Commonsense

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Praxicoide posted this (in the Learning section) a few weeks ago, to which I have still to reply:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/common-sense-t62239/index.html

P:


When you brought up the distinction, I said that making up ideological constructs to tear them down was not important, what is important is to look at the issue being brought fourth (common sense).

Once more, I made this distinction in order to question the theoretical (or quasi-theoretical) use of this phrase.

In response to this comment of mine:


I suspect you have confused these [i.e., 'self-evident' truths] with patent truths no one would think to deny, such as we all have parents, and our shadows are roughly our own projected shapes.

But, once more, have you ever heard anyone, let alone everyone, you have ever met utter any of these?

You said:


Sure I have, and many other of the kind. What is your evidence that says this is not so?

But earlier, you claimed that such requests for evidence were out of place on web forums. Are you now changing your mind?

If so, then I need you to quote all the evidence that shows there is such a thing as 'commonsense', as it is imagined to be by various theorists, and it seems by you too.

As to my 'evidence', you need to note that I merely said I 'suspected' this was so, and your admission above, that you have indeed confused these things, clearly obviates the need for any evidence.

I said the following about this empty term (i.e., 'commonsense':


Even you are struggling: after all, both of your attempted 'definitions' have failed.

To which you responded:


I have only given one.

That is why I put he word in 'scare quotes' since I do not think you have given even one -- and the 'one' you did give failed anyway.

So, we still do not know what you are referring to (in my sense of the word, or in yours).

P:


Not at all, any careful study could bring sufficient results.

Well, I have given you reasons why I think no study of this sort could ever work, so this response will hardly do.

To which you responded:


This is why there is a method for this.

Perhaps then you can tell us what this method is, and what the results have been?

I posted this:


Here is 'Definition' One:

P:


Precisely, it's a inconsistent level of thought; with juxtaposed, not connected, fleshed out notions.

This ropes in the above and much more.

To which you replied:


That was never a definition. You just assumed it so. I was merely stating that common sense notions are inconsistent (not thoroughly reflected) by people.

Again, I put the word in 'scare' quotes for that reason.

The point is, that whatever it was, it failed badly.

I then made this point:


Here is 'Definition' Two (which is inconsistent with One):

P:


but I again, ventured that when people speak of "common sense" they refer to "self evident" truths, arrived from their everyday activity

This has as part of common sense the uninspiring notion that all bachelors are married, which while uninteresting is hardly an "inconsistent level of thought; with juxtaposed, not connected, fleshed out notions."

In fact, the more I am getting you to think about this, the more your own ideas are approaching an "inconsistent level of thought; with juxtaposed, not connected, fleshed out notions".

Hardly an 'hypothesis' then; more a confused set of ideas worthy of nothing else but the very title you earlier wanted to give to 'commonsense'.

I re-iterate: no one, not even you, seems to have a clue what 'commonsense' is.

To which you replied:


I already answered this. I explained this before in a previous post as well.

Not so -- you merely brushed it aside.

Anyway, this 'definition' would allow in rather too many things I think you might want to leave out, and would omit others you might want to include. For example, person NN says of herself "I like coffee" (which is self-evident (in your sense) to NN, and based on her everyday activity). This cannot be part of 'commonsense' (not could any expressed like or dislike, such as this), but your definition allows it in.

On the other hand, it would exclude from commonsense things like "Massive volcanic eruptions a few metres away are not good for the health', which while a common belief, is not based on 'everyday' activity. And it would exclude, with respect to NN again, this: "My name is NN", which is self-evident to NN, but is not based on any experience at all.

In response to this of mine:


Well, that infection will bias the results, for it needs to feature in any interpretation of them, let alone in the framing of the methodology.

In which case, the results will not be 'scientific', but 'commonsensical' (whatever that is).

You replied:


I guess then that there is no such thing as a social science, then.
That does not follow, since there are ways of filtering things out in social science, but they do not work here.

Unless, of course, you can show otherwise.

In reply to this comment of mine:


Since then, we have seen you disagree with yourself.

So, no explanation needed; you are my best witness for the prosecution; you cannot agree with yourself.

The fact that experts cannot do so either is just an extension of your own confusion. They too struggle with this notion. And that is no surprise. This is an invented 'concept' and bears no relation to anything in reality.
You replied:


You in confusion assigned me a definition when there was not.

So, until you, or they, come up with something better, and with evidence to support it, I re-iterate:

{But what you wanted to re-iterate was not too clear; your words break off here}.

Well, you tried to 'describe'/'loosely-characterise' this notion in a way that conflicted with the above definition, neither of which work.

In that case, we still have no clear idea what you or anyone else is banging on about when they speak of 'commonsense'.

In reply to this of mine:


To repeat: you know about dogs because you were socialised to speak of them.

You said:


Yes, and we are able to distinguish and speak of them because we conceptualize them.

Well, that depends on what you mean by 'conceptualise'. If you mean by this a 'private inner act' of 'intellection', then my earlier allegation, that this 'theory' is not much of an advance over Locke and Descartes, and is thus thoroughly bourgeois, was correct. But, what else can you mean by this?

In relation to my allegation:


P:


Marx said: "As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears as common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form alone."

Rosa:


Well, I am afraid Marx was wrong here; this is a Lockean view of language/thought.

But, even he failed to apply this idea in Capital. [Not because he was incompetent, far from it, or because Capital is flawed, far from that too, but because abstractionism is an incoherent, and thus inapplicable, 'skill'). (I show this at my site in Essay Three Parts One and Two.)

You say:


That's from Grundrisse, which is a draft of Capital.

It is not wrong. It helps explain a great deal. He uses it to explain the abstract use of "labor"; the same can be said of "religion" (the Japanese were not aware of religion until encountering other cultures. "sintoism" is a name that developed much after the fact). We are talking once again socially, here.

1) Marx saw fit not to publish it.

2) Even if he had, it would still have been confused in the extreme. Instead of using a concept here, he would have used the name of an abstract particular, none of which which are capable of explaining anything. [More details in the above two Essays I referenced.]

P:


Names are words that refer to concepts which in turn refer to objects. Concepts are exactly that, concepts. These can refer to objects.

Well, this just confuses two distinct logical roles here, and merely underlines the confused thinking you have inherited from Locke and Descartes. If concepts refer to things they are names. So the above merely devolves to "Names refer to names". And if you use only names, or referring expressions, you end up not being able to say anything at all (something logicians have been aware of since at least Plato's day).

As I note in Essay Three Part One:


Not even a series of Proper Names can pick out anything true or false of concrete particulars. This is because such a series would at best form a list, not a sentence (still less a proposition). Consider, for example, the following:

E5: London, Lenin, Amazon, Venus, Socialist Worker, Coronation Street, Tony Benn, Proxima Centauri.

Lists like this say nothing -- even if they have a use, as here, to make that very point. We could, perhaps, imagine a sense for E5, but only by articulating it with general terms or with words that function other than as names.

Moreover, even if this list (of the Proper Names of objects and individuals) were replaced by another list formed out of the names of concepts or abstract general terms, it would make no difference; it would still say nothing -- as the next two examples illustrate:

E6: Identity, Substance, Matter, Form, Flux, Space, Time, Part, Whole, Mode, Particular, Absolute, General, Essence, Trope, Appearance, Entity, Thing-in-Itself.

E7: Female, glass, redness, anger, jealousy, knowledge, change, cause, honesty, eigenvector, humanity, isomorphism.

E6 and E7 have no meaning, since they are both lists. To repeat, in order to gain a meaning these terms would need to be articulated with expressions that do not function as names.

You will hit the same brick wall if you try to use other referring expressions, like definite or indefinite descriptions.

But you add:


I don't know what is so difficult to admit here. Whey I say "dog" am I referring to any dog in particular? Perhaps to the summation of all dogs that I have ever seen? How believable is that? I am referring to whatever concept I have of a dog, which I identify it to a particular dog or dogs, or dogs in general.

Well, you cannot refer even to dogs by simply saying "dog" (unless, of course, it were accompanied by a pointing gesture). And even in most sentences this word would still not be referring to this sort of animal. This is because this word is nether a Proper Name nor is it a definite or even an indefinite description.

In sentences like 'Fido is a dog' the word functions descriptively (or even as part of an identification, perhaps) but not referentially. If it were referential, it would make sense to ask in response to 'Fido is a dog', 'And which dog is that?'

Now you can see the problem you face here; for you the word' dog' does not even refer to dogs, but to your 'concept of a dog'. And that of course is the bind all such 'theories' get into. Once you start regarding all words as referring expressions (as you seem to be doing), naturally you are going to search for something for it to designate. And because the word "dog" cannot name all dogs, or any dogs at all, you then say "Aha, it must name a concept", with no proof that it either does this, or that it names anything whatsoever (because it is not a name to begin with).

More confusion here; P:


The premise however, is that "dog" and "red" make reference to concepts (dog-concept and red-concept) that point to the object.

This bourgeois theory traps you in a private world of atomised concepts of dubious import.

P:


"god" is a concept, but it refers to something. This something does not, and cannot exist, that is what is being refuted, not the concept.

Then how can it 'refer' to something if what is supposedly refers to does not exist?

P:


I care not for analytical philosophy. Whatever deviations it might include does bear any relevance here.

P:

I do not wish to be rude, but that probably explains why you are so confused about things.


Nice, so we will simply dish out normative contents on language use, forgetting that it is a social creation.

I allege that this is what your theory has you doing anyway: forgetting it is a social phenomenon, since you have to appeal to a sub-Lockean theory of meaning to make your ideas work.

And the normativity comes from the socialised use of language, not from me.

P:


The objects and events in the world manifest as phenomena.
Then how do you know there are any "objects and events in the world"? Your theory traps you in a privatised, atomised world of phenomena and concepts.

P:


The substrate that is before us is not reality. If reality is not made behind our backs (and you said that you do not advocate for this), then this substrate that precedes humans is not reality.

Well, how do you know there is a 'substrate' there in the first place? Or that it is not 'reality' itself?

P:


Language is not reduced to or identified with any one ideology.
Well, it is not any sort of ideology, never mind just one. If it were you could not do the things I illustrated in my earlier posts.

P:


Because none of these is ideological, right? Are you sure? Because they are correct?

Well, if you go down that route, and everything is viewed as ideological, you will have identified language with ideology. In that case, you'd find it impossible to give an account of why it we can assert and deny in one breath the sorts of things I listed, and still be understood.

P:


As I said, references or associations is how words work, while meaning is something arrived at. There's only a change in degree or distinction.

You are not really responding to my points, so I do not think it profitable to continue this part of the discussion.

I response to my 13 different uses of the word 'meaning' you say this:


Of course they would, because these are distinctions drawn by us for clarity, convenience. There is only one mechanism at work, in this case.

How can you possibly say this? How on earth can you know that there is only one 'mechanism' at work here, or even if there any at all?

I have to stop here, since it's clear from your posts that we are talking past each other.

I am in fact reluctant to continue debating with you for that reason, too.

[hajduk]

common sense is what you believe is common sense

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

H:


common sense is what you believe is common sense

And the proof of this is what...?

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 22, 2007 06:17 pm
H:


common sense is what you believe is common sense

And the proof of this is what...?
your beliefs

[RedAnarchist]

Originally posted by [email protected] 22, 2007 07:10 pm
common sense is what you believe is common sense
If its what you believe, then it wouldn't be common sense, would it, unless what you believed was the same as the majority of people?

[midnight marauder]

I've only really put forth a cursory effort at going through this thread and the other one, but here are my initial thoughts on the issue:

Common sense seems to be, at best, a collection of accepted cultural norms and ideas that one is expected to know, and at its worst, a totally subjective set of understandings of the world that are left to be determined by the individual making the claim of something being common sense (a claim which cannot be falsified seeing as how there's no determining criteria for something be added to the list of commonly sensical ideas in the first place -- or perhaps the criteria for this judgment is common sense itself? :lol:).

I haven't really given to much thought into this, but it would seem to me that common sense is a fairly meaningless term that hardly describes anything and has a minute ammount of use, if it has any utility at all.

To put it Socratically,

What is common sense?

How do we know it exists?

Is it universal?

If not, does the localization disprove it as a concept?

What determines whether something is a part of common sense?

What use does common sense as a concept have?

(or alternatively, why should I care? :P )

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

H:


your beliefs

You obviously do not understand the word "proof".

MM, thanks for that, but if you check out the thread in Learning, you will see we considered several of those ideas.

Youir questions at the end, though, are highly relevant, and have not yet been answered.

[praxicoide]

Once more, I made this distinction in order to question the theoretical (or quasi-theoretical) use of this phrase.

Precisely why we are talking past each other here, I think. I have repeatedly stated that what I am arguing here is not the existence of a “commonsense” as a attribute, but the validity in exploring the “common sense” phenomenon, like that poster above is doing. My comments on the irrelevance of this “commonsense” were ignored. There might be several mechanisms at work on what people refer to with “common sense”, it might group a number of different things, the point is that studying this is a valid endeavour, not doomed from its very start, like you say.


But earlier, you claimed that such request for evidence were out of place on web forums. Are you now changing your mind?

If so, then I need you to quote all the evidence there is that there is such a thing as 'commonsense', as it is imagined to be by various theorists, and it seems you too.

I made a cheeky comment on your repeated requests for evidence when anyone made any statements.


As to my 'evidence', you need to note that I merely said I 'suspected' this was so, and your admission above, that you have indeed confused these things obviates the need for any evidence (since I merely alleged this of you).

What admission? What things? I don’t follow. You are stating that people don’t use “common sense” the way it was used in those examples, correct? Are you attributing this to me?

In regards to the definition confusion, let’s leave it as confusion and move forward. I don’t think it’s worthwhile to dwell on it.



Well, I have given you reasons why I think no study of this sort could ever work, so this response will hardly do.

You are referring I assume to the quote you gave from your site.

Taken from here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2004.htm)

(and no, I haven’t read the whole thing)

I already raised objections to them; your very naïve reasons don’t convince me at all.

First off, and repeating what I have just stated, nobody here is attempting to “account for the allegedly universality of commonsense.”

Take this:


At no point in life has a single human being ever been tutored in 'commonsense'; no one runs through the list of its canonical ideas at school, at their parents' knee or even behind the bike sheds with their friends. Nobody studies 'commonsense' at college, nor do they take tests in it or receive a diploma proving their competence.

It’s absurd to consider that the only way information can be transmitted is through manifest conscious schooling. The whole idea is laughable.

People are not rational, people can behave rationally; rationality is a historical product and part of people. The non-rational part cannot be overlooked, much less in the reproduction of practices.

As for being able to “list its main precepts”; I have said elsewhere that meaning is something arrived at, many times arduously. This is a conscious effort, which can result in conflictive meanings, and it does not preclude people from understanding, even if inarticulately, what words refer to, what concepts they entail.



Perhaps then you can tell us what this method is, and what the results have been?

The methods used by social sciences.


This has as part of common sense the uninspiring notion that all bachelors are married, which while uninteresting is hardly an "inconsistent level of thought; with juxtaposed, not connected, fleshed out notions."

In fact, the more I am getting you to think about this, the more your own ideas are approaching an "inconsistent level of thought; with juxtaposed, not connected, fleshed out notions".

Hardly an 'hypothesis' then; more a confused set of ideas worthy of nothing else but the very title you earlier wanted to give to 'commonsense'.

Like I said, I am not an authority on this subject, my “hypothesis” served only as an example that exploration of this concept is possible. If the hypothesis is refuted, all the better; another one can come forth, this is how thought makes progress, through testing.


Not so -- you merely brushed it aside.

What are you talking about?


Anyway, this 'definition' would allow in rather too many things I think you might want to leave out, and would omit others you might want to include. For example, person NN says of herself "I like coffee" (which is self-evident (in your sense) to NN, and based on her everyday activity) cannot be part of 'commonsense' (not could any like or dislike, such as this), but your definition allows it in. And it would exclude from commonsense "Massive volcanic eruptions a few metres away are not good for the health), which while a common belief, is not based on 'everyday' activity. And it would exclude, with respect to NN, this: "My name is NN", which is self-evident to NN, but is not based on any experience at all.

The statement “I like coffee” would seem self-evident to NN, and would form part of his/her common sense. To others it would not, so socially it is not common sense. This case is very interesting and it highlights the individual/social dynamic. If a large portion of the members of that society like coffee, then “coffee tastes good” will become part of their common sense.
The volcano example is indeed based on experience, not individual but our historical social experience.
And “my name is NN” is of course based on experience. In Spanish we say “I call myself NN” because the name comes from what you are called. The point of choosing a name for a baby is a practical affair for people to agree on what to call someone.
It would be most unusual for somebody to know their name if not through experience.
And if by “everyday” you are crassly thinking that it is something done “every single day”, then I don’t even know what to say to you, except to look up “everydayness”, a term that can be equated to the impression on the consciousness of our praxis (I’m speculating here, I haven’t looked it up)





That does not follow, since there are ways of filtering things out in social science, but they do not work here.

Unless, of course, you can show otherwise.

I don’t need to. It is you who states that they would not work here.



{But what you wanted to re-iterate was not too clear; your words break off here}.

Yes, I would have to check, but I think that’s a quote box problem.


Well, you tried to 'describe'/'loosely-characterise' this notion in a way that conflicted with the above definition, neither of which work.

In that case, we still have no clear idea what you or anyone else is banging on about when they speak of 'commonsense'.


See above.


Well, that depends on what you men by 'conceptualise'. If you mean by this a 'private inner act' of 'intellection', then my earlier allegation, that this 'theory' is not much of an advance over Locke and Descartes, and is thus thoroughly bourgeois, was correct. But, what else can you mean by this?

Wow. So instead of responding to the obvious conflict between this argument and your allegations, you prefer put a label on it and sidestep it.

Wittgestein was a bourgeois, did you know? Should we dismiss his ideas without consideration? Of course not.

Again, how would be able to recognize things and processes in the world if we did not have concepts of them?






1) Marx saw fit not to publish it.

2) Even if he had, it would still have been confused in the extreme. Instead of using a concept here, he would have used the name of an abstract particular, which are capable of explaining nothing at all. [More details in the above two Essays I referenced.]
.

1) Marx never intended it to be published, this does not necessarily mean that he disagreed with it; these are biographical circumstances open to several interpretations. We are not mind readers, so we cannot state what part of his works he disagreed with or not. Any talk of this “real intention” starts off from shaky ground.

2) He would not because he was speaking dialectically, not logically, so its different terminology.





Well, this just confuses two distinct logical roles here, and merely underlines the confused thinking you have inherited from Locke and Descartes. If concepts refer to things they are names. So the above merely devolves to "Names refer to names". And if you use only names, or referring expressions, you end up not being able to say anything at all (something logicians have been aware of since at least Plato's day).

You are ignoring what I have said, and reiterating your point. That’s not very productive.


Not even a series of Proper Names can pick out anything true or false of concrete particulars. This is because such a series would at best form a list, not a sentence (still less a proposition). Consider, for example, the following:

E5: London, Lenin, Amazon, Venus, Socialist Worker, Coronation Street, Tony Benn, Proxima Centauri.

Lists like this say nothing -- even if they have a use, as here, to make that very point. We could, perhaps, imagine a sense for E5, but only by articulating it with general terms or with words that function other than as names.

Moreover, even if this list (of the Proper Names of objects and individuals) were replaced by another list formed out of the names of concepts or abstract general terms, it would make no difference; it would still say nothing -- as the next two examples illustrate:

E6: Identity, Substance, Matter, Form, Flux, Space, Time, Part, Whole, Mode, Particular, Absolute, General, Essence, Trope, Appearance, Entity, Thing-in-Itself.
E7: Female, glass, redness, anger, jealousy, knowledge, change, cause, honesty, eigenvector, humanity, isomorphism.

E6 and E7 have no meaning, since they are both lists. To repeat, in order to gain a meaning these terms would need to be articulated with expressions that do not function as names.

^^Hyperrationality. You are first assuming that we think in complete, articulate propositions in order to derive meaning. That’s a very big assumption. I am very surprised to see you mix logic with thought. Our very articulations in our consciousness are already a product, and even these often do not follow logic (as any esthetician can show you).


Well, you cannot refer even to dogs by simply saying "dog" (unless, of course, it were accompanied by a pointing gesture). And even in most sentences this word would still not be referring to this sort of animal. This is because this word is nether a Proper Name nor is it a definite or even an indefinite description.

In sentences like 'Fido is a dog' the word functions descriptively (or even as part of an identification, perhaps) but not referentially. If it were referential, it would make sense to ask in response to 'Fido is a dog', 'And which dog is that?'

Semantics, you are going off a tangent on a particular sense of reference and running away with it. You did not even answer my question.


Now you can see the problem you have here; for you the word' dog' does not even refer to dogs, but to your 'concept of a dog'. And that if course is the bind all such 'theories' get into. Once you start regarding all words as referring expressions (as you seem to be doing), naturally you are going to search for something for it to designate. And because the word "dog" cannot name all dogs, you then say "Aha, it must name a concept", with no proof that it either does this, or that it names anything at all (because it is not a name to begin with).

That is no problem, because dogs fit into the “concept of a dog”; there is no bind.


This bourgeois theory traps you in a private world of atomised concepts of dubious import.

That was an example. The only way we would be trapped in a “world of atomized concepts” is if we thought in terms of words, not concepts.



Then how can it 'refer' to something if it does not exist?

You are missing the point completely. The fact that people can say words such as “god” is because these words make reference to concepts. Now, there is nothing in the world that fits with this concept, the concept does not correspond with reality and is faulty.



Then how do you know there are any "objects and events in the world"? Your theory traps you in a privatised, atomised world of phenomena and concepts.



Well, how do you know there is a 'substrate' there in the first place? Or that it is not 'reality' itself?

Through our practical activity. This is why subjectivists exist, because they choose to ignore it.

What we call objective reality is a historical result of our activity. This does not mean that it is subjective, only that it is arrived at. Let’s not forget that measurements (ratio) are abstractions.

You (again) did not answer my question. And you did not answer this either:


So Marx would have advocated for a panoptic reality, God's reality?



Well, it is not any sort of ideology, never mind just one. If it were you could not do the things I illustrated in my earlier posts.

So Ideology is talking in a backwards way? “blacks are inferior” “women are less capable of thought”, etc.


Well, if you go down that route, and everything is viewed as ideological, you will have identified language with ideology. In that case, you'd find it impossible to give an account of why it we can assert and deny in one breath the sorts of things I listed, and still be understood.

Because science cannot be reduced to ideology. And I have not identified ideology with language; I have stated that it is not free from ideology since it is the result of our praxis and therefore loaded with our projections, assumptions, etc.



How can you possibly say this? How on earth can you know that there is only one 'mechanism' at work here, or even if there any at all?

So there is no mechanism for the production and reproduction of language? Is that what you are really saying?

It is one cognitive process; it could have several sources and steps involved, however. There is not one mechanism for “private references” and another for “true meaning” of words, and the proof is that there is no such thing as an ideal “true meaning” for words. Meanings are constructed by us from our daily usage. In this daily usage, these meanings are not required, although they might influence them as an extra reference, besides all the other references that come into play.



I have to stop here, since it clear from your posts that we are talking past each other.

I am in fact reluctant to continue debating with you for that reason, too.


I guess this leaves hanging you hypostasis of society.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I will leave you with the last word on this, since, as I said, we are talking past each other, and I really cannot be bothered wasting any more time on this aimless 'debate'.

[Hit The North]

Ooops... pressed wrong button!

[Hit The North]

midnight marauder,August 22, 2007 10:04 pm
What is common sense?


I've defined it as this:


[A]n accumulated stock of practical, social knowledge, held in common by particular communities and derived from their common social and historical experience.
http://www.revleft.com/index.php?showtopic=68791&st=50


How do we know it exists?

Through the anthropological and sociological study of human communities.


Is it universal?

It tends to pose as such, in that is assumes a practical naturalism. In actual fact it is local to historical and cultural milieu.


If not, does the localization disprove it as a concept?

No, it guarantees it.


What determines whether something is a part of common sense?

The people who use it. Most people have an idea of what is common sense and what sounds 'unpractical', for instance.


What use does common sense as a concept have?

For some sociologists the concept has been useful for (a) partially explaining how social interaction is possible; (b) distinguishing between 'common sense' understanding of social life (derived from day to day experience) and 'sociological' understanding of social life which is based on the systematic accumulation of data.

For Gramsci, the concept was useful for thinking about why layers of the working class were a-critical in their relation to capitalism, without resorting to a mechanical view of a dominant ideology being imposed from above.

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 22, 2007 09:32 pm
H:


your beliefs

You obviously do not understand the word "proof".


your beliefs are proof and that beliefs belong only you and no one else

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hajduk, you have been asked not to keep posting one-liners. Please desist.



your beliefs are proof and that beliefs belong only you and no one else

Well, that just confirms you do not know what the word 'proof' means.

On the basis of this idea, belief in Santa Claus would be all the 'proof' you needed.

Or, belief that there were WMD in Iraq, and the US would have been right, because that belief was all the 'proof' they needed.

[praxicoide]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 23, 2007 09:36 am
I will leave you with the last word on this, since, as I said, we are talking past each other, and I really cannot be bothered wasting any more time on this aimless 'debate'.

:mellow:


Well, I don't think it was aimless. I think it raises a series of valid concerns.

But, fine.

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 23, 2007 04:36 pm
Hajduk, you have been asked not to keep posting one-liners. Please desist.



your beliefs are proof and that beliefs belong only you and no one else

Well, that just confirms you do not know what the word 'proof' means.

On the basis of this idea, belief in Santa Claus would be all the 'proof' you needed.

Or, belief that there were WMD in Iraq, and the US would have been right, because that belief was all the 'proof' they needed.
no...that confirm that you have proof for your self

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hajduk:


no...that confirm that you have proof for your self

Well, according to you all I have to do is believe something and that is a proof.

But now you deny this of me.

You truly are a rather confused sort of fellow.

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 24, 2007 01:50 pm
Hajduk:


no...that confirm that you have proof for your self

Well, according to you all I have to do is believe something and that is a proof.

But now you deny this of me.

You truly are a rather confused sort of fellow.
becouse what we speaking is mutch deeper than you think

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

H:


becouse what we speaking is mutch deeper than you think

Well, and once more: according to you, all I have to do is believe something, and that enough to count as proof.

So, here goes: I believe Hajduk is completely and 100% wrong in what he says above.

That is, according to you, all the proof I need.

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 24, 2007 05:03 pm
H:


becouse what we speaking is mutch deeper than you think

Well, and once more: according to you, all I have to do is believe something, and that enough to count as proof.

So, here goes: I believe Hajduk is completely and 100% wrong in what he says above.

That is, according to you, all the proof I need.
yeah and mine said opposite that you Rosa are completely and 100% wrong in what you says above
do you understand know what i am speaking?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

H:


yeah and mine said opposite that you Rosa are completely and 100% wrong in what you says above

I note you have to copy me.

Are you incapable of thinking for yourself?


do you understand know what i am speaking?

Yes, but I am not sure you understand yourself.

That would explain all the confused comments you keep posting.

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 24, 2007 07:54 pm
H:


yeah and mine said opposite that you Rosa are completely and 100% wrong in what you says above

I note you have to copy me.

Are you incapable of thinking for yourself?


do you understand know what i am speaking?

Yes, but I am not sure you understand yourself.

That would explain all the confused comments you keep posting.
that is philosophy of common sense
i am not confused
you are becouse you cant go deeper in research of common sense
you are confused what i am speaking becouse you are afraid to go deeper
you rather stay on surface of psilosophy of common sense
becouse if you go deeper you are afraid what you will discover
and great fear of yours is to find that you are not right

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

H:


you are becouse you cant go deeper in research of common sense
you are confused what i am speaking becouse you are afraid to go deeper

According to your brilliant theory, all I have to do now is deeply believe that everything you say is tosh, and that is all the proof I need.

Why are you complaining? It's your theory. You should be proud of this scientific discovery of yours.

Your theory thus proves that everything you say is a load of rubbish, just because I deeply believe it.

This is the gift you have given to us mere mortals.

And we humbly thank you for it...

[Zoot Allures]

your beliefs are proof and that beliefs belong only you and no one else

If language is a learned and shared phenomena, how is it that any belief (that has to be in the form of 'words' in your mind) is truly only yours?

A subjective belief is really only a personal mediation of public language.

Much of what troubles philosophy is that a large portion of the terms, which are called 'philosophical', are not capable of being known...in the sense that they signify real events in the world.

The 'philosophy' is certainly public, yes, but this doesn't mean it is legitimate. It only means that the entire public is confused! [laughing]

Anyway, it is quite impossible to have a belief that someone else could not have. A belief is only a certain combination of words, as thoughts, in the mind. Those words must be learned. If a word is invented...it requires pre-existing words in order to qualify as a definition for anything.

I can invent the word 'dixtileps', but what would that word be without the possibility to refer to something in a descriptive manner?

[hajduk]

î mean on common sense not philosophy in global point of viev
Rosa believe in something whatever that it is
if she believes that my thinking is rubbish she made her own beliefs according to her knowledge and experiance BUT
that is not solid proof in the matter of global viev about common sense
in this arguing i made for Rosa philosophy trap telling her that she got own beliefs about common sense but that is not for all of us the same rigt?
she try to pot one solid hypothesis abouth common sense which is impossible,specialy doing that with philosophy becouse common sense is much complicated to put in one definition
public is confused becouse if its not long time before we will have revolution

[praxicoide]

your beliefs are proof and that beliefs belong only you and no one else

If language is a learned and shared phenomena, how is it that any belief (that has to be in the form of 'words' in your mind) is truly only yours?


A subjective belief is really only a personal mediation of public language.

Language is supposed to be the incarnation of a belief, but yes, I agree with you.


Much of what troubles philosophy is that a large portion of the terms, which are called 'philosophical', are not capable of being known...in the sense that they signify real events in the world.

What about "alienation", "fetishism", etc? These do point to real events in the world.


The 'philosophy' is certainly public, yes, but this doesn't mean it is legitimate. It only means that the entire public is confused! [laughing]

It's ideological; meaning that it is not unintelligible, but distorted. Philosophy then, should not be simply discarted, but apprehended and understood materially.

An empiricist might speak of ideology as a nonsense, behind which lies "true reality", but that is not Marxism. both ideology, and the reasons behind ideology are relevant and affect our reality.


Anyway, it is quite impossible to have a belief that someone else could not have. A belief is only a certain combination of words, as thoughts, in the mind. Those words must be learned. If a word is invented...it requires pre-existing words in order to qualify as a definition for anything.

I can invent the word 'dixtileps', but what would that word be without the possibility to refer to something in a descriptive manner?

Did you read the thread and the one it derived from?

Anyways, if a word exist, socially exists, then it is a phenomenon to be looked into, not dismissed.

[hajduk]

Originally posted by [email protected] 27, 2007 02:01 am

your beliefs are proof and that beliefs belong only you and no one else

If language is a learned and shared phenomena, how is it that any belief (that has to be in the form of 'words' in your mind) is truly only yours?

you mix up the socialisation and the complicate structure of common sense

[Zoot Allures]

Language is supposed to be the incarnation of a belief, but yes, I agree with you.

I would invert this. As Wittgenstein once put it "the limits of your language is the limits of your knowledge", or something like that.

The 'belief" is only possible if there is a language, since one cannot mediate thoughts without a language. However, a child who has not yet learned a language can bump into a wall, and learn, after doing this a few times, that that wall is an obstacle to him. He would then change his behavior to accommodate this discovery. Does the child "believe" that the wall will stop him in his efforts to crawl? Yes and no (if we mean by 'belief'- conditions which affect our intentions for action). The child does not need to know the phrase "this wall is there and will stop me" to know in advance the wall will stop him from crawling. It can be said that the child 'believes' the wall will stop him, if and when he decides to take another course of action....and crawl a different way.

This example can work as an argument against the above quote by Wittgenstein. It shows that 'belief' is not always dependent on language in order to modify behavior so that it is demonstrably reactive and calculated in behavior.

The problem here is finding the point where enough language is learned for the body and its behavior to be affected merely by "thinking with words" as opposed to voluntary tacit behavior...as a simple response to an environment. The term "belief', here, is slippery, because one cannot say at what point a behavior is the result of a mediation of words, in thinking, and not just a habitual response to a familiar circumstance.


What about "alienation", "fetishism", etc? These do point to real events in the world.

Technically no....they point to an agreement in language, held by a number of people who agree to identify a certain series of physical acts. For example, a group of marxists might observe a man who hangs his head down and looks 'depressed', in the company of other people. If, in comparison, this person does not possess a quality that the others possess, we might say he is 'alienated'.

Of course this is only a simple example and there is far more to it than that. But when terms like those are invented and shared among theorists, they can only be 'markers' of real, empirical events...not events themselves....because 'words' have no 'meaning' outside of a context. It is by collecting familiar, common instances in the world and designating those instances with descriptions that terms are invented to indicate a specific 'case' of such an instance.


It's ideological; meaning that it is not unintelligible, but distorted. Philosophy then, should not be simply discarted, but apprehended and understood materially.

Well I have some issues with the clichéd use of the term 'philosophy'. From the very start, it set off on the wrong foot. This 'love of wisdom'. What is it? Does it mean 'having knowledge of things'? If so, wasn't this a matter of the scientific method long before dudes with robes walked around the courtyard with stone tablets, rambling on and on about some 'theory', that, without the proper means to employ the scientific method, simply mystified everyone who was present?

In a nut shell, 'philosophy' is only a kind of complicated, compartmentalized language. It is a 'secret handshake'. It must be something beyond what is epistemologically possible in science, because if it isn't, science would suffice for a 'love of wisdom'.

I do not mean to sound cynical about philosophy. However I have 'grown out of it', so to speak, and my attitude toward it is a consequence of my having experienced, for years, at various forums, endless floundering and 'running in place'. These 'philosophers' keep on rambling...and the world keeps on falling into oblivion. Philosophy today is what Sartre once called a 'bourgeois luxury'.

Hajduk:


that is not solid proof in the matter of global viev about common sense

Slow down for a minute and define what you mean. How are you defining 'sense'? Are you saying that when a tactile object impresses itself upon a nerve ending, there is a common occurrence among animals with a nervous system to respond to it? Would this be a case of 'common sense'? If so, I would agree.

But if you mean that people 'know' things simply by virtue of sharing a language, such that one specific phrase is held to be universally true, and common, I cannot agree.

Here, your definition of 'common sense' can be right only insofar as a native language is practiced by people who experience native circumstances. For example, it might not be common sense that a polar bear will attack you if you enter into its cave....to people who are not eskimos. 'Common sense', therefore, is exclusive only to common people experiencing common cases and who share a common language.


she try to pot one solid hypothesis abouth common sense which is impossible

Well Rosa is like a computer. She is cold, hard, brilliant, and snooty. You can't get much out of her before she gives you a link to her site and says "I've already been through this. I won't do it again." Here, at revleft, Rosa works like Nietzsche: "I approach deep problems like a cold bath; quickly in, quickly out."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for those comments Zoot, but I have been through these things many times here at RevLeft over the last 18 months, and in great detail.

I set my site up partly to save myself having to say the same things over and over.

This is because the dialecticians who post here more or less say the same things, repeatedly. After 25 years of having to endure this hackneyed stuff, it tends to lose its novelty value.

But every last one of them think they are the very first to make these points, or that I have never heard them all before (when I have, countless times!!).

Now Hajduk suffers from two further serious incapacities: one he can't help (i.e., a lack of clear English), and one he can (an incapacity to think about what he is saying).

In the latter case, he just becomes more incoherent if you point this out.

I can't be bothered with him any more; you are welcome to make of what he says whatever you can.

And good luck.

[praxicoide]

I would invert this. As Wittgenstein once put it "the limits of your language is the limits of your knowledge", or something like that.

The 'belief" is only possible if there is a language, since one cannot mediate thoughts without a language. However, a child who has not yet learned a language can bump into a wall, and learn, after doing this a few times, that that wall is an obstacle to him. He would then change his behavior to accommodate this discovery. Does the child "believe" that the wall will stop him in his efforts to crawl? Yes and no (if we mean by 'belief'- conditions which affect our intentions for action). The child does not need to know the phrase "this wall is there and will stop me" to know in advance the wall will stop him from crawling. It can be said that the child 'believes' the wall will stop him, if and when he decides to take another course of action....and crawl a different way.

This example can work as an argument against the above quote by Wittgenstein. It shows that 'belief' is not always dependent on language in order to modify behavior so that it is demonstrably reactive and calculated in behavior.

Nice. This doesn't take away from the previous statement that words are how beliefs are articulated (incarnated).


The problem here is finding the point where enough language is learned for the body and its behavior to be affected merely by "thinking with words" as opposed to voluntary tacit behavior...as a simple response to an environment. The term "belief', here, is slippery, because one cannot say at what point a behavior is the result of a mediation of words, in thinking, and not just a habitual response to a familiar circumstance.

Yup because thoughts can be said to arise from praxis, which includes social factors and circumstances.




What about "alienation", "fetishism", etc? These do point to real events in the world.

Technically no....they point to an agreement in language, held by a number of people who agree to identify a certain series of physical acts. For example, a group of marxists might observe a man who hangs his head down and looks 'depressed', in the company of other people. If, in comparison, this person does not possess a quality that the others possess, we might say he is 'alienated'.

Of course this is only a simple example and there is far more to it than that. But when terms like those are invented and shared among theorists, they can only be 'markers' of real, empirical events...not events themselves....because 'words' have no 'meaning' outside of a context. It is by collecting familiar, common instances in the world and designating those instances with descriptions that terms are invented to indicate a specific 'case' of such an instance.

Exactly. A word can never be an "event" itself. That goes for all, not just philosophical or scientific terms; otherwise you would be divorcing "real" words versus "imaginary" words of the mind, a mass condemnation that would impoverish our language, instead of engaging in a more fruitful endeavor, which would be revealing the phenomena behind the use of words.



Well I have some issues with the clichéd use of the term 'philosophy'. From the very start, it set off on the wrong foot. This 'love of wisdom'. What is it? Does it mean 'having knowledge of things'? If so, wasn't this a matter of the scientific method long before dudes with robes walked around the courtyard with stone tablets, rambling on and on about some 'theory', that, without the proper means to employ the scientific method, simply mystified everyone who was present?

Well, I think those are historical circumstances, which have been overcome a long time ago. The presocratics overextended into science (which didn't really exist) with their speculations on the cosmos, movement, etc. Later philosophers took empirical results and constructed their own systems, and so on.

As material circumstances changed, science gained more and more importance, culminating in bourgeois society and the "usefulness" paradigm.

The core of philosophy, remains a negative question of men and their surroundings, as an ideological outlet.


In a nut shell, 'philosophy' is only a kind of complicated, compartmentalized language. It is a 'secret handshake'. It must be something beyond what is epistemologically possible in science, because if it isn't, science would suffice for a 'love of wisdom'.

Well, the fact that it hasn't been completely assimilated by science (even though it has lost most of its relevance) points to a materialistic understanding of it, behind the "secret handshake" and bourgeois ideology.


I do not mean to sound cynical about philosophy. However I have 'grown out of it', so to speak, and my attitude toward it is a consequence of my having experienced, for years, at various forums, endless floundering and 'running in place'. These 'philosophers' keep on rambling...and the world keeps on falling into oblivion. Philosophy today is what Sartre once called a 'bourgeois luxury'.

"The point, however, is to change it"

[hajduk]

Originally posted by Zoot [email protected] 27, 2007 03:05 pm

Hajduk:


that is not solid proof in the matter of global viev about common sense

Slow down for a minute and define what you mean. How are you defining 'sense'? Are you saying that when a tactile object impresses itself upon a nerve ending, there is a common occurrence among animals with a nervous system to respond to it? Would this be a case of 'common sense'? If so, I would agree.


Here, your definition of 'common sense' can be right only insofar as a native language is practiced by people who experience native circumstances. For example, it might not be common sense that a polar bear will attack you if you enter into its cave....to people who are not eskimos. 'Common sense', therefore, is exclusive only to common people experiencing common cases and who share a common language.


she try to pot one solid hypothesis abouth common sense which is impossible

Well Rosa is like a computer. She is cold, hard, brilliant, and snooty. You can't get much out of her before she gives you a link to her site and says "I've already been through this. I won't do it again." Here, at revleft, Rosa works like Nietzsche: "I approach deep problems like a cold bath; quickly in, quickly out."
Zoot exactly that is what i mean but Rosa is like you say computer and by that she cant make a god theory no matter how she is brilliant becouse people are not computers,people have sense and emotions which is very very complicated so if one part of those caracters in your mind is not involve you can easily make mistake like Rosa does

[MarxSchmarx]

Maybe it's philosophically vague, but the following operational definition seems to capture what passes for the concept in everyday life.

"Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen."
Albert Einstein

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

MarxSchmarx:


Maybe it's philosophically vague, but the following operational definition seems to capture what passes for the concept in everyday life.

"Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen."
Albert Einstein

Then it cannot be common.

Which just goes to show, Einstein was no philosopher.

[Raúl Duke]

All this arguments over common sense, what it is, etc, makes me think that maybe there is no such thing.

:unsure:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JD, you are right, for common sense, as we use the term in ordinary language is no more a thing than is "inadvertently", or "discretely".

Traditional thought likes to reify things:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reification_(Marxism)

Hence, common sense was re-defined as a set of beliefs, etc. Instead of seeing how we actually use this phrase, a new, and essentialist meaning was imposed upon it.

And then, each theorist had his/her own idea what this object was (and they all disagree -- as you can see in many of the posts here).

[MarxSchmarx]

Rosa:




"Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen."
Albert Einstein


Then it cannot be common.

Which just goes to show, Einstein was no philosopher.



Woah! Just 'cause he might be wrong doesn't mean he's not a "philosopher." Rosa, you think Hegel and Quine and Aristotle and just about every other "philosopher" is basically "wrong". But you let these guys be called philosopher. I say Einstein's insights deserve at least as much respect as Kierkergaard's.

And for the record, let me defend Einstein. "Common" does not imply "universal." Moreover, while not all prejudices are "common", the impression of "common" is extremely subjective. A key component of a claim that something is "common" is that it is widely shared. A prejudice is an extremely subjective assessment of something that is widely shared, at least to its applicable domain. "Common sense" is an extremely subjective, irrational faith in the validity of what is perceived to be a widely shared belief. In that sense, it is a subset of a prejudice. It is an accident of semantics that one is perjorative and the other is not.

Which is the sentiment Einstein captures in his quote.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

MarrxSchmarx:


Just 'cause he might be wrong doesn't mean he's not a "philosopher." Rosa, you think Hegel and Quine and Aristotle and just about every other "philosopher" is basically "wrong". But you let these guys be called philosopher. I say Einstein's insights deserve at least as much respect as Kierkergaard's.

I have news for you: Einstein was a Physicist.

And who says I think Quine is wrong?


And for the record, let me defend Einstein. "Common" does not imply "universal." Moreover, while not all prejudices are "common", the impression of "common" is extremely subjective. A key component of a claim that something is "common" is that it is widely shared. A prejudice is an extremely subjective assessment of something that is widely shared, at least to its applicable domain. "Common sense" is an extremely subjective, irrational faith in the validity of what is perceived to be a widely shared belief. In that sense, it is a subset of a prejudice. It is an accident of semantics that one is perjorative and the other is not.

And thanks for the re-definition. It's about the 100th I've heard.

Er..., that must mean that those who attempt to re-define this term for us in such disparate ways are in the grip of "an extremely subjective assessment of something...".

Now that I can buy.

All of which still makes Einstein no philosopher.

[MarxSchmarx]

RL:



I have news for you: Einstein was a Physicist.


And John Locke was a medical doctor.

And in any event, what constitutes "common sense" seems to be under the purview of social science, not traditional philosophy.



And who says I think Quine is wrong?


You have a post that says (in the what is philos. good for thread):


WVO Qiine -- but he would have denied being an 'analytic' philosopher,
...
Although I disagree with this way of doing philosophy, it is a major step in the right direction.


As far as Einstein's quote, the definitions sought to address your responses, evidently they haven't. SO: why can't prejudices be common?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

MS:


And John Locke was a medical doctor.

Locke was a rubbish philosopher too.


And in any event, what constitutes "common sense" seems to be under the purview of social science, not traditional philosophy.

Which rather concedes the point; after all, what qualifications in social science did Einstein possess?


MS:You have a post that says (in the what is philos. good for thread):

RL: WVO Qiine -- but he would have denied being an 'analytic' philosopher,
...
Although I disagree with this way of doing philosophy, it is a major step in the right direction

For sure, but that does not imply I disgree with everything he said.


As far as Einstein's quote, the definitions sought to address your responses, evidently they haven't. SO: why can't prejudices be common?

No idea.

Ask a social scientist, and stop relying on Physicists to tell you.