Identity

[MrDoom]

I know, it's a fictional technology, but aside from the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle, it's a feasible thought-experiment and deals with what composes identity. Of course there's all sorts of idealist rubbish out and about on this subject, but I'm interested in a materialist take on it.

When Captain Kirk, on some random planet, taps his commbadge and says, "Beam me up, Scotty," his quantum structure is scanned by the Enterprise, and the information stored in an information buffer. Kirk then is dematerialized on the spot. The Enterprise transport module then feeds Kirk's pattern information into a rematerialization module, reforming Kirk from the "freezeframe" state he was in upon being scanned. To the new "copy", nothing would have happened, he would have all the "previous" Kirk's memories up to being vaporized.

So my question is, who exactly appears on the Enterprise? Kirk, or a copy of Kirk whose original has been destroyed? Should the pre-transport Kirk be concerned about being "copied and killed"? How does this tie into identity? If the Kirk that appears on Enterprise is in fact a copy of the now dead Kirk, what is it that separates his identity from the originals? It cannot simply be "what atoms and molecules compose you", as our bodies constantly take in new molecules and lose old ones.

Furthermore, how would the answer to this be reconciled with the various transporter mishaps depicted in the Trek universe (such as Kirk being split into two, a good and evil form; Riker from TNG being accidentily copied; Tuvok and Neelix from Voyager being merged, etc.)?

I know, it's all fake technology, but the technology isn't the point: the philosophical concept is. So how does a materialist approach this?

[RebelDog]

I think about things like this a lot! I am made up of particles that have to be in the right place at the right time (ie, on the earth at a time pleasant for human life or on a space ship) interacting with one-another, being held by the strong nuclear force, forming chemical bonds and they must exist in distinct points in space and time in relation to one-another in order to form me. Particles (electrons, protons) are as far as I'm aware identical, so that means it is Kirk who appears on the enterprise. Fundemental particles being identical negates the fact that they are actually not the same particles that made up Kirk originally. This means 2 Kirks could be made and they would both have an equal right to call themselves Kirk. As far as I see it there is no reason why anything in the universe could not be theoretically copied completelly and differ in no way to the original. Humans are as material as stars and planets. Kirk is a collection of particles and can thus be re-created identically.


Furthermore, how would the answer to this be reconciled with the various transporter mishaps depicted in the Trek universe (such as Kirk being split into two, a good and evil form; Riker from TNG being accidentily copied; Tuvok and Neelix from Voyager being merged, etc.)?

I don't ever watch Star Trek so I don't have a clue who all these people are or what befell them but I would say these senarios are just entertainment and the likes of 'good and evil' forms are sci-fi fantasy.

Teleportation machines that 'transport' humans is a technology that will one day be a reality. I believe single particles have already been 'transported'.

[BurnTheOliveTree]

If we are constantly gaining and losing molecules, our essence cannot be physical or material as it wouldn't be consistent. But we can't have an essence outside material, because it wouldn't be real.

I can only think that essence is a bogus concept, and that to try to find what identity of consists of is to chase a chimera.

-Alex

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

This only works if you are using a metaphysical notion of identity (which, incidentally, still defies explication).

If you use ordinary terms, they cease to be of any guide in such bizarre surroundings.

So, either the scenes depicted in science fiction are impossible (i.e., the descriptive capacity of language breaks down in such cases), or we can make no sense of any of it (which amounts to the same thing).

[Liberal Kid]

Well if he was created and was the same no difference at all. Then his identity is saved.

[gilhyle]

THere was a film a while ago (cnt remember the name) where a firm secretly developed human cloning technology. They scaned their brains regularly into the system and when killed in the course of their nefarious deeds, they just downloaded themselves into a new clone. On the basis that they just downloaded themselves into a new body, they didnt care about being killed - the only result was loss of whatever happened since the last brain back-up.

The interesting point in the film was a moment when one clone was created before his predecessor died. Thus you have two persons who see themselves as the same person. The old one (who is slowly dying) identifies with the new person as himself, the new person, by contrast, does not identify with the old person.

The basis of identity is physical continuity to death. The 'essence' of identity is the continuity of memory and agency. Neither the analysis of being or essence is without flaws and limitations, it is necessary to articulte all of these from a point of view with a particular purpose underlying one's analysis of the nature of identity to make credible sense of identity which is otherwise endlessly confusing.

The ideas human's use do not, on their own, amount to a coherent and/or complete model of reality or even of one element of reality such as identity.

[bloody_capitalist_sham]

Hugh Jackman, in the film The Prestige (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0482571/) had to deal with the same kind of scenario.

He was a magician who ended up using a Tesla invention to do tricks. An exact copy of himself was created every time he performed this trick.

The catch though, for him to be recognised as the sole magician genius, no body could find out he was making copies of himself. so, there was a trap door in to a tank of water that was sealed, so he never knew whether he would be transported safely away from the trap door and live, meaning his copy would go into the tank of water and drown, or he would.

The film implied, that he could not know, if he was or not the first "real" Hugh Jackman or a copy.

I think the Star Trek Transporter, kills the original, and an exact copy is materialised on the enterprise.

It a really interesting idea though! good topic! :)

[Whitten]

You are not the same being you were years ago. Your molecules come from what you eat, drink, breath and in other ways consume. Old molecules are discarded from the body through ways we are all familiar with. Cells on average (different cells live for different legnths of time) live only a number of days, before having to reproduce. When they reproduce they make use of new molecules.

It seems pointless to discuss whether just a transporter scenario preserves the "self" in a material sense since it is a perfect copy, while the human body changes greatly with time.

The same is true for psychological effects, the "self" changes based on experiances. I think the hypothetical question asked seems rather meaningless as I am not the same person I was a few seconds ago.

[JimFar]

Rosa wrote:


This only works if you are using a metaphysical notion of identity (which, incidentally, still defies explication).

If you use ordianry terms, they cease to be of any guide in such bizarre surroundings.

So, either the scenes depicted in science fiction are impossible (i.e., the descriptive capacity of language breaks down in such cases), or we can make no sense of any of it (which amounts to the same thing).

One question that I would have would be how do you know that the scenes depicted in science fiction are impossible? Do these scenes contravene basic physical laws? If the descriptive value of ordinary language breaks down in such situations wouldn't that be a case of so much the worse for ordinary language, assuming that it really would lose its descriptive capacity in such situations?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Jim Farr:


One question that I would have would be how do you know that the scenes depicted in science fiction are impossible? Do these scenes contravene basic physical laws? If the descriptive value of ordinary language breaks down in such situations wouldn't that be a case of so much the worse for ordinary language, assuming that it really would lose its descriptive capacity in such situations?

Well, since the words 'descriptive capacity' are ordinary words, the vernacular cannot ever be challenged on this without that challenge itself self-destructing.

You will find lengthy examples of this at my site (one was in answer to Mr D).

I prefer not to say X, Y or Z is 'impossible' (except I qualify it in the way I did).

But, whenever people bring up some science fiction, and think we can learn anything from it, I myself treat it as such (as fiction), and do not bother any further with it.

No more than I try to figure out what, say, Raskolnikov's favourite colour was.

Of course, if others want to waste time on this stuff, that is their problem.

[RNK]

Well I do remember hearing that the Transports shared some technology with the Replicators (food dispenser thingies...). It's quite possible, but unlikely (personally I refuse to believe that the Federation would use such a barbaric technology).

I believe it's simply converting a person's mass to energy, beaming that energy, and then rematerializing it somewhere else. if it was a matter of making a copy, then there wouldn't be such a thing as a "transport range" -- they'd simply store a copy of the guy in the databank and materialize him at will. Hell, they could create an army of clones that way.