Comintern "21 conditions" and the German CP:

[Severian]

This started as part of a PM to Luis Henrique about other stuff, but it expanded to the point I decided to post it publicly.

I was thinking about something Luis Henrique posted a couple times:

Lenin and his conditions to join the III International - including conditions that no real working class party in Germany could have accepted without destroying itself, as the further history of the KPD proves
from this thread (http://www.revleft.com/index.php?showtopic=60280&st=0#entry1292232498)

Seems to me that's just factually, historically, inaccurate: not even a matter of opinion. 'Cause the German CP (KPD) actually expanded a lot after the 21 conditions were passed. The USPD (Independent Social-Democratic Party) split, and part of it merged with the German Communist Party.

And in subsequent years the German CP was a much bigger factor in German politics/class struggle than previously. Not always for the best; in '23 it missed the revolutionary moment - it can be debated about what kind of mistake it made and why. And it's rapidly downhill after that, of course, under Stalintern orders.

But that problem's not the one you describe.

That's what the 21 conditions were about: conditioning the entry of centrists like the USPD and the French Socialist Party into the Comintern. Not cramming the Luxemburgist/Spartacus tradition into a Bolshevik straightjacket or anything like that.

If the conditions are to be criticized, it'd be more reasonable to object that no list of conditions can turn a centrist (semi-reformist) into a revolutionary. You have to want it in your gut; those who don't can always lawyer their way around any written requirement. An objection actually made by some people at the 2nd Congress.

Others replied that they knew that; but the conditions were one tool for aiding the more revolutionary elements in the different parties. And that there were a lot of revolutionary workers in the ranks of the USPD and French Socialist Party; it was necessary to merge with those ranks despite the leaders.

The existing members of the International mostly anticipated no trouble meeting all 21 conditions, and there was little discussion on that. It was all on the French SP and German USPD, plus a little about the Norwegian Labor Party and so forth.

Don't take my word for it:
Here's the transcript of the debate on the 21 conditions at the 2nd congress (http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/ch06.htm#v1-p201)

Including comments by German CP representatives:Meye r on this page (http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/ch06a.htm)
and Levi on this one. (http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/ch07.htm#v1-p260)

I don't know how much of that is available in other languages.

Somehow, they seem not to have noticed these conditions would destroy them, or even that there was any difficulty about meeting them. I suspect the German CP already met most of the 21 conditions before they were written.
Here's the text of the 21 conditions, BTW (http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/ch07.htm#v1-p303)

[Die Neue Zeit]

I don't think that a revival of every single one of the "21 conditions" would be a good idea in today's "smaller" world.

For example, the condition of illegal struggles under anti-socialist laws goes hand in hand with the "separate" condition of anti-pacifism. The condition on national-liberation, is irrelevant, since we don't have "colonies" anymore.

What the hell is the condition on the Red International of Labour Unions? Besides, labour unions are nowadays so much part and parcel of the status quo (and not just "irredeemable"), hence direct workers' control as opposed to trade-union consciousness.

Ultimately, my organizational criticism of the Comintern is the same as that which I levelled at the Second International (in my international socialist party discussion).

[Luís Henrique]

Severian,

I will have to reread a bit on German history to be able to debate this issue - which, by the way, is fascinating as it is tragic.

I would agree with this:


If the conditions are to be criticized, it'd be more reasonable to object that no list of conditions can turn a centrist (semi-reformist) into a revolutionary. You have to want it in your gut; those who don't can always lawyer their way around any written requirement. An objection actually made by some people at the 2nd Congress.

But there seems to be more. The conditions would make harder to change the character of a party. Lenin imagined that they would function as safeguards to revolutionary parties, and avoid opportunism taking them over. Unhappily, once a party organised like that falls into the hands of opportunists, those conditions will work as safeguards against the retaking of the party by revolutionaries.

In the case of the German party, it is arguable that after Thallheimer, it never had a reliable leadership again. The successive directive bodies would increasingly subject the KPD to the whims of Moscow, failing to understant that the ascendency of the Russian party within the International depended directly on the destruction or demoralisation of the German party.

Luís Henrique

[Severian]

Originally posted by Luís Henrique+June 03, 2007 03:27 pm--> (Luís Henrique @ June 03, 2007 03:27 pm) But there seems to be more. The conditions would make harder to change the character of a party. Lenin imagined that they would function as safeguards to revolutionary parties, and avoid opportunism taking them over. Unhappily, once a party organised like that falls into the hands of opportunists, those conditions will work as safeguards against the retaking of the party by revolutionaries. [/b]
I don't think that was really much of a possibility with the Stalintern anyway.

But anyway. You can certainly argue the 21 conditions contributed to the centralization of the international, which beginning around '23 was used destroy the revolutionary character of the German and other CPs.

But that's different than saying the 21 conditions destroyed that. In fact, the 21 conditions were part of a Russian intervention which organizationally and politically strengthened the other sections of the international. One of many such interventions.

There's a lot to be learned from this experience, on conducting a merger with centrist forces among other things. Just as there's a lot to be learned from the early Comintern generally.

The first few years of the Comintern were the time that revolution in advanced capitalist countries was closest. I'd suggest that's because it's the time when revolutionary organization and leadership were most advanced. (The economic conditions for revolution were stronger in the 30s, for example.)


In the case of the German party, it is arguable that after Thallheimer, it never had a reliable leadership again.

One could put it even earlier, if that means a revolutionary leadership. But you mean an independent leadership?


The successive directive bodies would increasingly subject the KPD to the whims of Moscow, failing to understant that the ascendency of the Russian party within the International depended directly on the destruction or demoralisation of the German party.

Really? After '23, Kremlin control of the international would have been threatened by a stronger German CP? I doubt it would have been threatened by much of anything. They weren't going to allow any votes they might lose, certainly.

There was the possibility of larger forces splitting off the Comintern, I guess, but the advantages of being affiliated with the USSR were clearly considerable. Not just subsidy, but prestige.

Also: the Kremlin, and later Beijing, led many CPs into disaster without needing any such motive. Did Mao approve Aidit leading the Indonesian CP into a bloodbath because the strong Indonesian CP threatened his control of international Maoism?

I tend to think you're overemphasizing Russian control as part of the degeneration of the Comintern. Yes, the CPs became pawns for the Kremlin's national interests. But that's a byproduct of the class degeneration.....


Hammer
Ultimately, my organizational criticism of the Comintern is the same as that which I levelled at the Second International (in my international socialist party discussion).

The opposite of Luis' point, BTW. If you want an international party, not parties in the different countries.

But anyway, it seems weird to make the "same" organizational criticism of both when in fact the Comintern was much more centralized than the Second. It had national sections of the Comintern.

In its later period, it was totally centralized, with all national sections obeying (bureaucratic, Russian nationalist) orders from Moscow.


I don't think that a revival of every single one of the "21 conditions" would be a good idea in today's "smaller" world.

An idea which never even occurred to me, or probably anyone else.

[Die Neue Zeit]

^^^ I think you misunderstood me there (or are you being sarcastic?). When I said "every single one," I meant that only some conditions would be valid, both in letter (democratic centralism) and in spirit (obviously NOT the crap concerning the Red International of Labour Unions, and the logical extension to even globalized unions).


But anyway, it seems weird to make the "same" organizational criticism of both when in fact the Comintern was much more centralized than the Second. It had national sections of the Comintern.

In its later period, it was totally centralized, with all national sections obeying (bureaucratic, Russian nationalist) orders from Moscow.

To its credit, there was more centralization. Of course, the total centralization that I want came at the wrong time, and under more opportunistic circumstances for the bureaucrats, also rendering the other PARTIES irrelevant.

The whole idea behind my old thread is that near-revolutionary forces in nearby countries should aid revolutionary forces in the country of revolution. The failure of the Comintern in this was already clear when Finland was given its independence.

Also, when the tide turned in the civil war, why didn't the RKKA bother to attempt to spark a revolution in Hungary, where revolutionary forces were still stronger there than in peasant-ridden Poland?