How To Always Identify A Category Error

[hoopla]

Erm can Rosa help with my homework?

Ryle says that a category mistake is putting a term in the wrong "logical category". I am a bit lost as to what people mean when they say "logical". Is it referring to logical forms, which as I understand are the way terms (?) can be used in valid arguments.

Was Ryle the inventor of the concept of logical category :blink:

a "logical category" being a fundamental grouping (which all others of these groupings presuppose) of the way in which terms can be used in arguments.

Does he have evidence of such a thing as a "logical category"? I can probably find it if he does but I might not be able to if I'm not sure.

Thanks Rosa!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

It's a rather loose alluison I think to Aristotelian ideas, and a somewhat informal sort of logic he is appealing to here.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_(Aristotle)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost_in_the_machine

No evidence needed, just a facility with language to recognise when serious errors occur.

So, you do not need me to tell you this is a pig's ear:

"You can tell time by whispering in its ear."

Now, saying what the error is here is not too easy, but you can see there is one.

Many jokes trade on this facility we have in language to screw around with different areas of discourse (a phrase I prefer over 'categories', since I take my lead from Wittgenstein, not Ryle).

So, here are a few:

Boy to teacher: "Sir, you wouldn't punish me for something I hadn't done, would you?"

Teacher: "Of course not, boy!"

"Well, I haven't done my homework!"

Man rushes into doctor's surgery: "I think I have got Bright's disease, and he's got mine!"

Headline in a newspaper: 'General flies back to front'.

Another: 'Women lay priests at Vatican council'.

There are loads more.

Lewis Carroll uses this to great effect in his stories.

Ryle was claiming that metaphysicians make the same sorts of errors with their misuse of language, only they fail to see the joke they are inflicting on themselves and the rest of us (my words, not his!).

[hoopla]

I've read the wiki article. I think its sort of wrong. Imo he's not saying that universities exist on a different level to buildings, but that the concept of a university exists on a different "level" to the concept of buildings. I haven't finished the book tho.

[Hit The North]

Originally posted by [email protected] 19, 2007 10:50 pm
I've read the wiki article. I think its sort of wrong. Imo he's not saying that universities exist on a different level to buildings, but that the concept of a university exists on a different "level" to the concept of buildings. I haven't finished the book tho.
Well from the example used on the wiki, he's obviously saying that the university doesn't exist on the same level as the actual buildings, not the concept of them. It does not belong to the same category as 'actual buildings.' In other words the university exists as a totality of the buildings (but not only the buildings) and cannot be reducible to any particular one.

But then I've never read Ryle and don't intend to, so what do I know?

[hoopla]

I think iwas wrong but i'm not sure i follow your reasoning. Shrug.

[Hit The North]

Originally posted by [email protected] 19, 2007 11:29 pm
I think iwas wrong but i'm not sure i follow your reasoning. Shrug.
Well, I'm no philosopher (but I know what I think ;) ). But isn't Ryle saying that we can lump phenomena into categories: animals, minerals, for example? That it would be a mistake to place salt (for instance) into the category of animal and expect it to conform to the bounded characteristics of that category (given that it is a mineral). It's the logical basis for Rosa's critique of DM - that it anthropomorphises nature; or Marx's critique of commodity fetishim, which entails a rampant category confusion.

Or something. I'm drunk. Or the wine is.

[Hit The North]

Interestingly, Foucault in 'The Order of Things' demonstrates that there is no objective logic to the rules of categorization, but that they are historically located discourses, more the products of power relations than objective criteria.

For instance, he quotes from an old Chinese encyclopedia
In which it is written that "animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b)embalmed, © tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a fine camel hair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies." - Foucault (1966) The Order of Things

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

This is, of course, something with which Ryle would not have disagreed.

Forgive me saying this, Z, but you need to read more widely. :)

By the way, your Foucault example is based on an invention of Luis Borges, and hence is fictional.


Borges' Animals

In "The Analytical Language of John Wilkins," Borges describes 'a certain Chinese Encyclopedia,' the Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge, in which it is written that animals are divided into:

those that belong to the Emperor,
embalmed ones,
those that are trained,
suckling pigs,
mermaids,
fabulous ones,
stray dogs,
those included in the present classification,
those that tremble as if they were mad,
innumerable ones,
those drawn with a very fine camelhair brush,
others,
those that have just broken a flower vase,
those that from a long way off look like flies.

This classification has been used by many writers. It "shattered all the familiar landmarks of his thought" for Michel Foucault. Anthropologists and ethnographers, German teachers, postmodern feminists, Australian museum curators, and artists quote it. The list of people influenced by the list has the same heterogeneous character as the list itself.

http://www.multicians.org/thvv/borges-animals.html?1

It's out there now, and the incautious have accepted it as a fact.

[hoopla]

The book is incoherent. I have that on authority. Which makes me a little annoyed that I am asked to read it when the dealine for my dissertation is a few weeks away.

Anyway I was questioning the truth of the wiki article which was why I was unsure as to you reasoning from the wiki article in question.

So Rosa you are sure that a category mistake is according to Ryle placing something in the wrong divivion of "things" (not just the wrong division of linguitsic or logical items)?

I don't think that he's saying that a university exists on another level (-of what? Linguistic level??), as "the dogma of the ghost in the machine" could well say that the mind exists on a different "level".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoop:


The book is incoherent. I have that on authority. Which makes me a little annoyed that I am asked to read it when the dealine for my dissertation is a few weeks away.

Compared to Heidegger, it is a model of clarity.

And your 'authority' is wrong.


So Rosa you are sure that a category mistake is according to Ryle placing something in the wrong divivion of "things" (not just the wrong division of linguitsic or logical items)?

I do not think it was I who said this.

Please do not go back to being the Hoopla of 2006 who made up most of the stuff he attributed to me.

Or I will refrain from helping you. :angry:

[Ryle would, I think, have resisted the attempt to nominalise in this way, i.e., turn the verbs/predicates we use to express thoughts about our psychological lives and all the capacities we have, into nouns and noun phrases, or into the definite description 'the mind'. And rightly so, too.]

[ComradeRed]

Originally posted by [email protected] 19, 2007 12:18 pm
Erm can Rosa help with my homework?
Tossed to online classes.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 20, 2007 06:23 pm
Hoop:


The book is incoherent. I have that on authority. Which makes me a little annoyed that I am asked to read it when the dealine for my dissertation is a few weeks away.

Compared to Heidegger, it is a model of clarity.

And your 'authority' is wrong.


So Rosa you are sure that a category mistake is according to Ryle placing something in the wrong divivion of "things" (not just the wrong division of linguitsic or logical items)?

I do not think it was I who said this.

Please do not go back to being the Hoopla of 2006 who made up most of the stuff he attributed to me.

Or I will refrain from helping you. :angry:

[Ryle would, I think, have resisted the attempt to nominalise in this way, i.e., turn the verbs/predicates we use to express thoughts about our psychological lives and all the capacities we have, into nouns and noun phrases, or into the definite description 'the mind'. And rightly so, too.]
Apologies Rosa

Geoffery Warnock is the authority btw.

Who's turning what into a noun now?

It would be really really great to get your advice on this.

[hoopla]

I mean it is placing something in the wrong category... are you saying (please tell me if that is too close to putting words in your mouth) that a category mistake is putting some concept into the wrong linguistic category.

I men what type of category is e.g. the will put into when it is done so as a cateogory error? Is he saying that the linguistic item "will" is placed in the wrong category. Or the signified of 'will' is placed in the wrong category?

Apologies if thats wrong headed. I can post again with a better question (hopefully) if you ask.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I can't believe Warnock says this.

Where does he say it?

Nominalisation was a ploy invented in the West by the Greeks, as far as we know (Marxists call it 'hypostatisation').

So, to do this you have to invent a noun (or turn verbs into nouns) and then imagine that whatever you have thus 'named' must exist.

There then follows a 2500 year-long search for this bogus entity (!!) brought into existence by this spurious act of 'naming'.

Ryle called it the 'Fido-Fido' fallacy, in a review of Carnap's 'Meaning and Necessity', since this empty charade is still going on (and Carnap was guilty of doing just this).

In Descartes's case, he calls something a substance (in order to collect together a whole series of capacities we have, expressed in language (that has not been distorted in this way)), nominalising it as a 'res cogitans', a 'thinking substance' (a verbal noun).

[Anthony Kenny's book on Descartes is very good on this.]

These days this is done by the trick of turning things like 'NN thinks...', into 'NN has a thought...', or MM wants...' turned into 'MM has a desire...'

The language of the community (i.e., the language of communication -- these two words are not just accidentally connected), the material language of the working class, ordinary language, is thus turned into representational language, a technical language full of jargon, which is supposedly capable of representing (to a select few thinkers) the hidden world behind appearances, accessible to thought alone.

But this 'invisible' world is a fake, brought into existence by just such false moves.

However, a wild goose chase then sets off in search of these spurious 'thoughts' (now supposd to be in the head) answering to this counterfeit object created by a piece of linguistic surgery alone.

Now, Ryle is exercise by that; this category stuff is just part of it.

[Wittgenstein's 'Blue Book' outlines a very early critique of this metaphysical strategem, which critique Ryle was trying to apply to the philosophy of mind in his own way.]

[hoopla]

Interesting - I am glad that I now know what 'hypostatisation' means. But I don't understand who has hypostatisised what in this discussion.

Oxford companion to philosophy: Ryle, Gilbert.
Btw.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Hoop, thanks for that ref.

All my books are now boxed up ready for my move to a new flat, so I cannot check that reference, but I will do so when I have unpacked.

Descartes, for example, copying St Augustine (and thus Plato), hypostatised the 'mind'.

Incidentally, my previous post is a summary of a long essay on this topic, which outlines in detail the two traditions in the interpretation of language -- communication vs representation.

The latter option is favoured by practically every single traditional philosopher, and this is integral to my claim that traditional philosophy is not only bogus, but represents a ruling-class view of the world. The former by Wittgenstein.

The traditional view would have us believe that there is an ideal world, underlying the material world, accessible to thought alone, which workers cannot appreciate because of their 'semi-animal' existence

This then allows the hired 'ideologues' (priests, imans, philosophers) of the ruling class (and who spout the 'ruling ideas' Marx went on about) to argue that there is a god-ordained structure to reality (which workers cannot see, but fortunately for them, these experts can tell them all about) --, or which is 'natural', or 'necessary' -- but which they cannot alter, so must accept.

Oddly enough, the class that benefitted from all this always seemed to be able to find ideolgues who argued that their state was a reflection of that a priori cosmic order: hierarchcial in ancient and medieval society, atomistic in capitalist society (but I simplify greatly here).

So, this took on different forms in different modes of prtoduction, but the content was much the same: material reality and the material language of the working class (invented by them in collective communal life to facilitate communication (not representation)) was inadequate, or debased, and not fit to be mentioned in 'polite company'.

Now, this reappears in dialectics in a number of guises, too, from the denigration of ordinary language, to the alleged 'contradiction' between underlying 'essences' (which alone are 'real'), and superficial appearances (which thus 'fool' workers -- but fortunately those who 'understand dialectics' (just like those priests and imans) are on hand to lead them into dialectical valhalla).

It is small wonder then that the 'Marxist' states that emerge end up oppressing workers once more!

So, my defence of ordinary language is a class issue.

Now all this is central to many of the arguments I have run past you lot here.

[That Essay will probably be published in 2008. Incidentally, too: this is a completely new thesis, 100% original to me. On the basis of that, I hope to initiate the biggest change to Marxist philosophy in 150 years -- but I stand zero chance of succeeding.]

[hoopla]

Good luck!

I'm probably straining the point, but "mental processes belong in a category". And "sensations are not things". So what is the nature of the category that mental processes belong to: a category of lingusitics that say that the word cannot be conjoined in (?) confunctive propsitions; or a category of things; or a category of something else?

[quotes are not actual quotes]

Thanks

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, the phrase 'mental processes' is itself in need of much clarification before anything can be done with it.

Indeed, it looks like a nominalisation itself.

The pseudo-proposition 'Sensations are not things' is also a meaningless string of words -- what would it be, for instance, for a 'sensation' to be a 'thing'?

[hoopla]

Well iirc he does actually say that. I suppose that he might just mean that its not a mental event, but thats quite a roundabout way of restating it.

Clarifying yes. Its a term he uses. Retrospection probably.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

What is 'iirc', and who is 'he'?

[Hit The North]

Rosa:

Now, this reappears in dialectics in a number of guises, too, from the denigration of ordinary language, to the alleged 'contradiction' between underlying 'essences' (which alone are 'real'), and superficial appearances (which thus 'fool' workers -- but fortunately those who 'understand dialectics' (just like those priests and imans) are on hand to lead them into dialectical valhalla).

Except that because we are dealing with a materialist dialectic the relationship is inverted: the 'ideal world' is demonstrated to be the reflection of an underlying material reality. I'd argue that a key point Marx makes about alienated social life is that we mistake the 'ideal' for the 'real' and the 'real' for the 'ideal'. Thus the superficial appearance of social life is ideology and the underlying structure (which ideology seeks to obscure from view) is the material relations.

So you're wrong to assert a continuity between the 'ideal world' notion of the Platonic tradition and the Marxist dialectic. Neither is it true that Marxists view workers as stupefied or foolish and thus unable to break free of ruling ideas without our help. The fact that we see the material relations as the real world, means that a worker consciously involved in production (on the sharp end, as well!) and thus closer to the 'production of social life' is more capable of seeing the truth behind the veneer of bourgeois ideology than some academic schooled in the finest education known to Western civilisation.


It is small wonder then that the 'Marxist' states that emerge end up oppressing workers once more!

Cart before the horse syndrome - and a good example of an idealist interpretation of history, mistaking the ideological justification for the cause and the the concrete, material relations as the effect. Shame on you, Rosa! :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Except that because we are dealing with a materialist dialectic the relationship is inverted: the 'ideal world' is demonstrated to be the reflection of an underlying material reality. I'd argue that a key point Marx makes about alienated social life is that we mistake the 'ideal' for the 'real' and the 'real' for the 'ideal'. Thus the superficial appearance of social life is ideology and the underlying structure (which ideology seeks to obscure from view) is the material relations.

Well, this is what the brochure says, but when the assembled article is examined, we find the same style of a priori thesis mongering, imposed on nature (with little or no evidence to back it up), the same inexplicable jargon, the same distortion and denigration of the material language of the working class.

So, 'materialist dialectics' is about as accurate a descriptor as 'peace-loving imperialist'.


So you're wrong to assert a continuity between the 'ideal world' notion of the Platonic tradition and the Marxist dialectic. Neither is it true that Marxists view workers as stupefied or foolish and thus unable to break free of ruling ideas without our help. The fact that we see the material relations as the real world, means that a worker consciously involved in production (on the sharp end, as well!) and thus closer to the 'production of social life' is more capable of seeing the truth behind the veneer of bourgeois ideology than some academic schooled in the finest education known to Western civilisation.

Once more, as interesting as your opinion is, it bears as much relation to the facts as a Blairite dossier.

And, of course, I am referring to the dialectics of nature, which no worker in his or her right or left mind ever bothers with (unless talked into it by a fast talking dialectical mystic -- and even then, they can do nothing with them -- and neither can the mystics).

And, as these mystical notions have filtered into Historical Materialism, they have hepled cripple the scientific development of Marxism -- leaving us with the sorry, divided movement we see today, in long-term decline (obvious to those without their heads in the sand).


Cart before the horse syndrome - and a good example of an idealist interpretation of history, mistaking the ideological justification for the cause and the the concrete, material relations as the effect. Shame on you, Rosa!

Not so; professional revolutionaries are, by and large, petty bourgeois or declasse individuals, and the mystical 'theory' they have inherited from Hegel excuses and legitimates their own substitution for the working class.

Hence, such cadres end up oppressing workers.

A thoroughly materialist explanation this -- although I am not surprised you mystics cannot grasp it.

[hoopla]

Originally posted by Rosa [email protected] 21, 2007 08:10 am
What is 'iirc', and who is 'he'?
He is Gilbert
iirc is internet slang for "if I remeber correctly"

:P

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I'd be surprised if Ryle uses this term -- except he might be using as I do -- in order to help in its demise.

[hoopla]

Thats not the impression that I got. Of course I always care for the interpretations that I create but you may be right.

Incidently do you think he succesfully navigates around behaviourism? Or is he a behaviourist of sorts. Intersting and intellectually attractive theory that - behviourism. But I donno about its truth. Imvho.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

You may be right; it's so long since I read his book.

He always denied being a behaviourist; I believe him.

[Hit The North]

R:


Not so; professional revolutionaries are, by and large, petty bourgeois or declasse individuals, and the mystical 'theory' they have inherited from Hegel excuses and legitimates their own substitution for the working class.

Yes, it legitimates, but it doesn't explain how or why such substitution becomes either necessary or possible. Only an examination of the material circumstances of the Soviet Union can explain why a Stalinist bureaucratic domination arises.


Once more, as interesting as your opinion is, it bears as much relation to the facts as a Blairite dossier.

Well the only way you can contest the accuracy of my position when I write:


Neither is it true that Marxists view workers as stupefied or foolish and thus unable to break free of ruling ideas without our help. The fact that we see the material relations as the real world, means that a worker consciously involved in production (on the sharp end, as well!) and thus closer to the 'production of social life' is more capable of seeing the truth behind the veneer of bourgeois ideology than some academic schooled in the finest education known to Western civilisation.

Is either by resorting to an idealist version of this or through disingenuous intent.


And, of course, I am referring to the dialectics of nature, which no worker in his or her right or left mind ever bothers with (unless talked into it by a fast talking dialectical mystic -- and even then, they can do nothing with them -- and neither can the mystics).

Yes, but I'm referring to your tendency to give undue stress to the ideas in people's heads over and above the material relations to explain complex social facts (such as Stalinism or the failure of Western Marxism). I understand why you do this: you are a philosopher, comrade.

The whole thrust of your campaign against dialectics is based on an assumption that if only we have the right theory then we can change the world. Unfortunately, as any materialist will tell you (even the dialectical sort), changing the world is not a matter of theory.

Perhaps it's your unwillingness to look at life dialectically, which explains why you always fail to understand the relationship between theory and practice in both history and revolutionary praxis.

What do you reckon?

[JimFar]

Rosa wrote (c0ncerning Gilbert Ryle):


You may be right; it's so long since I read his book.

He always denied being a behaviourist; I believe him.

He may very well have denied being a behaviorist, but his approach of understanding mentalist language in terms of descriptions of behavior or predispositions to behavior is certainly behaviorist, in the broader sense of the term. While Ryle's philosophical behaviorism should not be confused with the behaviorism of psychologists like John B. Watson or B.F. Skinner, it is interesting to note that Skinner professed a great admiration for Ryle (and also BTW for Wittgenstein too).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Yes, it legitimates, but it doesn't explain how or why such substitution becomes either necessary or possible. Only an examination of the material circumstances of the Soviet Union can explain why a Stalinist bureaucratic domination arises.

I do not deny that, but even Stalinists have to act on their ideas and beliefs, and if those are dominated by a mystical theory that legitimates substitutionism (which it does), then my explanation is a materialist one, and one which is able to show how damaging DM has been to our movement.

An earlier post of mine, on another thread, went into this in more detail.

I can only refer you back to that -- in case you did not read it (it was in fact in reply to you).


Is either by resorting to an idealist version of this or through disingenuous intent.

Not so once more. I can only refer you to my comments above.


Yes, but I'm referring to your tendency to give undue stress to the ideas in people's heads over and above the material relations to explain complex social facts (such as Stalinism or the failure of Western Marxism). I understand why you do this: you are a philosopher, comrade.

Once more, we are dealing with human beings (not robots), who do, I think, have ideas in their heads, and who do actually act on them (even if they come up with other (sometimes ideological) reasons as a cover).

This is even true of you.

So, if you see a bus coming, and I report that you jumped out of the way because you believed you would be killed, I suspect that not even you would say I was being an idealist -- even if at the time that you took such evasive action you said you were practicing your goal-keeping dives.

Similarly, but on a more complex plane, if I say that the Stalinists justified their drive to undermine democracy in the Bolshevik party by an appeal to dialectics (which they did), but I also say that they did this to cover the fact that they were representing their own class interests (but noted that they actually said that this contradictory step was proof of the dialectical state of the class war, and thus was consistent with Marxism -- which they did), and this was a handy theory that allowed them to legitimate these moves, I trust you would not call me an idealist.

Or, if I said that the US ruling class backed the invasion of Iraq for, among other things, their belief that it contained the second most valuable reserves of oil on earth and they wanted to control it, but they came out with other excuses to legitimate the invasion, you would not, I trust call me an idealist.

So why here?


The whole thrust of your campaign against dialectics is based on an assumption that if only we have the right theory then we can change the world. Unfortunately, as any materialist will tell you (even the dialectical sort), changing the world is not a matter of theory.

Where do I even imply this?

But, turn this around; if Dialectical Marxists have a loopy theory that not a single one of you mystics can explain (which you have and you can't), which is provably loopy (which it is), and which is based largely on a crass logical error Hegel made (which it is), then that cannot but have had a deleterious affect on our 'praxis', (which it has).


Perhaps it's your unwillingness to look at life dialectically, which explains why you always fail to understand the relationship between theory and practice in both history and revolutionary praxis.

Perhaps it is your fondness for this confused theory that makes you see the opposite of what I say, instead of what I actually do say?

You know, that theory that prevents you seeing the unmitigated failure of our movement, and that will not allow you to even consider the remote possibility that it might just have had a small part to play in all this.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for those comments Jim. I disagree with them, but cannot be bothered right now to argue this point, not being a Rylean, and being caught up in a house move this week!!

I might return to this in a week or so.