cannot make sence out of this...

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 19, 2007 04:59 am
J:


If truth did not contain untruth. Then language could not exist.

What is the 'untruth' in this?
Everywhere.

The sentence is completely false.

Luís Henrique

[Guest1]

Jacobin's DiaMat, courtesy of the Stalin School of Falsification, Inc.

Geist? Come on man, don't be so dense.

Also, dialectics is useful in describing complex processes, it doesn't need to be applied to everything. So take it easy, and don't drag dialectical materialism back into the idealist cesspool that Marx and Engels rescued it from. Please.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Che:


Also, dialectics is useful in describing complex processes

Not so; it cannot even handle a bag of sugar:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2006.htm

And there are far better ways of describing complex processes; ordinary language is one way, using vocabulary like this:


Vary, alter, adjust, amend, revise, edit, bend, straighten, twist, turn, wrap, pluck, tear, mend, mutate, transmute, sharpen, modify, develop, expand, contract, constrict, swell, flow, differentiate, divide, unite, fast, slow, rapid, hasty, melt, harden, drip, cascade, drop, pick up, fade, wind, unwind, meander, peel, scrape, file, scour, dislodge, is, was, will be, will have been, had, will have had, went, go, going, gone, lost, age, flood, crumble, disintegrate, erode, corrode, rust, flake, percolate, tumble, mix, separate, cut, chop, crush, grind, shred, slice, dice, saw, spread, fall, climb, rise, ascend, descend, slide, slip, roll, spin, oscillate, undulate, rotate, wave, quickly, slowly, instantaneously, suddenly, gradually, snap, join, resign, part, rapidly, sell, buy, lose, find, search, cover, uncover, stretch, compress, lift, put down, win, ripen, germinate, conceive, gestate, die, rot, perish, grow, decay, fold, many, more, less, fewer, steady, steadily, jerkily, smoothly, quickly, very, extremely, exceedingly, intermittent, continuous, continual, push, pull, slide, jump, run, walk, swim, drown, immerse, break, charge, retreat, assault, dismantle, pulverise, disintegrate, dismember, replace, undo, reverse, repeal, enact, quash, hour, minute, second, instant, destroy, annihilate, boil, freeze, thaw, cook, liquefy, solidify, congeal, neutralise, flatten, crimple, evaporate, condense, dissolve, mollify, pacify, calm down, terminate, initiate, instigate, enrage, inflame, protest, challenge, expel, eject, remove, overthrow, expropriate, scatter, gather, assemble, defeat, strike, revolt, overthrow, riot, march, demonstrate, rebel, campaign, agitate, organise…

Naturally, it would not be difficult to extend this list until it contained literally tens of thousands of words all capable of depicting countless changes in limitless detail (especially if it is augmented with the language of mathematics). It is only a myth put about by Hegel and Marxist dialecticians that ordinary language cannot express change. On the contrary, it performs this task far better than the incomprehensible and impenetrably obscure jargon Hegel invented in order to fix something that was not broken.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Everywhere.

The sentence is completely false.

I agree, but I was trying to get Jacobin to admit this -- which is a classic example of arguing ad hominem.

As sson as he does he will perhaps no longer feel the need to defend the indefensible.

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 19, 2007 05:22 am

He restored Heraclitus to his rightful place. All of modern physics can be found in Heraclitus. As can the unity of opposites.

Heraclitus was an mystical idiot, who derived a universal truth from what he thought possible about bathing in the same river!
I strongly disagree with the caracterisation of Heraclitus as a mystical idiot. He was a Greek philosopher, writing 2,500 years ago, and should not be judged by modern standards. His sentence about bathing in the same river - which is, more often than not, misquoted to remove his recognisement of permanence - is about what constitutes things: a river is made of atoms, but it very much looks like it doesn't matter of which atoms it is made, since water flows and the river is, at each moment of its existence, composed of different atoms arranged in a different order, and yet it is the same river.

But evidently, Heraclitus had no hint of modern physics, never mind what a real mystical idiot like Fritjof Capra may believe. There may be curious coincidences between ideas of ancient philosophers and mystics, on one hand, and certain discoveries of modern science. But they are either just coincidences, or, more probably, seem to be coincidences because of historic reasons (ancient philosophers spoke of atoms, and modern science named certain particles "atoms" exactly because of that - but modern atoms are not what ancient philosophers believed atoms should be).

Modern science has a method to attain its results; a method that was totally unknown to Heraclitus. So he would only be able write things that contained "all of modern physics" if there was a different method capable to attain the same results as the scientific method. There is no reason to believe such alternate method exists, and even less reason to believe it was known in the past.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


I strongly disagree with the caracterisation of Heraclitus as a mystical idiot. He was a Greek philosopher, writing 2,500 years ago, and should not be judged by modern standards. His sentence about bathing in the same river - which is, more often than not, misquoted to remove his recognisement of permanence - is about what constitutes things: a river is made of atoms, but it very much looks like it doesn't matter of which atoms it is made, since water flows and the river is, at each moment of its existence, composed of different atoms arranged in a different order, and yet it is the same river.

Have you actually read his surviving work?

http://www.heraclitusfragments.com/files/e.html

The man was a mystical (and ruling class) idiot; I stand by my original verdict.

Moreover, his conclusion about rivers (etc) was no less confused, based as it was on his failure to recognize there are different criteria of identity for mass and for count/substantival nouns (a distinction you missed in your haste to concentrate on atoms).

Even putting this to one side, his attempt to extrapolate from an erroneous observation about local river conditions to everything in the universe for all of time was far more problematic, and not obviously (or confirmabley) correct.

For one thing, protons do not change; neither do photons or electons.

[Hit The North]

And there are far better ways of describing complex processes; ordinary language is one way, using vocabulary like this:

However, dialectics claims to explain change, not merely describe it.

Moreover:


It is only a myth put about by Hegel and Marxist dialecticians that ordinary language cannot express change.

Hegel was concerned with explaining historical change. The essence of Marx's criticism is that Hegel elevates the role of ideas in this explanation to mystical levels and fails to understand how ideas themselves express material relations.

The other side of Marx's critique deals with the failure of materialist philosophy to move beyond ideas as mere reflections of the material world and therefore occupying a passive role in human affairs.

Marxism is dialectical in that it attempts to articulate how ideas and material relations are both active and inter-related elements of historical development.

Attempts to extrapolate material dialectics to the physical processes of the universe, as found in the 'high dialectics' of Engels, Lenin and Mao, are probably misguided.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


However, dialectics claims to explain change, not merely describe it.

And that claim is no more accurate that George W Bush's claims about WMD in Iraq.


Hegel was concerned with explaining historical change. The essence of Marx's criticism is that Hegel elevates the role of ideas in this explanation to mystical levels and fails to understand how ideas themselves express material relations.

Good job Marx abandonned this mystical guff by the time he got to Das Kapital, then, isn't it?


Attempts to extrapolate material dialectics to the physical processes of the universe, as found in the 'high dialectics' of Engels, Lenin and Mao, are probably misguided.

Which seems to mean that human beings are not part of nature. :blink:

Anyway, far be it from me to point out the incoherencies in your 'theory'; as I said before, Z, you are half cured of the Hermetic virus.

Just let me know when you want rid of the other half.

[Hit The North]

And that claim is no more accurate that George W Bush's claims about WMD in Iraq.

That may be so. However, if Marxism is indeed the best approach to understanding history and society then, if the claim is that what makes it distinctive as a method is the material dialectic, then you might have to concede that a dialectical view of human history is superior to 'bourgeois' methods. Of course, you deny that dialectics play any role in Marx's material conception of history and therefore this is not even part of the reason as to why you think it is superior to bourgeois thinking. Then again, I've yet to hear what you think is distinctive about Marx's method and why it results in such a breakthrough. Maybe you think it has nothing to do with the method of analysis Marx employs, but is rooted in his ineffable genius [shrug smiley, if such a thing existed].


Good job Marx abandonned this mystical guff by the time he got to Das Kapital, then, isn't it?

Yes it is. It's also a good job he didn't just lapse into its theoretical opposite: mechanical materialism.


Which seems to mean that human beings are not part of nature

No, it just means that human history doesn't unfold in the same way as nature. But of course, for Marx, a defining characteristic of humanity is that it stands in a different relationship to nature than other beings in the natural world. So in a sense, Marx thought that humans weren't a part of nature in the way usually meant.


as I said before, Z, you are half cured of the Hermetic virus.

:D "Half cured"? Is that like "half-killed" or "nearly pregnant"? Sounds kinda Hegelian :blink:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


However, if Marxism is indeed the best approach to understanding history and society then, if the claim is that what makes it distinctive as a method is the material dialectic, then you might have to concede that a dialectical view of human history is superior to 'bourgeois' methods. Of course, you deny that dialectics play any role in Marx's material conception of history and therefore this is not even part of the reason as to why you think it is superior to bourgeois thinking. Then again, I've yet to hear what you think is distinctive about Marx's method and why it results in such a breakthrough. Maybe you think it has nothing to do with the method of analysis Marx employs, but is rooted in his ineffable genius [shrug smiley, if such a thing existed].

Historical Materialism is indeed the best available theory, but only if the Hegelian jargon is stipped away (as Marx himself indicated it should).

What is distinctive about Marx's theory?

May I suggest you read up on Historical Materialism (with all that detail about the interplay between the forces and relations of production, etc) to answer that question for yourself.


It's also a good job he didn't just lapse into its theoretical opposite: mechanical materialism.

Correct; he advocated historical materialism (stripped of 'contradictions', 'unities of opposites', 'negation of the negation', 'quantity into quality', etc.).

I can live with that.


No, it just means that human history doesn't unfold in the same way as nature. But of course, for Marx, a defining characteristic of humanity is that it stands in a different relationship to nature than other beings in the natural world. So in a sense, Marx thought that humans weren't a part of nature in the way usually meant.

Except you cannot account for the break in continuity here --, that is, why human beings are subject to such 'laws' whereas rocks and stones are not. You can declare it dogmatically to be the case, but you cannot account for it.

[Now I agree with Marx, but you dialecticians cannot.]


"Half cured"? Is that like "half-killed" or "nearly pregnant"?

I prefer 'half-baked'.


Sounds kinda Hegelian

No, it's far too clear for that.

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 19, 2007 03:33 pm
Have you actually read his surviving work?

http://www.heraclitusfragments.com/files/e.html

The man was a mystical (and ruling class) idiot; I stand by my original verdict.
Yes, I read his surviving work.

I also take into account the fact that he flourished 2,500 years ago. I don't judge him by modern standards.

Further, I take into account that what remains of his work consists in smallish quotations, out of context, and usually made by intellectual adversaries, interested in showing how he was wrong.


Moreover, his conclusion about rivers (etc) was no less confused, based as it was on his failure to recognize there are different criteria of identity for mass and for count/substantival nouns (a distinction you missed in your haste to concentrate on atoms).

Maybe. Did anyone else come to better conclusions before him?

He was positing a problem that was probably never posited before. It would be surprising if he could come also with a correct answer.


Even putting this to one side, his attempt to extrapolate from an erroneous observation about local river conditions to everything in the universe for all of time was far more problematic, and not obviously (or confirmabley) correct.

I don't think, considering the fragmentary state of his work, that it is reasonable to state that he attempted to extrapolate from an observation about a river.


For one thing, protons do not change; neither do photons or electons.

Well, protons seem to decay, though their estimated half-life is inconceivably long. But you are demanding too much from Heraclitus, who couldn't possibly know anything about protons or photons.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by [email protected] 19, 2007 02:07 am
As for the "maxim", only the actor knows the maxim. And the actor can not lie to or deceive his own reason. YOU know whether you fulfilled the CatImp or not. Its not like some trophy-committee needs to determine true motive.
Yes, that's Kant's point. Attempts to "debunk" him based on the difficulty to objectively determinate the subjective motives of actors are useless, because they do not even address Kant's ethics.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by [email protected] 19, 2007 02:04 am
According to formal logic, if a scientist conducts an experiment to test a thesis and it proves wrong. Then he has NOTHING.

But any scientists knows he has something, due to internal contradictions in A. So out of A and not A emerge not-not A, which is more than a simple restatement of A.
This doesn't make much sence.

If you absolutely need to try to pidgeonhole reality within Hegel's categories, you should try something like:

Thesis: you can't possibly be a revolutionary if you don't understand Hegel's Logic. (Lenin)

Antithesis: since Hegel's Logic is ununderstandable, you cannot possibly a revolutionary if you lose your time trying to understand it. (Rosa Liechtenstein)

Synthesis: What do thesis and antithesis, Lenin and RL have in common? They both believe being a revolutionary is dependent on accepting or rejecting one singular idea. The synthesis is the negation of both thesis' and antithesis' hidden pressuposition: being a revolutionary has nothing to do with Hegel's Logic.

But evidently you will find it rather difficult to find pairs of "opposites" that can be manipulated this way - particularly if they are "opposites" of the kind, ("Mao is dead", "No, Mao is alive"). So this seems to be a particular case, which Rosa certainly will be able to explain with formal logic and references to "ordinary words".

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


I also take into account the fact that he flourished 2,500 years ago. I don't judge him by modern standards.

I do, as I do the Bible. You will be defending Genesis next.


Further, I take into account that what remains of his work consists in smallish quotations, out of context, and usually made by intellectual adversaries, interested in showing how he was wrong.

Far too many, they should all have perished.


Did anyone else come to better conclusions before him?

How do we know? Working class science was never preserved, just ruling class crap like this.


He was positing a problem that was probably never posited before. It would be surprising if he could come also with a correct answer.

That we do not know, and that does not justify mysticism.


I don't think, considering the fragmentary state of his work, that it is reasonable to state that he attempted to extrapolate from an observation about a river.

Yes, you are right, he must have just received the data from all those recently launched Greek satellites.


Well, protons seem to decay, though their estimated half-life is inconceivably long. But you are demanding too much from Heraclitus, who couldn't possibly know anything about protons or photons.

So, he was wrong; not everything 'flows'. Into Hume's flowing bonfire...

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 22, 2007 02:54 am
I do, as I do the Bible. You will be defending Genesis next.
Defending in what sence?

The Genesis is full of genocide and things we would consider crimes of war. But it cannot be judged by modern standards. Killing all male inhabitants of a city and enslaving the females was the standard practice at that time.

The problem with Genesis is a whole lot of people still believe it is divine. Other than that it is not really worse that the Iliad, unless we are discussing literary merit. But if literary merit is the issue, then, while YHWH is clearly inferior to Homer as an author, the Genesis is also not that bad.

So, yes, I would defend the Genesis, and with gusto. As a tale, as a well-written story, as an interesting fable, as a document on how our ancestors behaved three or four millenia ago, etc.

But it has to be defended against its "friends", perhaps more than against its enemies. Those who believe it is "true", the expression of God's will or knowledge, etc, for instance.

The same with Heraclitus. He was a man trying to understand the world, with not much instruments to do it. He should receive our respect for trying. Believing that his results are, or could even be, much more than delusions, is harmful to his reputation. Saying that "all of modern physics is in Heraclitus", for instance - it's clearly an abuse.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 22, 2007 02:54 am
How do we know? Working class science was never preserved, just ruling class crap like this.
Working class is not as old as Heraclitus.

The "ruling class crap" includes not only Heraclitus, but also Plato, Aristotle, Ptolomeus, Euclid, Thucydides, Copernicus, Machiavelli, Vico, Newton, Galileo, Priestley, Saussure, Russell, Darwin, Freud, Einstein, etc. Whatever crapitude derives from that, I will stick to that crap against the idea of a "proletarian science" and its Lysenkos.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 22, 2007 02:54 am
So, he was wrong; not everything 'flows'. Into Hume's flowing bonfire...
And the Musca domestica has six limbs, not four. Can we throw Aristotle into Hume's bonfire too?

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Defending in what sence?

Perhaps in the same way you defend Hercalitus? [Genesis mentions change, too.]


Working class is not as old as Heraclitus.

I am sorry, there have been working people since the dawn of time.


The "ruling class crap" includes not only Heraclitus, but also Plato, Aristotle, Ptolomeus, Euclid, Thucydides, Copernicus, Machiavelli, Vico, Newton, Galileo, Priestley, Saussure, Russell, Darwin, Freud, Einstein, etc. Whatever crapitude derives from that, I will stick to that crap against the idea of a "proletarian science" and its Lysenkos.

In so far as any in this list tried to do philosophy, yes. And you are welcome to it.

No need for 'proletarian science', ordinary science will do.


The Genesis is full of genocide and things we would consider crimes of war. But it cannot be judged by modern standards. Killing all male inhabitants of a city and enslaving the females was the standard practice at that time.

You stick to your standards, and I'll still apply mine.


He was a man trying to understand the world, with not much instruments to do it. He should receive our respect for trying. Believing that his results are, or could even be, much more than delusions, is harmful to his reputation. Saying that "all of modern physics is in Heraclitus", for instance - it's clearly an abuse.

Sorry -- a ruling-class hack.

Hume's bonfire with the lot.


And the Musca domestica has six limbs, not four.

Eh? :wacko: :blink: :wacko: :blink:

I see it's time to review your dosage. :P


Can we throw Aristotle into Hume's bonfire too?

We can keep his logic and his science; the rest you can burn.

Thanks for volunteering.

[Volderbeek]

Originally posted by jacobin1949+December 18, 2007 10:07 pm--> (jacobin1949 @ December 18, 2007 10:07 pm)Kantian logic relies soley on reason and logic. An act for Kant is not "immoral" because God or the Bible says so, its immoral because it leads to a logical contradiction.

Kant shows what you SHOULD do. Because its hard or the majority may shrink from it does not change the fact that its duty. You can't refute an moral theory because its "hard"

As for the "maxim", only the actor knows the maxim. And the actor can not lie to or deceive his own reason. YOU know whether you fulfilled the CatImp or not. Its not like some trophy-committee needs to determine true motive.

And any time you break the CatImp your not committing a crime against God, but against you own reason.
People need a rigid, unyielding law not myth.[/b]

There's no ethical quality to reason and logic; they assume the value of separating truth and fiction. With the "CatImp," you're just replacing the reified omniscient being with yourself. You just have your personal God that you'll likely impose on others.


[email protected] 18, 2007 10:07 pm
Don't ask questions, just do your duty. Thats Kant.

This one pretty much speaks for itself...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:


There's no ethical quality to reason and logic

We have already seen that this is so far from the truth, it's in the next galaxy:

http://www.revleft.com/index.php?showtopic=70414

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by [email protected] 23, 2007 08:17 am
There's no ethical quality to reason and logic;
Which doesn't mean there isn't a logic quality to ethics.

Which is what Kant is about.

Luís Henrique

[Volderbeek]

Originally posted by Rosa Lichtenstein+December 23, 2007 11:14 am--> (Rosa Lichtenstein @ December 23, 2007 11:14 am)
There's no ethical quality to reason and logic

We have already seen that this is so far from the truth, it's in the next galaxy:

http://www.revleft.com/index.php?showtopic=70414[/b]
Hm, that topic looks strangely familiar...


That Other Topic
But, it is very easy to derive an ought from an is; logicians have been doing it for years.

Here is a one premiss argument that does just that:

Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

There are countless other argunments like this, and better.

This is quite clearly a hypothetical imperative. Lubricating engines is the means to an end (cars running well). As a hypothetical, it requires subjective preference to be added before it can be an ethic. I have no problem with that. In fact, that's exactly my point against Kant; he suggests slipping that choice through the back door and then calling a given act an end-in-itself.

And before you crucify Hume, perhaps you should consider what he was actually saying. This is from Wikipedia:


Others interpret Hume as saying not that one cannot go from a factual statement to an ethical statement, but that one cannot do so without going through human nature, that is, without paying attention to human sentiments.

[Volderbeek]

Originally posted by Luís Henrique+December 23, 2007 11:35 am--> (Luís Henrique @ December 23, 2007 11:35 am)
[email protected] 23, 2007 08:17 am
There's no ethical quality to reason and logic;
Which doesn't mean there isn't a logic quality to ethics.

Which is what Kant is about.[/b]
That's not all Kant is about. It would be a triviality to simply tell us not to be hypocrites. Kant claims that an act is an end-in-itself and the consequences are morally neutral. According to him, it would be your "perfect duty" to tell a serial rapist where to find your family, but only your "imperfect duty" to inform the police or stop him yourself. What kind of morality is that.

[Volderbeek]

Originally posted by Luís [email protected] 18, 2007 08:02 pm
The problem is that there is not a Marxist ethic, so most Marxist end up with a semi-Kantian absolutist ethic, or, worse, rehash some kind of utilitarianism.
And what, mind you, is wrong with utilitarianism?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V (quoting Wiki):


Others interpret Hume as saying not that one cannot go from a factual statement to an ethical statement, but that one cannot do so without going through human nature, that is, without paying attention to human sentiments.

Which view would reduce Hume to banality, for one might as well say that no one can make a choice without someone there to make it.

[Luís Henrique]

Originally posted by [email protected] 24, 2007 08:43 pm
And what, mind you, is wrong with utilitarianism?
Everything?

It is the subjacent philosophy under the utility theory of value, and I don't think it is compatible with labour theory of value.

It doesn't take into account the multidimensional nature of human beings, and reduce them to rational maximisers.

And, on top, it is completely unpractical.

See the contrast:

A man is about to be smashed by a car. He can only be saved if someone pushes him violently out of the car's trajectory.

Kantian actor:


If I was in the man's situation, I would like that someone push me out of harm's way. So I believe that pushing men in danger is something that I could wish everyone would do; ergo, I am going to push this man so that he doesn't get trampled.
Utilitarian actor:


Well, I need to understand whether a greater good will come out of this man being saved, or trampled. As I know nothing about this man, how can I know it would be a good thing to save him? Perhaps he is a mass murderer, or a serial killer, or a Tottenham Hotspurs fan. Besides, even if I knew everything about this man, I would still not be able to know anything about his future. Perhaps he is not a mass murderer yet, but how can I be sure that he won't become one in the future? Or perhaps his son will be? Besides, there probably are unintended consequences of actions, or lack thereof. For instance, by pushing this man, I might make his wallet fall from his pocket, and some heroin addict bum could find the wallet, and...
* shlosh * car tramples man

Utilitarian actor:


Oh well, I guess this was for greater good after all.

No one can actually behave as an utilitarian; our actions have other motivations than such silly bookkeeper ethics.

Luís Henrique

[Volderbeek]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 25, 2007 04:33 am
V (quoting Wiki):


Others interpret Hume as saying not that one cannot go from a factual statement to an ethical statement, but that one cannot do so without going through human nature, that is, without paying attention to human sentiments.

Which view would reduce Hume to banality, for one might as well say that no one can make a choice without someone there to make it.
It's not quite a banality with objectivists claiming they can do just that.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:


It's not quite a banality with objectivists claiming they can do just that.

Eh? :blink:

[Volderbeek]

And what, mind you, is wrong with utilitarianism?
Everything?

You tell me... :D


It is the subjacent philosophy under the utility theory of value, and I don't think it is compatible with labour theory of value.

How so? I've always thought Marx accounted for utility with "use value" and "exchange value".


It doesn't take into account the multidimensional nature of human beings, and reduce them to rational maximisers.

The only dimension we're talking about here is moral decision-making. And Kant stresses the need for "rational" morals more than utilitarians do.


And, on top, it is completely unpractical.

See the contrast:

A man is about to be smashed by a car. He can only be saved if someone pushes him violently out of the car's trajectory.

Kantian actor:


If I was in the man's situation, I would like that someone push me out of harm's way. So I believe that pushing men in danger is something that I could wish everyone would do; ergo, I am going to push this man so that he doesn't get trampled.Utilitarian actor:


Well, I need to understand whether a greater good will come out of this man being saved, or trampled. As I know nothing about this man, how can I know it would be a good thing to save him? Perhaps he is a mass murderer, or a serial killer, or a Tottenham Hotspurs fan. Besides, even if I knew everything about this man, I would still not be able to know anything about his future. Perhaps he is not a mass murderer yet, but how can I be sure that he won't become one in the future? Or perhaps his son will be? Besides, there probably are unintended consequences of actions, or lack thereof. For instance, by pushing this man, I might make his wallet fall from his pocket, and some heroin addict bum could find the wallet, and...* shlosh * car tramples man

Utilitarian actor:


Oh well, I guess this was for greater good after all.

This is an...um...interestingly constructed argument. I'm not sure why you assume the utilitarian needs perfect knowledge (including precognition apparently). He just makes a judgment based on his knowledge of the situation.

It would seem to me that the Kantian actor would think in terms of actions rather than situations (consequences are neutral remember). And because he has perfect duty to not do something wrong (push the guy) and only imperfect duty to do something right (save his life), he would actually be compelled to not do anything.


No one can actually behave as an utilitarian; our actions have other motivations than such silly bookkeeper ethics.

Are you referring to Hume's "hedons"? Well, I can't argue that isn't silly. :D

As to how no one can act utilitarian, I would argue that we can't not act that way.

[Volderbeek]

Eh? :blink:

This also comes from Wikipedia:


Moral objectivism or moderate moral realism is the position that certain acts are objectively right or wrong, independent of human opinion.[Haha, board software's screwing up old posts]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

V:



This also comes from Wikipedia:



So? What relevance has this got?

[Luís Henrique]

How so? I've always thought Marx accounted for utility with "use value" and "exchange value".

Yes, and as you probably remember, he says that "use value" is either 0 or 1... so he didn't seem to believe that utility can be quantified in the manner utilitarians believe.

Exchange value has nothing to do with utility; it is measurable because it corresponds to labour time embodied into commodities.


The only dimension we're talking about here is moral decision-making. And Kant stresses the need for "rational" morals more than utilitarians do.

Sure - but "rational" is completely different from "rational maximiser". I am not arguing for an irrationalist ethics; I am arguing against an ethics based in the impossible mathematisation of "utility". I am arguing against an essentially consequentialist ethics.


This is an...um...interestingly constructed argument. I'm not sure why you assume the utilitarian needs perfect knowledge (including precognition apparently). He just makes a judgment based on his knowledge of the situation.

This would destroy the kernel of utilitarian ethics. If we cannot predict the consequences of our acts, it becomes impossible to decide which actions are the most desirable in terms of bringing most happiness to the greatest number of people. So, yes, I would argue that an utilitarian needs perfect knowledge, including, and foremostly, precognition.


It would seem to me that the Kantian actor would think in terms of actions rather than situations (consequences are neutral remember). And because he has perfect duty to not do something wrong (push the guy) and only imperfect duty to do something right (save his life), he would actually be compelled to not do anything.

I don't think Kantian ethics works like that. According to Kant, you should behave in a way you believe all people should. Evidently he had his opinions on what we should think all people should do, but I hardly think they are mandatory. After all, it's what you think could and should become general behaviour that counts. In this individuals certainly differ.

I would say that in this particular case, since we would like to be saved in such situations, we have a moral obligation to save people in them.


Are you referring to Hume's "hedons"? Well, I can't argue that isn't silly. :D

Nope, I was more referring to "utiles" which are, if I correctly recall, a contribution from Bastiat. But certainly, the idea of units of "utility" is unsupportable; utility is completely subjective (and this is another problem with utilitarianism. It is obvious that the petty happiness you all enjoy from being alive cannot compare with the immense joy I would derive from killing you all, so an utilitarian cannot rationally deny me the right to kill everybody...)


As to how no one can act utilitarian, I would argue that we can't not act that way.

I've never seen anyone behave in an utilitarian way. People do what they think they should do; if they aren't moral monsters, they try to stay consistent with themselves, not with an abstract calculus about universal happiness. If their actions have bad consequences, they suffer, but they stand in their conviction that they acted with noble intentions, and in the fact that they could not predict the consequences of their actions. Evidently, there are people who are moral monsters, but this is another subject (and curiously enough, it is common to moral monsters to justify themselves through consequentialist arguments - for instance, Nachaev).

Luís Henrique

[Volderbeek]

Yes, and as you probably remember, he says that "use value" is either 0 or 1... so he didn't seem to believe that utility can be quantified in the manner utilitarians believe.

Exchange value has nothing to do with utility; it is measurable because it corresponds to labour time embodied into commodities.

So...0 and 1 aren't quantities? I've always thought that utility was one of Marx's control variables.


Sure - but "rational" is completely different from "rational maximiser". I am not arguing for an irrationalist ethics; I am arguing against an ethics based in the impossible mathematisation of "utility". I am arguing against an essentially consequentialist ethics.The way I see it, consequentialist ethics are the only authentic ones seeing as only they have an objective basis.


This would destroy the kernel of utilitarian ethics. If we cannot predict the consequences of our acts, it becomes impossible to decide which actions are the most desirable in terms of bringing most happiness to the greatest number of people. So, yes, I would argue that an utilitarian needs perfect knowledge, including, and foremostly, precognition.Maximizing utility is just that - a maximum; it doesn't have to be taken to some abstract infinite goodness. And if you can't at least guess the consequences of an action, it's impossible to determine its moral quality.


I don't think Kantian ethics works like that. According to Kant, you should behave in a way you believe all people should. Evidently he had his opinions on what we should think all people should do, but I hardly think they are mandatory. After all, it's what you think could and should become general behaviour that counts. In this individuals certainly differ.

I would say that in this particular case, since we would like to be saved in such situations, we have a moral obligation to save people in them.If the Kantian is allowed to think in terms of situations rather than acts, though, than he is sneaking in a utilitarian judgment. Would he also figure that he would want to be shoved all the time? The end of having his life saved justifies the means of getting shoved.


Nope, I was more referring to "utiles" which are, if I correctly recall, a contribution from Bastiat. But certainly, the idea of units of "utility" is unsupportable; utility is completely subjective (and this is another problem with utilitarianism. It is obvious that the petty happiness you all enjoy from being alive cannot compare with the immense joy I would derive from killing you all, so an utilitarian cannot rationally deny me the right to kill everybody...)It is completely subjective, but so is any system of ethics (unless they're given to us by God or someone similar). As such, you couldn't make that judgment of the quality of happiness other people possess. Also, it's the maximum utility for the maximum amount of people.


I've never seen anyone behave in an utilitarian way. People do what they think they should do; if they aren't moral monsters, they try to stay consistent with themselves, not with an abstract calculus about universal happiness. If their actions have bad consequences, they suffer, but they stand in their conviction that they acted with noble intentions, and in the fact that they could not predict the consequences of their actions. Evidently, there are people who are moral monsters, but this is another subject (and curiously enough, it is common to moral monsters to justify themselves through consequentialist arguments - for instance, Nachaev).You don't think people behave in ways that they think will bring the most utility to themselves and as many others as possible? It's highly unfortunate that so many still do what they perceive as their duty, even with horrible consequences for so many.