Log in

View Full Version : CPUSA on Mao



jacobin1949
30th November 2007, 22:44
Book Review: Mao: The Unknown Story

By Norman Markowitz


click here for related stories: China
4-06-06, 8:48 am

Mao: The Unknown Story

Jung Chang and Jon Halliday
New York, Alfred Knopf, 2005.


As someone who studied Chinese history as a minor field as a graduate student at the University of Michigan four decades ago, I must confess that Mao: The Untold Story is literally one of the worst books that I‘ve ever read in Chinese or any other history. It beats even Lenin and World Revolution, a work by a likeable professor at City College, Stanley W. Page, which was an embarrassment to even the most ardent Kremlinologist because it portrayed Lenin as a corrupt individual who advanced the revolution to gain not only power but wealth for himself.

Mao: The Unknown Story would have been greeted with either outrage or laughter by virtually all, non-McCarthyite historians and political scientists in the 1960s, including those who were rumored to be on the CIA payroll. It "interpretations" would have been seen as similar to those advanced by Karl Wittfogel and other embittered right-wing scholars who testified in the 1950s before red-baiting congressional committees to attack their liberal colleagues, who were being purged from the State Department, the Foreign Service and, ironically, the less distinguished universities.

What is remarkable, though, is the respectful reviews that such a work has received in the press in Britain and the US. Why this is true is a much more interesting question than the book itself, which simply asserts everything negative about Mao politically and personally, portraying him as a craven Soviet stooge for more than three decades while it uses every anti-Mao comment from Soviet sources to condemn him further

From its first sentence, which accuses Mao of murdering 70 million people, to its portrayal of the Chinese Communist party as the creation and subversive instrument of the Soviet Union from its inception to the successful revolution of 1949, to its characterization of Mao as a surrogate Stalin (even though Stalin in the end appears relatively positive by comparison) who comes to power in the CCP through ruthless purges, and acts as a miserable coward during the Long March, subverting a Chinese "modernization" which was advancing only to be hijacked by Communists, making it "impossible" for the US to recognize China because he wanted to curry favor with Joseph Stalin to build China’s military power, and then continuing on his monstrous path.

Consistent and monumental distortions and omissions like this are difficult to answer directly. First, let’s look briefly at the omissions. Mao’s intellectual development, the significance of the Hunan Report of 1926, dealing with the peasantry as a revolutionary force; the April Shanghai massacre of 1927 in which tens of thousands of Communists and others were murdered; Mao’s differences on strategy with other CCP leaders and particularly with the Comintern; the support that the imperialist powers gave to Chiang’s open dictatorship after the Shanghai massacre; the Chinese Communist party’s leading role in the resistance to Japanese colonial imperialism and the CCP’s growing strength during WWII(a war in which more than 10 million Chinese perished); all of which were acknowledged by anti-Communist scholars when I was in school, however unhappy they were with the CCP’s eventual victory, simply doesn’t exist here.

Also, the more than three billion dollars the Truman administration gave to Chiang’s military forces (material Soviet aid to the CCP was very negligible compared to this), the role of a rapidly developing McCarthyism which led to well documented purges in the State Department and the foreign service, doesn’t exist here either.


If you start with the premise, that Mao is the New Stalin, not so much the Red Pope of legions of underground Jesuitical Communists, the way Stalin was portrayed but a corrupt Red Buddha forcing "right conduct" on the masses while he himself lived a totally dissolute life, then all of Chinese history, even the less extreme anti-Communist interpretations, lose all meaning.
Why deal with Mao’s thought, his important tactical adaptations of Marxism-Leninism to the desperate conditions that the Chinese people faced, if everything is known and the story told from the first line to the last? Why deal with Mao’s complicated and serious differences with the Comintern and the Soviet leadership, which serious scholars, and for that matter, intelligence analysts have documented for more than half a century, because that is merely a trick. Instead, read and cite Mao the way HUAC would read and cite Karl Marx, as a police agent investigating criminals with the statements of informers, and leave it at that.

This "biography," even with its extensive documentation, is no more a serious work than a documentary on the life of Fidel Castro on Fox News would or could be. As historians know, scholarship is about framework and selection, informed decisions, as to how sources are analyzed. This work’s use of sources is self-serving in the extreme choosing to omit any discussion of Mao’s positive contributions to the Chinese revolution or the really positive achievements of the Chinese revolution rather than answering them in any informed way.

China, the largest nation in the world in terms of population, was, as I sometimes tell my classes, until the revolution a more terrorized and oppressed version of my old neighborhood in the South Bronx—a vast slum where criminals ran wild and landlords oppressed the people who desperately wanted to fight back, defend themselves, but didn’t know how, enslaved by tradition and their own fears and divisions.

Except, the Chinese, unlike the poor people in my neighborhood, couldn’t move out of China to some better neighborhood before the poverty and drugs and crime destroyed them. They also faced a foreign enemy, the Japanese imperialists, who sought to compound their misery by turning them into a colony of semi-slaves.

The Chinese Communist Party gave the Chinese people a way to fight back, to liberate themselves from their internal reactionary oppressors, murderous Japanese imperialists, and the great imperialist powers that sought since the 1920s to defeat their revolution. Mao, by adapting Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions, made an enormous contribution to the Chinese revolution and to the liberation struggles of oppressed peoples in the colonial regions and poor countries of the world.

Mao also made horrible errors and disastrous choices in the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, veering away from Marxist materialism into an idealist fog in which he believed that industry could be created in a decentralized rural environment and the country developed by adherence to ideology. This and the personality cult he and his supporters created around him did great damage to the development of the Chinese revolution. But that is the stuff of serious history, and that is not what Mao: The Unknown Story is. At best, it is the flip side of the personality cult, with the equivalent of anti-Red Guard Young Republicans waving the Wall Street Journal and shouting, "Down with Mao and Chinese Communism."

But I have been begging the question. Why the positive response. The co-author, Jung Chang, is the author of a respected work, Wild Swans, telling Pearl Buck style, the story of China through generations of a family. Jon Halliday an English writer, as the co-editor of a work called The Psychology of Gambling and other less known non-scholarly works

Perhaps this tells us more about ourselves today than about China. In the 1950s and 1960s, the enormous social achievements of the Chinese Revolution were very hard to deny, and those who saw China the way Mao: The Untold Story does, were seen for what they were – McCarthyites who purged the State Department, attacking even moderate liberal scholars and writers, running interference for General Macarthur’s advocacy of expanding the Korean war into China and in effect launching WWIII in Asia. McCarthy himself had said of the leading China scholar and State Department advisor, Owen Lattimore, if you asked any American school child who the number one Soviet agent in the US government, he would say Owen Lattimore.

That you could count the number of school children who had even heard of Owen Lattimore on the fingers of two hands was lost in the hysteria of 1950. But why should similar comments about Mao and the CCP be unanswered in liberal circles today when they were protested in such circles half a century ago?

Today the Soviet Union is no more and China is an enormous mixed economy exporting huge quantities of consumer goods to the rich countries. "Post cold war liberals" today are ready to believe the worst about China, from "slave labor" to "unfair trade practices" just as "cold war liberals" were ready to believe the worst about the Soviet Union half a century ago. That may explain the generally positive reviews the work has received in progressive publications like the Manchester Guardian and the Independent in Britain and the far less progressive New York Times in the United States.

In the late 1930s, Chiang K’ai-shek, China’s rightist dictator, reportedly responded to popular criticism that he was failing to fight the Japanese by saying "the Japanese are a disease of the skin. The Communists are a disease of the heart." For Jon Halliday and Jung Chang, the modern history of the Chinese people, all the tragedies and suffering in the collapsing feudal system and the mass murder of Japanese imperialism, are diseases of the skin. Mao, the Chinese Communist Party, the Peoples Liberation army, and the Chinese Revolution are diseases of the heart. For that reason they have written a crude work to cut the heart out.

It is said that this work is suppressed in China. This is bad and in the long run helps to give the work credibility. I think it should be read there and widely discussed. Its distortions are so transparent that Chinese scholars and journalists could easily pick them apart. Also, Chinese people, even those with strong criticisms of the CCP, would I believe see this work as an attack on them and their achievements as much as it is an attack on Mao.

http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/3134/1/160/

jacobin1949
30th November 2007, 22:49
The Leninist Heritage of the Socialist Market Economy

By C.J. Atkins


click here for related stories: China
9-05-07, 9:13 am

Just as China's socialist market economy is today dismissed by many in academia and the bourgeois press as a return to capitalism, it is important to recall that Lenin too faced similar criticism during the early years of Soviet power. His New Economic Policy (NEP) was often characterized by critics, both outside and inside the Communist movement, as an abandonment of socialism and Marxist ideology. While the conditions which necessitated the NEP in 1920's Soviet Russia and those which brought about the need for economic reform in China following the chaos of the Cultural Revolution were quite different, the ideological challenges the Russian Communist Party faced in the aftermath of the civil war and those that Chinese Communists were forced to address in the late 1970s do share some similarities.
Additional Coverage:
Radio episode #32: PA contributing editor Erwin Marquit discusses China

Lenin understood there could be no successful advance to socialist relations of production without a highly-developed set of productive forces to sustain socialist methods of distribution. Addressing the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in March of 1921, referring to the necessity of cooperation with foreign and domestic capitalist elements, Lenin stated:

We are now in a transitional stage, and our revolution is surrounded by capitalist countries. As long as we are in this phase, we are forced to seek highly complex forms of relationships. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 189)




A component of these "highly complex forms of relationships," of course, was the institution of the market mechanism in first the agricultural and later other sectors of the economy. In further remarks to the Congress, Lenin assured delegates that the gravest problem in the immediate period was not the policy of concessions to capitalism as some, particularly those on the left, warned. Rather, it was the very low level of the productive forces that threatened the survival of the October Revolution.

We must not be afraid of the growth of the petty bourgeoisie and small capital. What we must fear is protracted starvation, want and food shortage, which create the danger that the proletariat will give way to petty-bourgeois vacillation and despair. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 237-8)



Many of Lenin's writings from the early 1920s demonstrate the conclusion that in a predominantly peasant country with low levels of productive forces and education there could be no leap to socialist or communist lines of production and distribution. Instead, the transition would have to take place in stages. These kinds of measures were intended to build up the material-technical foundations for socialism that Marx and Engels had envisioned being already developed by capitalism in advanced industrial societies, where they had predicted the first socialist revolutions would take place. The proletarian revolution was expected to occur in the most technologically and economically advanced capitalist countries because of the development of a large industrial working class and the acute contradictions of advanced capitalist development which would serve as a catalyst for rising class consciousness.

The socialist revolutions of poor, underdeveloped, and usually overwhelmingly agrarian countries created a new challenge; once the working class and its Marxist parties succeeded in capturing state power, they were confronted with the task of trying to develop socialism in economies that were in no way prepared to support socialist relations of distribution. Lenin himself was the first to face the real-life situation of creating a socialist system on an underdeveloped base. He proposed what has recently been described as a "socialist market economy in embryonic form." (Sargis, PA Jan. 2004, p. 33) Shortly after the victory of the October Revolution, Soviet Russia became embroiled in a civil war and came under attack by interventionist armies from fourteen nations, among them the United States, Britain, and Japan. Under these conditions, with food and industrial shortages plaguing the country, a harsh system of surplus extraction from the peasants was introduced and wages were leveled, the policy of "war communism." After the civil war was won by the Red Army and the foreign interventionists were pushed out of the country, the Soviet economy was in ruins. The productive capacity of the nation had dwindled; agriculture was below even pre-WWI levels. There was an urgent need to raise capital and jumpstart the development of the productive forces.

In 1921, Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy to replace the extreme measures of war communism, "with which," in Lenin's words, the country "was saddled by the imperative conditions of wartime." (LCW, vol. 32, p. 187) The NEP allowed limited denationalization, foreign-domestic joint ventures, some foreign-owned enterprises, cooperatives running on market principles, and the use of economic administrators who had been trained in capitalist management methods. State-owned enterprises, which for the most part only constituted the commanding heights, had to be self-reliant and operated on profit/loss principles. The commanding heights referred to the lifeline sectors of the economy, such as energy, transport, finance/banking, and steel--those sectors that effectively control or support most other areas of the economy. Under the NEP, the state still formulated an overall plan for the economy, but it was achieved primarily through market, not administrative, means. Production of individual goods and services would be based on supply and demand, not on the decree of a central planning authority. Economic competition defined relations between public and private sectors. Of primary importance in this competition was which sector would win out. Addressing the Second Congress of Political Education Departments in the fall of 1921, Lenin stated the matter bluntly.

We must face this issue squarely—who will come out on top? Either the capitalists will succeed… Or the proletarian state power, with the support of the peasantry, will prove capable of keeping a proper reign on these gentlemen, the capitalists… The question must be put soberly. (LCW, vol. 33, p. 66)



Lenin admitted that such an arrangement was not fully socialist. "Retreat is a difficult matter, especially for revolutionaries who are accustomed to advance." (LCW, vol. 33, p. 280) He realized, however, that market relations were necessary until the capacity and infrastructure of a fully socialized economy could be constructed and secured. This was a task which he foresaw as encompassing years, even decades of transition. Lenin spent much time trying to explain what the New Economic Policy was and why it was an absolute necessity.


What is free exchange? It is unrestricted trade, and that means turning back towards capitalism… How then can the Communist Party recognize freedom to trade and accept it? Does not the proposition contain irreconcilable contradictions? The answer is that the practical solution of the problem naturally presents exceedingly great difficulties… How this is to be done, practice will show. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 218)

Since the state cannot provide the peasant with goods from socialist factories in exchange for all his surplus, freedom to trade with this surplus necessarily means freedom for the development of capitalism. Within the limits indicated, however, this is not at all dangerous for socialism as long as transport and large-scale industry remain in the hands of the proletariat. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 457)



The development of such a form of capitalism controlled and regulated by the state, which Lenin time and again referred to as state capitalism, if directed carefully by a socialist state, would be not only advantageous, but even necessary, in an underdeveloped country.

Like Soviet Russia in the years following the October Revolution, China today also finds itself facing a world economy dominated by and structured in the interests of the most powerful capitalist economies. Just as Lenin did in the 1920s, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has, since 1978, reached the conclusion that the liberation and development of the productive forces is the key to building the foundations for a transition to socialism. This idea was stressed throughout the first years of the reform period. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that,


"The fundamental task for the socialist stage is to develop the productive forces. The superiority of the socialist system is demonstrated, in the final analysis, by faster and greater development of those forces than under the capitalist system." (Selected Works, vol. 3, p. 73)



The rapid development of China over the past three decades has demonstrated the correctness of the CPC's overall approach, though of course there are contradictions which remain to be overcome. Like Lenin, the CPC estimates that the socialist market economy is a formation which will cover decades of development. The CPC Constitution states that China is in the "primary stage of socialism" and will remain so for a long period of time as it modernizes, even over "a hundred years." (2002, 78-9)

For the socialist market economy to truly be a means of navigating the transition to socialism (whether in China, Vietnam, or anywhere else), there must be a workers' state led by a proletarian party to promote a trajectory toward socialism. This has been recognized as a necessity since the days of Lenin's NEP. In his pamphlet, The Tax in Kind, Lenin stated without reservation that "…socialism is inconceivable unless the proletariat is the ruler of the state." (LCW, vol. 32, p. 334) There is always the danger in a socialist economy which contains elements of both the plan and the market that capitalist thinking could threaten socialist development and ideology. As referenced above, Lenin warned his fellow Bolsheviks of such a possibility. The main function of the state in a socialist market economy is to maintain a path directed toward socialism and uphold the dominance of the working class.


The socialist market economy, however, should not be viewed as the end result of socialist development; as Lenin said, mixed economic forms are transitional. Though the economic model of socialism based on the centralized plan and total public ownership of all sectors may have been instituted prematurely in the past, advances in technology and computer accounting makes an efficient central plan a greater possibility for the future (assuming the productive forces are in place to support it). It is difficult to predict what the exact characteristics and details of socialist economies may be in the future, though public ownership, working class power, and planned development figure highly in any projection. However, under current conditions, there is no reason to conclude that the socialist market economy is necessarily a departure from the socialist path. Changing conditions necessitate new strategies for development.

REFERENCE LIST

Communist Party of China. 2002. Constitution of the Communist Party of China. In Documents of the 16th National Congress of the CPC, 76-114. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
Deng Xiaoping. 1994. Building a Socialism with a Specifically Chinese Character. In vol. 3 of Selected Works, 72-5. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
Lenin, Vladimir I. 1977a. Report on the Political Work of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.). In vol. 32 of Collected Works, 170-91. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
------. 1977b. Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Appropriation System. In vol. 32 of Collected Works, 214-38. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
------. 1977c. The Tax in Kind. In vol. 32 of Collected Works. 329-65.
------. 1977d. Theses for a Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P. In vol. 32 of Collected Works, 453-61.
------. 1980a. The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments. In vol. 33 of Collected Works, 60-79. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
------. 1980b. Political Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.) In vol 33 of Collected Works, 263-309. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Sargis, Al L. 2004. Unfinished Business: Socialist Market Economy. Political Affairs, January, 32-34.

Marxist Napoleon
1st December 2007, 16:58
The NEP was a short-term solution that had to be enacted, because of the pressure from the Civil War. China is way past the point where they would need NEP-style reforms. Major industrialization in the Soviet Union took place in the context of a planned economy, and the First Five Year Plan in China was hugely successful. I agree that the Chinese must build productive forces now, but more focus has to be placed on the planned workers' economy. Only 1/3 of the GDP is from state-owned enterprises. This is completely unacceptable. It should be the other way around. A CPUSA article recently referred to how Belarus, a capitalist former-SU nation, still has 80% of the economy owned by the public sector. If capitalist Belarus can do this, why can't "socialist China"?