The "is/ought" problem

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OSWY:


I'd also draw your attention to the 'is/ought fallacy' or more specifically the 'naturalistic fallacy' (the latter being a version of the former). Facts of nature do not of themselves provide premises on which value judgements can be made

This is an idea that has been recycled now for well over 200 years, but it is no less a fallacy itself for all that.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem

But, it is very easy to derive an ought from an is; logicians have been doing it for years.

Here is a one premiss argument that does just that:

Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

There are countless other arguments like this, and better.

So, can we bury this old chestnut now?

[gilhyle]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 31, 2007 04:47 pm
OSWY:


I'd also draw your attention to the 'is/ought fallacy' or more specifically the 'naturalistic fallacy' (the latter being a version of the former). Facts of nature do not of themselves provide premises on which value judgements can be made

This is an idea that has been recycled now for well over 200 years, but it is no less a fallacy itself for all that.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem

But, it is very easy to derive an ought from an is; logicians have been doing it for years.

Here is a one premiss argument that does just that:

Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

There are countless other argunments like this, and better.

So, can we bury this old chestnut now?

You believe that all cars require lubricants to work well
and
You believe cars ought to work well

then

You believe Cars ought to be lubricated.


Sorry Rosa, the 'ought' is in the second premise. SInce its in one of the premises you have not derived ought from is - cant be done.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GIL:


Sorry Rosa, the 'ought' is in the second premise.

Nice try, but that was not my argument.

[gilhyle]

I think it is...the conditional conclusion just folds in the second premise. WIthout the 'if' clause you conclusion does not follow, for example:

All cars require lubricants to work well:

Therefore all cars ought to be lubricated

Clearly this does not hold


(Do you think there is something slightly freudian in using an example that involves lubrication on a thread that is ostensibly about a sex-related issue ?)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GIL:


I think it is...the conditional conclusion just folds in the second premise. WIthout the 'if' clause you conclusion does not follow, for example:

All cars require lubricants to work well:

Therefore all cars ought to be lubricated

Clearly this does not hold

Not so; you can propose your own argument till the cows evolve. Mine does not have the suppressed premiss you say it does.

But even your argument can be conditionised:

Premiss: You believe that all cars require lubricants to work well

Conclusion: So, if you believe cars ought to work well then you believe Cars ought to be lubricated.

I do not know why you are trying to argue this one out; we have known of such counter-examples since at least the work of Arthur Prior.

[gilhyle]

Im arguing cos its not true. Any of this stuff I have read just isnt right. What they describe as a conclusion is not a conclusion, but contains a hidden premise.

The answer to the is/ought fallacy is not that you can derive an ought from an is, but that its trivial that you cant, since the basis on which you cant is abstracting from agents. Agents, necessarily generate 'oughts' - to be an agent is to have the capacity to formulate objectives, to describe an agent is - in part - to describe given objectives. The desire to deny the is/ought distinction comes from an insistence that the objectives they formulate follow logically from their nature, i.e. from what is. That is not so - logic and description cannot model the formulation of objectives. Purpose is not logical in that sense.

Thus the car sitting in the museum no one ever intends to use again does not need to be lubricated to 'work' effectively.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Im arguing cos its not true. Any of this stuff I have read just isnt right. What they describe as a conclusion is not a conclusion, but contains a hidden premise.

It does so in re-configured arguments, but not mine.


The answer to the is/ought fallacy is not that you can derive an ought from an is, but that its trivial that you cant, since the basis on which you cant is abstracting from agents. Agents, necessarily generate 'oughts' - to be an agent is to have the capacity to formulate objectives, to describe an agent is - in part - to describe given objectives. The desire to deny the is/ought distinction comes from an insistence that the objectives they formulate follow logically from their nature, i.e. from what is. That is not so - logic and description cannot model the formulation of objectives. Purpose is not logical in that sense.

Sure, that this one way of slicing it, but it is not mine.

But, I am not sure what you mean by this:


Purpose is not logical in that sense

Logic is about what follows from premisses, so it will depend on those.

Now take this stencil:

Premiss: All and only Fs are Gs.

Conclusion: If you ought to F you ought to G.

["F" and "G" are predicate letters (restricted to the domain of the do-able) -- I'd employ 'phi' and 'psi' here if there was a sophisticated character here set we could use).]

But is it a valid schema?

I cannot see it generating falsehoods from truths, can you?

[gilhyle]

Its a valid schema
So (probably) is the following:

I now realise Im guilty of hikacking this thread

If one always ought to stop arguing when one realises one has hijacked a thread, I should now stop arguing

.....But it doesnt actually tell me what I ought to do - no ought has been derived.

Thus in your example to derive an 'ought' conclusion (I ought to G)...I have to add the premise, 'I ought to F.

Discussion here: http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2006/03...t_gap.html#more (http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2006/03/the_isought_gap.html#more)

[MarxSchmarx]

Hi Gil,

I get the sense you are confusing Rosa's



Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.


with some variant of:

Premise 1: All cars require lubricants to run well.
Premise 2: You want your car to run well.
Conclusion: You ought to put oil in the engine.

The two syllogisms are quite distinct, although admittedly it's not clear to me how the former obviates the is-ought problem. After all, the "is" premise says nothing about whether we in fact want (or should want) our car to run well.

And Rosa, which criticism of the is-ought problem do you subscribe to? Wouldn't any ethical inquiry worth its salt ask the question: "Do you want your car to run well", not just "what ought we to do to get our car to run well".

[rouchambeau]

Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

There are countless other argunments like this, and better.

So, can we bury this old chestnut now?
LOL

You do realize that "ought" is being used in the moral sense, right?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

R:


You do realize that "ought" is being used in the moral sense, right?

No problem:

All human beings require love in order to flourish.

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your child to flourish, you ought to love her.

Now, this moribund idea is well past it cremation date.

Anyone got a box of matches...?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GIL:


I now realise Im guilty of hikacking this thread

If one always ought to stop arguing when one realises one has hijacked a thread, I should now stop arguing

.....But it doesnt actually tell me what I ought to do - no ought has been derived.

Thus in your example to derive an 'ought' conclusion (I ought to G)...I have to add the premise, 'I ought to F.

Ah, the old 'move the goal posts' ploy.

But:

Premiss: All counterexampes are a pain

Conclusion: Therefore I ought to add a few premisses to screw around with them

Sure, that's an invalid argument, but it's what you keep doing.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

MS:


The two syllogisms are quite distinct, although admittedly it's not clear to me how the former obviates the is-ought problem. After all, the "is" premise says nothing about whether we in fact want (or should want) our car to run well.

And Rosa, which criticism of the is-ought problem do you subscribe to? Wouldn't any ethical inquiry worth its salt ask the question: "Do you want your car to run well", not just "what ought we to do to get our car to run well".

First: it's not a syllogism.

Second: I subscribe to neither.

Recall, I reject all philosophical theses as non-sensical.

Particularly those in ethics.

[gilhyle]

Rosa

I haven't grasped your answer to my point that, despite the presence of the relevant word, the proposition:


if you believe cars ought to work well then you believe Cars ought to be lubricate

is not an ought statement of the type to which the is/ought argument applies. There is no derivation of an 'ought' from this process of reasoning.

(I accept btw the criticism of this whole debate that it tends to use non-moral examples and moral (or ethical) examples have some distinctive characteristics, in particular not always being instrumental reasoning, but I think the debate can be held in these terms, up to a point, notwithstanding that.)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oh dear, there is life after death!


I haven't grasped your answer to my point that, despite the presence of the relevant word, the proposition:

if you believe cars ought to work well then you believe Cars ought to be lubricate

is not an ought statement of the type to which the is/ought argument applies. There is no derivation of an 'ought' from this process of reasoning.

I ignored it because it is just a reprise of the debate that went on several generations ago, wherein logicians provided counterexamples and the defenders of Hume moved the goalposts each time.

I addressed the claim that it is not possible to derive an ought from an is.

I have done so, several times.

You keep altering the examples.

Fine, your examples do not work, mine do. [In the sense that they address the original aim, not the moved goalposts.]

You say there is no derivation of an ought here; here it is again:


Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

Now, this has nothing to do with 'beliefs', so I do not know why you have introduced that red herring.

The derivation works independently of the existence of any believers.

You will be attacking Modus Tollens next on the pretext that one has to believe the premisses first!

[Oswy]

Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine. Rosa.

But here you are inserting an "if you want your car to...".

The is/ought fallacy states that an observed fact does not of itself provide values. What you're doing here is not presenting a premiss as fact but a premiss as a fact with a piggybacking value.

It may be a fact (i.e. an 'is') that cars run well on lubricant.

It does not inevitably follow from the above premiss that you are compelled (i.e. 'ought') to lubricate cars.

I think the is/ought fallacy is pretty watertight, but I've got to go out now to a BBQ!

Later people.

[syndicat]

i agree with Rosa on this one.

what i would point out is that there are reasons for thinking there exists in the natural world a certain kind of non-moral normativity that can generate "should" or "ought" statements from factual premises. for example, a heart is adapted thru evolution to pump blood. to say it is adapted to this is to say this is what it is for, this is it's biological function. and from this we can infer this is what it should do or ought to do. and if it isn't doing this sufficiently to keep the animal alive that it is in, then it is not doing what it should do. it is defective, a bad heart.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thankyou for those comments Syndicat, and I am tempted to go along with your examples (i.e., those related to biological functions), but to do so would, I am afraid, be to re-introduce teleology into nature.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OSWY:


But here you are inserting an "if you want your car to...".

The is/ought fallacy states that an observed fact does not of itself provide values. What you're doing here is not presenting a premiss as fact but a premiss as a fact with a piggybacking value.

But, that insertion, if such it may be called, is in the conclusion, not the premisses.

So, my example does derive an ought from an is.

And you need to question, too, the link (one which is, I think, almost universally held) between 'ought', morality and 'values'.

Now, I have ignored the latter term (since it is hopelessly vague), and have just concentrated on the logical issue at hand (and hence on the alleged 'fallacy').

I have absolutely no interest in concentrating on the bogus issue of the connection betwen facts and 'values', since the latter term, as I have said, has nothing to do with morality, or with 'ought'.

But, check out the end of this post -- where I show how to derive a 'value' from a fact.


It may be a fact (i.e. an 'is') that cars run well on lubricant.

It does not inevitably follow from the above premiss that you are compelled (i.e. 'ought') to lubricate cars.

Well, who mentioned compulsion?

No 'ought' compels anyway.

It should not be news to you, but people all over the world give the finger to what they 'ought' to do, and they do so in their millions, and every day.

So, this objection of yours is not in fact about the is/ought 'fallacy', but about the alleged impossibility of deriving a compulsion from an 'is'.

As I said to Gil, defenders of Hume here have to keep moving the goal posts -- but, in this case, you move to a new playing field!


[b]I think the is/ought fallacy is pretty watertight, but I've got to go out now to a BBQ!

Well, you will need something a little more substantial than just a 'think' to back you up here.

And, are you 'compelled' to go to that BBQ?

--------------------------------

How to derive a 'value' from a fact:

Premiss: All cats are mammals

Conclusioin: If you 'value' your cat, you 'value' a mammal. QED

-----------------------------

Obituary Notice: I regret to announce that Hume's obscure theory has passed away after a long and debilitating illness.

The funeral will be held at RevLeft, today

Send no flowers.

Rest In Pieces...

[syndicat]

however, in evolutionary biology the concept of a function or of being adapted "for" something, is reduced ultimately to the action of material forces. so evolutionary biology doesn't require some un-reduced concept of teleology in nature.

to say that it is the function of this heart to pump blood is to say:

1. this heart is a copy of a structure that has occurred in ancestors of this animal

2. those previous hearts pumped blood and this was an important explanation
for the survival of those animals

3. this fact (2) explains why this heart exists, i.e. why this animal has a heart.

That is what it means to say the function of the heart is to pump blood. Thus there is no unreduced teleology.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, you and I agree on far more things than we disagree, and I'd debate this with you normally.

But, as I have said to you before, I will not debate with you on anything -- so you can have the last word on this.

[rouchambeau]

No problem:

All human beings require love in order to flourish.

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your child to flourish, you ought to love her.

Now, this moribund idea is well past it cremation date.

Anyone got a box of matches...?
Just because a person wants something (in this case their child to flourish) it does not follow that what they want is ethical. For example, I can take the form of your argument and make something unethical become ethical.

P1 Genocide requires murder.
C1 If you want genocide, you ought to murder.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

R, slightly altered:


P1 Genocide requires murder.
C1 If you want avoid genocide, you ought not murder.

Now it is.

Looks like one or two comraders believe in life after death.

[MarxSchmarx]

not a syllogism

Fair enough.




P1 Genocide requires murder.
C1 If you want avoid genocide, you ought not murder. l.

The problem a lot of posters are having, RL, is that your deductions don't address the infinite regress in the answer to "Why oughtn't we to kill".

In this example, hypothetically someone is asking "Well, why ought we to avoid genocide", and you can only answer that by appealing to another statement that has "ought" somewhere in it (like "Because we ought to follow int'l law and int'l prohibits genocide", ok that was lame...) And similarly for the answer to that question and so on.

I don't see how you avoid an infinite regress without some premise about what one ought to do in the kind of answer to "Why oughtn't one kill?" that ethicists sought/seek. In essence it seems this is what Hume was on to.

I leave the problem of ethics being bunk for another day.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

MarxSchmarx:


The problem a lot of posters are having, RL, is that your deductions don't address the infinite regress in the answer to "Why oughtn't we to kill".

As I have pointed out several times, my concern was merely to neutralise the claim that there was some sort of fallacy in deriving an ought from an is, not to enter into whether or not we could justify any ought so derived.

Naturally, I can do the latter too (typically), but will not do so here, since this thread is about this alleged fallacy.

Now, as I have also shown, it is possible to derive an ought from an is --, and surprisingly easily.

What you need to do is focus on that, and stop moving the goal posts, or changing the subject.

So, even if there were an infinite regress here (which I deny, anyway), that would not be relevant to the logical point at issue: i.e., that it is laughably easy to derive an ought from an is.

In that case, it is no fallacy to do so.


I leave the problem of ethics being bunk for another day.

If mine involves an infinite regress, there is no way that this can avoid one either.

[Oswy]

Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine. Rosa.

I'll try and rephrase my objection.

The is/ought fallacy states that observed facts do not of themselves carry values. At least, this is how I understand the idea. More formally, descriptive statements do not make for logically necessary prescriptive statements. All cars require lubricants to run well. Fair enough. But this premiss doesn't demand I give a monkey's nads about cars running well. Only when you add something to your conclusion are you saying something that suggests I should care - but this is the conclusion! The original statement (premiss) does not on its own demand a prescriptive conclusion.

Look carefully at how you've constructed your argument, you've injected an "...if you want..." which has nothing whatsoever to do with the premiss.

[hajduk]

Those who lie he also steal

Those who steal also kill

Those who lie is murderer

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I am sorry Hajduk, this makes no more sense than most of the other things you post in this section.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OSWY:


The is/ought fallacy states that observed facts do not of themselves carry values.

Ok, here is a fact that 'carries' 'value':

It is a fact that my daughter values her teddy bear.

You see, traditional philosophers ignored the many complex ways we use language, and they did this in order to dream up ridiculous theses that make little sense, like the one you keep trying to breath life into.

Now, the following is not an example of arguing 'more formally'; if it were you'd use logical symbols, and certainly not that odd phrase "make for".


More formally, descriptive statements do not make for logically necessary prescriptive statements.

But wtf does "make for" mean here?

Are you trying to say that it is impossible to derive a prescriptive proposition from a descriptive one? If so, there are a couple of serious problems:

1) Impossibility proofs are notoriously difficult to find outside of technical areas of mathematics and logic.

Well, we have already seen several demonstrations here (courtesy of yours truly) that the above alleged impossibility is not even the case in simple logic. So, a general proof of this 'impossibility' stands no chance.

2) Since descriptive language can contain prescriptive elements (I gave one such example above), even your attempt to go 'more formal' falls at the first hurdle.


But this premiss doesn't demand I give a monkey's nads about cars running well. Only when you add something to your conclusion are you saying something that suggests I should care - but this is the conclusion! The original statement (premiss) does not on its own demand a prescriptive conclusion.

From this it looks like you want to move these goal posts permanently.

OK, in that case, wrap your laughing gear around this:

Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you care about your car running well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

Or:

All human beings require love in order to flourish.

Conclusion: Therefore, if you care about your child's flourishing, you will care about loving her.

Now, we can do this all day long (and go into a second week if you like), but this hoary old idea, derived from bourgeois empiricist theorists 200 odd years ago is dead.

Can we now give it a decent burial? It is beginning to smell.

-------------------------------------------

On a logical point:


Look carefully at how you've constructed your argument, you've injected an "...if you want..." which has nothing whatsoever to do with the premiss.

What has the above got to do with anything? It's hopelessly vague, too.

Now, this claim is not even correct with respect to the example you considered; you seem to take exception to my 'injection' of an 'if...then' connective. But what is the problem with that?

We reason this way all the time.

For example: Premiss: All Cyanides are poisonous.

Conclusion (C1): If you swallow that Potassium Cyanide, you will poison yourself.

Alternative conclusion (C2) If you want to swallow Prussic Acid, you clealry want to poison yourself.

[Often, the premiss is suppressd, and we just come out with C1 on its own.]

Notice, the extra words here (such as "if", "you", "want", "then", "yourself, "Prussic Acid")?

All perfectly normal, all entirely legitimate. We reason this way to avoid poisoning ourselves and others (just as we do over countless other things), introducing characters and items not mentioned in the premisses.

Another example:

Premiss: All horses are animals.

Conclusion: The head of a horse is the head of an animal.

Perfectly valid, even though I have 'injected' a body part here.

[And it won't do to argue that there is a suppresssed premiss in here, such as:

All horses have heads.

And this is why:

Premiss: All horses are animals.

Conclusion: A DVD of a horse is a DVD of an animal.]

Traditional logicians ignored this sort of stuff, too, because it could not be squeezed into a syllogism. [Plus it conformed with obscure ideas about the nature of logic.]

But, who on earth (apart from traditional logicians, and others who know no better) has ever reasoned with syllogisms?

They are useless.

[gilhyle]

Since I consider the is/ought point trivial (but valid) there is limited purpose to this discussion...but since I started it I wont quite drop it yet, notwithstanding the extent of repetition.

Just two points:

1. the sense in which this is a hoary old idea that no one accepts any longer is quite unclear to me - Prior's approach would not be universally accepted and many would consider that he sidesteps the issue. So its not as if those who disagre with you Rosa on this board are being particularly dense. The link I provided shows the issue being still debated and you will find debate on this issue in various philosophical fora.

2. I think you have not at all addressed the question of whether the conclusion of your reasoning is an 'ought' statement within Hume's meaning. If it is not then your argument fails as a criticism of Hume. If it fails as that it fails as such, since it is only as Hume proposed the idea that it has significance.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


1. the sense in which this is a hoary old idea that no one accepts any longer is quite unclear to me - Prior's approach would not be universally accepted and many would consider that he sidesteps the issue. So its not as if those who disagre with you Rosa on this board are being particularly dense. The link I provided shows the issue being still debated and you will find debate on this issue in various philosophical fora.

Who said it was no longer accepted?

I said the idea is dead, but like the monarchy, it lives on.

In this case, it is fed by leftists who should know better.


2. I think you have not at all addressed the question of whether the conclusion of your reasoning is an 'ought' statement within Hume's meaning. If it is not then your argument fails as a criticism of Hume. If it fails as that it fails as such, since it is only as Hume proposed the idea that it has significance.

Well, since Hume was also hoplessly confused on this, no wonder I failed to address it.

I did however address an 'ought' as you and I use it (i.e., as it is used in the vernacular, where it has a much wider application radius), not as it is used by an 18th century bourgeois empiricist.

As far as adressing the concerns of posters here, they will need to be far clearer than they have so managed for anyone (least of all myself) to tell what they are on about.

And that, I am afraid, applies to you too.

I have shown how 'ought' can be derived from an 'is', and many other things besides.

So, if this hoary old idea is to survive, it will need to be recast in terms that do not fall foul of logic.

Care to try?

[Oswy]

Sorry Rosa I don't understand your last argument [shrug]. For me you're offering a conclusion which imputes value to a simply factual premiss and then, retroactively, pretending that the premiss carried the need for an evaluative conclusion (even though it is actually based on content in the conclusion).

I can only repeat that your premiss...


Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

...does not in and of itself carry anything which leads to a logically necessary lubricating of your car.

Anyway, the is/ough fallacy is watertight enough for me. I'll be sticking with it. I'm out.

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 02, 2007 05:19 pm
I am sorry Hajduk, this makes no more sense than most of the other things you post in this section.
premiss 1: the man who lie also steal

premiss 2: the man who steal also kill

conclusion: the man who lie is a murderer

[gilhyle]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 02, 2007 06:23 pm
And that, I am afraid, applies to you too.


Im not cut up about it - clarity is over rated and the socratic method is a fraud.

If Prior thinks he has derived an 'ought' statement as Hume referrd to, he is patently wrong. If that is not the task he set himself, what he did is irrelevant to the is/ought debate. Hume would nevere have doubted that conclusions of the type Prior derived could be derived he would have just considered that so trivial as to be not worth mentioning and he would be right. Truth is, you still cant construct a set of descriptive premises that lead to an unconditional prscriptive conclusion and that is the point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

H:


premiss 1: the man who lie also steal

premiss 2: the man who steal also kill

conclusion: the man who lie is a murderer

No clearer I'm afraid.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Im not cut up about it - clarity is over rated and the socratic method is a fraud

Yes the Socratic method...

Who uses it anyway?

And of course clarity is opposed only by those who prefer confusion.


If Prior thinks he has derived an 'ought' statement as Hume referrd to, he is patently wrong. If that is not the task he set himself, what he did is irrelevant to the is/ought debate. Hume would nevere have doubted that conclusions of the type Prior derived could be derived he would have just considered that so trivial as to be not worth mentioning and he would be right. Truth is, you still cant construct a set of descriptive premises that lead to an unconditional prscriptive conclusion and that is the point.

Fine, but you will need to do much more than just pass an opinion if you want to establish your point.

Even Socrates knew that.

And is the above an impossibility proof? If so, may I respectfully suggest it is rather weak.

But, as I have shown, it is possible to do precisely what you say cannot be done.

Here is another:

Premiss: A UK pound equals one hundred UK pence. [Purely 'descriptive'.]

Conclusion: Anyone who promises to pay a UK pound promises to pay one hundred UK pence. [Prescriptive.]

Or:

Premiss: One kilo weighs more than 500 grams. [Ditto.]

Conclusion: If you promise to weigh one kilo, you will have promised to weigh over 500 grams. [Double ditto.]

Of course, the problem is: it is not at all easy to say what a purely descriptive propostion is, nor one that is purely prescriptive.

Until you are clearer (oh, you don't do that!), it is not easy to make sense of precisely what you mean.

Now, for the last time, can we cremate this 'theoretical cadaver' on Hume's bonfire?

[rouchambeau]

RL, you're deriving the ought from whatever the subject wants in your conclusions. I mean, what if the subject doesn't want their car to run well, but the car is still there needing it to run well? Does that mean the car no longer ought to be oiled? If so, the ought (lubrication) is not inherent in the is (the car).

[syndicat]

RL, you're deriving the ought from whatever the subject wants in your conclusions. I mean, what if the subject doesn't want their car to run well, but the car is still there needing it to run well? Does that mean the car no longer ought to be oiled? If so, the ought (lubrication) is not inherent in the is (the car).

doesn't matter. if i say "Jack wants a reliable car" this is a description. it ascribes a mental state to him. if X says "Jack wants a reliable car" and I say "then Jack ought to buy an A" (where A is a brand known for reliability), i'm "deriving an ought" from a purely descriptive statement.

but someone might then rephrase the problem this way: "values cannot be derived from facts" and they may interpret "values" in such a way that what a person wants is part of what they value. of course what a person wants is itself a fact, so maybe it should be: "an evaluative statement cannot be derived validly from only non-evaluative statements".

but even that won't work. if I say that Jack is diabetic, you might then reasonably say "Jack ought to avoid eating lots of sugar". that's because the concept of health entails prescriptive conclusions even tho health is a biological concept, and is not evaluative.

the reason for this is that biological traits are functional. there is an idea of what various structures are supposed to do....eyes provide sight, the heart pumps blood, etc. this is the activity they ought to perform. this conclusion is not based on any unreducibly evaluative ideas since biological functions can be explained (via evolutionary biology) in non-evaluative language. excessive levels of sugar in the blood stream undermine the ability of the cardiovascular system to perform its function.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

R:


RL, you're deriving the ought from whatever the subject wants in your conclusions. I mean, what if the subject doesn't want their car to run well, but the car is still there needing it to run well? Does that mean the car no longer ought to be oiled? If so, the ought (lubrication) is not inherent in the is (the car).

Well, Syndicat has answered most of your worries (and I largely agree with his analysis, except for the functionalist part).

I might add that what was derived by my argument, was a conditional conclusion:


All human beings require love in order to flourish.

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your child to flourish, you ought to love her.

Now, your first objection was that an earlier 'ought' was not an ethical 'ought', so I produced the above which contains just such an ethical 'ought'.

Now you retreat into the fall-back option that the one concerned might not want what was on offer. But, that objection has already been fielded. No word (like 'ought') can compel an action unless that person is already committed to the its 'moral force' (if such it may be called).

So, even if the 'ought ' was 'inherent' in the 'is' (to put this your way), that would not carry a 'moral force' unless the person involved was committed to it.

Hence, even if 'ought' was 'inherent' in 'is', an individual could reject its implications, and refuse to be coerced by it. He/she could be a moral rebel. There are plenty of those.

So, lack of moral compulsion is irrelevant here, for either way (your way or mine), an individual is not forced to want something, and not forced to acccept the moral force of an 'ought', either.

And, of course, that is the point of morality; we accept the demands of whatever moral codes we adhere to, otherwise what we actually decide to do would not be the result of a moral choice to begin with.

And, even if that were not so, I am far from clear what it means to say that one word can be inherent in another.

If an 'ought' follows from a proposition with an 'is', then why is that not evidence that this 'ought' is 'inherent' in that 'is'?

Unless you think that single words are containers of some sort, and feature in language like atoms (and thus that they do not have connections we have already established for them in our social practices), then I cannot see what you are driving at.

In that case, I conclude that I have derived both a non-moral and a moral 'ought' from an 'is'.

The problem with traditional thought (and in this case, with a theory dreamt up by a bourgeois empiricist philosopher) is that it treated words like atoms, just as bourgeois society treats us like atoms.

As should seem obvious to us, bourgeois social being determined Hume's 'consciousness'. And that is why he hit upon this atomistic theory.

I am rather surprised it seems to have influenced several comrades here.

Now, the ghost of this dead 'theory' has haunted us for far too long. Can we not send it on its way to philosophical hell, where it belongs?

[rouchambeau]

QUOTE

All human beings require love in order to flourish.

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your child to flourish, you ought to love her.


Now, your first objection was that an earlier 'ought' was not an ethical 'ought', so I produced the above which contains just such an ethical 'ought'.

I don't see how that makes love ethical, but whatever.


Now you retreat into the fall-back option that the one concerned might not want what was on offer. But, that objection has already been fielded. No word (like 'ought') can compel an action unless that person is already committed to the its 'moral force' (if such it may be called).

So, even if the 'ought ' was 'inherent' in the 'is' (to put this your way), that would not carry a 'moral force' unless the person involved was committed to it.
So? An ought that motivates has nothing to do with this.

As for the rest of your response, I think you're reading too much into my words. Maybe I'm being too sloppy with my language and we might do well to back-track?

So, when you say
Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.
Which is the "is" of that statement?

[gilhyle]

Yes the Socratic method...

Who uses it anyway?

Eh, you do, all the time. Your whole approach relies on this:


Of course, the problem is: it is not at all easy to say what a purely descriptive propostion is, nor one that is purely prescriptive.

The way this debate works is whoever tries to define a prescriptive statement looses....aint gonna be me :D

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

R:


I don't see how that makes love ethical, but whatever.

Ok, you give me what you think is ethical, and I will derive it from an 'is'.


An ought that motivates has nothing to do with this.

In that case, I have no idea what you are on about.


Which is the "is" of that statement?

Here it is, made more explicit (but far more stilted):

Premiss: Consider any mechanical device, if it is a car, then it requires lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

But there are countless other examples.

You really are floggong a dead bourgeois idea here.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Eh, you do, all the time. Your whole approach relies on this:

Not so; I use many critical methods, mostly neo-Wittgensteinian.

You are not suggesting, I hope, that Socrates was the only person ever to ask questions.

Socrates was an essentialist mystic, too, and relied on crass fallacies to make his point.


The way this debate works is whoever tries to define a prescriptive statement looses....aint gonna be me

I rather think it's more of a goal-post moving exercise, carried out by those trying to defend a mummified bourgeois theory.

[Oswy]

Rosa, all you're doing is shaping a conclusion to demand a prescription from a merely factual premiss. This is what you've been doing all along. Just because cars require lubricants to run well doesn't logically necessitate an action of any kind. It just doesn't! My car can sit on the driveway and happily rust away despite me having full knowledge of its benefit from lubricant. There's no required caring about lubricant from the premiss. Remember, the is/ough fallacy is saying that the premiss doesn't on its own produce prescriptive conclusions. Only by inserting ifs and buts into your conclusion do you then squeeze out a need to act on the premiss. I appreciate that you have a 'forthright' approach in your posting, and like to talk in a self-assured way which dimisses the objections of others out of hand, but you are not doing what you think you are doing here.

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 02, 2007 08:11 pm
H:


premiss 1: the man who lie also steal

premiss 2: the man who steal also kill

conclusion: the man who lie is a murderer

No clearer I'm afraid.
i give up Rosa you are agent Smith from Matrix movie :D

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OSWY:


Rosa, all you're doing is shaping a conclusion to demand a prescription from a merely factual premiss. This is what you've been doing all along.

No, read my posts again: I have refuted the bourgeois claim that it is imposible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.


Just because cars require lubricants to run well doesn't logically necessitate an action of any kind.

And, as I have also pointed out many times, even a categorical moral law cannot necessitate any action at all; people defy moral codes every day of the week.

Now, if you are trying to defend the view that the only way to necessitate obedience to moral law is to hold a gun to someone's head, then why don't you come clean, and say that?

I have derived a conclusion, that if somewone wants to maintain their car, then they are going to have to put oil in it. Now if they do not want to maintain their car, fine that is up to them. But, just as soon as they change their minds, they know what they are going to have to do.


Remember, the is/ough fallacy is saying that the premiss doesn't on its own produce prescriptive conclusions.

Ah, but it does; there is only one premiss (which contains no prescritive element at all), and one conclusion (that does).


Only by inserting ifs and buts into your conclusion do you then squeeze out a need to act on the premiss.

Then you have a beef with logic, not me. As far as logic (and everyday reasoning) is concerned, it is laughably easy to derive prescriptive conclusions from 'factual' premisses. Most of us do this on a daily basis (when we reason about what we should do to maintain cars, lawn mowers, vending machines, diswashers, TV's, guttering, roofs, friendships, our own health, a political party...).

Again you can reject this sort of logic if you want (and you can repudiate the ordinary reasoning that such logic formalises, even though you might find your life falling part as a result), but then you are going to find it hard to reconstruct another logic that will allow you to prove the impossibility of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'.

In fact, up to now, all you have done so far is assert the alleged truth of this bourgeois conclusion; you have made no attempt to prove it.

Hence, you can easily shut me up if you can construct such an impossibility proof (and good luck with that, you are going to need it).


I appreciate that you have a 'forthright' approach in your posting, and like to talk in a self-assured way which dimisses the objections of others out of hand, but you are not doing what you think you are doing here.

Even if that were so, I contend that you are not at all clear what the objectives are.

For example, quite apart from the absence of an impossibility proof, as noted above, you have given us no clear criteria that distinguishes 'factual' from 'prescriptive' language.

So, if I am in the dark, then I can put that down to your lack of clarity.

[You also seem to be rather unclear about the nature of logic.]

But, make no mistake, it is quite clear what you are doing: defending a bourgeois empiricist view of ethics, logic and language.

No wonder I am 'forthright' and dismissive.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

H:


i give up Rosa you are agent Smith from Matrix movie

And you are a character from the Jabberwocky:

http://www.jabberwocky.com/carroll/jabber/jabberwocky.html

[Oswy]

Rosa, you're still missing your error.

Nothing in the statement "Cars need lubricants to run well." requires us to do anything about it. We can let the car fall apart or we can go buy some lubricants, sure. But, I repeat, nothing in that statement of itself produces an 'ought'. Do you know what 'of itself' means? Now don't go trying to add a conclusion which injects the 'ought' because that's cheating! The is/ought fallacy is based on the idea that descriptive statements, like the one above, don't produce prescriptives within their own expression. I defy you to demonstrate prescriptive content in the above statement about cars and lubricant without you arbitrarily choosing to add an 'ought' in your conclusion. You can't do it. You just can't!

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 04, 2007 10:35 am
H:


i give up Rosa you are agent Smith from Matrix movie

And you are a character from the Jabberwocky:

http://www.jabberwocky.com/carroll/jabber/jabberwocky.html
Rosa becouse you are so smart answer me on this question but please dont be angry on me i just whant to find out how do you think

is it
10 X 0=0
or
10 X 0=10

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OSWY:


Nothing in the statement "Cars need lubricants to run well." requires us to do anything about it.

Yes..., so?

I already fielded that objection.

That is why my argument constitutes a derivation of a 'prescriptive' conclusion from a 'factual' premiss.


But, I repeat, nothing in that statement of itself produces an 'ought'

You seem to have a rather odd idea of language: no word 'produces' another word.

You are perhaps confusing this with magic (rabbits produced out of hats, etc), or maybe films (as in Terminator, produced by Woodruff Durferndorfer) -- or even child birth (after ten hours, the mother produced a healthy baby).

So, your ideas depend on the use of rather odd language.

Now, as I have told you too many times already, I have shown that a 'prescriptive' conclusion can be derived from a 'factual' premiss.

Now instead of providing us with the long overdue (i.e., 240 years overdue) impossibility proof, you just resort to table-thumping:


You can't do it. You just can't!

But what is it that I cannot do?


The is/ought fallacy is based on the idea that descriptive statements, like the one above, don't produce prescriptives within their own expression. I defy you to demonstrate prescriptive content in the above statement about cars and lubricant without you arbitrarily choosing to add an 'ought' in your conclusion.

Ok, here we go:

Premiss: Anyone who wants to demonstrate that OSWY is defending a bourgeois doctrine needs to construct a derivation of a 'prescriptive' conclusion from a 'factual' premiss, and they must produce the latter from the former.

Conclusion: Rosa wants to do the above so she ought to produce one. QED.

[I have clipped the conclusion a little to make it easier to folow.]

Now, can we have your impossibility proof?

If you do not have one, stop saying it is impsossible to derive an 'ought' fron an 'is'.

Or, check this out:

Premiss: An impossibility claim requires an impossibility proof.

Conclusion: OSWY has made such a claim so he ought to produce that proof.

And no 'if...then' anywhere in site in the above two arguments.

Prescriptive conclusion 'produced' from descriptive premisses.

[Moral: never pick a fight with a logician.]

[Oswy]

Sorry, Rosa, you're deluded, but hey, as long as you're happy!

[gauchisme]

the bourgeois claim

_

the tension between the descriptive and the prescriptive appears to me more intractable and mysterious than previous posts have appraised.

rosa seems to believe that description is the larger category (there are more things in the universe that *is* than there are things that *ought*), therefore we should simply acknowledge the possibility that there might be some things that *ought* among those that *is*, and "IF" there are, then those things that *ought* may "WANT" specific things that *is* to occur. morality thus defined is simply how to bring about the things you want - the everyday work of making things meaningful...

why is this too easy? oswy replies: "you're offering a conclusion which imputes value to a simply factual premise and then, retroactively, pretending that the premise carried the need for an evaluative conclusion (even though it is actually based on content in the conclusion)." ... i'd reply, because if there isn't an ought, then all those who think there is are wrong, and they shouldn't be ought-ing at all. they should be accepting what is, or better yet, they shouldn't even be thinking about things they should or shouldn't do. they aren't agents; they're just objects -- their very position suddenly looks self-defeating, but definitively, it's self-created...

what's the basis for moral decision-making if it can't be grounded in something deeper (and hopefully, more stable) than itself, if it simply refers to itself as a happenstance, in fact, if it's essentially synonymous with capricious chance?... if we happen to want to murder defenseless animals, then we will happen to ought that as well, and the same with vehicular maintenance. this descriptivity ends up eating itself whole; or put more simply, even if we do want lubricated cars and un-killed infants, WHY should we want it? and HOW is this wanting different or the same as something just existing like the computer in front of you?

_

instead let's try the opposite path. let's take the prescriptive/normative as primary... how is this possible? because in order for description to happen at all, it requires a frame of reference -- this frame is the ground floor of normativity (value) that makes descriptivity (facts) possible. there *is* no computer in front of you. when you were too young to remember, you learned to see in such a way that you can now separate out objects. the choice to see in this way is one you now have to take responsibility for. it's not very fair, but it is inescapable. you decided there ought to be objects. since you did, you've come across all different types of objects: some live only in your head, some live in the future or the past, some are right in front of you like this computer. but they're here because you're here, because you ought-ed it so...

burroughs said 'reality is a more or less constant scanning pattern'. he left out '...one that we're accountable for'.

_

no, i'm not sure i agree with that either... but here's the options as i see them:

(1) all the exists is objective, and we are determined like any other object, meaning moral choice lacks any other basis than itself, i.e. it's the illusion of change in a world that's already determined, the illusion of choice. enjoy the ride.

(2) all the ex-ists is subjective, and we choose to be what we are, choosing to create objects, maybe objects themselves being composed of values, which makes morals very important -- the decision to move from water to land was an ethical one, as the decision to evolve opposable thumbs, because we're stewards of the richness of all things existing. drive safe.

(3) 'subject-object' is a flawed division to start with, and the task is to unlearn it, to posit some kind of inter-subjectivity, some relativity, that can still rely on an absolute point (like the speed of light), or to inscribe one into the other at every turn in order to render the binary inoperative. stop the car.

(4) we'll never know for sure; it's a useless question to even ask. i'm not getting in.

* rosa, by the way, seems like someone who thinks that one way of enjoying the ride can be to drive safe... but if there's no way to alter the course of the car in any case, if all alterations we think we're making would've happened anyway because they are *ises and not *oughts*, if we have no reason to prefer control over chance, then the fact that morality is another way of saying that we can avoid accidents ends up not meaning much.

_

i know i'm being a little loosey-goosey here, but i think each one of these four variants constitutes a sort of a priori formulation implicit in some of the earlier arguments expressed.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OSWY:


Sorry, Rosa, you're deluded, but hey, as long as you're happy!

How disappointing!! :(

I was fully expecting a water-tight impossibility proof, and all I get is this stab at my good name.

I can only think that either you are not a Marxist, or not a revolutionary, if you think that a refutation of this hoary old bourgeois idea brands one as 'deluded'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

G:


rosa seems to believe that description is the larger category (there are more things in the universe that *is* than there are things that *ought*),

Where do I even hint that I believe this?

And this will need to be translated if I am to understand it, let alone acknowledge it as part of my belief system, or indeed, implied by any sub-set of the same:


therefore we should simply acknowledge the possibility that there might be some things that *ought* among those that *is*, and "IF" there are, then those things that *ought* may "WANT" specific things that *is* to occur. morality thus defined is simply how to bring about the things you want - the everyday work of making things meaningful...
:blink:

The rest seems not to be to the point at best, or confused at worst.

I have been trying to kill this bourgeois idea now for far too long; I simply haven't the energy to plough my way through your post.

Sorry! :(

[Oswy]

But Rosa I've repeatedly demonstrated that you are not deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' but constructing a conclusion which fabricates an ought. Anyone can do this, it's easy. It's clear that you have no clue as to the failing of your position here. You've made no serious attempt to engage with those of us who have countered you and have instead blustered about with your inflated claims to being supremely skilled in disproving the is/ought fallacy, yet you've actually done nothing of the sort.

Don't even bother replying to me because it's going to be yet another complete failure to recognise how you're in error.

[gauchisme]

"Where do I even hint that I believe this?" -- you're deriving ought from is, not the other way around (and by larger i don't really mean quantifiably bigger, but primary).

don't worry about the post, although you can skip down to the asterisk if you want.

[gauchisme]

even more basically i think you miss the distinction between describing what an ought is and how/why we derive an ought from what is.

for instance, let oswy try this one...


(1) a prescription X is valid if X has a set of descriptive properties Y.

(2) prescription X has properties Y.

:. (3) prescription X is valid.


... so we could replace X with "you ought to put oil in your car when it's about to run out" and Y with "it's about to run out of oil".

[rouchambeau]

So if you want something, you ought to do whatever it takes to get it?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

G:


"Where do I even hint that I believe this?" -- you're deriving ought from is, not the other way around (and by larger i don't really mean quantifiably bigger, but primary).

Sure but where do I even hint at this:


rosa seems to believe that description is the larger category (there are more things in the universe that *is* than there are things that *ought*),

"More" -- where did you get that idea from?

Not only have I never said this, I would never say this.

I never confuse scientific claims (like that) with philosophical ones.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

R:


So if you want something, you ought to do whatever it takes to get it?

Where did this whacky idea come from?

Forgive me guys, but have you all lost the ability to read?

All I have done is refute a bourgeois theory.

I have advocated no moral views here, nor will I.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

G:


(1) a prescription X is valid if X has a set of descriptive properties Y.

(2) prescription X has properties Y.

:. (3) prescription X is valid.

Forgive me, too, G, but this shows you have not really studied much logic.

How can a prescription be valid?

An argument can --, but a prescription???

And wtf is a 'descriptive property'?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OSWY, still putting off the day when he finally nails me with that impossibility proof we all know he has (sly little b*gger):


But Rosa I've repeatedly demonstrated that you are not deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' but constructing a conclusion which fabricates an ought. Anyone can do this, it's easy.

Not so, I did it more times than you have attempted to deny it.

And how does one 'fabricate' an ought'? Is it like making up an alibi? Or, a lie?

You really must start using language that makes sense.


It's clear that you have no clue as to the failing of your position here. You've made no serious attempt to engage with those of us who have countered you and have instead blustered about with your inflated claims to being supremely skilled in disproving the is/ought fallacy, yet you've actually done nothing of the sort

But, you have yet to tell us in what way I am 'failing', and in language that suggests you know what you are talking about.

So, if my attempt to refute this 'fallacy' is so weak, you should find it easy to reveal my mistakes.

Up to now all you have done is move the borgeois goalposts.


Don't even bother replying to me because it's going to be yet another complete failure to recognise how you're in error.

Well, so you keep saying, but that carries no more weight than if you said you were Spiderman.

Unless, of course, you can prove no such derivation can be made.

In that case, can we expect an impossibility proof any day soon? Otherwise, several RevLefters might begin to suspect that all your posts have been an elaborate smokescreen to hide the fact you do not have one.

Now, I can't keep covering for you forever.

Help me out here...

[syndicat]

one problem with the theory of the "is/ought fallacy" is that it is inconsistent with a naturalistic approach to ethics. a naturalistic approach to ethics grounds ethics in human nature, such as our capacity and need for self-direction, self-management, and our other needs. if the "is/ought" gap exists, how can ethics be grounded in human nature, which is biological fact? there are those who would say that Marxism presupposes a naturalistic ethics, that this is one area where Marxism is similar to Aristotle, as the good for humans is grounded in either case on human flourishing, the development of our human potential. for a naturalistic approach to ethics from a Marxist point of view, you might read "Ethics and Society" by Milton Fisk. (Fisk is an American Marxist.)

[Oswy]

I've got a feeling that somewhere in Marx is posited a difference betwen 'human nature' and 'the nature of man'. The former being composed of instinctive biologically driven behaviour and the latter being socially constructed behaviour attuned to specific material circumstances. My memory of this difference in Marx is vague so I'll bow to any one who can refute or clarify.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat, I could not agree more, and I think it is the kind of response Marx would have made, had he been alive today.

[syndicat]

I've got a feeling that somewhere in Marx is posited a difference betwen 'human nature' and 'the nature of man'. The former being composed of instinctive biologically driven behaviour and the latter being socially constructed behaviour attuned to specific material circumstances. My memory of this difference in Marx is vague so I'll bow to any one who can refute or clarify.

Marx held that humans are "creatures of practice." (one of his more important insights) By this he meant that social relations that govern the society are continually reproduced through our own behavior, as when workers develop habits of deference to authority from working day after day under the thumb of the bosses. The habits and dispositions and expectations we develop thru practice determine the social aspect of our nature.

Some Marxists make the inference that Marx held that all of our nature is a social creation. But this isn't quite Marx's view, as I interpret him. Rather, i think Marx held that part of our nature -- our "species being" -- is biological but part is created socially and thus can be changed by us. The biological aspect of our nature defines the limits of what is possible for us, and also defines our basic needs and human potential, such as our linguistic ability, our capacity for cooperative labor, and other biologically based aspects of our highly social nature.

Engels also makes some highly speculative suggestions that our biological nature has been affected or changed through our activity. But from what we know of evolution today, this would only be plausible as a speculation about the evolution of our ancestors hundreds of thousands of years ago. that's because our biological nature today is the same as that of our hunter/gatherer ancestors tens of thousands of years ago. this is the reply to conservatives who like to imagine that capitalist social relations are what we are "fit" for biologically. capitalism has existed for maybe 500 years and our biological nature hasn't changed in that period of time, which is a brief period from an evolutionary point of view. and there wasn't the institution of private property or the state in the epoch of our hunter/gatherer ancestors, and sharing (e.g. results of the hunt) were a part of the condition of life of humans back then.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Once more Syndicat, spot on!

[Volderbeek]

I think the disagreement in this topic is due to a confusion of the different types of morality. If we look at idealist morality ('killing is wrong'), then you really can't derive an ought from an is. You simply couldn't arrive at such a broad ethic with limited observations. If, though, we look at realist or consequentialist morality ('killing that guy would be wrong cause it would make his family grieve'), then you actually can derive ought from is rather easily. But you have to take in to consideration that idealist morality is abstracted and broadened from the realist variety.

But hold on, I'm not defending Rosa's view on this. I believe, and science supports this to some extent, that humans (as well as other animals) possess an innate moral sense, and this influences what is taken to be a favorable consequence/moral action.

Here are some sources regarding those innate ethics:

http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cf...57&ItemID=12865 (http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=57&ItemID=12865)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altruism_in_animals

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VB:


I think the disagreement in this topic is due to a confusion of the different types of morality. If we look at idealist morality ('killing is wrong'), then you really can't derive an ought from an is.

Much as we respect your authority here, we are going to need an impossibility proof if this is to become anything other than mere opinion.


But hold on, I'm not defending Rosa's view on this.

What view?

I have not expressed one. All I have done is show that this bourgeois empiricist idea is itself based on a fallacy, in that it is easy to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

[Volderbeek]

Originally posted by Rosa Lichtenstein+September 06, 2007 01:23 am--> (Rosa Lichtenstein @ September 06, 2007 01:23 am)VB:


I think the disagreement in this topic is due to a confusion of the different types of morality. If we look at idealist morality ('killing is wrong'), then you really can't derive an ought from an is.

Much as we respect your authority here, we are going to need an impossibility proof if this is to become anything other than mere opinion.[/b]
An impossibility proof? Isn't that a math thing?

My reasoning is simple: you can't take universal morals from isolated observations.


Rosa Lichtenstein

But hold on, I'm not defending Rosa's view on this.

What view?

I have not expressed one. All I have done is show that this bourgeois empiricist idea is itself a fallcy, in that it is easy to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

Haha. For one, the fact that that is a "bourgeois empiricist idea." BTW, calling everything you don't like "bourgeois" is a dangerous precedent.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VB:


An impossibility proof? Isn't that a math thing?

It can be, but in this case it would be in logic and or philosophy and logic.

If someone says derivation A, B or C is impossible, some sort of proof is needed over and above such an assertion. Otherwise it is mere opinion.

Like this:


you can't take universal morals from isolated observations.

How do you know this?

You don't; so you need a proof.

And that is not going to be easy to construct, since both myself and Syndicat have shown that this moribund idea is as bogus as it sounds -- we actually derived such things.


For one, the fact that that is a "bourgeois empiricist idea." BTW, calling everything you don't like "bourgeois" is a dangerous precedent.

No, in the case of dialectics, for example, that is a Hermetic theory, which is at least 2000 years old. So, I do not call everything I do not like 'bourgeois'.

And the 'bourgeois' accusation is not mine; it is a standard Marxist claim.

[Volderbeek]

Originally posted by Rosa Lichtenstein+September 06, 2007 02:35 am--> (Rosa Lichtenstein @ September 06, 2007 02:35 am)
you can't take universal morals from isolated observations.

How do you know this?

You don't; so you need a proof.

And that is not going to be easy to construct, since both myself and Syndicat have shown that this moribund idea is as bogus as it sounds -- we actually derived such things.[/b]
I derived it from simple reasoning. Besides, I'm not trying to refute your claims (at least not in that paragraph). I just explained why it can seem that ought can't come from is.


Rosa Lichtenstein

For one, the fact that that is a "bourgeois empiricist idea." BTW, calling everything you don't like "bourgeois" is a dangerous precedent.

No, in the case of dialectics, for example, that is a Hermetic theory, which is at least 2000 years old. So, I do not call everything I do not like 'bourgeois'.

And the 'bourgeois' accusation is not mine; it is a standard Marxist claim.

:lol: :lol: I was just going to make a joke about how you were going to say dialectics is an Illuminati conspiracy and here you come pretty close!

As to that though, Marx once wrote about how dialectics originated with the Greek philosopher Heraclitus. And if we get our timelines right, Heraclitus was dead long before Hermetic theory was conceived.

[hajduk]

so Rosa you didnt answer my question pleaasee
is it
10 X 0 = 0
or
10 X 0 = 10

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

VB:


I derived it from simple reasoning. Besides, I'm not trying to refute your claims (at least not in that paragraph). I just explained why it can seem that ought can't come from is.

Yes, homespun 'logic' like this might impress your Teddy Bear, but we are going to require the full proof.


I was just going to make a joke about how you were going to say dialectics is an Illuminati conspiracy and here you come pretty close!

Well, we have already noted your propensity to make stuff up.

Feel free to lie and dissemble some more.


As to that though, Marx once wrote about how dialectics originated with the Greek philosopher Heraclitus. And if we get our timelines right, Heraclitus was dead long before Hermetic theory was conceived.

Yes, that is why I added an 'at least' here:


No, in the case of dialectics, for example, that is a Hermetic theory, which is at least 2000 years old.

Now, Heraclitus was a born again mystic, of whom this source noted the following (taken from my Basic Introductory Essay, and you would have known this had you bothered to read it):


"Heraclitus, along with Parmenides, is probably the most significant philosopher of ancient Greece until Socrates and Plato; in fact, Heraclitus's philosophy is perhaps even more fundamental in the formation of the European mind than any other thinker in European history, including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Why? Heraclitus, like Parmenides, postulated a model of nature and the universe which created the foundation for all other speculation on physics and metaphysics. The ideas that the universe is in constant change and that there is an underlying order or reason to this change -- the Logos -- form the essential foundation of the European world view. Every time you walk into a science, economics, or political science course, to some extent everything you do in that class originates with Heraclitus's speculations on change and the Logos....

"In reading these passages, you should be able to piece together the central components of Heraclitus's thought. What, precisely, is the Logos? Can it be comprehended or defined by human beings? What does it mean to claim that the Logos consists of all the paired opposites in the universe? What is the nature of the Logos as the composite of all paired opposites? How does the Logos explain change? Finally, how would you compare Heraclitus's Logos to its later incarnations: in the Divided Line in Plato, in foundational and early Christianity? How would you relate Heraclitus's cryptic statements to those of Lao Tzu?" [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

The short answer to the last question is, obviously: The ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class! [RL]

http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GREECE/HERAC.HTM

More details here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Why%20...Oppose%20DM.htm (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm)


This is, of course, a doctrine that dialecticians share with all known mystical systems of thought (see, for example, here and here -- you can find these links in the original at my site; link below).

As Glenn Magee notes:

"Another parallel between Hermeticism and Hegel is the doctrine of internal relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else.... This principle is most clearly expressed in the so-called Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus, which begins with the famous lines "As above, so below." This maxim became the central tenet of Western occultism, for it laid the basis for a doctrine of the unity of the cosmos through sympathies and correspondences between its various levels. The most important implication of this doctrine is the idea that man is the microcosm, in which the whole of the macrocosm is reflected.

"...The universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosmic energies." [Magee (2001), p.13.]

You can find this here:

http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/...ks/en/magee.htm (http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/magee.htm)

and here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/glenn_magee.htm

Now some of the ideas Heraclitus was beginning to toy with later appeared in the Hermetic Tradition (and they reappear in every other mystical tradition of which we have any knowledge). [The ruling ideas and all that -- Heraclitus came from an elite family.]

I will be devoting a long Essay to proving this (to be published in 2008, or even 2009), but you can read an outline of it here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20016-7-14.htm

[4/5ths of the way down the page.]

You will need to try much harder than this to catch me out, sunshine.

I have already done more work on this than you can even begin to imagine.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

H:


so Rosa you didnt answer my question pleaasee
is it
10 X 0 = 0
or
10 X 0 = 10

Where did you ask this question?

Anyway: can you ask this in the 'Learning' section, where it belongs?

This thread is about ethics and logic, not basic mathematics.

[Although, you will need to learn to count first before you can understand the answer.]

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 06, 2007 02:32 pm
H:


so Rosa you didnt answer my question pleaasee
is it
10 X 0 = 0
or
10 X 0 = 10

Where did you ask this question?

Anyway: can you ask this in the 'Learning' section, where it belongs?

This thread is about ethics and logic, not basic mathematics.

[Although, you will need to learn to count first before you can understand the answer.]
the answer is

10 X 0 = 10

AND THIS QUESTION IS ABOUT LOGIC

[gilhyle]

Ok so this thread is about ethics and logic and your post is - somehow - about logic.....that does not mean its about what this thread is/was about, it was about logic AND ethics. However, if you can show that 10x0 'ought to' equal 10.....feel free :D

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil (I took this to be addresed to me; if not then Ok):


Ok so this thread is about ethics and logic and your post is - somehow - about logic.....that does not mean its about what this thread is/was about, it was about logic AND ethics. However, if you can show that 10x0 'ought to' equal 10.....feel free

I am not sure what you are going on about here.

This thread was about a notorious claim that 'is' cannot be derived from 'ought', and I have tackled that in my own way.

Now if you want to tackle it in another way, fine, go ahead and do so.

But, if you want me to try to show that 10 x 0 ought to equal 10, I will need to begin with a false premiss, won't I? Unless you allow me to equivocate quite alarmingly.

I could always use a disjunctive syllogism (since you did not say you wanted me to derive this from an 'is'); something like:

Either Paris is in Rome or 10 x 0 ought to equal 10"

But, Paris is not in Rome.

Therefore 10 x 0 ought to equal 10.

But I somehow do not think you meant that. [And you might be a 'Relevance Logician', who rejects the Disjunctive Syllogism, anyway.]

So, how about this (and it is not false either!):

Premiss: One way to screw with arithmetic is to adopt the rule: k x 0 = k (for any positive integer).

Conclusion: If NN has adopted this rule then for her either 1 x 0 ought to equal 1, or 2 x 10 x 0 ought to equal 2, or..., or 10 x 0 ought to equal 10,..., or (n-1) x 0 ought to equal (n-1), or n x 0 ought to equal n, or ... QED

How's that?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

H:


the answer is

10 X 0 = 10

AND THIS QUESTION IS ABOUT LOGIC

I am still not sure what the question is.

You can't expect me to answer a question if you haven't asked one.

Well, maybe you can...

[hajduk]

if you got 10 apples witch you try to multiply with 0
how many apples you left?
10
why?
becouse you still got 10 apples right?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Look, comrade, ask this in 'Learning'.

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 07, 2007 11:50 am
Look, comrade, ask this in 'Learning'.
no i whant to discouse with you Rosa becouse you have potential to make god point on this

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Maybe so, but what has this pseudo-problem got to do with this thread?

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 07, 2007 12:08 pm
Maybe so, but what has this pseudo-problem got to do with this thread?
it is not pseudo problem it is logic-philosophy problem connected with is/ought problem

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

In what way is this pseudo-problem connected with the alleged 'is'/'ought' 'fallacy'?

-------------------------------

I have split this thread, and posted Hajduk's arithmetical question in the Research section.

If you want to comment on that 'problem' please do so there.

---------------------------------

I have now posted a solution to Hajduk's 'problem' in that other thread.

[gilhyle]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 06, 2007 10:17 pm
Gil (I took this to be addresed to me; if not then Ok):


Rosa

I must be completely incomprehensible - probably too vague :D - but I was actually trying to agree with you.


Hajduk's question, it now turns out, is about the nature of mathematics.....now, who has the heart for that debate.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Hajduk's question, it now turns out, is about the nature of mathematics.....now, who has the heart for that debate.

Well, he did not seem to have a question (even though I asked him what it was, and several times), and his 'problem' was a pseudo-problem (which I have laid to rest in the thread I split off from this one -- now in the Research section), so whatever else he was on about, it was not the 'nature of mathematics'.

[hajduk]

ROSA look what i try to explain to you

10 x 0 IS 0

but

10 x 0 OUGHT TO BE 10

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ah, I get it!

Aplologies for being dim.

Unfortunately you have 'derived' a false conclusion from a true premiss, so your argument is invalid.

Now, I have shown in the research section why this is incorrect.

[awayish]

oh, hehe.

the struggle here is that, naturalistic descriptions are incommensurable with the moralist talk. (nonreductive) so, it is possible for the moralist talk to be itself a naturalistic process. the point is, moralist talk is itself a naturalistic process. although, this does not translate logically to moral talk. it is merely the case that, in a working moral judgment, this and this moral conclusion will be reached.

the 'flourishing' or 'health' is not meant to be taken as normative, but it does prescribe a moral outlook. the substantive area in naturalist ethics is something like virtue, a 'totality of behaving.' (since behaving has been abused to suggest overly behavioralist images, i must borrow terms. ) although it is not at all impossible to talk about ethics in non-virtue terms under naturalism.

i think now, the general account of morality as naturalistic is undeniably true, but in daily operations, it is still ok to use moralist logic on things. after all, you yourself is an admissible empirical data point in teh naturalistic analysis of morals.

[gauchisme]

p: 'this watch can't keep accurate time.'
p: 'this watch is too big to carry around.'
c: 'this is a bad watch'.
_
the premises are descriptive; the conclusion is evaluative; therefore it's possible to move from descriptive premises to an evaluative conclusion.

is/ought-gap bridged.

[gilhyle]

Except its not a logically valid argument the premises dont imply the conclusion

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Except its not a logically valid argument the premises dont imply the conclusion

But, they do in the examples I gave earlier in this thread.

[gauchisme]

yes, but it's not invalid because it moves from descriptive to evaluative... like a. n. prior wrote:

a. Tea-drinking is common in England.
b. Therefore, tea-drinking is common in England, or all New Zealanders ought to be shot.

http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2006/03/the_isought_gap.html
_

a good watch keeps time.
this watch fails to keep time.
therefore, this is a bad watch.

broken = bad.

[Oswy]

I've been through the thread again and I still don't see any values being logically and necessarily derived from facts, only weak attempts at making it look like that can happen.

Once people start to believe that an 'is' really can produce an 'ought' they are on their way to accepting all kinds of reactionary explanations.

[Oswy]

p: 'this watch can't keep accurate time.'
p: 'this watch is too big to carry around.'
c: 'this is a bad watch'.
_
the premises are descriptive; the conclusion is evaluative; therefore it's possible to move from descriptive premises to an evaluative conclusion.

is/ought-gap bridged.

The fact of a watch being 'too big to carry around' does not of itself produce an ought, only the importation of the wanting to carry it (via the use of 'bad') does so. As ever, there is no real logical step from the is to the ought.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


As ever, there is no real logical step from the is to the ought.

1) There is; my examples show this.

2) To accept your statement that there is no link, we would need a proof.


I've been through the thread again and I still don't see any values being logically and necessarily derived from facts, only weak attempts at making it look like that can happen.

You will need to show that 'values' are connected with 'ought'. To date, people just asume this connection; we'd need proof here too.

--------------------

Gauchisme, not many here will recognise the valid schema you have used in your last post

p, ergo pvq.

I am not denying it, but there are better derivations of 'ought' from 'is' than this.

[trivas7]

I am not denying it, but there are better derivations of 'ought' from 'is' than this.
IMO the problem is that 'is/ought' can mean either a cause-effect relationship or a moral one. Of course causes have effects, nevertheless one can't derive a moral code from the facts of reality.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Of course causes have effects, nevertheless one can't derive a moral code from the facts of reality.

Unfortunately for you, we can, as my examples show.

[trivas7]

Marx held that humans are "creatures of practice." (one of his more important insights)

I'm not sure I agree with this. Marx held in his earlier work that human possess a "species being" that comes out of the practice of human labor -- extracting from nature to satisfy human needs. Is this what you mean?

[trivas7]

Trivas:
Unfortunately for you, we can, as my examples show.
Your examples are examples of a cause-effect relation, not that moral norms are facts like any other, i.e:

All human beings require love in order to flourish.

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your child to flourish, you ought to love her.

This is a cause-effect relation, it's not a fact that my child ought to flourish.

Even Wittgenstein didn't believe this.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas, Syndicat no longer posts at RevLeft, and hasn't done so for about six months.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Your examples are examples of a cause-effect relation, not that moral norms are facts like any other, i.e:

All human beings require love in order to flourish.

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your child to flourish, you ought to love her.

This is a cause-effect relation, it's not a fact that my child ought to flourish.

Even Wittgenstein didn't believe this.

1) Most things (even the arguments in Das Kapital) are based on causes of various sorts, so I do not see what the problem is.

2) My arguments are aimed at showing that the bourgeois empiricist claim (that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is') is itself mistaken, and so it is independent of any and all causal concerns. Whether you are right or wrong when you say this:


This is a cause-effect relation, it's not a fact that my child ought to flourish.

it has nothing whatsoever to do with whether the conclusion follows from the premisses.

3) Last point: so what; Wittgenstein was not a logician.

[trivas7]

2) My arguments are aimed at showing that the bourgeois empiricist claim (that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is') is itself mistaken, and so it is independent of any and all causal concerns. Whether you are right or wrong when you say this:

My point that is that a moral code can't be derived from the facts of reality, which is the usual context of this debate.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


My point that is that a moral code can't be derived from the facts of reality, which is the usual context of this debate.

1) Well this thread is about the 'is/ought fallacy', which I have shown is no fallacy'. It is not about 'moral codes'.

2) We will of course need a proof that "a moral code can't be derived from the facts of reality", especially since Syndicat showed that ethical principles can indeed be derived from such fatcs.

[trivas7]

2) We will of course need a proof that "a moral code can't be derived from the facts of reality", especially since Syndicat showed that ethical principles can indeed be derived from such fatcs.
What constitutes a proof in discussions philosphical for you Rosa? IMO proof is a mathematical term, not a philosophic one.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


What constitutes a proof in discussions philosphical for you Rosa? IMO proof is a mathematical term, not a philosophic one.

In this case, of course, it would be impossible, for a proof must proceed from true premisses to a true conclusion -- but the conclusion here is false.

In general, proofs in philosophy are rather rare, and in all cases entirely bogus.

But, when those who believe in traditional philosophy come out with dogmatic statements, to put them on the spot (and to unmask their dogmatism) I generally ask for a proof.

By 'traditional philosophy' I mean the practice that has been around since ancient Greek times (in the 'west') whereby certain sage-like figures utter gnomic statements which everyone is expected to accept with hushed deference, or at least to treat with inordinate respect.

Asking for a proof is a way if taking a huge pin aimed a exposing/deflating such dogmatism.

Philosophy for me is about uravelling confusion and exposing dogmatism, not seeking ultimate truth (an idea which is as religious as it is confused) uttered by the odd guru or two.

Science reveals truth to us; traditional philosophy just wraps confusion up in high-falluting language.

[Oswy]

How to derive a 'value' from a fact:

Premiss: All cats are mammals

Conclusioin: If you 'value' your cat, you 'value' a mammal. QEDThe problem here, as elsewhere, is that the conclusion pretends to retrospectively derive its evaluative content from the premiss, despite the obvious fact that the premiss does not carry any information about which 'value' can be attained. The is/ough fallacy still stands.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


The problem here, as elsewhere, is that the conclusion pretends to retrospectively derive its evaluative content from the premiss, despite the obvious fact that the premiss does not carry any information about which 'value' can be attained. The is/ough fallacy still stands.

1) As you have had pointed out to you many times in this thread, such arguments do not 'pretend' to do anything; they actually derive a 'value' judgement from a proposition expressing a fact.

The whole thrust of meeting the 'is/ought' challenge is to derive an 'evaluative'/ethical conclusion from premisses that do "not carry any information about which 'value' can be attained", so it is hardly to the point to complain when we keep doing this!

2) We are still waiting for your proof that it is a fallacy to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

[trivas7]

The problem here, as elsewhere, is that the conclusion pretends to retrospectively derive its evaluative content from the premiss, despite the obvious fact that the premiss does not carry any information about which 'value' can be attained. The is/ough fallacy still stands.
Indeed. Conclusions themselves can't be conditionals.

[trivas7]

In general, proofs in philosophy are rather rare, and in all cases entirely bogus.

Then you are being entirely disingenuous to ask for proof that you know is bogus.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Conclusions themselves can't be conditionals.

They most certainly can, in formal logic, discursive logic and everyday reasoning.

Here is an everyday example:

Premiss: You say you are not sure what Marx means by 'relative form of value'.

Conclusion: If you really want to know, then you should study Das Kapital very carefully.

And several of the examples given earlier in this thread did not have conditional conclusions.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Then you are being entirely disingenuous to ask for proof that you know is bogus.

1) I do it to expose your dogmatism, as I have done yet again.

2) Even if I am being 'disingenouous', I am no more so than you are when you keep coming out with dogmatic statements you cannot justify, and which you lifted from bourgeois theorists like Hume and Hegel.

[trivas7]

2) Even if I am being 'disingenouous', I am no more so than you are when you keep coming out with dogmatic statements you cannot justify, and which you lifted from bourgeois theorists like Hume and Hegel.
I see. This begs the question of what justifies philosophic statements. And what dogma is it you think I'm propounding (and what makes it dogmatic)?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


This begs the question of what justifies philosophic statements. And what dogma is it you think I'm propounding?

1) Well, I do not think anything does -- philosophical theses are just hot air on stilts.

2) Your question is disingenuous itself; I have been telling you almost since the first day you arrived at RevLeft that much of what you say is mere dogma. There are now far too many even to begin to list.

The latest two are these:


Conclusions themselves can't be conditionals.

a moral code can't be derived from the facts of reality

[trivas7]

Here is an everyday example:

Premiss: You say you are not sure what Marx means by 'relative form of value'.

Conclusion: If you really want to know, then you should study Das Kapital very carefully.

Nothing follows logically from the fact that I'm not sure what Marx means by 'relative form of value'. It only follows that If I really want to know what Marx means by 'relative form of value', then I should study Capital very carefully.



2) Your question is disingenuous itself; I have been telling you almost since the first day you arrived at RevLeft that much of what you say is mere dogma.

I see. So the question "what makes it dogma?" Is a false appearance of frankness . What makes you think I am not being frank?


The latest two are these:
What makes these statements dogmatic? Just the fact that they are philosophical without an attempt at justifying them? Are only empirical statements nondogmatic IYO?

[Oswy]

Oswy:



1) As you have had pointed out to you many times in this thread, such arguments do not 'pretend' to do anything; they actually derive a 'value' judgement from a proposition expressing a fact.

The whole thrust of meeting the 'is/ought' challenge is to derive an 'evaluative'/ethical conclusion from premisses that do "not carry any information about which 'value' can be attained", so it is hardly to the point to complain when we keep doing this!

2) We are still waiting for your proof that it is a fallacy to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

Nothing about a cat being a mammal as a fact produces information about 'value'; hence there is nothing in the premiss which makes 'value' logically derived. You are dogmatically blind to your poor reasoning here, as you have been in this whole debate.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Nothing follows logically from the fact that I'm not sure what Marx means by 'relative form of value'. It only follows that If I really want to know what Marx means by 'relative form of value', then I should study Capital very carefully.

1) The 'you' in the premiss is not you, but the person being spoken to in the argument. I would prefer to have expressed this argument in the following way:

Premiss: NN says she is not sure what Marx means by 'relative form of value'.

Conclusion: If NN really wants to know, then NN should study Das Kapital very carefully.

Where 'NN' stands for the name of the other person. I didn't do this since I wanted to make it as colloquial as possible.

2) What you say in fact supports, it does not undermine, the conclusion I said that follows. Just look at what you posted:


It only follows that If I really want to know what Marx means by 'relative form of value', then I should study Capital very carefully

Compare that to the conclusion I gave:


If you really want to know, then you should study Das Kapital very carefully.

In other words, you agree with me!


So the question "what makes it dogma?" Is a false appearance of frankness . What makes you think I am not being frank?

What on earth makes you think that I think 'frankness' has anything to do with this?

You are a dogmatist whether or not you are being frank.


What makes these statements dogmatic? Just the fact that they are philosophical without an attempt at justifying them? Are only empirical statements nondogmatic IYO?

The fact that you cannot justify them in any way, even after you are asked to do so, and even after I have shown them to be false.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


Nothing about a cat being a mammal as a fact produces information about 'value'; hence there is nothing in the premiss which makes 'value' logically derived. You are dogmatically blind to your poor reasoning here, as you have been in this whole debate.

I already covered that reply earlier; here is what I said then:


You seem to have a rather odd idea of language: no word 'produces' another word.

You are perhaps confusing this with magic (rabbits produced out of hats, etc), or maybe films (as in Terminator, produced by Woodruff Durferndorfer) -- or even child birth (after ten hours, the mother produced a healthy baby).

So, your ideas depend on the use of rather odd language.

Now, as I have told you too many times already, I have shown that a 'prescriptive' conclusion can be derived from a 'factual' premiss.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=979422&postcount=50

And we can add to this that the idea that facts about cats can or cannot 'produce' things is not less odd -- it is human beings who produce things, but even that has no bearing on the matter in hand.

Once more, it follows from the fact that if a cat is a mammal, then whatever you do to a cat, or whatever attitude you take toward it, you do, or take, that to a mammal.

Now, you can thump the table yet again, but that does not affect the fact that the conclusion follows.

You would not, I hope, question this argument:

Premiss: All cats are mammals.

Conclusion: So, if you have a cat you have a mammal.

Or to this:

Premiss: All cats are mammals.

Conclusion: So, if you do to something to a cat you do to something to a mammal.

But then you object to this:

Premiss: All cats are mammals.

Conclusion: So, if you value a cat you value a mammal.

The only reason it seems that you have for objecting is the fact that you maintain, without any proof at all, that an 'ought' or a 'value' statement cannot follow from an 'is', even though other things plainly follow from an 'is'.

Now, just as soon as you share that proof with us, I will accept that this is indeed a fallacy.

Until then, my refutation of this bourgeois idea remains in place.

[trivas7]

What on earth makes you think that I think 'frankness' has anything to do with this?

Because the definition of disingenuousness is the false appearance of frankness.


The fact that you cannot justify them in any way, even after you are asked to do so, and even after I have shown them to be false.
But you've just admitted that nothing justifies philosophic statements: so again you are being disingenuous, viz.:


This begs the question of what justifies philosophic statements.


1) Well, I do not think anything does -- philosophical theses are just hot air on stilts.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


Because the definition of disingenuousness is the false appearance of frankness.

Ah, I see.


But you've just admitted that nothing justifies philosophic statements: so again you are being disingenuous, viz.:

Not so; I am quite open about what I am doing.

But, none of this means you are not a dogmatist.

[trivas7]

Not so; I am quite open about what I am doing.

But, none of this means you are not a dogmatist.
But OTOH I don't provide justification for what I say; OTO you say nothing can justify philosophic statement. So it must be that my very uttering them is what makes me a dogmatist, is that it?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Trivas:


But OTOH I don't provide justification for what I say; OTO you say nothing can justify philosophic statement. So it must be that my very uttering them is what makes me a dogmatist, is that it?

Philosophical dogmatism has its origin here:


"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65.]

You are just doing what this tradition tells you to do: propounding super-truths which can be obtained from thought alone, but which cannot be justified except by yet more of the same, but not by any other means.

So, it is not so much your uttering them that is the problem, it is the age-old tradition to which you give voice that is.

[Oswy]

ROSA:

Premiss: All cats are mammals.

Conclusion: So, if you value a cat you value a mammal.


This is logically no different from stating:



Premiss: All cats are mammals.

Conclusion: So, if you like torturing a cat you like torturing a mammal.


Obviously you could offer any number of bizarre variations, indeed variations that contradict each other:



Premiss: All cats are mammals.

Conclusion: So, if you don't value a cat you don't value a mammal.


Where does this get you in terms of extracting something meaningful and consistent from the premiss? Nowhere, because none of the valuing, not-valuing or torturing are to be derived from the premiss itself, they are simply plucked from the air by preference. This doesn't touch the is/ought fallacy because the is/ought fallacy states that the premiss can't of itself produce the evaluative conclusion.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


Obviously you could offer any number of bizarre variations, indeed variations that contradict each other:

Indeed, but this just shows that it is in fact possible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

Hence, your objection is no more relevant than this would be:

"You say you can go from New York to Chicago by plane. But that is no different from saying that you can go from New York to Pittsburg by plane."

It is no objection to one route from A to B for you to quote another from A to C.


Where does this get you in terms of extracting something meaningful and consistent from the premiss? Nowhere, because none of the valuing, not-valuing or torturing are to be derived from the premiss itself, they are simply plucked from the air by preference.

I'll tell you where it gets us: it refutes the bourgeois empiricist claim that one cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.


This doesn't touch the is/ought fallacy because the is/ought fallacy states that the premiss can't of itself produce the evaluative conclusion

So, you are now back to 'produce' again. I've already dealt with that.

If you mean by 'produce', 'derive', then it is laughably easy to 'produce' an 'evaluative' conclusion' from a 'non-evaluative' premiss, as I have shown.

However, and once more, we need to see your proof of this:


the premiss can't of itself produce the evaluative conclusion

If you haven't got a proof, then this is just an opinion of yours, and one that flies in the face of the fact that this it easy to do what you keep saying can't be done.

[Oswy]

Sorry Rosa you're just trapped in a bubble as far as I'm concerned.

You still, still, have not derived an evaluative statement from a merely factual premiss. You're just going around in circles producing evaluative statements from conclusions.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


Sorry Rosa you're just trapped in a bubble as far as I'm concerned.

You still, still, have not derived an evaluative statement from a merely factual premiss. You're just going around in circles producing evaluative statements from conclusions.

Then the problem lies with you, for you seem not to understand the word 'derive'.

And: once more, we need to see your proof of this:


the premiss can't of itself produce the evaluative conclusion

If you haven't got a proof, then this is just an opinion of yours, and one that flies in the face of the fact that this it easy to do what you keep saying can't be done.

Why are you continually ignoring this?

[Oswy]

Rosa,

I don't believe you are correct for one moment, but let's give you the benefit. If you are correct and, as you've 'demonstrated' any evaluative conclusion can be established in relation to merely factual premisses then you're actually demonstrating at least the spirit of the is/ough fallacy; that there's no consistent or fixed evaluative conclusion from factual premisses. Now don't double-back on yourself, you've conceded that any number of evaluative conclusions can be brought out of the very same premiss - even contradictory ones. Thus, even in the setting of your own 'logic' you're showing the power of the is/ought fallacy.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy (still refusing even to attempt to prove the bourgeois empiricist thesis he has uncritically swallowed):


I don't believe you are correct for one moment, but let's give you the benefit. If you are correct and, as you've 'demonstrated' any evaluative conclusion can be established in relation to merely factual premisses then you're actually demonstrating at least the spirit of the is/ough fallacy; that there's no consistent or fixed evaluative conclusion from factual premisses. Now don't double-back on yourself, you've conceded that any number of evaluative conclusions can be brought out of the very same premiss - even contradictory ones. Thus, even in the setting of your own 'logic' you're showing the power of the is/ought fallacy.

This seems contradictiory, for if I, among many others, have shown that 'ought' can be derived from 'is', and that 'evaluative' conclusions' can follow from 'factual' premises, then it is hard to agree that I'm:


actually demonstrating at least the spirit of the is/ough fallacy; that there's no consistent or fixed evaluative conclusion from factual premisses.

On the contrary, this is as 'fixed' and 'consistent' as are the countless instantiations there are of this stencil (one of many):

Premiss: All Fs are Gs.

Conclusion: Anyone who φ-ies an F, φ-ies a G.

Where "φ-ies" can be replaced by any verb or evaluative attitude, etc. Caveat: these have to be non-referentailly opaque contexts:

http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/referentialopacity.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opaque_context

But even then, there are ways to circumvent this.


Now don't double-back on yourself, you've conceded that any number of evaluative conclusions can be brought out of the very same premiss - even contradictory ones. Thus, even in the setting of your own 'logic' you're showing the power of the is/ought fallacy

But, I have already covered this. You need to respond to my reply, and not just repeat what is in fact not relevant to this case.

Yet again: we need to see your proof of this:


the premiss can't of itself produce the evaluative conclusion

If you haven't got a proof, then this is just an opinion of yours, and one that flies in the face of the fact that this it easy to do what you keep saying can't be done.