Originally posted by Comrade Nadezhda+October 18, 2007 10:08 am--> (Comrade Nadezhda @ October 18, 2007 10:08 am) These five features of Imperialism are features of global capitalism. This statement can be justified on this basis:
1) international monopolist capitalist associations still exist today - ex. the world bank, IMF, etc. and have complete control of industry and capital across the globe [/b]
Don't forget OPEC and Russia's proposal for a gas equivalent. However, I think in the modern world, the "five features" need to be interpreted more structurally:
1) We're past #1 already, because there exists relative monopoly power (just like relative vs. absolute surplus value). Ironically, the "hourglass" business economy intensifies competition, because at the top you've got companies with multinational markets. Lenin also acknowledged the continued existence of smaller, niche firms.
Originally posted by
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The problem is made complex by the inadeuate development of the theory of imperialism in the first place. Bukharin's theory was wrong and Lenin's book, while much much better was only a 'conspectus', a still photograph of trends, a list of elements rather than an articulated theory, linking back to Marx's Kapital. I think its a great book, but lets not overstate its achievements.
Indeed. The sad thing in all this is that Lenin didn't make that crucial link between accumulation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_accumulation#New_developments_in_capital_a ccumulation) and monopoly power, even as he linked monopoly power with imperialism.
Thankfully, Polish economist Michal Kalecki made that link. (http://www.monthlyreview.org/0102jbf.htm)
The point is that, since we're past it, we should proceed to analyze how this monopoly power can manifest itself. Otherwise, we would need a long book detailing the structural development of capitalism from a historical perspective, from "original accumulation" to "normal" capital accumulation, concentration, and centralization to monopoly and finance capital (#1 and #2) to macroeconomic, corporate, and political imperialism (#3, #4, and #5).
2) The problem with #2 is that a de-merger has occurred between industrial capital and one particular subset of finance capital (at least to some extent). In his day, the industrial capital was tied to the nation-state. Today, the speculative subset of finance capital has broken free of the ties to industrial capital (well, maybe except venture capital, an increasingly prominent sub-subset of finance capital). (http://networksdialectics.blogspot.com/2006_06_01_archive.html)
The other subsets are financial-institution-based finance capital and corporate finance capital through "intercorporate investments" (significant influence, parent-subsidiary control, joint-venture control, etc.).
Speculative capital works in the same way as finance capital in general, pooling individual capitals under its control. The main difference is that classic finance capital is directed back into production -- loaned out to expand production. If that capital cannot find a place in production (again, because production opportunities are constrained by hyperproductive new technologies and exhausted markets), it is put to work in speculation.
Speculative capital is the culmination of the process of the formation of a general rate of profit, the overall system of capital that Marx talked about, where all capitalists partake in the exploitation of labor even if they do not directly produce use values.
Speculative capital permeates all sectors of the economy, as a kind of spirit (Hilferding referred to finance capital as the holy ghost of capitalism; speculative capital is the perfection of that permeation) in and behind and around production, connecting everything together. Because it profoundly affects raw material prices and interest rates, speculative capital affects the daily operations of production and transport. Through complex derivatives and other kinds of hedging, speculative capital dissolves boundaries between sectors in other ways connecting distant markets in the same commodities as well as markets in different commodities. The complexity of these financial interconnections is not feasible without computers and digital communication networks.
The article also had this to say regarding venture capital:
In a similar way, speculative capital, through hedge funds, is playing a more active role in private equity, that is financing start-up companies. See the 6/12/06 Business Week article, also the 4/5/06 WSJ article "Need Cash? Call a Hedge Fund". Speculative capital also provides sources of capital for venture funds, and ways for investors to speculate on new technologies.
What was implicit in his outline was the shift in the control of wealth (http://networksdialectics.blogspot.com/2006_06_01_archive.html) which increases something called leverage. He mentioned the "holding" system of parent companies, direct subsidiaries, indirect subsidiaries, and so forth. This holding system can be one of many connections between shifts in control of wealth and relative monopoly power (especially if the consolidated entity is by far the lead company in its markets). Then there's a relatively new aspect of this holding system: the joint venture.
3) Good on Lenin to emphasis capital movement over goods movement (which Luxemburg overemphasized), but again, the only viable example of this in his day was the export of capital. What about capital movement between developed countries, such that the US itself can be a net importer of capital?
On the other hand (http://www.revleft.com/index.php?showtopic=71967):
Me
I didn't know where to put this thread, to be honest. It's too momentary to put into the Theory forum or the Politics forum (one month's results does not make for an interesting discussion on a feature of imperialism), too politically unimportant to put into the News forum (for the immediate attention of working-class folks), and too macroeconomic to put into the Research forum.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20071016/wl_can...bAg2dgIEwOjbA8F (http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20071016/wl_canada_nm/canada_markets_canada_dollar_bonds_col;_ylt=Amn68U gp8CPkGbAg2dgIEwOjbA8F)
While the news pertains to the Canadian dollar, there was a sentence that caught my interest:
The currency hit a session high of 97.45 Canadian cents to the U.S. dollar, or US$1.0262, moments after the Bank of Canada issued a more dovish statement and said its key interest rate would remain steady at 4.50 percent, as expected.
But the rise was short-lived and credited solely to a weaker greenback after U.S. data showed a record net capital outflow in August.
Is this cyclical, or the beginning of something big for the US here (back to the classic days of "exports of capital" in relation to imperialism)?
4) This, IMO, isn't as important as #1 structurally. All this says is that the relative monopoly power has become international in scope. Using business-speak, #1 = hourglass business economy, #4 = globalized market share for the Big Boys. Besides, the World Bank, IMF, their emerging monetary alternatives (like in South America), OPEC, etc. don't have as much day-to-day impact as the multinationals.
5) Get out flames, people! As I discussed here (http://www.revleft.com/index.php?showtopic=65550&view=findpost&p=1292390972), in order to properly evaluate Lenin's theory of imperialism, one must refer to all his works, and not just the "popular outline." He, alas, started to overemphasize the fifth feature, and then proceeded to say just months later ("Imperialism & The Split in Socialism") that colonialism was a quintessential feature of imperialism, despite keeping a much more open mind in the "popular outline."
I'll ask one last question for discussion: where do monetary concerns (like currency regimes) and energy fit into the five features above, or do they now merit separate mentions as additional features? (http://theoldmole.blogspot.com/2006/02/structures-of-imperialism.html) [My guess is that the fifth feature really needs a lot more "fleshing out," because Lenin's later overemphasis on colonialism has given way to monetary and energy concerns, among others.]
Last remark: IF indeed the theory of imperialism is debunked, it is only because we have entered into the epoch of decadence (and this is where the left-communist theoretical contributions on this epoch come into play), which appropriates much (but not all) from macroeconomic (including monetary), corporate, and political imperialism, while retarding much of monopoly and finance capital amidst diminishing returns in the aggregate. (http://www.monthlyreview.org/nfte0104.htm)