chimx
2nd April 2007, 20:47
A couple of folks asked me in live chat to post this, so here is a multi-chapter thesis thing I've been writing for the past few months.
Chapter 1 looks at the history of American-Korean relations to provide the Cold War context which emphasized stability. Chapter 2 looks at the events of the Kwangju Uprising. Chapter 3 offers media analysis to show that the American media mirrored the stance taken by the American government. Namely that Korea stability and security were the primary concern to the United States, while democracy and political liberalization were secondary. Chapter 4 is a brief conclusion that discusses the legacy of Kwangju on American-Korean relations.
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CHAPTER 1
South Korea is often characterized as America’s success story in East Asia. American politicos and ideologues, when discussing their relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK), are often quick to praise America’s promotion of democratic ideals. Along with the operation of stable political institutions, the Korean economy has seen growth by leaps and bounds that few would have expected following its liberation from Japan. During the 1960s, Burma’s exports dwarfed that of the ROK’s. By 1990, South Korea’s exports totaled 85 times greater than those of Burma. Thanks to early economic assistance from the United States, followed later by American investment, the ROK’s economy continues to grow. Though not at the double-digit rate seen in the 1980s, eight percent and nine percent growth of the GNP was not at all uncommon in the 1990s.1 Except for a brief hiccup in the late 1990s, the Korean economy is an overwhelming success story, with Korea’s real per capita GDP increasing five-fold between 1970 and 2001.2
The United States is never slow to praise the proliferation of capital and democracy on the southern half of the peninsula, and to affirm its dedication to the security of these ideals. On May 22, 1982, both the United States and Korea saw the centennial anniversary of diplomatic relations with one another. A resolution, passed by the Congress of the United States for the anniversary, specifically asserted American dedication “to the principles of freedom and democracy,” holding these values to be the “basis of the continued strength and friendship of the United States and Korea.”3
At the opening of the Korean War Memorial in Washington, D.C., on July 27, 1995, President Bill Clinton emphasized the importance of American involvement in the Korean conflict by highlighting American attempt to deflect an oppressive communist doctrine from undermining the ideals of capitalist democracy: “By sending a clear message that America had not defeated fascism to see communism prevail, [Americans] put the Free World on the road to victory in the Cold War.”4
Altruistic assertions of America’s commitment to democracy in East Asia are all the more absolved by America’s official history of our involvement. According to the Department of State in 1960:
At the moment of liberation the United States, as one of the occupying powers, looked forward to cooperation with its Allies and the Korean people in the creation of a new Korea—united, democratic, and free of all foreign domination. Twelve years ago, the people of the north, to whom the Communist occupying power denied the free expression of their own will, were instead forced to establish a rival regime which subsequently launched an unprovoked surprise attack on the south. At great cost of life and property, this aggression was repelled through U.N. action; and unceasing efforts have been made by the United Nations and its members since that time to realize the continuing aspirations of the Korean people for unity in a single, free, and independent nation.5
These types of historical distortions on American intentions within the peninsula are quite dubious when we examine the actual history of American-Korean relations since World War II. American dedication “to the principles of freedom and democracy” always hinged on the preservation of social stability and maintenance of its security interests. The American defined “Free World” demanded participants to acquiesce to the possibility of autocratic rule for the benefit of these security interests. Freedom from foreign domination was grounded more on America’s immersion in Cold War policy than seeing South Korea as an autonomous country, based on the principles of self-determination. As such, democracy within the Korean peninsula was to remain subjugated to foreign security interests that rested upon stability within the ROK.
Actions which undermined the creation of a democratic government free of “foreign domination” are frequent in Korean history since the Second World War. America’s war with Japan forced the allied powers to consider post-war policies with Japan’s colonial possessions. While Japan’s seizure of territories such as Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores had the simple solution of being returned to China, the Allied solution to Japanese colonialism on the Korean peninsula came to have serious consequences for the Korean people so long as foreign powers insisted on dominating Korea’s political development. This can be seen as early as 1943 at the Cairo Conference in which President Franklin Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chian Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated that “[t]he aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”6
The clause “in due course” had particular significance as it was indicative of Roosevelt’s hope for the creation of a Korean trusteeship under United States jurisdiction. By 1945 Roosevelt coaxed Stalin into participating in America’s war against Japan. At Yalta the discussion turned to a three-power trusteeship for Korea overseen by the Soviet Union, China, and the United States.7 The purpose of Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy is made clear by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden: “[Roosevelt] hoped that former colonial territories, once free of their masters, would become politically and economically dependent upon the United States, and had no fear that other powers might fill that role.”8 The death of Roosevelt in April of 1945 and the inauguration of Harry Truman led to some revisions in America’s policy in Korea. In particular, with the escalation of the Cold War, America’s chance of economically and politically influencing the country without interference from other powers was significantly reduced. Soviet interference in the region became more of a threat to American interests as was shown by the increase in hostilities between the two powers.
Thus, when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in 1945 and closed in on Manchuria and the Korean peninsula, the War Department of the United States scrambled to put together a policy to ensure an American presence in the region and created General Order no. 1, dividing the country along the thirty-eighth parallel. Arthur Grey, Jr., described the reasoning behind America’s decision to bisect the Korean peninsula and its evolution: “the [United States] War Department took note of the latest operations reports that Russian forces were already on the ground and realized that this precluded our accepting the surrender of all Japanese forces in Korea.”
Grey went on to explain America’s understanding of the Thirty-eighth Parallel:
For some time after the Japanese surrender it was officially maintained in Washington that American troops entered Korea only to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops, and indeed this was the nominal reason. During the year preceding the Communist invasion, however, military spokesmen showed a willingness to explain the occupation as the “best” that could be done under the circumstances to prevent Russia from taking all of Korea.9
In this light, the division of Korea made by the United States can be seen as one of many subsequent American policies meant to deter Soviet influence on the peninsula, and often made potentially at the expense of Korean interests.10
The Korean reaction to liberation from Japanese imperialism was quite distinct from its American counter-part and had no interest in seeing the artificial division of the country. Prior to American occupation of southern Korea, steps were already underway within Korea to establish a unified national government. When Japan’s surrender to the allied powers seemed imminent, Japan’s Governor General of Political Affairs approached Song Ch’in-wu and Lyuh Woon-hyung (Yo Un-hyung) regarding the transitioning of political power to Koreans, while ensuring the safety of Japanese citizens in Korea, as well as their property. Though Song declined to participate with Japan, Lyuh agreed and immediately called together a broad spectrum of Korean political leaders. While many nationalists declined to participate with Lyuh, including Song Ch’in-wu, believing it would be wiser to wait for the return of the Korean Provisional Government, considered to be the legitimate exiled government following the March 1st Movement of 1919, Lyuh persisted despite the lack of consensus within the Korean leadership. Lyuh, with the help of the moderate nationalist Ahn Chae-hong, and Communists Yi Kang-g’uk and Yi Yo-song, formed the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI).11 This body then reached out to local Korean communities to set up a base structure for future Korean government.
The initial reaction to the CPKI was more substantial than some would give credit. By the end of August 1945, nearly 150 committees had formed throughout the Korean peninsula, thanks in part to the freeing of numerous left-leaning political prisoners. These committees began to operate as basic units for Korean self-government.12
On September 6, 1945, immediately prior to the landing of American troops on the peninsula, the CPKI held a National Congress in Seoul and announced the formation of the Korean People’s Republic (KPR), dedicated to coalition governance of rightist, moderate, and leftist politicians, and passed a multi-point program for the political direction Korea should take since liberation had been achieved (see Appendix 1). Despite this, the left tended to dominate the initial central governing body of the KPR.13 It is noteworthy, however, that Syngman Rhee, though still living in the United States at the time of the Congress and unaware of it, was elected President despite his conservatism, while Kim Ku was appointed as a cabinet member.14
While the KPR became a body for Korean leftists to rally around, conservative forces focused their attention on the exiled Korean Provisional Government (KPG).15 On September 7, a day after the meeting of the KPR congress in Seoul, right-wing political leaders formed a committee for the creation of the Korean Democratic Party (KDP), which would officially form on September 16. The party threw its support behind the KPG initially and opposed the KPR, while those in the KPR denounced the KDP as being composed primarily of “landlords, capitalists and collaborators.”16
The following day, September 8, Lieutenant General John Hodge arrived in Korea and established himself as Commanding General of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea. His assigned mission was:
(1) Take the Japanese surrender, disarm the Japanese armed forces, enforce the terms of the surrender, and remove Japanese imperialism from Korea; (2) Maintain order, establish an effective government along democratic lines and rebuild a sound economy as a basis for Korean independence; (3) Train Koreans in handling their own affairs and prepare Korea to govern itself as a free and independent nation.17
Yet for Hodge, the maintenance of order initially superseded the first directive, which included the removal of Japanese imperialism, since he was not allowed to give recognition to either the KPR or the KPG as being legitimate ruling bodies, and was thus unable to use either governing frameworks for the sustention of peace. Instead, the American Military Command announced as early as September 9 that the Japanese colonial forces would continue to operate within Korea, keeping all personnel remaining in place, including the governor general, provincial governors, as well as the Japanese police force.18 While U.S. Occupational forces’ initial insistence on the use of Japanese authorities and police for the governing of southern Korea was short-lived, as historian Bruce Cumings notes, this brief flirtation “served as a prologue to the more prolonged attachment to the conservative elements in the Korean political spectrum. Here was a romance that lasted, eventually allowing these elements to prevail in south Korea.”19
Behind the scenes, America never denied the popularity of the Left in south Korea, yet continued to campaign against these forces because of the sympathy much of the Korean left held for initial Soviet policy in the north:
Almost all Koreans are leftists by current US standards, and not even the conservative parties can be considered defenders of traditional capitalism. The socialization of basic industries and the redistribution of land figure in the political platforms of every party in South Korea.20
Not to be out done by Korea’s left, Hodge and the American military government took steps in late 1945 through 1946 to squash groups antithetical to the occupying force’s political ideals. In November of 1945, Korean labor advocates made moves to create a unified labor council throughout the peninsula. The National Council of Korean Labor Unions met in Seoul and asserted its official approval of the KPR and its program. In response to this, and similar activities in other areas of the society, the United States’ military government passed restrictive labor laws, including the prohibition of striking, and ordered the closure of numerous newspapers.21
It was this attitude of anti-communism at the expense of democratic participation that characterized America’s relation with Korea following its liberation from Japan. In conjunction with Truman and Roosevelt’s desire to economically influence the peninsula via a period of trusteeship, American involvement in Korea in the years following the end of the Second World War are better surmised not in the promotion of democratic ideals, but ultimately in the deterrence of communist elements for the assurance of American interests in the region, both political and economic, and often times at the expense of real democratic participation by the Korean people. According to American officials: “There are an unknown number of political parties and groups in Korea, many of which have mushroomed since the Japanese surrender was announced. . . . All groups seem to have the common ideas of seizing Japanese property, ejecting the Japanese from Korea, and achieving immediate independence.”22 While the United States was able to mask its desires through anti-communist rhetoric, the reality that a large portion of Koreans following the peninsula’s liberation were in favor of the nationalization of industry owned by Japan and Japanese collaborators was undeniable.
However, American policy by this point was already wrapped in Cold War politics and competition with the Soviet Union for domination in the region. It is in this polarized political climate that the United States met with the U.S.S.R. on a Joint Commission to discuss the independence of Korea, as decided by the Moscow Agreement in late 1945. All talks ended in failure, with both the United States and the Soviet Union obstinately arguing over the direction Korea should take, ultimately at the expense of the Korean people. By 1947, the United States made the first move to bypass the Moscow Agreement and the commitment to bilateral talks regarding the Korean peninsula by submitting the Korean question to the General Assembly of the United Nations. While the Soviet Union made a last ditch effort to continue bilateral talks with the United States by suggesting the joint removal of both American and Soviet troops, the United States declined to reenter the dead-locked discussions of the Joint Commission.23
The United Nations quickly acknowledged the necessity of solving the problem of Korea’s division and created a Temporary Commission on Korea to supervise national elections. The Soviet Union in turn refused to participate with the U.N. commission out of fear that United States dominance within the U.N. could lead to a solution on Korea that would be unfavorable to Russia. They blocked the Commission from entry into the Soviet-occupied northern zone. Thus, the United Nations, on February 26, 1948, adopted a new resolution, stating that “the United Nations Commission on Korea proceed with the observance of elections in all Korea, and if that is impossible, in as much of Korea as it is accessible to it.”24
Concerns from K.P.S. Menon, India’s representative on the U.N. Commission, make clear a common sentiment held by Commission representatives:
I feel that, if the Koreans are left to themselves—not merely in name but in reality—they will work out their own salvation and establish their own democratic government.
. . . [T]he formation of a separate government in south Korea will not facilitate the twin objectives laid down in paragraph 5 of the resolution, namely the attainment of the national independence of Korea and the withdrawal of the occupying troops.25
Despite these objections, elections went forward, though the suppression of leftist dissidents did not go unnoticed by the U.N. team. When U.N. officials met in south Korea to observe elections “in a free atmosphere,” protests arose from the Syrian U.N. representative who had “exhibited distrust of the America régime which he thought was holding large numbers of political prisoners.”26
By May of 1948, a Constituent Assembly had been elected with Syngman Rhee’s party dominating. Truthfully, the United States had little interest in supporting the Rhee party, preferring moderates obtain political power, such as Kim Kiusic and Ahn Chae-hong, but these elements refused to participate in the Constituent Assembly, resulting in American support turning towards the Right over that of the Left. In the words of Kim Kiusic: “Any Korean who talks about a separate south Korean government will be condemned by history. . . . Once such a thing occurs, it will be permanent; and then you are responsible for perpetuating the division of Korea.”27
By August 15, south Korea committed itself to the U.N.’s policy of division and proclaimed the Republic of Korea south of the thirty eighth parallel. Rhee assumed the presidency due to his election in the largely boycotted May Assembly. The north responded shortly after with the creation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Both bodies asserted sole legitimacy over the entirety of the peninsula.
American and Korean politics consistently maintained anti-communist policies following the election. When residents of the southern island of Cheju protested the disuniting effects of exclusive southern elections, both American and Korean forces branded the demonstrators communistic and made moves to suppress the uprising unfolding on the island. According to a Newsweek interview with one island resident:
At Dongkwang, on Cheju's southern highlands, soldiers came to kill and burn because locals had reportedly fed area rebels. Kim Yeo Soo, now 71, fled with his family to a secret cave in the mountain. He recently returned to the hideout for only the third time since the war, searching for 15 minutes before locating its tiny entrance amid scattered boulders and scrub. "We lived here for two months," he says, pointing into a hidden fissure. "When the police found us we had to move." As they fled, his father was shot; he died two weeks later. Soldiers killed his brother in mid-1949. "If I had been caught, I would have been killed, too," Kim says. Below the cave, a small marble tablet under a banyan tree honors massacre victims as "pure and honest people" and blames government forces for reducing the hamlet to "a place of killing, tragedy and sad ghosts."28
Despite these reports of scorched earth tactics and genocidal murders, retired U.S. Army Colonel Jimmie Leach recalled a different interpretation of events on Cheju-do. Acting as military liaison between the American Army and Korean military forces on the island, Leach defended the military actions on the southern island as being a “legitimate military action against a rebellion that threatened a legitimate government.”29 American complicity in the massacre can perhaps best be understood in light of the fact that by 1948, 20 percent of the island’s residents were members of the leftist South Korean Labor Party (SLKP), while an estimated 80 percent were sympathizers or active supporters.30 It was easy to label the uprising as communist inspired, and thus in conflict with America’s interest in the region.
In many ways, the initiation of aggression by North Korea on the South in late June of 1950 can be seen as a continuation of civil strife between polarized political bodies present in both zones on the peninsula. In the words of Bruce Cumings, the conflict in Korea was “civil and revolutionary in character, beginning just after 1945 and proceeding through a dialectic of revolution and reaction. This opening of conventional battles in June 1950 only continued this war by other means.”31
At the start of conventional warfare, the military advancement by the North looked promising. By September much of the country was in the hands of the North Korean army, with the ROK authority maintaining only a small land mass around the southern city of Pusan. Prior to the outbreak of war, the DPRK had other reasons to be optimistic. American troops on the peninsula had all but left, leaving many politicians to reassess the United States’ role in East Asia. This led American Secretary of State Dean Acheson to make the famous statement in January of 1950 on America’s defense perimeter which notably left Korea, as well as Taiwan, out of the umbrella of military security. From America’s perspective, Korea had become a minor actor in the Cold War’s Pacific Theatre, and this fact would be reiterated again by Tom Connally of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as late as May of 1950, saying specifically that Korea was not a part of the American defense perimeter.32
By June 27, this was to change. President Truman announced that he had “ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean government troops cover and support.”33 This military action was ordered the previous day following an evening meeting at the Blair House, though discussion for the order began as early as the evening of June 25.34 Later, the United States sent ground forces through official U.N. channels under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, as did numerous other countries, though the United States always dominated the military arena. By late September, General MacArthur had retaken the entire southern peninsula, and insisted on moving north to squash communism in the DPRK, thus ensuring the admittance of Cold War politics onto the battlefield of the U.N. police action. China, fearing that American hegemony in Korea could lead to an invasion of Chinese soil, reacted by sending thousands of troops to thwart the U.N.’s retaliatory anti-communist aggression.35
By 1951, Korean and Chinese communists had retaken North Korea and marched south, retaking Seoul. On March 20, MacArthur was told not to allow further U.N. forces to cross the thirty eighth parallel following the recapture of Seoul earlier in the month. Despite this, four days later MacArthur sent a notice to the commander of enemy forces requesting a meeting for the discussion of the peaceful implementation of the original U.N. objectives in Korea, such as national elections. When the north declined the meeting, MacArthur sent patrols across the thirty-eighth parallel. U.N. forces continued to cross into north zones under MacArthur’s command without approval from President Truman.36
Movements of this kind by U.N. forces under the command of MacArthur would later give some credence to North Korean claims that the United Nations acted as an aggressor in the Korean War. In a 1959 statement before the U.N. General Assembly reviewing the history of the Korean unification process made by Walter Robertson, United States delegate to the U.N., this point was made especially clear, that the United States’ insistence on using the U.N. as a neutral body to oversee elections was consistently rejected by North Korea. In the words of North Korea, “the United Nations [had] been reduced to a belligerent in the Korean War and lost all competence and moral authority to deal fairly with the Korean question.”37
The fact that there was some truth to American domination of the U.N. also left many North Koreans questioning how such an American-biased body could act neutrally in dealing with national elections. At the time, the United States maintained a position of non-admittance to the newly created Chinese Communist government in the U.N.
By July of 1953, a cease-fire had successfully been reached, ending the U.N. police action in Korea practically, though not in theory. Communist aggression forced America to reassess its East Asian policy, and the role that Korea was to take in the Cold War world. Acheson’s comments on America’s defense perimeter were seriously shifted. In the words of General Omar Bradley of the Joint Chiefs of Staff following the 1950 invasion, “we must draw the line somewhere.”38 By 1953, the United States and South Korea drafted the Mutual Defense Treaty, stating in Article 3 that “[e]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties . . . would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”39 By 1954, the treaty went into effect and officially tied American security interests to those of South Korea.
The United States and the Republic of Korea successfully thwarted communist attempts to militarily unify the peninsula (though the same could be said of the North as well). The government created with American assistance remained in power, but by 1954, further deterrence of northern aggression dominated American policy in the south. This deterrence would come to dwarf American advocacy of political liberalization.
In 1947, original Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports of Syngman Rhee stated that he was a demagogue “bent on autocratic rule.”40 By 1951, the United States government was willing to give Rhee’s government over US$100 million. This amount increased to US$236 million by 1955, a year following Rhee’s constitutional amendment exempting him from term limits. 41
In 1956, Cho Pong-am, leader of the Progressive party, advocating a planned economy and peaceful unification, received 2 million votes, establishing Cho as an important minority candidate. By 1959, American aid to the ROK continued to surpass US$200 million per year, while Rhee broke up the Progressive party and had Cho executed for plotting with North Korean agents, most likely a false accusation.42 Throughout the repressive Rhee regime the United States continued to supply the ROK with billions of dollars in economic aid, all for the sake of “strengthening [US] political influence and securing a military foothold in Korea.”43 From America’s Cold War perspective, security and stability were values that superseded all else.
This equation was slightly altered out of necessity when social stability relied on political liberalization. As the reality of the Korean War distanced itself from the collective conscious of Korean citizens, especially from the younger student generation, it became more difficult for the Rhee regime to continue justifying heavy-handed governance and anti-democratic policy for the sake of national security. This culminated in the elections of 1960, specifically for the vice presidency. When Rhee’s anti-democratic policies became overly flagrant, specifically in the vice presidency election, demonstrations exploded throughout South Korea, forcing Syngman Rhee to resign in April of 1960.44
Thus began a short interlude of democratic reform on the peninsula, due largely to continued pressure by student groups demonstrating for political reform. However, by May 1961, military officials under the leadership of Park Chung-hee staged a coup d’état, ending hopes for civilian rule, at least in the near future, as the Korean military took control of the government.
Although originally there was hesitation to accept a military regime over that of a civilian government, Park’s commitment to stability in South Korea and his promise to President Kennedy that government would be handed back to civilian rule by the summer of 1963 left Washington with enough breathing room to acquiesce. When, in 1963, Park suggested to the Kennedy administration that military rule might need to be extended by four years, protests erupted in Washington which resulted in America’s refusal to provide further economic aid requested by the military junta.45
However, the United States’ dedication to the procurement of a civilian government was generally guided by stability concerns. Following Park’s attempt to extend military rule, the State Department stated that “prolongation of military rule could constitute a threat to a stable and effective government.”46 American policy makers feared the effects of extended authoritarian rule on a population used to operating at least under the pretense of a democracy. This held true in 1963 as well as in 1961 following the coup when the CIA stated, “the junta has made full use of its powers under martial law to close newspapers, jail politicians, educators, and businessmen, and impose curfews and censorship. . . . Another student-led uprising is possible.”47 It was largely this fear that guided America’s demand for a return to civilian rule in South Korea which Park eventually acquiesced to, himself becoming president in 1963 following his retirement from the army.
While a semblance of a democracy began to appear, by the mid-1960s Cold War politics again shook the Korean peninsula. As American troops became more bogged down with fighting in Vietnam, North Korea began testing the waters of American commitment to ROK security as “Pyongyang . . . stepped up its infiltration of agents southward, and more important . . . initiated a campaign of sporadic violence against U.N. forces in the DMZ area.”48 This culminated in the Pueblo incident on January 23, 1968, when North Korea boarded an American ship in international waters off the coast of the peninsula and took the crew captive.
While the Pueblo incident does show that North Korean aggression remained a palpable threat for the ROK and United States, it also demonstrates the continued inability of the United States to address the Korean question separate from broader anti-communist Cold War policies. From the American side, the common position was simply to blame Soviet involvement. National Security Advisor Walt Rostow stated in one White House meeting: “the most symmetrical suggestion I have seen is to have South Korea pick up a Soviet ship.”49 Numerous United States senators made comments such as that “the Soviet Union and North Korea are certainly working together,” or that there was a “master hand” behind the seizure of the Pueblo.50 This diversion and misinformation prolonged the return of American troops from the North.51
Despite this incident, and others like it in 1968, such as the North’s attempted assassination of Park Chung-hee, the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency saw a surprising shift in policy by quickly putting forth the Nixon Doctrine, stating that American allies should be expected to provide the bulk of their own defense. During Nixon’s term, the United States would remove roughly 20,000 troops from the peninsula, without discussing the move with the Park government.52
The reaction in Korea was severe. First Park amended the 1963 constitution to allow himself to run for a third term as president. Following his victory in 1971 among rumors of voter fraud, Park passed the Yushin constitution, in essence making Park dictator over the Republic of Korea. With America’s new policy of requiring allies to be more responsible for their own defense came a stance of noninterference with their domestic affairs as well. A United States House of Representative report stated:
When the Yushin declaration was made, the United States had to put its policy together quickly. At that time Seoul was in considerable favor in Washington because of the economic achievements and the negotiations with the North. Therefore, the policy adopted was one of noninterference. President Nixon reiterated the policy when he told Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil in January 1973 that “unlike other Presidents, I do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of your country.”53
When, in 1974, American ambassador to Korea Philip Habib suggested that America press for moderation in response to Park’s decree of 15-year sentences for political critics, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s was to tell Habib to “get off the Korean government’s back.”54 Colonel James Young, former military attaché in Korea explained the problem quite concisely:
The U.S. government had several overriding interests in Korea, but the primary concern was security. The major threat to security was North Korea, but the State Department was also concerned that human rights conditions in the ROK under President Park would eventually result in internal problems and instability. . . . U.S. policymakers . . . believed that Park had done a good job with the economy, and a continuing strong economic picture would blunt criticism internally for his lack of democracy. Human rights was [sic] not important enough to “rock the boat” and risk instability.55
The election of Jimmy Carter as president in 1976 was perhaps the first attempt to reassess American policy towards Korea and balance military security interests with American commitment to human rights. Carter had campaigned for complete troop withdrawal, but upon being sworn in, received severe criticism for such a policy from military advisors due to troop build-up along the North Korean border.56 Despite Carter’s aspirations to balance human rights with security concerns, America’s Korean policy was never capable of escaping the shroud of Cold War security concerns. By 1979, Carter was able to save some face and assure the release of 180 political prisoners, but by late summer of 1979, Carter’s plan for troop withdrawal was dead. Ultimately, Carter’s push for human rights remained an empty demand, as he attempted to remove the primary bargaining chip for such a policy.
However, Carter had been correct for emphasizing human rights and political liberalization on the peninsula. Economic conditions could not quell internal dissent. On October 26, 1979, Kim Jae-kyu assassinated President Park amid an increase in union activity and demonstrations. Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah assumed the presidency, while Major General Chun Doo-hwan initiated a probe into the assassination.57 For a short time, the procurement of a civilian-run democracy seemed possible for South Korea once again.
Chapter 1 looks at the history of American-Korean relations to provide the Cold War context which emphasized stability. Chapter 2 looks at the events of the Kwangju Uprising. Chapter 3 offers media analysis to show that the American media mirrored the stance taken by the American government. Namely that Korea stability and security were the primary concern to the United States, while democracy and political liberalization were secondary. Chapter 4 is a brief conclusion that discusses the legacy of Kwangju on American-Korean relations.
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CHAPTER 1
South Korea is often characterized as America’s success story in East Asia. American politicos and ideologues, when discussing their relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK), are often quick to praise America’s promotion of democratic ideals. Along with the operation of stable political institutions, the Korean economy has seen growth by leaps and bounds that few would have expected following its liberation from Japan. During the 1960s, Burma’s exports dwarfed that of the ROK’s. By 1990, South Korea’s exports totaled 85 times greater than those of Burma. Thanks to early economic assistance from the United States, followed later by American investment, the ROK’s economy continues to grow. Though not at the double-digit rate seen in the 1980s, eight percent and nine percent growth of the GNP was not at all uncommon in the 1990s.1 Except for a brief hiccup in the late 1990s, the Korean economy is an overwhelming success story, with Korea’s real per capita GDP increasing five-fold between 1970 and 2001.2
The United States is never slow to praise the proliferation of capital and democracy on the southern half of the peninsula, and to affirm its dedication to the security of these ideals. On May 22, 1982, both the United States and Korea saw the centennial anniversary of diplomatic relations with one another. A resolution, passed by the Congress of the United States for the anniversary, specifically asserted American dedication “to the principles of freedom and democracy,” holding these values to be the “basis of the continued strength and friendship of the United States and Korea.”3
At the opening of the Korean War Memorial in Washington, D.C., on July 27, 1995, President Bill Clinton emphasized the importance of American involvement in the Korean conflict by highlighting American attempt to deflect an oppressive communist doctrine from undermining the ideals of capitalist democracy: “By sending a clear message that America had not defeated fascism to see communism prevail, [Americans] put the Free World on the road to victory in the Cold War.”4
Altruistic assertions of America’s commitment to democracy in East Asia are all the more absolved by America’s official history of our involvement. According to the Department of State in 1960:
At the moment of liberation the United States, as one of the occupying powers, looked forward to cooperation with its Allies and the Korean people in the creation of a new Korea—united, democratic, and free of all foreign domination. Twelve years ago, the people of the north, to whom the Communist occupying power denied the free expression of their own will, were instead forced to establish a rival regime which subsequently launched an unprovoked surprise attack on the south. At great cost of life and property, this aggression was repelled through U.N. action; and unceasing efforts have been made by the United Nations and its members since that time to realize the continuing aspirations of the Korean people for unity in a single, free, and independent nation.5
These types of historical distortions on American intentions within the peninsula are quite dubious when we examine the actual history of American-Korean relations since World War II. American dedication “to the principles of freedom and democracy” always hinged on the preservation of social stability and maintenance of its security interests. The American defined “Free World” demanded participants to acquiesce to the possibility of autocratic rule for the benefit of these security interests. Freedom from foreign domination was grounded more on America’s immersion in Cold War policy than seeing South Korea as an autonomous country, based on the principles of self-determination. As such, democracy within the Korean peninsula was to remain subjugated to foreign security interests that rested upon stability within the ROK.
Actions which undermined the creation of a democratic government free of “foreign domination” are frequent in Korean history since the Second World War. America’s war with Japan forced the allied powers to consider post-war policies with Japan’s colonial possessions. While Japan’s seizure of territories such as Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores had the simple solution of being returned to China, the Allied solution to Japanese colonialism on the Korean peninsula came to have serious consequences for the Korean people so long as foreign powers insisted on dominating Korea’s political development. This can be seen as early as 1943 at the Cairo Conference in which President Franklin Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chian Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated that “[t]he aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”6
The clause “in due course” had particular significance as it was indicative of Roosevelt’s hope for the creation of a Korean trusteeship under United States jurisdiction. By 1945 Roosevelt coaxed Stalin into participating in America’s war against Japan. At Yalta the discussion turned to a three-power trusteeship for Korea overseen by the Soviet Union, China, and the United States.7 The purpose of Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy is made clear by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden: “[Roosevelt] hoped that former colonial territories, once free of their masters, would become politically and economically dependent upon the United States, and had no fear that other powers might fill that role.”8 The death of Roosevelt in April of 1945 and the inauguration of Harry Truman led to some revisions in America’s policy in Korea. In particular, with the escalation of the Cold War, America’s chance of economically and politically influencing the country without interference from other powers was significantly reduced. Soviet interference in the region became more of a threat to American interests as was shown by the increase in hostilities between the two powers.
Thus, when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in 1945 and closed in on Manchuria and the Korean peninsula, the War Department of the United States scrambled to put together a policy to ensure an American presence in the region and created General Order no. 1, dividing the country along the thirty-eighth parallel. Arthur Grey, Jr., described the reasoning behind America’s decision to bisect the Korean peninsula and its evolution: “the [United States] War Department took note of the latest operations reports that Russian forces were already on the ground and realized that this precluded our accepting the surrender of all Japanese forces in Korea.”
Grey went on to explain America’s understanding of the Thirty-eighth Parallel:
For some time after the Japanese surrender it was officially maintained in Washington that American troops entered Korea only to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops, and indeed this was the nominal reason. During the year preceding the Communist invasion, however, military spokesmen showed a willingness to explain the occupation as the “best” that could be done under the circumstances to prevent Russia from taking all of Korea.9
In this light, the division of Korea made by the United States can be seen as one of many subsequent American policies meant to deter Soviet influence on the peninsula, and often made potentially at the expense of Korean interests.10
The Korean reaction to liberation from Japanese imperialism was quite distinct from its American counter-part and had no interest in seeing the artificial division of the country. Prior to American occupation of southern Korea, steps were already underway within Korea to establish a unified national government. When Japan’s surrender to the allied powers seemed imminent, Japan’s Governor General of Political Affairs approached Song Ch’in-wu and Lyuh Woon-hyung (Yo Un-hyung) regarding the transitioning of political power to Koreans, while ensuring the safety of Japanese citizens in Korea, as well as their property. Though Song declined to participate with Japan, Lyuh agreed and immediately called together a broad spectrum of Korean political leaders. While many nationalists declined to participate with Lyuh, including Song Ch’in-wu, believing it would be wiser to wait for the return of the Korean Provisional Government, considered to be the legitimate exiled government following the March 1st Movement of 1919, Lyuh persisted despite the lack of consensus within the Korean leadership. Lyuh, with the help of the moderate nationalist Ahn Chae-hong, and Communists Yi Kang-g’uk and Yi Yo-song, formed the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI).11 This body then reached out to local Korean communities to set up a base structure for future Korean government.
The initial reaction to the CPKI was more substantial than some would give credit. By the end of August 1945, nearly 150 committees had formed throughout the Korean peninsula, thanks in part to the freeing of numerous left-leaning political prisoners. These committees began to operate as basic units for Korean self-government.12
On September 6, 1945, immediately prior to the landing of American troops on the peninsula, the CPKI held a National Congress in Seoul and announced the formation of the Korean People’s Republic (KPR), dedicated to coalition governance of rightist, moderate, and leftist politicians, and passed a multi-point program for the political direction Korea should take since liberation had been achieved (see Appendix 1). Despite this, the left tended to dominate the initial central governing body of the KPR.13 It is noteworthy, however, that Syngman Rhee, though still living in the United States at the time of the Congress and unaware of it, was elected President despite his conservatism, while Kim Ku was appointed as a cabinet member.14
While the KPR became a body for Korean leftists to rally around, conservative forces focused their attention on the exiled Korean Provisional Government (KPG).15 On September 7, a day after the meeting of the KPR congress in Seoul, right-wing political leaders formed a committee for the creation of the Korean Democratic Party (KDP), which would officially form on September 16. The party threw its support behind the KPG initially and opposed the KPR, while those in the KPR denounced the KDP as being composed primarily of “landlords, capitalists and collaborators.”16
The following day, September 8, Lieutenant General John Hodge arrived in Korea and established himself as Commanding General of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea. His assigned mission was:
(1) Take the Japanese surrender, disarm the Japanese armed forces, enforce the terms of the surrender, and remove Japanese imperialism from Korea; (2) Maintain order, establish an effective government along democratic lines and rebuild a sound economy as a basis for Korean independence; (3) Train Koreans in handling their own affairs and prepare Korea to govern itself as a free and independent nation.17
Yet for Hodge, the maintenance of order initially superseded the first directive, which included the removal of Japanese imperialism, since he was not allowed to give recognition to either the KPR or the KPG as being legitimate ruling bodies, and was thus unable to use either governing frameworks for the sustention of peace. Instead, the American Military Command announced as early as September 9 that the Japanese colonial forces would continue to operate within Korea, keeping all personnel remaining in place, including the governor general, provincial governors, as well as the Japanese police force.18 While U.S. Occupational forces’ initial insistence on the use of Japanese authorities and police for the governing of southern Korea was short-lived, as historian Bruce Cumings notes, this brief flirtation “served as a prologue to the more prolonged attachment to the conservative elements in the Korean political spectrum. Here was a romance that lasted, eventually allowing these elements to prevail in south Korea.”19
Behind the scenes, America never denied the popularity of the Left in south Korea, yet continued to campaign against these forces because of the sympathy much of the Korean left held for initial Soviet policy in the north:
Almost all Koreans are leftists by current US standards, and not even the conservative parties can be considered defenders of traditional capitalism. The socialization of basic industries and the redistribution of land figure in the political platforms of every party in South Korea.20
Not to be out done by Korea’s left, Hodge and the American military government took steps in late 1945 through 1946 to squash groups antithetical to the occupying force’s political ideals. In November of 1945, Korean labor advocates made moves to create a unified labor council throughout the peninsula. The National Council of Korean Labor Unions met in Seoul and asserted its official approval of the KPR and its program. In response to this, and similar activities in other areas of the society, the United States’ military government passed restrictive labor laws, including the prohibition of striking, and ordered the closure of numerous newspapers.21
It was this attitude of anti-communism at the expense of democratic participation that characterized America’s relation with Korea following its liberation from Japan. In conjunction with Truman and Roosevelt’s desire to economically influence the peninsula via a period of trusteeship, American involvement in Korea in the years following the end of the Second World War are better surmised not in the promotion of democratic ideals, but ultimately in the deterrence of communist elements for the assurance of American interests in the region, both political and economic, and often times at the expense of real democratic participation by the Korean people. According to American officials: “There are an unknown number of political parties and groups in Korea, many of which have mushroomed since the Japanese surrender was announced. . . . All groups seem to have the common ideas of seizing Japanese property, ejecting the Japanese from Korea, and achieving immediate independence.”22 While the United States was able to mask its desires through anti-communist rhetoric, the reality that a large portion of Koreans following the peninsula’s liberation were in favor of the nationalization of industry owned by Japan and Japanese collaborators was undeniable.
However, American policy by this point was already wrapped in Cold War politics and competition with the Soviet Union for domination in the region. It is in this polarized political climate that the United States met with the U.S.S.R. on a Joint Commission to discuss the independence of Korea, as decided by the Moscow Agreement in late 1945. All talks ended in failure, with both the United States and the Soviet Union obstinately arguing over the direction Korea should take, ultimately at the expense of the Korean people. By 1947, the United States made the first move to bypass the Moscow Agreement and the commitment to bilateral talks regarding the Korean peninsula by submitting the Korean question to the General Assembly of the United Nations. While the Soviet Union made a last ditch effort to continue bilateral talks with the United States by suggesting the joint removal of both American and Soviet troops, the United States declined to reenter the dead-locked discussions of the Joint Commission.23
The United Nations quickly acknowledged the necessity of solving the problem of Korea’s division and created a Temporary Commission on Korea to supervise national elections. The Soviet Union in turn refused to participate with the U.N. commission out of fear that United States dominance within the U.N. could lead to a solution on Korea that would be unfavorable to Russia. They blocked the Commission from entry into the Soviet-occupied northern zone. Thus, the United Nations, on February 26, 1948, adopted a new resolution, stating that “the United Nations Commission on Korea proceed with the observance of elections in all Korea, and if that is impossible, in as much of Korea as it is accessible to it.”24
Concerns from K.P.S. Menon, India’s representative on the U.N. Commission, make clear a common sentiment held by Commission representatives:
I feel that, if the Koreans are left to themselves—not merely in name but in reality—they will work out their own salvation and establish their own democratic government.
. . . [T]he formation of a separate government in south Korea will not facilitate the twin objectives laid down in paragraph 5 of the resolution, namely the attainment of the national independence of Korea and the withdrawal of the occupying troops.25
Despite these objections, elections went forward, though the suppression of leftist dissidents did not go unnoticed by the U.N. team. When U.N. officials met in south Korea to observe elections “in a free atmosphere,” protests arose from the Syrian U.N. representative who had “exhibited distrust of the America régime which he thought was holding large numbers of political prisoners.”26
By May of 1948, a Constituent Assembly had been elected with Syngman Rhee’s party dominating. Truthfully, the United States had little interest in supporting the Rhee party, preferring moderates obtain political power, such as Kim Kiusic and Ahn Chae-hong, but these elements refused to participate in the Constituent Assembly, resulting in American support turning towards the Right over that of the Left. In the words of Kim Kiusic: “Any Korean who talks about a separate south Korean government will be condemned by history. . . . Once such a thing occurs, it will be permanent; and then you are responsible for perpetuating the division of Korea.”27
By August 15, south Korea committed itself to the U.N.’s policy of division and proclaimed the Republic of Korea south of the thirty eighth parallel. Rhee assumed the presidency due to his election in the largely boycotted May Assembly. The north responded shortly after with the creation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Both bodies asserted sole legitimacy over the entirety of the peninsula.
American and Korean politics consistently maintained anti-communist policies following the election. When residents of the southern island of Cheju protested the disuniting effects of exclusive southern elections, both American and Korean forces branded the demonstrators communistic and made moves to suppress the uprising unfolding on the island. According to a Newsweek interview with one island resident:
At Dongkwang, on Cheju's southern highlands, soldiers came to kill and burn because locals had reportedly fed area rebels. Kim Yeo Soo, now 71, fled with his family to a secret cave in the mountain. He recently returned to the hideout for only the third time since the war, searching for 15 minutes before locating its tiny entrance amid scattered boulders and scrub. "We lived here for two months," he says, pointing into a hidden fissure. "When the police found us we had to move." As they fled, his father was shot; he died two weeks later. Soldiers killed his brother in mid-1949. "If I had been caught, I would have been killed, too," Kim says. Below the cave, a small marble tablet under a banyan tree honors massacre victims as "pure and honest people" and blames government forces for reducing the hamlet to "a place of killing, tragedy and sad ghosts."28
Despite these reports of scorched earth tactics and genocidal murders, retired U.S. Army Colonel Jimmie Leach recalled a different interpretation of events on Cheju-do. Acting as military liaison between the American Army and Korean military forces on the island, Leach defended the military actions on the southern island as being a “legitimate military action against a rebellion that threatened a legitimate government.”29 American complicity in the massacre can perhaps best be understood in light of the fact that by 1948, 20 percent of the island’s residents were members of the leftist South Korean Labor Party (SLKP), while an estimated 80 percent were sympathizers or active supporters.30 It was easy to label the uprising as communist inspired, and thus in conflict with America’s interest in the region.
In many ways, the initiation of aggression by North Korea on the South in late June of 1950 can be seen as a continuation of civil strife between polarized political bodies present in both zones on the peninsula. In the words of Bruce Cumings, the conflict in Korea was “civil and revolutionary in character, beginning just after 1945 and proceeding through a dialectic of revolution and reaction. This opening of conventional battles in June 1950 only continued this war by other means.”31
At the start of conventional warfare, the military advancement by the North looked promising. By September much of the country was in the hands of the North Korean army, with the ROK authority maintaining only a small land mass around the southern city of Pusan. Prior to the outbreak of war, the DPRK had other reasons to be optimistic. American troops on the peninsula had all but left, leaving many politicians to reassess the United States’ role in East Asia. This led American Secretary of State Dean Acheson to make the famous statement in January of 1950 on America’s defense perimeter which notably left Korea, as well as Taiwan, out of the umbrella of military security. From America’s perspective, Korea had become a minor actor in the Cold War’s Pacific Theatre, and this fact would be reiterated again by Tom Connally of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as late as May of 1950, saying specifically that Korea was not a part of the American defense perimeter.32
By June 27, this was to change. President Truman announced that he had “ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean government troops cover and support.”33 This military action was ordered the previous day following an evening meeting at the Blair House, though discussion for the order began as early as the evening of June 25.34 Later, the United States sent ground forces through official U.N. channels under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, as did numerous other countries, though the United States always dominated the military arena. By late September, General MacArthur had retaken the entire southern peninsula, and insisted on moving north to squash communism in the DPRK, thus ensuring the admittance of Cold War politics onto the battlefield of the U.N. police action. China, fearing that American hegemony in Korea could lead to an invasion of Chinese soil, reacted by sending thousands of troops to thwart the U.N.’s retaliatory anti-communist aggression.35
By 1951, Korean and Chinese communists had retaken North Korea and marched south, retaking Seoul. On March 20, MacArthur was told not to allow further U.N. forces to cross the thirty eighth parallel following the recapture of Seoul earlier in the month. Despite this, four days later MacArthur sent a notice to the commander of enemy forces requesting a meeting for the discussion of the peaceful implementation of the original U.N. objectives in Korea, such as national elections. When the north declined the meeting, MacArthur sent patrols across the thirty-eighth parallel. U.N. forces continued to cross into north zones under MacArthur’s command without approval from President Truman.36
Movements of this kind by U.N. forces under the command of MacArthur would later give some credence to North Korean claims that the United Nations acted as an aggressor in the Korean War. In a 1959 statement before the U.N. General Assembly reviewing the history of the Korean unification process made by Walter Robertson, United States delegate to the U.N., this point was made especially clear, that the United States’ insistence on using the U.N. as a neutral body to oversee elections was consistently rejected by North Korea. In the words of North Korea, “the United Nations [had] been reduced to a belligerent in the Korean War and lost all competence and moral authority to deal fairly with the Korean question.”37
The fact that there was some truth to American domination of the U.N. also left many North Koreans questioning how such an American-biased body could act neutrally in dealing with national elections. At the time, the United States maintained a position of non-admittance to the newly created Chinese Communist government in the U.N.
By July of 1953, a cease-fire had successfully been reached, ending the U.N. police action in Korea practically, though not in theory. Communist aggression forced America to reassess its East Asian policy, and the role that Korea was to take in the Cold War world. Acheson’s comments on America’s defense perimeter were seriously shifted. In the words of General Omar Bradley of the Joint Chiefs of Staff following the 1950 invasion, “we must draw the line somewhere.”38 By 1953, the United States and South Korea drafted the Mutual Defense Treaty, stating in Article 3 that “[e]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties . . . would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”39 By 1954, the treaty went into effect and officially tied American security interests to those of South Korea.
The United States and the Republic of Korea successfully thwarted communist attempts to militarily unify the peninsula (though the same could be said of the North as well). The government created with American assistance remained in power, but by 1954, further deterrence of northern aggression dominated American policy in the south. This deterrence would come to dwarf American advocacy of political liberalization.
In 1947, original Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports of Syngman Rhee stated that he was a demagogue “bent on autocratic rule.”40 By 1951, the United States government was willing to give Rhee’s government over US$100 million. This amount increased to US$236 million by 1955, a year following Rhee’s constitutional amendment exempting him from term limits. 41
In 1956, Cho Pong-am, leader of the Progressive party, advocating a planned economy and peaceful unification, received 2 million votes, establishing Cho as an important minority candidate. By 1959, American aid to the ROK continued to surpass US$200 million per year, while Rhee broke up the Progressive party and had Cho executed for plotting with North Korean agents, most likely a false accusation.42 Throughout the repressive Rhee regime the United States continued to supply the ROK with billions of dollars in economic aid, all for the sake of “strengthening [US] political influence and securing a military foothold in Korea.”43 From America’s Cold War perspective, security and stability were values that superseded all else.
This equation was slightly altered out of necessity when social stability relied on political liberalization. As the reality of the Korean War distanced itself from the collective conscious of Korean citizens, especially from the younger student generation, it became more difficult for the Rhee regime to continue justifying heavy-handed governance and anti-democratic policy for the sake of national security. This culminated in the elections of 1960, specifically for the vice presidency. When Rhee’s anti-democratic policies became overly flagrant, specifically in the vice presidency election, demonstrations exploded throughout South Korea, forcing Syngman Rhee to resign in April of 1960.44
Thus began a short interlude of democratic reform on the peninsula, due largely to continued pressure by student groups demonstrating for political reform. However, by May 1961, military officials under the leadership of Park Chung-hee staged a coup d’état, ending hopes for civilian rule, at least in the near future, as the Korean military took control of the government.
Although originally there was hesitation to accept a military regime over that of a civilian government, Park’s commitment to stability in South Korea and his promise to President Kennedy that government would be handed back to civilian rule by the summer of 1963 left Washington with enough breathing room to acquiesce. When, in 1963, Park suggested to the Kennedy administration that military rule might need to be extended by four years, protests erupted in Washington which resulted in America’s refusal to provide further economic aid requested by the military junta.45
However, the United States’ dedication to the procurement of a civilian government was generally guided by stability concerns. Following Park’s attempt to extend military rule, the State Department stated that “prolongation of military rule could constitute a threat to a stable and effective government.”46 American policy makers feared the effects of extended authoritarian rule on a population used to operating at least under the pretense of a democracy. This held true in 1963 as well as in 1961 following the coup when the CIA stated, “the junta has made full use of its powers under martial law to close newspapers, jail politicians, educators, and businessmen, and impose curfews and censorship. . . . Another student-led uprising is possible.”47 It was largely this fear that guided America’s demand for a return to civilian rule in South Korea which Park eventually acquiesced to, himself becoming president in 1963 following his retirement from the army.
While a semblance of a democracy began to appear, by the mid-1960s Cold War politics again shook the Korean peninsula. As American troops became more bogged down with fighting in Vietnam, North Korea began testing the waters of American commitment to ROK security as “Pyongyang . . . stepped up its infiltration of agents southward, and more important . . . initiated a campaign of sporadic violence against U.N. forces in the DMZ area.”48 This culminated in the Pueblo incident on January 23, 1968, when North Korea boarded an American ship in international waters off the coast of the peninsula and took the crew captive.
While the Pueblo incident does show that North Korean aggression remained a palpable threat for the ROK and United States, it also demonstrates the continued inability of the United States to address the Korean question separate from broader anti-communist Cold War policies. From the American side, the common position was simply to blame Soviet involvement. National Security Advisor Walt Rostow stated in one White House meeting: “the most symmetrical suggestion I have seen is to have South Korea pick up a Soviet ship.”49 Numerous United States senators made comments such as that “the Soviet Union and North Korea are certainly working together,” or that there was a “master hand” behind the seizure of the Pueblo.50 This diversion and misinformation prolonged the return of American troops from the North.51
Despite this incident, and others like it in 1968, such as the North’s attempted assassination of Park Chung-hee, the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency saw a surprising shift in policy by quickly putting forth the Nixon Doctrine, stating that American allies should be expected to provide the bulk of their own defense. During Nixon’s term, the United States would remove roughly 20,000 troops from the peninsula, without discussing the move with the Park government.52
The reaction in Korea was severe. First Park amended the 1963 constitution to allow himself to run for a third term as president. Following his victory in 1971 among rumors of voter fraud, Park passed the Yushin constitution, in essence making Park dictator over the Republic of Korea. With America’s new policy of requiring allies to be more responsible for their own defense came a stance of noninterference with their domestic affairs as well. A United States House of Representative report stated:
When the Yushin declaration was made, the United States had to put its policy together quickly. At that time Seoul was in considerable favor in Washington because of the economic achievements and the negotiations with the North. Therefore, the policy adopted was one of noninterference. President Nixon reiterated the policy when he told Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil in January 1973 that “unlike other Presidents, I do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of your country.”53
When, in 1974, American ambassador to Korea Philip Habib suggested that America press for moderation in response to Park’s decree of 15-year sentences for political critics, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s was to tell Habib to “get off the Korean government’s back.”54 Colonel James Young, former military attaché in Korea explained the problem quite concisely:
The U.S. government had several overriding interests in Korea, but the primary concern was security. The major threat to security was North Korea, but the State Department was also concerned that human rights conditions in the ROK under President Park would eventually result in internal problems and instability. . . . U.S. policymakers . . . believed that Park had done a good job with the economy, and a continuing strong economic picture would blunt criticism internally for his lack of democracy. Human rights was [sic] not important enough to “rock the boat” and risk instability.55
The election of Jimmy Carter as president in 1976 was perhaps the first attempt to reassess American policy towards Korea and balance military security interests with American commitment to human rights. Carter had campaigned for complete troop withdrawal, but upon being sworn in, received severe criticism for such a policy from military advisors due to troop build-up along the North Korean border.56 Despite Carter’s aspirations to balance human rights with security concerns, America’s Korean policy was never capable of escaping the shroud of Cold War security concerns. By 1979, Carter was able to save some face and assure the release of 180 political prisoners, but by late summer of 1979, Carter’s plan for troop withdrawal was dead. Ultimately, Carter’s push for human rights remained an empty demand, as he attempted to remove the primary bargaining chip for such a policy.
However, Carter had been correct for emphasizing human rights and political liberalization on the peninsula. Economic conditions could not quell internal dissent. On October 26, 1979, Kim Jae-kyu assassinated President Park amid an increase in union activity and demonstrations. Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah assumed the presidency, while Major General Chun Doo-hwan initiated a probe into the assassination.57 For a short time, the procurement of a civilian-run democracy seemed possible for South Korea once again.