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RedStarOverChina
30th November 2007, 22:17
OK, this is a hastily written critique for my university assignment.

This might help some of you who are interested in the Chinese economy. Took me 5 hours to research and write, so I hope it's worth a read. ;)


Nowadays, few people doubt the prominence of the Chinese economy in the international economy. Still, the consequences of China’s rise to economic prominence are still in debate. Most economists argue that in purely economic terms, China’s role in the world is overall positive—some leading economists even claim that China prevented a global recession in 2001. But the human cost of China’s economic rise not only in China, but around the world, has been largely ignored by economists overjoyed to see the enormous profit and economic stability created as a result of China’s rise. In this essay I will assess the structure of the Chinese economy and argue that the rapid development in China’s overall economy, much like any other Asian economic success, is built almost entirely upon the sufferings of the working class. More so than other Asian economies, Chinese capitalism has profound negative consequences on the welfare of the working class across the globe. In fact, I will argue that Chinese capitalism and the economy that sprouted as an result, functions to provide cheap goods for consumers and profit for foreign-based multinationals—but not necessarily for the wellbeing of the Chinese working class.

In the late 1970s, China’s leader Deng Xiaoping introduces economic reforms aimed at achieving a market economy—which was dubbed “Socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics”. It did not turn out very “socialist” but it did seem to have some “Chinese characteristics” in it. For example, as the Chinese are traditionally weary of foreign dominance, foreign investors are forced by the government to co-operate with or invest in Chinese companies if they wish to enter the Chinese market—Which to a limited extent, restricts them from taking all the profit in China’s domestic market, at the same time giving a boost to local industries.

But far more importantly in terms of development, Chinese capitalism took the statist, export-based approach as successfully implemented in other Asian countries such as South Korea. As was the case in Korea, the government retained much control over the economy while opening up to foreign investment. The result was a massive concentration of foreign capital in the years that followed. Foreign investment fueled economic development, which is evident in the fact that today 45% of China’s exports are produced by firms with foreign investment. Dramatic economic development has largely been a stabilizing factor in China’s overall society. National pride in China has been strong due to the rapid development. More importantly, people are hopeful regarding their future; as they see changes happening around them every day.

However, economic growth ever since the 80s has been “largely driven by external demand and external supply of finances and resources aimed at meeting that eternal demand.” (Breslin, Shaun, 2007: 191) In other words, the interests of the Chinese workers are not prioritized in this relationship, to say the least. Furthermore, China’s economic boom is largely fueled by export to the developed world (namely Japan, EU and the US). Therefore, if favorable trade terms with these actors are no longer in place, Chinese economy will suffer severely, as did the Japanese economy is late 1980s when the US sought to narrow its trade deficit with Japan. Increasingly, US and the EU are pressuring China to increase the value of its currency, in order to reduce the trade surplus it has with them. Failure to revalue its currency would risk China’s trade relations with the West—which is by no means desirable from China’s point-of-view. However, raising the value of renminbi (China’s currency) might result in as much disturbance to the Chinese economy, and I will explore that possibility later on.

Today, China’s overall economy remains heavily dominated by foreign capital—both financial and intellectual capital. Despite the powerful image the robust Chinese economy projects, it is much more volatile than the economies of developed countries, due to its heavy reliance on export to foreign countries. At the same time, it is foreign capital that makes much of the export industry possible: Foreign-based transnational corporations “control virtually all the intellectual property in China and account for 85% of its technology exports” (Economist, 2005, 61).

Therefore, it is not surprising that foreign companies take the greater part of the profit of goods manufactured in China. Take Apple’s mostly Chinese-manufactured iPod, for example. Even though Chinese workers are forced to work an extra 80 hours per month to produce the gadget, Apple and the retail stores are entitled to most of the profit, leaving little for Chinese factories and their workers; according to a recent study (Linden, Greg, Kenneth L. Kraemer and Jason Dedrick, 2007). The retail price of a 30GB iPod in the US is $299. Out of the $299, $155 is profit made by Apple and the retailers. $93 dollars are used to purchase the hard drive and the display from Japan. Take away other costs such as material and transportation; Chinese factories only get a few dollars out of it, at most.

Naturally, some would consider Chinese capitalism a form of ruthless exploitation—or an onslaught, of the Chinese workers by both Chinese and foreign capitalists, especially considering the tremendous suffering currently endured by the Chinese working class. Each year, hundreds die in China’s private-owned or illegal coal mines. In factories, working conditions are horrendous and wages are kept low, as the employers—both native and foreign, seek to minimize cost and maximize profit. In fact, in the province of Guangdong—the most productive province in China, the wage of assembly line workers in real terms has actually decreased as much as 30% in the past decade. (Gough, 2005) According to Business Week, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics concluded that 30 out of the 38 million urban manufacturing workers earn an average of $1.06 an hour. About 71 million suburban and rural manufacturing workers earn merely 45 cents per hour on average; whereas in Mexico, the number is at least $2.84 an hour. (Coy, 2004) Furthermore, “72.5 percent of China’s 100 million migrant workers were owed wages”, according to government survey. (Lee, 2004, 2) Consequently, the wealth gap between the rich and the poor continue to escalate; unrests across the China flare up.

Obviously, the wealth created by China’s economic boom has not been fairly distributed to the Chinese working class. But attempts to narrow the financial gap between the classes by increase the minimum wage is also not without consequences. In the case of wages increase for workers, capitalists, especially foreign-based multinationals would pull out immediately and move to elsewhere such as India, where the average wage is already lower than that of China. A radical increase in the value of Chinese currency would do the same. A higher wage or higher exchange rate would increase the cost for foreign companies, and they would not hesitate to pull out as fast as they came in, in favor of a more underdeveloped country to exploit; and there sure are many of those. As I have mentioned before, a pull-out of foreign investment due to any of the reasons mentioned above, would have great negative effects on the Chinese economy and bring the economic boom to a halt. In other words, a hike in worker’s wages would risk slowing down economic development. That, in turn, might destabilize China as it leaves masses of the already discontent poor with no other option than to demonstrate for their rights. We therefore come to the conclusion that the current form of Chinese capitalist system is both incapable and unwilling to increase the wages of its workers—the best thing decision makers in Beijing could wish for is to maintain the status quo and keep wages low.

That, from a Chinese working class perspective, is of course not very desirable. They are already expressing that feeling through the increasingly violent protests, strikes and demonstrations. Furthermore, these expressions of anger seem to be part of a growing trend. According to one Washington Post article, the Chinese working class is getting increasingly militant as workers shed their traditional fear of authority. The article cites a violent strike in a Taiwanese-owned shoe factory, Stella International Ltd., in which workers “sacked company facilities and severely injured a Stella executive”. (Cody, 2004) These are clear challenges to Chinese capitalism that it has not been able to resolve despite prevailing nationalist sentiments.

The threat Chinese capitalism poses not only to Chinese workers, but to the workers around the world—especially other Asian workers, are also evident. As factories one by one move to China, workers in countries such as South Korea, Philippines and Malaysia are feeling the pressure. Employers in those countries can black mail the workers, threatening to ship their jobs to China unless they show more enthusiasm in being exploited. Asian workers are being “pitted against each other in a contest to match the level of labor exploitation achieved in China, with disastrous consequences for all”. (Hart-Lansberg, Martin, Paul Burkett 2007: 128)

In conclusion, the Chinese model of economic development, i.e., statist, export orientated capitalism, is by no means desirable from a working class perspective. Globalization means that multinationals can and will easily slip away at the slightest sign of improvement of worker’s rights and wages. This effectively means that the workers’ conditions simply will not improve by much in the foreseeable future, since the increasing multinational corporations will adventure to every corner of the world to fulfill their homeland consumer demand and of course, their own pockets. The global economic order is one designed to achieve exactly that with utter disregard for those who produce. For most workers, the only way out of this nightmare in epic proportions is to organize themselves into an effective resistance movement and force the government to change its entire economic platform into a more humane, and lasting method of development.









Bibliography


Breslin, Shaun, China and the Global Political Economy. Paulgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Cody, Edward. (2004) “Workers in China Shed Passivity: Spate of Walkouts Shakes Factories”, Washington Post, 27, November.

Economist. (2005), “The Struggle of the Champions”, 6 January.

Gough, Neil. (2005), “Trouble on the Line”, Time Asia, 31 January.

Hart-Lansberg, Martin and Paul Burkett, “China and the Dynamics of Transnational Capital Accumulation,” in Marxist Perspectives on South Korea in the Global Economy. Ashgate Publishing, 2007.

Linden, Greg, Kenneth L. Kraemer and Jason Dedrick. “Who Captures Value in a Global Innovation System? The case of Apple's iPod” The Paul Merage School of
Business, June 2007

nom de guerre
30th November 2007, 22:44
I feel like a contribution to this discussion can be found within David Harvey's interview "On Neoliberalism" (http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/lilley190606.html), reposted below:


Originally posted by "On Neoliberalism"
SL: You write of the years 1979 to 1980 as a key moment for the ascendancy of neoliberalism, the Volcker shock that you spoke of earlier, the rise of Margaret Thatcher, take place during this time. Another event took place around those years, in 1978 in fact: the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping embarked on a path of economic liberalization that ultimately massively transformed the Chinese economy. You argue this event was connected in its own way to the rise of neoliberalism -- how so?

DH: I think what we have to look at here is a concordance of events. It's hard to see the reforms in China were triggered by events in Britain or events in the United States. Nevertheless, the liberalization in China set China off into a market-based kind of socialism, which then found a way to integrate into the global economy in ways that I think would not have been possible in the 1950s or 1960s. Because neoliberalization, in so far as it opens up the market, globally as well as within nations, in so far as it did that, it gave the Chinese an opportunity to suddenly venture into the global market in ways that could not easily be controlled from elsewhere. I think the reforms in China were initially meant to try to empower China in relationship to what was going on in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore. The Chinese were very aware of these developments and wanted to compete in some ways with those economies. Initially, I don't think the Chinese wanted to develop an export-led economy, but what their reforms led to was the opening up of industrial capacity in many parts of China, which then found themselves able to market their commodities on the world stage, because they had very cheap labor, very good technology, and a reasonably educated labor force. Suddenly the Chinese found themselves moving into this global economy, and, as they did so, they gained much more in terms of foreign direct investment, so suddenly China started getting involved in this neoliberalization process. Whether it was by accident or design, I don't really know, but it certainly has made a huge difference to how the global economy is working.

I think it's becoming increasingly obvious the future of the development of global capital lies in the East, with China, India, Iran, etc. It appears we have finally reached the immiseration of the working-class in the Western Hemisphere.

jacobin1949
30th November 2007, 22:50
The Leninist Heritage of the Socialist Market Economy

By C.J. Atkins


click here for related stories: China
9-05-07, 9:13 am

Just as China's socialist market economy is today dismissed by many in academia and the bourgeois press as a return to capitalism, it is important to recall that Lenin too faced similar criticism during the early years of Soviet power. His New Economic Policy (NEP) was often characterized by critics, both outside and inside the Communist movement, as an abandonment of socialism and Marxist ideology. While the conditions which necessitated the NEP in 1920's Soviet Russia and those which brought about the need for economic reform in China following the chaos of the Cultural Revolution were quite different, the ideological challenges the Russian Communist Party faced in the aftermath of the civil war and those that Chinese Communists were forced to address in the late 1970s do share some similarities.
Additional Coverage:
Radio episode #32: PA contributing editor Erwin Marquit discusses China

Lenin understood there could be no successful advance to socialist relations of production without a highly-developed set of productive forces to sustain socialist methods of distribution. Addressing the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in March of 1921, referring to the necessity of cooperation with foreign and domestic capitalist elements, Lenin stated:

We are now in a transitional stage, and our revolution is surrounded by capitalist countries. As long as we are in this phase, we are forced to seek highly complex forms of relationships. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 189)




A component of these "highly complex forms of relationships," of course, was the institution of the market mechanism in first the agricultural and later other sectors of the economy. In further remarks to the Congress, Lenin assured delegates that the gravest problem in the immediate period was not the policy of concessions to capitalism as some, particularly those on the left, warned. Rather, it was the very low level of the productive forces that threatened the survival of the October Revolution.

We must not be afraid of the growth of the petty bourgeoisie and small capital. What we must fear is protracted starvation, want and food shortage, which create the danger that the proletariat will give way to petty-bourgeois vacillation and despair. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 237-8)



Many of Lenin's writings from the early 1920s demonstrate the conclusion that in a predominantly peasant country with low levels of productive forces and education there could be no leap to socialist or communist lines of production and distribution. Instead, the transition would have to take place in stages. These kinds of measures were intended to build up the material-technical foundations for socialism that Marx and Engels had envisioned being already developed by capitalism in advanced industrial societies, where they had predicted the first socialist revolutions would take place. The proletarian revolution was expected to occur in the most technologically and economically advanced capitalist countries because of the development of a large industrial working class and the acute contradictions of advanced capitalist development which would serve as a catalyst for rising class consciousness.

The socialist revolutions of poor, underdeveloped, and usually overwhelmingly agrarian countries created a new challenge; once the working class and its Marxist parties succeeded in capturing state power, they were confronted with the task of trying to develop socialism in economies that were in no way prepared to support socialist relations of distribution. Lenin himself was the first to face the real-life situation of creating a socialist system on an underdeveloped base. He proposed what has recently been described as a "socialist market economy in embryonic form." (Sargis, PA Jan. 2004, p. 33) Shortly after the victory of the October Revolution, Soviet Russia became embroiled in a civil war and came under attack by interventionist armies from fourteen nations, among them the United States, Britain, and Japan. Under these conditions, with food and industrial shortages plaguing the country, a harsh system of surplus extraction from the peasants was introduced and wages were leveled, the policy of "war communism." After the civil war was won by the Red Army and the foreign interventionists were pushed out of the country, the Soviet economy was in ruins. The productive capacity of the nation had dwindled; agriculture was below even pre-WWI levels. There was an urgent need to raise capital and jumpstart the development of the productive forces.

In 1921, Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy to replace the extreme measures of war communism, "with which," in Lenin's words, the country "was saddled by the imperative conditions of wartime." (LCW, vol. 32, p. 187) The NEP allowed limited denationalization, foreign-domestic joint ventures, some foreign-owned enterprises, cooperatives running on market principles, and the use of economic administrators who had been trained in capitalist management methods. State-owned enterprises, which for the most part only constituted the commanding heights, had to be self-reliant and operated on profit/loss principles. The commanding heights referred to the lifeline sectors of the economy, such as energy, transport, finance/banking, and steel--those sectors that effectively control or support most other areas of the economy. Under the NEP, the state still formulated an overall plan for the economy, but it was achieved primarily through market, not administrative, means. Production of individual goods and services would be based on supply and demand, not on the decree of a central planning authority. Economic competition defined relations between public and private sectors. Of primary importance in this competition was which sector would win out. Addressing the Second Congress of Political Education Departments in the fall of 1921, Lenin stated the matter bluntly.

We must face this issue squarely—who will come out on top? Either the capitalists will succeed… Or the proletarian state power, with the support of the peasantry, will prove capable of keeping a proper reign on these gentlemen, the capitalists… The question must be put soberly. (LCW, vol. 33, p. 66)



Lenin admitted that such an arrangement was not fully socialist. "Retreat is a difficult matter, especially for revolutionaries who are accustomed to advance." (LCW, vol. 33, p. 280) He realized, however, that market relations were necessary until the capacity and infrastructure of a fully socialized economy could be constructed and secured. This was a task which he foresaw as encompassing years, even decades of transition. Lenin spent much time trying to explain what the New Economic Policy was and why it was an absolute necessity.


What is free exchange? It is unrestricted trade, and that means turning back towards capitalism… How then can the Communist Party recognize freedom to trade and accept it? Does not the proposition contain irreconcilable contradictions? The answer is that the practical solution of the problem naturally presents exceedingly great difficulties… How this is to be done, practice will show. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 218)

Since the state cannot provide the peasant with goods from socialist factories in exchange for all his surplus, freedom to trade with this surplus necessarily means freedom for the development of capitalism. Within the limits indicated, however, this is not at all dangerous for socialism as long as transport and large-scale industry remain in the hands of the proletariat. (LCW, vol. 32, p. 457)



The development of such a form of capitalism controlled and regulated by the state, which Lenin time and again referred to as state capitalism, if directed carefully by a socialist state, would be not only advantageous, but even necessary, in an underdeveloped country.

Like Soviet Russia in the years following the October Revolution, China today also finds itself facing a world economy dominated by and structured in the interests of the most powerful capitalist economies. Just as Lenin did in the 1920s, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has, since 1978, reached the conclusion that the liberation and development of the productive forces is the key to building the foundations for a transition to socialism. This idea was stressed throughout the first years of the reform period. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that,


"The fundamental task for the socialist stage is to develop the productive forces. The superiority of the socialist system is demonstrated, in the final analysis, by faster and greater development of those forces than under the capitalist system." (Selected Works, vol. 3, p. 73)



The rapid development of China over the past three decades has demonstrated the correctness of the CPC's overall approach, though of course there are contradictions which remain to be overcome. Like Lenin, the CPC estimates that the socialist market economy is a formation which will cover decades of development. The CPC Constitution states that China is in the "primary stage of socialism" and will remain so for a long period of time as it modernizes, even over "a hundred years." (2002, 78-9)

For the socialist market economy to truly be a means of navigating the transition to socialism (whether in China, Vietnam, or anywhere else), there must be a workers' state led by a proletarian party to promote a trajectory toward socialism. This has been recognized as a necessity since the days of Lenin's NEP. In his pamphlet, The Tax in Kind, Lenin stated without reservation that "…socialism is inconceivable unless the proletariat is the ruler of the state." (LCW, vol. 32, p. 334) There is always the danger in a socialist economy which contains elements of both the plan and the market that capitalist thinking could threaten socialist development and ideology. As referenced above, Lenin warned his fellow Bolsheviks of such a possibility. The main function of the state in a socialist market economy is to maintain a path directed toward socialism and uphold the dominance of the working class.


The socialist market economy, however, should not be viewed as the end result of socialist development; as Lenin said, mixed economic forms are transitional. Though the economic model of socialism based on the centralized plan and total public ownership of all sectors may have been instituted prematurely in the past, advances in technology and computer accounting makes an efficient central plan a greater possibility for the future (assuming the productive forces are in place to support it). It is difficult to predict what the exact characteristics and details of socialist economies may be in the future, though public ownership, working class power, and planned development figure highly in any projection. However, under current conditions, there is no reason to conclude that the socialist market economy is necessarily a departure from the socialist path. Changing conditions necessitate new strategies for development.

REFERENCE LIST

Communist Party of China. 2002. Constitution of the Communist Party of China. In Documents of the 16th National Congress of the CPC, 76-114. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
Deng Xiaoping. 1994. Building a Socialism with a Specifically Chinese Character. In vol. 3 of Selected Works, 72-5. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
Lenin, Vladimir I. 1977a. Report on the Political Work of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.). In vol. 32 of Collected Works, 170-91. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
------. 1977b. Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Appropriation System. In vol. 32 of Collected Works, 214-38. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
------. 1977c. The Tax in Kind. In vol. 32 of Collected Works. 329-65.
------. 1977d. Theses for a Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P. In vol. 32 of Collected Works, 453-61.
------. 1980a. The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments. In vol. 33 of Collected Works, 60-79. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
------. 1980b. Political Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.) In vol 33 of Collected Works, 263-309. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Sargis, Al L. 2004. Unfinished Business: Socialist Market Economy. Political Affairs, January, 32-34.

nom de guerre
30th November 2007, 23:04
Question for Jacobin: are you capable of contributing anything original to these forums, or do you simply get off on regurgitating CPUSA propaganda? Also - do you realize the irony of your name?

Dros
1st December 2007, 00:01
Originally posted by nom de [email protected] 30, 2007 11:03 pm
Question for Jacobin: are you capable of contributing anything original to these forums, or do you simply get off on regurgitating CPUSA propaganda? Also - do you realize the irony of your name?
Yeah. What's with all this reformist bullshit?

China = capitalist! Get over it.

RedStarOverChina
1st December 2007, 05:41
OK, let me get this straight: I give you statistics and analysis regarding the economic conditions and the workers conditions in China, and you throw a bunch of Lenin-quotes at me?

How does that help in assessing the situation China? Does Lenin even know who Deng Xiaoping is? Do you even care about the workers' perspective when calling China "socialist"? Does your brand of "socialism" have anything to do with the workers at all?

nom de guerre
1st December 2007, 07:47
Originally posted by [email protected] 01, 2007 05:40 am
OK, let me get this straight: I give you statistics and analysis regard the economic conditions and the workers conditions in China, and you throw a bunch of Lenin-quotes at me?
XD! And he assumes that Lenin's "holy writ" is justification from his ignorance! More Bolshevist bullshit.