PRC-UTE
19th March 2007, 06:27
A History of Nationalism in Ireland
from THE BLANKET
http://lark.phoblacht.net/LOR180307.html
Book Review
Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland
by Richard English
London: Macmillan, 2006
Liam O Ruairc • Sovereign Nation, Jan/Feb 2007
This lengthy book written by a QUB academic sums up almost everything that
is known and thought about nationalism in Ireland; all the way from the
11th to the 21st centuries. It sets the particular episodes and figures of
'Irish freedom' within the framework of the general theories of
nationalism.
Although written by an academic, the book has the advantage of being
accessible to the general reader. The book is very useful for its outline
of the many polemics and controversies that have arisen in debates about
particular periods (for example was 1916 legitimate etc). The author's
erudition is remarkable, and his ability to thouroughly carry out such an
ambitious task is impressive.
However there are some bizarre omissions in the book: O Donovan Rossa is
not mentioned, but his wife is, The Strabane Weekly is quoted, but there
are no references to significant publications such as The Catholic
Bulletin or The Wolfe Tone Annual which had a critical impact. Burke, Marx
and Mill's positions on Ireland are discussed, but Tocqueville is omitted.
The book creates a certain confusion in that it subsumes Republicanism and
Nationalism under the category of 'Irish Nationalism'. However, both
concepts have a different lineage, Republicanism being rooted in the
people (demos) and nationalism in an ethnonational community (ethnos).
Republicanism is based on universal principles, it is internationalist
rather than nationalist; whereas nationalism is particular. Tone's
Republicanism was not even Irish but imported from revolutionary France.
It is the democratic element within Irish Republicanism that distinguishes
it from Nationalism. Self-determination and sovereignty are articulated in
the language of universal democracy.
The author is good on how Nationalism has often contaminated Republicanism
with ambivalent results, for example when it has been mixed up with
Catholicism (just think how hunger strikes were embedded within the
culture of Catholic martyrology) and restrictive definitions of culture
(as if supporting certain types of sports was intrinsically connected to
the Republican project). He is understanding but not supportive of his
subject matter; hence his frequent use of terms such as "zealotry" and
"solipsism" to characterise it.
Richard English is generally critical of the Republican and Nationalist
position on Unionism, partition and the British connection. He argues that
they have "fundamentally misread" the phenomenon of Unionism (pp.249-251,
363). By focusing on a so-called 'external' actor (the British state),
they failed to grasp that the real opposition was 'internal' (the
Unionists).
However, what Republicans argue is that the people who consider themselves
British subjects have no incentives to come to terms with the rest of the
people of Ireland so long as the British government give them
unconditional guarantees. It is not that they misjudge the strength of
unionist opposition, but that unconditional British guarantees (such as
the 'consent principle') give Unionism an artificial strength that allows
it to prevent political change which it would not be able to prevent on
its own. The British presence institutionalises internal divisions and
make them harder to solve.
As 1998 Nobel Peace Prize laureate John Hume puts it:
"The whole trust of the guarantee is that it is a sectarian guarantee,
a unilateral guarantee and an unconditional guarantee. When the state
came into being it was set up on the basis of a sectarian head count.
That having been done, the British government then said, 'We guarantee
you can stay with us as long as the majority want to.' By doing that
they trapped the unionist population into perpetual sectarianism
because what in effect they were saying is, 'In order to maintain your
power and your privilege you must behave as a sectarian bloc.' And
that is exactly how unionism has behaved...If one is to break down
sectarianism one has to remove that guarantee..." (Padraig O Malley,
The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today; Belfast: Blackstaff 1983, p.100)
The British connection is the reason why Unionists have been so
intransigent. Terms might be reached if British power is removed from
Ireland, but not until then.
English also argues that Unionist opposition made some form of partition
inevitable and that Nationalist and Republican were "notoriously feeble"
in their stance on partition (pp.315ff). There was nothing 'artificial'
about the creation of Northern Ireland. However, it was the British
government which chose the way in which Ireland was divided and imposed
this by force. It is inconceivable that face-to-face negotiations between
Republicans, Nationalists and Unionists would have produced the same
settlement, especially if the British state had been out of the equation.
That is because the book generally underestimates the extent British
responsability and interests. For example, quoting the Brooke speech,
English presupposes that the British state has no selfish interest in the
North (p.381).
However, referring to the famous Brooke speech in 1990 in which he
declared that the British state had 'no selfish strategic or economic
interest' in Ireland,
"'The Guardian' learned that Lady Thatcher only approved the
controversial phrase which the Northern Ireland Office had been trying
to use for years after the end of the cold war. It is understood she
was reluctant to use such neutral language earlier because British
nuclear submarines passed close to Ireland to patrol the Atlantic."
(Nicholas Watt, Thatcher gave approval to talks with IRA, The
Guardian, 16 October 1999)
Strategic interests were therefore not absent in British considerations
during the Troubles. Has the end of the Cold War made the British state's
strategic interests in Ireland redundant? In his book, The Geopolitics of
Anglo-Irish Relations in the Twentieth Century (London: Leicester
University Press, 1997), G.R. Sloan, Deputy Head of Strategic Studies at
the Britannia Royal Naval College in Darmouth argues that the end of the
Cold War had not diminished Ireland's strategic importance; compelling the
British state to pursue a strategic policy of 'geopolitical dualism': on
one hand ensuring that part of Ireland remains within NATO, and on the
other claim 'no slefish strategic interests' to further the peace process.
This is not of course to argue that strategic interests are the prime
factor in shaping British state policy towards Ireland; but to emphasise
that scholars often wrongly take as axiomatic that the British state has
no longer any strategic interests in Ireland.
English concludes that the story of nationalism in Ireland is far from
over. But one may ask whether the political space for it is getting
restricted rather than enlarged. de Valera's piecemeal reforms gave the 26
counties a status that eventually reconciled the vast majority of its
citizens to the state, and the Belfast Agreement adresses most of the
material grievances which sustained Provisionalism, resulting in a growing
social and political incorporation of the Catholic working class into the
six counties. This sets limits upon and narrows the basis for
Republicanism or Nationalism to develop. Partitionist institutions may
suffer from legitimacy deficit, but whether it is significant enough to
cause organic crises in the near future is another matter.
from THE BLANKET
http://lark.phoblacht.net/LOR180307.html
Book Review
Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland
by Richard English
London: Macmillan, 2006
Liam O Ruairc • Sovereign Nation, Jan/Feb 2007
This lengthy book written by a QUB academic sums up almost everything that
is known and thought about nationalism in Ireland; all the way from the
11th to the 21st centuries. It sets the particular episodes and figures of
'Irish freedom' within the framework of the general theories of
nationalism.
Although written by an academic, the book has the advantage of being
accessible to the general reader. The book is very useful for its outline
of the many polemics and controversies that have arisen in debates about
particular periods (for example was 1916 legitimate etc). The author's
erudition is remarkable, and his ability to thouroughly carry out such an
ambitious task is impressive.
However there are some bizarre omissions in the book: O Donovan Rossa is
not mentioned, but his wife is, The Strabane Weekly is quoted, but there
are no references to significant publications such as The Catholic
Bulletin or The Wolfe Tone Annual which had a critical impact. Burke, Marx
and Mill's positions on Ireland are discussed, but Tocqueville is omitted.
The book creates a certain confusion in that it subsumes Republicanism and
Nationalism under the category of 'Irish Nationalism'. However, both
concepts have a different lineage, Republicanism being rooted in the
people (demos) and nationalism in an ethnonational community (ethnos).
Republicanism is based on universal principles, it is internationalist
rather than nationalist; whereas nationalism is particular. Tone's
Republicanism was not even Irish but imported from revolutionary France.
It is the democratic element within Irish Republicanism that distinguishes
it from Nationalism. Self-determination and sovereignty are articulated in
the language of universal democracy.
The author is good on how Nationalism has often contaminated Republicanism
with ambivalent results, for example when it has been mixed up with
Catholicism (just think how hunger strikes were embedded within the
culture of Catholic martyrology) and restrictive definitions of culture
(as if supporting certain types of sports was intrinsically connected to
the Republican project). He is understanding but not supportive of his
subject matter; hence his frequent use of terms such as "zealotry" and
"solipsism" to characterise it.
Richard English is generally critical of the Republican and Nationalist
position on Unionism, partition and the British connection. He argues that
they have "fundamentally misread" the phenomenon of Unionism (pp.249-251,
363). By focusing on a so-called 'external' actor (the British state),
they failed to grasp that the real opposition was 'internal' (the
Unionists).
However, what Republicans argue is that the people who consider themselves
British subjects have no incentives to come to terms with the rest of the
people of Ireland so long as the British government give them
unconditional guarantees. It is not that they misjudge the strength of
unionist opposition, but that unconditional British guarantees (such as
the 'consent principle') give Unionism an artificial strength that allows
it to prevent political change which it would not be able to prevent on
its own. The British presence institutionalises internal divisions and
make them harder to solve.
As 1998 Nobel Peace Prize laureate John Hume puts it:
"The whole trust of the guarantee is that it is a sectarian guarantee,
a unilateral guarantee and an unconditional guarantee. When the state
came into being it was set up on the basis of a sectarian head count.
That having been done, the British government then said, 'We guarantee
you can stay with us as long as the majority want to.' By doing that
they trapped the unionist population into perpetual sectarianism
because what in effect they were saying is, 'In order to maintain your
power and your privilege you must behave as a sectarian bloc.' And
that is exactly how unionism has behaved...If one is to break down
sectarianism one has to remove that guarantee..." (Padraig O Malley,
The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today; Belfast: Blackstaff 1983, p.100)
The British connection is the reason why Unionists have been so
intransigent. Terms might be reached if British power is removed from
Ireland, but not until then.
English also argues that Unionist opposition made some form of partition
inevitable and that Nationalist and Republican were "notoriously feeble"
in their stance on partition (pp.315ff). There was nothing 'artificial'
about the creation of Northern Ireland. However, it was the British
government which chose the way in which Ireland was divided and imposed
this by force. It is inconceivable that face-to-face negotiations between
Republicans, Nationalists and Unionists would have produced the same
settlement, especially if the British state had been out of the equation.
That is because the book generally underestimates the extent British
responsability and interests. For example, quoting the Brooke speech,
English presupposes that the British state has no selfish interest in the
North (p.381).
However, referring to the famous Brooke speech in 1990 in which he
declared that the British state had 'no selfish strategic or economic
interest' in Ireland,
"'The Guardian' learned that Lady Thatcher only approved the
controversial phrase which the Northern Ireland Office had been trying
to use for years after the end of the cold war. It is understood she
was reluctant to use such neutral language earlier because British
nuclear submarines passed close to Ireland to patrol the Atlantic."
(Nicholas Watt, Thatcher gave approval to talks with IRA, The
Guardian, 16 October 1999)
Strategic interests were therefore not absent in British considerations
during the Troubles. Has the end of the Cold War made the British state's
strategic interests in Ireland redundant? In his book, The Geopolitics of
Anglo-Irish Relations in the Twentieth Century (London: Leicester
University Press, 1997), G.R. Sloan, Deputy Head of Strategic Studies at
the Britannia Royal Naval College in Darmouth argues that the end of the
Cold War had not diminished Ireland's strategic importance; compelling the
British state to pursue a strategic policy of 'geopolitical dualism': on
one hand ensuring that part of Ireland remains within NATO, and on the
other claim 'no slefish strategic interests' to further the peace process.
This is not of course to argue that strategic interests are the prime
factor in shaping British state policy towards Ireland; but to emphasise
that scholars often wrongly take as axiomatic that the British state has
no longer any strategic interests in Ireland.
English concludes that the story of nationalism in Ireland is far from
over. But one may ask whether the political space for it is getting
restricted rather than enlarged. de Valera's piecemeal reforms gave the 26
counties a status that eventually reconciled the vast majority of its
citizens to the state, and the Belfast Agreement adresses most of the
material grievances which sustained Provisionalism, resulting in a growing
social and political incorporation of the Catholic working class into the
six counties. This sets limits upon and narrows the basis for
Republicanism or Nationalism to develop. Partitionist institutions may
suffer from legitimacy deficit, but whether it is significant enough to
cause organic crises in the near future is another matter.