[STUDY GROUP] On the Ten Major Relationships

[RNK]

Before I start, I'd like to request that all sectarianism be checked at the door. If you wish to discuss the merits of Mao's leadership, or ***** about his cult of personality or how he killed 80 trillion people or whatever, please do so by creating a thread in the discussion areas. This is a "study group" about one of Mao's writings; naturally, I'd hope that mostly those proclaiming MLM as their ideology would take part. If you'd like to come here to take part in constructive discussion, fine. If you come into this thread with the itch to try and debunk Mao, please don't bother. Now let's get on with it.

Link (http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/TMR56.html).

I'd like to discuss this theoretical text one section at a time. The sections are:
The Relationship Between Heavy Industry on the One Hand and Light Industry on the Other
The Relationship Between Industry in the Coastal Regions and Industry in the Interior
The Relationship Between Economic Construction and Defense Construction
The Relationship Between the State, the Units of Production and the Producers
The Relationship Between the Central and the Local Authorities
The Relationship Between the Han Nationality and the Minority Nationalities
The Relationship Between Party and Non-Party
The Relationship Between Revolution and Counter-
Revolution
The Relationship Between Right and Wrong
The Relationship Between China and Other Countries

I will begin with section I, The Relationship Between Heavy Industry on the One Hand and Light Industry on the Other. Text:


I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEAVY INDUSTRY
ON THE ONE HAND AND LIGHT INDUSTRY AND
AGRICULTURE ON THE OTHER
The emphasis in our country's construction is on heavy industry. The production of the means of production must be given priority, that's settled. But it definitely does not follow that the production of the means of subsistence, especially grain, can be neglected. Without enough food and other daily necessities, it would be impossible to provide for the workers in the first place, and then what sense would it make to talk about developing heavy industry? Therefore, the relationship between heavy industry on the one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other must be properly handled.

In dealing with this relationship we have not made mistakes of principle. We have done better than the Soviet Union and a number of East European countries. The prolonged failure of the Soviet Union to reach the highest pre-October Revolution level in grain output, the grave problems arising from the glaring disequilibrium between the development of heavy industry and that of light industry in some East European countries -- such problems do not exist in our country. Their lop-sided stress on heavy industry to the neglect of agriculture and light industry results in a shortage of goods on the market and an unstable currency. We, on the other hand, attach more importance to agriculture and light industry. We have all along attended to and developed agriculture and have to a considerable degree ensured the supply of grain and raw materials necessary for the development of industry. Our daily necessities are in fairly good supply and our prices and currency are stable.

The problem now facing us is that of continuing to adjust properly the ratio between investment in heavy industry on the one hand and in agriculture and light industry on the other in order to bring about a greater development of the latter. Does this mean that heavy industry is no longer primary? No. It still is, it still claims the emphasis in our investment. But the proportion for agriculture and light industry must be somewhat increased.

What will be the results of this increase? First, the daily needs of the people will be better satisfied, and, second, the accumulation of capital will be speeded up so that we can develop heavy industry with greater and better results. Heavy industry can also accumulate capital, but, given our present economic conditions, light industry and agriculture can accumulate more and faster.

Here the question arises: Is your desire to develop heavy industry genuine or feigned, strong or weak? If your desire is feigned or weak, then you will hit agriculture and light industry and invest less in them. If your desire is genuine or strong, then you will attach importance to agriculture and light industry so that there will be more grain and more raw materials for light industry and a greater accumulation of capital. And there will be more funds in the future to invest in heavy industry.

There are now two possible approaches to our development of heavy industry: one is to develop agriculture and light industry less, and the other is to develop them more. In the long run, the first approach will lead to a smaller and slower development of heavy industry, or at least will put it on a less solid foundation, and when the over-all account is added up a few decades hence, it will not prove to have paid. The second approach will lead to a greater and faster development of heavy industry and, since it ensures the livelihood of the people, it will lay a more solid foundation for the development of heavy industry.

The content of this section is self-explanatory; in it, Mao expresses concerns about a misappropriation of focus concerning the development of the industrial and agricultural sectors of China's economy. Mao expressly draws example from the economy of the Soviet Union, which was at the time heavily geared towards industrial production and, according to Mao, the agricultural sector suffered as a result. Mao wrote about this specifically in this text, urging caution when it came to underdeveloping agriculture.

As most know, two years after this was written (from 1958-1961), the "Great Famine" struck China. It is generally agreed (though to varying degrees) that the famine and resultant suffering was the result of both poor economic planning (which Mao seems to address here) and natural disaster.

So the question arises, were Mao's warnings heeded? Were his recommendations simply not enough to avoid catastrophy? Is his analysis, that industry must be the primary focus, while agriculture remained secondary but still important, a correct one? In another text, Mao explained how agriculture was organized democratically, with about a dozen families forming agricultural co-operatives, several of which formed local councils, several of which formed communes. These organs were seperate from the state, and formed the basis for the organization of agricultural productive forces.

[bezdomni]

Wasn't the main factor that motivated the Soviet Union to develop heavy industry without the "solid base" given by light industry and agriculture a looming war with Nazi Germany?

Mao is right. The more one can build a solid base for a bigger and stronger development of heavy industry the better, but it is not always possible given conditions.

Unless you can build tanks out of grain. :P

[Die Neue Zeit]

Non-Maoist checking in, but on this first section, should "heavy industry" be divided into at least two parts? In this day and age, the "energy industry" (particularly hydrocarbons) has come into its own like manufacturing.

SovietPants has then hinted at primitive accumulation and the historical cases of doing so with agriculture in order to develop "heavy industry." [Of course, given my thing with Venezuela, I'm seeing a milder form, but with oil and gas as the subject of "capital expropriation" instead of agriculture.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Didn't you forget one: the relationship between dialectics and the long-term failure of Marxism?

Don't tell me they are the only two things in the entire universe that are not inter-connected?

[OneBrickOneVoice]

Mao's warnings were headed, but the "great famine" wasn't "because of poor economic planning, and if that played any role it was minor in comparison to the fact that China experienced the 3 worst years of weather in the preceding century during this time period, flash floods in some areas and droughts destroyed the crops of entire communes. Planning had little to do with it, as China experienced famines every year preceding 1970 when the People's Communes were finally able to end starvation in China. Before the communes, and during Chiang Kai-shek & before, every year county after country would record crop failures. There's also the fact that Soviet engineers essentially walked out with their blueprints to industrial projects central to the plan of the GLF when Mao made the slightest critiscisms of the USSR.
The fact of the matter is that the "failure" of the GLF is highlighted by anti-communists everywhere because it was a prime example of the masses getting up, and getting free, breaking with exploitative fuedal-capitalist traditions and making a system which met their needs. The capitalists couldn't let that system seem liked it worked otherwise the world would be more revolutionary. Nonetheless, Maoist movements have made real revolution in a quite a few countries because the masses have seen through the bullshit

[Die Neue Zeit]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 03, 2007 02:33 pm
Didn't you forget one: the relationship between dialectics and the long-term failure of Marxism?

Don't tell me they are the only two things in the entire universe that are not inter-connected?
What's your point? :huh:

Enlighten me, but are you implying that Mao was implying some sort of Hegelian "law" in the above relationships? Unity of opposites, perhaps?

[RNK]

Originally posted by [email protected] 03, 2007 09:20 pm
Non-Maoist checking in, but on this first section, should "heavy industry" be divided into at least two parts? In this day and age, the "energy industry" (particularly hydrocarbons) has come into its own like manufacturing.

SovietPants has then hinted at primitive accumulation and the historical cases of doing so with agriculture in order to develop "heavy industry." [Of course, given my thing with Venezuela, I'm seeing a milder form, but with oil and gas as the subject of "capital expropriation" instead of agriculture.]

Non-Maoist checking in, but on this first section, should "heavy industry" be divided into at least two parts? In this day and age, the "energy industry" (particularly hydrocarbons) has come into its own like manufacturing.

True, but I've never heard of any sort of energy crisis in China -- as they had few pieces of heavy machinery, relatively few engines and other products that required energy, I doubt they had a crisis with the supply and demand of it.


Mao's warnings were headed, but the "great famine" wasn't "because of poor economic planning, and if that played any role it was minor in comparison to the fact that China experienced the 3 worst years of weather in the preceding century during this time period, flash floods in some areas and droughts destroyed the crops of entire communes. Planning had little to do with it, as China experienced famines every year preceding 1970 when the People's Communes were finally able to end starvation in China. Before the communes, and during Chiang Kai-shek & before, every year county after country would record crop failures. There's also the fact that Soviet engineers essentially walked out with their blueprints to industrial projects central to the plan of the GLF when Mao made the slightest critiscisms of the USSR.

Do you think the Famine could've been prevented had China abandoned (mostly) its development of heavy industry and concentrated almost solely on agriculture? And above that, would China's overall development been stunted by such a move? (this question is to all)

[bezdomni]

Originally posted by Hammer+September 04, 2007 01:50 am--> (Hammer @ September 04, 2007 01:50 am)
Rosa [email protected] 03, 2007 02:33 pm
Didn't you forget one: the relationship between dialectics and the long-term failure of Marxism?

Don't tell me they are the only two things in the entire universe that are not inter-connected?
What's your point? :huh:

Enlighten me, but are you implying that Mao was implying some sort of Hegelian "law" in the above relationships? Unity of opposites, perhaps? [/b]
Not that I don't appreciate Rosa's criticisms of dialectical materialism...but don't we have enough threads on that already?

Can we please keep this discussion to the Ten Major Relationships? If Rosa wants to make an objection to the "dialectical" nature of this discussion, she is more than free to do so...but this is a discussion about Maoism and I'd appreciate it if we could keep it that way.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

In reply to Hammer:

It seems to me that this is one relationship that dialecticians cannot acknowledge, for if all things really are interconnected, like they tell us, then the long-term failure of dialectical Marxism must be connected to dialectics.

That was my only point.

And SP, that is the last I will say on this in this thread; I do not wish to derail it.

[RNK]

Thanks Rosa.

I made a post, but I don't think people noticed it (above SP's) due to the derailment.

[bezdomni]

II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDUSTRY IN THE
COASTAL REGIONS AND INDUSTRY IN THE INTERIOR

In the past our industry was concentrated in the coastal regions. By coastal regions we mean Liaoning, Hopei, Peking, Tientsin, eastern Honan, Shantung, Anhwei, Kiangsu, Shanghai, Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi. About 70 per cent of all our industry, both light and heavy, is to be found in the coastal regions and only 30 per cent in the interior. This irrational situation is a product of history. The coastal industrial base must be put to full use, but to even out the distribution of industry as it develops we must strive to promote industry in the interior. We have not made any major mistakes on the relationship between the two. However, in recent years we have underestimated coastal industry to some extent and have not given great enough attention to its development. This must change.

Not so long ago, there was still fighting in Korea and the international situation was quite tense; this could not but affect our attitude towards coastal industry. Now, it seems unlikely that there will be a new war of aggression against China or another world war in the near future, and there will probably be a period of peace for a decade or more. It would therefore be wrong if we still fail to make full use of the plant capacity and technical forces of coastal industry. If we are to have only five years, not to say ten, we should still work hard to develop industries in the coastal regions for four years and evacuate them when war breaks out in the fifth. According to available information, in light industry the construction of a plant and its accumulation of capital generally proceed quite rapidly. After the whole plant goes into production, it can earn enough in four years to build three new factories, or two, or one or at least half of one, in addition to recouping its capital outlay. Why shouldn't we do such profitable things? The notion that the atom bomb is already overhead and about to fall on us in a matter of seconds is a calculation at variance with reality, and it would be wrong to take a negative attitude towards coastal industry on this account.

It does not follow that all new factories should be built in the coastal regions. Without doubt, the greater part of the new industry should be located in the interior so that industry may gradually become evenly distributed; moreover, this will help our preparations against war. But a number of new factories and mines, even some large ones, may also be built in the coastal regions. As for the expansion and reconstruction of the light and heavy industries already in the coastal regions, we have done a fair amount of work in the past and will do much more in the future.

Making good use of the old industries in the coastal regions and developing their capacities will put us in a stronger position to promote and support industry in the interior. To adopt a negative attitude would be to hinder the latter's speedy growth. So it is likewise a question of whether the desire to develop industry in the interior is genuine or not. If it is genuine and not feigned, we must more actively use and promote industry in the coastal regions, especially light industry.

Second major relationship.

[OneBrickOneVoice]

Do you think the Famine could've been prevented had China abandoned (mostly) its development of heavy industry and concentrated almost solely on agriculture? And above that, would China's overall development been stunted by such a move? (this question is to all)

No I don't actually, China had very little industry at the time as it was. I think it was largely the consequence of Chinese weather.

[OneBrickOneVoice]

On the Second Major Relationship,

This was a very crucial, and very necessary development so that more of the masses in the interior could have access to manufactured goods. Capitalists often claim this was why the GLF failed, well it just goes to show that the capitalist class cares nothing about the living conditions of the masses then.

[RNK]

I agree. I think it's common sense to strive to build industry up where it is lacking.

Third relationship...



III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC
CONSTRUCTION AND DEFENCE CONSTRUCTION
National defence is indispensable. Our defence capabilities have attained a certain level. As a result of the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and of several years of training and consolidation, our armed forces have grown more powerful and are now stronger than was the Soviet Red Army before the Second World War; also, there have been improvements in armaments. Our defence industry is being built up. Ever since Pan Ku separated heaven and earth, we have never been able to make planes and cars, and now we are beginning to make them.

We do not have the atom bomb yet. But neither did we have planes and artillery in the past. We defeated the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek with millet plus rifles. We are stronger than before and will be stronger still in the future. We will have not only more planes and artillery but atom bombs too. If we are not to be bullied in the present-day world, we cannot do without the bomb. Then what is to be done about it? One reliable way is to cut military and administrative expenditures down to appropriate proportions and increase expenditures on economic construction. Only with the faster growth of economic construction can there be greater progress in defence construction.

At the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of our Party in 1950, we already raised the question of streamlining the state apparatus and reducing military and administrative expenditures and considered this measure to be one of the three prerequisites for achieving a fundamental turn for the better in our financial and economic situation. In the period of the First Five-Year Plan, military and administrative expenditures accounted for 30 per cent of the total expenditures in the state budget. This proportion is much too high. In the period of the Second Five-Year Plan, we must reduce it to around 20 per cent, so that more funds can be released for building more factories and turning out more machines. After a time, we shall not only have plenty of planes and artillery but probably have our own atom bombs as well.

Here again the question arises: Is your desire for the atom bomb genuine and very keen? Or is it only lukewarm and not so very keen? If your desire is genuine and very keen, then you will reduce the proportion of military and administrative expenditures and spend more on economic construction. If your desire is not genuine or not so very keen, you will stay in the old rut. This is a matter of strategic policy, and I hope the Military Commission will discuss it.

Would it be all right to demobilize all our troops now? No, it would not. For enemies are still around, and we are being bullied and encircled by them. We must strengthen our national defence, and for that purpose we must first of all strengthen our work in economic construction.

A sound idea. Like the last one, there's not much to discuss about this. 1956 marked the closing of the Korean War and the massive expansion of the US military worldwide, and its arms race with the Soviet Union and threats of nuclear war against communism. Though I doubt they'd ever have invaded China, even if China didn't have a bomb.

[RNK]

Also, this line:

"At the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of our Party in 1950, we already raised the question of streamlining the state apparatus and reducing military and administrative expenditures and considered this measure to be one of the three prerequisites for achieving a fundamental turn for the better in our financial and economic situation.", seems to contradict most criticism of the "beauracracy" of the Chinese Communist Party immediately after the revolution -- it would seem Mao's aim was actually to roll back the beauracracy of the state, not increase it, and focus on the industrialization of society, not the buildup of centralized authority.

[UndergroundConnexion]

I hope this threat will continue well, and as it is relatively short, and there are only 10 points, i hope we will reacht the end nicely.

On the First Relationship :
This part is mostly about finding the right balance between heave and light industry.
Although the emphasis is on heavy industry , mao does not neglect the light industry and highlights it's importance of it, and why the soviets went wrong with it.
Mao also indicates why a right balance is necassary , especailly on the long term.

[OneBrickOneVoice]

I like this point too


We do not have the atom bomb yet. But neither did we have planes and artillery in the past. We defeated the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek with millet plus rifles. We are stronger than before and will be stronger still in the future.

I think its interesting because it shows the invincibility of people's war, and how powerful a strategy it was for Revolution in China that against all the odds faced, and completely inferior equipment, the people could prevail

[UndergroundConnexion]

On the second relationship:
Here Mao explains the relation between industry in the interior and the coastal ones. He explains how this came to bel ike this (product of history) , and how this should be used, also in times of war.The main emphasis of this text is the balance between industry inside and coastall.

On the third relation:
Mao starts by stating the national defence is indispensiable. The first paragraph explains some of the military history of China, and the last sentence gives some indication of what progresseswere being made at the time. Second paragraph Mao shows the importance of having "the bomb ". However he also explains that these kind of weapons where not needed against the japanse or the chiang kai shek. It shows the efficiency of the tactics used by the red army during these battles against the bourgeoisie, even while facign a much more advanced army.

This however needs to be done well and can lead to successes (Cuba, Nicaragua, Chiapas , Nepal) but when done on bad terrain , my opinion leads, to failure (Bolivia).
China at this time was in a favoralbe sittuation for this. But maybe this could be part of another study group.

Folowign this Mao explains why investing more in the ecnomic construction can bring progess in the defence. Mao , I have to say, brilliantly , shows in little words how economic construction costs, would justify cutting down on millitary spending.

I particularly like this chapter i have to say. However i wonder, i assume this was written for times of relative peace. If was was luring would you still take the risk of cutting down on military spending to get economic progress going, which in return could get you more money for military tools ? or would you just straight away put these funds in military needs?

[RNK]

Good points. Actually he said this 1956 -- not long after the Korean War and a time of heightening tension with the US.

Here's the next section:


IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE, THE
UNITS OF PRODUCTION AND THE PRODUCERS

The relationship between the state on the one hand and factories and agricultural co-operatives on the other and the relationship between factories and agricultural co-operatives on the one hand and the producers on the other should both be handled well. To this end we should consider not just one side but all three, the state, the collective and the individual, or, as we used to say, "take into consideration both the army and the people" and "take into consideration both the public and the private interest". In view of the experience of the Soviet Union as well as our own, we must see to it that from now on this problem is solved much better.

Take the workers for example. As their labour productivity rises, there should be a gradual improvement in their working conditions and collective welfare. We have always advocated plain living and hard work and opposed putting personal material benefits above everything else; at the same time we have always advocated concern for the livelihood of the masses and opposed bureaucracy, which is callous to their well-being. With the growth of our economy as a whole, wages should be appropriately adjusted. We have recently decided to increase wages to some extent, mainly the wages of those at the lower levels, the wages of the workers, in order to narrow the wage gap between them and the upper levels. Generally speaking, our wages are not high, but compared with the past the life of our workers has greatly improved because, among other things, more people are employed and prices remain low and stable. Under the regime of the proletariat, our workers have unfailingly displayed high political consciousness and enthusiasm for labour. When at the end of last year the Central Committee called for a fight against Right conservatism, the masses of workers warmly responded and, what was exceptional, overfulfilled the plan for the first quarter of the year by working all out for three months. We must strive to encourage this zeal for hard work and at the same time pay still greater attention to solving the pressing problems in their work and everyday life.

Here I would like to touch on the question of the independence of the factories under unified leadership. It's not right, I'm afraid, to place everything in the hands of the central or the provincial and municipal authorities without leaving the factories any power of their own, any room for independent action, any benefits. We don't have much experience on how to share power and returns properly among the central authorities, the provincial and municipal authorities and the factories, and we should study the subject. As a matter of principle centralization and independence form a unity of opposites, and there must be both centralization and independence. For instance, we are now having a meeting, which is centralization; after the meeting, some of us will go for a walk, some will read books, some will go to eat which is independence. If we don't adjourn the meeting and give everyone some independence but let it go on and on, wouldn't it be the death of us all? This is true of individuals, and no less true of factories and other units of production. Every unit of production must enioy independence as the correlative of centralization if it is to develop more vigorously.

Now about the peasants. Our relations with the peasants have always been good, but we did make a mistake on the question of grain. In 1954 floods caused a decrease in production in some parts of our country, and yet we purchased 7,000 million more catties of grain. A decrease in production and an increase in purchasing -- this made grain the topic on almost everyone's lips in many places last spring, and nearly every household talked about the state monopoly for marketing grain. The peasants were disgruntled, and there were a lot of complaints both inside and outside the Party. Although quite a few people indulged in deliberate exaggeration and exploited the opportunity to attack us, it cannot be said that we had no shortcomings. Inadequate investigation and failure to size up the situation resulted in the purchase of 7,000 million catties more; that was a shortcoming. After discovering it, we purchased 7,00 million catties less in 1955 and introduced a system of fixed quotas for grain production, purchasing and marketing[1] and, what's more, there was a good harvest. With a decrease in purchasing and an increase in production, the peasants had over 20,000 million more catties of grain at their disposal. Thus even those peasants who had complaints before said, "The Communist Party is really good." This lesson the whole Party must bear in mind.

The Soviet Union has adopted measures which squeeze the peasants very hard. It takes away too much from the peasants at too low a price through its system of so-called obligatory sales[2] and other measures. This method of capital accumulation has seriously dampened the peasants' enthusiasm for production. You want the hen to lay more eggs and yet you don't feed it, you want the horse to run fast and yet you don't let it graze. What kind of logic is that!

Our policies towards the peasants differ from those of the Soviet Union and take into account the interests of both the state and the peasants. Our agricultural tax has always been relatively low. In the exchange of industrial and agricultural products we follow a policy of narrowing the price scissors, a policy of exchanging equal or roughly equal values. The state buys agricultural products at standard prices while the peasants suffer no loss, and, what is more, our purchase prices are gradually being raised. In supplying the peasants with manufactured goods we follow a policy of larger sales at a small profit and of stabilizing or appropriately reducing their prices; in supplying grain to the peasants in grain-deficient areas we generally subsidize such sales to a certain extent. Even so, mistakes of one kind or another will occur if we are not careful. In view of the grave mistakes made by the Soviet Union on this question, we must take greater care and handle the relationship between the state and the peasants well.

Similarly, the relationship between the co-operative and the peasants should be well handled. What proportion of the earnings of a co-operative should go to the state, to the co-operative and to the peasants respectively and in what form should be determined properly. The amount that goes to the co-operative is used directly to serve the peasants. Production expenses need no explanation, management expenses are also necessary, the accumulation fund is for expanded reproduction and the public welfare fund is for the peasants' well-being. However, together with the peasants, we should work out equitable ratios among these items. We must strictly economize on production and management expenses. The accumulation fund and the public welfare fund must also be kept within limits, and one shouldn't expect all good things to be done in a single year.

Except in case of extraordinary natural disasters, we must see to it that, given increased agricultural production, 90 per cent of the co-operative members get some increase in their income and the other 10 per cent break even each year, and if the latter's income should fall, ways must be found to solve the problem in good time.

In short, consideration must be given to both sides, not to just one, whether they are the state and the factory, the state and the worker, the factory and the worker, the state and the co-operative, the state and the peasant, or the co-operative and the peasant. To give consideration to only one side, whichever it may be, is harmful to socialism and to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is a big question which concerns 600 million people, and it calls for repeated education in the whole Party and the whole nation.

I think this section is very important as it gives a bit of insight into the little-known socialist practices being undertaken in China. The third paragraph starts off with "Here I would like to touch on the question of the independence of the factories under unified leadership." and Mao goes on to use somewhat strange analogies (lol). The next paragraph talks a little about the peasant situation and he even mentions some of the organizational problems, ie, increasing purchasing of grain while production decreased.

Thoughts?

[Volderbeek]

I think this from #9 is instructive:


people who have made mistakes will make fewer ones provided they are good at drawing lessons. On the other hand, since it is easier for those who have not erred to become cocky, they are prone to make mistakes.

Seems like common knowledge, but I think it's something we all need to keep in mind more. It's also an excellent example of applied dialectics. Those who acknowledge and resolve their contradictions are better off than those who stagnate