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jacobin1949
22nd August 2007, 22:26
Difference between Five Year Plan and Great Leap Forward?

Why did Stalin's 5 Year Plan succeed in raising Soviet industrial levels to that of Britain and Germany while Mao's Great Leap Forward actually lead to a temporary decline in output? What were the fundamental design and calculation's differences in planning and focus?

PigmerikanMao
23rd August 2007, 00:37
Originally posted by [email protected] 22, 2007 09:26 pm
Difference between Five Year Plan and Great Leap Forward?

Why did Stalin's 5 Year Plan succeed in raising Soviet industrial levels to that of Britain and Germany while Mao's Great Leap Forward actually lead to a temporary decline in output? What were the fundamental design and calculation's differences in planning and focus?
Prove Mao's plan led to a decline and output... THEN I'll argue with you.

OneBrickOneVoice
23rd August 2007, 02:32
In the end the programs of the GLF were responsible for the end to all starvation, a yearly phenomenon in China pre-1962 (I think is the date), along with greatly decrease child mortality rates, increase life expectancy, literacy, etc...

The difference between the 5 year plan and the GLF is that the 5 year plan faced alot more resistance from kulaks, even though they were relatively small grouping, they burned crops and witheld crops messing up the plan. The GLF did not face such problems, however, it did rely on Soviet industrial blueprints which were pulled when the PRC slightly critiscisized Khrushchev-Soviet hegemony. Both plans faced brutal weather, resulting in crop failures and harsh times. In the end however, both plans collectivized land in their respective countries resulting in for the first time in history, the masses being in control of the land they worked, and having a say. I think moreso in China though.

jacobin1949
23rd August 2007, 04:04
The 2nd Five-Year Plan (1958-1962)
http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/157606.htm

The tasks set out under this Plan were:

First, to continue industrial construction with a focus on heavy industry, push forward technical reconstruction and lay a solid foundation for China's socialist industrialization.

Second, to continue socialist transformation, consolidate and enlarge the shares of collective ownership and ownership by the people.

Third, with basic construction and socialist transformation already established, to further boost industry, agriculture, handicrafts, transportation and commerce.

Fourth, to cultivate talents, strengthen scientific research and development to fulfill the needs of socialist economic and cultural development;

Fifth, riding on the basic industrial and agricultural development, to strengthen national defense and improve people's living standards and cultural awareness.

Major achievements during this time included:

Industrial output value had doubled; the gross value of agricultural products increased by 35 percent; steel production in 1962 was between 10.6 million tons or 12 million tons; investment in capital construction rose to 40 percent from 35 percent in the First Five-Year Plan period; the investment in capital construction was doubled; and the average income of workers and farmers increased by up to 30 percent.

However, many planning targets were modified and raised continuously during this time. In August 1958, the Political Bureau of the CPC held a conference in Beidaihe, Hebei Province, to discuss the Plan. Targets were raised from the last plan, and a decision was made that socialist construction would create conditions for the transition to a communist society. It was also set out that by 1962, China would have a strong, independent and complete industrial system, surpassing the United Kingdom and catching up with the United States in terms of the quality of key products. Gross value of agricultural products would increase 270 percent in five years, grain production in 1962 would reach 750 billion kilograms, cotton 150 million dan (1 dan = 50 kilograms), steel 80 million tons, coal 900 million tons and cotton yarn 16 million pieces. Capital construction investment in the five years would reach 385 billion yuan and major construction projects were to surpass 1,000.

The Great Leap Forward and Anti-Rightist movements that emerged in 1958 caused imbalances in the national economy, fiscal deficits over consecutive years, great hardship for the people. Realizing that it would be difficult to maintain the pace of economic development as envisioned, the government had to make certain adjustments. The State Planning Commission brought forward the policy of readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement, as laid out in its Report on Controlling Figures of National Economic Planning in 1961, and the CPC Central Committee disseminated it to subordinate departments in September 1960. It was officially approved at the Ninth Session of the Eighth National Congress of CPC in January 1961.

http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/157606.htm

http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t20060529_71334.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/g...line/156529.htm (http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/guideline/156529.htm)

PigmerikanMao
23rd August 2007, 04:57
I'll say it again; prove it. :lol:

Ahura Mazda
25th August 2007, 07:53
Originally posted by [email protected] 23, 2007 03:57 am
I'll say it again; prove it. :lol:
I can't prove that output was decreased, but I can surely give sites showing that it was a monstrous and stupid thing for mao to do.

http://www.catallarchy.net/blog/archives/2...st-cannibalism/ (http://www.catallarchy.net/blog/archives/2005/05/01/communist-cannibalism/)


While these stories are horrific, they pale in comparison to the history given by Wei Jingsheng about China’s Great Leap Forward.1

As soon as I arrived here, I often heard peasants talking about the Great Leap Forward as though it was some sort of apocalypse that they had by some miracle escaped. Quite fascinated, I questioned them in detail about the subject so that soon I too was convinced that the “three years of natural catastrophes” had not been as natural as all that, and had rather been the result of a series of political blunders. The peasants said, for example, that in I959-60, during the “Communist Wind” [one of the official names for the Great Leap Forward] their hunger had been so great that they had not even been strong enough to harvest the rice crop when it was ready, and that it would otherwise have been a relatively good year for them. Many of them died of hunger watching the grains of rice fall into the fields, blown off by the wind. In some villages there was literally no one left to take in the harvest. One time I was with a relative who lived a small distance away from our village. On the way to his home, we went past a deserted village. All the houses had lost their roofs. Only the mud walls remained.

Thinking it was a village that had been abandoned during the Great Leap Forward, when all the villages were being reorganized and relocated, I asked why the walls hadn’t been knocked down to make room for more fields. My relative replied: “But these houses all belong to people, and you can’t knock them down without their permission.” I stared at the walls and couldn’t believe that they were actually inhabited. “Of course they were inhabited! But everyone here died during the `Communist Wind,’ and no one has ever come back. The land was then shared out among the neighboring villages. But because it seemed possi*ble that some of them might come back, the living quarters were never shared out. Still, that was so long ago, I don’t think anyone will come back now.”
We walked along beside the village. The rays of the sun shone on the jade-green weeds that had sprung up between the earth walls, accen*tuating the contrast with the rice fields all around, and adding to the desolation of the landscape. Before my eves, among the weeds, rose up one of the scenes I had been told about, one of the banquets at which the families had swapped children in order to eat them. I could see the worried faces of the families as they chewed the flesh of other people’s children. The children who were chasing butterflies in a nearby field seemed to be the reincarnation of the children devoured by their par*ents. I felt sorry for the children, but not as sorry as I felt for their parents. What had made them swallow that human flesh, amidst the tears and grief of other parents-flesh that they would never have imag*ined tasting, even in their worst nightmares? In that moment I under*stood what a butcher he had been, the man “whose like humanity has not seen in several centuries, and China not in several thousand years":” Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong and his henchmen, with their criminal political system, had driven parents mad with hunger and led them to hand their own children over to others, and to receive the flesh of others to appease their own hunger. Mao Zedong to wash away the crime that he had committed in assassinating democracy (an allusion to the Hundred Flowers trap], had launched the Great Leap Forward, and obliged thou*sands and thousands of peasants dazed by hunger to kill one another with hoes, and to save their own lives thanks to the flesh and blood of their childhood companions. They were not the real killers; the real killers were Mao Zedong and his companions. At last I understood where Peng Dehuai had found the strength to attack the Central Com*mittee of the Party led by Mao, and at last I understood why the peas*ants loathed Communism so much, and why they had never allowed anyone to attack the policies of Liu Shaoqi, “three freedoms and one guarantee.” For the good and simple reason that they had no intention of ever having to eat their own flesh and blood again, or of killing their companions to eat them in a moment of instinctual madness. That reason was far more important than any ideological consideration.